IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE YENAGOA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT YENAGOA
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE BASHAR A. ALKALI
DATE: FEBRUARY 15, 2019
SUIT NO: NICN/YEN/06/2015
BETWEEN:
SMQA III OWEITEIGHA JOSEPH
CLAIMANT
AND
- THE NIGERIAN NAVY
- THE CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF
DEFENDANTS
REPRESENTATION
Mr. Ndeze Anthony Esq for the Claimant.
Defendants not represented.
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION AND CLAIMS
By a Complaint dated and filed on the 13th day of May, 2015, which was later amended by a Motion filed on the 7th day of June, 2018 which was granted by this Court, the Claimant instituted this action before this Honourable. On the face of the originating processes filed by the Claimant, the Claimant sought for the following reliefs:
- A DECLARATION that the Claimant is till date a lawful and bonafide employee of the defendants.
- The sum of N3, 198, 000.00 (Three Million, One Hundred and Ninety Eight Thousand Naira) only being the Claimant’s accumulated salary arrears from January 2012 to May 2015, at the rate of N78, 000. 00 (Seventy-Eight Thousand Naira), Only.
- The sum of the (sic) N78, 000. 00 (Seventy-Eight Thousand Naira), only, being the Claimant’s salary per month from June 2015 until judgment.
- 10% pre-judgment interest on reliefs (a) and (b) above.
- The sum of N500, 000. 00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira), only being cost of litigation.
The Defendants, through the Legal Department of the Federal Ministry of Defence, filed a Memorandum of Conditional Appearance, Statement of Defence, Witness Statement on Oath and other accompanying processes, which were all duly entered upon the grant of their Motion on Notice for Extension of Time dated 2nd day of November, 2015. The Defendants further amended their Statement of Defence via a Motion which was moved and granted on the 19th day of July, 2018.
Trial commenced on the 14th day of December, 2017 with the Claimant opening his case and calling one witness in the proof of his claim. The witness, who was the Claimant himself, tendered 8 documents that were admitted by this Court and marked as EXHIBITS CW1 001 – CW1 008 (A-D), and was cross-examined on the same day.
On their part, the Defendants also called one witness who testified as DW1 (Sub-Lieutenant Fidelis Ngbe Anyogo), who tendered one document which was admitted by this Court and marked as EXHIBIT DW1 NN 001. He was cross-examined on the 20th day of June, 2018 and the Defendants closed their case. Parties were thereafter ordered to file Final Written Addresses and Reply on Points of Law.
CLAIMANT’S CASE IN BRIEF
The Claimant successfully completed basic military and seamanship course on the 6th of April, 2006, and was issued a certificate by the Nigerian Navy after being authenticated by the Commanding Officer. He was shortlisted along with some of his colleagues to travel to the United States of America to bring the newly acquired warship by the Nigerian Government. In the course of his duty on board the ship, the Claimant’s fell ill upon which he was given medications, which he averred were inadequate. By his written deposition, the Claimant states that he collapsed on a particular day while on duty and was rushed to the US Coast Guard Clinic for medical treatment but could not be diagnosed. He was thereafter flown back to Nigeria where he was admitted at the Nigeria Navy Hospital, Ojo but despite the diagnoses and treatment at the hospital, his health continued to deteriorate. According to the Claimant, he was “unceremoniously abandoned by the hospital authority with no more medication and or care for about a month”.
He later sought traditional medical treatment and obtained a clean bill of health from the clinic in Edo State. Thereafter, he reported back to the Central Naval Command (Camp Porbeni) in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State but was referred back to the Navy Hospital, Ojo. The Defendants have since failed or refused to redeploy him despite the letters from his Counsel. See EXHIBITS CW1 005 – CW1 008(A) – (D).
Upon cross examination, the Claimant stated that he left the Navy Hospital, Ojo in October, 2011, although he did not have a letter of authority to leave. That he did not leave the hospital on his own but at the time he regained consciousness, his family had already taken him for the traditional medicine. He then closed his case.
THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANTS
The Defendants maintained that the Claimant “unfortunately abandoned” the hospital while his treatment was still in progress and without any official document authorizing him to leave. This is in contravention with the Armed Forces Act and the Naval code of conduct and it is considered that such officer is on AWOL (‘Away Without Official Leave’). It also required that the salary of such officer be automatically stopped.
When placed on cross-examination, DW1 admitted that the Claimant took ill while on official duty in the United States of America. He testified to the fact that when an officer of the Nigerian Navy stays out of work for more than 30 days, the name of such officer is struck off and his salaries stopped. He does not have anything to show that the Claimant was dismissed from the service of the Defendants even though EXHIBIT DW1 NN 001 one of the recommendations was for the Claimant to seek medical attention elsewhere. DW1 agrees that the Claimant has served the Nigerian Navy at 5 different locations and was happy with his job but cannot say at the time when the Claimant abandoned the hospital. He also cannot tell the Court when the Claimant’s salary was stopped. At the close of the trial, court ordered parties to file their Final Written Address.
THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS
The Defendants formulated one (1) issue for determination by this Court, that is:
- Whether the Claimant (sic) absents from duty without the permission (AWOL) of Nigerian Navy an offence under the Armed Forces Act?
Defendants’ counsel submits under his sole issue for determination that the Claimant went on AWOL while receiving treatment at the Nigerian Navy Reference Hospital, Ojo and as such is not entitled to receive any salary. He benched his submission on the provisions of Sections 241 and 242 of the Armed Forces Act, Cap. A20 LFN, 2004. He maintains that the provisions is to the effect that a deserter can be arrested without warrant if convicted by a Court Martial and punishable with two (2) years imprisonment.
The Claimant is subject to Service Law at the time he committed the act and cannot claim ignorance of the consequences of his action. Counsel also relied on the provisions of Sections 397 and 398 of the Nigerian Police Regulation.
Learned Counsel further argued that the Claimant cannot be entitled to his reliefs having failed to satisfy the Court with enough evidence. He contends that the Claimant must rely on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the Defendants’ case. He cited the authorities of AYEDOUN T. JULIES v RAIMI AJANI (1980) 5-7 SC 96 and CHIJOKE ASIEGBU & ANOR v CHIEF JOHN OLIBIE (2008) LPELR-3072 (CA). He urged the Court to refuse to grant any declaration irrespective of the admission of the Defendants or the default on their part to make any defence except on the evidence of the Claimant. Learned Counsel submitted that the Defendants need not prove anything if the Claimant has not succeeded in making out a prima facie case. He concluded by urging the Court to dismiss the Claimant’s suit in its entirety.
SUBMISSION OF THE CLAIMANT
The Claimant raised only one (1) issue in his Final Written Address, that is:
- Whether the Claimant is sequel to all oral and documentary evidences (sic) in this case, entitled to the reliefs sought.
Learned Counsel submitted that the Claimant is entitled to all the reliefs he requests from this Court, having recourse to all the evidence, both oral and documentary, he adduced before the Court. He continued by submitting that the fact that the Claimant is an officer of the Defendants and have served in various capacities and locations for the Defendants, were not only uncontroverted by the Defendants but were rather admitted wholly.
Counsel submitted further that the Defendants’ refused to accommodate the Claimant after regaining his fitness and healing despite reporting to the Defendants. Learned Counsel also maintained that the Defendants’ sole witness failed to substantiate, under cross examination, the procedure to declare an officer to be on AWOL. The Defendants did not follow the due procedure as prescribed by SECTIONS 241 and 242 of the ARMED FORCES ACT, CAP A20, LFN 2004 and as such cannot declare him a deserter. Counsel also relied on SECTION 59 of the same statute to contend that the Claimant was never on AWOL. He claimed that EXHIBIT DW1 NN 001 (Medical Report) did not state when the Claimant left the hospital to suggest when he went on AWOL neither could the Defendants’ witness state so.
He concluded by submitting that the burden of proving that he was on AWOL lies squarely on the Defendants, which they have failed to discharge and as such, the Court should grant the Claimant all the reliefs sought.
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW
The Defendants’ Reply on Points of Law was filed on the 18th day of October, 2018. The Learned Counsel relied on the provisions of SECTION 205(1)(a) of the Armed Forces Act to argued that the Claimant is not entitled to his pay having committed an offence contrary to the Service Law. Counsel maintained that the Claimant is a deserter who deserted from the Navy Hospital without the permission of his employer in accordance with the Act and the 1st Defendant struck out his name in line with the directive of the Chief of Naval Staff.
Counsel reiterated that it is common sense that where a serving officer wilfully abandons his responsibilities and duties by leaving his unit or refusing to stay in the hospital for continued treatment and further diagnosis, as in the instant case, such officer is termed a deserter. He cited the authority of LIEUTENANT COLONEL P.Y. AWUSA v NIGERIAN ARMY (2013) LPELR-22618 (CA). Learned Counsel also posited that the Court is empowered to arrest and keep in its custody, a Claimant who deserts his duty post and runs to the Court. Such Claimant should thereafter be handed over to the Military Authorities for prosecution of the offence of desertion. He asked the Court to look at the provisions of Sections 242 – 245 of the Armed Forces Act.
He urged the Court to dismiss the Claimant’s suit in its entirety for lacking in merit.
COURT’S DECISION
I have taken my time to look at all the processes and exhibits filed by the various Counsel for the Parties and I had the opportunity to watch the demeanour of the witnesses who gave evidence before me. Both of the Learned Counsel raised and argued one issue respectively which I seek to adopt. They are as follows:
- Whether the Claimant’s absence from duty without the permission of the Nigerian Navy is an offence under the Armed Forces Act.
- Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought based on his oral and documentary evidence adduced before this Court.
ISSUE ONE
On the authority of IBRAHIM VRS NIGERIA ARMY (2015) LPELR-24596 (CA), the term ‘offence’ may comprehend every crime and misdemeanor, or may be used in a specific sense as synonymous with ‘felony’ or with ‘misdemeanour’, as the case may be, or signifying a crime of lesser grade, or an act not indictable, but punishable summarily or by the forfeiture of a penalty.” An “offence” means “1. A violation of the law…..” See Black’s Law Dictionary (supra) page 1186.
Basically, the contention on this issue by the Defendants is that there are sufficient evidence to convict the Claimant for the offence of absenting his duty post without permission (AWOL) and or desertion from the service. Both are offences under our laws and they draw similar punishments. In support, particular reference was made to SECTIONS 59 of the ARMED FORCES ACT, CAP A20 LFN, 2004. Section 59 of the Armed Forces Act which provides for the offence of Away Without Leave (AWOL) reads thus:
A person subject to service law under this Act who-
(a) absents himself without leave; or
(b) persuades or procures any other person subject to service law under this Act to absent himself without leave, is guilty of an offence under this section and liable, on conviction by a court-martial, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or any less punishment provided by this Act.
Under Military Law, AWOL relates to a military service officer who fails to report at an assigned place or leaves that place or otherwise absents himself from his unit/post of duty without first seeking and obtaining the permission of his authorizing officer/supervisor. While DESERTION is the failure of a military service officer to report at assigned unit/duty post or leaves his assigned post with an intent to leave the service permanently. An officer who is AWOL for more than 30 days is considered a deserter. Section 60 of the Armed Forces Act provides for the offence of desertion. Particularly Section 60(4) provides for incidences where an officer is said to have deserted.
(4) For the purposes of this section and other sections of this Act, a person deserts who-
(a) leaves any service of the Armed Forces or when it is his duty to do so, fails to join or rejoin the Armed Forces, with (in either case) the intention, subsisting at the time of the leaving or failure to join or formed thereafter, of remaining permanently absent from his duty; or
(b) being an officer, enlists in or enters any of the other services of the Armed Forces, without having resigned his commission, or being a soldier, rating or aircraftman, enlists in or enters any of the services of the Armed Forces without having been discharged from his previous enlistment; or
(c) absents himself without leave with intent to avoid serving at any place outside Nigeria or to avoid service or any particular service when before the enemy, and reference in this section and other sections of this Act to desertion shall be construed accordingly.
I have taken this time to break down these terms because I observed that the Defendants have used the terms interchangeably in their arguments. Now back to the issue of whether the absence of the Claimant amounts to an offence as prescribed by Sections 59 and 60 of the Armed Forces Act. The Defendants declared the Claimant AWOL and struck his name off the Navy database because the Claimant left the Nigerian Navy Reference Hospital where he was placed on treatment without obtaining the approval of the Naval Authority. This the Claimant admitted under cross-examination but led oral evidence to the effect that members of his family got the oral approval of the Navy hospital management before he left the hospital to seek alternative medication in October, 2011.
The Defendants however did not lead any evidence as to the date the Claimant went AWOL, this is even in the face of the uncontroverted oral evidence of the Claimant that he received his last salary in December of 2011. It is very unlikely that a member of the Armed Forces would be away from the service for about 2 months without the knowledge of the Authorities. I am therefore moved to rely on SECTION 167(d) of the EVIDENCE ACT, 2011, which empowers the Court to presume the existence of facts which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to certain circumstances. Laying bare the evidence before me, EXHIBIT DW1 NN 001 fortifies the evidence of the Claimant as the medical report not only recommended that the Claimant be released to seek ‘spiritual help’, it also shows that the attention on the Claimant by the Defendants’ nurses ended on the 25th of July, 2011. It is apparent that there are no records to prove that the Claimant was given adequate attention between the periods of August and September, 2011 before he eventually left the hospital in October of the same year. It follows therefore that the Claimant’s assertion that he was ‘abandoned’ in the hospital are true, which also prompted the need to seek alternative treatment for his deteriorating health.
The clear imports from the provisions of SECTION 167 EVIDENCE ACT, which I have invoked is that what is required before the presumption would apply is not the failure to call a witness but the failure to call evidence. See NSC (NIG.) LTD VRS INNIS-PALMER (1992) 1 NWLR (PT.218) PG.422. I have invoked this section of the Evidence Act because of my belief that (1) there is proof that the evidence as to the approval of the Claimant’s exit from the hospital actually exists, and (2) the evidence in question was withheld by the Defendants who could have produced it. See also ONWUJUBA VRS OBIENU (1991) 4 NWLR (PT.183) PG.16; UMAR VRS STATE (2014) 13 NWLR (PT.1425) PG. 497.
The Claimant’s evidence also showed that he was admitted into a medical clinic for the periods between October 2011 and August, 2012. The contention of the Defendants that military personnel like the Claimant can only be treated in a military hospital or a government recognized hospital, does not hold any credence in law. On this, I hold tenaciously to the view posited by my Learned Brothers in the Court of Appeal in the case of IVWIGHRE VRS STATE (2018) LPELR-44862 (CA) that as long as the medical report is from a qualified medical doctor, whether it is from a private or government hospital is a non-issue.
For clarity of records, DW1 confirmed in evidence that the Claimant was happy with his job as a Naval officer, and since regaining his health the Claimant, on his part, made efforts into being reabsorbed into the Force but to no avail. EXHIBITS CW1 005, CW1 006, CW1 007 and CW1 008(a) – (d) are of the moment. My query, notwithstanding, is the fact that the Claimant made no efforts, since his bill of clean health in May or July, 2013, in reaching out to his employers until January, 2014, when he allegedly reported to the Central Naval Command in Bayelsa State. This is suspect.
This Court has however taken a cursory look at the question it is called upon to determine, which is whether the act of the Claimant has offended the provisions of SECTIONS 59 and 60 of the ARMED FORCES ACT, and is compelled to raise, suo moto, the issue of its jurisdiction to determine same. The point where Parties joined issues as to the question of whether the Claimant’s action is tantamount to the offence of desertion or AWOL, is a confluence where the original reliefs sought by the Claimant and the question of the jurisdiction of this Court embraced themselves, and the Court cannot look away from addressing that vital issue of whether it is amply adorned with the garment of jurisdiction to determine the question.
Clearly, the law completely frowns on a Court raising an issue suo moto, on its own motion, and deciding same without first asking Parties to address it. Such exercise has the capacity of infringing on the constitutional rights of the Parties to fair hearing as entrenched in the 1999 Constitution (As Amended). See MABAMIJIE VRS OTTO (2016) 13 NWLR (PT.1529) PG 171; ADEBAYO VRS PDP (2013) 17 NWLR (PT.1382) 1. This rule is, however, not without exceptions and it is on these exceptions that the Court relies. It is now settled law that the need for address by Parties would not be required if (a) the issue relates to the Court’s own jurisdiction; (b) both Parties are/were not aware or ignored a statute which may have bearing on the case and (c) on the face of the record, serious questions of the fairness of the proceedings is evident. The unreported case of KANO STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & ANOR VRS BASHIR ABBA SHERIFF & ANOR in APPEAL NO: CA/K/557/2015 DELIVERED IN DECEMBER, 2018; is of the moment.
In the eyes of the law, the question of jurisdiction is a fundamental and threshold question which must, at all times, be dispensed with by the Court first before diving into the matters before it. A Court that ignores this concern, does so at its own peril as its decision, no matter how beautifully couched is a nullity if it is discovered that it had no jurisdiction in the first place. See UTIH v ONOYIVWE (1991) 1 NWLR (PT.166) PG.166; NDIC VRS CBN & ANOR (2002) 7 NWLR (PT.766) PG.273; COTECNA INT’L LTD VRS IVORY MERCHANT BANK LTD (2006) 9 NWLR (PT.985) PG.275.
Although the subject matter of the case is within the jurisdiction of this Court, there are features entwined thereto which prevents this Court from exercising complete jurisdictional competence. The jurisdictional competence of any Court is complete when:
- It is properly constituted as regards members and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another;
- The subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction, and
- The case comes before the court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfilment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. See MADUKOLU VRS. NKEMDILIM (1952) 2 NSCC, PG. 375.
The unambiguous purport of the provisions of SECTIONS 59 and 60 of the ARMED FORCES ACT is that it is only within the purview of a Court Martial, as a Court of first instance, to determine what amounts to the offence of AWOL or desertion.
In view of the foregoing facts as enumerated above, its my ardent belief that this court does not possess the legal cloth to decide whether the Claimant did indeed committed the offences of AWOL or Dessertion, such power is within the ambit of the court martial. That leg of argument is hereby refused.
On the second issue that is whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought based on his oral and documentary evidence adduced before this court, it is of legal importance to note that one of the claims of the Claimant in his amended complaint and Statement of Facts dated 29th October, 2018, specifically at paragraph 33 (a) of the Statement of Facts establishing the cause of action, the Claimant want this court to make a declaration that he is till date a lawful and bona-fide employee of the Defendants.
From the evidence adduced by both the Claimant and the Defendants including the Exhibits tendered and admitted before this court there is nothing which tends to suggest that the Claimant was indeed tried and convicted by a court martial. Although by paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Defendants Amended Statement of Defence dated 13th July, 2018 and filed on 16th July and Witness Deposition on Oath of DW1, the Defendants assert that the officer was on AWOL and as such his salary was stopped. And the Claimant was able to established that the last time he received his salary was sometimes in December, 2011 and as such he is claiming the payment of the arrears of his salary from January 2012 to date. And the reason for the stoppage of the Claimant’s salary according to the Defendants in Paragraph 9 of their Statement of Defence was that, the Claimant left the Nigerian Navy Reference Hospital Ojo, Lagos State without the permission of the Naval authority. And that the 1st defendant after several months without knowing the whereabout of the Claimant, now declared the Claimant AWOL.
That said, Section 59 of the Armed Forces Act, Cap A20 LFN, 2004 which provides for the offence of Away without Leave (AWOL) provides as follows:
“A person subject to service law under this act who
- Absent himself without leave; or
- Persuades or procures any other person subject to service law under this Act to absent himself without leave;
is guilty of an offence under this section and liable, on conviction by a Court Martial, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or any less punishment provided by this Act.”
And from the records of this court and the evidence adduced there is nothing to show that the Claimant was indeed been tried and convicted by a court martial. And it is trite that when the provisions of a statute is clear and unambiguous, effect must be given to those provisions without recourse to any other consideration. See SHETTIMA & ANOR VRS GONI & ORS (2001) 18 NWLR (PT. 1279) PG 413.
Furthermore, Learned counsel to the Defendants made heavy weather on the fact that the defendants stopped the payment of salary to the Claimant in compliance with the provisions of section 205 of the armed forces act which provides thus:
- The pay of a person subject to service law under this act may be forfeited.
- For a period of absence in such circumstances as to constitute an offence under Section 59 or 60 of this act if the commander so directs, or of any other absence without leave;…”
While I am in agreement with the submissions of the learned counsel to the defendants that the pay of the claimant may be forfeited for his period of absence, but one can not read section 205 of the Act in isolation without recourse to the provisions of Sections 59 and 60 of the same act. This is because section 205 of the Act can not be enforced without the Claimant being tried and convicted by a court martial. And this court can not prevent or deter the defendants from disciplining the Claimant but same must be in compliance with the law.
Let me point out here that there are other ways provided by the Act that the pay of a personnel can be forfeited without mainly been tried by a Court Martial as provided in section 116 and 117 of the Act upon satisfying the conditions laid down in sections 119, 123 and 124 of the Act; which the Defendants failed to satisfy or adhere to any one of these procedures.
It’s also on record that the Claimant reported back to his place of work for posting but he was referred back to the Navy Reference Hospital Ojo, Lagos State, who in turn referred him to the Naval Headquarters. The claimant also wrote a letter dated 18th February, 2014 to the chief of naval staff (Exhibit CW1 – 005) for resumption of duty and payment of his salary but to no avail.
While the military has authority within its confines to discipline any erring or misbehaving soldier, however, the principle of fair hearing as enshrined in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria must be the factor in appealing against a misbehaving soldier. The rules of Natural Justice must be complied with at all times. See ZAKARI VRS NIGERIAN ARMY (2012) 5 NWLR P. 478; ESIAGA VRS UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR (2004) 7 NWLR (PT. 872) 366; YAKUBU VRS CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF (2004)1 NWLR (PT. 853) 94 C.A.
In view of the foregoing reasons enumerated ab-initio its my ardent belief that the Claimant has adduced enough evidence to prove his case based on proponderance of evidence to warrant the grant of some part of his claims as contained in his complaint and I resolved the second issue for determination in favour of the Claimant.
On the award of cost, the superior courts in a plethora of authorities have held that determination of cost is at the discretion of the court. The object of awarding costs is not to punish the unsuccessful litigant but to compensate the successful party for expenses to which he has been put by having coming to court. See LADEGA VRS AKINYILI (1975) 2 SC; EMORI VRS EGWU & ANOR (2016) LPELR – 40123 (CA); CITIBANK NIGERIA LTD VRS IKEDIASHI (2014) LPELR – 22447 (CA).
On the issue of pre-judgment interest, a party who claims interest on a sum of money, the Claimant has an obligation to support his claim. This is so in that a court cannot award a Claimant what he has not proved. And its evident that the Claimant has not lead any evidence to prove that claim and as such same is hereby refused. See BALOGUN VRS E.O.C.B (NIG) LTD (2007) 5 NWLR (PT. 1028) 584; M.H (NIG.) LTD VRS OKEFIENA (2011) 6 NWLR (PT. 1244) PG. 514.
For the purpose of clarity and for the reasons stated in this Judgement, I hold as follows:
- I declare that the Claimant is till date a lawful and bona-fide employee of the Defendants.
- I order the Defendants to pay to the claimant the sum of N3, 198, 000. 00 (Three Million, One Hundred and Ninety Eight Thousand Naira) Only being the Claimant’s accumulated salary arrears from January, 2012 to May, 2015, at the rate of N78, 000. 00 (Seventy Eight Thousand Naira) Only.
- The sum of N78, 000. 00 (Seventy Eight Thousand Naira) Only, being the Claimant’s salary per month from June, 2015 to date.
- The sum of N200, 000. 00 (Two Hundred Thousand Naira) Only being the cost of litigation. But I declined to award relief (d).
- All the terms of this judgement are to be complied with within 30 days from today.
I so hold.
Judgement is hereby entered accordingly.
__________________________________________
HON. JUSTICE BASHAR A. ALKALI
PRESIDING JUDGE
