PRINCEWILL EYO ASUQUO & ORS. v. MRS. GRACE GODFREY EYO & ANOR (2013)

PRINCEWILL EYO ASUQUO & ORS. v. MRS. GRACE GODFREY EYO & ANOR

(2013)LCN/5921(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Thursday, the 14th day of February, 2013

CA/C/102/2010

RATIO

POSITION OF THE LAW ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

Admissibility of evidence is governed by Section 6 of the Evidence Act. Once a piece of evidence is relevant, it is admissible in evidence, irrespective of how it was obtained. Fawehinmi vs. NBA (No.2) (1989) 2 NWLR Pt.105 page 558; B.O.N. vs. Soleh (1999) 9 NWLR Pt.618 page 331, Anoxe v. Obichere (2006) 3 NWLR Pt.981 Page 145, FBN Plc v. Jibo (2006) 9 NWLR Pt.985 Page 261. However, there are exceptions where by law, certain documents are rendered inadmissible for failure to satisfy some conditions or to meet certain criteria would among others include (a) unregistered instrument required by law to be registered (b) unsigned deed of grant or copy thereof (c) unstamped instrument or document requiring to be stamped unless it may legally be stamped after execution and the duties and penalties are paid. Ezomo vs. NNB Plc (2007) All FWLR Pt.368 page 1032. Per. UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.

ADMISSIBILITY OF AN UNREGISTERED REGISTRABLE INSTRUMENT

EVIDENCE: CONDITIONS WHICH QUALIFY ANY DOCUMENT FOR TENDERING AND ADMISSION AS EXHIBIT.

JUSTICES

UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

JOSEPH TINE TUR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ONYEKACHI A. OTISI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

1. PRINCEWILL EYO ASUQUO
2. EDEM EYO ASUQUO
3. EKONG EYO ASUQUO
4. EFFIONG EYO ASUQUO
5. MICHAEL EYO ASUQUO Appellant(s)

AND

1. MRS. GRACE GODFREY EYO
2. UTIBE GODFREY EYO
(Administratrix and Administrator of the Estate of Late Godfrey Eyo) Respondent(s)

UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This an Appeal against the Ruling of the High Court of Akwa Ibom State sitting at Uyo delivered on the 24th day of February, 2009.
The Respondents as Plaintiff sued the Appellants/Defendants in the Court below and claimed as follows:
“(a) An order of possession of the bungalow building of late Godfrey Eyo in Afaha Etok Ibesikpo in Ibesikpo Asutan Local Government Area covered by survey plan No.UUCR/1110/78 of 5th March, 1978 and building plan No.UYAPA/B:352/79.
(b) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants, their agent, privies and persons acting through them or on their instructions from interfering in any manner however or disturbing the Plaintiffs’ possession of the bungalow building of late Godfrey Eyo at Afaha Etok Ibesikpo hereinbefore described.
(c) N1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira) damages.”
The Respondents were forcefully removed from the bungalow which they claimed was built by their husband/father of the 1st & 2nd Respondents respectively. The deceased had bought the land, surveyed it, registered his building plan and built a bungalow. The deceased lived therein with his immediate family and his parents until his death. Soon after his death, his family was forcefully removed by the Defendant/Appellants.
It was on this premise that this action was brought to reclaim the bungalow. The Respondents called one witness, tendered documents and closed their case. The Appellants opened their case, called their first witness and applied to tender receipts of purchase of the land, the subject matter of this case. It is the objection by the Respondents’ Counsel to the tendering of receipts of purchase of various plots of land that gave rise to this appeal.
The Appellants being dissatisfied with the ruling filed their Notice and two Grounds of Appeal on the 4th March, 2009. The Appellants brief was filed on 12th October, 2011 but deemed properly filed and served on 3rd October, 2012.
The Appellants articulated two issues for determination as follows:
“1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding that the documents elegantly pleaded as receipts of the transaction between their Vendors and Purchasers as expressed thereon and sought to be tendered as such can be rejected simply because the said documents were not headed “RECEIPT”.
2. Whether the learned trial Judge rightly distinguished the case of ABU VS. KUYAGANA (2001) 4 WRN 113 from the present case to warrant the ruling on the objection of the Respondents on record.”
I shall be using the issues as articulated by the Appellants in the determination of this appeal. However, I will deal with the two issues together.
Learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that the learned trial Judge erred in law when she rejected the documents sought to be tendered by PW1 on the ground that the documents were not stamped and stamp duty paid on them.
In rejecting the documents, the trial Judge held
“the mere fact that the documents were pleaded as Receipts implies that they are relevant.”
Counsel contended that having pleaded these documents, they should be admitted in evidence. The trial Judge rejected these documents and marked them as such, stating that, the documents were not “Receipts properly so called”.
Counsel submitted that a document pleaded and sought to be tendered as receipts cannot be rejected because stamp duty has not been paid on them. The purpose of stamp duty is to get revenue for the government and does not affect admissibility. See the case of Okuwobi vs. Jimoh Ishola (1973) All NLR page 233. The Supreme Court held in this case admitting the documents rejected by the lower Court because stamp duty was not paid. However the Supreme Court ordered that stamp duty be paid whilst receiving the documents in evidence.
Counsel argued that the documents pleaded as receipt was just to show evidence of the transaction between the parties. The documents were not pleaded as registrable documents that would call for registration before tendering. The documents having passed the admissibility test ought not to be rejected. The learned trial Judge also held that:
“The documents even though in their original form cannot be regarded as receipts in the absence of stamp as condition precedent.”
Counsel submitted that the Appellants need not affix postal stamp on a document pleaded and sought to be tendered as a receipt to qualify as a receipt.
Counsel submitted further that the reasoning of the trial Judge was not the position of the law. The law does not require that a stamp must be affixed on a receipt for it to be admissible in law. There is also no law that states that for a document to be tendered as a receipt, ‘Receipt’ must be written on it.
Counsel submitted finally that the trial Judge was in error for the following reasons:
“(a) The documents were pleaded and were meant to show that there was a transaction between parties express thereon.
(b) Proper foundation was laid to the tendering of the documents which foundation was not faulted in anyway.
(c) The documents were not expected to come with stamp, and/or with inscription “receipt” to be admissible in evidence.
(d) The whole idea of stamp duties is to attract revenue to government and not otherwise.”
Counsel therefore urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellants and admit the documents rejected by the trial Judge.
In response, the learned Counsel to the Respondents submitted that the learned trial Judge was right in rejecting the unstamped documents, which DW1 Princewill Eyo Asuguo sought to tender to prove ownership of the disputed land. Counsel argued that there are three main criteria governing admissibility of a document in evidence viz:
“(a) Is the document pleaded?
(b) Is it relevant to the inquiry being tried by the Court? And
(c) Is it admissible in law?”
Okonji vs. Njokanma (1999) 14 NWLR Pt.638 page 250.
Counsel argued further, that the defence pleaded purchase receipts of various plots issued to late Chief Eyo Asuquo on purchase of land now in dispute. Counsel submitted that the document cannot be admitted as they do not comply with the provisions of the Stamp Duty Act and no penalty was paid as required by law. The Appellants in their defence also never pleaded when the land was purchased and the receipt bears no such date and this has no place in trial.
The Appellants never pleaded that the land transaction was a customary one in which no receipt is needed.
Counsel submitted that as the said Chief Eyo Asuquo bought the land under the statute, the instrument of purchase should comply or meet the requirements for its admissibility. Counsel therefore urged the Court to uphold the ruling of the trial Judge and reject these documents sought to be admitted.
Admissibility of evidence is governed by Section 6 of the Evidence Act. Once a piece of evidence is relevant, it is admissible in evidence, irrespective of how it was obtained. Fawehinmi vs. NBA (No.2) (1989) 2 NWLR Pt.105 page 558; B.O.N. vs. Soleh (1999) 9 NWLR Pt.618 page 331, Anoxe v. Obichere (2006) 3 NWLR Pt.981 Page 145, FBN Plc v. Jibo (2006) 9 NWLR Pt.985 Page 261.
However, there are exceptions where by law, certain documents are rendered inadmissible for failure to satisfy some conditions or to meet certain criteria would among others include (a) unregistered instrument required by law to be registered (b) unsigned deed of grant or copy thereof (c) unstamped instrument or document requiring to be stamped unless it may legally be stamped after execution and the duties and penalties are paid. Ezomo vs. NNB Plc (2007) All FWLR Pt.368 page 1032.

An unregistered registrable instrument is admissible as evidence of payment of purchase price. However, it is not admissible in evidence to prove or establish title, as it is not a valid document capable of transferring any title on estate. Such an instrument, coupled with the purchaser being in possession may give rise to an equitable interest. Okoye vs. Dumez Nig. Ltd. (1985) 1 NWLR Pt.4 page 783: Qbifuru vs. Ozimus (1985) 2 NWLR Pt.6 page 162; Tewogbade vs. Obadina (1994) 4 NWLR Pt.338 page 326: Alaya vs. Akinduro (1998) 4 NWLR Pt.545 page 311: Adeyemo v. Ida (1998) 4 NWLR Pt.546 page 504.
I will first of all go back to the evidence of Dw1 which I will repeat here for clarity:
“DW1: I told the Court that my father bought the disputed land from 3 different people and that there are receipts. These are receipts.
Asuquo: We seek to tender the receipts as exhibit.
Inyang: I am objecting to the tendering of the documents. They are not receipts but headed agreement for sale of land. Being an agreement for sale it should be registered and stamped. I urge the Court to reject the document.
Asuquo replies: The documents sought to be tendered are pleaded in paragraph 5 of the Statement of Defence. It is clearly stated that the document will be relied upon to establish the transaction between Defendants’ father and those he had transaction with. The document is therefore relevant. The law is where a document is tendered as a receipt or establishing a transaction such document is not registrable. See Abu vs. Kuyabana (2001) 44 WRN 118 held at 117-118.
Inyang rejoins: My learned friend has not stated why the documents were not stamped as receipts.”
The Appellants in their Statement of Defence paragraph 5 pleaded thus:
“Further to the fact in Paragraph 4 of the Statement of Defence and in further answer to paragraph 4 of the Statement of Claim, the Defendants state that the property lying and situate at Afoho Etok Ibesikpo is a family compound (property). Same was built by late Chief Eyo Asuquo, who was also the father of the deceased. Late Chief Eyo Asuquo was a prominent merchant and businessman from Afoho Etok Ibesikpo. He built the house the subject matter of this suit in 1972 and lived therein with his wives and children. Late Chief Eyo Asuquo acquired the land upon which he built the house the subject matter of this suit from various persons. The house the subject matter of this suit is situate on five (5) plots of land bought from three people as follows:
(a) James Akpan Una       –    2 plots
(b) Okon Usango       –    2 plots
(c) Effiong Etim Udobong    –    1 plot
The Defendants shall tender receipt of purchase of the various plots as issued to late Chief Eyo Asuquo on purchase, this, to establish the existence of such transaction.”
The Appellants indeed pleaded the documents sought to be tendered. In their pleading, the Appellants stated
“The defendants shall tender receipts of purchase of the various plots as issued to late Chief Eyo Asuquo on purchase, this, (sic) to establish the existence of such a transaction”.
Counsel referred the Court to the ratio in the case of Abu vs. Kuyagana (2001) 4 WRN page 113 where the Court held thus:
“It is my view with respect, that the admissibility or otherwise of an unregistered registrable instrument depends on the purpose for which it is being sought to be admitted. For example, if it is being tendered for the purpose of proving or establishing title to land and/or interest in land, it will apparently not be admissible under Section 15 of the Land Registry Act (supra). But if it is only to show that there was a transaction between the grantor and grantee it will be admissible. See page 118.
See also Okoye vs. Dumez (Nig) Ltd (1985) 1 NWLR pt.4 page 783 where the Supreme Court per Karibi Whyte JSC held as follows:
“It would therefore seem to me apposite and admissible in this action where documents, Exhibits ‘E’ and ‘F’ were tendered in an action against the Respondents were lawful on the land in dispute. It is admissible to show that Respondents were not trespassers to the land in dispute”.
See also Agwu Nedu vs. Onwu Meno (1994) 1 SCNJ page 106 where a customary sale of land was held admissible even though it was not registered. Mohommed JSC held as follows:
‘It is crystal clear from the wordings of Exhibit ‘C’ that it is evidence of sale of a piece of land and from the proceedings that the document had been tendered in evidence simply to establish a fact which the parties have pleaded. It is not and cannot be an instrument as defined in the lands instrument Registration Law. Even if it was an estate contract and consequently an instrument registrable for the purposes of the Lands Registration Law of Eastern Nigeria, since the purpose of producing it was only to establish evidence that the transaction between the respondent and Mbahaotu was for the redemption of pledge the document is admissible’.
See also Oluwaseun Agboola vs. UBA & 2 ors (2011) 11 NWLR pt.1258 page 375 and 406 where it was held that:
A deed of conveyance which though stamped, is not registered, is inadmissible as evidence of title. It is however admissible in proof of the transaction between the within named parties and evidence of payment of money’
The trial Judge in her ruling said this.

It is necessary here to restate the three conditions which qualify any document for tendering and admission as exhibit.
They are:
1. The document must be pleaded.
2. It must be relevant.
3. It must be admissible.
From the reply of defence Counsel, the documents sought to be tendered were pleaded in paragraph 5 of the Statement of Defence as receipts of purchase of land bought by the father of the Defendant from 3 different people. I have looked of the documents sought to be tendered as receipts and noted that they have no features of receipts namely stamps. So they cannot be tendered as receipts of purchase to establish the sale by 3 people to the Defendants’ father. The mere fact that the documents were pleaded as receipts implies that they are relevant, but they are not legally receipts properly so called. Relevancy has lost its value in this aspect since the documents are not receipts. The last issue is whether the document is admissible as it is. The immediate answer is no. As earlier said, the document even though in their original form cannot be regarded as receipts in the absence of stamps as condition precedent. In conclusion, it is only when the 3 conditions are present that a document can be qualified for tendering and admission. Any one of the 3 conditions missing disqualifies the document from being tendered. I have read the case cited by Counsel. It has clearly stated that the admissibility or otherwise of an unregistered registrable instrument depends on the purpose for which it is being sought to be admitted, i.e. if it is tendered for the purpose of proving or establishing title to land or interest in land it will apparently not be admissible under section 15 of the land registration Act. But if it only to show that there was a transaction between the grantor or the grantee it will be admissible. My comment on this case cited by defence Counsel is that the case cited does not apply in this case since the issue is not to show that there was a transaction between a grantor and a grantee. But simply to tender receipts of purchase. The documents are therefore rejected as receipts and should be so marked.
The Appellants had said it all they are not pleading or seeking to tender the documents as proof of title. They are only seeking to tender it as proof of a transaction.
If these documents are to show proof of the existence of a transaction, the Appellants cannot be foreclosed to tender their documents.
It should be noted that there is a clear distinction between admissibility of a document and the weight to be attached to it. A document may be admissible in law but when put through the crucible of evaluation and ascription of probative value thereto, it may be found to be a worthless document I.M.B (Nig) Ltd vs. Dabiri (1998) 1 NWLR pt 533 page 284, Buraimoh vs. Karimu (1999) 9 NWLR pt 618 page 310.
I believe the trial Judge misconstrued, the exception of “unstamped instrument or document requiring to be stamped”. A receipt does not fall under this exception. However an unstamped instrument may be admissible as evidence of a transaction but it will not suffice to be used as that instrument before it is stamped and penalties paid.
The documents rejected by the trial Judge were rejected in error. There are admissible in law. The weight to be attached to it would be determined as the case progresses to conclusion. This issue is resolved in favour of the Appellants.
The documents are to be received in evidence and marked as Exhibits. The Appeal is therefore allowed.
The learned Counsel to the Appellants had requested that this suit be transferred to another Court. Apart from the rejection of the documents, the parties here, have not accused the learned trial Judge of bias. The learned trial Judge should continue with the defence of this case till the trial is concluded. I make no orders as to costs.

JOSEPH TINE TUR, J.C.A.: I read an advance copy of the Judgment just delivered by my Lord, Uzo I. Ndukwe-Anyanwu, JCA and I do concur. I shall add a few words of mine.
In R.G. Okuwobi vs. Jimoh Ishola (1973) 1 All NLR (Pt.1) 291 the Plaintiff founded his cause of action on the recovery of the sum of 400 pounds “…in respect of money received by the Defendant from the Plaintiff between June and August, 1962 for a consideration which totally failed.” The claim was founded on a contract of sale of land by the Defendant to the Plaintiff the consideration of which had failed, hence the demand for the refund of the balance which was evidenced in two receipts. When the Plaintiff attempted to tender the receipts, one for 500 pounds and another for 100 pounds the learned trial Chief Magistrate rejected them as inadmissible. That covering the sum of 100 pounds was later however admitted in evidence. The learned trial Chief Magistrate dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim on the grounds that the receipt was inadmissible because inter alia, it was not stamped, and secondly, that the contract related to land yet there was no memorandum in writing as stipulated under Section 67 of the Property and Coveyancing Law, 1959 of the Western State of Nigeria. An appeal to the High Court of Lagos State was dismissed. The judgment of the Chief Magistrate was affirmed. On a further appeal to the Supreme Court it was found during argument that Section 67 of the property and Conveyancing Law, 1959 of Western State of Nigeria had ceased to apply in Lagos State. On the question of the non-stamping of the receipt, the Supreme Court held at page 295 as follows:
“Mr. Davis, learned Counsel for the Appellant, submitted that the learned appeal judge is wrong to have upheld the learned Chief Magistrate’s rejection of the document tendered at the trial on the ground of failure to have it duly stamped. We think that it was wrong of the learned Chief Magistrate to have held a document inadmissible merely on the ground of non-stamping, since the purpose of the requirement of stamping is to ensure that Government does not lose revenue thereby. The learned Chief Magistrate could have directed the document in question to be duly stamped and then receive it in evidence. Mr. Oluwa, learned Counsel for the Respondent merely attempted to defend the judgment appealed against for the same reasons as he had advanced in the Courts below.
For the various reasons we have given we think that the appeal succeeds and it is hereby allowed. We set aside the judgment of the High Court of Lagos State on appeal as well as the judgment of the Chief Magistrate, Ikeja, in Suit No.MIK/347/67 delivered on July 1, 1968, including the order as to costs. We remit the case back to the Chief Magistrate’s Court, Ikeja, for it to be re-tried in the light of this judgment. We assess cost in this appeal at N80 payable to the Appellant in this appeal.”
See also Olukade v. Alade (1976) 2 SC 183.
The law is that admissibility of oral or documentary evidence is usually governed by relevance. See Musa Sadar vs. The State (1968) 1 All NLR 124 at 129; Agunbiade vs. Sasegbon (1981) NMLR 223 at 226. In civil cases, relevance is determined by the pleading which set forth the purpose for tendering the document. See ACB Ltd. vs. Alhaji Gwagwada (1994) 4 SCNJ (Pt.2) 268 at 277.

Strictly speaking a document does not become evidence until admitted as an exhibit by the Court. Until that takes place the contents of documents should not be read out in Court or evaluated to determine the weight to attach to it when the only issue before the Court at that stage involves admissibility. See Queen vs. Mboho (1964) NMLR 49 at 52; Adegoke Motors Ltd. vs. Adesanya (1989) 5 SCNJ 80 at 88 and Ahmadu Tea vs. C.O.P. (1963) NNLR 77.

There is a wall of difference between admissibility of document and the weight to attach to the exhibit after it has been admitted. Once a matter, be it a document or oral evidence, is relevant to the pleadings it ought to be admissible. Thereafter the learned trial judge, in considering the evidence, will determine what weight to attach to it. See Torti vs. Ukpabi (1984) 1 SC 370 at 392-393; Nwobodo v. Onoh (1984) 1 SC 1; Isibor vs. The State (1970) 1 All NLR 248. At the stage of tendering evidence that is relevant the Court should not be concerned with how it was obtained unless the evidence, be it oral or documentary is excluded by any statutory provision. In Ishola vs. UBN Ltd. (2005) All FWLR (Pt.256) 1202 at 1213 paragraph “G” the Supreme Court held that:
“It is trite law that a Court should not and cannot make a case for the Parties different from what they set out in their pleadings. See Adebanjo vs. Brown (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt.14) 661 at 675. The Court can only use a document properly admitted before it for the purpose for which it was admitted. It is not open to the Court to use the document other than for the purpose intended by the parties as pleaded unless the attention of the Court is drawn by any of the parties before it to do so. And even in that case, the Court must invite all the parties before it to address it on the point before making a decision on it. This, in my view is the only legitimate use of the document admitted in evidence in Court.”
The relevant paragraph of the Statement of Defence is paragraph 5 which reads as follows:
“5. Further to the fact in paragraph 4 of the Statement of Defence and in further answer to paragraph 4 of the Statement of Claim, the Defendants state that the property lying and situate at Afaha Etok Ibesikpo is a family compound (property). Same was built by late Chief Eyo Asuquo, who was also the father of the deceased. Late Chief Eyo Asuquo was a prominent merchant and businessman from Afaha Etok Ibesikpo. He built the house, the subject matter of this suit in 1972 and lived therein with his wives and children. Late Chief Eyo Asuquo acquired the land upon which he built the house the subject matter of this suit from various persons. The house the subject matter of this suit is situate on five(5) plots of land bought from three people as follows:-
‘(a) James Akpan Una     –    2 plots
(b) Okon Usanga     –    2 plots
(c) Effiong Etim Udobong –    1 plot.’
The Defendants shall tender receipt of purchase of the various plots as issued to late Chief Eyo Asuquo on purchase, this, to establish the existence of such transaction.”
The whole of the pleadings should always be considered to determine what is the real issue in controversy. See Umesie vs. Onuaguluchi (1995) 12 SCNJ 120/131; Fadlallah vs. Arewa iles Ltd. (1997) 7 SCNJ 202 at 217. The question to be determined in this appeal is whether the document sought to be tendered in evidence in the Lower Court can come within the phrase, “…receipt of purchase of the various plots as issued to late Chief Eyo on purchase, this, to establish the existence of such transaction in the con of paragraph 5 of the Statement of Defence. If they do, they were material, relevant and admissible; if they did not, they were inadmissible.
An agreement is a mutual understanding between two or more persons, oral or documentary, about their relative rights and duties regarding past or future performances. It is a manifestation of mutual assent by two or more persons. An agreement is the parties’ actual bargain as found in their language or by implication, from circumstances, including the course of their dealings.

An agreement to sell land or buy land for instance is that which obligates the Vendor to sell and the purchaser to pay valuable consideration for its purchase. Such agreements often contain the purchase price, and other terms of the transaction. The receipt is evidence or acknowledgment that, for example in this case, the various Vendors actually received consideration from the purchaser. Therefore whether the documents sought to be tendered are titled agreements,” or ‘receipts,” they were tendered as “receipt of purchase of the various plots as issued to late Chief Eyo Asuquo… to establish the evidence of such transaction.” Indeed paragraph 6 of the Statement of Defence pleads that:
‘6. The Defendants state that on purchase of the five (5) plots mentioned in paragraph 5 above, late Eyo Asuquo built a mud and walled house thereon where he lived with members of his family, including the deceased…”
On the 24th day of February, 2009 Dw1 testified that:
“…I last testified in this case on 25th day of November, 2008. I told the court that my father bought the disputed land from 3 different people and that there are receipts. These are the receipts.”
The effect of these receipts in establishing paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Statement of Defence is what renders them relevant and admissible. Order 15 Rule 10 of Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2009 reads as follows:
’10. Wherever the content of any documents are material, it shall be sufficient in any pleading to state the effect thereof as briefly as possible, without setting out the whole or any part thereof, unless the precise words of the documents or any part thereof are material.”
I think the learned trial Judge erred in law and in fact to have held at page 63 lines 23 to page 64 lines 1-19 of the printed record as follows:
“From the reply of defence Counsel, the documents sought to be tendered were pleaded in paragraph 5 of the Statement of Defence as receipts of purchase of land bought by the father of the Defendant from 3 different people. I have looked at the documents sought to be tendered as receipts and noted that they have no features of receipts, namely, stamps. So they cannot be tendered as receipts of purchase to establish the sale by 3 people to the Defendants’ father. The mere fact that the documents were pleaded as receipts implies that they are relevant, but they are not legally receipts properly so called. Relevancy has lost its value in this aspect since the documents are not receipts. The last issue is whether the document is admissible as it is. The immediate answer is no. As earlier said the document even though in their original form cannot be regarded as receipts in the absence of stamps as condition precedent. In conclusion it is only when the 3 conditions are present that a document can be qualified for tendering and admission. Any one of the 3 conditions missing disqualifies the document from being tendered. I have read the case cited by Counsel. It has clearly stated that the admissibility or otherwise of an unregistered registrable instrument depends on the purpose for which it is being sought to be admitted, e.g. if it is tendered for the purpose of proving or establishing title to land or interest in land it will apparently not be admissible under Section 15 of the Land Registration Act. But if it is only to show that there was a transaction between the grantor or the grantee it will be admissible. My comment on this case cited by defence Counsel is that the case cited does not apply in this case since the issue is not to show that there was a transaction between a grantor and a grantee. But simply to tender receipts of purchase. The documents are therefore rejected as receipts and should be so marked.”
It is not stamping or not of receipts that renders them relevant. What renders them relevant is the fact that they have been pleaded to establish the fact that late Chief Eyo Asuquo purchased the five plots of land from the three named vendors in his lifetime and to establish the existence of such transactions.
For this and the fuller reasons given in the lead Judgment I also allow this appeal. I abide by the orders made in the lead Judgment by my Lord.

ONYEKACHI A. OTISI, J.C.A.: I have had the opportunity of reading in draft the Judgment just delivered by my learned Brother, Ndukwe-Anyanwu JCA. I am in complete agreement, and I have nothing further to add. I abide with the orders made in the lead Judgment.

Appearances

E. Akpanuwa Esq.For Appellant

AND

S. Eduok (Mrs) Esq.For Respondent