SATURDAY PALMA v. THE STATE
(2013)LCN/5978(CA)
(2016) LPELR-40139(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 7th day of January, 2016
CA/AK/2C/2014
RATIO
CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT: WHAT MAKES A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT ADMISSIBLE
“It is trite that for a confessional statement to be admissible and for the Court to rely on same it must be voluntary, direct and unequivocal. Confessional statement is a statement by an accused person charged within (sic) offence stating that he committed the offence. A free voluntary confession which is direct and positive and properly proved is sufficient to sustain a conviction without any corroborative evidence as long as the Court is satisfied with the truth. There is however, a duty or the Court test (sic) the truth of a confession by examining it in the light of the other credible evidence before the Court. The usual questions to ask are:
(a) Whether there is anything outside the confession to show that it is true.
(b) Whether it is corroborated.
(c) Whether relevant statement made in it of fact are true as far as they can be tested.
(d) Whether the accused person had the opportunity of committing the offence alleged.(e) Whether the confession is possible.
(f) Whether the confession is consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and have been proved”PER MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A.
CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT: WHETHER A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT IS STILL RELEVANT WHEN RETRACTED
Indeed, a confession is still relevant even though retracted by the accused person.
See: Madaki v. State (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt.429) 171; Ekpe v. State (1994) 9 NWLR (Pt.368) 263.PER MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A.
Justice
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
Justice
SATURDAY PALMAAppellant(s)
AND
THE STATERespondent(s)
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment
of O. D. Afolabi J. of the Osun State High Court sitting at Ikire delivered on 5th day of July, 2013.
The Appellant and one other accused person were charged with conspiracy and armed robbery pursuant to Section 6 (b) and 1 (1) and 1 (a) of the Armed Robbery and Firearms (Special Provision) Act Cap. R. 11 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.
The case of the prosecution as related by their sole witness, Inspector Danladi Audu, the IPO is that on the 28th day of April, 2007, a case of armed robbery was transferred to his unit, the special Anti ? Robbery Squad Oke – Bale Osogbo with the accused persons and exhibits.
He took the statement of the complainant and later visited the scene of the crime at Ikire. He took the cautionary statement of the two accused persons. When he saw it was confessional, he took them before a superior police officer who questioned the accused persons as to the voluntariness of the statements before he countersigned each. He said that his team traced the stolen motorcycle to Ondo State but they
did not recover it. He tendered Exhibit ‘A’, the cutlass used in the commission of the crime without objection from the accused persons and their counsel. The witness also tendered Exhibits “B”, “C”, “D” and “E” the extra judicial Statements Of the Appellant without objection by the defence.
He also tendered Exhibit “F” – the extra judicial statement of 2nd accused person without objection by the defence. He denied that he obtained the extra – judicial statements of the Appellant and the 2nd accused person by threat.
The case of the Appellant is that on the 3rd of April, 2007, he was on his way to Ibadan to buy clippers. The motorcycle he boarded was stopped by police men who asked for the particulars of the motorcycle.
The motorcycle owner and the other passenger were subsequently taken to Ayedaode police Station, Ikire. He was later taken by the police to his residence. It was then he saw the 2nd accused person coming from the farm and the policemen arrested him and three other persons. He did not know the 2nd accused person and that he was beaten at SARS and shot on the leg. (At the trial, he tried to show a bullet wound in his leg to the
Court, but there was no such wound). He denied conspiracy and armed robbery. He admitted that he thumb printed Exhibits ?B?, ?C’, “D” and “E” which were shown to him.
At cross – examination, the Appellant said his statement was taken at Ikire and not SARS. And that when his statement was admitted in the course of trial, he told his lawyer that it was obtained by force.
He said that he informed the Court too that he was hanged. He admitted that before his statements were admitted, it was shown to him by his lawyer and that he identified his thumb print. He said that his lawyer did not object to the statement being admitted as Exhibit.
At the end of the trial, the learned trial judge noted that the procedure whereby the learned counsel made “heavy weather” of the involuntariness of the Appellant’s statement in his submission after the close of the prosecution’s case is strange to our procedural law.
He could not find any nexus between the extra judicial statements of the Appellant Exhibits B, C, D, and E and that of the 2nd accused person – Exhibit F. Accordingly, he discharged and acquitted the Appellant and the 2nd
accused person on the count of conspiracy.
The learned trial judge also discharged the 2nd accused person of the offence of armed robbery but convicted the Appellant alone on the 2nd count of armed robbery at page 79 of the record as follows:
“The case of the 1st accused person is in a class of his own. From his confessional statement Exhibits ?B, ?C?, “D” and “E” it showed clearly that he was actually the planner and executioner of the armed robbery incident for which he was charged before the Court.
In addition, I found that 1st accused person in the course of this trial to be a brazen liar in Open Court’ Consequently, I found him guilty of the offence of armed robbery as charged”.
Dissatisfied with his conviction, the Appellant filed an omnibus ground of appeal in this Court on 30-10-2013. However on 12-5-2015, Appellant filed an Amended Notice of Appeal (containing five grounds of Appeal).
?Appellant’s brief of argument is dated 3-1-2014 and was filed on 7-1-2014. The Respondent’s brief of argument is dated 22-10-2014 and was filed on the same day and deemed filed on 17- 6-2015. Appellant’s Reply brief is dated
11- 5 – 2015 but was deemed filed on 17-6-2015.
Learned counsel for the Appellant nominated a sole issue for determination, that is:-
“Whether the prosecution has proved the case against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt”
The Respondent adopts the single issue formulated by the Appellant.
Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that in proof of the charge against the Appellant the learned trial judge heavily relied on the confessional statements of the Appellant without considering the questions raised by him against the said confessional statement in his judgment.
He submitted that the learned trial judge needed to relate the ingredients of the offence of armed robbery in order to sustain the conviction of the Appellant. However, that, the learned trial judge went on to say:
“Prosecution having based its case on the alleged confessional statement of the accused persons, there is need to determine whether the statement was confessional by considering the objection of the accused learned counsel in his submission”
He submitted that the learned trial judge went on at the same pages 77 – 78 of the record as follows:
“It is trite that for a confessional statement to be admissible and for the Court to rely on same it must be voluntary, direct and unequivocal. Confessional statement is a statement by an accused person charged within (sic) offence stating that he committed the offence. A free voluntary confession which is direct and positive and properly proved is sufficient to sustain a conviction without any corroborative evidence as long as the Court is satisfied with the truth. There is however, a duty or the Court test (sic) the truth of a confession by examining it in the light of the other credible evidence before the Court. The usual questions to ask are:
(a) Whether there is anything outside the confession to show that it is true.
(b) Whether it is corroborated.
(c) Whether relevant statement made in it of fact are true as far as they can be tested.
(d) Whether the accused person had the opportunity of committing the offence alleged.(e) Whether the confession is possible.
(f) Whether the confession is consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and have been proved”
Appellants counsel conceded that the above
proposition of law by his lordship of the trial Court is sound and unassailable but that the honourable Court did not apply the proposition of law to the statement of the Appellant alleged to be confessional.
Counsel submitted that Exhibit B is a statement allegedly made by the Appellant on 18th April, 2007 by Sgt. Danladi Audu. That from the beginning of the statement the recorder states as follows after the alleged cautionary statement which was allegedly thumb printed by the Appellant as follows:
“I of the above named address freely elect to state that I am a native of Owe Delta State I was born 19 years ago—-?.
?
Counsel submitted that the opening paragraph of the statement and the thumb printing of cautionary word suggest that the Appellant
(1) is an illiterate
(2) is from Delta State
Also, that, at the conclusion of the statement the writer of the statement Sgt. Danladi Audu after the Thumb printing of the Appellant wrote as follows:
“statement recorded by me from the maker read and explained to the maker in the language he understands and he thumb printed his statement as correct”
followed by the writers
signature and date 18/4/2007.
Appellant’s counsel asked the question in which language was the statement interpreted to the writer and who was the interpreter of the statement?.
He submitted that having written on the statement that the statement was interpreted to the Appellant in the language he understands, it shows that the Appellant do not understand the language in which the statement was written. He submitted that the service of an interpreter is a Constitutional requirement under Section 33 (6) (e) of the 1999 Constitution and if the interpretation had been done by the writer he would have said so.
He submitted that the statement allegedly made on 19-4-2007 a day after Exhibit B was made, that is Exhibit C did not have the benefit of being interpreted to the Appellant but was allegedly read over to the Appellant by a superior police officer on the pre Justice that it is confessional. Again, counsel asked the question, in which language was it interpreted?
Appellant’s counsel submitted that Exhibits D and E were also additional statements taken by the same Sgt. Danladi Audu the IPO on 19/5/2007 and 5/7/2007 respectively.
He?referred to the definition of confession in Section 27 of the Evidence Act Cap. 112 LFN 1990 (now S. 28 of the Evidence Act Cap. E. 14, 2011 and the cases of Henru Odeh v. FRN (2008) 4 KLR (Pt.252) pg. 1615 at 1652, The State v. Salami (2011) 12 SC (pt.iv) page 191 at 214,
Ogudo v. The State (2011) 10 – 12 KLR (Pt.301) 2373.
Counsel submitted that in Exhibit B, the Appellant was alleged to have said that he and Ige the 2nd accused person agree to go and rob motorcycle because their farm is too far and they consequently went to the road leading to the Gbongan and on their way going both of them saw a motorcycle parked on the road and they disconnect the ignition key and rob it.
He submitted further that this story of robbery of motorcycle with Ige have been rejected as untrue by the learned trial judge. That at page 79 of the record, the learned trial judge said:
“I have scrutinized Exhibits B, C, D, and E and the oral testimonies of the accused persons in Court and come to a reasonable conclusion that there was no nexus between the ingredients of the offence of conspiracy against them, I accordingly discharged and acquitted (sic) them on
count one”.
Appellant’s counsel submitted that having rejected the evidence of robbery with the 2nd defendant put forward in Exhibit B, the story in Exhibit C does not warrant the Appellant’s conviction.
That in Exhibit C, the Appellant was alleged to have put up a story of learning motorcycle repairs from one Ahmed Amidu and consequently selling stolen motorcycles to him, but this was withdrawn as untrue in Exhibit D.
The writer of the statement Exhibit D, said counsel had this to say
“I of the above named address freely elect to state in addition to my former statement that all the statement I made before that I sold the motorcycle I stole to Ahmed Amidu is a lie, when I stole the motorcycle I took it to one Akeem a vulcanizer at Gbongan so that he can be using it for commercial motorcycle for me”
And that Exhibit E which was made on 5th July, 2007 was recorded as saying:
“I of the above name and address freely elect to state in addition to my former statement that the motorcycle that I robbed at lkire along Unity Road on 1/3/2007 was given to my brother called Good who lives at Aba William along Olorunkemi Road Oke
Igbo———-?
Appellant’s counsel submitted that it is trite law that before a conviction could be made on a confessional statement, such statement must be
(i) Be free and voluntarily made.
(ii) It must be direct.
(iii) It must be properly proved.
He asked whether one can say all the statements made to the police by the Appellant Exhibits B, C, D, and E are confessional in nature or that they can be free and voluntary in the circumstances of this case or that any of them is direct or positive or that any of them has also been properly proved.
After answering all the above questions in the negative, learned counsel for the Appellant added that if nothing the learned trial judge has beautifully answered the question as negative when he held that the story of joint business of robbery with Ige 2nd accused person could not be true and consequently discharged and acquitted the 2nd accused person of the count of conspiracy and Robbery.
Appellant’s counsel tried to apply the six (6) way test for the truth of the confessional statement alluded to by the learned trial judge at page 78 of the record in the following manner:
”1. Whether there is anything outside the confession to show that it if true
He submitted that the learned trial judge has even said the confessional statement of the Appellant contained in Exhibit B that concerns the 2nd accused person and the stealing of motorcycle is untrue. There is no evidence from any person including any of the victims of the robbery particularly the person who was allegedly matchetted on the head and ear before he was dispossessed of his motorcycle and picked the matchet and went to report at the police station.
Counsel conceded that the prosecution/respondent has no duty to call all or any witness but those essential for the proof of the case. However, that this witness and others are vital witnesses to provide something outside the confession to corroborate the confessional statement and provide other facts outside the confessional statement.
2. Whether it is corroborated.
There is no single corroboration but a denial of earlier statements. He referred to Exhibit D which denied the contents of Exhibit C and Exhibit D which set up a different story of the sale/use of the motorcycle.
3. Whether relevant
statement made in it of fact are true as far as they can be tested— — That the learned trial judge has answered that Exhibit B is not true. The Appellant himself also said so in subsequent statements – Exhibits C and D.
4. Whether the accused person had the opportunity of committing the offence charged.
It has not been shown that the Appellant is placed in a position where he can do this.
5. Whether the confession is possible —-
The Appellant has demonstrated in the said confession that they are tissues of lie written by the police to implicate him more so when he cannot read and write. The confession contained in Exhibits B, C, D, and E are therefore impossible of performance and therefore untrue.
6. Whether the confession is consistent with the facts which have been ascertained and have been proved.
No external factor beyond the confession was placed before the honourable Court.”
Appellant’s counsel referred to the cases of State v. Ajia (2000) 7 SC (Pt.11) 146, Ogoala v. State (1991) 3 SC 80, Ali v. State (1988) 1 SC 257; FRN v. Nweka (2011) 11 – 12 SC (Pt.1) 105 at 109 and Wahab Adejobi & Anor. V. The State (2011)
6 KLR 1613 to say that he is aware that the prosecution is only bound to call only witnesses whom it considers and is satisfied to be material and vital witnesses to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and that it does not have to call every single person that was involved in the incident or act that led to the crime committed in a bid to secure conviction.
That, however, the prosecution can only prove its case against the accused person by adducing evidence to prove the ingredients of the offence the Appellant was charged with.
He referred to the cases of Ikechukwu Sunday & Anor. v. The State (2010) 7 – 12 KLR (Pt.286) 2583 at 2603 and Bello Shurumo v. The State (2010) 12 KLR (Pt.286) 302.
He urged us to allow the appeal.
Learned counsel for the Respondent reiterated the definition of confession in Section 28 of the Evidence Act and submitted that an accused can be convicted on his confession alone regardless of the fact that he resiled therefrom or retracted it altogether at the trial.
That it is however desirable that the contents therein should be tested by factors outside the statement. That the retraction notwithstanding, a
confessional statement should be considered along with other evidence by the trial judge who at the end would decide whether or not the Appellant did make the statement to the police.
On this, Respondent’s counsel referred to plethora of cases including Yesufu v. The State (1976) 6 S.C. 167 at 173, R. v. Sullivan (1887) 10 Cox. 347, R. v. Sykes (1913) 9 CR App. R. 233 R. v. White & Anor?(1823) 168 E. R. 922, Onochie v. The Republic (1966) NMLR 129 and Egbogbonome v. The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt.306) 388.
He submitted that the trial Court having concluded that the Appellant’s confessional statement is direct, positive true and unequivocal on the commission of the offence, the conviction on the confessional statement which the Appellant retracted from satisfied that:
(a) The accused made the statement
(b) There are circumstances which give credence to the contents of the confession.
He submitted that it is the corroborative evidence that is placed alongside the contents of the confessional statement which must lead to the conclusion that the confession is true and that it is not necessary to outline the six tests and test each
against available evidence once a Court has found corroborating evidence independent of the confessional statement before it could rely on such confessional statement to convict.
He referred to the case of Obisi v. Chief of Naval Staff (2002) 2 NWLR (Pt.751) 400 at 416.
He submitted further that assuming but without conceding that the learned trial judge failed to consider the six tests in Ogudo v. The State (Supra) as argued by the Appellant, the principle of law that it is desirable that the contents of a confessional statement should be tested by facts outside the statement is not an absolute one and cannot be a vitiating factor upon which to rest the quashing of the Appellant’s conviction.
On this, Respondent’s counsel referred to the cases of Nwaobonyi v. The State (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt.343) 138 at 150 – 151, Akpan v. The State (1986) 3 NWLR (pt.27) 225 and Obisi v. Chief of Naval Staff (supra).
He submitted that the role of corroborative evidence in a case of this nature is to find out whether the accused person made the statement and to test the authenticity of the confession. To argue otherwise will lead to the inevitable conclusion
that the time tested principle of law that an accused can be convicted solely on his direct, positive and true confessional statement is wrong and that independent evidence must
prove the guilt of the accused.
He argued that corroboration can be sustained by any material in the proceeding which even could come from the maker of the confessional statement himself or by way of conduct or demeanor.
He referred again to the case of Obisi v. Chief Naval Staff (Supra). He submitted that Appellant in the instant case volunteered confessional statement (Exhibib B, C, D and E) that the statements were obtained after the Appellant had been duly cautioned, and after the contents of Exhibit B, C, D and E was read over to the Appellant, he thumb printed and was also taken to a superior police officer for confirmation.
Furthermore, said counsel, during the trial the defence did not object to the tendering of the confessional statements, making it to be true that the Appellant actually committed the offence of armed robbery as charged.
These conducts together with the demeanor of the Appellant according to counsel provide sufficient corroboration
for Exhibits B, C, D and E.
He urged us to resolve the sole issue as against the Appellant.
Learned counsel for the Appellant in his Reply Brief referred to the case of Alhaji Jibril Okabichi & Ors. v. The State (1975) 9 NSCC 124 at 130 and submitted that corroborating evidence must be independent of the evidence to be corroborated and that the conduct or demeanor of the Appellant cannot be used as corroboration for the statements of the Appellant Exhibits B, C, D and E.
There are three or perhaps four points raised in the sole issue formulated for determination by the learned counsel for the Appellant.
The first is whether Exhibits B, C, D and E are confessional in nature. The second the allegation that the interpreter of the Appellant’s statement did not state the language in which it was done and who did the interpretation. The third is the counsel’s allegation that the learned trial judge had indeed declared Exhibit B to be untrue and lastly is the legal effect of corroboration and retraction of the Appellant’s statement(s).
On the first, Section 28 of the Evidence Act, 2011 defines confession as “——an admission made at
any time by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime”.
By the above definition Exhibits B, C, D and E are all confessional statements by the Appellant in the instant case.
In Exhibit B, the Appellant admitted cutting his victim with a cutlass and then robbing his motorcycle from him. The same was repeated in Exhibit C. the major difference between Exhibits B and C is that the Appellant sought to exonerate the 2nd accused person in Exhibit C.
In all the Exhibits B and C inclusive but more especially in D and E, the Appellant continued to change his stories on what use he made of the motorcycle which he robbed, none of these stories to my mind derogated from the admission of the crime of armed robbery by the Appellant in Exhibits B, C, D and E.
The allegation by the Appellant of language used by interpreter is not fatal in all the circumstances of the case.
?In the first place, the cautionary words which preceded the making of the statement and the end statement of the recorder are substantially regular. Secondly, Exhibits B, C and D were adequately confirmed by a superior police
officer as the statements of the Appellant.
Thirdly, and perhaps more important, the only witness for the prosecution Inspector Danladi Audu spoke as regards the Appellant’s confessional statements during cross examination at page 67 of the record.
“The suspect with the Exhibit A was handed over to me by the I. P. O. at Ikire. I took 1st accused statements. He gave the statement voluntarily. 1st accused did not refuse to sign or thumb print the statements, Nobody forced or threatened him before he signed the statements. He thumb printed the statements in my presence,—————– I wrote his statements because he told me to write for him. He spoke Yoruba language when he gave his statement. I wrote it in English language because I understand Yoruba Language. I?read it over to him in Yoruba language ———”
From the records, the statements of the Appellant and the 2nd accused person were written in English language and read to each of them in Yoruba Language. In any event, there was no objection to the admissibility of the statements.
Learned counsel for the Appellant indeed made heavy weather of his suggestion that Exhibits B, C, D
and E were not corroborated by any independent evidence and that the learned trial judge did not apply the six way tests laid down in the cases of Ogudo v. The State (2011) 10 12 KLR (Pt.301) at page 2386 and Ore – Ofe Adesina & Anor. v. The State (2012) 6 SC (Pt.111) page 114 at 133 to the Appellant’s confessional statement.
Before dealing with the issue of corroboration of the Appellant’s confessional statements, it is as well right to dispel the suggestion by the learned counsel for the Appellant, that the learned trial judge actually declared Exhibit B as untrue in the course of the judgment. This is not the factual position of things. The learned trial judge admitted and utilized the Appellant’s confessional statements Exhibits B, C, D and E as against the Appellant but refused to accept Appellant’s confessional statement particularly Exhibit B as implicating the 2nd accused person. Thus at page 79 of the record, the learned trial judge had this to say:
“However, notwithstanding the inadequacy of learned counsel, I shall bend back to scrutinize the alleged confessional statement closely. I shall also take into consideration the
demeanor of the accused person in arriving at a just decision in this case. I have scrutinized Exhibits B, C, D, E and F and the oral testimonies of the accused persons in Court and come to a reasonable conclusion that there was no nexus between them to establish the ingredient of the offence of conspiracy between them. I accordingly discharged and acquitted (sic) them of count one”
On corroboration, I am in total agreement with the learned counsel for the Respondent that a plethora of Nigerian authorities have followed the attitude of the West African Court of Appeal in R. v. Omokaro (1941) 7 W.A.C.A.176 to the effect that a free and voluntary confession of guilt by an accused person, if it is direct and positive, duly made and satisfactorily proved, is sufficient to warrant a conviction, even if there is no corroborative evidence.
A conviction based on such a confession will not be quashed on appeal merely because it is based entirely on the evidence of confession by the appellant provided the Court is satisfied with the fact and circumstances in which the confession was made.
See: Edamine v. State (1996) NWLR (Pt.464) 1, Nwaeze v. State
(1996) 2 NWLR (Pt.428) 1, Bature v. State (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt.194) 697, Ekpenyong v. State (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt.200) 683, Onwumene v. State (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt.186) 428, Ogoala v. State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.175) 509, Asanya v. State (1991) 8 NWLR (Pt.212) 715 and Ogbu v. State (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt.259) 255.
Indeed, a confession is still relevant even though retracted by the accused person.
See: Madaki v. State (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt.429) 171; Ekpe v. State (1994) 9 NWLR (Pt.368) 263.
In the instant case, the fact that the confession was denied or retracted does not make it inadmissible. However both counsel are right that in such a case, it is desirable that before conviction can properly be based on such a retracted confession, there must be some corroborative evidence outside the confession which would make it probable that the confession was true. See: Olufabe v. State (1968) N. M. L. R. 261 at 265 – 266. In Ejinima v. State (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt.200) 627 at 655, the Supreme Court adopted the test laid down in R. v. Sykes (1913) 8 C. A. R. 233 where a confession is retracted at trial.
(a) Is there anything outside the confession to show it was true?
(b)Is it corroborated
(c) Are the statements made in it in fact true as far as they can be tested.
(d) Was the prisoner the person who had the opportunity of committing the murder? (offence).
(e) Is his confession possible?
(f) Is it consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and which have been proved?
The decided authorities have held that these questions are desirable where a confession is retracted but there is nothing from the decided authorities to suggest as the learned counsel for the Appellant would, that a trial judge must answer these questions in a tabular form or in any particular order as long as corroborative evidence outside the confession which would make it probable that the confession was true could be found.
See: R. v. Osakwe (1994) 2 NWLR (Pt.326) 273 at 286, Obisi v. Chief of Naval Staff (2002) 2 NWLR (Pt.751) 400 at 416 and Akpan v. State (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt.27) 225.
Clearly, therefore, it is the corroborative evidence that is placed alongside the contents of the confessional statement which must lead to the conclusion that the confession is true and it is not necessary to outline the six way
tests and test each against available evidence once a Court has found corroborating evidence independent of the confessional statement when retracted to convict the accused person.
In the instant case, it is noteworthy that the Appellant’s statements corroborate themselves. Exhibits C, D and E corroborate Exhibit B and all of them are corroborated by Exhibit A, the matchet used for the commission of the crime which was also tendered in evidence without any objection.
In the circumstances, the only issue for determination is resolved against the Appellant. The appeal lacks merit and it is according dismissed.
The conviction and sentence of the Appellant by O. D. Afolabi J. on 5th day of July, 2013 in suit No. HRE/3C/2010 is accordingly affirmed.
MOHAMHED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.: I agree
JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI, J.C.A.: I agree.
Appearances
Prince Abioye A. OloyedeFor Appellant
AND
A. AdejumoFor Respondent
