SANJO AWONIRAN & ANOR v. THE STATE
(2013)LCN/6332(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Monday, the 24th day of June, 2013
CA/I/279/2011
JUSTICES
MONICA B. DONGBAN-MENSEM Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ADAMU JAURO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
OBIETONBARA DANIEL-KALIO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. SANJO AWONIRAN
2. SUNDAY AWONIRAN Appellant(s)
AND
THE STATE Respondent(s)
RATIO
THE DEFENCE OF ALIBI
The defence of alibi connotes that the accused is elsewhere. The word ‘Alibi’ originates from Latin and it stems from a combination of two words “ALIUS” and “IBI’ or “UBI” meaning “other” and “there” or “where”, put together in English usage it means “elsewhere”. The import of the defence of alibi and what it entails is to the effect that the accused person was somewhere other than where the prosecution alleges he was at the time of the commission of the offence; making it impossible for him to have committed or participated in the commission of the offence with which he was charged.
The defence of alibi denotes the physical impossibility of an accused person to be somewhere else and at the same time be at the scene of crime. It is a complete defence, which if proved in favour of an accused person, it exonerates and exculpates him of any criminal liability. It is also a jealous defence which once raised, the accused is foreclosed from setting up another defence. Once alibi is properly raised by an accused person, it is the duty of the prosecution to investigate and disprove it. It is however the duty of the accused person relying on the defence of alibi to give the details, of the alibi he sets up timeously, to enable the prosecution investigates same. His duty involves letting the police to know at the earliest opportunity, where and with whom he was at that material time. See Ibrahim v. State (1991) 5 SCNJ 129, Ebre v. State (2001) 12 NWLR (Pt. 728) 617 at 636, State v. Azeez (2008) 4 SC 188, Bozin v. State (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 8) 465, Obakpolor v. State (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 165) 113, Gachi v. State (1965) NMLR 334, Nwabueze v. State (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 86) 16, Akpan v. State (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 27) 258. PER JAURO, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE POLICE HAVE A DUTY TO INVESTIGATE THE DEFENCE OF ALIBI ONCE RAISED
Once the defence of alibi is raised the police have a duty to investigate it, in order to know the veracity and authenticity of the defence. See Okosi v. State (1989) 1 NWLR (pt. 100) 642, Emenegor v. State (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 511) 884 Ogoala v. State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 175) 509. It is also the law that where the evidence of witnesses located the accused to the scene of crime, the defence of alibi is physically and logically demolished. See Sowemimo v. State (2004) 11 NWLR (Pt. 385) 515, Ozaki v. State (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 124) 92, Ogoala v. State (supra); Archibong v. State (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 323) 1747 at 1785, Akpan v. State (2002) FWLR (Pt. 110) 1845 at 1853, Hausa v. State (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt. 350) 281, Ifedjere v. State (1984) 9 SC 59. PER JAURO, J.C.A.
ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the Oyo state High Court of Justice, Ibadan Division delivered on 12th November, 2010 by Hon.Justice E.C.A. Lufadeju in suit No. I/90c/2006.
A synopsis of the facts resulting in this appeal is hereby made as follows. In the early morning hours of 21st March, 2004 at about 6am the house of Omoleke Ogunsanwo (PW4) in Agudu village Ibadan got burnt. The appellants were alleged conspired together to set the house ablaze. Consequently the appellants were arraigned before the High Court of Justice, Oyo state, sitting in Ibadan on a two count charge of the following offences:
(i) Conspiracy to commit Arson contrary to Section 516 of the Criminal Code Law cap.38, vol. II Laws of Oyo State of Nigeria, 2000 and
(ii) Arson contrary to Section 443 of the Criminal Code Law,Cap. 38, vol. II Laws of Oyo State of Nigeria, 2000.
At the trial a total of 13 witnesses testified, made up of seven witnesses for the prosecution and six for the defence with the appellants testifying as 5th and 6th defence witnesses. Documentary exhibits were tendered and admitted in evidence. Upon the conclusion of hearing, written addresses were filed, exchanged and adopted in court.
In a judgment delivered on 20th November, 2010 the appellants were found guilty in respect of the two counts as charged and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment in respect of the first count and 10 years imprisonment for the second count and the sentences to run concurrently. Hear the court:
“I have considered the allocutus of counsel for the two accused persons. On the first count of conspiracy to commit Arson for which the 1st accused has been adjudged guilty, I hereby sentence him to a term of five years imprisonment with hard labour.
On the 2nd count of Arson for which the 1st accused has been adjudged guilty, I hereby sentence him to 10 years of imprisonment. Both sentences are to run concurrently.
As regards the 2nd accused person in respect of the 1st count of conspiracy to commit Arson for which he has been adjudged guilty. I hereby sentence him to 5 years imprisonment with hard labour. On the 2nd count of Arson for which the 2nd accused has been adjudged guilty, I hereby sentence him to 10 years with hard labour. Both sentences are to run concurrently.”
See pages 155 to 156 of the record.
Aggrieved by the aforementioned decision the appellants filed their respective notices of appeal on 21st December, 2010. The said notices of appeal were anchored upon three grounds of appeal, as can be seen from pages 159 and 160 of the record. In strict compliance with the Rules of court, briefs of argument were filed and exchanged. The appellants amended brief of argument dated and filed 5th December, 2012 was deemed duly filed and served on 13th February 2013. The respondent’s brief of argument was dated and filed on 13th February, 2013. Mr. Adekunre Ojo, leading Dupe Ajayi Mrs. and Chairman Okolose Esq. for the appellants, adopted the appellants amended brief of argument in urging the court to allow the appeal. Mr. M. O. Adebayo, Hon. Attorney General Oyo State with A. W. Gbadegesin Esq. Solicitor General Oyo State, Adegboyega Salau Esq. PSC and L. A. Adereke Esq. SSC for the respondent, adopted the respondent’s brief and urged the court to dismiss the appear as unmeritorious and affirm the judgment and sentence imposed by the lower court.
The appellants distilled two issues for determination on page 4 of their amended brief of argument as follows:
“1. Whether or not the offence of conspiracy to commit Arson and Arson were proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution against the appellants. Grounds 2 and 3.
2. Did the learned trial Judge evaluate or properly evaluate all the evidence before finding the appellants guilty and, if not, did not his failure to do so occasioned a miscarriage of justice, Ground 1.”
The respondent on its part nominated a sole issue for determination on page 5 of its brief of argument, namely:
“Whether the respondent proved beyond reasonable doubt the offences of conspiracy and Arson against the appellants at the trial court in view of the defence of Alibi raised by the Appellants.”
The two issues formulated by the appellants can be subsumed into the lone issue nominated by respondent. I have also found the respondent’s issue very comprehensive and all encompassing; hence it will be adopted in the resolution of this appeal.
By way of introduction the appellant stated that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the accused person’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In support, reference was made to Section 135 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011 and the following cases: Ibrahim v. State (1991) 5 SC 171, Alabi v. State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 307) 511, Uchegbu v. State (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 309) 89. The appellants submitted that from the facts on the record, there are three reasons why they will be urging the court to hold that the respondent did not prove its case against the appellants. The three reasons were stated as follows:
1. The defence of alibi put forward by the 1st appellant was neither investigated nor rebutted
2. The case of the prosecution was based on circumstantial evidence which is not compelling, complete or pointing to the guilt of the accused and
3. The ingredients of conspiracy to commit Arson and Arson not proved against the appellants.
On the defence of alibi, it was contended that the 1st appellant in Exhibit C stated that he was elsewhere, at Oritamerin Ibadan at the time of the incident. It was submitted that the duty of the appellant is to notify the police at the earliest opportunity as to where and with whom he was at the material time the offence was committed. In support, reference was made to the following cases: Obakpolor v. State (1991) 1 SC (Pt. 1) 35, Ani & Anor v. State (2009) 6-7 SC (Pt. 111) 1, Umani v. State (1988) 2 SC (Pt. 1) 88-at 71, Akpan v. State (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 29) 258. It was submitted that the police failed to investigate the alibi and that the testimony of DW1, DW2, DW3, DW4, DW5 and DW6 supported the alibi. It was contended that there was circumstantial evidence in support of the alibi as no incriminating evidence was found with the appellants hence an order of discharge ought to be made. In support, reference was made to the case of Bozin v. State (1985) 7 SC (reprint) 276. It was argued that the lower court did not appreciate the defence of alibi and the consequential duties, placed on the court and the police. It was contended that once the defence has been raised and the police fail to investigate, the court is left with no option than to accept it as a full defence to the crime. In support, reference was made to Umani v. State (1988) 2 SC (reprint) 64 at 71, Obinga v. Police (1965) NMLR 172, Ani & Anor v. State (2009) 6-7 SC (pt. 111) 1. It was submitted that the trial court misdirected itself when it rejected the plea of alibi, in spite of the failure of police to investigate. The appellants urged the court to hold that conspiracy to commit arson and arson have not been proved against the appellants.
On circumstantial evidence, it was contended that it must be cogent, conclusive and point to only one conclusion, namely the guilt of the accused. In support, reference was made to Section 167 of the Evidence Act 2011 and the following cases: Obakor v. State (2002) 6 SC (Pt. 11) 33, Orji v. State (2008) 3-4 SC 198, Ogidi v. State (2005) 1 SC (Pt. 1) 98. The appellants made reference to the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW3 and PW4 and contended that their evidence is circumstantial and weak and does not conclusively points to the guilt of the accused. It was submitted that there was enough evidence that the 2nd appellant was in his house in the village nursing a wound on the leg. It was also argued that the testimony of the appellants and their witnesses to the effect that they were coming to evacuate the children of the 2nd accused from Agudu Village, has not been rebutted. It was submitted that the evidence led by the prosecution is inconclusive, unsatisfactory and not compelling and this court was urged not to allow the conviction of the appellants to stand.
The appellants contended that the ingredients of both offences were not proved beyond reasonable doubt against the appellants. In support, reference was made to the following cases: Ishola v. State (1972) 10 SC 63 at 76-77, Garba v. C.O.P. (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1060) 378, Ikonne v. State (1981) 2 NCR 264 at 268. It was argued that the prosecution did not lead any evidence that the fire was caused by the appellants, but the witnesses only speculated that it was by the appellants. It was submitted that the evidence is speculative and no combustible or inflammable found with the appellants and the evidence of PW3 was hearsay. It was further argued that mere suspicion however strong, cannot amount to circumstantial evidence to prove the commission of an offence. In support, reference was made to the following cases: Omotola v. State (2009) 2-3 SC (Pt. 2) 196, Mamman v. State (1976) (reprint) 6 & 7 SC 72. The court was urged to hold that the prosecution did not adduce evidence to proof the offences of conspiracy to commit arson and arson.
The appellants also contended that the trial judge failed to evaluate the evidence before convicting them, hence occasioning a miscarriage of justice. It was contended that from the evidence of PW1 and PW2, there was a fundamental contradiction, as to which direction the appellants were coming from and heading to. The appellants further contended that PW1 and PW2 did not link the appellants to the fire incident. It was argued that the finding of the lower court to the effect that eye-witnesses saw the appellants with a keg of petrol was perverse as neither PW1 nor PW2 stated that the jerry can contained petrol. The appellants contended the aforementioned finding is speculative and unsupported by evidence as the trial judge substituted his own version for the real evidence of parties. In support, reference was made to the following case: Iteshi Onwe v. State (1975) (reprint) 9-11 SC 14 at 19, Akpabio v. State (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 359) 635. The court was urged to hold that the improper evaluation resulted in the wrongful conviction, which ought to be set aside.
In response it was contended that the evidential burden of proving alibi is on the appellants, though the respondent has a duty to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. It was submitted that an accused whose defence is an alibi has the onus of adducing evidence to prove same which when considered with the prosecution’s case will create doubt to entitle him to an acquittal. In support reference was made to the case of Archibong v. State (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 323) 1747 at 1785. It was contended that the positive identification of the appellants at Agudu village (scene of crime) by PW1 and PW2, unequivocally destroyed their alibi, thereby making the investigation of the alibi by the respondent unnecessary. In support reference was made to the following cases: Akpan v. State (2002) FWLR (Pt. 110) 1845 at 1853, Hausa v. State (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt. 350) 281, Ifedjere v. State (1984) 9 SC 59.
The respondent made a reference to the evidence of PW1 and PW2, and contended that they were eyewitnesses who saw the appellants committing the crime and fleeing from the scene hence the defence of alibi is an afterthought and should be rejected. The respondent submitted that PW1 and PW2 gave a succinct account of what transpired at the scene of crime and they stated that the appellants were responsible for the crime.
In support reference was made to the case of Ogidi v. State (2003) 9 NWLR (Pt. 824) 1 at 7 and 8. The respondent urged the court, to hold that the defence of alibi was flawed by the totality of the evidence led by the respondents and to affirm the decision of the trial court in rejecting the alibi.
The respondent posited that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not “proof to the hilt’ or proof beyond all iota of doubt. Hence, the respondent contended that the failure to give evidence that the appellants struck a match, pour petrol or kerosene to set the house of PW4 on fire is not fatal. In support, reference was made to the following cases: Osuagwu v. State (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 460) 700 at 718, Miller v. Minister of Pensions (1947) 3 All ER 373. It was submitted that there were no contradictions in the evidence on oath of PW1 and PW2, but their evidence was consistent as they identified the appellants at the scene of crime. It was contended that the evidence of PW1 and PW2, without more was enough to convict the appellants. In support, reference was made to the following cases: Abogede v. State (1996) 37 LRCN 674 at 677, Akpan v. State (1972) INSCL 201, Gira v. State (1996) 37 LRCN 688 at 693. It was further submitted that the perceived contradiction, if any did not occasion a miscarriage of justice to the appellants. In support, further reference was made to the case of Abogede v. State (supra) at 677.
The respondent posited that the trial court was right in its conclusion, that the appellants committed the offences charged. It was argued that from the evidence adduced through PW1 and PW2, the appellants were identified at the scene of crime. The respondent placed emphasis on the evidence of PW1 and PW2 to the effect that the appellants were seen at the Baale’s (PW4) house and immediately the fire was sighted. The respondent contended that there was an agreement and common criminal design and purpose on the part of the appellants to commit the arson and which they succeeded in committing. On the offence of conspiracy, reference was made to the following cases: Oduneye v. State (2001) 5 NSCQR 1 at 11-12, Ogbu & Anor v. State (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 361) 1651 at 1674. The respondent urged this court to hold that the lower court, rightly convicted the appellants for the offences of conspiracy to commit arson and arson as same were proved beyond reasonable doubt.
A consideration of the defence of alibi raised will be the foundation of resolving this appeal. The defence of alibi connotes that the accused is elsewhere. The word ‘Alibi’ originates from Latin and it stems from a combination of two words “ALIUS” and “IBI’ or “UBI” meaning “other” and “there” or “where”, put together in English usage it means “elsewhere”. The import of the defence of alibi and what it entails is to the effect that the accused person was somewhere other than where the prosecution alleges he was at the time of the commission of the offence; making it impossible for him to have committed or participated in the commission of the offence with which he was charged.
The defence of alibi denotes the physical impossibility of an accused person to be somewhere else and at the same time be at the scene of crime. It is a complete defence, which if proved in favour of an accused person, it exonerates and exculpates him of any criminal liability. It is also a jealous defence which once raised, the accused is foreclosed from setting up another defence. Once alibi is properly raised by an accused person, it is the duty of the prosecution to investigate and disprove it. It is however the duty of the accused person relying on the defence of alibi to give the details, of the alibi he sets up timeously, to enable the prosecution investigates same. His duty involves letting the police to know at the earliest opportunity, where and with whom he was at that material time. See Ibrahim v. State (1991) 5 SCNJ 129, Ebre v. State (2001) 12 NWLR (Pt. 728) 617 at 636, State v. Azeez (2008) 4 SC 188, Bozin v. State (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 8) 465, Obakpolor v. State (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 165) 113, Gachi v. State (1965) NMLR 334, Nwabueze v. State (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 86) 16, Akpan v. State (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 27) 258.
Once the defence of alibi is raised the police have a duty to investigate it, in order to know the veracity and authenticity of the defence. See Okosi v. State (1989) 1 NWLR (pt. 100) 642, Emenegor v. State (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 511) 884 Ogoala v. State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 175) 509. It is also the law that where the evidence of witnesses located the accused to the scene of crime, the defence of alibi is physically and logically demolished. See Sowemimo v. State (2004) 11 NWLR (Pt. 385) 515, Ozaki v. State (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 124) 92, Ogoala v. State (supra); Archibong v. State (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 323) 1747 at 1785, Akpan v. State (2002) FWLR (Pt. 110) 1845 at 1853, Hausa v. State (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt. 350) 281, Ifedjere v. State (1984) 9 SC 59.
The complaint of the appellants in the instant case is that the defence of alibi was raised in Exhibit C but was not investigated by the police. The respondent on its part contended that failure to investigate the alibi was not fatal because PW1 and PW2 around 5.30am saw the appellants moving to the scene of crime on a motorcycle. The alibi of the 1st appellant was that he was in his house at Orita-Merin Ibadan on the date of the incident. According to the 1st appellant, it was in the morning of the incident the 2nd appellant came to his house to solicit for assistance as to how they could evacuate the children in the 2nd appellant’s house in the village, hence the two of them left on a motorcycle. The second appellant on the other hand was said to be nursing a leg injury in his house in the village, before coming to meet the first appellant in the morning after the incident.
The respondent conceded that the alibi was not investigated and that there was no need to do so in view of the evidence of PW1 and PW2. DW1, DW2, DW3, DW4, DWs and DW6 gave evidence in support of the alibi. DW1 stated that they live in the village together with the second accused, while the 1st accused lives in the township. DW2 testified along the same line with DW1. DW3 on page 36 lines 22 to 29 stated thus:
“I know Agudu, My husband’s younger brother came to tell us that a house was burning at Agudu that it was Baba Moleke’s house that was burning. My husband was at Oritamerin Idi Osan on that day. He requested from my husband on how my husband will help to evacuate his children at Agudu, Sanjo followed Sunday. I heard later that police arrested them”
DW4 a co-tenant of the 1st appellant, stated thus on page 39 lines 5-18 of the record:
I live at Orita merin Ogbere ti o ya. I am a pepper seller. I know the accused persons named Sanjo and Sunday. Myself and Sanjo are co-tenants in the same house at Ogbere ti o ya. We have been co tenant, I could remember sometime in year 2004 in March that on a Sunday morning. Sunday Awoniran came to look for his brother Sanjo my cotenants and I was the one who opened the door of the house for him. I saw him limping and asked whether the leg was troubling him, he said he has come to discuss with his brother. I was in my room when Sanjo was speaking aloud in his room that something had happened. I came out of my room and requested from Sanjo to know what happened, Sanjo informed me that Sunday came to inform him that there was fire outbreak in the village and that all villagers had left the village and that Sanjo should come with him to the village to evacuate his wife and children.”
DW5 and DW6 are the appellants and their evidence is in line with the alibi.
The evidence of PW1 and PW2 which the respondent contends obviates the necessity of investigating the alibi is more or less circumstantial. The testimony of PW1 and PW2 was not a direct eye witness account as to how the appellants burnt the house of PW4. Conviction can be based on circumstantial evidence, where it is cogent and compelling and points conclusively to the guilt of the accused persons. In view of the state of the evidence, the prosecution ought to have investigated the alibi, since it was raised at the earliest possible opportunity. The evaluation of evidence on the issue of alibi raised was lopsided, as the trial court completely closed its eyes to the evidence adduced. Furthermore, the contradiction as to which direction the appellants were coming and heading to, in the evidence of PW1 and PW2 is very material. This also has the effect of throwing some doubt in the prosecution’s case. In view of the failure of the prosecution to investigate the alibi, can it be said that the prosecution have proved the offences beyond reasonable doubt. See section 135 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011. In Sunday Ani & Anor v. State (2009) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1168) 443, (2009) 6-7 SC (Pt. 111) 1 at 12-13 the Apex Court, per Ogebe, JSC stated thus:
“On the 3rd issue on the plea of Alibi it is quite clear that the Police made no attempt to investigate the Alibi of the Appellant given in their statements to the police. The Law is that once an Alibi has been raised the burden is on prosecution and to rebut the evidence. See the case of Opeyemi v. The State (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 5) 101, Bozin v. The State (1985) 2 NWLR 465 and Obakpolor v. The State (1991) 1 SC (Pt. 1) 35; (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 165) 113. Without investigating the alibi of the Appellants but relying on the questionable identification of the Appellants by P.W.1, the Police or the prosecution cannot claim that the case for the prosecution was proved beyond reasonable doubt.”
In view of the foregoing, the failure to investigate alibi is fatal to the prosecution’s case. Consequently the offences of Conspiracy to commit Arson and Arson have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt against the appellants. The sole issue for determination is hereby resolved in favour of the appellants against the respondent. The appeal is meritorious; it succeeds and is hereby allowed. The judgment of the lower court delivered 12th November, 2010 in Suit No. I/90c/2006 is hereby set aside. A verdict of discharge and acquittal is hereby entered in favour of the appellants.
MONICA B. DONGBAN MENSEM, J.C.A.: I agree with the lead Judgment prepared by my learned brother Adamu Jauro J.C.A., allowing this appeal as meritorious.
A defence of alibi raised and supported by the graphic testimonies of several witnesses is a substantial defence which cannot be ignored. In criminal proceedings, the burden is always on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt (See section 135 of the Evidence Act 2011). Where, as in the special defence of alibi, the accused person is required to support his assertion, a credible and probable explanation shifts the entire burden back to the prosecution to disprove the explanation proffered by the accused person. (See Aiguorreghian v. State (2004) 2 NWLR (Pt. 860) p.367 @ 401).
In the absence of such demolition of the defence of alibi set up by the defence, the prosecution’s case collapses and the court must uphold the innocence of the accused person.
In this appeal, my learned brother Jauro, JCA has copiously cited portions of the evidence of the defence witnesses who testified to situations which render the presence of the Appellants at the scene of crime improbable. The prosecution did not adduce contrary and more compelling evidence to challenge the defence witnesses. The doubt created by the defence enures in favour of the Appellants.
The appeal is allowed.
OBIETONBARA DANIEL-KALIO, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft, the judgment just delivered by my brother Adamu Jauro, J.C,A. and I agree with the reasoning and conclusions reached in the judgment, I wish to make a little contribution on the issue of alibi. Once the defence of alibi is raised by the defence and sufficient particulars provided, the prosecution has a duty to investigate it. See Akpan v. State (1991) 3 NWLR part 182 p.646 at p.655. In other words, there is an obligation to investigate the alibi once sufficient particulars of the alibi have been given at an early stage by the accused. It is therefore wrong for the respondent to say rather brusquely that there was no need to investigate the alibi in view of the evidence of PW1 and PW2. It would seem that the duty to investigate an alibi can only be done away with where the accused person gives conflicting stories as to his whereabouts at the material time under investigation. See Ozaki v. State (1990) 1 NWLR Part 124 p.92 at p.109.
For the above reasons and the fuller and better reasons given by my brother, I too will allow the appeal.
Appearances
Adekunle Ojo Esq. with Dupe Ajayi Mrs. and Chairman Okolose Esq.For Appellant
AND
M. O. Adebayo Esq. Hon. Attorney General Oyo State with A.W. Gbadegesin Esq., Solicitor General Oyo State, Adegboyega Salawu Esq. Principal State Counsel and L. A. Adeleke Esq., Senior State CounselFor Respondent
