SPRING BANK PLC. V. JULIUS O. BABATUNDE
(2011)LCN/4350(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Wednesday, the 2nd day of March, 2011
CA/B/348/2008
RATIO
DUTY OF THE COURT: WHETHER A COURT CAN SPECULATE ON A MATTER
The learned trial Judge, with due respect, erred when he speculated on a matter – a document not before him. Courts of law do not and should not speculate. See RAPHAEL EJEZIE & ANOR. V. CHRISTOPHER ANUWU & ORS. (2008) 12 NWIR (Pt. 1101) 446 at 490; FRANK UWAGBOE v. THE STATE (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1102) 62t at 647 and TKENTA BEST (NIG.) LIMITED V. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, RIVERS STATE (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1084) 612… PER MOORE A. A. ADUMEIN, J.C.A.
TERMINATION OF CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT: WHETHER A MASTER CAN TERMINATE THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT WITH HIS SERVANT AT ANYTIME AND FOR ANY OR NO REASON WHATSOEVER
It is trite law that a master can terminate the contract of employment with his servant at any time and for any reason or for no reason whatsoever. PER CHINWE E. IYIZOBA, J.C.A.
TERMINATION OF CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT: EFFECT OF THE TERMINATION OF A CONTRACT IN A MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT ON THE EMPLOYER
Where however the contract is terminated in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the contract of employment, the master must pay for the breach. The only exception is in respect of employments with statutory flavour. See the cases of Shitta-Bey v. F.C.S.C. (1981) 1 SC 40. PER CHINWE E. IYIZOBA, J.C.A.
TERMINATION OF CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT: WHETHER A SERVANT WHO HAS BEEN UNLAWFULLY DISMISSED CAN CLAIM HIS WAGES FOR SERVICES HE NEVER RENDERED
A servant who has been unlawfully dismissed cannot claim his wages for services never rendered. Olatunbosun V. Niser Council (1983) 3 NWLR (Pt.80) 25. PER CHINWE E. IYIZOBA, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
NWALI SYLVESTER NGWUTA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
CHINWE E. IYIZOBA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MOORE A. A. ADUMEIN Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
SPRING BANK PLC. Appellant(s)
AND
JULIUS O. BABATUNDE Respondent(s)
MOORE A. A. ADUMEIN, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of OLUWOLE FAGBE, J. of the High Court of Ondo State sitting at Akure, in Suit No. AK/284/2002 between JULIUS O. BABATUNDE (Plaintiff) V. SPRING BANK PLC (defendant), delivered on the 2nd day of June, 2008. In his amended statement of claim containing 27 paragraphs, the respondent who was the plaintiff in the court below, claimed the following relief, namely:
“1. An order of this honorable court compelling the defendant to pay the plaintiff retirement benefit accruing to the plaintiff due to the unlawful and wrongful separation of the plaintiff contract of employment/appointment by the defendant.
2. A sum of N5 million general damages against the defendant for its wrongful, malicious, vengeful and illegal separation of the contract of employment of the plaintiff.
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO (2) ABOVE
3. An order for special damages in the following sum;
(a) RETIREMENT BENEFIT
N K N K
NSITF REFUND: Self (2.5%) 7,336.82
:Employer (2.5%) 7,336.82
Total= 14,673:64
SHARE REFUND: 80,025:04
Plus interest at 10% per Annum 12,600:16
(2001-May 2004)
92,625:21
NHF: Self (2.5%) 7,336.82
:Employer (2.5%) 7,336.82
Total 14,673.64
INSURANCE PENSION SCHEME
Year 1999 30,224.24
Year 2000 25,399.72
Total= 55,623:96
CONTRACTUAL 1 MONTH BASIC SALARY IN
LIEU OF NOTICE 9YRS. BASIC SALARY (146,426 x 9) 12,202.00
1,317,834.00
HOUSING ALLOWANCE 134,227.00
Total= 1,641,859:45
(b) DAMAGES AS A RESULT DAUHTER’S DEATH: 2,500,000
(c) ECONOMIC HARDSHIP, PAIN AND
SUFFERING DUE TO THE WRONGUL
ACTION OF THE DEFENDANT: 1,000,000
(d) UNLAWFUL BREACH OF CONTRACT: 2,500,000
Total= 6,000,000.00
Ground Total= N7,641,859:45
(A total sum of seven million, six hundred and forty one thousand, eight hundred and fifty nine Naira, forty-five kobo as special damages)” (See pages 4 and 5 of the record of appeal).
The appellant as defendant in the trial court, filed an amended statement of defence and a counter claim of 23 paragraphs. At the close of the respondent’s case, the learned counsel for the appellant withdrew the counter claim and it was struck out accordingly.
(See page 25 of the record of appeal).
The respondent filed a reply to the amended statement of defence and a defence to the counter claim. The process, containing 14 paragraphs, spans pages 10 – 12 of the record of appeal.
The case was heard and determined by the trial court in favour of the respondent and the sum of N1,507,032.45 special damages was awarded against the appellant. The judgment of the lower scout covers pages 49 – 71 of the record of appeal. The appellant was not satisfied and he filed a notice of appeal containing 5 (five) grounds (pages 73 -77 of the record of appeal).
At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant adopted and relied on its brief of argument dated the 12th day of May, 2010 but filed on the 13th day of May, 2010 and its reply brief filed on 23/06/2010. Mr. Ekerete Udofot, learned counsel for the appellant urged the Court to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the trial judge and dismisses the respondent’s claims in the court below. On the other hand, Mr. Titiloye Charles, learned counsel for the respondent, adopted and relied on his brief of argument dated the 9th day of June, 2010 and filed the same date. The respondent urged the Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In his brief of argument, Mr. Udofot, learned counsel for the appellant distilled the following four (4) issues as calling for determination:
1. Was the learned trial judge right, in dealing with this case, to have gone outside the contract of employment (exhibit B), this case being an action for wrongful termination of employment (Ground 1)
2. Was the learned trial judge right, having regards to the circumstances of this case in holding and granting to the plaintiff special damages or the award of 9 year’s basic salary as retirement benefit (or entitlement at the time of termination) after the plaintiff employment had been terminated (Ground II)
3. Whether the learned trial judge was right to have granted a relief not asked for by the plaintiff (Ground III)
4. Whether or not there was any sufficient evidence to support the findings and order of monetary awards made by the learned trial judge (Ground IV). (Pages 4 – 5 of the appellant’s brief)
The respondent, on the other hand, formulated the following four (4) issues as arising for determination, namely:
1. From the Evidence before the trial court, can the letter of appointment of Respondent as a clerical staff of the Appellant, Spring Bank P.L.C. on 20/2/92 be said to be the final contractual terms of employment of the Respondent which was never reviewed in the course of the employment of Respondent in the Appellant’s Bank.
2. Was the lower court not right in presuming the existence of retirement benefit as proved by the Respondent evidence and partly admitted by the Appellant’s statement of Defence when the Appellant refused on subpoena during trial of the case to tender the staff manual hand book in its possession where the condition of service of staff are contained.
3. Can an Appellant who rested its case on the Respondent evidence during trial disprove any fact given by the Respondent evidence by way of counsel argument before appellate Court?
4. Can an Appellant by way of appeal canvass a different case from what he pleaded in his statement of Defence before the trial Court? (Page 1 of the respondents’ brief)
In its reply brief, the appellant contended the 3rd and 4th issues formulated by the respondent did arise from the grounds of appeal filed by the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant referred to and relied on the cases of ASSAM V. DAVANDY FINANCE AND SECURITIES LTD. (2008) ALL FWLR (pt. 432) 1165 at 1170; I.C.H. LTD. V. C.S. & R. (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt. 400) 680 at 696 and OWOH v. ASUK (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt. 429) 449 at 455 and urged the Court to ignore the 3rd and 4th issues formulated in the respondent’s brief of argument.
I have examined the two issues complained of vis-a-vis the grounds of appeal filed by the appellant. Issue No.3 and issue No.4 formulated by the respondent do not arise for the appellant’s grounds of appeal and they are hereby ignored as they are irrelevant to the determination of the appeal. See WEST AFRICAN EXAMINATIONS COUNCIL V. OMODOLAPO ADEYANJU (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1092) 270 at 291 and UNITY BANK PLC & ANOR. V. MR. EDWARD BOUARI (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1085) 372 at 400.
The appellant’s Issue No.1 and the respondent’s first issue shall be considered and taken together.
Mr. Udofot, learned counsel for the appellant, argued that the relationship of servant and mater between the respondent and the appellant was governed by exhibit ‘B’- the respondent’s letter of appointment and that the parties were bound by the terms and conditions set out therein. The learned lawyer contended that “no court is allowed to read into such contract terms that are not included and agreed upon”. Counsel referred the Court to the cases of OCEANIC BANK INTERNATIONAL LIMITED V. UDUMEBRAYE (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt.430) 169 at 782 -783 and UBN LIMITED V. OZIGI (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt.333) 385 at 404.
The appellant referred to sundry aspects of the testimony of the respondent, who testified as PW2, in the Court below, and argued that the learned trial Judge erred when held as follows:
“A casual interpretation of the phrase from time to time shows that the staff Handbook was in existence at the time of the plaintiff employment”.
The appellant contended that since the respondent was employed on the 20th day of February, 1992 and the alleged staff manual was introduced in 1993, the contract of employment between the respondent and the appellant was exhibit ‘B’- the respondent’s letter of employment. Counsel for the appellant submitted it was wrong for the trial court to have “speculated on the existence of another contract of employment apart from exhibit ‘B’ the letter of appointment”. He opined that this speculation was wrong and that it occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Counsel referred the Court to the case of AGBALLLAH V. NNAMANI (2005) ALL FWLR (Pt.245) 1052 at 1074.
Mr. Udofot argued that the alleged staff handbook, which at best could be regarded as a collective agreement, was never incorporated into the respondent’s employment and therefore not binding. He cited the cases of TEXACO NIGERIA PLC V. KEHINDE (2002) FWLR (Pt.94) 143 at 160 – 151; ACB PLC V. NWADUKA (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt. 443) 470 and UNION BANK OF NIG. LTD. V. EDET (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt.287) 288.
The appellant referred to the case of OFORKAJA V. TARABA (2008) FWLR (Pt. 178) 1035 at 1064 and submitted that the “learned trial judge certainly fell into serious error of law when he speculated on the content of a document not before it”.
The respondent’s learned counsel, on the other side, referred to the evidence of the respondent (PW2) at pages 15 to 24 of the record of appeal and argued that the respondent’s letter of employment – exhibit ‘B’ “stated that the condition of service shall be reviewed from time to time”. He contended that the respondent’s letters of promotion – exhibits C and D were “indication of a review of the condition of service of the Respondent which totally is different of (sic) Exhibit B”. Titiloye Charles, learned counsel for the respondent, then submitted as follows:
“We submit therefore that the letter of appointment marked Exhibit B has been further improved and modified in the promotion of the Respondent from a clerical officer to a supervisory officer. The remuneration and status of the Respondent as at the time of his disengagement differ from what was contained in the letter of appointment. This fact of changes to remuneration and status of the respondent and introduction of condition of services in the staff handbook of the Defendant as regard retirement benefit was never denied by the Respondent in its statement of Defendant. The Appellant is therefore bound by his (sic) renegotiated contract of employment with Respondent ……” (Underlining mine).
The question here is whether the learned trial Judge was right in relying on an alleged staff handbook or manual when the said document was not before the Court. In his judgment, the learned trial Judge, after referring to paragraph 6 of exhibit B, stated inter alia thus:
“A casual interpretation of the phrase from time to time shows that the staff Hand book was in existence at the time of the plaintiff’s employment and the book may, be subject to review and the conditions in the reviewed edition will be binding on the plaintiff.” (See page 64 of the record of appeal). It should be noted that paragraph 6 of exhibit B states thus:
“Your entitlement for leave and other fringe benefits will be in accordance with the rules and scales of the bank as may be applied from time to time.”
From the words and wording of paragraph 6 of exhibit B, no reference is made to any “staff Hand Book” or “staff Manual”. In any case, a thorough reading of the parties’ pleadings, the amended statement of defence and counter claim, and the reply to the statement of dafence and counter claim, the case of the respondent was that the staff hand book was new and it was foisted on the staff by the appellant’s “C.E.O.” Please, see paragraph 7 of the respondent’s “reply to Defendant statement of defence and counter claim” (page 11 of the record of appeal) where the respondent pleaded as follows:
“7. The Defendant in reply to the paragraph (sic) 6 & 7 of the said defense (sic) states that as of time he was employed on 3rd of February 1992, nothing like separation was referred to in the letter. The word separation was introduced later in a new staff hand book introduce (sic) by the said C.E.O. of the Defendant for staff that wishes to retire on medical grounds. The staff manual was imposed on the staff by the said C.E.O.” (Underlining mine).
The said staff hand book or staff manual was never put in evidence by any of the parties. The learned trial Judge, with due respect, erred when he speculated on a matter – a document not before him. Courts of law do not and should not speculate. See RAPHAEL EJEZIE & ANOR. V. CHRISTOPHER ANUWU & ORS. (2008) 12 NWIR (Pt. 1101) 446 at 490; FRANK UWAGBOE v. THE STATE (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1102) 62t at 647 and TKENTA BEST (NIG.) LIMITED V. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, RIVERS STATE (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1084) 612 and should not.
This question is hereby resolved in favour of the appellant against the respondent.
I will consider the appellant’s issue No.2, issue 3 and issue No.4 together with the respondents issue No.2. These issues have been fully reproduce herein – before and I do not consider it necessary to further reproduce them.
Mr. Udofot, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the only contract of employment was exhibit B and by the fourth clause of exhibit B, the appellant’s liability was to give the respondent one month’s notice before terminating his appointment or payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice. Learned counsel contended that the respondent’s employment was not one with “statutory flavor in which case retirement age would be implied”. Mr. Udofot argued that the measure of damages would be the amount of money payable for the period of the notice and “not salaries up to retirement age”. Counsel referred, on this point, to the cases of ONALAJA V. AFRICAN PETROLEUM (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 206) 691 at 598; NPMB V. ADEWUMI (1972) II SC III and OLATUBOSUN V. NISER (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt.80) 25.
The appellant submitted that the respondent could not claim wages for services he never rendered upon the termination of his employment. On this point, the appellant cited and relied on the cases of CCB (NIG.) LTD. v. NWANKWO (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 286) 159 at 179 and NATION BANK OF NIG. LTD. V. OMOTAYO (2002) FWLR (Pt. 114) 454 at 466.
It was contended on behalf of the appellant that there was no legal basis for awarding the sum of N1,317,834.00 being nine years’ basic salary to the respondent.
Mr. Udofot also contended, that since the respondent’s alternative relief 3(a) was a claim of special damages for “retirement benefit” it was wrong for the trial court to have awarded the respondent “special damages and other entitlements due to him at the termination of his employment”. He contended strongly that the trial court awarded a relief not asked for by the respondent. He referred the Court to the cases of NATIONAL BANK OF NIG. LTD. V. OMOTAYO (supra) at 461; WR & PC LTD. V. ONWO (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 630) 312 and EKPENYONG & ORS. V. NYONG & ORS. (1975) 2 SC 71 where the Supreme Court, per DAN IBEKWE, JSC, held as follows:
“It is trite law that the court is without power to award to a claimant that which he did not claim. This principle of law has time and again been stated and re-stated by this court that it seems to us that there is no longer any need to cite authorities in support of it. We take the view that this principle of law is not only good law, but good sense.”
The appellant submitted that the trial court went contrary to the express terms of exhibit B when it held that “The appellant result is that all the heads of retirement entitlement are proved”. The appellant argued that exhibit B did not have provision for “retirement”, “retirement benefit” or “retirement entitlement”. The appellant contended, among other things, that “the various heads of entitlement on NISTF, share refund, NHF, Insurance Scheme………found by the learned trial judge and monetary awards made against the appellant were without any evidence supporting them…..”
The appellant also referred to the Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund (NSITF) and argued that the funds contributed by an employee are not with the appellant and the respondent could request for a refund from the Board in charge of the funds. The appellant referred the Court to sections 3 and 21 of the NIGERIA SOCIAL INSURANCE TRUST FUND ACT, CAP. N88, VOL. II, LAWS OF THE FEDERATION OF NIGERIA, 2004.
The appellant finally urged the Court to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the respondent’s claims,
Mr. Titiloye Charles, in his respondent’s brief of argument, submitted that the appellant admitted that the respondent was entitled to some retirement benefits not specifically mentioned in exhibit B and this admission was binding on the appellant. The respondent referred the Court particularly to paragraphs 8 and 10 of the appellant’s amended statement of defence
I have read the contending arguments of the parties to this appeal. I have also read the legal authorities cited by Messrs Ekerete Udofot and Titiloye Charles, learned counsel for the appellant and respondent respectively.
The facts of this case are clear and straightforward. The respondent was employed as a clerk by the appellant vides a letter of appointment dated 20th February, 1992 – exhibit B. By exhibit J – letter dated 31st January, 2001 the employment of the respondent was terminated by the appellant with effect from the 1st day of February, 2001. The letter terminating the respondent’s employment was received by the respondent on the 3rd day of February, 2001. The appellant did not give the respondent any notice before terminating his employment. The appellant did not also make any monetary payment to the respondent in lieu of notice. Aggrieved by the manner his employment was terminated, the respondent filed this suit in the court below against the appellant,
The facts of this case are clear and straightforward. The respondent was employed as a clerk by the appellant vide a letter of appointment dated 20th F.
From the issue formulated by the parties and their legal arguments, the live question that calls for an answer is whether or not the trial court was right in awarding the monetary damages complained of in favour of the respondent.
A substantial part of the appellant’s case in this court is merely academic and relates to questions not raised in the court below. For example, the argument that the respondent, as a contributor to the National Social Insurance Trust Fund is entitled, under the National Social Insurance Trust Fund Act, Cap. N88, Vol. II, Laws of the Federal of Nigeria 2004 to apply for a refund of his contribution or entitlement was not raised in the trial court. The appellant, having admitted liability for the respondent’s claim in respect of this head in the trial court cannot make out a different case here. The appellant’s legal argument on this question is merely of academic relevance without any impact on the appeal before this Court.
In its judgment the trial court held inter alia as follows:
The claim for general damages of the sum of N6 million fails. But I am satisfied that the plaintiff has proved that his employment was wrongfully terminated by the defendant.
Also he has proved by evidence the special damages and other entitlements that were due to him at the time of his termination. Accordingly I award to the plaintiff a sum of N1,507,032.45 being special damages and other entitlements due to him at the termination of his employment which breakdown are as follows:
(i) NSITF Refund…N14,673.64
(ii) Share Refund …N92,625.21
(iii) N.H.F. …N14,673.64
(iv) INSURANCE PENSION SCHEME…N55,623.96
(v) ONE MONTH’S SAIARY IN LIEU OF NOTICE…N12,202.00
(vi) 9 YEARS’ BASIC SALARY… N1,317,834.00
(vii) HOUSING ALLOWANCE…NIL
TOTAL….N1,507,632″
(See pages 70 – 7I of the record of appeal).
One of the appellant’s quarrels with the said awards is that the trial court erred in awarding “entitlements that were due to him at the time of his termination” whereas the respondent’s claim was special damages for “retirement benefit”. In my humble opinion, the difference is merely a matter of nomenclature and not substantial as to deny the respondent entitlements due and payable to him upon the termination of his employment. This is more so when in paragraph 8 of its amended statement of defence and counter claim, the appellant admitted that the respondent was “entitled to the following:-
(a)One month Basic Salary in lieu of Notice
(b) Year 2001 Pension Contribution
(c) NSITF Refund
(d) Share Refund.”
The respondent, who testified as PW2, gave evidence on his entitlements as follows:
“My retirement benefits include N80,000.23 as share refund. I am also entitled to Nigeria Social Trust fund of N14,673.64; National Housing Fund of N14,673.64. Insurance Pensions Scheme for 1999 and 2000 N30,224.24 and N25,399.72 respectively. I am also entitle (sic) to housing allowance for the year my services were separated N134,227.00. One month basic salary in lieu of notice N12,202.00, Nine years basic salary which amounts to N1,317,834.00.” (Page 18 of the record).
Under cross-examination by Mr. Aderibigbe, the then learned counsel for the appellant, the respondent admitted that he collected his housing for 2001 – the year his appointment was terminated. The respondent, however, denied that he was entitled to insurance of only N432.00. (See page 23 of the record of appeal).
As stated earlier, the appellant rested its case on the respondent’s case by calling no evidence, abandoning its counter-claim and making a no case submission. (See pages 26, 31, and 54 of the record of appeal).
On the parties’ pleadings and the unchallenged evidence proffered by the respondent, the appellant admitted that the entitlements of the respondent at the time his employment was terminated were one month’s salary in lieu of notice, share refund, Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund, National Housing fund, Insurance Pensions Scheme for 1999 and 2000 respectively.
On the admission by the respondent, under cross-examination, that he was paid his housing allowance for 2000 his claim under this head was rightly refused by the trial court. Having granted the respondent his one month’s salary in lieu of notice; the award by the trial Judge of nine (9) years’ basic salary to the respondent was wrong and it is hereby set aside. The respondent demanded for a share refund of N80,000.25 but was awarded the sum of N92,625.21 by the lower court-that award is hereby set aside and replaced with the sum of N80,000.20 claimed by the respondent. There is no basis to disturb the other monetary awards by the trial court.
For the avoidance of any doubt, the monetary entitlements proved by the respondent and which ought to be awarded to him are follows:
(i) One month’s salary in lieu of notice= N12,202.00
(ii) Share Refund= N80,000.20
(iii) National Housing Fund= N14,673.64
(iv) NSITF Refund= N14,673.64
(v) Insurance Pensions Scheme= N55,623.96
Total= N177,173.44
Therefore, this appeal succeeds in part as highlighted hereinabove. The award of the sum of N1,507,532 as special damages in favour of the respondent by the trial court is hereby set aside. In its place, the sum of N177,173.44 (One hundred and seventy-seven thousand, One hundred and seventy-three naira, forty-four kobo) is hereby awarded in favour of the respondent. This sum represents the respondent’s entitlements as itemized above.
The appellant unfairly failed to abide by the terms of the respondent’s letter of appointment (exhibit B) by refusing or neglecting to give the respondent one month’s notice or payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice before terminating his appointment. The appellant’s unlawful conduct culminated in this suit. Under the circumstances of this case, the respondent is entitled to costs in both the trial court and this court.
I award the sums of N75, 000.00 (seventy-five thousand naira only) in the court below and N50,000.00 (fifty thousand naira only) in this court, being and representing costs in favour of the respondent against the appellant.
NWALI SYLVESTER NGWUTA, J.C.A.: I read in draft the lead Judgment just delivered by my Lord Adumein, JCA and I abide by the reasoning and conclusion reached. I also allow the appeal in part and adopt the consequential orders in the lead Judgment.
CHINWE E. IYIZOBA, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Moore A.A. Adumein, JCA. I agree with the reasoning contained therein and the conclusions arrived thereat.
It is trite law that a master can terminate the contract of employment with his servant at any time and for any reason or for no reason whatsoever. Where however the contract is terminated in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the contract of employment, the master must pay for the breach. The only exception is in respect of employments with statutory flavour. See the cases of Shitta-Bey v. F.C.S.C. (1981) 1 SC 40. In this appeal, the contract of employment was improperly terminated as rightly held by the learned trial judge. The respondent was therefore entitled to his one month salary in lieu of notice and other allowances as set out in the leading judgment.
The learned trial judge was in error to have awarded the respondent 9 years basic salary of N1,317,834.00. A servant who has been unlawfully dismissed cannot claim his wages for services never rendered. Olatunbosun V. Niser Council (1983) 3 NWLR (Pt.80) 25. The law on what a plaintiff can lawfully claim in an action for wrongful termination of employment is so settled that it is surprising that counsel continue to file such cases and make all kinds of indefensible claims. I abide by all the orders made by my learned brother in the leading judgment including the order as to costs.
Appearances
Ekerete Udofot, Esq.For Appellant
AND
Titiloye Charles, Esq.For Respondent
