SUNDAY MADAGWA V. THE STATE
In The Supreme Court of Nigeria
On Friday, the 2nd day of December, 1988
SC.2/1988
RATIO
THE BURDEN OF PROOF FOR DEFENCE OF ALIBI
The law is that the accused setting up the defence of alibi has the burden of adducing evidence on which he relies for the defence – See Odidika v. The Slate (1477) 2 SC. 21. It is no proof merely to assert he was not and could not be there because he was elsewhere. He must lead credible evidence of where he was.” See Yanor v. The State (1965) NMLR. 337, and Nwosisi v. The State. PER A. G. KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C
JUSTICES
AUGUSTINE NNAMANI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
MUHAMMADU LAWAL UWAIS Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
ADOLPHUS GODWIN KARIBI-WHYTE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
ABDUL GANIYU OLATUNJI AGBAJE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
EBENEZER BABASANYA CRAIG Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
SUNDAY MADAGWA Appellant(s)
AND
THE STATE Respondent(s)
B. CRAIG, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant was charged at the Oshogbo High Court of Oyo State with armed robbery contrary to sub-section 2(a) of Section 1 of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Decree No. 47 of 1970 as amended by the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) (Amendment) Decree (No.2) of 1974.
The particulars of the offence were that the appellant and two others on or about the 21st day of June, 1979 at Arola Village near Ede, in the Oshogbo Judicial Division, whilst armed with offensive weapons – to wit guns, robbed one Olayele Usiola (male) of a peugeot 504 Saloon car No. OD.8511.
After due trial before that Court, he was convicted and his subsequent appeal to the Court or Appeal was dismissed. This is a further appeal from the lower court.
The case for the prosecution rested on the evidence of four eye-witnesses. The first of these witnesses was the 4th P.W., he was the driver of the taxi cab allegedly stolen. According to him, on the 21st day of June, 1979; he left Ondo for Ile-lfe at about 6.00a.m and on getting to Ife, he saw the appellant and two others standing opposite the University of Ife Teaching Hospital. They hailed his taxi and asked to be taken to Ede town to collect their sick mother. After they had agreed on the fares, the three men entered the car,- the appellant sat in the front seat next to the driver, whilst the other two sat at the back.
At a village near Ede, the 4 P.W. was asked to stop, and the appellant alighted, ostensibly to fetch his sick mother. In the meantime, the driver had turned round the car in readiness for the return journey. The appellant soon returned but without his mother. On getting to the car, he set upon the driver, and wrested the steering wheel from him. The appellant and his colleagues then dragged the 4 P.W. out of the car, and at this stage, the three of them brought out their guns – apparently to – show the 4 P.W. what they would do if he offered any more resistance. Eventually, they drove off in the taxi. After they had left, the 4 P.W. reported the incident to the Police at Ede. Later, on the 18th day of October, 1979, he attended an identification parade at the Police Station, Ibadan and there he identified the Appellant and his two colleagues as the persons who had robbed him of his taxi-cab.
The other eye-witnesses were the 1st, 2nd and 3rd prosecution witnesses, and they saw the appellant with the stolen car a few hours after the robbery. According to the 1st P.W., at about 5.00p.m. on the day in question, she was returning from her farm when she saw a car parked in the compound. She raised alarm and the villagers came round. There were six persons inside the car and the appellant was one of them. She knew the appellant very well. because he was born in that Village, (UGBORHEN), although he later went and settled in AMUKPE Village. When the Appellant and others alighted from the car, the appellant came to her and asked for N200.00 which they needed to repaint the car. 1 P.W. told him that she had no money. Following this, they all then asked the 1st P.W. to give them the key to her house. At this stage, she ran away from them and went to report the incident to the Village Head – 2nd P.W.
Sometimes later, the Village Head saw the car and stopped it. He told the occupants that he had received a complaint from the 1st P.W. and asked them what was the matter. The appellant spoke sharply to the Village Head and asked what right he had to query them. When the Village Head tried to speak further, the Appellant asked him to shut up.
At this stage, the 2nd P.W. blew an alarm to summon his people, but before the Villagers came, the appellant and his colleagues had run away. A few hours after this, the Appellant and his colleagues were again seen with the taxi-cab at a road block and stopped by two night guards. 3 P.W. was one of the guards and he stated that at about 1.00 a.m. on 22nd day of June 1979 they stopped a car with six men and questioned the occupants. One of the men called ‘AFRO’ said that he was the owner of the car, and that they were coming from Ugboren.
When the guards searched the occupants, they recovered three locally made pistols from them; in consequence of this, they handed over the six men to the Police at Sapele. That same day the Appellant made a statement Exhibit ‘J’ to the Police.
At the close of the case for the prosecution, the Appellant testified in his defence. His evidence was short. This is what he said:
“SUNDAY MADAGWA: Sworn on the Bible and states in English. I live at AJANKAWA near Foam Industry AMUKPE, SAPELE. I am a cook. I do not know the 1st P.W. IYAWODE EGAGANYAN. I remember 21/6/79. I was inside my house. I saw Moses Dukpe alias AFRO in a taxi 504 saloon. I also saw Felix Okporie in the vehicle. Moses Dukpe claimed the ownership of the vehicle. Felix Okporie drove the vehicle. I have never seen 4th P. W. before.”
He admitted that he made a written statement, Exhibit J but he denied that he took part in any robbery.
I shall return to Exhibit J later in this judgment, but it is appropriate at this stage to refer to some parts of the said statement. In Exhibit J, the appellant stated that
he was in his house on 21/6/79 when one Moses Dukpe (alias AFRO) came to show him a Peugeot 504 Saloon taxi which he had just bought. Afro was accompanied by the 1st accused.
The statement then went on to state:
1. That Afro said that he was looking for some money to enable him repaint the taxi in the colour of Bendel State taxis.
2. That he was going to see his brother at Ugborhen about the money and he invited the appellant to go with him.
3. That there were six of them in the car, and 1st accused was the driver.
4. They stopped at various places and at UGBOREN Village. There, Afro called on his brother and asked him for N300.00 to repaint the car, but the brother told him that he had no money to spare.
5. They left Ugborhen at about 8.00 p.m. and sometime later they were stopped at a road block and accused of being thieves.
6. When all of them were searched, three guns were recovered in the pockets of Afro, Wilson Edemo, and the driver i.e. the 1st accused.
7. The six of them were handed over to the Police, but nothing illegal was recovered from him.
It will be appreciated that at the time that the appellant made the statement Exhibit J, the theft of the taxi cab had not been discovered and so he made no statement about the incident at Ede in Oyo State. However, at the close of the case for the defence, Counsel addressed the Court.
In his judgment, the learned trial Judge Oloko J., carefully considered the facts of the case and came to the conclusion that the evidence against the appellant was ‘overwhelming.’ The trial Judge also considered the defence of alibi which the appellant had raised and after referring to several authorities on the point, he held the view that the prosecution had successfully dislodged the alibi set up by the appellant. He therefore found him guilty of the offence as charged.
The appellant was dissatisfied with that judgment, and appealed to the Court of Appeal. One of the two questions canvassed in that Court was:
“Whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding that the defence of alibi set up by the Appellant had been dislodged by the prosecution when there was no evidence that the alibi was investigated by the prosecution.”
In dealing with that issue, the lower Court, per Onu, J.C.A., stated as follows:
“Under our law, it is not the duty of an accused person to prove alibi, but he has the onus to bring evidence on alibi, which when considered with the case for the prosecution, creates a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Judge so as to entitle him to an acquittal. The burden is far less than in Civil cases. As there are no statutory provisions on alibi, in Nigeria reliance is placed on English and common law cases – see Mohammadu Chewnloh v. The State (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt.22) 331-332. In the case in hand the learned trial Judge, in my view decided the guilt of the appellant was proved beyond reasonable doubt by the dislodgement of the alibi set up by the appellant based on circumstantial evidence. At page 46 lines 6-10 of the trial courts’s record he has this to say:
“I believe and accept the evidence of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd prosecution witnesses. The cumulative effect of their evidence was that the 2nd and 3rd accused persons were found inside Exhibit A’ on 21/6/79 few hours after Exhibit A had been robbed by alleged assailants.”
Appellant’s mere assertion that he was in his room does not discharge his burden as this was shown to he false through evidence proffered by witnesses.-”
Further on in his judgment, the learned Judge said as follows:
“In the case in hand, P.W4 had identified the appellant positively, at an identification parade as one of the three men who robbed him of Exhibit A at gun point at Arola near Ede. It was not a dock identification which ought to be frowned upon as inappropriate and of little value. See R. v. Cartwright 1914 Cr. App. R.219; Sunday Anyanwu v. The State (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt.43) 612. Some hours later, P.W.1 saw appellant and two others in the same car at her village Ugborhen near Sapele. So did P.W.2 and P.W.3 thereafter and on the same day. Appellant could not therefore be in his room for the whole day of 21st June, 1979 and equally float like a spirit to Arola, Ede, Ugborhen and Okuovo No.2 near Sapele at the same time. Hence, the alibi claimed by appellant was logically demolished -see Patrick Njovens & Ors v. The State (1973) 5 SC. 17 at 65.”
In my view, the lower Court’s treatment of the law relating to alibi was correct. But in a further submission to the Court of Appeal, Counsel contended that a rejection of the defence of alibi does not amount to proof of the prosecution’s case; again, this is how the lower court dealt with that submission. It stated that;
“On the rejection of alibi not amounting to proof of prosecution’s case, I am satisfied that where as in the case in hand the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt by producing clear and strong evidence even of one prosecution witness of identification of the appellant with the crime, a conviction obtained thereby is unimpeachable. In fact, in the case on hand, the application of s.148(a) of the Evidence Act becomes inevitable.
That section says:
“The court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case and in particular the court may presume –
(a) that a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession.”
“In the case in hand, the identification of the appellant by P.W.4 at the parade dovetailing the evidence of P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.3 at other settings the same day of the offence of robbery, so fixed him as one of the perpetrators of the robbery of exhibit A in which he was found with his confederates, that the proof of the prosecution’s case was so cogent and convincing that it amounted to proof of a proposition ‘with the accuracy of mathematics'”
see R. v. Taylor & 2 Ors. 21 C.A.R. 20 at 21. It is no derogation of proof to say that the evidence was circumstantial.
The learned trial Judge owes it as a duty to weigh the evidence for the prosecution against that for the alibi, and this he did in the case on appeal herein. He was left in no doubt about appellant’s guilt. So am I. The proof of the case in my view had gone beyond the stage of suspicion for any tribunal to so regard it; it was cogent, convincing and overwhelming – see Edet Obosi v. The State (1965) NMLR 129 and R. v. Teper (1952) A.C. 480 at 489.”
After the impeccable and learned analysis of the whole appeal, the lower Court went on to dismiss the appeal as lacking in substance, but it is the reference to section 148(a) of the Evidence Act that has given rise to this further appeal.
Originally, two grounds of appeal were filed, but at the hearing of this appeal, his Counsel, Otunba Ajayi-Okunnuga, asked for leave to withdraw those grounds and to substitute only one ground of appeal which reads as follows:-
“Ground of Appeal:
That the learned justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law, when they held erroneously that section 148(a) of the Evidence Act Cap. 62 Laws of Nigeria inevitably applied, and therefore confirmed the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant by the trial Judge OLOKO, J.
Particulars:
(a) That their Lordships the Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law and they misdirected themselves when they held that proof with mathematical accuracy constitutes proof as required by the law. See page 96 lines 5 – 7 of the records.
(b) Their Lordships erred in law when they failed to realise that an ‘alibi’ is a complete defence in law, whereas they were well aware from the records that the appellant was not found at the ‘locus criminis’.
(c) Their Lordships the Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law when they confirmed the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant, whereas appellant was not identified with the crime; and their Lordships misdirected themselves when they held that ‘the other selling so fixed the appellant as one of the perpetrators of the Robbery’ see page 96 lines 3 – 4 of the Records.”
In presenting the Issues for determination, the appellant merely repeated word for word what he had set out as ‘particulars’ in his ground of appeal.
In my view, this is a misconception of Order 6 rule 5(1) of the Supreme Court Rules. That Rule stipulates that an appellant’s brief shall contain a succinct statement of his argument in the appeal as well as
“What are, in the appellant’s view the issues arising in the appeal.’
It seems quite clear that issues in an appeal are not the same thing as particulars of a ground of the appeal.
Sometimes, three or four grounds of appeal may raise only one issue in the appeal and it does not help the appellant to set out all the four grounds of appeal, (together with their particulars) as issues in the appeal. It should be clearly understood that what is required by the Rules is for the appellant to present an intelligent appraisal of what he considers to be the important question or questions which he wants this Court to decide. Those questions must be concise in form and should be based on the grounds of appeal already filed.
In view of my observations above, I think the issues as presented by the Respondent, are more in line with the requirement of the Rules, and would adopt them in the determination of this appeal. They are as follows:
“1. Whether having regard to the evidence before the Court, the learned Judges of the Court of Appeal were right in holding that the defence of alibi had been dislodged by the prosecution.
2. Whether the appellant was properly identified by the 4 P.W. (the victim) as one of the robbers that robbed him of his Peugeot 504 Saloon car.
3. Whether their Lordships wrongly applied the provisions of section 148 of the Evidence Act without the Respondent proving his case beyond reasonable doubt.”
With regard to the first two issues, the appellant’s Counsel has submitted in her Brief that a defence of ‘alibi’ is a complete defence in law to a crime, and that the appellant was wrongly convicted of the offence especially when the record of proceedings show clearly that the appellant was not found at the locus criminis.”
Firstly, I am unable to agree with the bare assertion that an alibi is a ‘complete’ defence available to an accused person. I agree, of course, that it is a defence which he is entitled to raise in answer to the charge, but whether or not that defence completely absolves him, would depend on all other available evidence in the case.
It should of course be remembered that a defence of alibi means no more than saying that the accused was not at the scene of the crime and could not have committed the offence. But it is open to the Prosecution to show by credible evidence, that the accused was actually at the scene of the crime and not where he claimed to be.
In the often-cited case of Yanor v. The State (1965) NMLR 337, this Court has held that
“On the defence of alibi, the law is that evidence of alibi should not be disregarded by a trial court unless there is a stronger evidence against it, and that while the onus is on the prosecution to prove the charge against an accused person, the latter has the duty of bringing the evidence of which he relies for his defence of alibi.”
In the instant case, the Prosecution led evidence to show that the appellant and two others robbed the 4 P.W. of the car in broad daylight on the morning of 21/6/79. The 4 P.W. saw the appellant clearly and held conversation with him. This is not all, for on the journey from Ife to Ede, the appellant sat on the front seat with the 4 P.W. and later on, he identified the appellant as one of those who stole his taxi-cab from him. The evidence of identification was confirmed by Policemen who conducted the parade. At about 5.00 p.m. on the same day, the appellant was seen by 1, 2 and 3 P.W.s with the stolen car at Ugboren Village in Bendel State.
As against this, the appellant said that he was at the material time in his house, but he did not call any witnesses to support this assertion. After considering the evidence as a whole, the trial Judge accepted the story of the prosecution that the appellant was present at Ede and that he joined other persons to rob the 4 P.W. of his taxi. The Court rejected the evidence of alibi given by the appellant and held that the evidence against him was ‘overwhelming.’
The lower Court confirmed the finding of the trial Court, and in so doing, it held that if the appellant was in his room the whole day as he stated, it was impossible for him to be at Ede, Arola, Ugborhen and Okuovu where P.W.s 1, 2, 3 and 4 saw him.
The concurrent finding of fact made by the two lower Courts is in my view, amply supported by the evidence before the Court and I cannot find any justifiable reason to disturb it. See Sobakin v. The State (1981)5 S.C.75 at 78.
In regard to the 3rd issue, the appellant’s complaint was that the lower Court had misapplied the provisions of sec. 148(a) of the Evidence Act to the facts of this case. With the greatest respect to Otunba Ajayi-Okunuga, it is difficult to ascertain from her brief what point she was trying to argue. For instance, at page 2 of the Brief, she asks the following questions:
”Whereas a cardinal principle of law provides for proof beyond reasonable doubt, see section 137(1) Evidence Act Cap. 62 Laws of Nigeria 1958, why then should their Lordships hold that section 148(a) which is a presumption inevitably applied Can a conviction and sentence based on a mere presumption stand in law”
But this is not a ‘mere’ presumption, it is a presumption of law based on the facts and if Counsel had taken enough trouble to read and assimilate the judgment of the trial Court, she would have found that the trial Judge found the appellant guilty on the proved facts without the aid of any presumption- Now what are these facts They have been clearly set out earlier in this judgment, but for the sake of emphasis, I shall only repeat the salient facts which were found established and believed.
1. That the appellant and two others in broad daylight, hired the taxi-cab of the 4 P.W. for a trip from Ife to Arola Village near Ede in Oyo State.
2. That during the trip, the appellant sat in the front seat with 4 P.W.
3. That on the return journey, the appellant seized the steering of the car and with the assistance of the other two robbers, dragged 4 P.W. out of the car and drove off.
4. That the 4 P.W. later identified the robbers at an identification parade.
5. That on the same day of the robbery (at about 6.00 p.m.) the appellant and others were seen with the stolen car at Ugboren Village in Bendel State.
6. That they were begging 1 P.W. for money with which to change the colour of the taxi to that of Bendel State taxis.
7. That when an alarm was raised, they ran away, but were later apprehended by 3 P.W. at a road-block at about 1.00 a.m.
8. That the appellant made a statement that same day in which he admitted that he and others were seen in the car at Ugboren.
In the face of those compelling facts, the trial Judge did not find it difficult to convict the appellant. The learned Judge did so purely on the facts and without relying on the provisions of section 148(a) of the Evidence Act.
However, when the matter got to the Court of Appeal, that court observed, as it was entitled to do, that the facts of the case raised a presumption of guilt against the accused, that is, that the appellant was in possession of a stolen car, a few hours after it was stolen, and could be presumed to have been the thief. That is a presumption of law – it is an inference which section 148 of the Evidence Act allows the court to make and in this instant case, I am satisfied that that presumption could validly he made.
Indeed, that same type of presumption has been made in similar cases.
In R. v. Kwashie (1950)13 WACA 86, it was held that an accused who was found in possession of property stolen some 90 minutes earlier, could he presumed to be the thief. Similar presumptions were made in
R. v. Sunday Jumbo (1960) L.L.R. 192;
R. v. Michael Opara (1961) WNLR 127;
M. Kolade v. Commissioner at Police (1971) NMLR 109
After a careful consideration of the only ground of appeal presented to this Court, I am satisfied that there is no merit whatsoever in this appeal.
It was for these reasons that I agreed on 22nd September, 1988 that this Court should dismiss the appeal and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.
The judgment of the trial Court as affirmed by the lower Court, is hereby confirmed.
A. NNAMANI, J.S.C.: This appeal came before this Court on 23rd September, 1988. Having read the records of proceedings, and having heard learned counsel to both parties, I was satisfied that the appeal lacked substance. I therefore, dismissed it and indicated that I would give my reasons for that judgment today. I now give the reasons.
The appellant and others were charged with robbing one Olaleye Usiola of a Peugeot 504 Saloon Car property of one Joseph Ada Olofinika at Arola Village near Ede on 21st June, 1979: At the conclusion of the trial before Oloko, J. the appellant and others were convicted and sentenced to death. An appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed and the appellant then appealed to this Court. By a notice of Motion dated 20th May, 1988, the appellant’s counsel, Mrs. Ajayi-Okunnuga, sought an amendment of the original grounds of appeal by adding the ground of appeal shown in the schedule attached to the application. The application was granted. The only ground of appeal is therefore:
“Ground of Appeal
That the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law, when they held erroneously that Section 148(a) of the Evidence Act Cap. 62 Laws of Nigeria inevitably applied, and therefore confirmed the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant by the trial Judge OLOKO, J,
Particulars
(a)…..
(b) ….
(c)…..
The appellant’s counsel formulated 3 issues for determination in this appeal but I would, with respect, prefer the issues as formulated by learned Counsel to the Respondent as they appear to me to more clearly bring out the matter to be decided. The issues so formulated by the Respondent were:
“(i) Whether having regard to the evidence before the Court, the learned Judges of the Court of Appeal were right in holding that the defence of alibi had been dislodged by the prosecution.
(ii) Whether the appellant was properly identified by the P.W.4 (the victim) as one of the robbers that robbed him of his Peugeot 504 Saloon Car.
(iii) Whether their Lordships wrongly applied the provisions of Section 148 of the Evidence Act without the Respondent proving his case beyond reasonable doubt……”
Before going further with my reasons for judgment, I had before now a preview of the reasons for judgment just delivered by my learned brother, CRAIG, J.S.C. I agree entirely with them and I adopt them as my own. I intend to deal therefore only with ground 1 of the grounds of appeal as in my view it encompasses all the complaints – Whether alibi was open to the appellant or whether the doctrine of recent possession as in Section 148(a) of the Evidence Act was wrongly applied against the appellant.
The evidence against the appellant, which the learned trial Judge and the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal accepted, was given by P.W.1. P.W.2, P.W.3, P.W.4. The ‘Star’ witness was clearly P. W.4 who was the victim of the robbery. His testimony at page 23 of the record was as follows:-
“I left Ondo in my vehicle No. OD 8511D for Ife.
I was driving the vehicle when I got to Ife
I saw three men opposite the University of Ife Teaching Hospital complex gate. The two accused persons (i.e. including the appellant) in the dock were among the three men who pleaded with me that I should take them to Ede Township to go and see their sick mother. I charged them for both journeys. They agreed to pay N10. They requested that I should bring their mother to the hospital at Ife. I took them to their destination at Ede Township. On our way to Ede, 3rd accused (i.e. the appellant) sat with me in front of the vehicle. 2nd accused and the 3rd man sat at the back of the vehicle. At kilometre 5 to Ede Township, the three men stopped me (i.e. the two accused and the 3rd man) and said that they have reached their destination. I stopped. 3rd accused came down from the vehicle to go and fetch the sick mother. Thereafter I turned the vehicle towards the direction 3rd accused returned to the vehicle without the sick mother. 3rd accused twisted the steering of the vehicle with me. The other two assisted him and dragged me out of the vehicle. They all brought out their guns. Eventually they drove off the vehicle.” (Italics mine).
The 1st prosecution witness, Iyawode Egaganyan, testified at page 20 that she knows the 3rd accused person i.e. the appellant. In effect she testified that on 21st June, 1979 (i.e. the same day of the robbery) at about 5p.m. she saw a car in her premises. There were six occupants in it among whom she recognised one AFRO and the 3rd accused. 3rd accused asked her to give them N200 for the painting of the car. She replied that she had no money and eventually ran away.
The 2nd P.W. one Peddo Ukpechaghan, testified at page 21 that on that same 21/6/79 the 1st P.W. told him certain things. He stopped a vehicle and asked the occupants what transpired between them and 1st P.W.3rd accused person i.e. the appellant, who he identified in the dock, challenged him claiming that he had no right to ask such questions. The 3rd P. W., one Disi Kpirima testified at page 22 that on 22/6/79 he was on duty at Okuovu as a night watchman. At 1 a.m. on that day, he stopped a vehicle at the road block. When he asked who was the owner of the vehicle one AFRO who was in the vehicle claimed ownership. They were six people in the car. He recognised
2nd accused person as one of the six persons in the car. He referred the six persons to the older man in the village. When the six persons were searched, they were found to have locally made pistols in their possession. Under cross-examination, the witness identified 3rd accused as Sunday.
On 18th October, 1979 an identification parade was arranged at the Police Station Iyaganku, Ibadan and the 4th P.W. identified the three men who robbed him on 21/6/79.
It seems quite clear to me therefore that the evidence against the appellant was overwhelming. The victim of the robbery P.W.4, gave a graphic detail of how appellant sat next to him in front of the vehicle on the journey to Ede. He also stated how it was the appellant who twisted his steering wheel at the point of the robbery. He clearly had every opportunity of knowing the appellant as one of the 3 robbers who robbed him of his vehicle on 21/6/79. On the same 21st June, 1979 the 1st and 2nd P.W.s, who know the appellant well, saw him among other persons in this same vehicle – the P.W.1 said it was about 5 p.m. on the same day!.
The defence of the appellant was an alibi to the effect that he was in his house on the 21st June, 1979 when the robbery took place. It is not surprising that in the light of the evidence of the prosecution ‘witnesses which the learned trial Judge believed this alibi was held to have been demolished.It is settled than even where the accused person had discharged the evidential burden on him to give the details of the alibi he sets up, the learned trial Judge would weigh this against the evidence led by the prosecution and decide whether the prosecution had proved its case against the accused person. If there is any doubt he would resolve it in favour of the accused person.See Patrick Njovens and Ors. v. The State (1973) 5 S.C. 17 at 65; Gachi and Ors v. The State (1965) NMLR 333; Yanor and Anor v. The State (1965) NMLR 337; Umani v. The State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 70) 274
Again on the state of the evidence, it cannot be argued that Section 148(a) of the Evidence Act which states that-
“a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession.”
was properly applied to the appellant. See Phillip Omogodo v. The State (1981) 5 S.C. 5, 17; Joseph Lori v. The State (1980) 8 – 11 S.C. 81, 91. At about 5 p.m. on 21/6/79, the appellant was seen in the vehicle at Okuovu. He was alleged to have asked 1st P.W. for N200 with which to paint the vehicle.
It was for these reasons, and the more detailed reasons given by my learned brother, CRAIG, J.S.C. that I dismissed this appeal.
M. L. UWAIS, J.S.C.: This appeal was dismissed on the 23rd day of September, 1988 and we reserved our reasons for doing so till today. I now give my reasons.
I have had the opportunity of reading in draft the reasons for judgment read by my learned brother, Craig J.S.C. As it was for the same reasons that I dismissed the appeal, I adopt them as mine and have no desire to add anything.
A. G. KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.: I have read the judgment of my learned brother Craig, JSC. in this appeal in draft and I agree with the reasoning therein. I also will dismiss the appeal. I wish to say a few words in amplification of the reasoning for dismissing the appeal.
Appellant was the 3rd accused in a prosecution for Robbery with Firearms, filed against them on 25/11/80 under section 1(1) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Decree No. 47 of 1970 as amended by the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) (Amendment) (No.2) of 1974. The offence was that Felix Okporie, John Obule and Sunday Madagwa (the appellant) on or about the 21st June, 1979 at Arola Village near Ede in Oshogbo Judicial Division armed with an offensive weapon to wit, gun, robbed Olayele Usiolaofa Peugeot 504 saloon with registration No. OD 8511D property of Joseph Ade Olofinika.
Before trial commenced the first accused Felix Okporie was reported to have escaped from lawful custody since 21/6/80 and on the 8th December, 1980 the original charge was withdrawn, and another was substituted. The remaining accused persons 2 and 3 pleaded not guilty to the charge as amended when read and explained to them. The charge was withdrawn against the 1st accused who was accordingly discharged. After a trial in which the prosecution called eight witnesses, the accused persons gave evidence on oath in their own defence, denying the charge, but called no witnesses, the learned trial Judge Oloko J, found both of them guilty of the offence charged and convicted them accordingly. They were both sentenced to death by hanging by the neck.
In his judgment the learned Judge found that
(a) the 4th prosecution witness was on the 21st day of June, 1979 at Arola Village near Ede robbed with firearms of a Peugeot 504 saloon car with Registration No. OD 8511D
(b) the offence was committed by the accused persons.
The learned trial Judge considered and finally rejected the defence of alibi set up by the accused persons. In arriving at this conclusion, the learned Judge relied on the evidence of the PW1, PW2, PW3, persons who knew the accused persons very well and who saw them in the stolen car a few hours after the robbery. He said; at p. 46
“I believe and accept the evidence of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd prosecution witnesses. The cumulative effect of their evidence was that: 2nd and 3rd accused persons were found inside Exhibit ‘A’ on 21/6/79 few hours after Exhibit ‘A’ had been robbed by alleged assailants. The only link remaining is to see whether there is evidence to connect the two accused persons with the commission of the offence of armed robbery…..”
The learned Judge found the link in the discovery of guns in Exh. A, i.e. the Peugeot 504 Saloon subject-matter of the robbery a few hours after the robbery, the fact that PW4 stated in evidence that he was robbed of Exh. A at gun point, and the fact that in Exh. Hand J, the accused persons confirmed that guns were found in Exh. A when it was in their possession. With respect to the defence of alibi set up by the accused persons, the learned Judge held that in addition to the above, the 4th prosecution witness who was robbed of Exh. A, was able in a properly conducted identification parade to identify the two accused persons. He held that there was no mistaken identity.
Only the 3rd accused appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal. Two original grounds of appeal were filed. At the Court of Appeal, counsel sought and was granted leave to file two additional grounds of appeal. The four grounds of appeal are as follows –
“1. The Judge misdirected himself in accepting that I intentionally robbed a person whom I did not know his name.
2. That the decision is unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the weight (sic) of evidence.
3. The learned trial judge erred in law and misdirected himself on facts when he held as follows:-
“From the evidence before me therefore I hold the view that the prosecution succeeded in dislodging the alibi set up by the accused persons.”
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
(i) Evidence of the Appellant that he was inside his house on 21st June, 1979 was never discredited by the prosecution and there was no evidence by the investigating police officer that the Appellant was not in his house on 21st June, 1979.
4. The learned trial Judge erred in law and misdirected himself on facts when he held as follows:-
“I believe the evidence of the prosecution that at the identification parade mounted and conducted by 6th P.W. 4th P.W. identified the two accused persons. This was confirmed by Exhibits F, F1 and G, G1.”
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
There is no evidence by the 4th P.W. that the personal features of and characteristics of the Appellant are similar and identical to that of the person who robbed him of his vehicle on 21st June, 1979.”
The two issues for determination formulated by Counsel to the appellant/3rd accused and adopted by Respondent’s Counsel represent the contention of appellant before the Court. They are as follows –
“(1) Whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding that the defence of alibi, set up by the Appellant had been dislodged by the prosecution when there was no evidence that the alibi was investigated by the prosecution.
(2) Whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding that the Appellant had been properly identified by the 4th P.W. at the identification as one of the armed robbers that robbed 4th P.W. of his Peugeot 504 saloon car when there was no evidence of the personal features and characteristics of the Appellant by 4th P.W.”
The issues before the Court of Appeal concerned the question whether the prosecution dislodged the alibi set up by appellant and whether the trial Judge was right on the issue of the identification of the appellant.
On the question whether the appellant had not established the defence of alibi or rather whether the prosecution had ‘dislodged’ the defence of alibi set up by the appellant, subject matter of grounds 1 and3 of the grounds of appeal. The Court of Appeal held agreeing with the submission of respondents’ counsel that ‘the defence that appellant was in his house on the 21st June, 1979, when the robbery took place is false having regard to the evidence of 1st P.W., 2nd P.W. and P.W.3 dovetailing into the evidence of PW4 which show that on the same day that the robbery took place at Arola near Ede in Oyo State as described by PW4, PW1, PW2 and PW3 did see appellant in Exhibit ‘A’ with others at various places near Sapele in Bendel State thus dislodging the alibi set up by the appellant.
In arriving at this conclusion the Court acknowledged the settled law that the onus on the accused was merely to adduce evidence of the alibi, but not to prove the fact of alibi. It was held that appellant’s mere assertion that he was in a place other than where he was alleged to have committed the offence having been shown to be false by the evidence of the prosecution witnesses did not discharge the burden on him – Gachi & Ors. v. The State (1965) NMLR 333; Yanor v. The State (1965) NMLR 337 were cited in support.
To the submission that the alibi set up was not investigated, it was held, relying on Okosun & Ors. v. The State (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt.12) 283 that the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was at the scene of the crime and committed the offence alleged was stronger and more credible than the alibi set up and accordingly falsified the alibi. It was therefore in the circumstance not necessary to investigate the defence of alibi set up. The Court also relied on The State v. Ozaki & 6 Ors. (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt.40) 258 at 259; Nwosisi v. The State (1976) 6 Sc. 109. It was submitted that the rejection of the alibi set up did not amount to proof of the case of the prosecution’s case. The Court of Appeal rejecting the submission held that the strong evidence of identification of the appellant, and the application of section 148(a) of the Evidence Act, so fixed the appellant ‘as one of the perpetrators of the robbery of Exhibit A in which he was found with his confederates, that the proof of the prosecution’s case was so cogent and convincing that it amounted to proof of a proposition ‘with the accuracy of mathematics’- See R. v. Taylor & 2 ors. 21. C.A.R. 20 at 21. The Court of Appeal agreeing with his conclusion held that the learned Judge adopted the correct approach of weighing the evidence of the prosecution against the defence of alibi. The trial Judge was at the end of the exercise not in any doubt of appellant’s guilt. The Court of Appeal held that ‘The proof of the case had gone beyond the stage of suspicion for any tribunal to so regard it; it was cogent, convincing and overwhelming – See Edet Obosi v. The Stale (1965) NMLR 119 and R. v. Teper (1952) AC. 480 at 489″
On grounds 2 and 4 which attacked the identification of the appellant on the ground that PW4 on whose evidence the trial Judge relied did not satisfy the legal requirement that the personal features and characteristics of the person or persons who committed the offence should have been given before the identification. The identification of the appellant was therefore unsatisfactory and inadmissible – R. v. Turnbull (1976) 3 ALL ER. 549. The Court of Appeal rejected this contention because in this case….the danger of mistaken identity was eliminated. “The Court citing Ukorah v. The State (1977) 4 SC. 167, 17, and Odidika v. The State (1977) 2 SC.21 referred to the quality of the identification as unimpeachable.
The Court of Appeal observed that the issue of the personal features as an essential requirement for his identification was not raised at the trial and could not be raised before that court. The Court held that the manner of the identification was conducted having not been challenged. there was nothing to complain – Bozin v. The State (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.8) 465, Sunday Anyanwu v. The State (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt.43) 612. After referring to Orimoloye v. The State (1984) 10 SC.138, Igwe v. The State (1982) 9 SC. 174, Odili v The State (1977) 4 SC.1 in which it was held that the question of identification is a question of fact, the Court went on to hold that the identification in the case did not fall short of the requirement of the law. It was held that there was no mistaken identify ‘since the identification has been made positively with dovetailing evidence which renders it incapable of being impugned.’
In affirming the judgment of the learned Judge the Court of Appeal said;
“…….. there is beside the identification of appellant by PW4, other pieces of evidence which established the case of the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. In other words the identification of appellant was not based wholly or substantially on the correctness of the identification of the appellant, although standing alone, it has not been faulted.”
The appeal was dismissed on the 19th June, 1987. Appellant has further appealed to this Court. He filed two original grounds of appeal on the 29th June, 1987 and with leave of this Court granted on the, 16th June, 1988 has filed an additional ground of appeal. The original grounds of appeal filed in Prison Custody by the appellant himself unaided by legal advice are as follows-
1. That the decision of the lower courts are unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the weight of evidence.
2. That the judge was misdirected to accept that I robbed the person whom I did not know.
Otunba Ajayi Okunnuga, counsel for appellant sought for and was granted leave to amend the original grounds of appeal by filing an additional ground of appeal. The new ground of appeal is as follows:-
“That the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law, when they held erroneously that section 148(a) of the Evidence Act Cap. 62 Laws of Nigeria inevitably applied, and therefore confirmed the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant by the trial Judge OLOKO, J.
Particulars:
(a) That their Lordships the Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law and they misdirected themselves when they held that proof with mathematical accuracy constitutes proof as required by the law. See page 96 lines 5 – 7 of the records.
(b) Their Lordships erred in law when they failed to realise that an ‘alibi’ is a complete defence in law, whereas they were well aware from the records that the appellant was not found at the “locus criminis.”
(c) Their Lordships the Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law when they confirmed the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant, whereas appellant was not identified with the crime; and their Lordships misdirected themselves when they held that ‘the other setting so fixed the appellant as one of the perpetrators of the Robbery’ See page 96 lines 3 – 4 of the Records.”
This was the only ground of appeal argued before us. Both counsel to the appellant, Otunba (Mrs.) Ajayi-Okunnuga, and Mr. Okesola, Senior State Counsel, Ministry of Justice, Ibadan, filed their briefs of argument. During argument counsel adopted the briefs of argument so filed and relied on their contents. It is however necessary to observe that there appears to be a misunderstanding of the requirement in the rules of this Court of the clear statement of the issues to be determined.
In this appeal, Otunba (Mrs.) Ajayi-Okunnuga, for the appellant has in the brief of argument stated the issues to be determined in this appeal as follows:-
“(a) Whether the Honourable Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law, and whether they misdirected themselves when they held that section 148(a) of the Evidence Act Cap. 62 inevitably
applied, and that proof with mathematic accuracy constitutes proof as required by the law, see page 96 lines 5 – 7.
(b) Whether their Lordships the Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law when they failed to realise that an ‘alibi’ is a complete defence in law when the records show clearly that the appellant was not found at the locus criminis.
(c) Whether their Lordships erred in law, when they confirmed the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant, when he was not in any way identified with the crime. Whether their Lordships misdirected their minds when they held thus:- ……………. the other setting so fixed the appellant as one of the perpetrator’s of the Robbery’ as if the ‘setting’ is the burden which is required to be discharged in law – See page 96 lines 3-4 of the records.”
The formulation of the questions for determination in the brief of argument of the respondent which I prefer and adopt is more comprehensible and intelligible. It is as follows-
“(i) Whether having regard to the evidence before the Court, the learned Judges of the Court of Appeal were right in holding that the defence of alibi had been dislodged by the prosecution.
(ii) Whether the appellant was properly identified by the 4th P.W. (the victim) as one of the robbers that robbed him of his Peugeot 504 saloon car.
(iii) Whether their Lordships wrongly applied the provisions of section 148 of the Evidence Act without the Respondent proving his case beyond reasonable doubt.”
Though arranged in a different sequence. the issues cover the same questions of alibi, identification of the appellant and application of section 148(a) of the Evidence Act contained in appellant’s formulation. It is relevant to observe that these were the same issues raised on appeal in the court below against the judgment of the trial Judge.
In appellant’s brief filed by Otunba Ajayi-Okunnuga the only additional ground filed was in substitution for the two grounds of appeal filed by the appellant. It is somewhat of a surprise that counsel was able to formulate the three issues for determination from this ground of appeal. This court has had on occasions to emphasise to counsel the importance of adhering to and remaining within the parameters of their grounds of appeal in their formulation of issues for determination. See Okonkwo v. Okolo (1988) 2 NWLR. (Pt.79) 632 at 649. This is because the issues must necessarily follow and arise from the grounds of appeal which allege error against the judgment sought to be reversed. Hence where issues for determination in the appeal are formulated without reference and unrelated to the grounds of appeal filed, as it were de hors the grounds of appeal they cannot certainly be regarded as issues for determination arising from such grounds.
In the instant appeal, although the only ground of appeal filed alleged error in the application of the provisions of section 148(a) of the Evidence Act, Cap. 62, the issues for determination included the defence of alibi and the proper identification of the appellant.
The argument of counsel to the appellant was not confined to the error alleged, but was at large to challenge the judgment in its rejection of the defence of alibi and the acceptance of the identification of the appellant as one of those who robbed PW4 armed with firearms. It is conceded these were matters considered by the Court of Appeal and ought ordinarily to have been subject matter of appeal if appellant so considered them.
In arguing the appeal Otunba Ajayi-Okunnuga referred to section 148(a) of the Evidence Act and submitted that the proposition that a man in ‘possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to have been stolen, unless he can account for his possession,’ is a ‘discretionary presumption’ which may be applied depending upon the circumstances of the case. Counsel admitted that in this case it was clear Exhibit ‘A’ was stolen property, but doubted whether on the evidence before the learned Judge there was sufficient facts to enable the Judge exercise his discretion for such a presumption.
Counsel pointed out that on the evidence of PW4 three armed robbers seized the vehicle from him at Kilometre 5 near Ede. When the vehicle Exh. ‘A’ was found and stopped in Ugborhen Village near Sapele Bendel State, there were two accounts of the number of persons found in it. A witness said there were five occupants, while another said they were six. It was submitted that the mere presence of 5 or 6 persons in the stolen car is not proof that they were the robbers. Counsel cited Queen v. Moses (1960) 5 FSC 187 in support. The discrepancy in the occupants of Exhibit A was referred to as contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses which should cast doubt in the mind of the Court as to the evidence of the prosecution. Counsel citing State v. Kura (1975)2 SC. 83 submitted that the Court of Appeal should not have affirmed the conviction and sentence in such a circumstance.
The facts of this case are of critical importance to the determination of the issue of the presumption of guilt of appellant drawn from the fact that he was in possession of the stolen property, Exhibit A, shortly after PW4 was robbed of it with force of arms. Evidence before the learned Judge was that at about 6a.m. on the 21st June, 1979 one Olayele Usiola the driver of Peugeot 504 saloon car with registration No. OD 8511D was hired by three men at the Gate of the University of Ife Teaching Hospital Complex, Ile-Ife, to take them in his said car to Ede township to visit their sick mother. His fee was N10 for the journey to and from Ede, and to bring the sick mother to the hospital at Ile-ife. The 2nd accused and the third person were at the back seat. They started on the journey to Ede as agreed. On their way, appellant sat with PW4 in front. At Arola Village about 5 kilometres to Ede, the three men who hired PW4 asked him to stop and told him that they had reached their destination. Appellant alighted from the car and said he was going to bring their sick mother. He soon returned without her. Appellant held the steering of the vehicle which PW4 was holding and twisted it. The 2nd accused and the third person assisted appellant by overpowering PW4 and dragged him out of the car. PW4 said that all the three of them brought out guns. They finally drove away with the vehicle and PW4 lodged a report with the Police at Ede.
The evidence of PW1 Iyawode Egaganyan was that at about 5 p.m. on the 21st June, 1979 at Ugborhen Town near Sapele in Bendel State, she saw a Motor Vehicle in which there were about six persons. Appellant was one of them. Each of the persons wore only trousers and were hare chested. She also recognised another person she called AFRO. Appellant asked PW1 for N200 to enable him paint the car, PW1 said she had no money. She was asked for the key of her house, but she refused and ran away to tell PW2, the head of the area of the incident. Under cross-examination PW1 said that she knew appellant’s father who is a native of Ugborhen but lived at Amukpe. She also testified that appellant was among the four persons who came out of the car. PW1 had seen appellant within the year and at a funeral ceremony at Ugborhen.
PW2, Pedde Ukpechaghen, who was at the relevant time, Head of Ugborhen, knew appellant and appellant’s father before the incident after PW1 reported to him on 21st June, 1979, he subsequently saw a vehicle painted blue yellow approaching him at Ugborhen and stopped it. When he tried to find out from the occupants what was the matter with them and PW1, appellant challenged him that he had no right to ask such a question. When he protested that he was acting on the complaint of PW1, appellant asked him to keep quiet. They were about five men in the car. In reaction PW2 blew an alarm, but before the villagers came appellant and the others had driven away in the car. PW2 saw appellant last three years before the incident. PW3, Disi Kpirima, a farmer and Night watchman of Okuovu, stopped a vehicle at Okuovu at about 1a.m. on 22/6/79 at a road block. 2nd accused was in the cat which they said was coming from Ugborhen. There were six persons in the car. One of them known as Afro claimed ownership of the car. All the occupants of the car were arrested and handed over to the Police at Sapele. When searched three locally made pistols were found in their possession. Under cross-examination PW3 said 2nd accused was known to he a thief, and appellant was also known by the name Sunday. In the identification parade conducted on the 18th October, 1979. PW4 identified appellant as one of those who on 2116/79 at Arola near Ede robbed him of the Peugeot 504 saloon car with registration No. 008511D. Appellant gave evidence on oath in his own defence. He denied having any transaction with PW4, or knowing PW1 or ever seeing him before. All he remembered of 21/6/79 was that he was in his house al Ajamukawa Village on that day. He also saw Moses Dukpe alias AFRO in a Peugeot 504 saloon who claimed ownership of the vehicle. He also saw Felix Okporie, 1st accused, who escaped from custody. Appellant made a statement to the Police which was admitted in evidence as Exhibit J. Exh. J corroborated the evidence of PW1 and PW2, PW3 in all material particulars. In the statement Exh. J. he stated that Moses Dukpe alias Afro claimed to be the owner of the Peugeot 504 saloon car, that he accompanied Moses Dukpe and first accused and three others in the car to Ugborhen with first accused driving. They picked and accused on the road. At Ugborhen at about 8p.m. they went to the brother of Moses Dukpe Emikare where he Moses Dukpe wanted to borrow N300 to paint the car. The effort failed because Emikare was unable to raise the money. They all returned to Okuovu from Ugborhen where they ran, into a road block and were arrested. When searched they found a small gun in the pocket of one of them, another gun near the drivers scat and a gun with Moses Dukpe. alias Afro. He claimed that no gun or incriminating materials were found on him. All of them suspects who were later accused for the offences were handed over to the Police in the morning on 22/6/79. Appellant said nothing about the robbery incident. On the evidence before the Court, it was clear that the Peugeot 504 saloon car with registration Number OD 8511D robbed from PW4 with arms on the 21st June, 1979 was the same car in which appellant and other persons were seen at Ugborhen at about 5p.m. on the day of the robbery. It was the car in which they were found at a road block at Okuovu at about 8p.m. the same day and arrested. Although appellant denied knowing or ever seeing PW4 at any time, and claimed not to have left his house that day at Ajamukawa Village, before his confederates came in the Peugeot 504 saloon car subject matter of the robbery, and he accompanied them. He was identified by PW4, without any difficulty as a member of the team of three who hired his services at Ile-Ife, but who at Arola about 5 kilometres to Ede, seized his Peugeot 504 saloon car at gun point dragged him out of the car and drove the car away. Above are the salient facts of the case. I now turn to analysis of the evidence in view of the application of section 148(a) of the Evidence Act. Cap. 62.
Section 148(a) so far as is relevant provides as follows:-
“The court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case, and in particular the court may presume –
(a) that a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession”
It is pertinent to observe that the section deals with two situations, namely-
(i) circumstances where the presumption may lead to the fact that a person in possession is the thief.
(ii) circumstances where he will be regarded as a receiver of the stolen goods.
In each case the central factor is that there must be stolen goods. Concisely, stated, the presumption is that where the circumstances are such that the relationship of a person to stolen goods is such that he could be regarded either as the thief or its receiver, the Judge is entitled on the facts to presume that he is the thief or the receiver, unless of course he is able to account for his possession. The overriding consideration for exculpation even if in possession of stolen goods, is where he can account for his possession. Since the issue is determined by a presumption, it is entirely a question of fact. I have already reproduced section 148(a) of the Evidence Act. The general part of this section enables the Court to rely on the establishment of certain facts to accept, following the common course of natural events, what was likely to have happened. A presumption of fact is the logical inference of the existence of other facts from the proved existence of other facts. The provision of the section applies and the presumption can be drawn where
1. The accused was found in possession of some goods
2. The goods were stolen goods.
3. The possession was soon after the theft.
4. There is a failure to account for the possession.
The opening words of section 148 of the Evidence Act which reads “The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened…..” and the phrase in paragraph (a) “……..unless he can account for his possession”are instructive. Whereas the former clearly makes the drawing of the inference from the facts and surrounding circumstances merely precatory in the ordinary course of events, the latter exculpates entirely and prohibits the establishment of the presumption. In other words, although the general view is that it is not a presumption which must but may be drawn, it is one which in my opinion must be drawn where the facts are overwhelming and the accused is unable to account for his possession of goods recently stolen. This is because where the accused is not able to explain the circumstances of his possession of the stolen goods, the inference that he is the thief is conclusive and must be drawn. However, where the totality of the evidence and the surrounding circumstances do not support the inference that the accused was the thief or receiver of the stolen goods, the presumption cannot be drawn.
I have already stated in this judgment that the fact that the goods are stolen goods is an essential element in the presumption. The other essential facts are that the accused must be in possession, and the possession must have been soon after the theft. I shall explain these two expressions as they apply to the presumption.
Possession
It is essential that the stolen goods must be in the possession of the accused. This must be proved beyond reasonable doubt – See R. v. Obiase (1938) 4 WACA. 16. However, where possession is not proved in the accused the presumption cannot be drawn. – See R. v. Bamin (1946)12 WACA.8 (S.L.). It is well understood in our jurisprudence that the concept of possession is invariably related to the character of the property. My brother Oputa, JSC, expressed it succinctly in the recent case of Eze v. State (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt.13) at p.438 when he said, “Possession does not only imply physical power or custody over the res but also (and even more importantly) the power to exclude others” It includes exclusive control.
Soon after the theft
The proximity of the time of possession to the theft seems to be an essential requirement of the presumption whether the accused is the thief; or received them with knowledge that they are stolen goods- See R. v. Kwashie (1950) 13 WACA. 86 only 90 minutes R. v. Sunday Jumbo (1960) LLR. 192 a few hours R. v. Opara (1961)WNLR. 127. This imports the English law doctrine of recent possession. There have been several cases in our courts prescribing the period within which the possession of stolen goods by the accused has been used to presume the possessor as the thief. In Nwachukwu v. State (1985) 3 NWLR (Part 11) 218, appellant after presenting a toy gun to his victim, snatched the bag of money carried by his victim and ran away. He was chased into a house and with the assistance of the Police, arrested hiding under the bed and lying on the bag of money. It was held that section 148(a) of the Evidence Act applied since the accused was found lying on the bag containing the money subjected matter of the robbery, so soon after the robbery. The presumption that accused was one of the robbers was one which on the facts ought to be drawn and was drawn.
In Eze v. State (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt.13) 429, appellant and another robbed the victim of his suzuki Motor Cycle at about 6 a.m. They were spotted at about 5p.m. the same day at a Beer Parlour where they had taken the Motor Cycle. When the son of the victim and a Policeman identified the Motor cycle at the Beer Parlour, one of the two men who robbed the Motor Cycle at gun point escaped. The other was arrested. In his breast pocket was found the ignition key of the Motor cycle. He said he did not know how the key got into his pocket. He was on the facts held to be one of the armed robbers.
In Salami v. The State (1988)3 NWLR. (Pt. 85) 671, appellants robbed at gun point the victim of his Datsun 120Y Panel Van with registration No.LA 5501 at about 2 p.m. on 15/9/81. At about 8 p.m., that is within six hours on the same day along Ijebu-Ode – Ibadan Road, the appellant was seen driving the car, the registration number already changed to read OG 803 B. Appellant was arrested and handed over to the Police. The trial Court presumed Appellant was the thief. His appeal to the Court of Appeal and to this court was dismissed.
Now applying the principles above enunciated to the facts of this case, Counsel to the Appellant admitted, since it cannot be otherwise, that the Peugeot 504 saloon car registered with No.OD 8511 D was a stolen car. Appellant has admitted he was in the car with the 2nd accused and his other confederates. He has admitted that the car was in their possession and was being driven from Ugborhen to Okuovu, looking for money to respray the car into different taxi colours when they were arrested. The car was reported stolen by armed robbers the same morning. These were the facts which enabled the trial Judge to presume that appellant is one of the robbers. In coming to this conclusion the trial Judge had regard to the nature of the property stolen as well as the course of human conduct in relation to the stealing of cars.” See State v. Aiyeola (1969)1 All NLR. 303. Counsel to the appellant submitted that the contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses regarding the discrepancy in the number of the occupants of the stolen car Exh. A. should have cast doubt in the mind of the trial Judge the doubt should have been resolved in favour of the appellant.
With due respect to learned counsel neither of the cases cited in support is helpful or relevant to the contention. The Queen v. Moses (1960) 5 FSC. 187 concerned proof by circumstantial evidence falling short of the required standard and not sufficient to support conviction. The State v. Dr. Muhtari Kura (1975)2 SC.83 was concerned with proof where the totality of the evidence was equivocal.
The issue in the instant appeal is the discrepancy in the number of the occupants of the stolen car – Exh. A. PW1 said they were six, and PW3 said they were five. Indeed appellant in his evidence said they were six. This is not an essential requirement of the presumption. It is sufficient if the car was stolen property, which is not denied, and the accused was in possession of the car. I think the Court of Appeal was right in its application of section 148(a) of the Evidence Act. The criticism of counsel of the application of the doctrine of recent possession as contained in that section is unjustified and without merit. The next issue to be determined concerns the challenge to the dismissal of the defence of alibi. Counsel to the appellant submitted that the court below failed to realise that an alibi is a complete defence in law and especially in this case where appellant was not found at the locus criminis. After a short definition of the word ‘alibi’counsel submitted that the only positive identification of appellant was the evidence of PW4. Pitched against the denial of appellant, it is oath against oath. It was submitted that the court below was wrong in law to have come to the conclusion that the proof of the case of the prosecution was so cogent and convincing as to amount to proof of a proposition ‘with the accuracy of mathematics’ It was submitted that the prosecution failed to dislodge the defence of alibi set up by the accused.
It is important to point out that appellant’s alibi was against the robbery with arms of the Peugeot 504 saloon car OD 8511 D at Arola near Ede on 21/6/79. It does not concern the question whether appellant was in possession of the stolen car after the robbery. This is not subject matter of the alibi because appellant’s evidence was that he was with the others including the 1st and 2nd accused in the car until they were arrested.
What then was the alibi The alibi of the appellant was that he was on the 21st June, 1979 in his mother’s house in his village at Ajamukawa. He was there until his confederates came at about 5 p.m. when he accompanied them to Ugborhen and Okuovu where they were arrested.
It is well settled that where a defence of alibi has been raised, the accused is saying that he was at the time of the commission of the offence at a place other than the locus criminis, and could not have committed the offence. It is not only a plea of not guilty to the charge, accused is saying that he could not have committed the offence alleged.
Whilst it is not by any means disputed that an alibi when established is a complete defence, the courts have always held that an alibi that the other place other than the locus criminis where the accused claims to he at the time of the commission of the offence being a matter peculiarly within his knowledge, the onus of establishing it lies on him – See Gachi v. The State (1965) NMLR. 333. The burden of proof on the prosecution to prove the charge against the accused is different. This burden on the accused is not the same as that on the prosecution. With alibi, it is sufficient if it is proved on the balance of probabilities. Sec Ohiude v. The State (1970) 1 All NLR. 35. The law is that the accused setting up the defence of alibi has the burden of adducing evidence on which he relies for the defence – See Odidika v. The Slate (1477) 2 SC. 21. It is no proof merely to assert he was not and could not be there because he was elsewhere. He must lead credible evidence of where he was.” See Yanor v. The State (1965) NMLR. 337, and Nwosisi v. The State
(1476) 6 SC. 109. The trial Court considered the defence of alibi set up by the appellant. In his judgment he observed that the assailants of PW4 ‘departed from the locus criminis without being apprehended.’ After considering the cases of Nwosisi v. The State (supra), Yanor v. The State (supra), Gachi v. The State (supra), and the evidence of the prosecution witnesses as against the evidence of the accused persons including their statements. Exh. H. and J. he said.
“I believe the evidence of the prosecution that at the identification parade mounted and conducted by 6th P.W; 4th P.W. identified the two accused persons. This was confirmed by Exhibits F.F1 and G.G1. From the evidence before me therefore I hold the view that the prosecution succeeded in dislodging the alibi set up by the accused persons.”
The defence of alibi set up relied on the story that the appellant was at Ajamukawa Village at the material time when the offence was alleged to have been committed by him. This was his ipse dixit. There was no other evidence in support of this assertion – See Anyanwu v. The State (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt.43) 612. The duty of leading such other evidence without which the alibi is not established is on the accused – See Nwosisi v. The State (supra). In any case in the instant case, the evidence fixing the accused at the locus criminis and the commission of the crime is stronger than his alibi, then the alibi fails – See Njovens v. The State (1973) 5 SC. 17. Thus if the accused is believed then the prosecution would not have proved its case to the standard required, and the alibi succeeds.
In this case the identification of the appellant by PW4 who was the victim of the offence, as one of those who robbed him of the car at gun point at Arola Village near Ede on the 21/6/79 was positive direct and unequivocal. The assertion of alibi of appellant which is no evidence still remains too weak to be believed and the learned Judge did not believe it. In the circumstances it was correct to hold that the assertion of alibi was demolished. In Njovens v. The State (supra). this court stated the rule clearly when it said; at p.65
“There is nothing extra-ordinary or esoteric in a pica of alibi. Such a plea postulates that the accused person could not have been at the scene of the crime and only inferentially that he was not there. Even if it is the duty of the prosecution to check on a statement of alibi by an accused person and disprove the alibi or attempt to do so, there is no inflexible and/or invariable way of doing this. If the prosecution adduced sufficient and accepted evidence to fix the person at the scene of crime at the material time, surely this alibi is thereby logically and physically demolished.”
I think the trial judge correctly in my opinion, and supported by the cases cited, rejected the defence of alibi set up by the appellant. The Court of Appeal was right in affirming that decision:- See State v. Ozaki & ors. (1986) 5 NWLR. (Pt.40) 258 at p.259.
Counsel to the appellant finally challenged the acceptance of the trial Judge of the identification of the appellant by the PW4. The Court of Appeal affirming the conviction and sentence of appellant held that ‘the quality of the identification is unimpeachable since the danger of mistaken identity was eliminated’. Counsel regarded this statement as incredible as she put it ‘in view of the shoddy manner in which the driver/witness claimed to have identified the appellant.’ It was submitted that there was no evidence of their manner of dressing or any special features, and there was no evidence that PW4 had any opportunity of observing his passengers who he is now accusing of robbing his car with arms. Counsel submitted that the possibility of accusing the wrong person could not be ruled out.
Counsel to the respondent in his brief has submitted that the identification parade conducted and in which PW4 identified appellant was within the principles enunciated in Bozin v. The State (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt.8) 465. It was submitted that having regard to the finding of fact made by the learned trial Judge that PW4 identified appellant, concurred in by the Court of Appeal, there was no mistaken identity.
It seems to me counsel to the appellant completely confused the issues involved and appears to have ignored the evidence of the 4th prosecution witness. Since the defence of the appellant was an alibi the only evidence on the issue is that of the 4th PW. The question therefore rests on whether 4th P.W’s evidence was believed by the trial Judge The evidence of PW4 has been stated and remains uncontradicted. He gave evidence of how he negotiated with three persons including appellant the arrangement to convey appellant and the two others to Ede. His evidence was that appellant sat in the front seat and the other two at the back seat. He also stated how about 5 kilometres to Ede appellant and the others asked him to stop the car, how appellant alighted, that he was going to bring their sick mother; how he returned without her; how appellant held to the steering of the car; how with the assistance of the other two passengers, PW4 was overpowered, dragged out of the car and the car was driven away by the team, PW4 was on the evidence the only eye witness of the incident. The learned trial Judge believed his evidence in its entirety. He also believed the evidence of the identification of the appellant by the PW4 in the identification parade mounted for the purpose and rejected the suggestion of a mistaken identity.
I agree entirely with the view expressed in the judgment of the court below that the personal features and characteristics which are questions of fact was not an issue before the trial Judge and cannot now be under consideration. They are factors which ought to have been raised under cross-examination of the PW4, but were not raised. This is an appellate court which is not concerned with primary findings of fact. There was no doubt that PW4 was an eye witness of the incident being himself a conscious victim.
In the circumstances the quality of the identification which is positive, direct and unequivocal, was rightly described as unimpeachable by the court below – See Lawrence Odidika v. The State (1977) 2 SC. 21. The matter has been well expressed by Oputa, JSC. in Orimoloye v. The State (1984)10 SC. 138 when he observed;
“The issue of identification is an issue of fact which on the evidence before him, the learned trial Judge was quite competent to handle. He believed the evidence of identification. I do not see anything unreasonable or perverse in this belief.
I agree entirely with the observation of the court below that at the time of the identification parade appellant was no longer a stranger to PW4. There is no doubt he had sufficient opportunity before the incident to observe appellant who was sitting in front of the car with him. The contention of counsel for appellant is clearly erroneous and is hereby rejected.
I should make this observation which follows inexorably from the facts of the case but has not been adverted to in any of the courts below. Appellant could be convicted of the offence on the evidence of PW4 alone if believed and was indeed believed since it is a direct evidence of the offence of armed robbery; and remains uncontradicted with the failure of the alibi or by relying on the presumption under section 148(a) Evidence Act that the appellant was the armed robber. The presumption applies where there is no direct evidence. Where the evidence is positive, direct and unequivocal, it seems to me unnecessary to resort to the presumption under section 148(a) however attractive. Section 148(a) Evidence Act though equally probative, at best a very strong circumstantial evidence – See Ukorah v. The State (1977) 4 SC. 167.
In the old English case of Omychund v. Barker (1745) 1 Atk.21, at p.49, Lord Hardwicke was reported as having said,
“the judges and sages of the law have laid it down that there is one general rule of evidence, the best that the nature of the case will allow”
It is conceded in the instant case that the nature of the case allows both direct eye witness evidence and the presumption. The calling in aid of the two may not merely be complementary but undesirable duplication. For the reasons I have given above the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
A. G. O. AGBAJE, J.S.C.: On 22nd September, 1988 I dismissed the appellant’s appeal. I indicated then that I will give fuller reasons for my decision today. I have had the opportunity of reading in draft the lead reasons for judgment given by my learned brother Craig, J.S.C. I agree with his reasoning and I adopt the reasons he gave as my reasons for dismissing the appeal.
Appeal Dismissed
Appearances
Otunba Mrs. C. Ajayi-Okunuga (with her, Mrs. E.O. Balogun and Miss B.E. Bopo)For Appellant
AND
O. Okesola, Senior State Counsel. Ministry of Justice, Oyo StateFor Respondent



