TAOFEEK ADELEKE & ANOR. V. THE STATE
(2011)LCN/4439(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 31st day of March, 2011
CA/I/65/07
RATIO
ROBBERY: STATUTORY PROVISION ON THE DEFINITION OF “ROBBERY”
What is robbery? Section 15(1) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special provisions) Act Cap 398 defines “Robbery” as follows – “Robbery means stealing anything and at or immediately before or after the time of stealing it, using or threatening to use actual violence to any person or property in order to obtain or retain the thing stolen or to prevent or overcome resistance of its being stolen or retained.” PER STANLEY SHENKO ALAGOA, J.C.A.
PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT/PROOF BEYOND A SHADOW OF DOUBT: DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROOF BEYOND A SHADOW OF DOUBT
it is important to bear in mind that “proof beyond reasonable doubt” is not the same as “proof beyond a shadow of doubt”. Courts have tended to use both expressions interchangeably but this is wrong as it does not represent the true position of the law. “Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to the hilt” according to Denning J in MILLER V. MINISTER OF PENSIONS (1947) 3 All E.R. 373. What the learned Lord Justice (as he was later to become) meant was simply that proof beyond reasonable doubt is to be distinguished from proof beyond shadow of a doubt. In MOSES JUA V. STATE (2010) 43 WRN 1 pages 24-25 erudite scholar and renowned jurist Niki Tobi JSC put this position thus, “While our adjectival law places on the prosecution the duty to prove a criminal case beyond all reasonable doubt, the prosecution has not the duty to prove the case beyond all shadow of doubt The Court can convict an accused person the moment the prosecution proves its case beyond reasonable doubt and proof beyond all shadow of doubt do not mean the same thing. The latter places a heavier burden on the prosecution a burden which is not known to our adjectival law.” See also UGO V. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (1972) 11 SC 37; AMEH V. STATE (1978) 6-7 SC 27. PER STANLEY SHENKO ALAGOA, J.C.A.
PROOF IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: PURPORT OF PROOF IN ALL CRIMINAL TRIALS
The purport of proof in all criminal trials is that if the essential ingredients of the offence have been proved by the prosecution, the charge is proved beyond reasonable doubt. The standard need not be as high as proof beyond a shadow of a doubt. PER STANLEY SHENKO ALAGOA, J.C.A.
OFFENCE OF ROBBERY: WHAT THE PROSECUTION MUST PROVE TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION FOR THE OFFENCE OF ROBBERY
In HENRY OTTI V. THE STATE (1991) 8 NWLR (PART 207) page 103 at 118, it was held that for the offence of robbery to sustain a conviction the prosecution must prove – (a) That the accused stole something; (b) That the thing stolen is in law capable of being stolen; (c) That the accused threatened to use violence or actually used violence immediately before or immediately after the time of stealing the thing; (d) The violence could be on either a person or on a property in order to obtain or retain the thing stolen or to prevent resistance to its being stolen or retained. Once the trial Judge is satisfied that evidence adduced is in proof of these ingredients, he can proceed to convict the accused. See BUJE V. THE STATE (1991) 4 NWLR (PART 185) 287; OTEKI v. ATT. GEN BENDEL STATE (1985) 2 NWLR (PART 24) 648; ONAFOWOKAN V. THE STATE (1987) 3 NWLR (PART 61) 538. PER STANLEY SHENKO ALAGOA, J.C.A.
WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE: WHAT ARE THE TESTS TO BE FOLLOWED BEFORE EVIDENTIAL WEIGHT CAN BE ATTACHED TO CONFESSIONAL STATEMENTS
The procedure adopted by the learned trial Judge in the trial within trial was to my mind proper. Apart from the trial within trial the learned trial Judge evaluated the confessional statements of the Appellants by subjecting them to the six tests before any evidential weight can be attached to them. These are as follows – 1. Is there anything outside the confessional statement to show that it is true? 2. Is it corroborated? 3. Are the relevant statements made in it of facts as they can be tested? 4. Was the prisoner one who had the opportunity of committing the crime? 5. Is his/her confession possible? 6. Is the confession consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and have been proved? The following cases are to the point – R. V. OBISIA (1962) 2 SCNLR 402; (1962) 1 All NLR 651; AFOLABI V. STATE (2010) 19 WRN 117 at 129; NSOFOR. V. STATE (1010) 43 WRN 162 at 187; LUKMON OSETOLA V. STATE (2010) 36 WRN 177 at 182; OKE UTUYORUME V. STATE (2010) 43 WRN 162 at 187; DAWA V. STATE (1980) 8-11 SC 236; R. V. SYKES (1913) 8 CR App REPORTS 223. PER STANLEY SHENKO ALAGOA, J.C.A.
JUSTICES:
STANLEY SHENKO ALAGOA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
SIDI DAUDA BAGE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. TAOFEEK ADELEKE
2. MUMUNI OLAOYE – Appellant(s)
AND
THE STATE – Respondent(s)
STANLEY SHENKO ALAGOA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): In the High Court of Justice Abeokuta Ogun State of Nigeria the present Appellants as 1st and 2nd Accused were arraigned, tried, convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment on a two count charge of Conspiracy to commit Armed Robbery and Robbery. The Charge for which they pleaded not guilty was as follows –
COUNT I – That you Taofeek Adeleke (M), Mumuni Olaoye (M) and others now at large on or about the 15th day of March 2002 at Onigari area of the lbadan/Lagos Expressway in the Abeokuta Judicial Division conspired together to commit a felony to wit: Armed Robbery contrary to section 5(b) and punishable under section 1(2)(a) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act (Cap 398) Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 as amended by the Tribunals (Certain Consequential Amendments etc.) Act 1999.
COUNT II – That you Taofeek Adeleke (M), Mumuni Olaoye (M) and others now at large on or about the 15th day of March 2002 at Onigari area of the Ibadan/Lagos Expressway in the Abeokuta Judicial Division did rob one Mrs. Monsurat Moni Babatunde of the sum of N500,000.00 and thereby committed an offence contrary to section 1(i) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act (Cap 398), Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 as Amended by the Tribunals (Certain Consequential Amendments etc.) Act 1999.
The prosecution called four witnesses to establish its case and also relied on some exhibits while the accused/Appellants gave evidence in defence of themselves. After a full trial and addresses of Counsel, the learned trial Judge Shoremi J. (as he then was) in his reserved judgment delivered on the 14th June, 2004 convicted and sentenced the accused/Appellants as follows –
1st accused Taofeek Adeleke is sentenced as follows:-
1st Count – 10 years imprisonment I.H.L.
2nd Count – 21 years imprisonment I.H.L.
2nd accused Mumuni Olaoye is sentenced as follows:-
1st Count – 10 years imprisonment I.H.L.
2nd Count – 21 years imprisonment I.H.L.
It is against this judgment that the 1st and 2nd accused persons as 1st and 2nd Appellants have appealed to the court of Appeal by their Notice of Appeal dated the 19th January, 2007 which was subsequently amended by an order of Court granted on the 28th May, 2008.
The case for the prosecution is that the 2nd Appellant Mumuni Olaoye who was the driver of PW1 Mrs. Monsurat Moni Babatunde and who had driven her for some three months prior to the present incident, had on the 14th March, 2002 driven PW1 to All States Trust Bank Ibadan where she withdrew a sum of N500,000.00 which she intended to take to Lagos for business the following day. The 2nd Appellant asked her for the sum of N5,000.00 as loan and her account is that she refused to give it to him because he had just been paid and she told him so. Having collected the N500,000.00 from All States Trust Bank Ibadan she went home. The next day being the 15th March, 2002, PW1, her daughter Temitope, her Ward and one Morufat Adebayo (PW2) left for Lagos driven by the 2nd Appellant. PW1 instructed 2nd Appellant to buy petrol at Challenge Ibadan but he insisted that he would buy it elsewhere. The 2nd Appellant began the journey to Lagos on the fast lane of the Expressway but suddenly changed to the slow lane.
When he was asked by PW1 whether there was any problem his response was that there was none. In the course of their journey to Lagos a black Mercedes Benz car which drove parallel to them asked the 2nd Appellant to stop and park by the roadside, the occupants of the said Benz car claiming to be policemen. PW1 suspicious that they could not be policemen ordered the 2nd Appellant not to heed to them but to accelerate further. Noticing that her instructions were being flouted by the 2nd Appellant she asked him to vacate the driver’s seat so that she would take over the driving herself and speed off from the intruders but the 2nd Appellant ignored her and parked their car while the other car also parked some metres away and the occupants of the Mercedes Benz car came down with an iron rod. PW1 again ordered the 2nd Appellant to start the car but the 2nd Appellant refused. One of the robbers then went to PW1 while the other went to the 2nd Appellant.
The 2nd Appellant alighted from the vehicle and discussed with the robbers. Thereafter one of the robbers went to PW1 and told her they were armed robbers. PW1 alighted from the car and the robbers demanded for money. One of the robbers took the bag from one of the occupants of PW1’s car, opened it and went back to the 2nd Appellant. He then went back to PW1 and specifically demanded for the bag containing N500,000.00 threatening in the process to kill her. The robber then went into the car and took the bag containing the money. He asked PW1 to lie down and wanted to know from her whether the money was complete. The 2nd Appellant also told PW1 and the others to lie face down because the robbers had guns. The robbers then went into the vehicle to remove the ignition key.
When they could not remove it they called on the 2nd Appellant who removed it and gave it to them. The 2nd Appellant told PW1 to leave everything to God.
From the amended Notice of Appeal the Appellant has formulated the following two issues for determination of the Court of Appeal viz –
1. Whether the prosecution proved a case of attempted Robbery against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt particularly in the light of the Evidence adduced?
2. Whether the learned trial Judge properly evaluated the evidence before the Court and if the defence put up by the Appellant was considered?
These issues are contained in paragraph 3.00 at page 4 of the Appellants’ Brief of Argument dated the 19th June, 2008 and filed on the 22nd June, 2009 but deemed properly filed on the 13th July, 2008 following the grant by this Court of a motion on Notice dated 19th June, 2008 and filed on the 22nd June, 2009 for the Appellant to extend time to file his Brief of Argument and to deem the Brief of Argument already filed and served as properly filed and served.
This application which was brought pursuant to Order 7 Rule 10(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2007 and under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court was granted on the 13th July, 2009 and the Appellants’ Brief of Argument deemed as properly filed and served on that day.
The Respondent on their part formulated a sole issue for the determination of this Court viz –
“Whether from the totality of evidence the prosecution proved the offences of Conspiracy to Commit Armed Robbery and Robbery beyond reasonable doubt.”
This sole issue is contained in paragraph 4.01 at page 5 of the Respondent’s Brief of Argument, dated the 21st October, 2010, filed on the 21st October 2010 and also deemed as properly filed same day. This followed the grant by this Court on the 21st October 2010 of a motion for the Respondent to extend time to file their Brief and to deem their Brief already filed and served as properly so filed and served. This appeal came up for hearing on the 28th February, 2011.
O. Agbebi with him O. Oyegun (Miss) adopted and relied on the Appellants’ brief of Argument and urged this Court to allow the appeal.
A. Osibanjo, Hon. Attorney-General of Ogun State urged this Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial High Court. With him were the following J. K. Omotosho ADPP Ogun State, J. A. O. Lawal (Mrs.) PSC, O. O. Adeniyi SC, R. T. Shokanmi SC, and D.A. Johnmark SC.
I consider the sole issue distilled by the Respondent as appropriate to effectually dispose of this appeal i.e. Whether from the totality of the evidence, the prosecution proved the offences of Conspiracy to commit Armed robbery and Robbery beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellant.
Conspiracy to Commit Armed Robbery and Robbery being criminal in nature must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. This heavy burden on the shoulders of the prosecution does not shift until it is discharged and it must constantly be borne in mind that every accused person under the Nigerian Criminal Justice system is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. Authorities on these principles of law are inexhaustive. See the following –
NWEKE V. STATE (2001) 15 WRN 96; (2001) 4 NWLR (PART 704) 588;
AIGBADON V. STATE (2000) 7 NWLR (PART 555) 586 AT 754; (2000) 7 LRCN 820; (2001) 2 ACLR 60;
NWOSU V. STATE (1998) 8 NWLR (PART 562) 433 at 444;
IDEMUDA V. STATE (1999) 7 NWLR (PART 61O 202 at 205; (1999) 5 SCNJ 47; (2001) FWLR (part 55) 549;
ESANGBEDO V. STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (PART 113) 57;
TANKO V. STATE (2008) 31 WRN 117; (2008) 16 NWLR (PART 1114) 597 at 636;
OWE V. QUEEN (1961) 2 SCNLR 354;
DIBIE V. STATE (2007) 7 SCM 101.
I shall deal with the offence of Robbery first before proceeding on to the Conspiracy aspect. What is robbery?
Section 15(1) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special provisions) Act Cap 398 defines “Robbery” as follows –
“Robbery means stealing anything and at or immediately before or after the time of stealing it, using or threatening to use actual violence to any person or property in order to obtain or retain the thing stolen or to prevent or overcome resistance of its being stolen or retained.”
With this definition constantly in mind, is there sufficient evidence which the prosecution can fall back on as proof beyond reasonable doubt that there was a robbery of PW1’s N500,000.00 by the Appellants on the 15th March 2002 on the Ibadan/Lagos Expressway? We shall visit or revisit the evidence of all the ‘dramatis perconae’ on the day of the incident but before doing so, it is important to bear in mind that “proof beyond reasonable doubt” is not the same as “proof beyond a shadow of doubt”. Courts have tended to use both expressions interchangeably but this is wrong as it does not represent the true position of the law. “Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to the hilt” according to Denning J in MILLER V. MINISTER OF PENSIONS (1947) 3 ALL E.R. 373. What the learned Lord Justice (as he was later to become) meant was simply that proof beyond reasonable doubt is to be distinguished from proof beyond shadow of a doubt. In MOSES JUA V. STATE (2010) 43 WRN 1 pages 24-25 erudite scholar and renowned jurist Niki Tobi JSC put this position thus,
“While our adjectival law places on the prosecution the duty to prove a criminal case beyond all reasonable doubt, the prosecution has not the duty to prove the case beyond all shadow of doubt The Court can convict an accused person the moment the prosecution proves its case beyond reasonable doubt and proof beyond all shadow of doubt do not mean the same thing. The latter places a heavier burden on the prosecution a burden which is not known to our adjectival law.”
See also UGO V. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (1972) 11 SC 37; AMEH V. STATE (1978) 6-7 SC 27.
The purport of proof in all criminal trials is that if the essential ingredients of the offence have been proved by the prosecution, the charge is proved beyond reasonable doubt. The standard need not be as high as proof beyond a shadow of a doubt. In HENRY OTTI V. THE STATE (1991) 8 NWLR (PART 207) page 103 at 118, it was held that for the offence of robbery to sustain a conviction the prosecution must prove –
(a) That the accused stole something;
(b) That the thing stolen is in law capable of being stolen;
(c) That the accused threatened to use violence or actually used violence immediately before or immediately after the time of stealing the thing;
(d) The violence could be on either a person or on a property in order to obtain or retain the thing stolen or to prevent resistance to its being stolen or retained.
Once the trial Judge is satisfied that evidence adduced is in proof of these ingredients, he can proceed to convict the accused. See BUJE V. THE STATE (1991) 4 NWLR (PART 185) 287; OTEKI v. ATT. GEN BENDEL STATE (1985) 2 NWLR (PART 24) 648; ONAFOWOKAN V. THE STATE (1987) 3 NWLR (PART 61) 538.
Earlier in this write-up the evidence of PW1 the Robbery victim was comprehensively reproduced. It shows in graphic detail how the Robbery operation was carried out by the Appellants and the nefarious role played by the 2nd Appellant her employee before, during and after the Robbery operation. 2nd Appellant impliedly did not want the matter investigated when he advised PW1 after the robbery incident to “leave the matter to God”.
Mention must now be made of the confessional statements of the Appellants Exhibit C, D, E and F. The entire Statement of the 1st Appellant is confessionary of the crime.
He said that 2nd Appellant had visited him on the 14th March, 2002 to intimate him that PW1 had withdrawn some money and how he and PW1 would travel to Lagos the next day being 15th March, 2002 and that they should rob her of the withdrawn money. He then went to intimate one Ishola while the 2nd Appellant went to inform three others namely Kunle, Shola Black and Sunday and they all arranged how to carry on with the robbery operation.
2nd Appellant in his own confessional statement said that in the evening of the 14th March, 2002 he went to inform the 1st Appellant and Ishola that PW1 had withdrawn some money that day and would be going to Lagos the next day to buy goods. He said he knew them to be robbers and they promised him that if they succeeded they would give him his own share.
He said the 1st Appellant and one Ishola were among the robbers in the Mercedes Benz car who introduced themselves as policemen and promised to assist the police in locating all the miscreants when called upon to do so.
It is instructive to say that PW2 Morufat Adebayo’s evidence was corroborative of the evidence of PW1. She described PW1 as a mother. She had been to All States Trust Bank Ibadan on the 14th Marc, 2002 with PW1 and 2nd Appellant. She said three of them got into the bank together and while in there she sat with 2nd Appellant on a bench.
Under cross-examination, she said the N500,000.00 was given to her in two bundles. She put the money in a bag. She was not only told that the money was N500,000.00 she also saw it. The cross-examination of PW2 rather than weakening the prosecution’s case strengthened it. The robbers had after conferring with the 2nd Appellant asked PW1 for the bag containing the N500,000.00. Any doubt that the 2nd Appellant though seated in the bank could not have known the amount of money withdrawn by PW1 is dispelled by the fact that she sat on the same bench with PW2 when she was given the N500,000.00 to put in the bag. PW2 also stated in her evidence that it was in their presence that the 2nd Appellant after being detained for about a week told his brother Akeem and a sister that he sent one Sola and Akibu to rob PW1.
Suffice it to say that the evidence of PW1 and PW2 scaled through the rigours of cross-examination.
On the other hand the confessional statements of 1st and 2nd Appellants were consistent, free flowing and in harmony with each other. The learned trial Judge conducted a trial within trial to determine the voluntariness or otherwise of the 2nd Appellant’s confessional statement and it was after he was satisfied that it was voluntarily made that he admitted same.
The procedure adopted by the learned trial Judge in the trial within trial was to my mind proper.
Apart from the trial within trial the learned trial Judge evaluated the confessional statements of the Appellants by subjecting them to the six tests before any evidential weight can be attached to them. These are as follows –
1. Is there anything outside the confessional statement to show that it is true?
2. Is it corroborated?
3. Are the relevant statements made in it of facts as they can be tested?
4. Was the prisoner one who had the opportunity of committing the crime?
5. Is his/her confession possible?
6. Is the confession consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and have been proved?
The following cases are to the point – R. V. OBISIA (1962) 2 SCNLR 402; (1962) 1 All NLR 651; AFOLABI V. STATE (2010) 19 WRN 117 at 129; NSOFOR. V. STATE (1010) 43 WRN 162 at 187; LUKMON OSETOLA V. STATE (2010) 36 WRN 177 at 182; OKE UTUYORUME V. STATE (2010) 43 WRN 162 at 187; DAWA V. STATE (1980) 8-11 SC 236; R. V. SYKES (1913) 8 CR App REPORTS 223.
At page 49 of the Record of Appeal the learned trial had stated thus,
“Having gone so far and from the circumstances of the case it is quite clear from the evidence of 1st and 2nd prosecution witnesses together with unsolicited confession of the 1st and 2nd accused persons that an offence had been committed. The denial of the 1st and 2nd accused persons of their involvement in the crime is an afterthought.”
The learned trial by this assertion –
(a) Considered all the circumstances of the case;
(b) Considered the evidence of the 1st and 2nd prosecution witnesses;
(c) Considered the confessions of the 1st and 2nd Appellants.
Thus without specifically saying so, the learned trial Judge had by his assertion subjected the confessional statements to the six tests enunciated above.
I shall now turn my attention to the issue of Conspiracy to commit this crime. Conspiracy has been held to be a meeting of the minds of the Conspirators to carry out an unlawful act or to carry out a lawful act by unlawful means and conviction for conspiracy is usually based on circumstantial evidence. See ODUNE V. STATE (2001) 13 WRN 88; (2001) SC (PART) 11 UPAHAR V. STATE (20031 5 NWLR (PART 139) 1512; PATRICK NJOVENS V. STATE (1973) I SC 17; OKEKE V. STATE (1999) 2 NWLR PART 590 page 245 at 265.
There can be no doubt that from their confessional statements the 1st and 2nd Appellants conspired to rob PW1 of N500,000.00 on the 15th march 2002. 2nd Appellant told the 1st Appellant about the withdrawal by PW1 of the sum of N500,000.00 from All States Trust Bank on the 14th March 2002. He told 1st Appellant that PW1 was going to travel to Lagos on a business trip the following day 15th March 2002.
They had discussions with other persons and planned how they were going to carry out the robbery operation and they did succeed in carrying out the robbery operation. Conspiracy is a separate offence and I am satisfied that the prosecution has proved the case of conspiracy against the 1st and 2nd Appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The judgment of the learned trial Judge is certainly not perverse as –
(a) It does not run counter to the evidence.
(b) It has been shown that the trial Court took into account matters which it ought to take into account.
(c) It has not occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
See ARCHIBONG V. STATE (2004) NWLR PART 855 page 488 at 498.
Consequently, I have no reson to disturb the findings of the learned trial Judge. The Judgment of Shoremi J. (as he was) delivered on the 14th June in Charge No. AB/17R/2002 is hereby affirmed by me. Learned Counsel for the 1st & 2nd Appellants Mr. Agbebi had informed the Court on the 28th February, 2011 that the 2nd Appellant had been granted State pardon. Hon. Attorney General of Ogun State Professor Osibanjo who personally argued this appeal did not contest this assertion. This judgment is therefore without prejudice to the State pardon granted to the 2nd Appellant.
SIDI DAUDA BAGE, J.C.A.: I had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment prepared by my learned brother S.S. ALAGOA, J.C.A. just delivered. I am in full agreement with the reasonings and conclusions contained in the said judgment, affirming the decision of the lower court.
I abide with the consequential orders contained therein.
JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.: I concur in the judgment prepared by my learned brother, Alagoa, J.C.A., with these few words. Conspiracy to commit armed robbery was proved beyond reasonable doubt by the respondent against the appellants. Both appellants were shown by the unshaken evidence in the court below and their confessional statements that they had schemed to rob P.W.1 of money, The 2nd appellant as the driver of the p.w.1 provided inside information to the 1st appellant and the others at large on the withdrawal of N500,000 by P.W.1 from the bank.
The 2nd appellant was therefore the link person in the chain of the conspiracy to rob the P.W.1. His treacherous mind met with the others on the hatching of the conspiracy, As aptly held by Jackson, J, in Krulewitch v. United States 335 U.S 440 at 2148 or 69 S. Ct. 716 at 719 -720, conspiracy,
“… is always predominantly mental in composition because it consists primarily of a meeting of the minds and an intent.”
See also Okosun v. A.G. Bendel State (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt.12) 283, Ibrahim v. The State (2011) 1 NWLR (pt.1227) at 33; Usufu v. The State (2007) 1 NWLR (Pt.1020) 94 at 124.
The appeal is devoid of merit. I dismiss it and affirm the decision of the court below.
Appearances
O. Agbebi Esq. with him Miss O. Oyegun For Appellant
AND
A. Osibanjo, Hon. Attorney-General of Ogun State with him J.
K. Omotosho ADPP Ogun State, J. A. O. Lawal (Mrs.) PSC,
O. O. Adeniyi SC, R. T. Shokanmi SC, D.A. Johnmark SC For Respondent
