Regina
v.
Adomako (Appellant)
(On Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division))
JUDGMENT
Die Jovis 30° Junii 1994
Upon Report from the Appellate Committee to whom was
referred the Cause Regina against Adomako, That the Committee had
heard Counsel as well on Tuesday the 10th as on Wednesday the
11th days of May last upon the Petition and Appeal of John Asare
Adomako of 15 Windmill Court, West Green, Crawley, West Sussex
RH10 2NA, praying that the matter of the Order set forth in the
Schedule thereto, namely an Order of Her Majesty’s Court of
Appeal (Criminal Division) of the 20th day of May 1993, might be
reviewed before Her Majesty the Queen in Her Court of Parliament
and that the said Order might be reversed, varied or altered or
that the Petitioner might have such other relief in the premises
as to Her Majesty the Queen in Her Court of Parliament might seem
meet; as upon the case of the Director of Public Prosecutions (on
behalf of Her Majesty) lodged in answer to the said appeal and
due consideration had this day of what was offered on either side
in this Cause:
It is Ordered and Adjudged, by the Lords Spiritual and
Temporal in the Court of Parliament of Her Majesty the Queen
assembled, That the said Order of Her Majesty’s Court of Appeal
(Criminal Division) of the 20th day of May 1993 complained of in
the said Appeal be, and the same is hereby, Affirmed and that the
said Petition and Appeal be, and the same is hereby, dismissed
this House: And it is further Ordered. That the question
certified by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) on the 15th
day of June 1993 be answered with a declaration that:
“In cases of manslaughter by criminal negligence involving
a breach of duty, it is a sufficient direction to the jury
to adopt the gross negligence test set out by the Court of
Appeal in the present case following Rex. v. Bateman 19 Cr.
App. R.8 and Andrews v. DPP [1937] AC 576 and it is not
necessary to refer to the definition of recklessness in R.-
v. Lawrence [1982] A.C. 510, although it is perfectly open
to the trial judge to use the word “reckless” in its
ordinary meaning as part of his exposition of the law if he
deems it appropriate in the circumstances of the particular
case”;
And it is also further Ordered, That there be no order as to the
Costs of the said Appeal.
Cler: Parliamentor:
Judgment: 30 June 1994
HOUSE OF LORDS
REGINA
v.
ADOMAKO
(APPELLANT)
(ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL
(CRIMINAL DIVISION))
The Lord Chancellor
Lord Keith of Kinkel
Lord Goff of Chieveley
Lord Browne -Wilkinson
Lord Woolf
LORD MACKAY OF CLASHFERN L.C.
My Lords,
This is an appeal brought with the leave of your Lordships’
House granted on 23 November 1993 from an Order of Her Majesty’s Court
of Appeal, Criminal Division (Lord Taylor of Gosforth C.J., Henry, and
Blofeld J.J.) whereby the appellant’s appeal against conviction for
manslaughter was dismissed.
The conviction arose out of the conduct of an eye operation carried out
at the Mayday Hospital, Croydon on 4 January 1987. The appellant was.
during the latter part of that operation, the anaesthetist in charge of the
patient.
The operation was carried out by two surgeons supported by a team of
five nurses and a theatre sister. Anaesthesia commenced at about 9.45 a.m.
The patient was paralysed by injection of a drug and an endotracheal tube was
inserted to enable the patient to breathe by mechanical means. At the start of
the operation the anaesthetist was Dr. Said, a registrar. An operating
department assistant was also present to help him. At about 10.30 a.m. there
was a changeover of anaesthetists. The appellant was called to attend and take
Dr. Said’s place following which both Dr. Said and his assistant departed to
deal with another operation elsewhere in the hospital. Another assistant was
called to attend but did not arrive until later.
At approximately 11.05 a.m. a disconnection occurred at the
endotracheal tube connection. The supply of oxygen to the patient ceased and
this led to cardiac arrest at 11.14 a.m. During this period the appellant failed
to notice or remedy the disconnection.
– 1 –
The appellant first became aware that something was amiss when an
alarm sounded on the Dinamap machine, which monitors the patient’s blood
pressure. From the evidence it appears that some 4½ minutes would have
elapsed between the disconnection and the sounding of this alarm. When this
alarm sounded the appellant responded in various ways by checking the
equipment and by administering atropine to raise the patient’s pulse. But at
no stage before the cardiac arrest did he check the integrity of the
endotracheal tube connection. The disconnection itself was not discovered
until after resuscitation measures had been commenced.
For the prosecution it was alleged that the appellant was guilty of gross
negligence in failing to notice or respond appropriately to obvious signs that
a disconnection had occurred and that the patient had ceased to breathe. In
particular the prosecution alleged that the appellant had failed to notice at
various stages during the period after disconnection and before the arrest
either occurred or became inevitable that the patient’s chest was not moving,
the dials on the mechanical ventilating machine were not operating, the
disconnection in the endotracheal rube, that the alarm on the ventilator was not
switched on and that the patient was becoming progressively blue. Further the
prosecution alleged that the appellant had noticed but failed to understand the
correct significance of the fact that during this period the patient’s pulse had
dropped and the patient’s blood pressure had dropped.
Two expert witnesses gave evidence for the prosecution. Professor
Payne described the standard of care as “abysmal” while Professor Adams
stated that in his view a competent anaesthetist should have recognised the
signs of disconnection within 15 seconds and that the appellant’s conduct
amounted to “a gross dereliction of care”.
On behalf of the appellant it was conceded at his trial that he had been
negligent. The issue was therefore whether his conduct was criminal.
The expert witness called on behalf of the appellant at his trial was Dr.
Monks. His evidence conceded that the appellant ought to have noticed the
disconnection. But in his view there were factors which mitigated this failure.
He considered that another independent problem either occurred or could have
occurred before or at the same time as the disconnection which distracted the
appellant’s attention and activities. This problem would in his view have
caused the patient’s blood pressure to drop and may either have been a
reaction to the drug being used to paralyse the patient or alternatively may
have been caused by an ocular cardiac reflex.
The appellant himself said in evidence that when the alarm sounded on
the Dinamap machine his first thought was that the machine itself was not
working properly. Having carried out checks on the machine he then thought
that the patient had suffered an ocular cardiac reflex for which he
administered atropine in two successive doses. Further attempts to administer
atropine by intravenous drip and to check the patient’s blood pressure
– 2 –
followed until the cardiac arrest occurred. It had never occurred to him that
a disconnection had taken place. He stated in evidence that ”after things went
wrong I think I did panic a bit”.
In relation to the appellant’s actions during this period Professor Payne
had conceded during cross examination that “given that Dr. Adomako misled
himself the efforts he made were not unreasonable”. The period to which this
evidence referred was obviously the period after the alarm had sounded on the
Dinamap machine which was as I have said apparently some 4½ minutes after
the disconnection occurred.
The jury convicted the appellant of manslaughter by a majority of 11
to 1. The Court of Appeal Criminal Division dismissed the appellant’s appeal
against conviction but certified that a point of law of general public
importance was involved in the decision to dismiss the appeal, namely:
“In cases of manslaughter by criminal negligence not involving driving
but involving a breach of duty is it a sufficient direction to the jury to
adopt the gross negligence test set out by the Court of Appeal in the
present case following Rex. v. Bateman (1925) 19 Cr. App. R. 8 and
Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1937] AC 576, without
reference to the test of recklessness as defined in Reg. v. Lawrence
(Stephen) [1982] A.C. 510 or as adapted to the circumstances of the
case?”
The decision of the Court of Appeal is reported at [1994] Q.B. 302
along with a number of other cases involving similar questions of law. The
Court of Appeal held that except in cases of motor manslaughter the
ingredients which had to be proved to establish an offence of involuntary
manslaughter by breach of duty were the existence of the duty, a breach of the
duty which had caused death and gross negligence which the jury considered
to justify a criminal conviction; the jury might properly find gross negligence
on proof of indifference to an obvious risk of injury to health or of actual
foresight of the risk coupled either with a determination nevertheless to run
it or with an intention to avoid it but involving such a high degree of
negligence in the attempted avoidance as the jury considered justified
conviction or of inattention or failure to advert to a serious risk going beyond
mere inadvertence in respect of an obvious and important matter which the
defendant’s duty demanded he should address; and that, in the circumstances,
the appeals of the two junior doctors and the electrician would be allowed and
the appeal of the anaesthetist, namely Dr. Adomako, would be dismissed.
The reason that the Court of Appeal excepted the cases of motor manslaughter
and their formulation of the law was the decision of this House in Reg. v.
Seymour (Edward) [1983] 2 A.C. 493 in which it was held that where
manslaughter was charged and the circumstances were that the victim was
killed as a result of the reckless driving of the defendant on a public highway,
the trial judge should give the jury the direction which had been suggested in
Reg. v. Lawrence (Stephen) [1982] A.C. 510 but that it was appropriate also
– 3 –
to point out that in order to constitute the offence of manslaughter the risk of
death being caused by the manner of the defendant’s driving must be very
high.
In opening his very cogent argument for the appellant before your
Lordships, counsel submitted that the law in this area should have the
characteristics of clarity, certainty, intellectual coherence and general
applicability and acceptability. For these reasons he said the law applying to
involuntary manslaughter generally should involve a universal test and that test
should be the test already applied in this House to motor manslaughter. He
criticised the concept of gross negligence which was the basis of the judgment
of the Court of Appeal submitting that its formulation involved circularity, the
jury being told in effect to convict of a crime if they thought a crime had been
committed and that accordingly using gross negligence as the conceptual basis
for the crime of involuntary manslaughter was unsatisfactory and the court
should apply the law laid down in Seymour [1983] 2 A.C. 493 generally to all
cases of involuntary manslaughter or at least use this as the basis for providing
general applicability and acceptability.
Like the Court of Appeal your Lordships were treated to a considerable
review of authority. I begin with Rex. v. Bateman 19 Cr. App. R. 8 and the
opinion of Lord Hewart C.J., where he said, at pp. 10-11:
“In expounding the law to juries on the trial of indictments for
manslaughter by negligence, judges have often referred to the
distinction between civil and criminal liability for death by negligence.
The law of criminal liability for negligence is conveniently explained
in that way. If A has caused the death of B by alleged negligence,
then, in order to establish civil liability, the plaintiff must prove (in
addition to pecuniary loss caused by the death) that A owed a duty to
B to take care, that that duty was not discharged, and that the default
caused the death of B. To convict A of manslaughter, the prosecution
must prove the three things above mentioned and must satisfy the jury,
in addition, that A’s negligence amounted to a crime. In the civil
action, if it is proved that A fell short of the standard of reasonable
care required by law, it matters not how far he fell short of that
standard. The extent of his liability depends not on the degree of
negligence but on the amount of damage done. In a criminal court, on
the contrary, the amount and degree of negligence are the determining
question. There must be mens rea.”
Later he said, at pp 11-12:
“In explaining to juries the test which they should apply to determine
whether negligence, in the particular case, amounted or did not amount
to a crime, judges have used many epithets such as ‘culpable’,
‘criminal’, ‘gross’, ‘wicked’, ‘clear’, ‘complete’. But whatever epithet
be used and whether an epithet be used or not, in order to establish
– 4 –
criminal liability the facts must be such that, in the opinion of the jury,
the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of
compensation between subjects and showed such disregard for the life
and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and
conduct deserving punishment.”
After dealing with a number of authorities the Lord Chief Justice went on,
at pp. 12-13:
“The law as laid down in these cases may be thus summarised: if a
person holds himself out as possessing special skill and knowledge and
he is consulted, as possessing such skill and knowledge, by or on
behalf of a patient, he owes a duty to the patient to use due caution in
undertaking the treatment. If he accepts the responsibility and
undertakes the treatment and the patient submits to his direction and
treatment accordingly, he owes a duty to the patient to use diligence,
care, knowledge, skill and caution in administering the treatment. No
contractual relation is necessary, nor is it necessary that the service be
rendered for reward. It is for the judge to direct the jury what
standard to apply and for the jury to say whether that standard has
been reached. The jury should not exact the highest, or a very high,
standard, nor should they be content with a very low standard. The
law requires a fair and reasonable standard of care and competence.
This standard must be reached in all the matters above mentioned. If
the patient’s death has been caused by the defendant’s indolence or
carelessness, it will not avail to show that he had sufficient knowledge;
nor will it avail to prove that he was diligent in attendance, if the
patient has been killed by his gross ignorance and unskilfulness. No
further observation need be made with regard to cases where the death
is alleged to have been caused by indolence or carelessness. As
regards cases where incompetence is alleged, it is only necessary to
say that the unqualified practitioner cannot claim to be measured by
any lower standard than that which is applied to a qualified man. As
regards cases of alleged recklessness, juries are likely to distinguish
between the qualified and the unqualified man. There may be
recklessness in undertaking the treatment and recklessness in the
conduct of it. It is, no doubt, conceivable that a qualified man may be
held liable for recklessly undertaking a case which he knew, or should
have known, to be beyond his powers, or for making his patient the
subject of reckless experiment. Such cases are likely to be rare. In
the case of the quack, where the treatment has been proved to be
incompetent and to have caused the patient’s death, juries are not
likely to hesitate in finding liability on the ground that the defendant
undertook, and continued to treat, a case involving the gravest risk to
his patient, when he knew he was not competent to deal with it, or
would have known if he had paid any proper regard to the life and
safety of his patient.
– 5 –
“The foregoing observations deal with civil liability. To support an
indictment for manslaughter the prosecution must prove the matters
necessary to establish civil liability (except pecuniary loss), and, in
addition, must satisfy the jury that the negligence or incompetence of
the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation and showed
such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime
against the State and conduct deserving punishment.”
Next I turn to Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1937] A.C.
576 which was a case of manslaughter through the dangerous driving of a
motor car. In a speech with which all the other members of this House who
sat agreed, Lord Atkin said, at pp. 581-582:
“Of all crimes manslaughter appears to afford most difficulties of
definition, for it concerns homicide in so many and so varying
conditions. From the early days when any homicide involved penalty
the law has gradually evolved ‘through successive differentiations and
integrations’ until it recognizes murder on the one hand, based mainly,
though not exclusively, on an intention to kill, and manslaughter on the
other hand, based mainly, though not exclusively, on the absence of
intention to kill but with the presence of an element of ‘unlawfulness’
which is the elusive factor. In the present case it is only necessary to
consider manslaughter from the point of view of an unintentional
killing caused by negligence, that is, the omission of a duty to take
care. I do not propose to discuss the development of this branch of
the subject as treated in the successive treatises of Coke, Hale, Foster
and East and in the judgments of the courts to be found either in
directions to juries by individual judges or in the more considered
pronouncements of the body of judges which preceded the formal
Court of Crown Cases Reserved. Expressions will be found which
indicate that to cause death by any lack of due care will amount to
manslaughter; but as manners softened and the law became more
humane a narrower criterion appeared. After all, manslaughter is a
felony, and was capital, and men shrank from attaching the serious
consequences of a conviction for felony to results produced by mere
inadvertence. The stricter view became apparent in prosecutions of
medical men or men who professed medical or surgical skill for
manslaughter by reason of negligence. As an instance I will cite Rex.
v. Williamson (1807) 3 C. & P. 635 where a man who practised as an
accoucheur, owing to a mistake in his observation of the actual
symptoms, inflicted on a patient terrible injuries from which she died.
‘To substantiate that charge’ namely, manslaughter Lord
Ellenborough said, ‘the prisoner must have been guilty of criminal
misconduct, arising either from the grossest ignorance or the most
criminal inattention.’ The word ‘criminal’ in any attempt to define a
crime is perhaps not the most helpful: but it is plain that the Lord
Chief Justice meant to indicate to the jury a high degree of negligence.
So at a much later date in Rex. v. Bateman 19 Cr. App. R. 8 a charge
-6-
of manslaughter was made against a qualified medical practitioner in
similar circumstances to those of Williamson’s case.”
Lord Atkin then refers to the judgment of Lord Hewart C.J. from
which I have already quoted and goes on, at p. 583:
“Here again I think with respect that the expressions used are not,
indeed they were probably not intended to be, a precise definition of
the crime. I do not myself find the connotations of mens rea helpful
in distinguishing between degrees of negligence, nor do the ideas of
crime and punishment in themselves carry a jury much further in
deciding whether in a particular case the degree of negligence shown
is a crime and deserves punishment. But the substance of the
judgment is most valuable, and in my opinion is correct. In practice
it has generally been adopted by judges in charging juries in all cases
of manslaughter by negligence, whether in driving vehicles or
otherwise. The principle to be observed is that cases of manslaughter
in driving motor cars are but instances of a general rule applicable to
all charges of homicide by negligence. Simple lack of care such as
will constitute civil liability is not enough: for purposes of the
criminal law there are degrees of negligence: and a very high degree
of negligence is required to be proved before the felony is established.
Probably of all the epithets that can be applied ‘reckless’ most nearly
covers the case. It is difficult to visualise a case of death caused by
reckless driving in the connotation of that term in ordinary speech
which would not justify a conviction for manslaughter: but it is
probably not all-embracing, for ‘reckless’ suggests an indifference to
risk whereas the accused may have appreciated the risk and intended
to avoid it and yet shown such a high degree of negligence in the
means adopted to avoid the risk as would justify a conviction. If the
principle of Bateman’s case 19 Cr. App. R. 8 is observed it will
appear that the law of manslaughter has not changed by the
introduction of motor vehicles on the road. Death caused by their
negligent driving, though unhappily much more frequent, is to be
treated in law as death caused by any other form of negligence: and
juries should be directed accordingly.”
In my opinion the law as stated in these two authorities is satisfactory
as providing a proper basis for describing the crime of involuntary
manslaughter. Since the decision in Andrews was a decision of your
Lordships’ House, it remains the most authoritative statement of the present
law which I have been able to find and although its relationship to Reg. v.
Seymour (Edward) [1983] 2 A.C. 493 is a matter to which I shall have to
return, it is a decision which has not been departed from. On this basis in my
opinion the ordinary principles of the law of negligence apply to ascertain
whether or not the defendant has been in breach of a duty of care towards the
victim who has died. If such breach of duty is established the next question
is whether that breach of duty caused the death of the victim. If so, the jury
– 7 –
must go on to consider whether that breach of duty should be characterised as
gross negligence and therefore as a crime. This will depend on the
seriousness of the breach of duty committed by the defendant in all the
circumstances in which the defendant was placed when it occurred. The jury
will have to consider whether the extent to which the defendant’s conduct
departed from the proper standard of care incumbent upon him, involving as
it must have done a risk of death to the patient, was such that it should be
judged criminal.
It is true that to a certain extent this involves an element of circularity,
but in this branch of the law I do not believe that is fatal to its being correct
as a test of how far conduct must depart from accepted standards to be
characterised as criminal. This is necessarily a question of degree and an
attempt to specify that degree more closely is I think likely to achieve only a
spurious precision. The essence of the matter which is supremely a jury
question is whether having regard to the risk of death involved, the conduct
of the defendant was so bad in all the circumstances as to amount in their
judgment to a criminal act or omission.
My Lords the view which I have stated of the correct basis in law for
the crime of involuntary manslaughter accords I consider with the criteria
stated by counsel although I have not reached the degree of precision in
definition which he required, but in my opinion it has been reached so far as
practicable and with a result which leaves the matter properly stated for a
jury’s determination.
My Lords in my view the law as stated in Reg. v. Seymour (Edward)
[1983] 2 A.C. 493 should no longer apply since the underlying statutory
provisions on which it rested have now been repealed by the Road Traffic Act
1991. It may be that cases of involuntary motor manslaughter will as a result
become rare but I consider it unsatisfactory that there should be any exception
to the generality of the statement which I have made, since such exception, in
my view, gives rise to unnecessary complexity. For example in Kong Cheuk
Kwan v The Queen (1985) 82 Cr. App. R. 18 it would give rise to
unnecessary differences between the law applicable to those navigating vessels
and the lookouts on the vessels.
I consider it perfectly appropriate that the word “reckless” should be
used in cases of involuntary manslaughter, but as Lord Atkin put it “in the
ordinary connotation of that word”. Examples in which this was done, to my
mind, with complete accuracy are Reg. v. Stone [1977] Q.B. 354 and Reg. v.
West London Coroner, Ex parte Gray [1988] Q.B. 467.
In my opinion it is quite unnecessary in the context of gross negligence
to give the detailed directions with regard to the meaning of the word
“reckless” associated with Reg. v. Lawrence (Stephen) [1982] A.C. 510. The
decision of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division in the other cases with
which they were concerned at the same time as they heard the appeal in this
– 8 –
case indicates that the circumstances in which involuntary manslaughter has
to be considered may make the somewhat elaborate and rather rigid directions
inappropriate. I entirely agree with the view that the circumstances to which
a charge of involuntary manslaughter may apply are so various that it is
unwise to attempt to categorise or detail specimen directions. For my part I
would not wish to go beyond the description of the basis in law which I have
already given.
In my view the summing up of the learned judge in the present case
was a model of clarity in analysis of the facts and in setting out the law in a
manner which was readily comprehensible by the jury. The summing up was
criticised in respect of the inclusion of the following passage:
“Of course you will understand it is not for every humble man of the
profession to have all that great skill of the great men in Harley Street
but, on the other hand, they are not allowed to practice medicine in
this country unless they have acquired a certain amount of skill. They
are bound to show a reasonable amount of skill according to the
circumstances of the case, and you have to judge them on the basis
that they are skilled men, but not necessarily so skilled as more skilful
men in the profession, and you can only convict them criminally if. in
your judgment, they fall below the standard of skill which is the least
qualification which any doctor should have. You should only convict
a doctor of causing a death by negligence if you think he did
something which no reasonably skilled doctor should have done.”
The criticism was particularly of the latter part of this quotation in that
it was open to the meaning that if the defendant did what no reasonably skilled
doctor should have done it was open to the jury to convict him of causing
death by negligence. Strictly speaking this passage is concerned with the
statement of a necessary condition for a conviction by preventing a conviction
unless that condition is satisfied. It is incorrect to treat it as stating a
sufficient condition for conviction. In any event I consider that this passage
in the context was making the point forcefully that the defendant in this case
was not to be judged by the standard of more skilled doctors but by the
standard of a reasonably competent doctor. There were many other passages
in the summing up which emphasised the need for a high degree of negligence
if the jury were to convict and read in that context I consider that the
summing up cannot be faulted.
For these reasons I am of the opinion that this appeal should be
dismissed and that the certified question should be answered by saying:
“In cases of manslaughter by criminal negligence involving a breach
of duty, it is a sufficient direction to the jury to adopt the gross
negligence test set out by the Court of Appeal in the present case
following Rex. v. Bateman 19 Cr. App. R. 8 and Andrews v. Director
of Public Prosecutions [1937] AC 576 and that it is not necessary to
– 9 –
refer to the definition of recklessness in Reg. v. Lawrence [1982] A.C.
510, although it is perfectly open to the trial judge to use the word
“reckless” in its ordinary meaning as part of his exposition of the law
if he deems it appropriate in the circumstances of the particular case.”
We have been referred to the Consultation Paper by the Law
Commission No. 135. Criminal Law. Involuntary Manslaughter An Overview
(1994), and we have also been referred to a number of standard text books.
I have also had the opportunity of considering the Note by Sir John Smith.
[1994] Crim. L.R.. p. 292 since the hearing was completed. While I have not
referred to these in detail I have derived considerable help in seeking to
formulate my view as a result of studying them.
I have reached the same conclusion on the basic law to be applied in
this case as did the Court of Appeal. Personally I would not wish to state the
law more elaborately than I have done. In particular I think it is difficult to
take expressions used in particular cases out of the context of the cases in
which they were used and enunciate them as if applying generally. This can
I think lead to ambiguity and perhaps unnecessary complexity. The task of
trial judges in setting out for the jury the issues of fact and the relevant law
in cases of this class is a difficult and demanding one. I believe that the
supreme test that should be satisfied in such directions is that they are
comprehensible to an ordinary member of the public who is called to sit on
a jury and who has no particular prior acquaintance with the law. To make
it obligatory on trial judges to give directions in law which are so elaborate
that the ordinary member of the jury will have great difficulty in following
them, and even greater difficulty in retaining them in his memory for the
purpose of application in the jury room, is no service to the cause of justice.
The experienced counsel who assisted your Lordships in this appeal indicated
that as a practical matter there was a danger in over elaboration of definition
of the word “reckless”. While therefore I have said in my view it is perfectly
open to a trial judge to use the word “reckless” if it appears appropriate in the
circumstances of a particular case as indicating the extent to which a
defendant’s conduct must deviate from that of a proper standard of care, I do
not think it right to require that this should be done and certainly not right that
it should incorporate the full detail required in the case of Lawrence.
LORD KEITH OF KINKEL
My Lords,
For the reasons given in the speech of my noble and learned friend the
Lord Chancellor, which I have read in draft and with which I agree, I too
would dismiss the appeal and answer the certified question as he has proposed.
– 10 –
LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY
My Lords,
For the reasons given in the speech of my noble and learned friend the
Lord Chancellor, which I have read in draft and with which I agree, I too
would dismiss the appeal and answer the certified question as he has proposed.
LORD BROWNE-WILKINSON
My Lords,
For the reasons given in the speech of my noble and learned friend the
Lord Chancellor, which I have read in draft and with which I agree. I too
would dismiss the appeal and answer the certified question as he has proposed.
LORD WOOLF
My Lords,
I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech of my noble
and learned friend the Lord Chancellor, and with which I agree, I too would
dismiss the appeal and answer the certified question as he has proposed.
– 11 –
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