THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF ENUGU STATE v. CHIEF FIDELIS I. K. UGWU & ANOR (2016)

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF ENUGU STATE v. CHIEF FIDELIS I. K. UGWU & ANOR

(2016)LCN/8579(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Friday, the 6th day of May, 2016

CA/E/82A/2011

RATIO

INTERPRETATION: ATTITUDE OF COURT TOWARDS INTERPRETING WORDS LITERALLY
It is a trite rule of interpretation that when the words of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the Courts are generally enjoined to interpret the provisions of the statute literally by giving it, its ordinary, plain, simple grammatical meaning. Nothing more or less should be added thereto. PER MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA, J.C.A.
LIMITATION: HOW IS THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION DETERMINED
The period of limitation in any limitation statute is determined by looking at the writ of summons and the statement of claim alleging when the wrong which gave rise to the cause of action was committed and by comparing that date, with the date on which the writ of summons was filed. If the time on the writ of summons is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, the action is statute bared. See Elabanjo & Anor. vs. Ganiat Dawodu (2006) 6 SCNJ 204. PER MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA, J.C.A.
LIMITATION LAW: LIMITATION PERIOD FOR INSTITUTING AN ACTION AGAINST A PUBLIC OFFICER
The wordings of Section 37(1) of the Actions Law are plain, unambiguous and strictly stipulates that any action or suit, instituted against any person for acts performed by him or omissions in the discharge of public duty or exercise of public authority, should be brought within the maximum time limit of twelve months from the day the accrual or effect of the act or omission occurred, except for circumstances in which the act or omission was a continuous one. The failure or default on the part of the aggrieved party or person to bring an action to ventilate his grievances within the prescribed time limit would render his claim (notwithstanding how meritorious) unenforceable. This position of the law has equally been reiterated by the Supreme Court, per Okoro J.S.C., in the recent case of Ibrahim v. Lawal (2015) 17 NWLR (Pt.1489) 490 @ 523, wherein His Lordship lucidly stated as follows:
“Let me state again for the umpteenth time that where a law prescribes a period for instituting an action, proceedings cannot be instituted after that period. Also, where an action is statute – barred, a plaintiff who might have had a cause of action loses the right to enforce the cause of action by judicial process because the period of time laid down by the limitation law for instituting such an action had elapsed and the right to commence the action would have been extinguished by law. Unfortunately, this is the fate of the 1st – 4th respondents case in the circumstance… PER MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA, J.C.A.

JUSTICES:

HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF ENUGU STATE – Appellant(s)

AND

1. CHIEF FIDELIS I. K. UGWU
2. CHIEF CHRISTOPHER ARUA – Respondent(s)

MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA, J.C.A.(Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the ruling of Honourable Justice A. R. Ozoemena, J., of the High Court of Enugu State, sitting at Enugu-Ezike (hereinafter referred to as the “Lower Court”). The said ruling was delivered on the l0th day of May, 2010. The substantive suit was instituted by the plaintiff /1st respondent vide a writ of summons, dated and filed contemporaneously with the statement of claim on the 6th day of May, 2009; wherein the plaintiff/1st respondent claims against the 1st defendant/2nd respondent and 2nd defendant/appellant, jointly and severally for the following reliefs:
“(a). A declaration that an elected Governor of a State in Nigeria have no authority and power to perform the duties and functions of his office of the Governor of a State before the subscription to the oath of office and oath of allegiance and after the expiration of his tenure of office under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
(b). A declaration that the purported recognition of the 1st defendant by the Governor of Enugu State one year and ten months before his assumption

of office is ultra vires the Governor, null, void and of no effect whatsoever.
(c). A declaration that the Enugu State Government lacks the powers under the law to ignore/disregard the
findings of its own panel that the 1st defendant was not elected/selected Igwe and traditional ruler of Ovoko Autonomous Community, and proceed to recognize the 1st defendant as the Igwe and traditional ruler of the community.
(d). A declaration that the plaintiff, having been found and confirmed as the elected/selected Igwe and traditional ruler of Ovoko Autonomous Community, by the report of the Enugu State Government investigation, is the proper person to be recognized and certificated by the Enugu State Government.
(e). An order for the recognition and certification of the plaintiff as the Igwe and traditional ruler of Ovoko Autonomous Community.
(f). An order of the Honourable Court setting aside the recognition and certification of the 1st defendant as the Igwe and traditional ruler of Ovoko Autonomous Community, and other thing done or purported to have been done in pursuance thereto.
(g). An order of injunction restraining the 1st

defendant from performing or continuing to perform any of the functions and duties of the Igwe and traditional ruler of Ovoko Autonomous Community and enjoying any rights or privileges attached to the said exalted office.”

Upon being served with the requisite Court processes, the 2nd defendant/ appellant entered appearance on 26th May, 2009 and brought a motion on notice on 25-02-10 seeking leave of the Lower Court for extension of time within which to file his statement of defence. The 1st defendant/2nd respondent herein on his own part, responded and filed a notice of preliminary objection on 13/07/2009. The said notice of preliminary objection is reproduced below:
“1. Take Notice that this Honorable Court will be moved on 30th day of September 2009 at the hour of Nine O’clock in the forenoon or soon thereafter as counsel may be heard on behalf of the 1st defendant for an order dismissing/striking out the suit.
2 AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that the grounds upon which this action is brought is that that plaintiff has no right, capacity or title in law to institute this action/alternatively the action is incompetent or is barred by S. 37 of Actions

Law of Enugu State.
3. AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that at the hearing of this application the defendant will rely on all processes filed in this action which form part of the records of the Honourable Court”

The said notice of preliminary objection was accompanied by a written address in support thereof. Upon being served with the notice of preliminary objection and the written address in respect thereto, the plaintiff/1st respondent herein filed his written reply on 04/09/09. The 2nd defendant/appellant in this regard filed his written response on 25/02/2010 in support of the notice of preliminary objection. Also, the 1st defendant/2nd respondent herein, had hitherto filed a further written address on points of law on 23/09/2009.

On the 22nd day of March, 2010, learned counsel for the respective parties adopted their written addresses in support and opposition to the preliminary objection. They were also given adequate opportunities by the learned trial judge, to make oral amplifications with regard to their respective written addresses. At the end of it all, the learned trial judge concluded in his ruling thereon and held as follows:
“I am

of the opinion that the defendants can properly bring this preliminary objection without filing the Statement of Defence. The defendants may not even file the details of preliminary objection, the facts that the defendants did not have to file conditional appearance to me is not material.
What bothers my mind is the issue of Section 37(l) of the Actions Law. The Plaintiff counsel in exposing the implications of that section has said-
“It is our submission that an officer performing a public duty to exercising a public authority in the execution of a law, duty or authority can be brought to Court for redress if he steps outside the confines of the enabling law in the performance of the alleged duty in this case.”
He supported that assertion with a number of authorities to wit:-
1. Godwin Nwankwere v. Ademimi (1996) All NLR 119 at 124.
2. R. A. Okoh v. the Nigerian Navy & Ors. (2007) 25 W. R N. 46 at 64.
3. Offoboche v. Ogoja Local Govt. (2001) 36 WRN 1.
4. Aiyelabegan v. Local Govt. Service Commission (2009) 22 WRN 108 at 135
5. Adams v. Ibadan District Council (1961) WNLR 52.
6. Egbe v. Belgore (2004) 8 NWLR

(Pt.975) 366.
“He said by the Revised Laws of Enugu State 2004, only the Governor of Enugu State can recognize a person as a Traditional Ruler. Sullivan I. Chime became the Governor of Enugu State on 29th day of May, 2007. The alleged recognition of 1st defendant by Sullivan Chime on 1st August 2005 when he was merely the Attorney General of Enugu State; was act performed outside the colour of the office of a State Governor.
I do not think that both counsel for defendants have attempted to answer that in their reply and further reply.
I will in the circumstance of this case, and it is my humble opinion, that defendants need to file their Statement of Defence in reply to the issues raised by the plaintiff.
Consequently, the preliminary objection fails and it is hereby dismissed.
I make no order as to cost.

Dissatisfied with the above decision of the learned trial judge, the 2nd defendant/appellant appealed against the same vide his original notice and grounds of appeal which was filed on the 4th day of May, 2010. Subsequently, an amended notice of appeal was deemed as having been properly filed and duly served on

09/02/2016 by an order of this Court. The said amended notice of appeal contained three (3) grounds of appeal. The said grounds of appeal without their particulars are reproduced below:-
“GROUND 1
ERROR IN LAW
The learned trial judge erred in law, when he held that the preliminary objection filed by 2nd respondent, Christopher Arua, affirmed by appellant, contending that the suit was statute barred could not succeed.”
“GROUND 2
The learned trial judge erred in law when he held that a public officer who acts ultra – vires his office could be dragged to Court outside the limitation period delimited by law: and cited Section 37 Actions Law, Revised Laws of Enugu State of Nigeria 2004.”
“GROUND 3
The learned trial judge erred in law when he admitted arguments from the supposed provisions of the Public Officers Protection Act.

Henceforth in this judgment, the 2nd defendant/appellant shall be called the appellant while the plaintiff/1st respondent and the 1st defendant/2nd respondent herein shall be referred to as the 1st and 2nd respondents respectively.

In accordance with the rules of this Court, the parties

filed and exchanged their respective briefs of argument. The appellant’s brief of argument was settled by Victor Abochi, Esq., Assistant Chief Legal Officer, Ministry of Justice, Enugu. It was dated 11/10/2012, but deemed as having been properly filed and duly served on 8/02/2013. The 1st respondent’s brief of argument, on the other hand was settled by Okenna Agubuzu, Esq. It was dated 01/03/2013 but filed on 05/03/2013. The 2nd respondent did not file any brief with respect to this appeal.

The learned appellant’s counsel distilled two (2) issues for the determination of this appeal. The issues are as follows:
“2.1 Whether the learned trial judge was right in ruling that the suit was not statute – barred in view of the provisions of Section 37(1)Actions Laws Cap.4 Revised Laws of Enugu State of Nigeria, 2004 and Section 11(1) of State Proceedings Law Cap.146 Revised Laws of Enugu State of Nigeria, 2004 (Grounds 1 and 2 of grounds of Appeal.)
2.2 Whether the learned trial judge was right in imputing the supposed provisions of Public Officers Protection Act to Section 37 Actions Law Cap. 4, Revised Laws of Enugu State, 2004 when Public Officers

Protection Act was not canvassed as defence by appellant or 2nd respondent. (Ground 3 of grounds of appeal).”

The learned respondent’s counsel on his own part distilled three (3) issues for the determination of this appeal. The issues are as follows:-
(a) Whether the Governor of Enugu State (represented by the appellant) can be brought to Court in respect of the said recognition of the appellant on 1st day of August 2005, outside the limitation period prescribed by Section 37(1) of the Actions Law and Section 11(1) of the State Proceedings Law Cap. 146 Revised Laws of Enugu State, 2004.
(b) Whether the learned trial judge was wrong to have held that the 2nd respondent’s suit No. EZ/8/2009 Chief Fidelis I. K. Ugwu vs. Chief Christopher Arua & Anor. was not barred by Section 37(1) of the Actions Laws 2004
(c) Whether the learned trial judge was wrong in relying on judicial authorities decided on issues which arose from the Public Officers Protection Act Laws of the Federation, 2004″

Having gone through the record of appeal, grounds of appeal, issues formulated by learned counsel to both parties and arguments canvassed in support

thereof. I am of the view that Issue No. 1 as distilled by the learned appellant’s counsel adequately/aptly captured the issues formulated by both parties and is sufficient for the determination of this appeal. The same is hereby adopted for the determination of this appeal.

ARGUMENTS ON ISSUE.
The learned appellant’s counsel reproduced the provisions of Section 11(1) of the State Proceedings Law, Cap.146, Revised Laws of Enugu State of Nigeria, 2004 and Section 37(1) of Actions Law, Cap 4, Revised Laws of Enugu State of Nigeria, 2004. He then submitted that the provisions of the said Laws are clear and unambiguous. Thus, according to the learned counsel, they should be given their simple, plain and ordinary meanings. He referred us to the cases of E.F.C.C. v. Ekeocha (2008) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1106) 161; Sobamowo v. Elemuren (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1097) 12; among others. On the strength of the above authorities, the learned counsel argued that the learned trial judge had gone outside the relevant statutes in search of an interpretation convenient to the 1st respondent.” Thus, according to the learned appellant’s counsel, the judgment of the learned

trial judge (with due respect) was decided on erroneous application of the law and based on extraneous factors that were not canvassed before him. He referred us to the cases of Umaru v. Aliyu (No. 1) (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt.1180) 135; Dimegwu vs. Ogunewe (2003) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1116) 358 among others.

The learned counsel for the appellant further contended, that the case of the appellant and the 2nd respondent was based mainly on Section 37(l) of the Actions Law and not Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. Thus, by virtue of the said Section 37(1) of the Actions Law and Section 11(1) of the State Proceedings Law, the action of the 1st respondent herein is statute – barred. It was further submitted, that in order to determine a cause of action and when it arose, recourse should be had to the statement of claim. He supported his submission with the case of Hassan v. Aliyu (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt.1223) 547.
Additionally, that with the respondent’s suit having been found to have been filed outside the time limit provided for such a suit to be filed against the appellant; the suit and the cause of action must have transformed into an incompetent one. He

referred us to the cases of Araka v. Ejeugwu (1999) 2 NWLR (Pt.589) 107; UBN Ltd. v. Oki (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt. 614) 244; Nwadiaro v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt.150) 322 among others. Having placed reliance on the above arguments and authorities in support thereof, he thereby urged us to allow this appeal in favour of the appellant; set aside the ruling of Hon. Justice A. R. Ozoemena delivered on 10/5/2010 and thereafter, the said suit should be “dismissed or at least struck out for being statute bared.”

The learned counsel for the 1st respondent in response, submitted that, “it is settled and now beyond argument that there is a burden of proof or onus on every appellant to establish, that the decision and findings of the trial Court appealed against, is wrong,” and where the appellant fails to discharge the said burden or the appellate Court is in doubt as to whether the said burden was discharged or not, the said doubt must be resolved in favour of the decision or judgment of the trial Court.” He supported his submission with the cases of Colonial Securities Co. Ltd. v. Messey & Ors. (1896) 1.Q.B.D. 36; and

Igboanude Ogbodo & Anor. v. Emmanuel Ogba & Ors. (1987) 3 S.C.N.J. 82 @ 88.

Learned counsel for the 1st respondent further contended that Section 37(1) of the Actions Law is a limitation law which seeks to prohibit the prosecution of civil actions against public officers for acts done in pursuance, or execution or intended execution of any written law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority unless it is commenced before the expiration of one year from the date, on which the cause of action accrued.” The learned counsel maintained, that Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act is in pari-materia with Section 37(1) of the Actions Law; thus, according to the learned counsel, they have the same implications in the ‘eyes’ of the law. Indeed, he submitted that once a public officer is found to have stepped beyond the confines of his statutory authorities and/or powers (as the Enugu State Governor being represented by the appellant as allegedly done), he loses the protection of the said limitation laws. He referred us to the cases Ekemode v. Alausa (1961) 1

All NLR 143; Aiyelabegan v. Local Govt. Service Commission Ilorin, Kwara State (2009) 22 W.R.N. 108 @ 135; R. A. Okoh v. The Nigerian Navy & Ors. (2007) 25 W. R. N. 46 @ 64 among others.

The learned counsel further canvassed and rightly too, that in the consideration of the point as to whether an action is statute barred or not, a Court is in law authorized to look at the statement of claim and writ of summons. He relied on the case of Adekoya v. Federal Housing Authority (2008) 28 WRN 1 @ 11. Again, it was submitted that, ongoing through the facts averred in the statement of claim in order to determine the cause of action, the date the same accrued and whether the defendant or the person complained against stepped outside the confines of his duty or authority, merely amounts to considering the merit of the preliminary objection, and not the merit of the entire case (at an interlocutory stage); which is not allowed in law. He referred us to the case ofOsunbor v. Oshiomhole (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 463) 1363.

The fulcrum of this case lies basically on the interpretation of the provisions of Section 37 (l) of the Actions Law; Section 2 (a) of the

Public Officers Protection Act; and Section 11(1) State Proceedings Law. For the purpose of clarity and proper assimilation, the provisions of the said Laws are reproduced below:
Section 37(l) of the Actions Law:
“Subject to any written Law from time to time in forcer no action shall be brought against any person for any act done in pursuance, or execution or intended execution of any written law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority, unless it is commenced before the expiration of one year from the date on which the cause of action accrued.
Provided that where the act, neglect or default is a continuing one, no cause of action in respect thereof shall be deemed to have accrued, for the purposes of this subsection, until the act, neglect or default has ceased.
Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act:
Where any prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act of Law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged

neglect or default in the execution of any such Act Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect.”
a. Limitation of Action.
The action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect, or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof:
Provided that if the action, prosecution or proceeding be at the instance of any person for cause arising while such person was a convict prisoner, it may be commenced within three months after the discharge of such person from prison.
Section 11(1) of the State Proceedings Law:
“No action or proceeding shall lie or be instituted under this law unless it is commenced within twelve months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in the case of a continuing damage or injury, within twelve months next after the ceasing thereof. Provided that if the action or proceeding be at the instance of any person for a cause arising while such a person was a convict prisoner, it may be commenced within twelve

months after the discharge of such person from prison or, in the case of a continuing damage or injury, within twelve months next after the ceasing thereof whichever shall last occur.
Having critically analysed the statutory provisions reproduced above I am of the firm view point that even though they are limitation laws, but they have different applications. I agree with the submission of the learned counsel to the appellant to the extent that, failure of an aggrieved party to file an action against the alleged wrong-doing perpetrated by a person acting under a public authority or in discharge of public duty within the time limit set by the law would render the cause of action (or any suit thereon) incompetent and unenforceable, the action having become statute barred. See the case of Hassan v. Aliyu & Ors. (2010) LPELR-1357. Thus, a party who slept on his right over a period exceeding the time within which he is entitled to ventilate his grievance in a Court of law, cannot be helped, as such right or action (notwithstanding how meritorious) would be deemed to have been irredeemably lost. The right of access to court would be denied to such

a party.

It is also pertinent to observe at this point, that the 2nd respondent’s preliminary objection was predicated solely on Section 37 (1) of the Actions Law. The provision and applicability of the provisions of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act and Section 11(1) of the State Proceedings Law to this case were introduced by the 1st respondent herein and appellant, in their respective replies to the preliminary objection. I am thus of the firm view point that the Lower Court was in error to have shifted the grounds of the 2nd respondent’s preliminary objection from the law upon which it was predicated and thereafter proceeded to determine same on a completely different law which was not invoked by the objector in his said preliminary objection.

It is a trite rule of interpretation that when the words of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the Courts are generally enjoined to interpret the provisions of the statute literally by giving it, its ordinary, plain, simple grammatical meaning. Nothing more or less should be added thereto.

The period of limitation in any limitation statute is determined by looking at the writ of summons

and the statement of claim alleging when the wrong which gave rise to the cause of action was committed and by comparing that date, with the date on which the writ of summons was filed. If the time on the writ of summons is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, the action is statute bared. See Elabanjo & Anor. vs. Ganiat Dawodu (2006) 6 SCNJ 204.

The wordings of Section 37(1) of the Actions Law are plain, unambiguous and strictly stipulates that any action or suit, instituted against any person for acts performed by him or omissions in the discharge of public duty or exercise of public authority, should be brought within the maximum time limit of twelve months from the day the accrual or effect of the act or omission occurred, except for circumstances in which the act or omission was a continuous one. The failure or default on the part of the aggrieved party or person to bring an action to ventilate his grievances within the prescribed time limit would render his claim (notwithstanding how meritorious) unenforceable. This position of the law has equally been reiterated by the Supreme Court, per Okoro J.S.C., in the recent case of Ibrahim

v. Lawal (2015) 17 NWLR (Pt.1489) 490 @ 523, wherein His Lordship lucidly stated as follows:
“Let me state again for the umpteenth time that where a law prescribes a period for instituting an action, proceedings cannot be instituted after that period. Also, where an action is statute – barred, a plaintiff who might have had a cause of action loses the right to enforce the cause of action by judicial process because the period of time laid down by the limitation law for instituting such an action had elapsed and the right to commence the action would have been extinguished by law. Unfortunately, this is the fate of the 1st – 4th respondents case in the circumstance…

Basically, the question as to whether an action is statute bared is dependent on the nature of the action and the relevant provisions of the statute of limitation. A defence found on statute of limitation is a defence that the plaintiff has no cause of action and even if he has, it has been lost-irretrievably. It is a defence on a point of law which can be raise in limine. In the instant case, a letter dated 1st August, 2005 with Ref. No. GHS/44/XVI/43 conveyed the approval

and issuance of certificate of recognition. It was copied to the 2nd respondent. Thereafter and two years down the line, yet another certificate of recognition was granted/issued by Governor S. I Chime on the 24th day of August, 2007. Again, letter with Ref. No. MCM/CM/98/Vol.II/49/99 dated 25th September, 2007 was written/addressed to the 2nd respondent herein. The letter further conveyed the approval and recognition of the 2nd respondent as Igwe and Traditional Ruler of Ovoko Autononmous Community, with effect from 1st August, 2005. The instant suit was commenced on the 6th day of May, 2009. Thus, as argued by the learned counsel for the appellant , that the right or cause of action if any, accrued more than two to three years before the commencement of the suit. That was way for too long and beyond the durational period stipulated/prescribed by the limitation law that was invoked in this case.

Thus, it is not in dispute in this case that the substantive suit (wherein the instant appeal emanated from) was filed out of time and was therefore caught by the limitation law as provided by the clear provision of Section 37 (I) of the Actions Law and would without

much effort being wasted, be deemed to have been statute barred. However, the respondent’s defence to this was that the said Section 37(1) of the Actions Law was equivalent to Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, and thus, the exception applicable to the said Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act was applicable also to this case. I do not subscribe to this ingeneous argument I have earlier in this judgment, stated that the provision of Section 37 (l) of the Actions Law and Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, even though similar, they do have different effect, application and implication. Thus, the respondent’s bid to escape the effect or hammer of being caught by the provision of Section 37(1) of the Actions Law by averring that the Enugu State Governoros act of confirming the 2nd respondent as the substantive traditional ruler of the Ovoko Autonomous Community as being ultra vires of the Governor and unconstitutional, cannot avail him as such exception is not applicable to Section 37 (1) of the Actions Law.

Let me reiterate and this is for emphasis, that is has been held in a plethora of cases, that it is the

general principles of interpretation of statutes, that in the absence of an ambiguity no exposition shall be made which is opposed to the express words of the statute or instrument. Thus, a Court will not put any interpretation on any enactment which is contrary to its literal or plain meaning. Indeed, if the words are expressly clear, even inconveniences, real or imagined will not justify the Court to depart from their ordinary meanings. See Fred Egbe vs. Yusuf (1992) 6 SCNJ 263; Abubakar & Ors. vs. Nasamu & Ors. (2011) 11-12 SC (Pt.1) 1. Where the words used in a statute are expressed in a clear and unambiguous manner, the duty of the Court is to give literal interpretation to such words, in order to convey its dictionary and dictional meaning. See Alhaji Atiku Abubakar & Ors. vs. Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’adua & Ors. (2008) 12 (Pt.II) 1.

In the instant case, the bottom line is that, since the action is not maintainable because it is statute-barred, it cannot be properly and validly instituted. If instituted, it is liable to be struck out as not having been properly and duly placed before the Court. See P.N. Udoh Trading Co. Ltd. vs. Sunday

Abere & Anor. (2001) 8 SCM. 100. In the light of this, I am therefore of the firm view point that the respondent’s suit No.EZ/8/2009 was filed clearly and glaringly out of time and was without doubt statute bared. It was thus, liable to be struck out in the absence of any saving grace, salvation or succour. This issue is thereby resolved in favour of the appellant.

In the premise and with the sole issue adopted for the determination of this appeal having been resolved in the manner stated above, this appeal hereby succeeds and consequently allowed as being meritorious. Thus, the ruling of the Lower Court delivered on the 10th day of May, 2010 which pertained to the dismissal of the 2nd respondent’s preliminary objection dated and filed on the 13th day of July, 2009 is hereby set aside. Consequently, the respondent’s Suit No.EZ/08/2009 instituted at the Enugu State High Court is hereby struck out for want of jurisdiction and competence. No order is made with regard to costs.

HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading the judgment just delivered by my learned brother MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA JCA. I am in

complete agreement with His Lordship’s reasoning and conclusion that this appeal should be allowed.

I have nothing useful to add. I abide by all the orders in the lead judgment.

MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A.: I had the opportunity of reading before now the lead judgment of my learned brother, HON. JUSTICE MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA, J.C.A. I am in complete agreement with his reasoning, conclusion and all the orders made therein.

Appearances:

Victor Abochi, Esq. (Legal Officer, Ministry of Justice, Enugu) with him, Miss E. I. Idung (Pupil State Counsel, Ministry of Justice, Enugu) For Appellant(s)

Okenna Agbubuzu, Esq. with him, Barth Ezea, Esq., Mrs C. N. Anakek and Miss Ngozi Eze, for 1st Respondent

D. C. Agbakwuru-Onyike, Esq. for 2nd Respondent. For Respondent(s)

Appearances

Victor Abochi, Esq. (Legal Officer, Ministry of Justice, Enugu) with him, Miss E. I. Idung (Pupil State Counsel, Ministry of Justice, Enugu) For Appellant

AND

Okenna Agbubuzu, Esq. with him, Barth Ezea, Esq., Mrs C. N. Anakek and Miss Ngozi Eze, for 1st Respondent

D. C. Agbakwuru-Onyike, Esq. for 2nd Respondent. For Respondent