REV. P. K. AGUNBIADE & ANOR v. MRS. OGIDAN & ORS
(2016)LCN/8148(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Tuesday, the 2nd day of February, 2016
CA/AK/137/2011
RATIO
UNLAWFUL ARREST: WHETHER A PERSON’S LIBERTY MAY BE IMPAIRED INTERFERED WITH WHERE THERE IS REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT A PERSON HAS COMMITTED AN OFFENCE
If there is a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed an offence, his liberty may be impaired or temporarily interfered with. See Ekwenugo v. FRN (2001) 6 NWLR (pt. 708) 171 at 185. The test of what is a reasonable belief is on the person alleging. per. MOHAMMED AMBI-USI?DANJUMA, J.C.A.
EVIDENCE: BURDEN OF PROOF; WHICH OF THE PARTIES HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE LEGALITY OF THE ARREST
The law is that the burden of proving the legality of the arrest which was set in motion and or its constitutionality was on the 1st Respondent who reported the Appellants to the 2nd – 4th Respondent. See Odogu v. AG Federation (1996) 6 NWLR (pt. 456) 508. See also the decision of this Court in CA/AK/101/2011 delivered on 2nd of December, 2015 per Abiriyi, J.C.A. The 1st Respondent had sought to argue that the Appellant’s right had not been infringed. The 2nd – 4th Respondents agree with this view. As my Lord, Abiriyi, J.C.A stated in the case of Ikudayisi & ors v. Mrs. Oyingbo & 4 Ors. CA/AK/101/2011 (Supra) where the Constitution gives a right and facts have been proved which prima facie show an infringement, it is for the person alleged to have infringed that right to justify the infringement and not for the person whose right has been infringed to exclude all circumstances of justification. See Agbakoba v. Director S. S. S. (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt. 351) 475 at 495. per. MOHAMMED AMBI-USI?DANJUMA, J.C.A.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT; WHETHER THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY CAN BE INTERFERED
The right to property, whether legal or equitable cannot be taken away or threatened or interfered with under whatever guise. The case of Obina v. COP (supra) is in applicable therefore; as the Appellants causes of action are all related to violation of personal and proprietary rights. These are fundamental rights guaranteed by Section 33 and Sections 40 – 42 of the Constitution of the Federal of Nigeria, 1999. per. MOHAMMED AMBI-USI?DANJUMA, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. REV. P. K. AGUNBIADE
2. MR. MOYOSOLUWA AGUNBIADE Appellant(s)
AND
1. MRS. OGIDAN
2. MR. OBADASA
(Area Commander’s Office, Okuta-Elerinla, Akure)
3. INSPECTOR AJAYI
4. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, ONDO STATE Respondent(s)
MOHAMMED AMBI-USI?DANJUMA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): By a judgment delivered on 26th day of January, 2011, the High Court of Ondo State per Hon. Justice A. O. Odusola sitting at the Akure Judicial Division, granted a declaration that the Appellants had made out a case of their breach of fundamental human right relating to the detention of property to wit a pavilion tent worth N4, 000,000.00 (Four Million Naira) which was being used for commercial or rental purposes and a subject of a contract of purchase from the 1st Respondent.
From the record of appeal, it is clear that part payment in substantial contract price had been made.
? The dispute was on whether or not the said pavilion had been handed over to the 1st Appellant by the 1st Respondent before the full payment which had been shown to have been made in installments or that the pavilion was taken by an act of forgery, constituting theft.
The appellants had claimed that the pavilion tent was forcefully retrieved and or detained by the 2nd – 4th Respondents who further forced part payment of the purchase price and had the 2nd Appellant’s liberty curtailed by
detention, on the pre of acting pursuant to a petition alleging forgery and theft of the pavilion as lodged by the 1st Respondent: who denied instructing the detention.
The 1st Respondent, however, had made a report of forgery and theft to the police.
From the case, the facts of which has been succinctly shown above, the Appellants filed an application for the enforcement of their fundamental rights, claiming as it were, declaratory remedies and injunction together with consequential damages in compensation and injunction.
Only a declaration for the wrongful detention of property was made but without consequential damages ordered. Injunction was however, ordered.
The Appellants lodged this appeal upon 4 grounds as contained at pages 59 – 62 of the record of appeal.
Appellants’ Brief of Argument dated 6th January, 2012 was field on 6 – 11 – 2013, while the 1st Respondents Brief dated 11 – 11 – 2014 and filed 13 – 11 – 2014. It was regularized by leave of Court and deemed filed 17 – 2 – 2015.
In like manner the 2nd Respondents’ Brief of Argument dated and filed 11 – 2-2015 was regularized by motion grated on 17 – 2 – 2015.
The appellants formulated the following issues for determination:
1. Whether on the material evidence placed before the learned trial judge by the Applicants (Appellants), the learned trial judge exercised his discretion judicially and judiciously in refusing to award exemplary damages against the respondents particularly after the learned trial judge had found as a fact that the Appellants’ pavilion tent was wrongfully detained by the respondents
2. Whether the trial judge was right in holding that the fundamental right of the 2nd Applicant was not breached and consequently refused to award any exemplary damages, having found that the petition leading the arrest and detention of the 2nd Applicant was false.
3. Whether the trial judge was right in holding that the arrest and detention of the 2nd Applicant by the police was right when the 1st Respondents petition, (Exhibit ‘A’) instigating the arrest was not written against the 2nd Applicant.
On the first issue, it was argued that the reliefs in paragraph ‘A’ of the Appellants/Applicants for One Hundred Million Naira Only N100, 000. 000.00) as exemplary damages against the
Respondents jointly and severally for the unlawful arrest and detention of the 2nd Applicant and the continuous detention of the applicant’s big pavilion tent of a value of Four Million since 14th day of May, 2010 till date ought to have been awarded on the ground that damages are presumed as natural, direct and probable consequences of any act complained of by any person whose right is breached.
That where it has been shown that the acts leading to the violation of a right are unconstitutional, injustifiable, high handed, vindictive or malicious and sufficiently outrageous to merit punishment and has been proved in Court. Williams v. Daily Times (1990) 1 SCNJ 1.
?Where it was held thus:
“Where it is shown or proved that the act of the respondent (Servant of Government) is unconstitutional and where the act of the respondent or (Servant of Government) is oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional and where the act of the respondent or tortfeasor has been held to be tortuous and outrageous to merit punishment.”
That with Exhibits Rt3 to Rt6 and the finding of the trial Court injury was done to the applicants through the false
Petition of stealing and forgery for a material of simple contract, the Appellants were entitled to the award of exemplary damages as sought.
That damages follows naturally. Umar v. Omidike (2002) 10 NWLR 774 page 129 at 141 referred.?
ISSUE 2
It was submitted on this issue that the trial Court having found that the petition leading to the arrest of and detention of the 2nd Appellant was false, holding that the 2nd Appellant’s fundamental right was not breached and thus no damages awardable was wrong.?
Referring to Mclasen v. Jennigs (2003) FWLR Part 154 page 528 at 537 – 538 C. B. W. v. Okojie (2004) 10 NWLR 882, page 488 Cappa & Alberto v. Akintola (2003) 9 NWLR 824, page 49 it was argued that the 2nd Applicant was entitled to damages as his fundamental right had been breached on account of the malicious, oppressive and unconstitutional act leading to his arrest and detention no matter how slight the arrest and detention was.
The 1st Respondent, by his Brief of Argument dated 11th of November, 2014 and filed 13th of November, 2014 but deemed filed on 17th of November, 2015, formulated 2 issues to wit:?
1. Whether
considering the materials facts before the lower Court the fundamental right of the 2nd Respondent had been breached.
2. Whether considering the material facts the trial Court was right in not awarding damages against the 1st Respondents.
Arguing in response to the Appellants issue 1,
The 1st Respondent countered his own Issue No. 2; it was argued that exemplary damages could only be awarded against the 1st Respondent if it can be shown that the 2nd Appellant’s fundamental right was breached as a direct consequence of the 1st Respondent’s act. That such right was not breached and therefore, there was no entitlement to damages.
The 1st Respondent argued further with reference to paragraph 12 of the affidavit of the 2nd – 4th Respondents (Contained on page 25 of the record of appeal) that the continued detention of the tent of the Applicants/Appellants at the Police Station was not caused by the said 2nd – 4th Respondents but by the refusal of the Appellants to remove the tent where they kept it at the open place at the station after investigation into the case was concluded.
?In the words of the 1st Respondents counsel the pavilion
tent which was the object of the police investigation was abandoned at the police station within the discretion of the Appellant and has nothing to do with the 1st Respondent. That the Appellant cannot be complaining of a self-induced detention of the pavilion tent.
It was contended that the case of Cappa & D’ alberto Ltd. v. Akintola (2003) 9 NWLR (pt. 824) 49 was in applicable as it was not subjected to police investigation; it was also contended that assuming the pavilion tent was ever detained by the police the 1st Respondent could not be held responsible for the acts of the 2nd – 4th Respondents carried out within the scope of their official duties and discretion.
Reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Obinwa v. COP (2007) 11 NWLR (pt. 1045) 411 at 427 wherein Owoade, J.C.A. held thus:
“In the instant case, the action of the respondents could not be tied down to any of the above Rules and therefore would not have been awarded. It is pertinent to point out at this stage that this case like many others in our Courts suffered from the dilemma of form of action. For example, the remedies of the Appellant vis – a – vis the
4th respondent would have been easily realizable if his counsel had filed a separate suit as against the 4th defendant/respondent by way of a writ of summons or malicious prosecution and false imprisonment.
In other words, the attempt by the appellants/applicant’s counsel to lump the various remedies available to the appellant together in action under the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules has only caused a lot of mix ups or confusion in the Court below but also limited the appellant’s chances of realizing his full remedies.”
That the lumping of the claim for detention of the pavilion tent and alleged detention of the 2nd Appellant made it difficult for the trial Court to determine and apportion the N10,000.000.00 damages claimed more so when the fundamental right of the 2nd Appellant was held not to be breached.
The 2nd – 4th Respondents by their Brief of Argument filed 11 – 2 – 2015 raised two issues for determination to wit:
1. Whether from the facts and circumstances of this case the learned trial judge was not right when he held that the 2nd – 4th Respondents had not breached the fundamental rights of the 2nd appellant.
2. Whether the learned trial was not right in dismissing the claim of the appellants against the 2nd – 4th Respondents as regards to the issue of exemplary damages.
Arguing its issue I,
It was submitted that the arrest of the 2nd Applicant/Appellant was based on the complaint of the 1st Respondent and was therefore justified that the 2nd – 4th Respondents acted pursuant to their constitutional power.
That upon exhibit ‘C’ alleging fraudulent conversion and threat to life of the 1st Respondent, the 2nd – 4th Respondents were justifies in so acting.
Section 35(1) (c) of the 1999 Constitution was relied upon in justifying the interference with the 2nd Appellant?s liberty.
That upon a reasonable suspicion of he having committed a criminal offence, the Appellant could be arrested; that the investigation of this Appellant and arrest was based on a complaint that had been established.
Section 4 of the Police Act, Gani Fawehinmi v. IGP 8 SCM page 77 at 79 ratio 85; Udeh v. FRN (2001) FWLR part 61, page 1747, paragraphs D- E; AG Anambra State v. UBA (2005) ALL FWLR (pt. 708) 171 at 185.
?That what was reported to the police was a
criminal case and not civil and they had the duty to so investigate in the manners they did. That it was wrong to contend that it was a civil claim that was reported against the Appellants; to the contrary that it was the police that so discovered and then advised appropriately that the fundamental right of the 2nd Appellant was not breached …as the police kept within the 24 hour period allowed by Section 35(4) (b) of the 1999 Constitution as found by the trial judge; page 56 of the record referred. These respondents, out rightly denied collecting any N200, 000. 00 or any sum for that matter and put the Appellants to proof that they had become debt collector.
It was argued that neither the 1st nor the 2nd Appellant have had their fundamental rights breached by the 2nd – 4th Respondents.
The Appellants filed an Appellant’s Reply to the Respondents’ Briefs which is dated and filed 3rd of March, 2015 but deemed filed on 28th of May, 2015.
?Responding to the issue 1 of the Respondents as to the breach or other wise of the 2nd Appellant’s fundamental right, it was contended that it could not have been true that the 2nd Appellant who was said to have
only been invited to the police station could only be so invited and discharged without an arrest even when he was said to have made a cautionary statement and brought the pavilion tent alleged to have been stolen.
Learned counsel urged that the date of the alleged forged document was 5th of January, 2010 while the tent was allegedly collected in November 2009 from the 1st Respondent’s house – and that the tent was for N1, 360, 000. 00 contrary to the N4,000, 000.00 tent later stated.
Learned counsel refers to Exhibit Rt2 on pages 8 – 9 of the record where 1st Respondent’s counsel denied that any criminal complaint was lodged by his client against the Appellant; that only a report to the police to assist in recovering the debt which it did to the tune of N200, 000. 00 from the 2nd Appellant and as confirmed by the 1st Respondent herself at paragraph 14, page 19 of the record of appeal and page 21 paragraph 3, line 25 thereof.
That the denial by the police of its complicity was ridiculous and should be sanctioned for this unconstitutional complicity.
?A. C. (O. A. O) Nig. Ltd. v. Umanah (2013) 4 NWLR pt. 1344, page 323 at 341, paragraphs
E-F; Abdullahi v. Buhari (2004) 17 NWLR pt. 902, page 278 at 302 – 303 paragraphs A – B relied upon.
Counsel contended that though the 2nd Appellant had alleged that the police incidented the collection of the money in their police record but did not tender such a record, the police ought to have so tendered its record of entry of the complaint as they had after all agreed to a complaint which they referred to as civil. Iyere v. Duru (1998) 5 NWLR Pt. 44 at 665 refers.
As relating the 1st Respondent, it was contended that having set the machinery of Justice in motion wrongfully it cannot be heard that she was not liable.
That she instigated the arrest and detention complained of. See SPDC (Nig.) Ltd. v. Olanrewaju (2002) 16 NWLR 792 page 38 at 46 – 47.
It was also argued that the equivocation of the 2nd – 4th Respondents should be noted as to the denial of the arrest and at the same time to justify the arrest, counsel contends that this speculative, hypothetical and academic posture shows the unreliability of these Respondent’s position.
That the Courts do not act on Academic or hypothesis. Akinfolarin v. Akinnola (1994) 3 NWLR pt.
335 at 667; Dike v. Nzeka (1986) 4 NWLR pt. 34 at 144.
It was contended that even if the 2nd Appellant was released within 24 hours, the illegality of the arrest and detention was not in doubt.
Alaboh v. Boyes (1984) 5 NCLR 830.
Learned counsel finally submitted that the Courts have cautioned against arresting and detaining an innocent person until there are reasonable facts to suspect.
I have perused the evidence led at the trial Court and the findings of the trial Court in respect of the 2nd Appellants complicity and whether he was arrested and/or detained or not; and have also considered the contention of the Respondents that he was not arrested or detained.
I am inclined and persuaded that from the complaint lodged, it is obvious that the 2nd Appellant was cited for criminality by the 1st Respondent; it is beyond dispute that the said Appellant was arrested based on that complaint as made. This was investigated and found by the 2nd – 4th Respondents as baseless as it was purely a civil dispute relating to contractual agreement.
?I think that the police, 2nd – 4th Respondents from the totality of the facts and circumstances did
not breach the Appellants fundamental rights in any way in the due exercise of their constitutional and statutory powers and duties to investigate crimes and their allegations and or suspicious.
The prevarifications noticed in the 2nd – 4th respondent?s defenses in my view is, only in desperation to justify their role either way. The allegation on the collection of sums of money may be a fact of corruption or counter allegation of criminality of extortion of sums of money which though may not be ruled out, but does not constitute the proof of the violation of the Appellant’s fundamental right as alleged.
These Appellants are at liberty in taking this up in a different forum or proceedings upon proof or abide the visitation of the law of karma as no scheme can be covered in perpetuity;
As relating the 1st Appellant, I am persuaded that she (1st Respondent) set the machinery of Justice wrongfully to the detriment and injury of this Appellant. To seek to shift the blame to the 2nd – 4th Respondents and to seek to justify their action for them was a most unfortunate disposition.
An act of unlawful infringement of a subject is tortuously
shown to have been activated by a person and damage is caused to another in the process, as in this case where I am convinced that 2nd Appellant was arrested, I take it that the instigator is, in law, the doer or cause of that injury caused.
2nd Appellant had shown that he was deprived of his liberty and the dignity of his person and freedom to walk the Nigerian soil unmolested except upon the commission of crime and Court order or restriction upon reasonable cause shown as enshrined in Section 33 (5) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
The 1st Respondent set the machinery of the arrest and detention of the 2nd Appellant in motion by her baseless complaint. The police solidified it by investigating even when the alleged document purported to have been made was post facto made in May 2010 and the collection of the pavilion tent said to have already been made much earlier as November 2009), it is still the act of the 1st Respondent, which by this shows malice and haziness. Exhibit “C” written by the 1st Respondent against the 2nd Appellant speaks for its self. The 2nd – 4th Respondents support the 2nd Appellant’s case as to
the role of the 1st Respondent against him except that they seek to justify their own response has been covered by the law.
I think they are right when they relied on the exceptions provided in Section 35 (c) of the 1999 Constitution in their own defence alone. If there is a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed an offence, his liberty may be impaired or temporarily interfered with.
See Ekwenugo v. FRN (2001) 6 NWLR (pt. 708) 171 at 185.
The test of what is a reasonable belief is on the person alleging.
?
It is based on whether from the facts available to the respondents, it could reasonably be inferred that the 2nd Appellant or even the 1st Appellant had committed any offence.
The law is that the burden of proving the legality of the arrest which was set in motion and or its constitutionality was on the 1st Respondent who reported the Appellants to the 2nd – 4th Respondent. See Odogu v. AG Federation (1996) 6 NWLR (pt. 456) 508.
See also the decision of this Court in CA/AK/101/2011 delivered on 2nd of December, 2015 per Abiriyi, J.C.A.
The 1st Respondent had sought to argue that the Appellant’s right had not been?infringed.?
The 2nd – 4th Respondents agree with this view.
As my Lord, Abiriyi, J.C.A stated in the case of Ikudayisi & ors v. Mrs. Oyingbo & 4 Ors. CA/AK/101/2011 (Supra) where the Constitution gives a right and facts have been proved which prima facie show an infringement, it is for the person alleged to have infringed that right to justify the infringement and not for the person whose right has been infringed to exclude all circumstances of justification.
See Agbakoba v. Director S. S. S. (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt. 351) 475 at 495.
The fact of bringing a claim for damages, unlawful arrest, detention and detention of charter i.e. pavilion tent against the Respondents did not in my view, amount to not making clear under what head of claim the damages attached.
Here was a claim for breach of the right to liberty accessioned by unlawful or baseless arrest;
Here was a claim for damages for the deprivation of property by detention which was not warranted as it was not reasonably a property tied to the commission of any crime real or suspected.
The right to property, whether legal or equitable cannot be taken away or threatened or
interfered with under whatever guise.
The case of Obina v. COP (supra) is in applicable therefore; as the Appellants causes of action are all related to violation of personal and proprietary rights.
These are fundamental rights guaranteed by Section 33 and Sections 40 – 42 of the Constitution of the Federal of Nigeria, 1999.
It is my resolution that the Appellant’s Issue Number one which is similar to the 1st Respondents Issue 2 and 2nd – 4th Respondent’s Issue 1 be resolved in favour of the Appellants and the 2nd – 4th Respondents but against the 1st Respondent.
The 2nd Issue formulated by the Appellants is simply whether having found that the petition upon which the 2nd Appellant was arrested was false, it was not wrong for the trial Court to hold that the said 2nd Appellant’s Fundamental Right was not breached and to have refused any damages.?
I had answered this question in my consideration of issue one of the Appellant. His fundamental right was breached by the 1st Respondent.
Damages accordingly flowed naturally as rightly submitted by the Appellant’s learned counsel.
This Issue is resolved in favour of the?Appellants.
The Appellant had argued as his issue number 3 the question whether the holding that the arrest and detention of the 2nd applicant by the police was right when the 1st Respondent’s petition instigating the arrest was not written against the 2nd Applicant/Appellant.
The Appellants argued that 1st Respondent sufficiently showed that the 2nd Appellant was not involved in the crimes alleged and sought to put the fault at the doorstep of the 2nd – 4th Respondents whom it accused of having no justification.
He relied on Fawehimi v. IGP (Supra) and Ikonne Ikonne V. Cop & Anr. (1986) 4 NWLR Pt. 36, Page 473 at 475 Paragraph E to submit that unlawful and unwarranted arrest must be frowned at, and that the arrest of the Appellant was unlawful and that exemplary damages ought to have been awarded.
Having earlier resolved that the arrest, detention for investigation of the allegation of crimes as made was triggered by the 1st Respondent and upon no reasonable cause, it was the 1st respondent alone and not the 2nd – 4th Respondents that should be liable for the infringement of the fundamental rights alleged and proved. In the
circumstance, I find and hold that the arrest and detention of 2nd Respondent was not right; and I hold also that only the 1st Respondent is liable in damages. The 2nd – 4th Respondents acted in good faith in the performance of their statutory duties and concluded as they were reasonably expected to do by discharging the victims/appellants upon the discovery that it was purely a civil matter devoid of any proof of criminality.
Why the 1st Respondent would not sue for breach of contract or for the payment of the balance of the sum due and with interest thereon for delayed liquidation was unfathomable; she (1st Respondent) chose the hard, fast and easy but maliciously oppressive way of the use of force by making a false report to the police force for full recovery of the contract sum.
?I wonder why the manager who was said to have parted with the pavilion tent upon the alleged forgery was not made to make a statement to the police. Where was the signature of the 1st Respondent that was shown to be at variance with that in the document that was said to have been forged? No wonder, the police did not proceed in the investigation of the allegation of
criminality any further!
The signatures on the petition made appear similar to that in the statement of the 1st Respondent and on the invoice complained of.
I see no element of criminality as forgery there from. On the contrary, the 1st Respondent had shown beyond doubt by letter at page 8 of the record, that they have converted civil claim in contract to a claim that could be investigated and realized by the investigation and full recovery by the Nigeria Police, as she could not tolerate the “antics” of the 1st Appellant.
What an admission of culpability and liability in damages, as made vide the 1st Respondent’s solicitor’s letter to the Appellants.
In all circumstances, I find the 1st Respondent liable in damages for the infringement of the fundamental right of the 2nd Appellants to liberty from arrest and detention.
The tenor of defence as crafted in the 1st Respondent’s Brief of Argument does not exonerate her but incriminates by its implied admission of liability.
The trial judgment exonerating the 1st Respondent is set aside and quashed.
?In its place, I substitute a verdict of liability against the 1st Respondent
and award against her damages in the sum of N50,000.00 only in favour of the 2nd Appellant. Both the act, motives and mode of conduct are reprehensible.
While the 1st Appellant is at liberty to sue for malicious prosecution and/or defamation of character or let sleeping dogs lie as the 1st Respondent, would have by now known of the futility of anxiety and crass falsehood in desperation as business protection.
Indeed, the confistication and detention of the large pavilion tent being property wherein the appellants had equitable proprietorial rights and possession was a violation of their fundamental right to own and enjoy or use property as enshrined in Section 44 (1) of the Nigeria Constitution, 1999 and Section 14 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.
Accordingly, I award N50, 000.00 only as damages in favour of the Appellants jointly.
In this regard, as the two issues formulated by the 1st Respondent are both resolved against her: though not an action in detinue, but the proprietary right over the tent had been violated by the improper expropriation and denial triggered by the 1st Respondent herein for the duration
complained of.
Appeal is allowed, as against the 1st Respondent only but is dismissed against the 2nd – 4th Respondents.
Costs: I award a cost of N30, 000.00 (Thirty Thousand Naira) Only in favour of Appellants against the 1st Respondent.
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the leading judgment of my learned brother, Mohammed Ambi-Usi Danjuma, J.C.A., just delivered and I agree with his reasoning and conclusion. Accordingly, I also allow the appeal and endorse the consequential orders made in the leading judgment including the order of costs.
JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI, J.C.A.: I read in advance, in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother Mohammed A. Danjuma, J.C.A.
I agree entirely with the reasoning and conclusions in the leading judgment. I adopt the reasoning and conclusions as mine.
I abide by all the orders made in the leading judgment including the order as to costs.
Appearances
Amos Olobi, Esq.
(Kehinde Aladedutire, Esq. for the Appellants prepared the Brief of Argument)For Appellant
AND
Ambekemo, Esq. for 1st Respondent (Brief settled by Duro Adonis, Esq.)
Aderemi Ajibola, Esq. for 2nd-4th RespondentsFor Respondent
