S.M.B ALOMASOJO VS NELLY ELSIE IBRU
(1973) LCN/1744(SC)
In the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Friday, April 13, 1973
Case Number: SC. 125/1972
JUSTICES:
ELIAS CHIEF JUSTICE, NIGERIA
COKER JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
IBEKWE JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
APPELLANTS
MR S.M.B. ALOMASOJO
BETWEEN
RESPONDENTS
MRS NELLY ELSIE IBRU
RATIO
WHTEHER OR NOT A JUDGEMENT IS BINDING ON ALL PARTIES IN A REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY
The action had been fought on both sides in representative capacities, and so the judgment is binding on both parties to the case and their privies who are parties to the present case. PER ELIAS, J.S.C.
T. O. ELIAS, C.J.N. (Delivering the Leading judgment): In Suit No. LD/265/69, Taylor, CJ., in the High Court of Lagos State entered judgment on January 11, 1971 for the plaintiff against the defendant in trespass and dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim for title in fee simple in respect of the land in dispute.
On January 12, 1971, the learned Chief Justice also granted the plaintiff an injunction restraining the defendant, his agents and/or servants from further trespassing on the land. The plaintiff’s claim from the defendant was for the sum of £200 as damages for trespass allegedly committed by the latter on the plaintiff’s land known as Plot No. 92, Mr. J.A. Daniel’s allotment or 33, Omobola Street, Ikate, Surulere, Lagos; the plaintiff also sought an injunction restraining the defendant and his agents and/or servants from committing further acts of trespass on the land in question. The defendant filed a counterclaim in which he sought a declaration of title to the said land. The issue for decision was correctly stated thus by the learned trial judge:
“The facts of the case as presented at the hearing and in the pleadings present no difficulty at all for the matter to be decided in this case and on which the case for both claimant and counter claimant rest is a matter of law. Whilst the plaintiff rest her case on the judgment in Suit No. 1/108/55 confirmed on appeal in FSC.85/58, the defendant rest his case on HK/39/62 which on appeal to the Supreme Court was settled in SC.293/64.” The facts of this case are briefly as follows.
The plaintiff claimed that he purchased the land in dispute from the representatives of the estate of J.A. Daniel (deceased) who in turn purchased it from the Ajiya family. This family claimed title by an absolute gift of the land from the Onitire Chieftaincy family, and the title under customary law was declared by Taylor, J., as he then was, to have been so granted in Salawu Lawani (on behalf of the Onitire family) v. Asimowu Durojaiye (on behalf of the Ajiya family), Suit No. 1/108/55 in the High Court of Western Nigeria at Ikeja. This decision was confirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court in Suit No. FSC.85/58 delivered on November 13, 1958. The action had been fought on both sides in representative capacities, and so the judgment is binding on both parties to the case and their privies who are parties to the present case. The defendant claimed title through the Onitire Chieftaincy family as original owners of the land after he had first purchased from a third party (one Biliaminu Oginni), who was probably a squatter, before he was told who the alleged owners were. There was no dispute as to the identity of the land in question: see Exhibit A which includes the area in dispute in the present case. But it is necessary at this stage to refer to Suit No. HK/69/60 between Salawu Lawani and Asimowu Durojaiye in which the plaintiff sued the defendant seeking an order to set aside the judgment in Suit No. 1/108/55 on ground of fraud, but the suit was dismissed by Madarikan, J., on July 31, 1963. It is also to be noted that neither J.A. Daniel nor his representatives were parties to this action and that his conveyance and title deeds were dated some eight years prior to the date of this judgment. Similarly to be noted is the fact that the plaintiff in the action had purchased the plot in dispute as per Exhibit H on October 31, 1962, though the conveyance to her was made in 1969 as per Exhibit J. The plaintiff then appealed to the Supreme Court from the judgment of Madarikan, J., and the following drawn-up order containing the terms of settlement was made:
“It is ordered that this appeal be settled on the following terms herein agreed to by the parties.
(1) That the judgment on the counterclaim in Suit No. 1/108/55 instituted ‘Salawu Lawani Bale of Itire representing the Itire family versus Ashimowu Durojaiye representing the Agia family’ given in the High Court of Western Nigeria on the 3rd January, 1957 be set aside and an order for dismissal of the said counterclaim entered.
(2) That the order for costs in the court below be set aside.
(3) That the costs of this appeal be costs in the cause
. (4) That these terms of settlement do form the judgment of the Court in this appeal. Dated the 11th day of November, 1965.”
Since this consent judgment (a) deals only with the 1955 judgment on the counterclaim alone and does not deal with the judgment dismissing the claim to title of the Onitire family, and (b) does not deal with the judgment of the Supreme Court upholding the judgment of the lower court, the learned trial judge held that the plaintiff’s title is derived from that of J. A. Daniel’s which is itself based on the judgment in Suit No. 1/108/55, and which was confirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court in FSC.85/1958 and that, therefore, the plaintiff “must succeed in the claim which though one for trespass and injunction, pre-supposes title”.
The counterclaim was thereupon dismissed. Against this decision the present appeal has been brought to this court on the following five grounds:
“1. The judgment is wrong in law in that (a) at the end of the evidence in the case, there was before the court no admissible evidence in proof of the material averments in paragraphs 4, 5 and 9 of the Statement of Claim to wit;
(i) the original ownership of Agia Family of the land in dispute,
(ii) the due execution of Exhibit E and Exhibit F by the grantors thereof. (b) contrary to paragraph 4 of the Statement of Claim where the Agia family claim to be the original owners, the plaintiff’s root of title Exhibit E admits the original ownership of Onitire but notwithstanding this the plaintiff did not seek to amend his Statement of Claim and the learned Chief Justice came to a wrong decision in holding that the plaintiff had established title to the land as against the defendant who relied on and proved a grant from the Onitire Family (Exhibit O).
2. The decision is wrong in law in that the learned Chief Justice’s interpretation of the effect of the judgment in Suit 1/108/55 (Exhibit A) and No. SC.293/64 (Exhibit N) overlooks the facts that (a) Ex. N set aside the judgment in Exhibit A. PAGE| 4 (b) Daniel’s title had accrued before the judgment Exhibit A and Exhibit A cannot therefore be relied on by Daniel and his successors in title as res judicata. (c) Lee v. Motor Insurer’s Bureau (1953) 1 WLR 620 is not on all fours with the present case on the facts.
3. The plaintiff having wrongly joined a claim for trespass and injunction with one for possession, the evidence of possession on the plaintiff’s behalf was (a) uncertain and (b) hearsay, and the learned Chief Justice’s finding that the plaintiff was entitled to succeed in trespass because (i) she had established title and (ii) ‘the fact is admitted by the defendant that he built on the land in 1970 after notice and after action had been instituted’ are wrong in law in that this finding does not establish possession.
4. The learned Chief Justice misdirected himself in law in dismissing the defendant’s counterclaim for a declaration of title when (
a) the Conveyance Ex. E on which the plaintiff relied admits the original ownership of the Onitire family;
(b) the defendant had a conveyance (Ex. O) of the land from that family and called one of his grantors; and (c) the plaintiff did not discharge the burden of establishing that title was no longer in the Onitire Family at the time Ex. O was executed.
5. The verdict is against the weight of evidence.” It would seem that the main grounds of appeal may be summarised under the following three heads: (a) that the judgment in Suit No. 1/108/55 does not constitute res judicata and estoppel against the appellant in view of the consent judgment of the Supreme Court in SC. 293/64 (Exhibit N), (b) that the conveyance (Exhibit E) and the deed of ratification (Exhibit F), both of which together constitute Exhibit G, have not been proved to have been duly executed in favour of the respondent; and (c) that the claim for trespass and an injunction does not accord with the claim to title as granted by the trial judge and that there is in any case no satisfactory evidence of the respondent’s possession of the land in dispute.
In support of ground (a) Mr. Lardner, learned counsel for the appellant, cited Flower v. Lloyd (1877) 6 Ch.D. 297 as authority for the proposition that the judgment of a court of appeal based on a High Court judgment which was later reversed must be deemed to have been thereby overruled. What that case in fact decided is that the Court of Appeal in England has no jurisdiction to rehear an appeal once determined and that the remedy open to a plaintiff is by original action analogous to a suit to set aside a decree as having been obtained by fraud. Jessel, M.R., said at p.299: “The question which we have to decide is wheth



