THE CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF & ANOR v. BENJAMIN LIVINUS TSENONGO
(2018)LCN/12112(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 1st day of November, 2018
CA/MKD/129/2016
RATIO
COURT AND PROCEDURE: FOR A COURT TO STRIKE OUT AN APPEAL
“Again, Fabiyi, JSC in Duru v FRN (2013) LPELR- 19930 SC at page 24 of the E-Report, said: It is now trite that a Court must rule on all applications brought before it and decide all issues between the parties. Before striking out the appeal. the Court below should have taken the application and ruled on it one way or the other.
The procedure adopted, no doubt, engendered some measure of injustices to the appellant as same compromised his constitutional right to fair hearing. In a similar situation, this Court, per Udoma, JSC. In Ilona v. Dei (1971) All NLR 8 cited by the appellants counsel, pronounced in the same vein without any equivocation.” PER JOSEPH EYO EKANEM, J.C.A.
COURT AND PROCEDURE: WHERE FACTS IS MIXED WITH LAW
“It is when the ground contests facts that it is either one of facts or mixed law and facts. Once facts are not in dispute or are admitted or are accepted or the ground is based on finding of facts which is not questioned, it is a ground of law. See Okoreaffia V Agwu (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1100) 168, 186. In the two grounds of appeal, there is no call for evaluation of evidence and so they cannot be grounds of facts or mixed law and facts. See EFCC V Akingbade (2015) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1470) 249, 281 and Enterprise Bank Ltd v Aroso (2014) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1394) 256, 282. Again, it has been held that a ground of appeal on breach of constitutional right of a litigant is one that borders on error or misdirection in law. See Edjekpo V Osia (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1037) 635, 665 (also reported in (2007) LPELR 1014 (Page 38). The complaints in the two grounds of appeal border on alleged breach of appellants constitutional right to fair hearing. They are thus grounds of law.” PER JOSEPH EYO EKANEM, J.C.A.
JUSTICES:
JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JOSEPH EYO EKANEM Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. THE CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF
2. NIGERIAN NAVY – Appellant(s)
AND
BENJAMIN LIVINUS TSENONGO – Respondent(s)
JOSEPH EYO EKANEM, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
The case of the respondent at the National Industrial Court, Makurdi (the trial Court) was that he is an able seaman of the 2nd appellant. He was at all material times serving on the Nigerian Navy Ship NNS Jubilee, stationed at Ikot Abasi, Akwa Ibom State. He was on the order of another Naval Officer, arrested at the Ikot Abasi Naval Base on 18/2/2012 and detained till 27/2/2012 when the Commanding Officer pronounced him guilty of certain offences. He was sentenced by the Commanding Officer to dismissal from the service in addition to 28 days imprisonment with hard labour. This, he said, was done without affording him any hearing. He continued in detention till 2/11/2012 when he was released from custody upon the Commanding Officer being served with the processes of the Federal High Court, Uyo for the enforcement of his fundamental rights.
Consequent upon the above state of affairs, the respondent took out an originating summons against the appellants at the Federal High Court, Makurdi. In the originating summons four questions for determination are raised and three reliefs are claimed as follows:
(1) An order re-instating the plaintiff to his full status as an officer of the 2nd defendant.
(2) An order quashing or setting aside the purported dismissal of the plaintiff from the service of the 2nd defendant as null, void and of no effect whatsoever.
(3) General, aggravated or exemplary damages.
The matter was subsequently transferred to the National Industrial Court.
The appellants filed a notice of preliminary objection at the Federal High Court but did not argue it before the trial Court. The matter was heard by the trial Court on 16/7/2014 in the absence of appellants and their counsel who had not filed a memorandum of appearance or a counter affidavit. The trial Court adjourned the matter to 6/11/2014 for ruling but the ruling was not delivered on that date. While the ruling was pending and on 16/6/2015 and 16/12/2015, the appellants filed two separate applications, namely;
(i) a motion on notice for;
(a) an order extending the time for the appellants to file their statement of defence;
(b) an order extending time for appellants to file their memorandum of appearance; and
(c) a deeming order in respect of the memorandum of conditional appearance already filed (the first motion or motion of 16/6/2015) and
(ii) a motion on notice directing parties to file pleadings (the second motion or motion of 16/10/2015).
When the case came up on 28/4/2016, appellants counsel moved the second motion which was opposed by respondents counsel. Immediately thereafter, he moved the first motion. The trial Court delivered a bench ruling, dismissing the first motion. Thereafter the trial Court delivered its judgment granting respondents claim.
Aggrieved by the judgment, the appellants filed a notice of appeal to this Court. The notice of appeal bears three grounds of appeal.
Pursuant to the rules of this Court, appellants counsel filed an amended brief of argument on 29/9/2017 which was deemed duly filed on 9/11/2017. He also filed a reply brief on 12/1/2018 which was deemed duly filed on 18/9/2018. Respondents counsel filed an amended brief of argument on 22/12/2017 and the same was deemed duly filed on 18/9/2018.
At the hearing of the appeal on 18/9/2018, T. D. Pepe, Esq., for the respondent, drew the Courts attention to his notice of preliminary objection and the argument thereon contained in page 3, paragraph 3.0 and pages 36, paragraphs 3.1 3.7, respectively, of the respondents brief of argument. He adopted the same and urged the Court to dismiss the appeal.
B.A. Abdulsalam, Esq., for the appellants, referred to pages 26, paragraphs 2.1 2.13 of the appellants reply brief which he adopted as his response to the preliminary objection. He urged the Court to discountenance the preliminary objection.
He thereafter adopted and relied on appellants amended brief of argument and reply brief, pages 6 10 paragraphs 3.1 4.0, in urging the Court to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the trial Court.
T.D. Pepe, Esq., adopted and relied on the amended respondents brief of argument in urging the Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial Court.
In the appellant amended brief of argument, the following issue is formulated for the determination of the appeal:
Whether a breach of fair hearing resulting in a miscarriage of justice against the Appellants/Defendants was occasioned by the lower Court (flowing from Grounds 1 & 2 of the Notice of Appeal).”
As can be seen, appellants have abandoned ground 3 of the grounds of appeal. I accordingly strike out the same.
In the respondents brief of argument one issue is also formulated for the determination of the appeal, viz;
Whether the lower Court violated the appellants right to fair hearing in the circumstances of this case.
The issues formulated by counsel on both sides are in substance the same. I therefore shall be guided by the issue formulated by appellants counsel in the determination of the appeal.
Before I consider and determine the issue, I shall first treat the preliminary objection of the respondent.
The Preliminary Objection
The contention of counsel for the respondent is that grounds 1 and 2 of the grounds of appeal raise issues of mixed law and fact for which leave of Court was required. It is his further contention that since no leave was applied for and obtained, the appeal should be struck out for being incompetent. He noted that ground one complains of (lack of) fair hearing on the ground that a motion filed on 16/10/2015 was not determined by the lower Court before proceeding to deliver judgment. This, he asserted, presupposes the existence of the application and would involve the Court investigating its record to find out if such a motion was filed and moved. It was his position that the same consideration applies to ground two. It was his final contention that assuming, without conceding, that ground one is a competent ground, ground 2 which he said is incompetent had polluted it, heaving been argued together under the sole issue.
Appellants counsel, on the other hand, submitted that ground 2 is an allegation of breach of fair hearing as enshrined in Section 36 of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). Referring to Section 243 (2) of the Constitution and Section 9(2) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, he argued that ground 2 can be raised as of right, thus requiring no leave. He also proffered the same argument in respect of ground one.
Section 243(2) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) provides:
An appeal shall lie from the decision of the National Industrial Court as of right to the Court of Appeal on question of fundamental rights as contained in Chapter IV of this Constitution as it relates to matters upon which the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction.”
I agree with counsel for respondent that any question of fundamental right in any suit within the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court is appealable as of right to this Court. To determine the nature of a ground of appeal, the Court is to examine not only the ground but also its particulars so as to ascertain the thrust of its complaint. I shall therefore set out the two grounds of appeal hereunder:
GROUND 1
The learned trial judge denied the Appellants fair hearing when he failed to determine the Motion on Notice of the Appellants dated 7th October, 2015 and filed on the 16th of October, 2015 before proceeding to deliver his judgment.
PARTICULARS
1) It is trite law that all pending applications in an action must be determined or disposed of, one way or the other before judgment is entered.
2) By failing to make a determination on the Motion on Notice of the Appellants dated 7th October 2016, the learned trial judge has refused to give fair hearing to the Appellants.
GROUND 2
The learned trial judge denied the Appellants fair hearing when he proceeded to deliver his judgment well over ninety days after final addresses in the suit without giving the Appellants a renewed opportunity to at least make final address or be heard in the matter.
PARTICULARS
1) The Respondent made his final address in the suit on the 16th of July 2015 and the judgment was delivered on the 28th of April 2016 almost a year later.
2) Upon the expiration of ninety days without delivering his judgment, the learned trial Court was duty bound to give an opportunity to the Appellants to be heard in the matter at the least indication of an intention to defend, and the failure to do so has occasioned a denial of fair hearing and a miscarriage of justice against the Appellants.
3) In addition to the Appellants Motion on Notice for extension of time dated 9th June, 2015 which was refused by the Court on the date of the judgment, counsel to the Appellants had applied for an opportunity to make final oral address but was denied by the Court.
4) The learned trial judge did not state or give any reason in his judgment for failing to deliver judgment within the stipulated time of ninety days.”
Ground one complains of denial of fair hearing to the appellants by the trial Court failing to determine the motion on notice filed on 16/10/2015 before it proceeded to deliver its judgment. Ground two similarly complains of denial of fair hearing by the trial Court in that it proceeded to deliver its judgment over 90 days after final address without giving the appellant opportunity to be heard since the time for delivery of judgment (Ninety days) had passed. Both grounds raise a question of fundamental right, to wit; right to fair hearing under Section 36 of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). By the provision of Section 243(2) of the said Constitution, leave to raise the grounds was not required.
Furthermore, the grounds along with their particulars raise questions of law. This is because they raise questions which the Court is bound to answer in accordance with rule of law.
See National Judicial Council V Agumagu (2015) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1467) 365, 403. I do not agree with respondents counsel that ground 1 is a ground of mixed law and facts because, according to him, it would involve investigation of the Courts file to see if the motion referred to in the particulars was filed and moved. The mere presence of facts in a ground of appeal does not translate a ground of law to one of facts. See Nzidee V Kootu (2007) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1014) 97, 177.
It is when the ground contests facts that it is either one of facts or mixed law and facts. Once facts are not in dispute or are admitted or are accepted or the ground is based on finding of facts which is not questioned, it is a ground of law. See Okoreaffia V Agwu (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1100) 168, 186. In the two grounds of appeal, there is no call for evaluation of evidence and so they cannot be grounds of facts or mixed law and facts. See EFCC V Akingbade (2015) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1470) 249, 281 and Enterprise Bank Ltd v Aroso (2014) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1394) 256, 282.
Again, it has been held that a ground of appeal on breach of constitutional right of a litigant is one that borders on error or misdirection in law. See Edjekpo V Osia (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1037) 635, 665 (also reported in (2007) LPELR 1014 (Page 38). The complaints in the two grounds of appeal border on alleged breach of appellants constitutional right to fair hearing. They are thus grounds of law.
The preliminary objection is without merit and I accordingly discountenance it.
The Appeal
Arguing his sole ground of appeal, appellants counsel stated that it is trite that a Court must determine all applications before it one way or the other before delivering judgment. He stated further that failure to consider or determine or rule on an application constitutes a denial of hearing. He contended that the trial Court neglected to deliver a ruling on the motion filed on 16/10/15. This, he argued, occasioned a miscarriage of justice as it robbed the appellants of the opportunity of having their motion decided as to whether the suit should have been heard by way of pleadings as opposed to originating summons. He stressed that since the time for delivery of judgment had elapsed, the motion ought to have been heard and determined.
For the respondent, it was submitted by his counsel that the appellants were afforded every opportunity to be heard by the trial Court. Counsel noted that the application of 16/10/2015 was filed about one year and three months after the matter had been heard and adjourned for judgment on 16/7/2014. It was his view that the motion of 16/10/15 could not stand without the motion of 16/6/2015. Thus, he submitted, when the trial Court dismissed the motion of 6/6/2015 (for extension of time to file memorandum of appearance and statement of defence) the basis of the motion of 16/10/2015 (to file pleadings) had been removed. He noted that there was no suggestion of dispute as to facts to warrant the calling of oral evidence or filing of pleading.
Counsel submitted that had the appellants desired the trial Court to act on their motion of 16/10/2015, they should have drawn the Courts attention to it after the dismissal of the motion of 16/6/2015 or moved it. He opined that the motion was abandoned. It was therefore his position that the appellants could not complain of denial of fair hearing as they had opportunity of being heard. He added that with the dismissal of the motion of 16/5/2015, the motion of 16/10/2015 became otiose and academic.
He stated that the appeal was based on technicality and not substance, and pointed out that the trial Court is a Court of substantial justice and not of technicalities. He then argued that the suit was properly brought by originating summons. Counsel lamented that had the judgment been delivered within three months from the date of final address, the appellants would not have had an opportunity to file their motions. It was his contention that having benefited from the delay in the delivery of judgment appellants can not now complain about it. He contended that appellants needed to show that the delay in the delivery of judgment occasioned a miscarriage of justice. He pointed out that since it was a matter commenced by originating summons there was no question of demeanour of witness and there was no indication that the trial Court had lost its impression of the case.
In his reply brief, appellants counsel argued that the two motions were mutually exclusive and that the second motion was not based on the first motion. He contended that the trial Court did not rule on the second motion.
For a proper resolution of the lone issue, it is in my view necessary to re-state the pertinent facts of the matter leading to this appeal. The respondent sued the appellants for the reliefs which have been set out in this judgment. Appellants filed a notice of preliminary objection on 12/11/2012 praying for the dismissal of the suit for lack of jurisdiction. No other process was filed by them. On 10/6/2014, when the matter came up for the first time at the trial Court, appellants and their counsel were absent and it was adjourned to 16/7/2014 for hearing.
When the matter was called for hearing on 16/7/2014 appellants and their counsel were absent. After satisfying itself that appellants had been served (with hearing notice) the Court directed counsel for the respondent to proceed to argue the originating summons. After argument the Court adjourned the matter to 6/11/2014 for ruling. The ruling was not delivered on 6/11/2014 but much later on 28/4/2016.
Meanwhile on 16/6/15, appellants filed the first motion. Again on 16/10/2015, appellants filed the second motion.
On 28/4/2016, appellants counsel first moved the second motion for an order directing parties to file pleadings. Respondents counsel opposed the application. Without a ruling by the trial Court, appellants counsel announced that he had another motion. The trial Court stated at page 90 of the record of appeal:
Very well move the application for extension of time it should have come 1st.
The Respondents counsel opposed the application.
The trial Court delivered a bench ruling on the motion of 16/6/15 and dismissed it. Without ruling on the second motion, the trial Court proceeded to deliver its judgment granting respondents claim.
It is the bounden duty of the Court to hear and determine all applications pending before it before making a final pronouncement by way of delivery of judgment. It is immaterial that an application may be stupid, frivolous, malicious or in abuse of judicial process. An exception in proper circumstances is the exercise of the punitive jurisdiction of the Court against a contemnor of a Court order who is expected to purge himself of the contempt before he could be heard. See United Parcel Services Ltd v Ufot (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 314) 337, 356, Nitel Plc v Mayaki (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1023) 173, 188 and Dingyadi v INEC (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1224) 1, 52 -53.
In this instance, the trial Court heard the two applications that were pending before it. It delivered a ruling on the first motion of 16/6/15 but it did not deliver a ruling on the one of 16/10/15. The statement of the trial Court that the first motion of 16/6/15 should have come first did not amount to a ruling. A ruling, as rightly pointed out by appellants counsel is:
The outcome of a Courts decision either on some points of law or on the case as a whole Blacks Law Dictionary, 9th ed. Pages 889 and 1450 quoted in Abacha v Kurastic Nigeria Ltd (2014) LPELR 22703 (CA).
Where an application is argued on the merit, as was done in respect of the second motion, the Court is to either grant it, if it succeeds, or dismiss it if it fails. If the application is withdrawn before it is moved and opposed, the Court is to strike it out. See Amusan v Obideyi (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 322, 329. None of these happened in this instance.
Respondents counsel contended that if the appellants desired the lower Court to act on the second motion after the dismissal of the first motion, they had a duty to the trial Court to have drawn its attention to the second motion. He asserted that there was no attempt by appellants counsel to move the second motion or draw the Courts attention to it or to indicate that he still wished to move it. He concluded that appellants had abandoned the motion.
The contention above is, with due respect, misconceived. Appellants counsel, as earlier stated, moved the second motion first and it was opposed by respondents counsel. What was left was for the trial Court to rule on it one way or the other. It was therefore unnecessary for appellants counsel to move the said motion a second time or draw the Courts attention to it. The ball was in the Court of the trial Court and not that of the appellants. It can not therefore be rightly said that the appellants had abandoned the second motion. How could they have abandoned what they had moved and which was opposed
Again, I do not agree with counsel for the respondent that the second motion was dependent on the first motion. Each motion stood on its own and had to succeed or fail on its own merit and not on the merit of the other. Even if the second motion had no basis or was otiose as argued by respondents counsel, the trial Court still had a duty to rule on it before proceeding to deliver its judgment.
The failure of the trial Court to rule on the motion before proceeding to deliver its judgment meant that the application was still pending and unresolved when the Court delivered its final judgment. At this point, it is pertinent to set out the position of the Supreme Court in Akpan v Bob (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 421, 465 (also reported in (2010) LPELR 376 (SC) where Muhammad, JSC, stated thus:
The trite position of the law is that where there are pending processes before a Court such as motion or other applications, such issues have to be dispensed with before a final decision is taken on the main action or appeal. See Irolo v Uka (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 786) 195, 2250 F where this Court held. It is the duty of a Court whether of first instance or appellate to consider all the issues that have been joined by parties and raised before it for determination. If the Court failed to do so without a valid reason, then it certainly failed in its duty for in our judicial system, it is a fundamental principle of administration of justice that every Court has a duty to hear, determine and resolve such questions. Thus it would be wrong of a Court, whose attention has been drawn to a pending process such as notice of withdrawal of appeal or motion on notice to proceed to treat the appeal to finality when such processes have not been pronounced upon by it.
The trial Court, I say for the umpteenth time, did not rule on the second motion. It had the option (which it failed to utilize) of doing so in its final judgment as was stated in Newswatch Communication Ltd. v Attah (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 993) 144. In that case, the Supreme Court referred to the decision in Onyekwuluje v. Animashaun (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt. 439) 637 in which it was held by the Supreme Court that it is a cardinal principle of the administration of justice to let a party know the fate of his application whether properly or improperly brought before the Court. This cardinal principle of the administration of justice was not observed in this instance.
I am not unaware of the position of Rhodes Vivour, JSC, in Emeka V Okadigbo (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1331) 55, 94 that:
It is not in all cases that failure of the trial Court to hear pending motion before delivery of judgment is fatal to the proceedings. It is the duty of an appeal Court to examine the motion that was pending and ensure that failure of the trial Judge to take it has not led to a denial of fair hearing or/and miscarriage of justice.”
The situation in the instant matter is different from the situation stated above. This is because in that case, the trial Judge refused to hear the motion that was filed while judgment was pending whereas in this instance, the trial Judge heard the motion but failed to rule on it. This Court can not rule for the trial Court that heard the motion.
Before concluding, it is pertinent to comment on the contention between counsel as to whether the complaints of wrongful termination can be ventilated by way of originating summons and that since the time for delivery of judgment had expired, the appellants motion ought to have been heard and determined. I think these contentions pale into nothingness in the face of my position above. I shall not be drawn into determining them.
I therefore resolve the lone issue for determination in favour of the appellants. The appeal therefore has merit. It succeeds. Consequently, the judgment of the trial Court is hereby set aside. I hereby direct that the matter shall be retried by the trial Court but before a judge of that Court other than W. Abali, J., the trial judge. The matter shall be given accelerated hearing.
Parties shall bear their costs.
JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A.: I had the privilege to read in draft the Judgment just rendered by my learned brother, Ekanem, J.C.A.
There is no gainsaying that the failure of the trial Court to rule on the motion filed on 16-10-15 seeking an order directing the parties to file pleadings, before proceeding to finally determine the action granting the Respondent claim and effectively shutting out the Appellant from its proceedings, occasioned a grave miscarriage of justice.
A Court of law is under a bounden duty to, as much as possible, hear and determine all pending applications filed before it, before proceeding to deliver judgment in substantive matters before it. See Akpan V Bob (2010) LPELR-376(SC) This is more so that in the instant case, the motion was actually heard, but a ruling on it was not rendered. Instead, the lower Court proceeded to deliver Judgment. Certainly, this amounted to a denial of fair hearing to the Appellant.
It is therefore for these reasons well articulated in the lead Judgment that I also find merit in the Appeal. It is accordingly allowed. I abide by the consequential orders made therein.
ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.: I had read before now the Judgment just delivered by my learned Brother, Joseph F. Ekanem, JCA, allowing this appeal. I agree with the resolution of the issues formulated therein for determination.
The appeal has merit. It is trite that a trial Court has the duty to rule on every application brought before it, no matter how useless. This position of the law was clearly pronounced upon in FAAN v. Wamal Express Services (Nig) Ltd (2011) LPELR- 1261 (SC), per Muhammad, JSC at pages 16 17 of the E-Report, thus:
“it is the law that a Court of law has neither jurisdiction nor discretionary power to refuse to take a pending process before it, whatever may be its pre-trial opinion on it. The process may be a downright abuse of the judicature as an institution. It may be stupid, reckless, irregular aberrant or unmeritorious, but still, the Court must hear it and rule on it. See the case of Elike v. Nwakwoala (1984) 12 SC 301, cited also by the learned counsel for the appellant, indeed, it is the duty of a Court to entertain and decide on the merit or otherwise of any application brought before it by any party notwithstanding the perceived strength or the weakness of such application. It is a partys basic and constitutional right which he cannot be denied of. See: Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited & Anor v. Simeon Monokpo & Anor (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 852) 346. Thus, it would be wrong of a Court to proceed to treat an appeal to its final conclusion when other processes are still pending. See: Irolo v. Uka (2002) 75C (Pt. 1) 77 (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 786) 195 at 225. A-G Federation v. AIC Ltd (2000) FWLR (Pt. 26) 1744 at 1758.
The position of the judgment of the Court below is a nullity as it failed to do what it ought to have done in the first place, i.e. treating an impending application process before it. That judgment is liable to be set aside and I accordingly do so.
(Emphasis mine)
Again, Fabiyi, JSC in Duru v FRN (2013) LPELR- 19930 SC at page 24 of the E-Report, said: It is now trite that a Court must rule on all applications brought before it and decide all issues between the parties. Before striking out the appeal. the Court below should have taken the application and ruled on it one way or the other.
The procedure adopted, no doubt, engendered some measure of injustices to the appellant as same compromised his constitutional right to fair hearing.
In a similar situation, this Court, per Udoma, JSC. In Ilona v. Dei (1971) All NLR 8 cited by the appellants counsel, pronounced in the same vein without any equivocation.
(Emphasis mine).
In the instant case, the application was actually heard but not ruled upon before final judgment was delivered by the learned trial Judge on the substantive matter. That judgment is liable to be set aside.
For this reason and for the more comprehensive reasons given by my Learned brother, I also allow the appeal. I abide by the orders made in the lead Judgment.
Appearances:
B. A. Abdulsalam, Esq. with him,
T.D. Pepe, Esq.I. S. Kato, Esq. For Appellant(s)
J. Jorver, Esq. with him, J.V. Ozigi, Esq.,O.N. Nor, Esq. and M.B. Ugudu, Esq. For Respondent(s)
