SAMSON IDJIGHERE & ANOR v. MR. BILLY AGBINONE & ORS
(2019)LCN/12612(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Wednesday, the 30th day of January, 2019
CA/B/381/2010
RATIO
COURT AND PROCEDURE: PROPER APPEARANCE OF PARTY IN COURT
“The reasoning of the learned trial judge is that since the intendment of the requirement of personal service of originating processes and other Court processes is to bring to the notice and awareness of the person sued, the claim of the plaintiff against him and to compel his appearance in Court of the party allegedly served will serve as the strongest evidence of service of the process. Except the appearance is conditional or on protest, the personal appearance in Court of a party served with processes of Court will be deemed proper evidence of service, good enough to meet the requirement of the rules. See Aikhomu v E.E.C. Ltd.; Kalu Mark & Anor v. Gabriel Eke 17 NSCQR 60; Chiazor v. Tukur (2007) All FWLR Pt. 354 Pg. 394 at 410 Par. A-B; Anyoha v. Chukwu (2008) 4 NWLR Pt. 1076 Pg. 31 at 44-45 Par H-B; P. 48; Coker v. Obawole (2002) FWLR Pt. 131 Pg. 2021.” PER HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT: CLAIM OF UNLAWFUL ARREST
“The position of the law is that it is not enough for a plaintiff in a claim for unlawful arrest and detention or false imprisonment to plead and provide evidence that the defendant merely made a report against him, he must also plead and establish that there was no reasonable and probable cause for making the report. The Plaintiff has the legal burden of showing that the report made by the defendant is false, frivolous and without legal foundation. See BAYOL vs. AHEMBA (1999) 7 SC (PT. 1) 92 and IYALEKHUE vs. OMOREGBE (1991) 3 NWLR (PT. 177) 941. PER HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A
JUSTICES
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
CHIOMA EGONDU NWOSU-IHEME Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. SAMSON IDJIGHERE
2. FORCE ROCK TOOLS LTD Appellant(s)
AND
1. MR. BILLY AGBINONE (JUSTICE OF PEACE)
2. THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE RIVERS STATE
3. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE Respondent(s)
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Delta State, delivered by Honourable Justice Roli Daibo Harriman on 19/5/2010 wherein damages were awarded against the Appellants in favour of the 1st Respondent.
The facts that led to this appeal are as follows:
The 1st Respondent, Applicant at the lower Court entered into a contractual agreement with the Appellants. There was an alleged breach of contract and the 1st Respondent demanded for some monies owed while the Appellants demanded for the full sum of the lease agreement. Negotiation apparently broke down between the parties.
The Appellants herein lodged a complaint to the 2nd Respondent, the Commissioner of Police, Rivers State against the 1st Respondent by a petition dated 28th October, 2009 over an allegation of criminal breach of contract, conduct likely to cause breach of peace and threat to life.
The 2nd Respondent arrested the 1st Respondent from his home in Effurun and took him to Port Harcourt for interrogation and released him on bail the same day he was arrested.
The 1st Respondent then filed a Fundamental Rights Application against the Appellants, the 2nd Respondent and 3rd Respondents at the Delta State High Court wherein he claimed as follows:-
1. A declaration that the arrest of the applicant on Thursday, the 21st day of January, 2010 (From his residence at Sedco Road, Effurum) and subsequent detention on the same day at the Delta State Police Command, ‘A’ DIVISION, WARRI, Delta State and at the State C.I.D, Port Harcourt, Rivers State by men of the 3rd and 4th Respondent at the instance of the 1st and 2nd Respondents is unwarranted, illegal and unconstitutional in that the arrest and detention is a breach of applicant’s fundamental right to liberty and freedom of movement.
2. The sum of 200, 000, 000. 00 (Two Hundred Million Naira) being special and general damages as well as loss suffered by the Applicant as a result of his arrest and detention on the 21st day of January, 2010 by men of the 3rd and 4th Respondents at the instance of the 1st and 2nd Respondents.
3. Injunction restraining the 3rd and 4th respondents, their men, agents, servants and privies from further arresting and detaining the applicant at the instance of the 1st and 2nd respondent on account of the facts and circumstances deposed to by the applicant in the affidavit in support of this application.
The learned trial Judge granted all the reliefs of the 1st Respondent as Applicant and awarded the sum of N500,000.00 against the Appellants as well as the 2nd and 3rd Respondents jointly and severally, being special and general damage as loss suffered by the 1st Respondent as a result of his arrest and detention on 31/01/2010 by the Police at the instance of the Appellants.
Dissatisfied, the Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal on 25/6/10 and filed an amended Notice of Appeal on 10/5/18. Record was transmitted in 2010. Appellants? brief was filed on 8/6/16 and deemed filed on 3/5/18. 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ brief was filed on 3/5/18.
In the brief settled by Mr. O.J. Oghenejakpor Esq., the Appellants identified four issues for the determination of this appeal to wit:-
1. Whether the trial Court is justified when it held that the absence of proof of service of the Originating Process on the Appellants in this case does not affect the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the action.
2. Whether the learned trial judge was justified in assuming jurisdiction in a fundamental right proceeding when the Applicant/1st Respondent failed to pay the mandatory N100.00 filing fees of his address in support of the application.
3. Whether the learned trial judge was justified in holding the Appellants liable for the arrest and detention of the 1st Respondent by the Police.
4. Whether the learned trial judge was justified in the circumstances of this case, to deal with this case under the Fundamental Right Proceedings when there was no breach of fundamental right of the 1st Respondent.
The 2nd and 3rd Respondents in the brief settled by E.E. Edet Esq., identified two issues for determination as follows:-
1. Whether the suit at the lower Court was not incompetent owing to a fundamental defect.
2. Whether the trial Court was justified when he held 2nd and 3rd Respondents liable for the breach of fundamental Rights of 1st Respondent in lawful exercise of their statutory duties as police officers.
I am aware that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ counsel, Mr. E.E. Edet Esq., also filed a brief in this appeal. The position of the law is that the traditional role of a Respondent in an appeal is to defend the judgment appealed against. The Respondent cannot urge any point against the judgment appealed against as in this case unless by virtue of a Respondent’s notice or a Cross Appeal. See Uwazuruike v. Nwachukwu & Ors. (2012) LPELR-15353; Senator Umaru Dahiru & Anor v. All Progressive Congress & Ors. (2016) LPELR-42089. The brief filed by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ counsel in this appeal being in support of the Appellants? position is hereby discountenanced. In any event, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents filed a sister appeal No CA/B/220/2016 to ventilate their grievances against the judgment of the trial Court.
I have therefore distilled one issue for determination in this appeal.
Whether in the entire circumstance of this case, the 1st Respondent is entitled to the reliefs granted by the trial Court.
At the hearing of this appeal on 13/11/18, learned 1st Respondent’s counsel, Mr. M.E. Ukusare Esq., was in Court but stated that he did not file a brief in defence of the appeal.
By the rules of this Court, counsel could not be heard on oral arguments having not filed any briefs, so the appeal was in fact undefended.
However, not filing 1st Respondent’s brief in no way puts the Appellants at an advantage, since the judgment of the trial Court was in favour of the 1st Respondent. The Appellants still has to show that the judgment of the trial Court was wrong.
The law is that an Appellant will succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the Respondent’s case. However the Respondent will be deemed to have admitted the truth of everything stated in the Appellant’s brief in so far as it is borne out of the Records. See Unity Bank Plc v. Bouari (2008) 7 NWLR Pt. 1086 Pg 372; Waziri v. Waziri (1998) NWLR Pt. 533 Pg. 322; Tractor & Equipment (Nig.) Ltd v. Integrity Concepts Ltd. (2011) LPELR (5034) CA; John Holt Ventures Ltd. v. Oputa (1996) 6 NWLR Pt. 470 Pg. 101; Cameroon Airlines v. Mike Otutuizu (2011) LPELR-827 (SC).
Now, I will consider the sole issue distilled for determination in this appeal.
SOLE ISSUE
Whether in the entire circumstance of this case, the 1st Respondent is entitled to the reliefs granted by the Court.
Learned Appellants’ counsel argued that a cursory look at the Record of Appeal reveals that the trial Court is at Effurun, Delta State while the parties whom the originating processes were meant to be served on were resident in Port Harcourt, River State and their address for service was Port Harcourt. The learned trial judge was satisfied that there was no service of the Originating Processes on the Appellants but because the 1st Appellant filed a counter affidavit to the originating process as well as appear in Court on 25th February, 2010, the Court held that it was satisfied by the requirement of service of the court process on the Appellants.
Counsel further argued that service of originating process is a fundamental issue that cannot be waived and non service of originating processes goes to the very foundation or root of the Court to hear the matter. Fundamental right applications are commenced by Motion on Notice and such Motion on Notice amounts to an originating process.
Counsel opined that where an originating process is issued in one state to be served in another state, such process must comply with Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap S6 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. This provision applies to all originating processes including Fundamental Right Applications. Counsel citedNgige v. Achukwu (2005) ALL FWLR Pt. 127 Pg. 1545 at 1560 Par. G-B.
Counsel submitted that from the provisions of Section 95, it is clear that a Motion on Notice by which a fundamental right application is commenced falls under or within the meaning of Section 95 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act and failure of the 1st Respondent to comply with the provisions of Section 97 of the same Act makes the process a nullity as the processes in this case was not properly served on the Appellants outside the jurisdiction of the trial Court.
Counsel emphasized that the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 provides for personal service of processes on all the parties that the application will affect directly, it is only when personal service cannot be effected or envisaged to be impossible that an Applicant can apply to Court for substituted service.
Counsel submitted that Orders V Rule 2 and 7 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 must be read together and the combined effect is that personal service of Fundamental Rights processes cannot be dispensed with except upon the order of Court granting substituted service.
Counsel emphasized that the trial Court granted an order of substituted service of the process meant for the 4th Respondent to be served on the 3rd Respondent and there is no order of Court in the Enrollment of order granted on 3/2/2010 directing the Bailiff of the trial Court or any other person to serve the 1st and 2nd Appellants through substituted means. Counsel urged this Court to set aside the purported service on the Appellants which was effected on the 1st Appellant’s son on Monday, 8/2/2010 at No 16, Airport Road, Rumukpoku, Port Harcourt, Rivers State. Where a service of a Court process is ordered to be effected in a particular way, mode or manner, any derogation from that way, mode or manner cannot be said to be a good and a valid service and would be a nullity.
Counsel argued that the Appellants challenged the service of the originating process at the earliest possible time and whenever the service of a process of Court is challenged, the Court has to look at its record to ensure that there is proof of service in the Court’s file to ascertain whether there was proper services of a Court process.
Counsel further argued that there is no place in the records where the learned trial judge called for oral evidence to clarify the contradiction that service of the Court process were not served on the Appellants and there is nowhere in the counter affidavit of the Appellants filed on 16/2/2010 or anywhere in the Records that the Appellants stated or admitted that the 1st Appellant’s son is the Secretary to the 2nd Appellant.
Counsel again argued that the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 enjoined every party to such proceedings and who intends to file a preliminary objection to do so together with his counter affidavit and his written address to the main application at the same time and the Appendix of the same Rule provides for a scheduled fees of N100. 00.
Counsel submitted that the Applicant/1st Respondent?s written address not being assessed and filing fees not paid in respect of the written address, the written address and the entire application is incompetent and the trial Court cannot look at them. Judgment based on the incompetent process is not valid. Failure to pay filing fee by a party is fatal to the application. Counsel cited Onwugbufor v. Okoye (1996) SCNJ 1 Pg. 8 Ratio 23; Fada v. Naomi (2002) FWLR Pt. 130 Pg.1681at 1683 Ration 3, 4 and 6.
Counsel argued that the 1st Appellant have a right as a citizen of this country to report any threat to his life to an appropriate authority and that appropriate authority is the Nigeria Police, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents in this appeal.
Counsel argued that the fact that there was no further affidavit in reply to the 1st Appellant’s counter affidavit in respect of the allegation of threat to life to counter the averments in the counter affidavit is that the facts deposed to therein prevail and were to be relied upon by the Court. Counsel cited Ikpina v. R.T.P.C.N (2006) 3 NWLR Pt. 966 Pg. 106 at 113 Ratio 9.
Counsel opined that Section 4 of the Police Act gives the Police power to arrest and investigate anybody who is alleged to have committed a crime.
The 2nd and 3rd Respondents therefore has the duty to investigate the complaint of the 1st Appellant over the threat to his life by the 1st Respondent. Counsel citedIgbinovia v. The State (1981) 2 SC Pg. 5 at 15.
Counsel submitted that the 1st Appellant has the duty as well as the right to report the threat to his life as well as the conduct likely to cause breach of peace by the 1st Respondent herein. Counsel cited Gbajor v. Agunburegui (1961) ANLR Pt. IV Pg. 856
Counsel emphasized that the Police cannot be sued for breach of Fundamental Rights while in the legitimate exercise of their duties. The 1st Respondent’s status is not above the powers of the Police that he cannot be invited for interrogation. Counsel cited Okanu v Imo State Commissioner of Police (2001) 1 CHI 407 at 411 Par C.
Counsel submitted that there was no material placed before the learned trial judge to suggest that the 1st Appellant instigated the arrest of the Applicant/1st Respondent other than the report he made to the Police. The counter affidavit of the Appellants being unchallenged and the trial Court should have acted on it. Counsel cited Akinmade v. Ajayi (2008) 34 WRN Pg. 175 at 179 Ration 2
Counsel emphasized that the Applicant/1st Respondent can only approach the Court by way of writ of summons to challenge and seek remedy for any alleged tort of unlawful and wrongful arrest and he cannot do so by way of fundamental right action. 1st Respondent has approached the trial Court through a wrong procedure because the right the 1st Respondent tried to ventilate is not what he can do through the fundamental right procedure. Counsel cited Grace Jack v. University of Agriculture, Makurdi (2004) 1 SCNJ 335; Sea Trucks (Nig) Ltd v. Anigboro (2001) 1 SCNJ 55.
Counsel opined that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate and grant the reliefs sought. There is nothing to show that the Appellants breached the fundamental right of the Applicant/1st Respondent. The Applicant did not exhibit a medical report to show that he suffered some ailment from the arrest or detention but only annexed a receipt for treatment that did not contain the ailment for which he was treated.
Counsel submitted that it is trite law that it is not sufficient for an applicant to rely on mere averments, the averments must be substantiated by exhibiting the relevant materials for the averment to be credible. Counsel cited Liverstock Feed Plc v. Funtua (2005) ALL FWLR) Pt. 286 Pg 755 at 755-758.
Counsel opined that a breach of Fundamental Right relates to arrest and detention of a party over and above the time prescribed by the 1999 Constitution (as amended).
OPINION
The argument of counsel for the Appellant that S. 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act was not complied with is factually untrue. At Pg. 56 of the Record showing the proceedings of the trial Court on 3/2/10 when the motion filed by 1st Respondent for service out of jurisdiction on the Appellants and the other prayer for substituted service/service out of jurisdiction on the 2nd and 3rd Respondents was moved and granted, the learned trial judge ordered specifically as follows:-
‘leave is hereby granted to the Applicant to serve the motion on notice and other accompanying processes in this suit on the respondents at their respective addresses outside jurisdiction. Leave is also granted to the applicant to serve the 4th Respondent through the 3rd Respondent.’
The basis has been taken out of counsel’s argument that leave to serve outside jurisdiction the originating processes in this case was neither sought nor obtained.
The other leg of the complaint is that the trial Court did not grant any order to the effect that service on the 2nd Appellant would be deemed proper service if effected on 1st Appellant which the Court had done at trial in respect of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents herein. The fact of the matter as conceded by the Appellants was that service on both Appellants was effected on the son of the 1st Appellant who took the process on behalf of both. The trial Court conceded that there was no proof of service of the writ on the 1st Appellant in the file. Be that as it may, the 1st Appellant appeared in person on 25/2/10 after filing a counter affidavit on 16/2/10 shows that he was aware and prepared for the case against him. There is no doubt that it is the service of the process on the Respondent that confers jurisdiction to try a matter on the judex.
The reasoning of the learned trial judge is that since the intendment of the requirement of personal service of originating processes and other Court processes is to bring to the notice and awareness of the person sued, the claim of the plaintiff against him and to compel his appearance in Court of the party allegedly served will serve as the strongest evidence of service of the process. Except the appearance is conditional or on protest, the personal appearance in Court of a party served with processes of Court will be deemed proper evidence of service, good enough to meet the requirement of the rules. See Aikhomu v E.E.C. Ltd.; Kalu Mark & Anor v. Gabriel Eke 17 NSCQR 60; Chiazor v. Tukur (2007) All FWLR Pt. 354 Pg. 394 at 410 Par. A-B; Anyoha v. Chukwu (2008) 4 NWLR Pt. 1076 Pg. 31 at 44-45 Par H-B; P. 48; Coker v. Obawole (2002) FWLR Pt. 131 Pg. 2021.
I cannot fault the line of reasoning in respect of the 2nd Appellant, the learned trial judge observed on Pg. 108 of the judgment that process was served on 8/2/10 on the son of the 1st Appellant who took same as Secretary of the Company. Order 7 Rule 8 of the Delta State High Court Rules 2009 which was the extant law at the time, provides that service on the Corporation, Company etc can be properly effected on any Director, Secretary, Principal Officer or left at the place of business of such Company. Having conceded that they received process but the service was improper because the person on whom process was served who was the 1st Appellant’s son was not the 1st Appellant nor the person nominated as the Secretary of the 2nd Appellant. The fact remains that the 2nd Appellant filed a joint counter affidavit with the 1st Appellant on 16/2/10, on 25/2/10, the 1st Appellant appeared for the 2nd Appellant as its Managing Director. Order 5 Rule 2 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedures) Rules 2009 provides for service on an agent of that Respondent and that will be deemed as personal service. I am of the view that the Appellants were properly served with the originating process in this case.
The other issue raised by learned Appellants? counsel is that the 1st Respondent did not pay for the filing fee of the written address in support of the motion on notice. Paragraph 2 of Pg 111 of the Record shows that factually, that argument is baseless as the learned trial judge looked into it and found that on 1/2/10 the 1st Respondent counsel had paid filing fees for the contended process.
Counsel also argued that since the 1st Respondent did not file a further affidavit to oppose the counter affidavit of the Appellants, all the averment in the said affidavit must be deemed true as uncontroverted. That would be the law where the counter affidavit stands alone as a single process filed in the matter. There had been the affidavit filed by the 1st Respondent on 1/2/10 in support of the motion with its accompanying exhibits. A law suit is not ping pong or table where parties must file a reaction to a reaction ad nuseum or ad infinitum. So long as the original affidavit sufficiently answers all the allegations in the later affidavit, it is left to the Court to decide whether it can arrive at facts from the affidavit evidence or it would need to call oral evidence. The complaints contained in the affidavit originating the complaints can in no way be ignored on the basis that there was no further reaction from the 1st Respondent. Afterall, the learned trial judge had two competing claim/stories to weigh on an imaginary scale.
Another complaint is that this is the tort of unlawful arrest and detention and that Fundamental Rights Proceedings was unnecessary.
There is no doubt that the 1st Respondent could have filed an action in tort, indeed he had a choice between both options, however, in paragraph 22 of the affidavit in support of the Fundamental Rights Proceedings, the 1st Respondent claimed that there still existed the threat of his further arrest by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents upon subsequent report by the Appellants. Nothing in law prohibits the 1st Respondent from protecting his Fundamental Human Right in the circumstance of this case.
The Appellant also argued that afterall, the 1st Respondent was detained for only a day and so his fundamental rights were not abused. I beg to disagree. Where a person?s liberty is compromised by another even for an hour, violence has been done to the rights of that person. There is only one rider provided in S. 35 (1)(b) to the absolute rights of freedom of movement and personal liberty enshrined in S. 35 (1) of the Constitution. The circumstances of that rider is absent in the situation at hand.
The last complaint is that the Appellants merely made a report to the police who arrested the 1st Respondent on their own.
Let us look at the law on this issue. In Shell Petroleum v Daniel Pessu (2014) LPELR 23325(CA), the Court held that:
‘It is trite law that if a person orders a policeman to arrest another person, it is an imprisonment by the person ordering the arrest as well as by the policeman. They are joint tortfeasors and their conduct can ground an action in unlawful arrest and detention. However, merely making a report to a policeman who on his own responsibility takes the person into custody is no arrest or detention by the person who made the report. There is no doubt that someone who merely gives information without more, which information leads to the arrest of a suspect by the Police acting within their mandate and responsibility, cannot be liable in an action for unlawful arrest or detention.’
See also Afribank v. Onyima (2004) 2 NWLR Pt. 858 Pg. 654.
The position of the law is that it is not enough for a plaintiff in a claim for unlawful arrest and detention or false imprisonment to plead and provide evidence that the defendant merely made a report against him, he must also plead and establish that there was no reasonable and probable cause for making the report.
The Plaintiff has the legal burden of showing that the report made by the defendant is false, frivolous and without legal foundation. See BAYOL vs. AHEMBA (1999) 7 SC (PT. 1) 92 and IYALEKHUE vs. OMOREGBE (1991) 3 NWLR (PT. 177) 941.
Can it be said in the circumstances of this case that there was no basis for the report made by the Appellant to the Police or that it was made mala fide with no reasonable and probable cause for making the report against the Respondent?
In AIZEBOJE v. EFCC (2017) LPELR-42894(CA), ITA G. MBABA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment) held that:
‘The law is well developed on the issue that one who lodges complaint with the Police, malafide, leading to the arrest and/or detention of a respondent is answerable in law for the harassment and injuries caused the respondent.’ See the case of EJIOFOR VS. OKEKE (2000) 7 NWLR (Pt. 665) 363, ratio 4.
In UAC of Nigeria PLC v. SOBODU (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1030); (2006) LPELR – CA/501/99, this Court, on what constitutes false imprisonment (the same with unlawful detention), said:
‘False imprisonment involves the unlawful, illegal and unjustifiable restraint of a person’s right and liberty to move about freely. In cases that usually end up in the Courts, the wrong of false imprisonment consists of acts of arrest and detention or imprisonment of a plaintiff, without lawful justification by the Police or other law enforcement agencies, on complaint or information received in the course of their duties …The position of the law is that it is not enough for a plaintiff in a claim for false imprisonment to plead and provide evidence that the defendant merely made a report against him … but must also plead and establish that there was no reasonable and probable cause for making the report….plaintiff has the legal burden of showing that the report made by the defendant is false, frivolous, without legal foundation and therefore actuated by malice.” BAYOL VS AHEMBA (1999) 7 SC (Pt. 1) 92 (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt. 623) 381; IYALEKHUE VS. OMOREGBE (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt. 177) 941; BALOGUN VS. AMUBIKAHUN (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 107) 18 and NWANGWU VS. DURU (2002) 2 NWLR (Pt. 751)265.’
I am persuaded that in this case, it was the allegation in paragraph 2 of the petition of the Appellants on Pg. 75 of the Record which was not supported by any evidence at the time which caused the Police – 2nd and 3rd Respondents to travel from Port Harcourt, mobilized by the Appellants to arrest the 1st Respondent at Effurum in Delta State. There is no doubt in my mind, having considered the letters exchanged between the parties before that intervention, that there was no issue of threatening each other’s lives involved, but an attempt to resolve the disagreements in a contractual transaction. The Appellants merely used the instrumentality of the Police by maliciously stating that a crime was about to be committed in an effort to bring the 1st Respondent to comply with his demands. The law cannot allow that. The sole issue is resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent.
I have to commend the lucid and erudite judgment of the learned trial judge.
In the circumstances, I am of the view that the appeal has no merit and it should be dismissed. The judgment and orders of the High Court of Delta State in Suit No. EHC/M9/2010 delivered by Hon. Justice Roli Dibo Harriman are hereby affirmed. Appeal Dismissed. No order as to costs.
CHIOMA EGONDU NWOSU-IHEME, J.C.A.: I agree.
PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE, J.C.A.: I have had the advantage of reading before now, the Judgment of my learned brother, HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, JCA I am in total agreement with the reasoning and conclusions in the lead Judgment that this appeal is lacking in merit and should be dismissed.
I too dismiss it accordingly and affirm the Judgment of the lower Court delivered on 19/5/2010 in Suit NO. EHC/M9/2010 by Hon. Justice Roli Daibo Harriman. I abide by the order as to costs in the lead Judgment.
Appearances:
S.O. Adamu holding the brief of O. J OghenejakporFor Appellant(s)
M.E. Ukusare for the 1st Respondent.
E.E. Edet (DSP, Legal Officer) for 2nd and 3rd Respondents
For Respondent(s)
