SKYE BANK PLC v. DR. AMOBI UWALEKE
(2018)LCN/11757(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 22nd day of June, 2018
CA/OW/349/2012
RATIO
TRIAL JUDGE CAN LOOK INTO COURT RECORD FOR PROOF OF SERVICE
The trial judge is entitled to look into the Court’s record to satisfy himself whether there is proof of service of any process on the parties or their legal representatives before embarking on several adjournments which can lead to the unjust dismissal of the appellant’s case. per AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE, J.C.A.
AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM AND NEMO JUDEX IN SUA CAUSA
The audi alteram partem rule (which, together with the rule nemo judex in sua causa form the twin pillars upon which fair hearing is based), carries with it the need to give to all the parties due notice of hearing and the opportunity to be heard and to cross-examine every witness called by ones adversaries per AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE, J.C.A.
EFFECT OF THE BREACH OF THE RULE OF FAIR HEARING AND NATURAL JUSTICE
Generally, a breach of the rule, save in a few statutory exceptions, will invalidate the proceedings because it is breach of not only the right to fair hearing entrenched in our Constitution but also a breach of the rule of natural justice. per AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ITA GEORGE MBABA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
SKYE BANK PLC Appellant(s)
AND
- AMOBI UWALEKE Respondent(s)
AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
The appeal is against the ruling delivered on 16/5/2012 by the High Court of Imo State holden at the Owerri Judicial Division presided over by Hon. Justice F.I. Duroha-Igwe (hereafter to be simply referred to as the lower Court and learned trial Judge respectively).
The Respondent (as claimant before the lower Court) commenced the instant case against the Appellant (as Defendant) by a writ of summons which issued on 17/9/2009 and in which he claimed the following reliefs: –
1. The liquidated sum of N500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira only) being the sum of money which was fraudulently withdrawn from claimants account on 2nd August, 2009.
2. The further sum of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira only) being damages suffered by the claimant by reason of the defendant’s denial of the use by claimant of funds standing his credit in his account and the resultant financial and emotional distress to which claimant has been unduly subjected.
- Interest on N500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira only) at the rate of 20% per annum from 2/08/2009 till judgment and at the rate of 10% from date of judgment till the date of payment.
4. The further sum of N200,000.00 (Two Hundred Thousand Naira only) being the cost of instituting and prosecuting this action.
5. An order compelling the defendant to return to the claimant his ATM card which was wrongly withheld by the ATM on 2/08/2009.
The Respondent filed an 18-paragraph statement of claim in which he averred to facts he considered appropriate for the purpose of securing the reliefs set out in the writ of summons and which were re-stated in the statement of claim. The claimants(i.e. Respondents) deposition on oath was filed along with the statement of claim.
The Appellant filed a statement of defence in which it controverted the case of the Respondent as set up in the statement of claim and also challenged the entitlement of the Respondent to the reliefs he claimed. The deposition on oath of the witness the Appellant intended to field at trial, equally accompanied the statement of defence.
On page 27 of the record is the note of proceedings before the lower Court on 7/4/2011. It reads thus: –
Parties absent. Uche Ubochi, esq. for Claimant. Ndionyemna Nwankwo, esq. for the defendant not in Court and there is no letter from him to this Court. This matter is for Pre-trial conference. Claimant says that he has filed and served the defendant with Pre-trial forms and that they have not responded. He applies that judgment be entered in their favour as per their claims See order 25 Rule 6(b) of the High Court Civil Procedure Rules, 2009 (sic).,
COURT:
I hereby enter judgment for the claimant as per his claim, in accordance with Order 25 Rule 6(b) of our High Court Rules.
I make no order as to cost.
Sequel to this, the Appellant on 10/6/2011, filed a motion on notice dated 9/6/2011, before the lower Court. Therein, it sought for the following orders: –
1. Extension of time within which to apply to set aside judgment dated 7th April, 2011.
- Setting aside the judgment of this Court dated 7th April 2011.
3. Setting aside the purported writ of execution date (sic) 10th May, 2011.
4. Stay of execution of the said judgment.
A supporting affidavit was filed in respect of the motion. The Respondent filed a counter affidavit in response to the said supporting affidavit and a written address; while the Appellant filed a further affidavit in the motion and a written address. See pages 28 to 36 of the record.
A similar motion dated 17/10/2011 and filed on 18/10/2011 asking for the same orders, was brought by the Appellant. This motion too has a supporting affidavit to which the Respondent reacted by filing a counter affidavit and a written address. In the motion in question, the Appellant also filed a further affidavit and a written address. See pages 37 to 51 of the record.
The proceedings for the date when both of the aforementioned motions or either of them were/was entertained by the lower Court is not included in the record; but it is clear from the ruling of the lower Court delivered on 16/5/2012, which spans pages 52 59 of the record that it was the motion dated 17/10/2011 and filed on 18/10/2011 that the said Court entertained on the merit.
Having set out the issues formulated by the parties in the motion to wit:
Whether this Hon. Court can set aside its judgment of 7th April 2011 by the Appellant; and: –
i. Whether applicant has good reasons for not being at the hearing.
ii. Whether the applicant has shown good reason for his delay in bringing this application
iii. Whether the Respondent will not be prejudiced or embarrassed if the order re-hearing is made.
iv. Whether the applicant’s conduct throughout the proceedings is deserving of sympathetic consideration.
v. Whether applicant’s application is not an abuse of Court process.
By the Respondent, and the respective arguments/submissions of the parties thereon, the lower Court proceeded as follows in its ruling: –
I will adopt the issues formulated by Respondent’s counsel as it is (sic) more comprehensive. However, I will discuss them embolic (sic). In Aro V. Lagos Island Local Government Council (Supra) R 16, the Supreme Court stated the factors to consider in the grant of this type of application. They are:
(a) The applicant has good reasons for being absent at the hearing
(b) He has shown that there was good reason for his delay in bringing the application that is in other words whether there was undue delay in bringing the application so as to prejudice the party in whose favour the judgment persists.
(c) The Respondent will not be prejudiced or embarrassed if the order for Re-hearing is made
(d) The applicant’s case was manifestly unsupportable and
(e) The applicant’s conduct throughout the proceedings is deserving of sympathetic consideration.
Further, the Court had this to say: “All these matters ought to be resolved in favour of the applicant before the judgment should be set aside. It is not enough that some of them can be so resolved”.
The only reason the applicant gave in their paragraph 6 of the affidavit in support for non-appearance and participation in the proceedings is ignorance. They deposed thus:
“That from the records but unknown to us this matter was adjourned to 7th of April 2011 which date we were not aware of as we did not take date along with the Counsel for the Claimant/Respondent.
Is ignorance a good reason for absence of applicant at the hearing It is definitely not. The situation is even made worse in the face of Respondents depositions in paragraphs 4 18 of the numerous adjournments and also hearing notice issued on the applicant all in a bid to cajole them to come to court and defend the suit.
This very application was not made promptly In fact, the motion paper seeks for leave to bring it out of time. Their reason for being out of time can be glimpsed from paragraphs 8 & 9 where they deposed that applicant was not served with a copy of the Judgment order and that they had to apply for a Certified true copy of the Judgment order. Respondent did not challenge or controvert this averment. The law requires me to accept this averment as true. See Ajomale V. Yaduat (No.2) (1991) 5 NWLR (PT 191) 266 R. 3.
What is the effect in law on execution of judgment embarked upon without service of Judgment order on the Judgment debtor I will come to this point later but suffice it to say that there is delay in bringing this application.
Respondent has deposed in his paragraph 20 of his counter affidavit that he had already paid the sum of N50,000 to effect the execution of this Judgment. Applicant did not challenge this averment.
The conduct of the applicant throughout the proceedings as shown in the 3 affidavits before the Court does not deserve sympathetic consideration of this Court.
I cannot therefore resolve any of the factors/criteria in favour of the applicant. If anything, applicant has shown glaring indifference and manifest lack of vigilance and diligence since the commencement of this matter as borne out by the records. I am not minded to grant this application in the face of the utter indifference shown by applicant to the outcome of the case and the reason adduced for non-appearance which I consider not substantial. See Williams Vs. Voluntary Hope Rising funds society (1982) 1-2 SC 145.
There is need to comment on Respondents Counsel, Submission that this application having once been struck out is an abuse of Court process. If a matter was struck out, it can always be relisted with leave of Court. Where lies the abuse I do not agree that re-filing of this application is an abuse of Court process.
Now back to learned Counsel for the applicants submission that execution cannot be levied against his Client who was absent on the day judgment was entered against him without first serving on him the Judgment order. His authority is Abbas V. Solomon (2001) F.W.L.R. (Pt. 67) 847 at 864 paragraphs E G. (Ratio 7). This is a Supreme Court decision I will reproduce R. 7 hereunder for better appreciation.
No order of court requiring a person to do or abstain from doing any act may be enforced if such order was made in the absence of the Judgment debtor and is in the nature of an injunction, unless a copy of the order has been served personally on the person required to do or abstain from doing the act in question.
Where such an order was made in the absence of the judgment debtor the Registrar shall, at the time when the order is drawn up and on the application of the judgment Creditor, issue a copy of the order endorsed with a notice in form 48 and such endorsed copy shall be served on the Judgment debtor in like manner as a judgment summons. This Rule is fully reflected in Order 9 Rule 13 (1) of the Judgments (Enforcement Rule). (underlining mine for Emphasis).
From the above, it is clear that where the order sought to be enforced is in the nature of an injunction then it is mandatory that the Judgment order be first served on the judgment debtor. In the instant case, the order is not an injunctive order. These disposes of this issue.
In conclusion, I answer
Issue 1 in the negative
(ii) in the negative
Issue (iii) in the Positive
Issue (iv) in the Negative
Issue (v) in the negative
Application is hereby dismissed. I make no order as to cost.
Being aggrieved with the ruling of the lower Court, the Appellant initiated the instant appeal by lodging at the registry of the lower Court on 18/5/2012 a notice of appeal dated 16/5/2012. The notice of appeal contains a sole ground of appeal.
The said ground and its particulars read thus: –
GROUND OF APPEAL
1. The trial Court erred in law when it refused to set aside its judgment dated 7th April, 2011 entered into on the grounds that the Appellant was absent during the pre-trial conference as that amounts to a denial of fair hearing.
i. There was evidence that the Appellant was absent due to a confusion created following the sympathy boycott of Courts due to the kidnapping of one of the Judges of Imo State Judiciary by men of the underworld.
ii. At the time the judgment was given by the Court the Appellant had completely complied with the Imo State High Court Rules 2008 by filing its Statement of Defence and deposition of witness in evidence.
iii. The judgment of 7th April, 2011 which the honourable Court refused to set aside when no party has testified offends the provisions of the 1999 Constitution.
The reliefs which the Appellant seeks from this Court as set out in the notice of appeal are: (i) for the Court of Appeal to set aside the ruling of the lower Court dated 16th May 2012 in this suit; and (ii) for the Court of Appeal to allow a trial of this matter on its merit.
The appeal was entertained on 27/3/2018 with learned lead counsel, N.H. Nwankwo in urging the Court to allow the appeal, adopting and relying on Appellants amended brief of argument dated 20/5/2017 and filed on 25/5/2017 but which was deemed as properly filed and served on 4/10/2017 and Appellants reply brief of argument dated 14/5/2016 and filed on 25/5/2016.
In the same vein learned counsel L.U. Ubochi adopted and relied on the Respondents brief of argument dated 21/9/2017 and filed on the same date, in urging the Court to dismiss the appeal.
The sole issue which the Appellant formulated for the determination of the appeal reads: –
Whether the judgment of 7th April, 2011 by the lower Court was not given in breach of the Appellant’s right to fair hearing, and whether the Court’s refusal to set aside that judgment is not a further denial of that right to fair hearing.
The Respondent equally formulated a sole issue for the determination of the appeal in his brief of argument. The issue reads thus: –
Whether the judgment of 7th April, 2011 by the lower Court was given in breach of the appellants right to fair hearing and whether the Courts refusal to set aside that judgment is a further denial of the right to fair hearing.
It is in my considered view obvious that the issue for determination of the appeal as formulated by the Appellant and the Respondent, is actually the same only for the different usage of tenses therein.
In dwelling on the issue for the determination of the appeal, the Appellant having stated that it was in evidence that both parties had complied with the Imo State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2008, (hereafter to be simply referred to as the Rules of the lower Court) by filing and exchanging pleadings, and deposition of witnesses, and that both parties admitted that the new date for pretrial conference in line with the Rules of the lower Court came up after a boycott of Courts including the lower Court by the Lawyers of Owerri Bar in sympathy with the kidnap of a High Court Judge by hoodlums, submitted that the ensuing confusion from that boycott created a situation that necessitated the issuance of hearing notice to it (Appellant) before such a far reaching decision, like the default judgment being complained of can stand. That unfortunately no hearing notice was ordered and served before the lower Court proceeded to give the default judgment of 7/4/2011 for the entire sum claimed by the Respondent.
It is the stance of the Appellant that opportunity was not given to it, to be heard in the instant case, as it was not aware of the date taken by the Respondent along with the clerk of Court as neither of them made effort to communicate the date to the Appellant. That as it were, the date taken was only known to the Respondent. It is the stance of the Appellant that opportunity to participate in the proceeding of 7/4/2011 could have been said to have been given it, if hearing notice had been issued following the abrupt termination of dates by the well-deserved boycott action of the Courts by the Owerri Branch of the Nigerian Bar Association.
That the situation was a good one for ordering the issuance of hearing notice to the parties, and that the failure to do so amounted to a denial of fair hearing and also a denial of the opportunity of being heard especially after the Applicant had filed its statement of defence and the deposition of witnesses which strongly suggested that it was very willing and ready to defend the action against it.
It is also the stance of the Appellant that the refusal of the lower Court to set aside its default judgment, is a further denial of the Appellant’s right to fair hearing. This is because the said refusal which is contrary to Order 25 Rule 6 and other relevant provisions of the Rules of the lower Court, put a final nail to the denial of the opportunity of allowing the Applicant to ventilate his case as already filed before the lower Court. The Appellant submitted that since the judgment was a default one, the lower Court ought to have exercised its discretion in its favour by setting aside the said default judgment. This Court was urged to uphold this issue particularly as it had been demonstrated by it (Appellant) that the delay in the instant case was because it was unaware of the date of the pretrial. That aside from this, it (Appellant) had while applying to set aside the judgment of the lower Court and knowing it was coming late, first prayed for the extension of the time within which to apply to set aside the said judgment; which the Rules of the lower Court provide for in Order 44 Rule 4; and Order 11 Rule 14 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act Cap. 407.
Dwelling on the issue for determination as couched by him, the Respondent said that on 17/1/2011 when pre-trial was to commence, the lower Court found out that the Appellant had failed to file its pre-trial information sheet in defiance of the order which the Court made on 15/11/2010. That the Appellant equally failed to take advantage of two further adjournments (15/2/2011 and 3/3/2011) to regularize its position. That the sympathy boycott of Courts by lawyers lasted only four days (1/3/2011 to 4/3/2011) and both he and the Appellant were affected in equal measure by the boycott and its consequences. That though he (Respondent) filed his pre-trial information sheet on 17/12/2010 the Appellant inexplicably filed its pre-trial information sheet on 9/6/2011 (six months after pre-trial was scheduled to hold). That it is therefore utterly misleading for the Appellant to adduce the lawyers 4-day boycott of Courts, as an excuse for filing its pre-trial information sheet five months late in breach of the Rules of the lower Court. That the real reason for Appellants delay in filing its pre-trial information sheet can be deduced from paragraph 4 of Appellants further affidavit in support of motion to set aside the default judgment. That the delay was definitely not occasioned by the lawyer’s boycott for only four days. That the Appellant displayed manifest lack of diligence in the matter as the affidavit did not disclose that further attempts were made to file the pre-trial information sheet after the first attempt failed as a diligent party would have done. Rather, the Appellant went into slumber only to wake up six months later to file its pre-trial information sheet on 9/6/2011 (i.e. six months after pre-trial was scheduled to hold and two months after default judgment was entered).
It is the stance of the Respondent that it is apparent that the Appellant was availed a fair opportunity to participate in the pre-trial conferences but it rather failed to take advantage of the opportunity, and this compelled the lower Court to invoke the provisions of Order 25 Rule 6(b) of its Rules. The Respondent submitted that the judgment delivered on 7/4/2011 by the lower Court was not given in breach of the Appellants right to fair hearing as it failed and neglected to take advantage of the opportunity afforded it to participate in the pre-trial conference.
Dwelling on whether the refusal of the lower Court to set aside the default judgment amounts to a further denial of fair hearing, the Respondent submitted that the Appellant did not meet the conditions required to succeed in getting the lower Court to set aside the default judgment.
I do not think there is need to dwell upon the Appellants reply brief as I am of the considered view that since the issue formulated by the Respondent is no different from that formulated by the Appellant, it cannot be said that the Respondent raised anything new that required an answer by way of reply brief from the Appellant.
The motion brought before the lower Court by the Appellant and which the said Court dismissed, and which decision is now being appealed against, is one for the setting aside of the decision of the said lower Court delivered on 7/4/2011, granting the Respondent the reliefs which he sought in the instant case at pre-trial stage of the action and in the absence of the Appellant. It is in my considered view indisputable given the above narration, that the judgment or decision of the lower Court delivered on 7/4/2011 is glaringly a default judgment which the lower Court in the exercise of discretion can set aside or refuse to set aside. See in this regard, the case of MOHAMMED V. HUSSEINI (1998) LPELR 1896(SC), (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 108 wherein the Supreme Court per Wail and Onu (J.SC), dwelling on default judgment, amongst others, said thus: –
“The words default judgment are defined in U.T.C. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Pamotei (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 103) 244 at 282-283; (1989) 20 NSCC (Pt.1) 523 at 549 wherein this Court (per Karibi- Whyte, J.S.C.) said: “The word default which qualifies the noun ‘judgment’ as used in this appeal seems to me to mean a judgment obtained by a plaintiff in reliance on some omission on the part of the defendant in respect of something which he is directed to do by the rules. The word is used very widely to signify situations where a person has omitted to do what he is required to do having regard to the law governing his actions to the relations he occupies. In ordinary parlance it means not doing what is reasonable in the circumstances.” per Onu, JSC.
Distinguishing “default judgment” from “judgment on the merits” the learned Justice at pages 558-559 of the report said:
“A judgment on the merits is one based on legal rights as distinguished from mere matters of procedure or jurisdiction. A judgment on the merits is thus a decision that was rendered on the basis of the evidence led by the parties in proof or disproof of the issues in controversy between them. Normally, a judgment based solely on some procedural error is not, as a general rule, considered as a judgment on the merits.
A judgment on the merits is therefore one arrived at, after considering the merits of the case – the essential issues, the substantive rights presented by the action, as contradistinguished from mere questions of practice and procedure.” See also Cardoso v. Daniel & Ors. (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt.20).
In the instant appeal, the learned trial Judge, in my view, acted within the statutory exception that was espoused in Sanusi v. Ayoola (supra). Order 37 Rule 9 (ibid) provides as follows:-
“Any judgment obtained where one party does not appear at the trial may be set aside by the Court upon such terms as may seem just, upon an application made within six days after the trial or within such long period as the Court may allow for good cause shown:”
Order 27 Rule 10 (ibid) on the other hand provides as follows:-
“The Court may, on such terms as it thinks just, set aside or vary any judgment entered in pursuance of this order:’ (This order is titled default of pleadings).
In the case in hand, judgment was given in default of the appellants’ pleading a clear case or truncated form of summary trial. Being acknowledged to be a default judgment therefore, it is indisputable that the trial Judge had the jurisdiction via the rules of Court to set it aside. Thus, despite the plethora of authorities cited by the appellants at page 10 of their brief, the respondents and their erstwhile counsel, Wande Obatusin & Co. could not file their statement of defence nor was he served a hearing notice for attendance at court when the case came up for hearing on 19/11/92. Nor, further still, did the respondent give any evidence at all after the appellant gave some skeletal evidence, the veracity of which could neither be tested nor could it be weighed on the imaginary scale to determine where the scale of the balance of probability tilted vide Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 4 S.C. 91. Thus, a judgment already delivered as in the instant case, can be set aside if there had been fundamental defects in the proceedings culminating in judgments that resulted in a nullity vide Skenconsult (Nig.) Ltd. & Ors v. Ukey (1981) 1 S.C. 6. That in the instant case the respondents had no notice of hearing can be seen in the trial Court’s ruling wherein the learned trial Judge said inter alia:
“Firstly, the applicants’ excuse for not appearing in Court on 19/11/92 is that were not informed by the former counsel on whose chambers the hearing notice was served that the case was coming up for hearing on that day. The respondents not having come up with any positive evidence to cast doubt on the fact that they had no notice of the hearing the excuse appears to me to be plausible. The record of the Court which I take judicial notice of shows that since 29/11/91 when Wande Obatusin & Co’s Chambers filed a memorandum of appearance on behalf of the applicant’s service of Court processes had always been on counsel. That lends credence to the fact that the applicants may not be aware of the notice that was served on their counsel. They are to be entitled to be given the benefit of doubt that they were not aware that the case was coming up on 19/11/92.” I think the learned trial Judge was right.
The Court below referred to the above passage in its judgment when it held thus:
“The issue of service of a hearing notice on the parties is very important and before any Court embarks on hearing a case it must satisfy itself that (he parties are duly served with a hearing notice if the Court proceeded to hear a matter on the basis that the parties were served and if it later turns out that one or the parties was not served, it is of course a very good ground to set aside a judgment obtained in default against one of the parties.
(Italic is supplied by me)
I think too that the learned Justices were also right here. What is more, in the instant case, it was the first time ever that the case was called for hearing when the judgment was given in default of appearance. See Oke v. Aiyedun (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt.23) 548: (1986) 4 SC. 61 at 90-92. It is trite law that it is open to a party in a subsequent proceeding to plead that the decision of a lower Court was given without jurisdiction and therefore a nullity (as the respondents sought to show in the instant case) and this notwithstanding that no proceeding had been taken to set the decision aside. See Aladegbemi v. Fasanmade (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt.81) 129. Contrast the above Statement of the law with that which enunciates that once a judge has arrived at a decision in the presence of the parties, which decision contains no fundamental defect pertaining the jurisdiction and competence of the Court amounting to the decision being a nullity, he becomes functus officio and has no right to set it aside. per Onu, JSC.
The principle is that unless and until the Court pronounced a judgment on merit or by consent it retains the power to set aside its own default judgment. The power to do so is discretionary which has to be exercised judiciously, guided by the following principles pronounced by this Court in Williams & Ors v. Hope Rising Voluntary Funds Society (1982) 1-2 SC 145:
1. the reasons for the applicant’ s failure to appear at the hearing or trial of the case in which judgment was given in his absence;
2. whether there has been undue delay in making the application to set aside the judgment so as to prejudice the party in whose favour the judgment subsists;
3. whether the party in whose favour the judgment subsists would be prejudiced or embarrassed upon an order for rehearing of the suit being made, so as to render such a course inequitable;
4. whether the applicant’s case is manifestly unsupportable; and
5. whether the applicant’s conduct throughout the proceedings, that is, from the service of the writ upon him to the date of judgment, has been such as to make his application worthy of a sympathetic consideration. per Wali, JSC.
I am of the considered view that it is clear as crystal from the case under reference, that the judgment of the lower Court which the Appellant sought to be set aside was without doubt a default judgment and which the said Court was eminently empowered to set aside or refuse to set aside in the judicial and judicious exercise of its discretion. In the circumstance, I am also of the considered view, that the pertinent question to unravel or resolve for the purpose of the instant appeal, therefore is, whether the lower Court acted judicially and judiciously in the exercise of its discretion in dismissing the Appellants motion to set aside the said Courts judgment of 7/4/2011 given the reasons advanced for that purpose by the Appellant
Order 25 Rules 1 to 7, of the Rules of the lower Court make copious or elaborate provisions for Pre-trial Conference and Scheduling.
One thing that is clear from the provisions of the said Order, is that Pre-trial is a separate and unique aspect in the adjudicatory process before the lower Court and that it has to be initiated by either the claimant or the defendant in an action. It is also clear from the provisions of the said Order 25, that where the claimant or the defendant fails to initiate Pre-trial Conference, the Court upon the receipt of the certificate of the registrar that neither the claimant nor the defendant has applied for the initiation or commencement of Pre-trial Conference can properly have the case in question struck out after complying with the conditions stipulated for the purpose. Order 25 Rule 6 of the Rules of the lower Court in my considered view further attests to the distinctiveness of Pre-trial Conference by specifically providing as follows: –
If a party or his legal practitioner fails to attend the pre-trial conference or obey a scheduling or order pre-trial order or is substantially unprepared to participate in the conference or fails to participate in good faith the Judge shall:
(a) In the case of the claimant dismiss the claim; or
(b) In the case of a defendant enter final judgment against him.
Any judgment given under this Rule may be set aside upon an application made within 7 days of the judgment or such other period as the pre-trial Judge may allow not exceeding the pre-trial conference period. The application shall be accompanied by an undertaking to participate effectively in the pre-trial conference.
In the supporting affidavit of its motion to set aside the judgment of the lower Court, it was deposed to on behalf of the Appellant amongst others, thus: –
Paragraph 3
That this matter was adjourned for pre-trial conference to 15th day of February, 2011.
Paragraph 4
That on 15th day of February 2011 nothing happened.
Paragraph 5
That subsequently the matter was adjourned to 3rd March, 2011 but the lawyers in Owerri were on strike with the consequence that the Courts were not sitting.
Paragraph 6
That from the records but unknown to us this matter was adjourned to 7th of April, 2011 which date we were not aware of as we did not take date along with the Counsel for the claimant/Respondent.
Paragraph 7
That it was on that 7th of April that a motion was taken and judgment given.
The response of the Respondent to the depositions in the supporting affidavit of the Appellant re-produced above, are to be found in paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of his counter affidavit and they read thus: –
Paragraph 11
That the matter commenced de novo on 15th November, 2010 before your lordship and applicant insisted on pre-trial and the matter was adjourned to 17th January, 2011 for pre-trial.
Paragraph 12
That on 17th December, 2010 respondent filed his Form 18. (Exhibit D)
Paragraph 13
That when the matter came up on 17th January, 2011, the Court found to its dismay that applicant had not filed its pre-trial information sheet and awarded cost of N3,000.00 (Three Thousand Naira) to the respondent and further adjourned the matter to 15th February 2011 for pre-trial.
Paragraph 14
That this cost has not been paid till date.
Paragraph 15
That 15th February 2011 turned out to be a public holiday and the matter was further adjourned to 3rdMarch 2011.
Paragraph 16
That on 3rd March 2011, the Court did not sit following the abduction of a judge of the high Court (sic) and the matter was adjourned to 7th April, 2011.
Paragraph 17
That on 7th April 2011 applicant was absent and the Court found that the applicant had failed to file pre-trial information sheet in defiance of the order of Court made on 15th November, 2010 whereupon judgment was entered for respondent upon application.
I am of the considered view that the fact that the Appellant relied on the non-notification to the hearing date of 7/4/2011 as one of the grounds for bringing the motion to set aside the judgment of the lower Court delivered on 7/4/2011, was not lost on the said Court. This much in my considered view is clear when the lower Court in its ruling said thus: –
Is ignorance a good reason for absence of applicant at the hearing It is definitely not. The situation is even made worse in the face of Respondents depositions in paragraphs 4 to 18 of the numerous adjournments and also hearing notice issued on the applicant all in a bid to cajole them to come to Court and defend the suit.
I am however of the considered view that the lower Court missed the point completely by considering the question of the non-notification of the hearing date of 7/4/2011 to the Appellant as one of ignorance per se instead of considering the said ignorance in the con of or against the background of the non-sitting of the Court on 3/4/2011 and on which date it cannot be said that the matter was adjourned on record whether or not the parties were present. All that I am trying to say is that if the lower Court had borne in mind the fact that further proceeding in the matter, was not truncated or cut short by the Appellant or anything attributable to the Appellant on 3/4/2011, the said Court would have seen the need or come to the conclusion that it ought to have ordered the issuance and service of hearing notices on the parties in respect of the adjourned date of the matter from 3/4/2011, and to have thereby found substance in the ignorance of the hearing date of 7/4/2011 as set up by the Appellant. There are many decisions of this Court dealing with the purpose of hearing notice and when there is need to order the issuance and service of hearing notice as well as the consequences of not ordering the issuance and service of hearing notice when there is need to do so. See in this regard the case of ASUQUO V. ESHIET (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 401) 970 at 983-984, whereat this Court per , JCA; said thus: –
“When any of the parties to a suit is absent from Court and has not been previously served a notice of the date of hearing or commencement of hearing of the suit, the Court is under obligation to make an order for the issue of a hearing notice on such a party. The issue of such a hearing notice is at the discretion of the Court. Surely the exercise of a discretion not to issue a hearing notice will depend on evidence of knowledge that the absent party is aware of the hearing date and has neglected to be present in Court. Where there is no evidence of the knowledge of the hearing date by the absent party, there is a duty on the trial Court to issue a hearing notice in compliance with the need for service of the rule of audi alteram partem.”
See also the case of INTAGRO LTD V. BASSEY (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 419) 450 at 452 to 453(CA) whereat this Court per Owoade, JCA, said thus: –
“The purpose of serving hearing notice is to give notice to the parties. A party can only diligently prosecute his case if he has notice of the case or if he is aware of it. Hearing notice is the only legal means and procedure to get a party to appear in Court. The service of the hearing notice on a party informing him of the hearing date is very fundamental to the administration of justice. It is the service of the hearing notice that confers on the trial court the jurisdiction to entertain the matter. When a matter comes up before a trial Court, it is its duty to fully satisfy that a party to the case was duly served and is aware that the matter is coming up before the Court that day. It is not for the trial court to assume that the party is aware of the suit when in the first place, it had not issued any hearing notice to the party.
The trial judge is entitled to look into the Court’s record to satisfy himself whether there is proof of service of any process on the parties or their legal representatives before embarking on several adjournments which can lead to the unjust dismissal of the appellant’s case. I have hereinbefore re-produced the note of proceeding before the lower Court on 7/2011. In the light of the cases cited above, I simply see no basis for the expectation of the lower Court that the Appellants counsel should have written the said Court (apparently to explain his absence) when the said Court could not even state when the said counsel or Appellant were given notice of the hearing date of 7/4/2011, when it delivered judgment in favour of the Respondent (whose deposition in paragraph 17 of his counter affidavit finds no support in the note of proceeding of 7/4/2011); and at the prompting as it were of Respondents counsel. I am of the considered view that if the lower Court had appreciated the fact that it had no evidence before it that hearing notice in respect of the hearing date of 7/4/2011 issued and was served on the Appellant, it should have further adjourned the matter on 7/4/2011 to a future day and to have ordered the issuance and service of hearing notice on the Appellant. This would have been in keeping with the words of wisdom uttered by this Court in the case of DAWODU V. OLOGUNDUDU (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 33) 104 per Nnaemeka-Agu, JCA; (as he then was)and which go thus: –
Before I conclude, I should observe that the learned Judge obviously acted out of exasperation for the constant adjournments of the proceedings. Having regard to the constant out-cry against delays in the trial of cases and the consequent congestion of our Courts, this is understandable. But, in showing his disapproval of the situation, he should have done well to remember that certain features of our adversary system of administration of justice carry with them some implications of inevitable delay. The audi alteram partem rule (which, together with the rule nemo judex in sua causa form the twin pillars upon which fair hearing is based), carries with it the need to give to all the parties due notice of hearing and the opportunity to be heard and to cross-examine every witness called by ones adversaries.
Generally, a breach of the rule, save in a few statutory exceptions, will invalidate the proceedings because it is breach of not only the right to fair hearing entrenched in our Constitution but also a breach of the rule of natural justice. This is why I am surprised that the learned judge also dismissed the appellants application that all the witnesses who had testified before he came into the hearing be recalled for cross-examination. The Judge should have granted the application as the cross-examination of those witnesses was necessary, assuming there was a valid trial, if the Judge had to do justice between the parties. See Tabbaa v. Lababedi & Anor. (1974) 1 A.N.L.R. Pt. 1) 400. Indeed, I cannot see on what rule or to what purpose the learned Judge had to force the appellant into the witness box to give evidence in his defence when he had not the opportunity of hearing and cross-examining the respondents and their witnesses. In my opinion, in the circumstances that arose in this case the learned Judge had the duty to balance the need for speedy trial with the dictates of fair hearing guaranteed by our Constitution and inherent in our system of administration of justice. It was a grave error to have sacrificed those features on the altar of speed.
The settled position of the law as enunciated or articulated in all the case that have been cited hereinbefore is to the effect that the non-service of hearing notice in respect of the hearing date of a matter or proceeding in a matter where it is supposed to be issued and served, is a breach of the fundamental right of the affected party to fair hearing and is by itself alone sufficient to void or nullify the proceedings from that point onwards and should readily result in a Court setting aside a default judgment. See in particular the case of MOHAMMED V. HUSSEINI (supra) as well as OKON V. ADIGWE (2011) LPELR 4528 (CA) where this Court per Nwodo, JCA, (of blessed memory) said thus: –
The principle of fair hearing lies in the procedure followed in the determination of the case not the question of how correct is the decision. It is the violation of that right to be heard or opportunity to be heard that its breach will amount to breach of fundamental right to fair hearing. See VICTINO FIXED ODDS Ltd v. OJO (2010) 8 NWLR Part 1197 SC 486. In the instance circumstance the appellant was not given an opportunity to be heard, he was not served with hearing notice.
Consequently, failure to serve a hearing notice when the service of hearing notice was required rendered the entire proceedings and the decision of the trial Court against the appellant null and void. It is a manifestation of violation of principle of fair hearing..
The non-giving of effect to the breach of the fundamental right to fair hearing of the Appellant occasioned by the non-issuance and service on it, of the hearing notice in respect of the proceedings of 7/4/2011, in my considered view tantamount to an unjudicial and injudicious exercise of the lower Courts discretion, inasmuch as a Court cannot properly exercise its discretion when there is an established violation of a party’s right to fair hearing than to nullify the proceedings in question. In other words, a Court in the exercise of its discretion cannot perpetuate or keep alive an established breach of fair hearing.
Flowing from all that has been said therefore, is that the issue formulated for the determination of the instant appeal by the Appellant, is resolved in its favour.
In the final analysis, the instant appeal is meritorious and it succeeds. The ruling of the lower Court delivered on 16/5/2012 dismissing the Appellants motion to set aside the default judgment delivered by the said Court on 7/4/2011, is hereby set aside. In its stead, the said motion is hereby granted and the default judgment of the lower Court delivered in favour of the Respondent, is set aside. The matter is to be assigned by the Chief Judge of Imo State to another Judge of the High Court of Imo State for determination.
MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA, J.C.A.: I have had the benefit and read before now while in draft, the lead judgment just delivered by my noble Lord and learned brother, Hon. Justice Ayobode Olujimi Lokulo-Sodipe, JCA. His Lordship had in his characteristic, admirable, lucid and incisive manner dealt with the sole issue raised, adopted and canvassed by the learned counsel for the parties. I agree entirely with the reasoning and conclusion arrived therein for adjudging the instant appeal matter to be meritorious and why it should be allowed. I also accordingly allow the appeal and endorse the consequential orders made in the lead judgment of my learned brother, Loluko-Sodipe,JCA.
ITA GEORGE MBABA, J.C.A.: I had the opportunity to read in draft, the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, A.O LOKULO-SODIPE JCA and I agree completely with his reasoning and conclusions that the Appeal is meritorious.
I too allow it and abide by the consequential orders in the lead judgment.
Appearances:
N.H. Nwankwo with him, C.C. Akude For Appellant(s)
L.U. Ubochi For Respondent(s)
Appearances
N.H. Nwankwo with him, C .C. Akude For Appellant
AND
L.U. Ubochi For Respondent



