THE FEDERAL POLYTECHNIC IDAH & ANOR v. ENGINEER KALU GEORGE EGBEKE (2019)

THE FEDERAL POLYTECHNIC IDAH & ANOR v. ENGINEER KALU GEORGE EGBEKE

(2019)LCN/13585(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Friday, the 28th day of June, 2019

CA/A/655/2013

JUSTICES

ABUBAKAR DATTI YAHAYA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

TINUADE AKOMOLAFE-WILSON Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

1. THE FEDERAL POLYTECHNIC IDAH

2. THE COUNCIL, FEDERAL POLYTECHNIC IDAH – Appellant(s)

AND

ENGINEER KALU GEORGE EGBEKE – Respondent(s)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT AN EVIDENCE NOT DENIED IS DEEMED ADMITTED

It is settled law that evidence, whether given orally or in an affidavit in Court, if not denied is deemed admitted, and the Court is bound to act on it, if it is credible, as proof of the facts narrated therein. The Supreme Court in Adesina & Anor v. Commissioner, Ifon-Ilobu Boundary Commission, Osogbo & Anor (1996) LPELR 148(SC), held thusly- If a party deposes to certain facts in an affidavit, his adversary, who wishes to dispute the facts so stated has a duty to swear to an affidavit to the contrary, otherwise the facts deposed to maybe regarded as duly established. See also A-G Plateau State V. A-G Nassarawa State (2005) 4 SC 55. PER AGIM, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUE OF NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES IN A CASE BEFORE A COURT CAN AFFECT ITS JURISDICTION

The law is settled by a long line of judicial decisions that non joinder of parties in a case before a Court cannot affect the jurisdiction of that Court to entertain and determine the case provided there is at least one competent plaintiff and defendant in the case. See Bello v. INEC & Anor (2010) LPELR 767 (SC) in which the Supreme Court held that- The position of law is well settled that no cause or matter shall be defeated by reason of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties and the Court may in every cause or matter deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interest of the parties actually before it. See also Green V Green (1987) LPELR 1338 (SC), Sapo & Anor V Sunmonu (2010) LPELR 3015 (8), Okoye v. NCFC Ltd (1991) 7 SC (Pt 111) 33. PER AGIM, J.C.A.

EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal No. CA/A/655/2013 was commenced on 5-5-2013 when the appellant herein filed a notice of appeal against the judgment of the National Industrial Court delivered on 14-2-2013 in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/219/2012 by O.A. Shogbola J. The notice of appeal contains seven grounds of appeal.

Both sides filed their respective briefs as follows- appellants brief, respondents brief and appellants reply brief.

The appellants brief raised the following issues for determination;

1. Whether given the overall facts of the case and the state of our law, it can justifiably be held that the Public Service Rules, 2008 was/is the applicable law for the determination of the validity or otherwise of the suspension of the respondent by the appellants.

2. Whether given the overall facts and circumstances of the case and the state of our law, it is justifiable to hold that the respondent who was engaged on a salary of CONTISS 15 STEP 1 was/is equal to an Officer on GL 14 and above within the meaning and contemplation of the Public Service Rules, 2008.

3.Whether it is justifiable to allow the interpretation of the provisions of Article 030406 of the Public Service Rules, 2008 t translate to the invalidation of the powers of the Rector of the 1st Appellant, as set out in S.17(2) of the Federal Polytechnics Act (Cap. F.17, Laws of the Federation, 2004).

4. Whether the nullification of the suspension of the respondent is justifiable and sustainable, given the earlier conclusion of the Court below that the Public Service Rules, 2008 is not the applicable Law governing the employment of the respondent by the appellants.

5. Whether the non-joinder of necessary parties did not rob the Court below of the jurisdiction to entertain the substantive suit.

6. Whether the nullification of the suspension of the respondent on the strength of the Public Service Rules, 2008, which is bereft of valid legal existence, is justifiable and sustainable.

given the non-joinder of the Rector of the 1st appellant to the substantive suit, translate to the deprivation of the Rectors constitutional right to fair hearing.

The respondents brief raised the following issues for determination-

1. Whether the Appellant can discipline the Respondent in any manner except in accordance with the Federal Polytechnics Act CAP F17 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 and the Federal Polytechnic Staff Manual which governs the Respondents employment. (Distilled from the Respondents Notice of Contention).

2. Whether the trial Court was not right in its decision that the suspension of the Respondent by the Appellants was null and void as same was done in violation of the Public Service Rules 2008 (Distilled from Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6)

3. Whether the trial Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit on grounds of non-joinder of necessary parties (Distilled from Grounds 5 and 7).

I will determine this appeal on the basis of the issues raised for determination in the appellants brief.

I will determine issues 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 together.

The part of the judgment of the trial Court complained against under these issues reads thusly-

2. Whether the defendants are entitled to discipline the claimant for any act of misconduct in any manner other than as provided by the Federal Polytechnic Act, CAP F17 LFN 2004 and the Polytechnic Staff Manual.

The Claimant was employed by the defendants as a Director of Works and Services vide Exhibit A which is the letter of appointment dated 11th February, 2010 signed by B.I.F. Unwuchola the Deputy Registrar (P) for the Registrar on Salary CONTISS 15 Step 1. The letter of appointment Exhibit A listed in paragraphs 2(f) & 4 documents that will govern the claimants contract of service with the respondents to be that the claimant:-

F. Will be subject in all respects, to all conditions of service as stipulated in Federal Civil Service Rules or any other regulation approved by the Federal Polytechnic, Idah.

4. Other conditions of service will be as in the other arms of the Public Service or as may be stipulated by Council from time to time.

The Contract of service is the bedrock or foundation upon which the employee must base his case

where the contract of employment has been reduced into writing. The Court as well as parties are bound by these terms and the Court has no duty to look outside the terms stipulated and agreed therein by the parties to the contract in determining the respective rights and obligations of the parties in case of dispute on the contract.

The 1st defendant (The Federal Polytechnic Idah) is an Institution established by the Federal Polytechnic Act CAP 17 LEF 2004. The 2nd defendant is established by the same Act as the governing body of the 1st defendant that manages its affairs.

In the course of his employment there was an allegation against the claimant for serious misconduct and he was suspended on the 18th July, 2012 in line with Chapter 3 Article 030406 of the revised Public Service Rules (2008) Edition. The suspension was without pay Exhibit K.

The claimant main contention in this issue is that the Public Service Rules under which the defendant acted and his suspension was based is not applicable to him. To the claimant his employment is governed only by the Federal Polytechnics Act and the Federal Polytechnics Staff Manual. In other words, the

claimant is saying that his suspension is not in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract of service.

The Respondent on the other had argued that the claimants appointment is not governed only by the Federal Polytechnic Act, 2004 and Staff Manual but his appointment is also regulated by the Public Service Rules. The above suffices that the claimant appointment or employment enjoyed statutory flavour. It is trite law that employment with statutory flavour must be handled in the way and manner prescribed by statute.

In determining the rights and obligations between the parties, Exhibit A, which is the Claimants letter of appointment must be examined. This expressly stated that the claimants appointment will be governed by all conditions of service as stipulated in the Federal Civil Service Rules.

Having submitted above, the duty of the Court is to construe and apply the terms, conditions, and provisions of the contract. See the case of NRMAFC V. JOHNSON (2007) 49 WRN 123, the court held at pages 150 151 that-

In written contract of service, the provisions are binding on the parties thereto

and it is outside the powers of the ourt to look anywhere else for the terms . When the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous, the parties cannot move out of the terms in search of more favourable terms.

It is also trite that where parties have embodied the terms of their contract in a written document, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add, vary, subtract from or contradict the terms of the written instrument. See the case of Union Bank Nigeria V. Prof. OZIGI (1994) 3 NWLR 9Pt. 333) Pg. 385 at 389 and Section 128(1) of the Evidence Act (2011).

In that event, it is clear that the employment of the claimant with the 1st defendant is governed by the Federal Polytechnics Act CAP 17 LFN of 2004, the Federal Polytechnic Staff Manual, the Federal Civil Service Rules and other regulations approved by the Federal Polytechnic, Idah. Going by the above facts it is clear that the employment of the claimant is also governed by the Public Service Rules and this issue is resolved in favour of the respondent.

The 2nd issue to consider which is whether the defendants are entitled to discipline the claimant for an act of

misconduct in any manner other than as provided by the Federal Polytechnics Act, CAP F17 LFN 2004 and the Federal Polytechnic Staff Manual.

The power of the Federal Polytechnic, Idah to discipline its members for any act of misconduct of which the claimant is obviously one is not in question. The claimant was suspended by the defendants on an allegation of serious misconduct on the 18th July, 2012 in line with chapter 3 Article 030406 of the revised Public Service Rules 2008 Edition governing his conditions of appointment.

The crux of the claimants argument on this issue is that the defendants are entitled to punish or discipline him for any act or alleged act of misconduct only in line with the provisions of Section 17 of the Federal Polytechnics Act CAP F17 LFN 2004 which provides for removal and discipline of academic, administrative, and technical staff. According to the claimant the defendants have purported to act under Chapter 3, Article 030406 of the Public Service Rules 2008 Edition in issuing Exhibit K which to the claimant is inapplicable to him.

The defendants however, have argued that the Federal Civil Service Rules are

applicable to the contract of employment between the claimant and the defendants.

The implication of applying the Civil Service Rules is that the defendants are bound to comply with the provisions of the Rules in suspending the claimant. It is evident that the Public Service Rules of the Federal Public Service governs the condition of Service, inter alia appointments, promotion and discipline of Federal Public Servants and they are made pursuant to the powers conferred on the Commission by the Constitution. Consequently, any act of disciplining of a Public Servant in the established Pensionable Cadre, which is not in accordance with the Civil Service Rules will be ultra vires, null and void.

In the instant case, the claimant was appointed by the defendants as a Director of Works and Services not under the authority or direct act of the Federal Civil Service Commission. In other words, the claimant in my view is not a Civil Servant to which the Civil Service Rules is applicable. The role of the Court is not to make contract for parties but to interpret the terms and conditions of the contract between them.

Undoubtedly, the conditions of service

as contained in other parastatals of government (including Polytechnics) may be fairly different from the Civil Service. But it is obvious that to a large extent many aspects of the Public Service Rules and Regulations have universal application and relevance thereby having a unique binding effect on Public Servants both in Ministries, Department and Agencies (MDA).

It is implied, therefore that since there has been no any other Rules and Regulations replacing the current on in use, the letters and the spirit of the current Public Service Rules subsist. Be that as it may, the Court cannot make contract for parties, but to abide and interpret the terms and conditions of the contract between them in accordance with the letters and spirit of the contract.

Section 1 Rule 030103 provides the Federal Civil service Commission has delegated full disciplinary powers to Permanent Secretary and Heads of Extra Ministerial Offices in respect of officers on salary GL 13 and below with the exception of the power of dismissal which has been delegated only from GL06 and below.

From the provision of the afore-stated section of the

Public Service Rules 2008, it is only the Federal Civil Service Commission that has the power to discipline officers on GL 14 and above. Therefore the purported suspension of the claimant by the 2nd defendant is null and void and of no effect whatsoever as the power of the Federal Civil Service Commission was usurped by the 2nd defendant. It is trite that where a statute, directs that a certain procedure be followed before a person can be deprived of his right, such a procedure must be followed. It follows therefore that the suspension of the claimant must be set aside as the 2nd defendant has no authority to suspend the claimant going by the provisions of Section 1 Rule 030103 of the Public Service Rule. It is only the Public Service Commission that has the power to do this.

In this con, the suspension of the claimant which is not in compliance with the Public Service Rules 2008 adopted by the defendant for this purpose is ultra vires, null and void. The letter of suspension dated 18th July, 2012 titled SUSPENSION is hereby set aside. The claimant is therefore entitled to all his salaries and allowances from 18th July, 2012 until the

right action is taken by the defendants.

On the claimants request for an order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from freezing, blocking, placing an embargo restricting the claimant from operating his account at Ecobank Plc, Federal Polytechnic, Idah Branch cannot be granted as there is no evidence that the defendants had disturbed him from operating his account in the Bank.

Finally, there is equally no evidence before the Court of the trauma either psychologically, physically, mentally or any embarrassment suffered by the claimant to warrant the Court in awarding N35,000,000.00 (Thirty-Five Million Naira) only as exemplary and general damages. In consequent thereof the claims of the clamant succeed in parts and the suspension letter is hereby set aside.

Learned Counsel for the appellant argued that given the fact that it was/is beyond controversy that the respondent was employed as the 1st appellants Director of Works and Services in pursuance of S13(1) and (2)(a) of the Federal Polytechnics Act, (Cap. F.17, Laws of the Federation, 2004); given the fact that the S. 17 of the Federal Polytechnics Act, (Cap F.17, Laws of the Federation, 2004)

reproduced above has made express provisions for the removal and discipline of academic, administrative and technical staff of the 1st appellant, including the respondent; given the fact that the Federal Polytechnics Act, (Cap. F.17, Laws of the Federation, 2004), which governs the appointment of the respondent as the 1st appellants Director of Works and Services is a principal legislation; given the fact that the Court below held that the claimant in my view is not a Civil Servant to which the Civil Service Rules is applicable; the nullification of the suspension of the respondent for want of compliance with the provisions of Section 1 Rule 030103 of the Public Service Rules, is unjustifiable and unsustainable; as the said decision translates to using the ?the provisions of Section 1 Rule 030103 of the Public Service Rules, which is a subsidiary legislation to defeat the provisions of section 17(2) of the Federal Polytechnics Act, (Cap. F.17, Laws of the Federation, 2004), which is the principal statute governing the appointment and conditions of service of the respondent as

the 1st appellants Director of Works and Services, that the equation of the salary of CONTISS 1 STEP 1, which is expressly stated on Exhibit A as the salary grade level pursuant to which the respondent will be remunerated as the 1st appellants Director of Works and Services; with salary Grade Level 14 and above, is not supported by any iota of evidence and ipso facto the equation aforesaid, translates to a decision predicated on speculations, that there is no evidence divulging any relationship whatsoever between the salary scale set out in the Public Service Rules, 2008 and the salary scale known as CONTISS, in pursuance of which the respondent was remunerated as the 1st appellants Director of Works and services and accordingly, we urge my lords to come to the conclusion that the decision of the Court below to the effect that the respondent was/is an Officer on Salary Grade 14 and above, who can only be disciplined by the Federal Civil Service Commission, is unjustifiable and unsustainable, that the suspension of the respondent is an issue which arose from the employment of the respondent by the appellants,

that S.17(2) of the Federal Polytechnics Acts, (Cap. F. 17, Laws of the Federation, 2004) provides that in a case of misconduct, which, in the opinion of the Rector, is prejudicial to the interests of the Polytechnic, the Rector may suspend any member of staff of the Polytechnic, that the suspension of the respondent was carried out by the Rector of the 1st appellant and the suspension was/is predicated on misconduct considered prejudicial to the interests of the 1st appellant, that the trial Courts interpretation of the reference to Chapter 3, Article 030406 of the Public Service Rules, 2008, conduced in the invalidation of the powers of the Rector of the 1st appellant as set out in S.17 of the Federal Polytechnics Acts, (Cap. F. 17, Laws of the Federation, 2004), which is the principal legislation governing the validity of the suspension of the respondent and this interpretation and the resultant invalidation of the exercise of the powers set out in S.17(2) of the Federal Polytechnics Acts, (Cap. F. 17, Laws of the Federation, 2004), is unjustifiable, that the reference made in Exhibit K, to Chapter 3, Article 030406 of the Public Service Rules, 2008

is a naked and indefensible blunder because the said reference is a flagrant violation of S.17(4) of the Federal Polytechnics Acts, (Cap. F. 17, Laws of the Federation, 2004), that the Court below ought to have held that the reference made in Exhibit K by the Rector of the 1st appellant to Chapter 3, Article 030406 of the Public Service Rules, is ultra vires, null and void and not to predicate its own decision to the effect that the Public Service Rules, 2008 is the applicable law in respect of the removal and discipline of the respondent; on the naked and indefensible blunder of the 1st appellants Rector, that the blunder of the 1st appellants Rector in Exhibit K, which blunder is the suspension of the respondent without pay, cannot make or unmake laws and ipso facto, the Court below erred in law when, in the decision appealed against, it allowed the blunder of the 1st appellants Rector aforesaid to displace the operation of S.17 of the Federal Polytechnics Acts, (Cap. F. 17, Laws of the Federation, 2004), and replaces same with the non-existent Public Service Rules, 2008, that the Court below held that since the respondent was appointed

a Director of Works and Service, not under the authority or direct act of the Federal Civil Service Commission, the respondent was/is not a Civil Servant to which the Civil Service Rules, 2008, is applicable, that the Court below held that the suspension of the respondent by the Rector of the 1st appellant was/is a nullity for non-compliance with the Public Service Rules, 2008, that the judgment of the Court below translated to giving the parties the power to use the terms of the contract between them to exclude the operation of the applicable law and replace same with the provisions of an inapplicable subsidiary legislation, that the nullification of the suspension of respondent as the 1st appellants Director of Works and Services was/is predicated on a non-existent legislation; for the Public Service Rules, 2008, upon which the decision of the Court below is predicated on a non-existent legislation, that the Public Service Rules, 2008 was/is not made by the Federal Civil Service Commission or by any other person having the legal authority to make the Public Service Rules, 2008.

Learned Counsel for the respondent argued in reply that if the actions

of the Appellants are mirrored against the provisions of the Federal Polytechnic Act as the Respondent now invites this Honourable Court to do, this Court will indeed come to the same conclusion that the Appellants letter dated 18th July, 2012 was issued ultra vires their powers and therefore null and void, that the Respondents submission that he can only be disciplined by the Appellants in accordance with Section 17 (supra) is reinforced by the provision of the Federal Polytechnic Staff Manual which was attached to the Affidavit in support of the Originating Summons as Exhibit B and now reproduced at pages 14 177 of the Record, that the provisions of the polytechnic Staff Manual on Removal and Suspension from office at Chapters 8.4 8.9 are in pari-materia with the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. (See pages 33 34 of the Record), that in exercise of its disciplinary powers over the Respondent, the Appellants issued the Respondent with Exhibit K suspending the Respondent for an indefinite period, without pay and went on to restrain the Respondents movement, that in resolving this issue, we respectfully invite

your Lordships to examine the contents of Exhibit K against the provisions of the Act and Exhibit B, that the examination will reveal that the Appellants do not have the powers to suspend the Respondent indefinitely or without pay or restrain his movement as was done in Exhibit K, that by the provisions of Section 17 (4) (supra), the powers of the Appellants to suspend the Respondent are made subject to the payment of half salary for the period of the suspension, that the same provision demands that the 2nd Appellant shall within the period of three months from the date of suspension consider the case against the respondent with a view to taking further actions pursuant to Section 17 (4) (a), (b) or (c) (supra), that the purport and intendment of Section 17 (4) (supra) is that the Respondent can only be suspended by the Appellants for a period not exceeding three months pending the decision of the 2nd Appellant on the matter, that in flagrant disregard of this provision, Exhibit K not only suspended the Respondent indefinitely but also failed to comply with the requirement that such suspensions shall be brought to the notice of the 2nd Appellant for further

actions which shall be within a three month period, that another violation of the provision of Section 17 of the Act by Exhibit K can be found in the letter which states that Furthermore you are advised not to travel out of Idah without the express permission of the Registrar, that the Appellants by the above advise in Exhibit K acted outside the provision of Section 17 of the Act and the Federal Polytechnic Staff Manual and indeed violated the Respondents right to freedom of movement as enshrined in Section 41 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), that the Appellants letter of suspension, Exhibit K cannot be said to be authorized expressly or impliedly by Section 17 (supra) and in the circumstance where it cannot be predicated on the provisions of the Act expressly or impliedly, it is ultra vires the powers of the Appellants and therefore null and void.

Let me now determine the merits of the above arguments of all sides.

The letter appointing the Respondent as Director of Works and Services of the 1st appellant is attached to the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons as Exhibit A. The letter

states in its first paragraph that the appointment was made by the 2nd appellant after approving the recommendation of the Senior Staff Appointment and Promotions Committee of the 1st appellant. The letter also states that the respondent was appointed on a salary of CONTISS 15 Step 1.

Paragraph 2(f) of the letter states that your appointment would be subject to the following conditions -(f) that you will be subject, in all respects, to all conditions of service as stipulated in the Federal Civil Service Rules or any other regulations approved by the Federal Polytechnic Idah.

Paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 therein also state thusly-

3. The Polytechnic is autonomous with its own Governing Council.

4. Other conditions of service will be as in the other arms of the Public Service or as may be stipulated by Council from time to time.

6. The appropriate entry step on the grade level will be determined on presentation of your last pay slip.

Paragraph 5 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons depose that upon my employment, the Defendants issued to me a document titled THE FEDERAL POLYTECHNIC STAFF

MANUAL. A copy of the document is attached hereto and marked EXHIBIT B.

The counter affidavit of the appellants did not deny this averment. The said deposition therefore was admitted by them. It is settled law that evidence, whether given orally or in an affidavit in Court, if not denied is deemed admitted, and the Court is bound to act on it, if it is credible, as proof of the facts narrated therein. The Supreme Court in Adesina & Anor v. Commissioner, Ifon-Ilobu Boundary Commission, Osogbo & Anor (1996) LPELR 148(SC), held thusly- If a party deposes to certain facts in an affidavit, his adversary, who wishes to dispute the facts so stated has a duty to swear to an affidavit to the contrary, otherwise the facts deposed to maybe regarded as duly established. See also A-G Plateau State V. A-G Nassarawa State (2005) 4 SC 55.

Paragraphs 10 to 17 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons depose thusly-

10. That I resumed duties as the 1st Defendants Director of Works and Services on April 6, 2010.

11. That I was issued a query on May 10, 2012 on the ground that I had received salaries

from my former employers Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) for the months of April and May 2012 while in the employment of the 1st Defendant. A copy of the Query is attached and marked EXHIBIT C.

12.That I promptly replied the Query on May 11, 2012 explaining that I had no complicity in the payment of salary to me by my former employers Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN). A copy of my response titled RE: REPLY TO QUERY is attached and marked EXHIBIT D.

13. That after my response to the query on May 11, 2012, the Defendants wrote me further queries/memoranda on the matter which I responded to in the following order;

i. Defendants Letter dated May 25, 2012 and titled RE: REPLY TO QUERY. Copy attached and marked EXHIBIT E.

ii. My reply dated May 31, 2012 and titled RESPONSE TO MEMO REF: FPI/SS/1231. Copy attached and marked EXHIBIT F.

iii. Defendants Letter dated June 7, 2012 and titled RE: RESPONSE TO MEMO REF. FPI/SS/1231/97. Copy attached and marked EXHIBIT g.

iv. My reply dated June, 14, 2012 and titled IDENTIFIABLE FLAWS IN THE ALLEGATION AGAINST ME CONTAINED IN THE QUERY RE: FPI/SS.1231/106

(PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS). Copy attached and marked EXHIBIT H.

14. That further to my explanations that it was not my intention to earn salary from two establishments, having retired and withdrawn my services from Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) before resuming my duties as the 1st Defendants Director of Works and Services, I wrote a letter to the 1st Defendant on the June 22, 2012 titled REQUEST FOR INSTALMENTAL DEDUCTIONS FROM MY MONTHLY SALARY. A copy of the letter is attached and marked EXHIBIT J.

15. That the Defendants did not respond to my plea/request for monthly deduction by instalments from my salary from the month of June 2012 to offset the salary paid to me for the months of April and May 2010 since I had also been inadvertently paid salaries for the period by my former employers Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN).

16. That while I was waiting for the response of the Defendants to my letter of June 22, 2012, I received a letter from the Defendants dated July, 18, 2012 titled SUSPENSION. A copy of the letter is attached and marked EXHIBIT K.

17. That in the said letter signed by Alhaji K. M. Abu, Deputy Registrar

(P) for Registrar, the Defendants suspended me from office with immediate effect without pay and also requested me not to travel out of Idah without express permission of the Registrar.

The exact of Exhibit K, the letter suspending the respondent from his employment reads thusly-

SUSPENSION

Refer to the query issued to you vide our memorandum N.FPI/SS.1231/106 of 10th May, 2012 and your subsequent responses.

In consideration of the above issue, the Rector has approved that you be suspended from office for this serious misconduct with immediate effect.

In line with Chapter 3, Article 030406 of the revised Public Service Rules (2008 Edition), this suspension is without pay.

You are requested to please hand-over the office to Engr. Solomon Ayegba Sani immediately.

Furthermore, you are advised not to travel out of Idah without the express permission of the Registrar.

It is clear that exhibit A made the appointment subject to the Federal Civil Service Rules, any other regulations approved by the appellants and other conditions of service in the other arms of the Public Service or other conditions of

service as approved by the appellants and that by Exhibit K, the Rector of the 1st appellant chose to suspend the respondent from his employment under Chapter 3, Article 030406 of the Revised Public Service Rules (2008 Edition).

It is not in dispute that Exhibit B, the Federal Polytechnic Staff Manual and the Federal Polytechnic Act, Cap F.17, Laws of the Federation 2004 also contains provisions for discipline of a senior staff like the respondent by suspension. It provides thusly-

(1) If it appears to the Council that there are reasons for believing that any person employed as a member of the academic, administrative or technical staff of the polytechnic, other than the Rector, should be removed from office on the ground of misconduct or inability to perform the functions of his office, the Council shall-

(a) Give notice of those reasons to the person in question;

(b) Afford him an opportunity of making representations in person on the matter to the Council; and

(c) If he or any three members of the Council so request within the period of one month beginning with the date of the notice, make arrangements-

(i) If he is an

academic staff, for a joint committee of the Council and the Academic Board to investigate the matter and to report on it to the Council; or

(ii) For a committee of the Council to investigate the matter, where it relates to any other member of the staff of the polytechnic and to report on it to the Council; and

(iii) For the person in question to be afforded an opportunity of appearing before and being heard by the investigating committee with respect to the matter, and if the Council, after considering the report of the investigating committee, is satisfied that the person in question should be removed as aforesaid, the Council may so remove him by an instrument in writing.

(2) The Rector may, in a case of misconduct by a member of the staff which in the opinion of the Rector is prejudicial to the interests of the polytechnic, suspend such member and any such suspension shall forthwith be reported to the Council.

(3) For good cause, any member of staff may be suspended from office or his appointment may be terminated by the Council, and for the purpose of this subsection, good cause means-

(a) Any physical or mental

incapacity which the Council, after obtaining medical advice, considers to be such as to render the person, concerned unfit for the discharge of the functions of his office; or

(b) Any physical or mental incapacity which the Council, after obtaining medical advice, considers to be such as to render the person concerned unfit to continue to hold his office; or

(c) Conduct of a scandalous or other disgraceful nature which the Council considers to be such as to render the person concerned unfit to continue to hold his office; or

(d) Conduct which the Council considers to be such as to constitute failure or inability of the person concerned to discharge the functions of his office or to comply with the terms and conditions of his service.

(4) Any person suspended pursuant to Subsection (2) or (3) of this section, shall be placed on half pay and the Council shall before the expiration of the period of three months after the date of such suspension consider the case against that person and come to a decision as to-

(a) Whether to continue such persons suspension and if so on what terms (including the proportion of this emoluments to be

paid to him);

(b) Whether to reinstate such person, in which case the Council shall restore his full emoluments to him with effect from the date of suspension;

(c) Whether to terminate the appointment of the person in question, which case such a person, will not be entitled to the proportion of is emoluments withheld during the period of suspension; or

(d) Whether to take such lesser disciplinary action against such person (including the restoration of such proportion of his emoluments that may have been withheld) as the Council may determine, and in any case where the Council, pursuant to this section, decides to continue a persons suspension or decides to take further disciplinary action against a person, the Council shall before the expiration of a period of three months from such decision come to a final determination in respect of the case concerning any such person.

(5) It shall be the duty of the person by whom an instrument of removal is signed in pursuance of Subsection (1) of this section, to use his best endeavours to cause a copy of the instrument to be served as soon as reasonably practicable on the person to whom it

relates.

(6) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section shall prevent the Council from making such regulations for the discipline of other categories of staff and workers of the polytechnic as it may think fit.

Chapter 8 paragraphs 8.1 to 8.8 at pages 13 to 15 of the Federal Polytechnic Staff Manual Provide thusly-

8.1. The following disciplinary action may be taken against any officer for any of the offences and short-comings defined as misconduct in paragraph 1.3.18 of these Regulations:

(i) Verbal or written warning;

(ii) Withholding or deferring increment;

(iii) Reduction in grade;

(iv) Suspension and removal from office

(v) Termination or Dismissal;

(vi) Interdiction.

8.2 DISMISSAL

An Officer shall be dismissed for committing any of the wrong doings defined as gross misconduct in paragraph 1.3.19 of these regulations

8.3 WARNING

(a) An employee who has committed a minor misconduct may be warned orally by the Head of the Department.

(b) An employee whose conduct or performance is unsatisfactory shall be given a query in writing by the Head of the Department. If his explanation

is considered by the Head of Department as adequate, no further action shall be taken. If his explanation is unacceptable or is unsatisfactory, the Head of the Department shall record a warning in writing against the employee and copy the Registrar. Where a subsequent warning becomes necessary, the Head of the Department shall issue a query to the employee concerned and obtain explanation from him and forward both with his recommendation through the normal channel to the Registrar who would then issue a subsequent warning if in his opinion such a conduct merits a warning.

8.4. REMOVAL AND SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE

Senior Staff (Academic, Administrative and Technical Staff)

If it appears to the Council that there are reasons for believing that any person employed as a member of the academic, administrative or technical staff of the Institution, other than the Rector, should be removed from office on the ground of misconduct or inability to perform the functions of his office, the Council shall;

(a) Give notice of these reasons to the person in question;

(b) Afford him an opportunity of making representations in person on the matter to the

Council; and

(c) If he or any three members of the Council so request within the period of one month beginning with the date of the notice make arrangements-

(i) If he is an academic staff, for a Joint Committee of the Council and the Academic Board to investigate the matter and to report on it to the Council; or

(ii) For a Committee of the Council to investigate the matter, where it relates to any other member of the staff of the Institution and to report on it to the Council; and

(iii) For the person in question to be afforded an opportunity of appearing before and being heard by the Investigating Committee with respect to the matter, and if the Council, after considering the report of the Investigating Committee, is satisfied that the person in question should be removed as aforesaid, the Council may so remove him by an instrument in writing signed on the directions of the Council.

8.5. The Rector may, in a case of misconduct by a member of staff which, in the opinion of the Rector is prejudicial to the interests of the Institution suspend such member and any such suspension shall forth with be reported to the Council.

8. 6. For good cause, any member of staff may be suspended from office or his appointment may be terminated by Council; and for the purposes of these Regulations, Good cause means:

i. Any Physical or mental incapacity which the Council after obtaining medical advice, considers to be such as to render the person concerned unfit for the discharge of the functions of his office; or

ii. Any physical or mental incapacity which the Council after obtaining medical advice, considers to be such as to render the person concerned unfit to continue to hold his office; or

iii. Conduct of a scandalous or other disgraceful nature which the Council considers to be such as to render the person concerned unfit to continue to hold his office; or

iv. Conduct which the Council considers to be such as to constitute failure or inability of the person concerned to discharge the functions of his office or to comply with the terms and conditions of his service.

8.7. Any person suspended pursuant to Regulation 8.5 or 8.6 above shall be placed on half pay and the Council shall before the expiration of a period of three months after the date of such suspension, consider

the cause against that person and come to a decision as to:

i. Whether to continue such persons suspension and if so, on what terms (including the proportion of his emoluments to be paid to him):

ii. Whether to reinstate such person, in which case the Council shall restore his full emoluments to him with effect from the date of suspension;

iii. Whether to terminate the appointment of the person in question in which case such a person will not be entitled to the proportion of his emoluments withheld during the period of suspensions; or

iv. Whether to take such lesser disciplinary action against such person (including the restoration of such proportion of his emoluments that might have been withheld) as the Council may determine; and in any case, where the Council pursuant to these Regulations, decides to continue a persons suspension or decides to take further disciplinary action against a person, the Council shall before the expiration of a period of three months from such decision come to a final determination in respect of the case concerning any such person.

8.8. It shall be the duty of the person by whom an instrument of

removal is signed in pursuance of Regulation 8.7 (i) above to use his best endeavours to cause a copy of the instrument to be served as soon as reasonably practicable on the person to whom it relates.

Chapter 3 Article 030406 of the Federal Civil Service Rules 2008 provides that- Suspension should not be used as a synonyms for interdiction. It shall apply here a prima facie case, the nature of which is serious, has been established against an officer and it is considered necessary in the public interest that he/she should forthwith be prohibited from carrying out his/her duties. Pending investigation into the misconduct, the Federal Civil Service Commission or the Permanent Secretary/Head of Extra-Ministerial Office (if within his/her delegated powers) shall forthwith suspend him/her from the exercise of the powers and functions of his/her office and from the enjoyment of his/her emolument.

It is not in dispute that the respondent accepted the terms of his appointment in Exhibit A and resumed duty on the basis of the said terms of the appointment. The appellant having appointed the respondent on the terms in Exhibit A and the

respondent having accepted the appointment and resumed duty on the basis of those terms, both sides had agreed to be bound by the terms in Exhibit A, which constitutes the contract between them. The trial Court rightly held that the letter of appointment, Exhibit A embodied the contract of employment between the appellants and the respondent and that it binds the parties who cannot go out of it in search of more favourable terms. This Court per Galunje JCA (now JSC) in Mbosoh v. JAMB (2008) LPELR 4306 (CA) held that- In determining disputes arising from the determination of a contract of employment, the Court must confine itself to the plain words and meaning which can be derived from the terms of the contract of service between the parties which provides for their rights and obligations. In this case it is the relevant conditions stated in the Appellants letter of appointment that must be construed and nothing else, as neither the Respondent nor the Appellant had any recourse to the Staff regulations or conditions of service as playing a role in the dispute between them.

The Rector of the 1st appellants in keeping with the terms of

the letter of appointment chose to suspend the respondent from his employment under Chapter 3, Article 030406 of the Revised Public Service Rules (2008 Edition). The appellants had a choice of suspending him under the provisions of the 1st appellants staff manual (Exhibit B) or under S.17 of the Federal Polytechnic Act. The Rector of the 1st respondent chose to act under the Revised Federal Public Service Rules (2008 Edition) in suspending the respondent.

Considering that it was the Rector of the 1st appellant that chose to suspend the respondent under the Revised Federal Public Services Rules 2008, can Learned Counsel for the appellant argue as he has done in the appellants brief that relying on the Revised Federal Public Service Rules to suspend the respondent would defeat the provisions of S.17(2) of the Federal Polytechnic Act, that the Federal Public Service Rules being a legislation subsidiary to the Federal Polytechnic Act, a statute, it cannot be applied when it conflicts with the Act and that the trial Court was wrong to have relied on it to nullify the suspension. Learned Counsel for the appellant cannot competently and validly

make such argument. The appellants cannot now run away from the Federal Civil Service Rules they chose to act on in Exhibit K because they found it favourable to them. On the principle of equitable estoppel, they are estopped from making the above arguments. They cannot make a case inconsistent with the position they took in Exhibit K. Having chosen to suspend the respondent under the Federal Civil Service Rules (2008 Edition), it is by those Rules that the regularity, legality, propriety or otherwise of the suspension must be assessed. The trial Court was therefore right to have assessed the legality of the suspension on the basis of the Federal Civil Service Rules.

The trial Court rightly enforced the terms of the contract between the appellants and the respondent in Exhibit A. It was bound to do so. It had no power to determine the dispute arising from that contract on the basis of terms not contained in the contract. There is no doubt that if the appointment letter had not stated the Federal Civil Services Rules as one of the instrument that shall govern the appointment and if the appellants had not chosen to suspend the respondent under those Rules,

the Federal Polytechnic Act or the Staff manual (Exhibit B) would have been applicable to determine the lawfulness of the suspension. Notwithstanding that S.17 of the Federal Polytechnic Act is a statute, it cannot override the agreement of the parties in their contract as to the rules or conditions that should govern the contract. This is so by virtue of the principle of freedom to contract and autonomy of contract. See JFS Inv Ltd v Brawal Line Ltd (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt 1225) 495 (SC) in which the Supreme Court held thusly- The general rule of law is that parties to a contract have the autonomy to choose the law which will govern their transaction. It is the law chosen by the parties which will guide the Court in the determination of their rights, provided the terms are not against public policy. The Court of law on the other hand, must always respect the sanctity of the agreement of the parties ? the role of the Court is to pronounce on the wishes of the parties and not to make a contract for them or re-write the one they have already made for themselves. Sona Breweries Plc v. Peters (2005) 1 NWLR (pt.908) pg.478. Owoniboys Technical Services Ltd v. U.B.N. Ltd

(2003) 15 NWLR (pt. 844) Pg. 545. S.E. Co. Ltd, v. N.B.C. (2006) 17 NWLR (pt.978) pg.201.

In Nika Fishing Ltd v. Lavina Corp. (2008) 6 7 SC (Pt 11) 200 it held that- Where there is a contract regulating any arrangement between the parties, the main duty of the Court is to interpret that contract and to give effect to the wishes of the parties as expressed in the contract document?. It is the law that parties to an agreement retain the commercial freedom to determine their own terms. No other person, not even the Court, can determine the terms of contract between parties thereto. The duty of the Court is to strictly interprete the terms of the agreement on its clear wordings.

In BFI Group Corp. v BPE (2012) LPELR 9339 (SC), it held that- It must be reiterated here that the Court must treat as sacrosanct the terms of an agreement freely entered into by the parties. This is because parties to a contract enjoy their freedom to contact on their own terms so long as same is lawful. The terms of a contract between parties are clothed with some degree of sanctity and if any question should

arise with regard to the contract, the terms in any document which constitute the contract are invariably the guide to its interpretation when parties enter into a contract, they are bound by the terms of the contract as set out by them. It is not the business of the Court to rewrite a contract for the parties. See Afrotech Services Nig Ltd. v. M.A. & Sons Ltd. (2002) 15 NWLR (Pt. 692) 730 at 788. In West Const. Co Ltd v Santos M. Batalha (2006) 4 SC (Pt 1) 88 it held that- It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily those rules which say that a given contract is void as being against public policy, because if there is one thing which more than another public policy, requires, it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of Justices therefore, you have this paramount public policy to consider ? that you are not likely to interfere with freedom of contract.

Let me now consider if the suspension is in compliance with the Federal

Civil Service Rules.

I do not agree with the argument of Learned Counsel for the appellant that there is no evidence that salary on CONTISS 15 Step 1 is equivalent to salary on Grade Level 14 and that the trial Courts equation of the two is speculative. The argument is unnecessary because the salary is that of a senior staff of the cadre of a Director and Head of a department. There is nothing to show that CONTISS is not a synonym for grade. In any case Exhibit A used it interchangeably with the word grade. While in the unnumbered paragraph 2 on the first page it uses the phrase on salary of CONTISS 15 Step 1, in Paragraph 6 in page 2 therein it uses the words grade level. The exact of paragraph 6 reads thusly- The appropriate entry step on the grade level will be determined on presentation of your last pay slip. So CONTISS 15 Step 1 is the same as Grade 15 Step 1

By virtue of S. 1 Rule 030103 of the Federal Civil Service Rules, the Rector not being the Federal Civil Service Commission has disciplinary power over only officers on salary Grade

Level 13 and below. The exact of the said Rule reads thusly-

Section 1 Rule 030103 provides that the Federal Civil Service Commission has delegated full disciplinary powers to Permanent Secretary and Heads of Extra Ministerial Offices in respect of officers on salary GL 13 and below with the exception of the power of dismissal which has been delegated only from GL 06 and below.”

Therefore the Rector has no disciplinary power over an officer on salary Grade Level 14 and above. I uphold the decision of the trial Court that the suspension of the respondent by the Rector of the 1st appellant is in violation of the Federal Civil Service Rules and is therefore void and that the letter of suspension is set aside.

In any case, the suspension of the respondent also violates S.17 of the Federal Polytechnic Act and Chapter 8 paragraphs 8.4 to 8.9 of Exhibit B, the 1st respondents staff manual which are the same with the provisions of S.17 of the Federal Polytechnic Act.

Firstly Exhibit K, the letter of suspension did not state that in the Rectors opinion, the misconduct committed by the

respondent is prejudicial to the interest of the Polytechnic. It is glaring from the provisions of S.17(2) of the Act that the Rector can only exercise the power of suspension on the basis of his opinion that the misconduct is prejudicial to the interest of the polytechnic. That opinion is a condition precedent to the exercise of that power. It is clear from the express words of S.17(2) that the power cannot be exercised in respect of every misconduct or serious misconduct. It can only be exercised in respect of a misconduct which in the opinion of the Rector is prejudicial to the interest of the Polytechnic.

The suspension also violates S.17(4) of the Act as it is indefinite, without any salary, freezes the bank account of the respondent and restrains the liberty of the respondent and his freedom to move out of Idah, where the Polytechnic is located. It is clear from the express words of that subsection, that a suspension by the Rector of the 1st appellant or 2nd appellant pursuant to Subsections (2) and (3) of S.17 shall not exceed 3 month, and the suspended officer shall be paid half salary and within 3 months period of his suspension, his case shall

be placed before the 2nd appellant to consider the case against him and come to any of the decisions prescribed in that subsection. None of these steps was or has been taken in respect of the suspension of the respondent. There is nothing in S.17 (2) of the said Act empowering the Rector of the 1st appellant or the appellants to restrict the liberty of the suspended officer or his freedom of movement in any manner. The restriction of his movement violates not only S.11 of the Act, it also violates the respondent fundamental right to personal liberty and freedom of movement guaranteed him by S.35(1) and S.41(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

There is nothing in S.17 of the Act or the Staff Manual empowering the Rector to freeze the bank account of the suspended officer. The suspension is clearly in breach of S.17 of the Act and Chapter 8 paragraphs 8.4 to 8.9 of the staff manual (Exhibit B).

The indefinite suspension of the respondent, the restraint of his liberty and freedom of movement and the freezing of his bank account amount to acts of oppressiveness, high handedness, inhuman treatment and abuse of power by

the Rector of the 1st appellant. These acts cannot come within the purview of a legitimate disciplinary process against the respondent.

In the light of the foregoing, I uphold the decision of the trial Court that the suspension of the respondent by the Rector of the 1st appellant is illegal, null and void. The trial Court was right in setting it aside.

Issues Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 are resolved in favour of the respondent.

Let me now determine issues Nos. 5 and 7 which ask:-

5. Whether the non-joinder of necessary parties did not rob the Court below of the jurisdiction to entertain the substantive suit.

7. Whether the judgment of the Court below appealed against, which determined the validity of the exercise of the power conferred on the Rector of the 1st Appellant by S. 17(2) of the Federal Polytechnics Act, (Cap. F.17, Laws of the Federation, 2004); did not, given the non-joinder of the Rector of the 1st appellant to the substantive suit, translate to the deprivation of the Rectors constitutional right to fair hearing.

Let me first consider the preliminary objection of the respondent to these issues and the grounds from

which they derive before I delve into their merits if need be.

By a motion on notice filed on 5-6-2018, the respondent herein applied for an order striking out grounds 5 and 7 of this appeal and issues 5 and 7 derived from them in the appellants brief on the grounds that-

i. The grounds of appeal raise issue of non-joinder of parties to the suit of the Respondent

ii. The issue of non-joinder of parties was not canvassed before the trial Court and is therefore a fresh issue in this Appeal.

iii. The Appellants did not obtain the leave of this Honourable Court before raising fresh issue on appeal.

iv. Grounds 5 and 7 of the Notice of Appeal and issues 5 and 7 distilled therefrom are incompetent.

For ease of reference and to facilitate a better understanding of the treatment of this objection, the said grounds 5 and 7 are reproduced hereunder thusly-

GROUND FIVE

The honourable trial Court erred in law, when it determined the suit without jurisdiction.

PARTICULARS OF ERROR

(i) The suspension which was the Respondents principal complaint before the Court below, was effected in

pursuance of the exercise of the power conferred on the Rector of the 1st Appellant, by S.17(2) of the Federal Polytechnic Act (Cap. F.17 Law of the Federation, 2004) yet the Rector of the 1st Appellant was not made a party to the suit.

(ii) The Court below decided the compliant of freeing the Respondents Salary Account No. 0051673313, held in Ecobank Nig. Ltd. without joining Ecobank (Nig.) Ltd to the proceedings.

GROUND SEVEN

The honourable trial Court, erred in law when it failed to give the Rector of the 1st Appellant the opportunity to be heard before determining the validity of exercise of the power conferred on the Rector of the 1st Appellant by S.17(2) of the Federal Polytechnic Act (Cap F.17 Law of the Federation, 2004)

PARTICULARS OF ERROR

(i) S.17(2) of the Federal Polytechnic Act (Cap F. 17 Law of the Federation, 2004), gives the Rector of the 1st Appellant the power to suspend any member of staff of the 1st Appellant who is involved in a case of misconduct, which in the opinion of the Rector is prejudicial to the interests of the 1st Appellant.

(ii) In the exercise of the power conferred on the Rector of the 1st

Appellant by the aforesaid S.17(2) of the Federal Polytechnic Act (Cap F.17 Law of the Federation, 2004), the Rector of the 1st Appellant, suspended the Respondent.

(iii) In the action challenging the validity of the aforesaid suspension of the Respondent, the Rector of the 1st Appellant, not being a party to action (sic), was not heard before the honourable Court nullified the exercise of the power conferred on the Rector of the 1st Appellant by S.17(2) of the Federal Polytechnic Act (Cap F. 17 Law of the Federation, 2004).”

Even though the complains in these grounds are couched as ones of lack of jurisdiction or lack of fair hearing, they are glaringly ones of non joinder of the Rector of the 1st appellant and Ecobank (Nig.) Ltd as parties to the suit.

well settled that no cause or matter shall be defeated by reason of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties and the Court may in every cause or matter deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interest of the parties actually before it. See also Green V Green (1987) LPELR 1338 (SC), Sapo & Anor V Sunmonu (2010) LPELR 3015 (8), Okoye v. NCFC Ltd (1991) 7 SC (Pt 111) 33.

So the issue of non-joinder of the Rector of the 1st appellant and Ecobank (Nig) Ltd not being a jurisdictional issue cannot be raised for the first time in an appeal to this Court as a fresh issue without the leave of Court to raise it as a fresh issue. See Direct on PC V. SOF Tech. Ltd (2011) LPELR 4042.

It is not in dispute that thee appellants did not seek for and obtain the leave of Court to raise the issues of non joinder of the Rector of the 1st appellant and Ecobank (Nigeria) Ltd as parties in the trial Court as fresh issues in this appeal before they filed and argued grounds 5 and 7 of this appeal. With the leave to raise them as fresh issues in this appeal not having been first obtained, grounds 5 and 7 of this

appeal and issues Nos. 5 and 7 derived therefrom and the arguments thereunder are incompetent. See Ojiogu v. Ojiogu & Anor (2010) LPELR 2377 (SC) and Owie v. Ighiwi (2006) 1 Sc (Pt 11) 16. Grounds 5 and 7 of this appeal, issues Nos. 5 and 7 derived therefrom and the arguments thereunder are hereby struck out. Having struck them out, no useful purpose would be served considering their merit.

On the whole, this appeal fails as it lacks merit. It is hereby dismissed. The judgment of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria delivered on 14-2-2013 in suit No NICN/ABJ/219/2012 by O.A. Shogbola J., is hereby affirmed and upheld.

The appellants shall pay the respondent the costs of N400,000.00.

ABUBAKAR DATTI YAHAYA, J.C.A.: I have read in draft, the leading judgment of my learned brother AGIM JCA and I entirely agree with him that this appeal lacks merit. I therefore dismiss it and I abide by the order as to costs.

TINUADE AKOMOLAFE-WILSON, J.C.A.: I had the preview of the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, JCA.

I am in agreement with his reasoning and

conclusion reached in dismissing the appeal.

Appearances:

P.C. Obasi, Esq.

For Appellant(s)

George Ukaegbu, Esq. with him, M.C. Nwoye, Esq.For Respondent(s)

Appearances

P.C. Obasi, Esq.For Appellant

AND

George Ukaegbu, Esq. with him, M.C. Nwoye, Esq.For Respondent

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