SYLVESTER OKONKWO v. HON. EBELE OBI & ORS
(2019)LCN/13508(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 14th day of June, 2019
CA/A/359/2019
RATIO
JURISDICTION : THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES PROVIDES FOR JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of Courts is specified and governed by the provisions of the Constitution or the statute that created them. A Court cannot assume jurisdiction to adjudicate in a cause or matter unless its jurisdiction has been properly invoked. Any proceeding conducted without jurisdiction is a nullity, no matter how well conducted and no matter how sound the decision or orders made Ntherein. It has been held that the issue of jurisdiction is extrinsic to adjudication. Since MADUKOLU v. NKEMDILIM (1962) 1 ALL NLR 587 at 593 was handed down, it has remained a locus classicus as to when a Court is competent to assume jurisdiction to entertain a suit or matter. It is stated clearly therein that a Court is competent when: –
1. It is properly constituted as regards members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or the other; and
2. The subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court exercising its jurisdiction, and
3. The case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.PER ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
JURISDICTION OF A COURT CAN BE DETERMINED BY PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM
It is trite law that the jurisdiction of the Court is determined by the plaintiff’s claim as disclosed in the pleadings i.e writ of summons and/or endorsed in the statement of claim, or as in the instant case, the affidavit in support of the originating summons, rather than the defendants’ statement of defence. See the cases of SKEN CONSULT VS. UKEY (1981) 1 S.C 6; LADO VS CPC (2011) 18 NWLR PT. 1279 689.PER ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
THE COURTS CANNOT DECIDE WHO SHOULD BE SPONSORED BY A POLITICAL PARTY
The Courts do not have jurisdiction to decide who should be sponsored by any political party as its candidate in an election. See OLUGBEMI VS. LAWRENCE 2017 16 NWLR PT. 1591 AT 246-247.PER ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
A DISSATISFIED CANDIDATE CAN PROTEST THE RESULT OF A PRIMARY ELECTION
But where a political party decides to conduct primary election to choose its flag bearer, any dissatisfied contestant at the primary is empowered by Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 to ventilate his complaint before the Federal High Court or High Court of a State or FCT.PER ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
ADAMU JAURO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
SYLVESTER OKONKWO Appellant(s)
AND
1. HON. EBELE OBI
2. ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS (APC)
3. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC) Respondent(s)
ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appeal herein is against the Judgment of the Federal High Court, sitting at Abuja, delivered on 5th day of April, 2019 by Hon. Justice Taiwo O. Taiwo in Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1463/2018.
The Appellant herein was the 2nd defendant at the trial Court, while the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents were the plaintiff, 1st and 3rd Defendants respectively.
Brief summary of the facts of this case is that the 1st respondent, Senator Uche Ekwunife and one other candidate expressed their interest to run for Senate to represent Anambra Central Senatorial District of Anambra State. At the expiration of the time allotted by the 2nd respondent for 1st respondent, obtaining expression of interest and nomination forms, the Senator Uche Ekwunife and one other candidate were the only ones who obtained, filled and returned their forms to the 2nd respondent. The National Committee of the 2nd respondent finally published the names of aspirants cleared to contest the primary election of the party, which also did not include the name of the appellant.
?The 2nd respondent scheduled its Senatorial primary election for
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Anambra State for 2nd October, 2018 but failed to hold on that day. The Senatorial primary election was re-scheduled to 4th October, 2018 but the members of the primary election committee set up by the 2nd respondent failed to show up and the election did not hold. Later, the aspirants were told by one Barr. Chukwuma Agufugo that the primary election was to hold on 7th October, 2018, on the said 7th October, 2018 the news of non-arrival of the election committee frittered in. Based on the aspirants’ complaints, the National working committee of the 2nd respondent promised to deploy another panel to conduct the primary election. On 18th October, 2018, the 2nd respondent submitted a list of candidates for Anambra State including Anambra Central Senatorial district to the 3rd respondent by which the name of Senator Uche Ekwunife was forwarded as the 2nd respondent’s candidate for Anambra Central Senatorial District.
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Aggrieved by the nomination of Senator Uche Ekwunife, the 1st Respondent commenced an action at the Federal High Court in suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1274/18 against the 2nd respondent herein, Senator Uche Ekwunife & another to set aside the
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nomination of the said Senator Uche Ekwunife and to compel the 2nd respondent to conduct its primary election before nominating a candidate. Later, Senator Uche Ekwunife voluntarily withdrew her candidacy and communicated same to the 2nd respondent. The National working committee of the 2nd respondent immediately called all the stakeholders of the party in the gate to a meeting and indicated their interest to pick a candidate to substitute Senator Uche Ekwunife. The 2nd respondent on 17th November, 2018 substituted Senator Uche Ekwunife with the appellant.
Dissatisfied, the 1st Respondent commenced this suit. By an originating summons dated 30th November, 2018 and filed on the same date the 1st respondent as plaintiff at the trial Court sought for the determination of the questions as can be found at pages 3 to 4 of the record of appeal. Upon the determination of the said questions, the plaintiff prays the Court for the reliefs, as can be found at page 4 to 6 of the record of appeal. The originating summons is supported by an affidavit of 32 paragraphs deposed to by Hon. Ebele Obi on 30/11/2019 and exhibits attached. The plaintiff also filed a
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further affidavit on 25/1/2019 and a further and better affidavit on 21/3/2019, all in support of the originating summons.
Upon service with the plaintiff?s originating processes, the 1st and 3rd defendant did not enter appearance, nor filed any process in this suit.
However, the 2nd defendant on his part filed a counter affidavit of 4 paragraphs on 1/2/2019 in opposition to the originating summons with a written address in support. The plaintiff filed a reply on point of law to the 2nd defendant’s written address in opposition to the originating summons.
The 2nd defendant also filed a notice of preliminary objection of 3 paragraphs on 13/2/2019 seeking for an order(s) striking out the plaintiff’s suit (among others). In support of the preliminary objection is a written address filed on 13/2/2019. The grounds of the objections are as can be found at pages 220 of the record of appeal. The plaintiff on his part filed a counter affidavit of 3 paragraphs in opposition to the said preliminary objection and a written address in support. See pages 231 to 238 of the record of appeal.
The trial Court in its ruling dismissed the
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preliminary objection, and on the substantive suit, it entered judgment in favour of the plaintiff as per reliefs 1 to 5. Dissatisfied with the said ruling/judgment of the trial Court, the Appellant herein who was the 2nd defendant at the trial Court filed his notice of appeal dated 17th April, 2019. The notice appeal which appears on pages 287-290 of the record of appeal contains 4 grounds of appeal. The record of appeal was compiled and transmitted to the Court on 25/4/2019. The briefs of argument were subsequently filed and exchanged by the parties in accordance with the Rules of Court.
On 20th May, 2019, the appeal was heard before the Court. The Appellant’s Counsel adopted the Appellant’s brief of argument and urged the Court to allow the appeal. The 1st Respondent’s Counsel on his part adopted the 1st Respondent’s brief of argument and urged the Court to dismiss the appeal.
The Appellant from his 4 grounds of appeal distilled four issues for determination as follows:
1. Whether the Honourable Judge was right when he assumed Jurisdiction to determine the suit?
2. Whether the Honourable Court was right in holding that the suit can be
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determined by originating summons?
3. Whether the Honourable Court was right in holding that no issue was joined by the appellant at all in defending the suit?
4. Whether the Honourable Judge was right in its decision that there was no valid substitution of the name of the appellant?
The 1st Respondent on his part distilled two issues for determination as follows;
1. Whether the Honourable Court was right when he assumed Jurisdiction to determine the suit and held there was no valid substitution of the appellant?
2. Whether the Honourable Court was right in holding the suit can be determined by originating summons, the appellant having not substantially joined issues with the 1st respondent?
The 2nd and 3rd respondents have not filed any brief of argument. The two issues as formulated by the 1st respondent is all encompassing. Therefore, the appeal will be determined on the basis of the two issues raised in the 1st Respondent’s brief of argument.
ISSUE ONE
Whether the Honourable Court was right when he assumed Jurisdiction to determine the suit and held there was no valid substitution of the appellant?
?
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Learned counsel for the Appellant contended that this case is a mere internal politics of a political party, which the 1st respondent called upon the trial Court to decide upon. He submitted that a member of a political party does not have locus standi to question the party?s prerogative right, on the issue of choice of its candidate for elective offices. The only redress available to such a member who is aggrieved, as a result of refusing him nomination and sponsorship, is damages against the political party.
He argued that the 1st respondent did not participate in the substitution process. The 1st respondent also conceded that no primary election was held in APC for the Anambra Central Senatorial Zone, therefore, the trial Court was wrong in its decision that the 1st respondent can renege from his admission of no primary election.
Learned counsel contended further that this suit is a forum shopping having been determined in Abuja and not Anambra State where the cause of action arose. He referred the Court to the cases of;MADUKOLU VS. NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 SC NLR 341; DANIEL VS. AMOSUN (2012) 11 WRN 47; EMENIKE VS. PDP (2012) 13 NWLR PT. 1310 PG 557;
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PDP VS. SYLVA (2012) 13 NWLR PT. 1316 AT 146; EMEKA VS. OKADIGBO (2012) 18 NWLR PT. 1331 PG 55 AT 88; ADEOSUN VS. GOVT OF EKITI STATE (2012) ALL FWLR PT. 619 1044 SC.
On whether the trial Court was right in its decision that there was no valid substitution of the name of the appellant, the appellant counsel submitted that by virtue of Section 33 of the Electoral Act, 2010, a political party shall not be allowed to change or substitute its candidate whose name has been submitted pursuant to Section 31 of the Electoral Act 2010 except in case of death or withdrawal by the candidate.
He maintained that by virtue of Section 35 of the Electoral Act, 2010 a candidate may withdraw his candidature by notice in writing signed by him. He referred the Court to the Exhibits attached to further affidavit in support of the originating summons at pages 144 to 163 of the record of appeal.
Learned counsel contended that there is no any law that stated that before substitution of a candidate there must be a valid primary election. He insisted that the case of the appellant is the issue of substitution, which was done in line with Sections 33 and 35 of the Electoral Act, 2010
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and not Section 87 of the Electoral Act.
He referred the Court to the cases of; ONUOHA VS. OKAFOR (1983) 2 SCNLR PG 244; PDP VS. SYLVA (2012) 13 NWLR PT. 1316 PG 85. UGWU VS. ARARUME (2007) 12 NWLR PT. 1048 PG 365.
He contended that the cases of OGBONNA VS. IMO STATE; MATO VS. HEMBER & UZODINMA VS. IZUNASO relied upon by the trial Court are not relevant to the instant case.
In response, learned counsel for the 1st respondent, submitted that a political party is bound by its constitution and guidelines, and the procedure, way and manner for the nomination of candidates are regulated by the provisions of section 87 of the Electoral Act, 2010. He referred the Court to the cases of; PDP VS. SYLVA SUPRA; SHINKAFI VS. YARI (2016) 7 NWLR PT. 1511 AT 415.
He maintained that it is surprising that at the trial Court the appellant could not substantiate his counter affidavit with even a single document throughout the entire proceedings. He referred the Court to the finding of the trial Court in its judgment at pages 271-272 of the record, and contended that the finding of the lower Court is not challenged by the appellant and therefore must be deemed to
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be valid.
In response to the appellant’s contention that this suit is a forum shopping having been determined in Abuja and not Anambra State the 1st respondent’s counsel contended that the Federal High Court in Nigeria has only one jurisdiction. He referred the Court to Section 249 (1) of the CFRN 1999 as amended and the case of ABIOLA VS FRN (1995) 3 NWLR PT. 382 AT 231. He maintained that the word “Jurisdiction” used in Section 45 of the Federal High Court Act does not in any way limit the jurisdiction of the Court to the place or area in relation to which the word is used. Learned counsel argued that there is only one Federal High Court with territorial jurisdiction over the entire country. He maintained that the cause of action in this case crystallized when the 2nd respondent forwarded the name of the appellant to the 3rd respondent as its candidate, which took place between the 2nd and 3rd respondent in Abuja within the jurisdiction of the trial Court.
He submitted further that the event complained of by the 1st respondent was the forwarding of the name of the appellant to the 3rd respondent without a valid primary election. However, the cause of
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action cannot be founded merely on the non-conduct of the primary election; it is the nomination and unlawful substitution of the candidate without a valid primary election that gave rise to the cause of action. He referred the Court to the cases of; J.O. AYINDE VS. SAMUEL A. ADIGUN (1993) LPELR-678 SC; LASISI FADARE & ORS VS. A.G. OYO STATE 1982 4 SC 1.
On the appellant?s contention that the 1st respondent did not participate in the substitution process, the 1st respondent submitted that the main thrust of the argument of the 1st respondent at the trial Court was that you cannot place something on nothing and expect it to stand. He contended that the issue in this suit is in all fours with the authority ofISA SHAIBU LAU VS. PDP & ORS 2017 LPELR-42800 SC.
Learned counsel for the 1st respondent submitted further that the 1st respondent filed an action in Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1274/18 challenging the validity of a purported primary election of the 2nd respondent which produced Senator Uche Ekwunife as its candidate. The 2nd defendant in the said suit (Senator Uche Ekwunife) withdrew her candidature and defected to PDP. But rather than the
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1st respondent conducting a valid primary election or substituting from the list of persons that presented themselves for primary election that never held, the 1st respondent procured the appellant who did not purchase expression of interest or nomination form and substituted him with the erstwhile purported candidate. He referred the Court to pages 111-133 & 144-147 of the record of appeal respectively and the cases of; AGHEDO VS. ADENOMO (2018) 13 NWLR PT.1636 AT 304; MRS. SUSAN OLAPEJU SINMISOLA OLLY VS. HON. OLUKOLU GANIYU TUNJI & ORS (2012) LPELR-7911 CA.
He argued that Sections 31, 33 and 35 of the Electoral Act, 2010 can only operate when there had been a valid primary election. He urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the 1st respondent.
The jurisdiction of Courts is specified and governed by the provisions of the Constitution or the statute that created them. A Court cannot assume jurisdiction to adjudicate in a cause or matter unless its jurisdiction has been properly invoked. Any proceeding conducted without jurisdiction is a nullity, no matter how well conducted and no matter how sound the decision or orders made
12
therein. It has been held that the issue of jurisdiction is extrinsic to adjudication. Since MADUKOLU v. NKEMDILIM (1962) 1 ALL NLR 587 at 593 was handed down, it has remained a locus classicus as to when a Court is competent to assume jurisdiction to entertain a suit or matter. It is stated clearly therein that a Court is competent when: –
1. It is properly constituted as regards members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or the other; and
2. The subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court exercising its jurisdiction, and
3. The case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.
The appellant contended that the trial Court was not right when it assumed jurisdiction to determine the 1st respondent’s suit filed before it. It is trite law that the jurisdiction of the Court is determined by the plaintiff’s claim as disclosed in the pleadings i.e writ of summons and/or endorsed in the statement of claim, or as in the instant case, the affidavit in support of the
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originating summons, rather than the defendants’ statement of defence. See the cases of SKEN CONSULT VS. UKEY (1981) 1 S.C 6; LADO VS CPC (2011) 18 NWLR PT. 1279 689.
On the issue that this suit is a forum shopping as contended by the appellant, I have read the originating summons, the affidavit in support, and the documents filed by the 1st respondent in the trial Court. These processes span pages 3 to 133 of the record of appeal. From the originating processes filed by the 1st respondent, it is evident that, the action of substituting the name of Senator Uche Ekwunife with that of the appellant and the forwarding the name of the appellant to INEC by the 2nd respondent, took place at Abuja. See paragraph 27 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons.
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The provision of Order 2 Rule 1, particularly Sub-rule (9) of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2009 is clear that it is the nature of the plaintiff’s claim that determines the Judicial Division of the Federal High Court where the suit is to be commenced and determined. Where the suit does not relate to taxation, penalties, contract, customs, excise, tariff, foreign trade,
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passport, immigration or copyright as specified under Order 2 Rule 1 Sub-rules (2) to (8) of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, the suit must be commenced and determined in the Judicial Division where the defendant resides or carries on his business or where the cause of action arose as stipulated by Sub-rule (9) of the said rule.
In the instant case, the substitution and forwarding of the name of the appellant to the INEC by the 2nd respondent, which took place at Abuja, in my view constitutes those very facts which must be shown to have happened in order to give the 1st respondent the right to sue. Therefore, the cause of action in this case arose at Abuja. It is my view that by the 1st respondent’s originating summons and the affidavit in support he has shown that Abuja Judicial Division of the Federal High Court, was or is the venue where his suit ought to have been commenced and determined.
On the appellant’s contention that the 1st respondent’s suit is a non-justiciable, I have carefully perused the 1st respondent’s originating processes and entire argument of both parties in this appeal, the action complained at the trial Court by
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the 1st respondent was the act of 2nd respondent in submitting the name of the appellant to the 3rd respondent, by way of substitution as its candidate, upon withdrawal of the candidate whose name was initially forwarded to the INEC (as the 2nd respondent’s candidate), without a valid primary election. At paragraph 30 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons the 1st respondent as plaintiff averred thus;
“If at all, there could be substitution, I am the person whose name ought to be forwarded to the 3rd defendant upon the withdrawal of Senator Uche Ekwunife as I purchased the expression of interest and nomination forms from the 1st defendant, and was screened and cleared to contest the primaries and also presented myself for the primary election”.
The trial Court in its judgment held thus:
The purported submission of withdrawal letter to the 3rd defendant by the 1st defendant which purportedly paved the way for the 2nd defendant?s name to be submitted as a candidate were all exercise in futility as there was no primary election in Anambra State. The list submitted to INEC, that is the name of the 2nd defendant,
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becomes hollow, baseless and invalid.? Underline mine for emphasis.
It is mandatory for political parties to forward only names of the candidates who won their primaries. In the instant case, the 1st respondent admitted that he has filed an action at the Federal High Court in suit No. FHCFCT/CS/1274/18 seeking to set aside the nomination of Senator Uche Ekwunife as the candidate of the 2nd respondent. See paragraph 25 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons at page 11 of the record. There is no evidence before the trial Court or this Court that the said suit was determined by the Federal High Court one way or the other. Therefore, the holding of the trial Court that there was no valid primary election, an issue which is not before it in my view is speculative. I so hold.
The nomination of a candidate to contest an election is the sole responsibility of the political party concerned. The Courts do not have jurisdiction to decide who should be sponsored by any political party as its candidate in an election. See OLUGBEMI VS. LAWRENCE 2017 16 NWLR PT. 1591 AT 246-247.
But where a political party decides to conduct primary
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election to choose its flag bearer, any dissatisfied contestant at the primary is empowered by Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 to ventilate his complaint before the Federal High Court or High Court of a State or FCT. In the instant case, the 1st respondent is not an aspirant in any primary election, as he alleged there was none conducted at all. It is trite law that a member of a political party does not have the locus standi to question the party’s right on the issue of choice of candidate for elective post. The redress to a member who is aggrieved and who suffered damages as a result of refusing him nomination is damages against the political party and a refund of all monies paid to the political party.
In the case of ANGADI Vs PDP & ORS (2018) LPELR-44375 (SC) the supreme Court per Peter-Odilli JSC held thus: –
“From the claims what the appellant really is seeking is the invocation of Section 87 (4) (c) (ii) of the Electoral Act 2010 as amended and using the Court to compel a political party and in this case the PDP or 1st respondent to impose him as its candidate. The limitations placed on the Court in the application of Section 87 of the Electoral Act
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are in a long line of cases and I shall refer to what my learned brothers faced with similar situation had to say. In Tukur v UBA (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt.1343) 90 at 162E-163E, this Honourable Court followed Onuoha v Okafor (supra) and held that: “No aspirant is entitled to approach the Court to force the political party to nominate him or her as candidate on the pre that a breach of the party’s guidelines had occurred… However, the Court has been empowered by the introduction of Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act to see that the guidelines of a political party are not breached albeit with impunity thereby ensuring that no excesses and arbitrariness of political parties are foisted on a member of the party. The above does not detract from the right of the political party in its sponsorship of a candidate of its choice…””…the Court has NO business whatsoever in entering into the process rightly or wrongly done by a political party in its selection of a candidate of its liking. The BEST the Court can do WHERE A BREACH HAS TAKEN PLACE lay in DAMAGES to assuage the candidate’s grievance.” (Emphasis added). The appellant in paragraph 3.83
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of his brief predicated his claims on Section 87 (4) (c) (ii) of the Electoral Act 2010, as amended. However, inAdebayo v PDP (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt.1382) 1 at 59 – 60 H-B; your Lordships held that:-“…the question of jurisdiction as raised hereunder Section 87(4) (c) (ii), C(ii) and 9 in this matter is statutory and that the Courts have limited jurisdiction when invoked under Section 87 (9) (supra) by an aspirant who has participated in the primaries; and which has given him the necessary locus standi… The provision of the subsection has conferred on the Courts that limited jurisdiction which in my view HAS NOT derogated from the non-justiciability of a party’s wide discretionary powers of choosing one of its members for the elective office…” (Emphasis added) ” (Underlining mine for emphasis)
On the issue of substitution of the name of Senator Uche Ekwunife with that of the appellant, there is evidence on record that Senator Uche Ekwunife withdrew her candidature by notice signed by her, and delivered to the 2nd respondent that nominated her. It is my view that the 1st respondent himself is not contending that the substitution did not follow due process,
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but that the 2nd respondent should have conducted a valid primary election or Senator Uche Ekwunife?s name be replaced from the list of persons that purchased expression of interest and nomination forms. See paragraph 26 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons at pages 12 of the record of appeal. It is trite law that a member of a political party cannot compel his political party to nominate or sponsor him for election to elective office and no Court has jurisdiction to decide such a matter. See EYIBOH VS. ABIA 2012 16 NWLR PT. 1325 51 SC.
In view of all the above, the 1st respondent’s suit at the trial Court in my view raised a political question and therefore non justiciable, it ousted the trial Court of its jurisdiction to entertain same.
Issue one is partly resolved in favour of the appellant.
Having held that the jurisdiction of the trial Court had been ousted, the other issue raised in this appeal have become academic and of no moment.
This appeal is adjudged to be meritorious and it is hereby allowed. The decision of the trial Court in suit No. FHC/FCT/CS/1463/2018 is hereby set aside, as the trial Court had no
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jurisdiction to entertain the 1st respondent’s suit filed on 30th November, 2018.
There shall be no order as to costs.
EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my Learned brother, Lord Justice Adamu Jauro, JCA. I agree with the reasoning, conclusions and orders therein.
MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.C.A.: My learned brother ADAMU JAURO, JCA. afforded me the opportunity of reading before today a draft copy of the lead judgment just delivered.
I adopt the judgment as mine with nothing further to add.
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Appearances:
Chibuzor C. Ezike, Esq.For Appellant(s)
Constance Akpadolu Miss, with him, P. T. Longinus, Esq. for the 1st Respondent. Ime Edem-Nse, Esq. for the 2nd Respondent.
3rd Respondent ? Absent & Not Represented.For Respondent(s)
Appearances
Chibuzor C. Ezike, Esq.For Appellant
AND
Constance Akpadolu Miss, with him, P. T. Longinus, Esq. for the 1st Respondent. Ime Edem-Nse, Esq. for the 2nd Respondent.
3rd Respondent Absent & Not Represented.For Respondent
