ROAD TRANSPORT EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATION OF NIGERIA & ORS v. MR. OLUFEMI AJEWOLE & ORS (2016)

ROAD TRANSPORT EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATION OF NIGERIA & ORS v. MR. OLUFEMI AJEWOLE & ORS

(2016)LCN/8227(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Monday, the 29th day of February, 2016

CA/K/287/2009

RATIO

APPEAL: NOTICE OF CONTENTION; WHETHER A RESPONDANT’S NOTICE OF CONTENTION IS AN OPPORTUNTY TO RAISE FRESH ISSUES

It is settled law that a Respondent’s Notice of Contention is not an opportunity to raise fresh issues which had not come up for consideration before the lower Court – Uhumwangho Vs Okojie (1989) 12 SCNJ 84, Nabisco Inc Vs Allied Biscuits Co. Ltd (1998) 7 SCNJ 235, Delta State Government Vs Okon (2002) 2 NWLR (pt 712) 665, Touton S A Vs Grimaldi Compagnia Di Naviga Zioni SPA (2010) LPELR-5033(CA). per. HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.

COURT: JURISDICTION; THE SCOPE OF THE JURISDICTION OF AN APPELLATE COURT

This is an appellate Court and its jurisdiction is confined to reviewing the decision of a lower Court in order to find out whether, on proper consideration of the facts placed before it and the applicable law, the lower Court arrived at the right decision. In the absence of such a decision of a lower Court, there cannot be anything for this Court to deliberate on – Dagaci of Dere & Ors Vs Dagaci of Ebwa & Ors (2006) 7 NWLR (pt 979) 382, Abdullahi Vs State (2013) 11 NWLR (pt 1366) 435, Yaro Vs National Salaries, wages and Income Commission (2013) 12 NWLR (pt.1367) 173. per. HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE DUTY OF THE COURT IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION; HOW THE COURT INTERPRETS STATUTE

It is trite that in interpreting a Statute, the duty of a Court is to discover the intention of the lawmaker and in so doing it must consider the words used in order to discover their ordinary meaning, and then give use their ordinary meaning as they relate to the subject matter – Merill Guaranty Savings & Loans Ltd Vs Worldgate Building Society Ltd (2013) 1 NWLR (pt 1336) 581, Gbagbarigha vs Toruemi (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt 1350) 289, Commissioner for Education, Imo State Vs Amadi (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt 1370) 133. And in doing so, a Court must not give an interpretation that would defeat the intention and purpose of the lawmakers, and it should adopt a holistic approach and interpret the provisions dealing with a subject matter together to get the true intention of the lawmakers and should adapt a holistic approach and interpret the provisions dealing with a subject matter together to get the true intention of the law maker and should aim at giving a Statute a purposeful interpretation – Abia State University, Uturu Vs Otosi (2011) 1 NWLR (pt.1229) 605, Ayodele Vs State (2011) 6 NWLR (pt.1243) 309, National Union of Road Transport Workers Vs Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt 1307) 170, Attorney General, Federation Vs Attorney General, Lagos State (2013) 16 NWLR (pt 1380) 249. A Statute must be read as a whole, and not parts in isolation, and that the different parts of the Statute must be interpreted in the light of the whole Statute and an effort must be made to achieve harmony amongst its different parts – Amalgamated Trustees Ltd Vs Associated Discount House Ltd (2007) 15 NWLR (Pt 1056) 118, Nigerian Army Vs Aminu- Kano (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt 1188) 429, Abubakar Vs Nasumu (No. 2) (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt 1330) 523. per. HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION; THE DUTY OF THE COURT TO APPLY COMMON SENSE IN CONSTRUING STATUTES

It is trite that there is always there is a presumption against the legislature intending what is unreasonable and inconvenient in the interpretation of Statute. Thus, it is trite that common sense must be applied in construing Statutes and the construction agreeable to justice and reason must be adopted – Ibrahim Vs Sheriff (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt 892) 43, Elabanjo vs Dawodu (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt 1001) 76, Sobamowo vs Elemuren (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt 1097) 12. In Attorney General, Nasarawa State Vs Attorney General, Plateau State (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt 1309) 419, the Supreme Court stated that no reasonable Court or Tribunal will impute any absurd or unjust consequences to a Statute or imply in a Statute consequences that will lead to absurdity or in justice. The position of the law in this respect is well set out in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12 Edition by Langan, 1976 at page 199 thus:
“In determining either the general object of the legislature, or the meaning of its language in any particular passage, It is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles should, in all cases of doubtful significance, be presumed to be the true one. An intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a Statute if there is some other construction available. per. HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; THE IMPLICATION OF FAILURE TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH WHAT THE STATUTE PROVIDES FOR

Where the Court finds that there is a failure to strictly comply with what the Statute provides for, such an act purported to be done under the Statute would be ultra vires and would be declared null and void as such action would be regarded not to have been carried out under the said provisions of the Statute – Inakoju Vs Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (pt 1025) 423, Maikyo Vs Itodo (2007) 7 NWLR (pt 1034) 443, Olaleye-Ote Vs Babalola (2012) 6 NWLR (pt 1297) 574. per. HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.

JUSTICE

HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

OLUDOTUN ADEBOLA ADEFOPE-OKOJIE justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

AMINA AUDI WAMBAI justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

ROAD TRANSPORT EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATION OF NIGERIA
CHIEF ABUBAKAR SADIQ (STATE CHAIRMAN FCT ABUJA)
CHIEF M. O. AJAYI (NATIONAL PATRON)
CHID F. O. U. NWOGU (NATIONAL INTERNAL AUDITOR)
MAZI AMOBI OYEMUWA (FIRST ASST NATIONAL SECRETARY GENERAL)Appellant(s)

AND

MR. OLUFEMI AJEWOLE
MR. MOSES OGUNFAYO
REV. O. L. EDEMA
ALHAJI SHEHU MUSA ISHEWELE
MAGISU AKINPELURespondent(s)

HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the decision of the National Industrial Court sitting in Kano contained in a Ruling delivered on the 18th of May, 2009 in Suit No NIC/7/2007. The Appellants, as plaintiffs, commenced the action in the lower Court against the Respondents, as defendants, and they, by an amended originating summons dated the 18th of May, 2007 and filed on the 21st of May, 2007, posed the following questions for resolution by the lower Court:
i. Whether the defendants, in view of the trade dispute declared by the 4th and 5th Plaintiffs for themselves and on behalf of South East and South South Zones of RTEAN through a notice to that effect dated the 23rd of June 2005, in compliance with the stipulation of the Union’s Constitution in Article 6c, can proceed to purport to plan, organize, convene or hold a National Delegates Conference at Abeokuta Ogun State of Nigeria on the 27th and 28th of February, 2007 without first resolving the dispute, having regard to the weight of the issues involved in the trade dispute.
ii. Whether the defendants can purport to organize a National

Delegates conference of RTEAN at Abeokuta Ogun State on the 27th and 28th of February, 2007 despite the Notification of Trade Dispute (intra) given to the Honorable Minister of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity Abuja in accordance with the Trade Disputes Act Cap 432 Laws of the Federation 1990 on the 19th of July 2005 through a letter signed by the 5th Defendant and the requisite Form TD/3 dated 19th of July, 2005.
iii. Whether in view of the letter of the Honorable Minister of Labour dated the 17th of August, 2005 with reference No ML-HB/7663/1/12 signed by Mrs. Eghobamien inviting the defendants to a meeting for the resolution of the Trade Dispute, which has not yet been concluded, and the further letter of the Honorable Minister of Labour and Productivity signed by Mr. Chris Ahata dated the 25th of July, 2006 with reference No ML.IB/56/111/176 denying the defendants of approval to hold a National Delegates Conference, can the defendants still disregard same and hold a National Delegates Conference.
iv. Whether in view of Section 36 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and Article 13(i) (a) Article 15,

Section 10(b) Article 15 and Section 12(b) Article 19(a) of the Constitution of RTEAN of September 2003, the defendants can legitimately hold a National Delegates Conference.
v. Whether in view of the appeal pending in the Court of Appeal, Lagos Judicial Division in Appeal No CA/L/108/03 filed by Chief Ogunyade challenging the purported election of the defendants, the defendants can still proceed to organize a National Delegates Conference.
vi. And if questions (i) to (iv) are answered in the affirmative, whether the 4th and 5th plaintiffs are not entitled to be heard on their grievances, and if they are so entitled to be heard, whether the Court cannot declare the purported holding or convening of the National Delegates Conference of RTEAN at Abeokuta Ogun State on the 27th and 28th of February 2007 as illegal and void and of no effect whatsoever.

Consequent on the resolution of the above questions, the Appellants prayed for the following orders:
i. A declaration that the purported holding of the National Delegates Conference of the RTEAN by the defendants at Abeokuta Ogun State on the 27th and 28th of February, 2007 without the resolution

of the issues raised in the plaintiffs Notice of Trade Dispute is unlawful, illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
ii. An order of the Court directing the defendants and all parties concerned in the intra union dispute of RTEAN to resolve all major intra union disputes by involving all zones of the Union before holding a united and an all embracing National Delegates Conference.

The amended originating summons as supported by an affidavit of facts and to which was attached exhibits. Upon being served with the processes, the Respondents filed a memorandum of appearance as well as a motion on notice dated the 30th of August, 2007. The motion prayed for:
i. An order striking out the suit for incompetence as the Plaintiffs had no locus standi to institute this action.
ii. An order striking out this suit for fraud and deceit.
iii. An order striking out this suit for this Honorable Court lacks requisite jurisdiction.
The motion was supported by an affidavit with exhibits attached.

In the course of the proceedings on the 26th of September 2008, the lower Court expressed doubt as to its competence to hear and determine

the subject matter of the suit and it consequently raised the issue suo motu and directed the parties to address it on its jurisdictional competence to hear and determine the subject matter of the suit. Counsel to the parties filed their written addresses, but whilst the written address of the Appellants, as plaintiffs, limited its scope to the issue raised by the lower Court, the written address of the Respondents, as defendants, strayed beyond the issue. In addition to addressing on the issue raised suo motu by the lower Court, Counsel to the Respondents also addressed on the propriety of the reliefs sought on the amended originating summons, fraudulent misrepresentation, locus standi, wrong description of case and abuse of process. These were arguments on the issues contained in the Respondents’ application of 30th of August 2007. In its Ruling, the lower Court ignored the arguments of the Counsel to the Respondents on issues outside the singular issue it raised suo motu. In resolving the issue of its jurisdictional competence to entertain the subject matter of the case of the Appellants, the lower Court held that it did not possess original jurisdiction to

entertain the claims of the Appellants and it struck out the suit for want of jurisdiction. The Appellants were dissatisfied with the Ruling and they caused their Counsel to file a notice of appeal against it. The notice of appeal is dated 12th of June, 2009, but was filed on the 15th of June, 2009 and it contained six grounds of appeal.

In arguing his appeal before this Court, Counsel to the Appellants filed a brief of arguments dated the 8th of February, 2010 on the 12th of April, 2013. Counsel to the Respondents responded by a brief of arguments dated the 20th of March, 2014 and filed on the 24th of March, 2014. Counsel to the Appellants filed a reply brief of arguments dated the 24th of April, 2014 on the 2nd of May, 2014. Counsel to the Respondents additionally filed an amended Notice of Contention praying that the Ruling of the lower Court be upheld on other grounds other than that relied upon by the lower Court and it was dated the 20th of March, 2014. The Respondents’ brief on the notice of contention was dated the 20th of March, 2014 and it was filed on the 24th of March, 2014. Counsel to the Appellants filed a brief of arguments dated the 24th of

April, 2014 in response on the 2nd of May, 2014. Counsel to the Respondents filed a reply brief of arguments dated the 3rd of November 2014. At the hearing of the appeal, Counsel to the parties adopted and relied on the arguments contained in their respective briefs of arguments on both the appeal and on the amended Notice of Contention as their oral submissions.

By the amended Notice of Contention, the Respondents intended to contend that this Court should affirm the decision of the lower Court on different grounds and these were listed as (i) improper to pray for an injunctive relief for an action that has already been concluded; (ii) amending pleadings and reliefs sought in the original processes contrary to the prayers granted by the lower Court; (iii) deceitfully including the names of dead persons and other persons without their consent which is fraudulent misrepresentation; (iv) lack of locus standi; (v) claim of the Appellant had to do with election/electoral matters – Delegates Conference which is not a labour matter per se, and (vi) abuse of process. These were the issues raised by the Respondents in their motion dated the 30th of August, 2007.

This motion was not taken by the lower Court.
The issue that the lower Court raised suo motu and on which it directed the parties to address it was whether it had jurisdictional competence to hear and determine the subject matter of the claims of the Appellants. It is correct that in addressing the lower Court on the issue raised, Counsel to the Respondents digressed into arguing the issues raised in their motion dated the 30th of August, 2007, and which are the issues raised in the Notice of Contention, and the lower Court rightly, in the view of this Court, discountenanced the digressing arguments and focused only on those that were related to the issue it raised suo motu.

therein did not come up for hearing before the lower Court and did not constitute part of the issue raised suo motu by the lower Court. The issues raised in the motion cannot thus be raised in this appeal and cannot form the basis for this Court affirming or varying the decision of the lower Court on the issue raised by that Court suo motu. The Notice of Contention is an attempt by the Respondents to argue their motion on notice filed before the lower Court and dated 30th of August, 2007 before this Court directly. They cannot be allowed to do so. This is an appellate Court and its jurisdiction is confined to reviewing the decision of a lower Court in order to find out whether, on proper consideration of the facts placed before it and the applicable law, the lower Court arrived at the right decision. In the absence of such a decision of a lower Court, there cannot be anything for this Court to deliberate on – Dagaci of Dere & Ors Vs Dagaci of Ebwa & Ors (2006) 7 NWLR (pt 979) 382, Abdullahi Vs State (2013) 11 NWLR (pt 1366) 435, Yaro Vs National Salaries, wages and Income Commission (2013) 12 NWLR (pt.1367) 173.

The amended Notice of Contention and

the issues raised therein are inappropriate in this appeal and they are hereby struck out along with the briefs of arguments filed thereon by the Counsel to the parties.

In its deliberations on the issue it raised suo motu, i.e. the jurisdictional competence of the Court to entertain the subject matter of the claims of the Appellant, the lower Court stated in its Ruling thus:
“… We totally agree that the cause of action disclosed are intra union dispute which by the provisions of Section 54(1) of NICA 2006 is described as dispute within a trade union or an employers association. At this juncture the question is having seen the claim of the claimants are of the view that their claims fall squarely within the purview of Sections 7(1)(a)(i), 7(1)(c)(iv) and 7(1)(c)(v) of the NICA 2006. While we agree that Section 7 of the NICA 2006 generally defines the jurisdiction of this Court, we must quickly point out that Section 7(1)(a) in particular must be read in conjunction with the provisions of Subsection (3) of the same Section 7. For the avoidance of doubt the said Section 7(1)(a)(i) of NICA provides as follows:
7. (1) The Court shall have and

exercise exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes and matter.
(a) relating to-
…(i) labour, including trade unions and industrial relations
While Section 7(3) of the NICA provides thus:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act or any other enactment or law, the National Assembly may by an Act prescribe that any matter under Subsection(1)(a) of this Section may go through the process of conciliation or arbitration before such matter is heard by the Court.
This Court has held in a number of cases that the effect of the provisions of Section 7(3) of the NICA 2006 is that the original jurisdiction of this Court in relation to trade dispute cannot be accessed without first going through the processes of dispute resolution outlined in the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Dispute Act Cap T8 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004…
In view of this therefore, it is our view that the Claimants claim in this suit which is rooted in an intra union dispute has prematurely come before this Court. The parties would have to first exhaust the processes of conciliation and arbitration as provided

for under the Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act before they could come before this Court on appeal, if necessary.

This is the reasoning of the lower Court that the Appellants have a grievance with and their Counsel formulated two issues for determination in this appeal. These were:
i. Whether once the claim of a party is based on intra Union dispute it cannot be filed before the National Industrial Court without first going through the process of conciliation and arbitration, before the claim can be filed at the National Industrial Court as an appeal.
ii. Whether in view of the claims in the Originating Summons and the reliefs sought therein, the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Dispute Act apply as a mandatory precondition and inhibition on the Appellants from directly invoking the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court as is enshrined in Section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 due to the provisions of Section 7 (3) of the Act.

Counsel to the Appellants argued the two issues for determination together and he reproduced the questions posed by the Appellants on their originating summons before the lower Court and

the reliefs sought therein, but in stating the reliefs, Counsel referred to those contained in the original originating summons and not those contained in the amended originating summons. Counsel reproduced the above quoted portion of the Ruling of the lower Court, and more, and the provisions of Section 7 (3) of the National Industrial Court Act of 2006, which he said formed the basis for the reasoning of the lower Court, and stated that the lower Court misapplied and misinterpreted the provisions of the Section. Counsel referred to the canon of interpretation that says that where words in a Statute are plain and unambiguous, it is the duty of the Court to give effect to them and he cited the case of AG Federation Vs Abubakar (2007) 10 NWLR (pt 1041) 1 thereon and stated that instead of giving the words used in Section 7 (3) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 their plain meaning, the lower Court imported the words “Trade Dispute” into them and brought into play the Trade Dispute Act Cap T8, LFN 2004 to which the Section made no reference and thus breached the rule that says that Courts must refrain from interpretation of Statutes that would translate

into making legislations and he again referred to the case of AG Federation Vs Abubakar supra. Counsel stated that by interpreting Section 7 (3) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 as meaning that the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be accessed without complying with the Trade Dispute Act, the lower Court imposed a mandatory condition to be satisfied by a plaintiff before he can access the National Industrial Court and that this amounted to making legislation because Section 7 (3) did not impose such condition and it used the word “may” which is permissive and not mandatory, and not the word “shall”.

Counsel stated further that Section 7 (3) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 provides for the likelihood of the National Assembly to make a law in future which may provide the option to a party to first refer his claims that fall under the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court in Sections 7(1) and (2) for conciliation and arbitration before bringing the matter before the Court or to choose to file his grievances directly before the Court without going through the process of conciliation and arbitration under the law to be made by the

National Assembly. Counsel stated that the provisions of Section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act could not have been making reference to the Trade Dispute Act, a law that was already in existence at the time the National Industrial Court Act was made and that Section 53 of the National Industrial Court Act expressly repealed Part II of the Trade Dispute Act and stated that other provisions of the Trade Dispute Act shall be construed with such modifications as may be necessary to them in conformity with the provisions of the National Industrial Court Act and that Section 7 (3) would have specifically mentioned the Trade Dispute Act, if that was its intendment. Counsel stated that the provisions of Section 7 (3) of the National Industrial Court Act were futuristic and they cannot be given retrospective application and he referred to the cases of Ogunlesi Vs Attorney General (Federation) and Mogele Vs Alewe, both reported in Digest of Supreme Court case 1956 -1984 on pages 821 and 822 respectively.

Counsel stated that the Trade Dispute Act covers claims relating to trade disputes alone and that these must be trade disputes founded on a collective

agreement and he referred to the definition of trade dispute in Section 1 of the Trade Dispute Act and stated that it does not include intra union disputes and that the lower Court having found that the claims of the Appellants were rooted in an intra union dispute, and which was not dependent on a collective agreement, the conciliation and arbitration process referred to in the Trade Dispute Act were not applicable. Counsel also stated that entire provision of Part 1 of the Trade Dispute Act deals with “procedure” rather than substantive jurisdiction as conferred by Section 7(1), (2) and (3) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 and that rules of procedure cannot override the provision of a substantive law which specifically confers jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court. Counsel concluded his arguments by using this Court to resolve the two issues for determination in favour of the Appellants and to allow the appeal.

In his response, Counsel to the Respondents formulated one issue for determination and it was whether the lower Court was not correct when it held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the claims of the Appellant. In arguing

this issue, however, Counsel made no reference to the deliberations in or the reasons given by the lower Court for coming to its decision in the Ruling appealed against. Rather Counsel chose to argue the issues raised in the Respondents’ amended Notice of Contention. Issues which this Court had found as arising from the contents of a motion which was not heard or considered by the lower Court and which this Court had struck as being inappropriately raised in this appeal. It is elementary that to be relevant in an appeal, issues for determination and arguments thereon must relate to and challenge the ratio of the decision appealed against – Eyigebe Vs Iyayi (2013) 11 NWLR (Pt 1365) 407 and Tukur Vs Interglobal Procurement Engineering Services Ltd (2014) 17 NWLR (pt 1437) 575. The brief of arguments of the Respondents does not add value to the issues in this appeal and will be discountenanced.

This however does not mean that this Court must accept the arguments of the Counsel to the Appellants as gospel truth and automatically enter judgment in favour of the Appellants. This is because the address of Counsel is not binding on the Court. The Court must still

assess the arguments – Oruboko Vs Oruene (1996) 7 NWLR (pt 462) 555, Ogbu Vs The State (2007) All FWLR (Pt 361) 1651., Eya Vs Olopade (2011) 11 NWLR (pt 1259) 505 and Independent National Electoral Commission Vs Nyako (2011) 12 NWLR (pt 1262) 439. In Edonkumoh Vs Mutu (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt 620) 633, Ibiyeye, JCA stated at 652 E-F thus:
It is pertinent to point out that the learned counsel for the first respondent did not proffer any response to this issue in his brief of argument. It follows therefore that he has little to urge on it. The fact that there is want of response by the first respondent is no license to accede to the arguments and submissions of learned counsel for both the appellant and the second to fourth respondents. Those submissions will still be meticulously considered and opined upon accordingly.

The excerpt of the core reasoning of the lower Court in holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the claims of the Appellants has been reproduced above. What is evident from the reasoning is that the lower Court accepted that it had substantive jurisdiction to hear and determine the claims of the Appellants under Section

7(1)(a) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, but it declined the exercise of that jurisdiction on the ground of failure of the Appellants to comply with a condition precedent for coming to Court; failure to exhaust the conciliation and arbitration procedure provided for in the Trade Disputes Act, Cap T8, Laws of Federation 2004. The lower Court predicted its reasoning on the provision of Section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. Section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 reads:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act or any other enactment in law, the National Assembly may by an Act prescribe that any matter under Subsection (1)(a) of this Section may go through the process of conciliation or arbitration before such matter is heard by the Court.

Three questions arise for resolution from the arguments of Counsel to the Appellants in this appeal and these:
i. Whether the Trade Disputes Act Cap T8, Laws of Federation 2004 comes within the contemplation of or was one of the laws envisaged by the provisions of Section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006.
ii. If (i) is in the

affirmative, whether the provisions relating to conciliation and arbitration in the Trade Dispute Act, Cap T8, Laws of Federation 2004 were applicable to the claims of the Appellants.
iii. If (i) and (ii) are in the affirmative, whether, in the circumstances of this case, the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Dispute Act, Cap T8, Laws of Federation, 2004 on conciliation and arbitration provisions procedure were indeed applicable.

On the first question, the Trade Disputes Act was promulgated in 1976 and was subsequently amended by the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act of 1992 and by the National Industrial Court Act of 2006. The Trade Dispute Act predated the National Industrial Court Act of 2006 and it was one of the existing laws that were deemed to be Acts of the National assembly by the provisions of Section 315 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. The Trade Disputes Act had fifty two Sections and was divided into six parts. Section 53 (1) of the National Industrial Court Act of 2006 repealed Part II of the Trade Dispute Act and Sections 53 (2) and 53 (3) read thus:
(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of

Subsection (1) of this Section, the other provisions of the Trade Disputes not shall be construed with such modifications as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of this Act.
(2) If any provision of the Trade Disputes Act is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, the Provisions of this Act shall prevail.

By the above provisions the surviving provisions of the Trade Disputes Act became harmonized and synergized with the National Industrial Court Act of 2006 and they, for all intent and purposes, became part of a continuous whole. The provisions dealing with conciliation and arbitration of trade disputes are contained in Part I of the Trade Disputes Act; it is part of the surviving provisions of the Act. Both the Trade Disputes Act and the National Industrial Court Act deal with the same subject the resolution of trade disputes as well as inter and intra union disputes. Counsel to the Appellants has argued that the provisions Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act were not one of the Acts of the National Assembly envisaged or contemplated in the wordings of Section 7 (3) of the National Industrial Court Act of 2006,

but another law which is to be subsequently passed.

Union of Road Transport Workers Vs Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt 1307) 170, Attorney General, Federation Vs Attorney General, Lagos State (2013) 16 NWLR (pt 1380) 249. A Statute must be read as a whole, and not parts in isolation, and that the different parts of the Statute must be interpreted in the light of the whole Statute and an effort must be made to achieve harmony amongst its different parts – Amalgamated Trustees Ltd Vs Associated Discount House Ltd (2007) 15 NWLR (Pt 1056) 118, Nigerian Army Vs Aminu- Kano (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt 1188) 429, Abubakar Vs Nasumu (No. 2) (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt 1330) 523.
Applying these principles to the interpretation of Section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 vis-a-vis the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act, this Court must say that it is unable to agree with the Counsel to the Appellants that the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act do not come within the contemplation of the Act of the National Assembly referred to in Section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act. If the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act were not contemplated, the

National Industrial Court Act would either have repealed them, as it did of Part II of the Trade Disputes Act or it would have limited their scope of operation. Having not done either and having said in its Section 53(2) that the surviving provisions of the Trade Disputes Act must be interpreted in a manner to bring them in conformity with the provisions of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, it means that the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act must be read into the provisions of Section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act as one of the Acts of the National Assembly contemplated or envisaged.
To hold otherwise will be to suggest that though the Legislature chose to preserve the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act by not repealing it in the National Industrial Court Act, it did not intend for the provisions to be of any use as it “may” pass another law on the conciliation and arbitration of trade disputes which will then be operational under Section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act. It is trite that there is always there is a presumption against the legislature intending what is unreasonable and inconvenient in the

interpretation of Statute. Thus, it is trite that common sense must be applied in construing Statutes and the construction agreeable to justice and reason must be adopted – Ibrahim Vs Sheriff (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt 892) 43, Elabanjo vs Dawodu (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt 1001) 76, Sobamowo vs Elemuren (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt 1097) 12. In Attorney General, Nasarawa State Vs Attorney General, Plateau State (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt 1309) 419, the Supreme Court stated that no reasonable Court or Tribunal will impute any absurd or unjust consequences to a Statute or imply in a Statute consequences that will lead to absurdity or in justice. The position of the law in this respect is well set out in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12 Edition by Langan, 1976 at page 199 thus:
“In determining either the general object of the legislature, or the meaning of its language in any particular passage, It is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles should, in all cases of doubtful significance, be presumed to be the true one. An intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a Statute if

there is some other construction available.
Thus, where words used in an enactment are open to two interpretations and one construction will lead to an absurdity while the other would give effect to what commonsense shows was obviously intended, the construction that accords with commonsense must be applied. Commonsense dictates that the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act must be read into the provisions of Section 7 (3) of the National Industrial Act, 2006 as one of the Acts of National Assembly referred to. The first of the three questions that arose from the submissions of the Counsel to the Appellants is thus answered in the affirmative.

This takes us to the second question – whether the provisions relating to conciliation and arbitration in the Trade Dispute Act, Cap T8, Laws of Federation 2004 were applicable to the claims of the Appellants. The resolution of this question must necessarily turn on the interpretation of the provisions of Trade Dispute Act on conciliation and arbitration. These provisions are contained in Part 1 of the Act which is headed “Procedure for settling trade disputes” and Section 1 states that

where a trade dispute exists or is apprehended, the provisions of this part shall apply in relation to the dispute. It proceeds in Section 2 to state that In this part, unless the con otherwise requires, dispute means the trade dispute in question… And Section 48 of the Trade Disputes Act defines trade dispute to mean any dispute between employees and workers or between workers and workers, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment and physical conditions of work of any person. In other words for a dispute to be declared a trade dispute within the meaning of Section 48, the following ingredients must all be present (i) there must be a dispute; (ii) the dispute must involve a trade; (iii) the dispute must be between employers and workers or between workers and workers; (iv) the dispute must be connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the physical conditions of work of any person – National Union of Road Transport Workers Vs Ogbodo (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt 537) 189, Attorney General, Oyo State Vs Nigeria

Labour Congress, Oyo State Chapter (2003) 8 NWLR (pt 821) 1.

Reading through the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act, it is clear that their essence is to compel parties to go through the conciliation and arbitration process provided for in the provisions before they can access the National Industrial Court for adjudication of their disputes. Now, it is an established principle of interpretation that where the right of access of a person to Court is either taken away or restricted by any Statute, the language of any such Statute or provision will not be extended beyond its obvious meaning unless clear words are used to justify such extension. This is mainly because it is the practice of the Court to guard its jurisdiction jealously. Thus, while interpreting any outer or restrictive clause in a Statute the Courts usually scrutinize every aspect of such provision with a view to ensuring that everything done under such Statute is done strictly in compliance with the provisions of the Statute. Where the Court finds that there is a failure to strictly comply with what the Statute provides for, such an act purported to be done under the Statute would

be ultra vires and would be declared null and void as such action would be regarded not to have been carried out under the said provisions of the Statute – Inakoju Vs Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (pt 1025) 423, Maikyo Vs Itodo (2007) 7 NWLR (pt 1034) 443, Olaleye-Ote Vs Babalola (2012) 6 NWLR (pt 1297) 574.
Applying this principle of interpretation to the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act it is clear that they apply only what is referred to as a “trade dispute”, and not to any other type of dispute. This Court notes that Section 2 of the Trade Disputes Act states that “no person shall commence an action, the subject matter of a trade dispute or any other inter or intra union dispute in a Court of law. and it proceeded to abate all pending actions in all Court prior to the commencement of the Section and it made contravention of the provision a punishable offence. The Section was added by the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act of 1992. Reading this provision along with the other provisions in Part 1 of Trade Disputes Act, it is completely incongruous and out of place. Section 1 of the Trade Disputes Act is very clear that the provisions in Part 1

relate only to trade disputes, and made no mention of inter or intra union disputes, and this provision was not amended even when Section 2 was added to the Act. It is a settled principle of construction of Statutes that where a Section names specific things among many other possible alternatives, the intention is that those not named are not intended to be included – Udoh Vs Orthopaedic Hospitals Management Board (1993) 7 SCNJ 244. Also, the definition of “trade dispute” in Section 48 of the Act was also not expanded to include inter or intra union disputes. The law is settled that once a Statute defines a word, phrase or term, the Court cannot go outside the Statute to seek a meaning of that word, phrase or term not contained in the definition in the Statute – Uhunmwangho Vs Okojie (1989) 5 NWLR pt 122) 471. Kalu Vs Odili (1992) 6 SCNJ 76 and Shettima Vs Goni (2011) 18 NWLR (pt 1279) 413. Thus, any dispute that does not come within the definition of trade dispute in Section 48 of the Trade Disputes Act is not amenable to and/or covered by the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act.
It is obvious that Section 2 of the Trade Disputes Act, 2004 was

inserted to remove the jurisdiction hitherto possessed by the High Court and the Federal High Court over trade disputes and inter and intra union matters, it was not for the purpose of making inter and intra union disputes amenable to settlement procedure in Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act – Udoh Vs Orthopaedic Hospitals Management Board supra, National Union of Road Transport Workers Vs Ogbodo (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt 537) 189, Ekong Vs Oside (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt 929) 102 and Umoren Vs Akpan (2011) 22 NLLR (pt 62) 264. The sting has been taken out of the Section by the provisions of Sections 53 (2) and 53 (3) of the National Industrial Court 2006 which subjected the provisions of the Trade Dispute Act to the overriding provisions of the National Industrial Court Act and some of which are Section 7 which vests exclusive jurisdiction over some matters in the National Industrial Court and Sections 16 to 19 which grant only the National Industrial Court powers to make certain orders. Therefore, in the spirit of harmonious interpretation of Sections of a Statute, an inter or intra union dispute would only be covered by the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act if

the nature of the dispute therein comes within the nature of the disputes said to constitute trade dispute under Section 48 of the Act. Once the complaint of a plaintiff is not a trade dispute, it cannot be caught by Section 7 (3) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 – First Marine Engineering Services Ltd Vs National Union of Petroleum & Natural Gas Workers (2011) 23 NLLR (Pt 65) 283.

It was not in dispute in the instant case that the dispute submitted for adjudication by the Appellants before the lower Court was an intra Union dispute; a dispute within the Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria. The lower Court stated in the
Ruling that:
“… We totally agree that the cause of action discloses an intra union dispute which by the provisions of Section 54(1) of NICA 2006 is described as dispute within a trade union or an employers association.

It was a dispute between the regional organs of the Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria and it had to do with the holding of a National Delegates Conference of the Union that took place on the 27th and 28th of February, 2007. The dispute was not between

employers and workers or between workers and workers, and it had nothing to do with nor is it connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment and physical conditions of work of any person. It did not come within the definition of Trade Dispute in Section 48 of the Trade Disputes Act. The National Industrial Act 2006 recognized in its Section 54 that there was a distinction between a trade dispute and an inter or intra union dispute, and that they are not synonymous and yet it did not expressly include intra union dispute as one of the disputes covered Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act.

This Court is not unaware of some decisions of the National Industrial Court which say that by the provisions of Section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, inter and intra union disputes must first go though the settlement of disputes procedure contained in Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act before they can be brought to the National Industrial Court by way of an appeal – see for example Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria Vs Nigerian Labour Congress (2005) 4 NLLR (Pt 10) 270, the unreported decision in Suit No NIC/12/2007 – Association

of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) Vs Union Bank of Nigeria Plc delivered on the 24th of January, 2008, Adamu Vs Jalaludeen (2009) 14 NLLR (Pt 38) 272 and Anthony Vs Iloduba (2010) 18 NLLR (Pt 50) 229. The reasoning behind these decisions was explained by Kanyip, PJ in Asuzu Vs Ajewole (2009) 14 NLLR (Pt 39) 434 at452 to 455 thus:
“… This Court has in a number of cases ruled that in inter or intra union disputes, even after the enactment of Section 7 of the NIC Act 2006, the jurisdiction of this Court is appellate not original. In the case of Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) vs Union Bank of Nigeria Plc… this Court had cause to review the authorities and antecedents pertaining to the issue. The holding of this Court in that case deserves to be quoted in full. To this Court-
Before the enactment of the NIC Act 2006, this Court held in several cases that in intra and inter union disputes, the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain same was appellate not original… Specifically, the legality of having to subject intra and inter-union disputes to the

procedure set out in Part 1 of the IDA was tested in the case of National Union of Hotel and Personal Service Workers v. National Union of Food Beverage and Tobacco Employees and Anor. The Court, however held it to be valid and legal. One of the reasons for so holding was the provision of Section 24 of IDA which provided that a right of appeal shall be from the IDA to the NIC in cases of intra union disputes arising from the organization and running of a trade union as laid down in the union Constitution or in cases of inter-union disputes arising from restructuring of trade unions established under the MIA 1990. The reasoning was that there could be no right of appeal from a body unless that body has some jurisdiction to hear the matter in the first place. And coupled with the provision of Section 9 A(1) of the IDA, which bars the commencement of an action in respect of a trade dispute or any other inter or intra union dispute in a Court of law, the NIC reasoned that since it is also a Court of law, it could not assume original jurisdiction in cases of trade disputes, and inter and intra union disputes.
Section 24, forming part of the Part 11 of

the IDA has now been repealed by Section 63(1) of the NIC Act 2006, and the other provisions of the IDA by Sections 53(2) and (3) and 54(4) are subject to the overriding provisions of the NIC Act and are to be read with such modifications as to bring them into conformity with the provisions of the NIC Act. The question therefore remains whether under the NIC Act an intra union dispute falls within the original jurisdiction of the NIC Section 7(1)(a) of the NIC Act, in giving jurisdiction to this Court in matters relating to labour, trade unions, industrial relations and matters incidental thereto among other matters, can be said to have given a wide jurisdiction in respect of the enumerated matters. But Section 7(1)(a) must be read subject to Section 7(3) which provides as follows.
Notwithstanding anything contrary in this Act or any other enactment or law, the National Assembly may by an Act prescribe that any matter under Subsection (1) (a) may go through the process of conciliation or arbitration before such matter is heard by the Court.
this Court in interpreting Section 7 (3) in ASBIFI v ICDA had this to say

the word notwithstanding in Section 7(3) is meant to qualify the jurisdiction granted the NIC until conciliation and arbitration, if provided for, have been done. It is to reinforce this stance of the law that Section 7(4) of the NIC Act provides that an appeal shall be from the decision of an arbitral Tribunal to this Court as of right in matters of disputes specified in Section 7(1)(a) of the NIC Act…
The impact of this Subsection is that matters within the purview of Section 7(1)(a) that is, matters in respect of labour including trade unions and industrial relations; environmental and conditions of work, health safety and welfare of labour, matters incidental thereto, which had to go through the processes of Part 1 of the IDA will continue to go through those processes even after the passing of the NIC Act. In other words, those issues which for instance, the IAF entertained before the passing of the NIC Act will continue to be entertained by that body in the spirit of Section 7(3) of the NIC Act This means therefore that, like trade disputes, intra-union (and by extension, interunion) disputes are

contemplated under Section 7(1)(a) of the NIC Act for the purpose of Section 7(3) and so would not come under the purview of the original jurisdiction of this Court…

This Court must say that it is unable to accept the logic in the above reasoning. It is very obvious that the interpretations of the provisions of the Trade Disputes Act, as amended by the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, and of the provisions of Sections 7(3) and 7(4) of the National Industrial Court Act were guided by a pre-conceived notion of what was, and what was desired to continue, instead of by the clear and unambiguous words of the provisions. As stated earlier, Section 1 of the Trade Disputes Act stated that the arbitration and conciliation procedure provided for in the Act was applicable only to trade disputes. The effect of Section 2 which brought in and sought to lump trade disputes together with inter and intra union disputes has be ameliorated and practically obliterated by the provisions in Sections 53(2), 53(3) and 54(4) of the National Industrial Court Act. The Section 24 of the Trade Disputes Act which suggested specifically that cases of intra-union

disputes arising from the organization and running of a trade union as laid down in the union Constitution or in cases of inter-union disputes arising from restructuring of trade unions should first go before the Industrial Arbitration Panel for conciliation and arbitration before coming to the National Industrial Court was in Part II of the Trade Disputes Act which was expressly repealed by Section 53(1) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, and it was not reproduced in any Section of the National Industrial Court Act. The definition of trade dispute was not extended to cover intra and/or inter union disputes either in the provision of Section 48 of the Trade Disputes Act or of Section 54 of the National Industrial Court Act.

The provisions of Sections 7(3) and 7 (4) of the National Industrial Court Act cannot by any stretch of imagination be interpreted to extend the meaning and purport of the provisions of the Trade Dispute Act, as amended, beyond the scope of the ordinary meanings of the words contained in the Statute. It is correct that Section 7(3) provides some possible limitations on the direct exercise of original jurisdiction by the

National Industrial Court in matters in which the Court has exclusive jurisdiction under Section 7(1)(a), but it did not focus that limitation only on the conciliation and arbitration procedure contained in the Trade Disputes Act and it recognizes the power of the National Assembly to promulgate other laws that may provide for conciliation and arbitration procedure for other matters not expressly stated in the Trade Disputes Act. And the provision of Section 7(a) is generic and it covers matters stated in Section 7(1)(a) that are presently covered by the Trade Disputes Act or those which may in future be directed by law yet to be made to be referred to the Industrial Arbitration Panel. The intendment of Sections 7(3) and 7(4) is not circumscribed by the Trade Disputes Act; it is beyond the Act. A read through the complete reasoning of the National Industrial Court in Asuzu Vs Ajewole supra shows the continuous struggle by the Court to extend the meaning of words of the Trade Dispute Act, as amended, and of the National Industrial Court Act beyond their ordinary grammatical meanings to achieve a desired end.

The decisions of the National Industrial Court,

post the passing of the National Industrial Court Act of 2006, that inter and intra-union matters must undergo the conciliation and arbitration procedure in Part 1 of the Trade Dispute Act before they can come before the Court by way of an appeal were, with respect, predicated on presumptions, conjectures and what the Court would prefer to happen, rather than on the clear provisions of the Statute. It is not the duty of the Court to ascribe meaning to the clear, plain and unambiguous provisions of a Statute in order to give them a slant which accords with the Court’s own view – lzedonmwen Vs Union Bank of Nigeria Plc (2012) 6 NWLR (Pt 1295) 1. This is particularly more so where the Statute in question seeks to restrict access of citizens to Court, as in this case, because the wordings of such a Statute must be interpreted strictly and must not be stretched beyond its ordinary meaning unless the need for such stretched interpretation is expressly stipulated in the Statute.

The provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act were not applicable to the case of the Appellants before the lower Court which was on an intra union dispute. The point was conceded by

the National Industrial Court in one of its decisions, Aghwefeada vs Asemota (2011) 22 NLLR (pt 63) 413, wherein it stated that a claim that essentially relates to disputes and/or are on occupation of seats and/or election of officials of a trade union is an organizational dispute for which the NICA 2006 has rested power in this Court to adjudicate upon. The second question in this appeal is thus answered in the negative.

This resolution of the second question raised in the arguments of the Counsel to the Appellants ordinarily determines this appeal. However, in view of the fact that this Court is not the final Court in the judicial hierarchy, it is wise that it goes further to look at the third question raised in the arguments of Counsel to the Appellants, in case it turns on a further challenge that its findings on the second question are wrong – Ovunwo Vs Woko (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt.1277) 522, Iwunze Vs Federal Republic of Nigeria (2013) 1 NWLR (Pt 1334) 119 and University of Calabar Vs Akintunde (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt 1340) 1. In resolving the third question, this Court will assume that the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act were

applicable to the claims of the Appellants.

The third question is whether, in the circumstances of this case, the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Dispute Act, Cap T8, Laws of Federation, 2004 on conciliation and arbitration provisions procedure were applicable.

It is settled law that it is the case of the plaintiff as endorsed on the writ of summons and elaborated in the statement of claim or any other originating process that determines the jurisdiction of the Court – Elelu-Habeeb Vs Attorney General, Federation (2012) 13 NWLR (pt 1318) 423, Merill Guaranty Savings & Loans Ltd Vs WorldGate Building Society Ltd (2013) 1 NWLR (Pt 1336) 581, Uwazurike Vs Nwachukwu (2013) 3 NWLR (pt 1342) 503, Ahmed Vs Ahmed (2013) 15 NWLR (pt.1377) 274.

The case of the Appellants in the affidavit in support of the originating summons was that on the 23rd of June 2005, after more than three years of lack of action over the complaints of the members South East and South-South Zones against the Respondents over several issues, the fourth and fifth Appellants issued a notice of declaration of trade dispute on behalf of members of the two zones and served same on

the Secretary of the Road Employers Transport Association of Nigeria and that the notice was given for twenty-one days in line with the provisions of the amended Constitution of the Union of September 2003. It was their case that they thereafter, on the 19th of July, 2005, gave information on the declaration of a trade dispute against the Respondents to the Honorable Minister of Employment, Labour and Productivity and that on the same day the late National Vice President of the Association, Etubon Eyo Honesty, duly complied with the provisions of the Trade Dispute Act by completing Form TD/3 and submitting same to the Honorable Minister of Employment, Labour and Productivity. It was their case that upon the receipt of their notification of trade dispute, the Honorable Minister of Employment, Labour and Productivity by a letter dated the 17th of August, 2005 invited both the Appellants and the Respondents to a meeting at the Conference Room of the Honorable Minister to be held on the 30th of August, 2005.

It was the case of the Appellants that at the meeting of the 30th of August, 2005 the issues contained in the notification of a trade dispute were not

resolved and the meeting deadlocked and the Ministry promised to call another meeting, but it was yet to do so till date. It was their case that before the meeting of the 30th of August, 2005, the Honorable Minister of Employment, Labour and Productivity wrote a letter dated the 25th of July, 2005 refusing to approve the request of the Respondents to convene a National Delegates Conference of the Road Employers Transport Association in view of the intra union crisis engulfing the Association. It was their case that in the course of investigating the first complaint of the Appellants on the notification of trade dispute with respect to the Nigerian Security and Minting Company Plc, the Honorable Minister by a letter dated the 14th of July, 2006 confirmed the crisis existing in the Association. It was their case that up till now, the intra union crisis and internal disputes within the Association have not been resolved, including the very fundamental issues raised by the Appellants which were very basic to the existence or proper running of a union. It was their case that this was the state of affairs when the Respondents proceeded to purport to hold a National

Delegates Conference of the Association in Abeokuta on the 27th and 28th of February, 2007 and that the holding of the Conference without first resolving the crisis existing within the Union has further deepened the crisis as only a faction of the Association held the Conference without carrying a substantial number of members, especially those of South East and South-South Zones, along.

It was on the basis of these facts that the Appellants approached the lower Court and posed the questions contained on the originating summons and sought the two prayers thereon; to wit
i. A declaration that the purported holding of the National Delegates Conference of the RTEAN by the defendants at Abeokuta Ogun State on the 27th and 28th of February, 2007 without the resolution of the issues raised in the plaintiffs Notice of Trade Dispute is unlawful, illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
ii. An order of the Court directing the defendants and all parties concerned in the intra union dispute of RTEAN to resolve all major intra union disputes by involving all zones of the Union before holding a united and an all embracing National Delegates

Conference.

Can it be said in the circumstances that the case of the Appellants was brought before the lower Court prematurely, without they having first exhausted the settlement procedure contained in Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act? The simple answer is, No. Firstly, the facts as contained in the affidavit show that the Appellants did make an attempt to have the dispute mediated or arbitrated over a number of years between the parties and later through the office of Honorable Minister for Labour and Productivity. The facts show that the mediation or arbitration was still ongoing and that the Honorable Minister refused to approve the request of the Respondent to convene and hold a National Delegates Conference without the resolution of the dispute. The Appellants alleged that Respondents defied the ongoing mediation and the directive of the Honorable Minister and proceeded to convene and hold a National Delegates Conference in Abeokuta on the 27th and 28th of February, 2007. This was what prompted the Appellants to approach the lower Court and, as it is obvious from their claims, they did not pray the lower Court to resolve the dispute between them, but to

nullify the convening and holding of the National Delegates Conference and to direct the parties to go and resolve all pending intra union disputes between them before holding an all embracing National Delegates Conference. This was a matter for the lower Court to deal with directly, quickly and positively and not a matter for the Industrial Arbitration Panel.

Secondly, the prayers sought by the Appellants were a declaratory relief and an order in the nature of a mandamus and by the provisions of Sections 17 (1) and 19 (b) of the National Industrial Court Act, only the National Industrial Court could grant the orders, the Industrial Arbitration Panel was not so empowered. The position is that in such instances, sending such matters to go through the conciliation and arbitration process is a complete waste of time and that it is a matter that the National Industrial Court should take in its original jurisdiction – Ugwu Vs Ogboso (2010) 21 NLLR (Pt 58) 164 and Aghwefeada Vs Asemota (2011) 22 NLLR (Pt 63) 413.

The case of the Appellants was thus not one suited for conciliation and arbitration. The third question arising from the arguments of Counsel to

the Appellants is also answered in the negative.

In conclusion, this Court finds merit in this appeal and it is hereby allowed. The decision of the National Industrial Court in Suit No NIC/7/2007 contained in the Ruling delivered by Honorable justices M. B. Dadda, M. N. Esowe, A. Ibrahim and O. A. Shogbola on the 18th of May, 2009 is hereby set aside. The case is remitted to the National Industrial Court sitting in Kano for further proceedings and the hearing of the matter in its original jurisdiction. The parties shall bear their respective costs of this appeal. These shall be the orders of this Court.

OLUDOTUN ADEBOLA ADEFOPE-OKOJIE, J.C.A.: My learned brother Habeeb Adewale O. Abiru JCA has extensively dealt with the issues in controversy in this appeal. I am in agreement with His Lordship’s reasons and conclusions and find merit in this appeal.

I also allow the appeal with the costs awarded and set aside the Ruling of the lower Court. In concurrence with the lead Judgment, this case is remitted to the National Industrial Court sitting in Kano for hearing on its merits.

AMINA AUDI WAMBAI, J.C.A.: I have read in advance the lead

Judgment delivered by my learned brother HABEEB A. O. ABIRU, JCA. He has comprehensively dealt with all the issues in the appeal. I adopt his reasoning and conclusion as mine. I also allow the appeal and set aside the Ruling of the Lower Court. I abide the consequential orders therein.

Appearances

Bello IbrahimFor Appellant

AND

Christopher OshomegieFor Respondent