PRINCE NICHOLAS UKACHUKWU v. DR. OKEY J. CHIDOLUE & ORS
(2019)LCN/12671(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 7th day of February, 2019
CA/A/1175/2018
RATIO
JURISDICTION: THE ISSUE OF TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
“The issue of territorial jurisdiction of the trial Court can be raised at any time, even in the Supreme Court for the first time without leave. See SHELIM VS. GOBANG (2009) 12 NWLR PT. 1156 AT 460. In the instant case the primary election, the subject matter that led to the 1st Respondent’s action at the Trial Court was conducted in Anambra State. This is not contested. The action was instituted at the FCT High Court Abuja, which has no territorial jurisdiction over the action conducted in Anambra State by virtue of Section 255 of the CFRN 1999. See also the case of MAILANTARKI v. TONGO & ORS (SUPRA).” PER ABDU ABOKI, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
ABDU ABOKI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
STEPHEN JONAH ADAH Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
PETER OLABISI IGE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
PRINCE NICHOLAS UKACHUKWU – Appellant(s)
AND
1. DR. OKEY J. CHIDOLUE
2. ALL PROGRESSIVES GRAND ALLIANCE (APGA)
3. CHIEF VICTOR IKE OYE (NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, (APGA)
4. NORBERT OBI (ANAMBRA STATE CHAIRMAN (APGA)
5. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC) – Respondent(s)
ABDU ABOKI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
The appeal herein is against the Judgment of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja delivered on 13th December, 2018 by Hon. Justice V. B. Ashi J. in Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/3084/2018.
The summary of the facts of this case that led to this appeal was that, by the 1st Respondent, as Plaintiff at the Trial Court, filed an originating summons on the 19th day of October, 2018 asking for the determination of the questions as can be found at pages 1 – 3 of the Record of Appeal. Upon the favourable determination of these questions, the 1st Respondent also seeks the reliefs as can be found at pages 3 – 5 of the Record of Appeal.
The summons is supported by an affidavit of 40 paragraphs deposed to by the 1st Respondent himself, with ten (10) exhibits attached. The case of the 1st Respondent is that he was screened and cleared by the Appellant to participate in the 3rd October 2018 Anambra South Senatorial District Election, for the 2019 Senatorial Office. He contended that the Appellant was unlawfully returned as the winner thereto, and a Certificate of Return issued to him, despite the fact that a majority of the authentic delegates accredited for the election subsequently confirmed that they voted overwhelmingly for the 1st Respondent. His appeal to the Appeal Panel of the Appellant yielded no results; hence the initiation of the suit giving rise to this appeal at the Trial Court.
Upon being served with the originating summons, the defendants filed counter affidavits in defence. The Appellant and the 2nd – 4th Respondents filed separate Notices of Preliminary Objection to the jurisdiction of the Trial Court, praying the Trial Court in the main, to strike out the suit for being statute barred in that the action was filed out of the time limited by statute for filing pre-election cases and to entertain the suit, the cause of action of which arose in Anambra State. See pages 1507 – 1517, 1522 – 1542 of the Record.
The Trial Court consolidated the objections and in its judgment overruled the objections of the Appellant and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, and nullified the APGA Primary Election held on 3rd of October, 2018 at Ekwulobia Township Stadium, holding that the Primary Election was improperly conducted and in breach of Party Guidelines and the Electoral Act, 2010. At pages 1787 ? 1788 the Trial Court held as follows:
“It is therefore hereby ordered that the APGA, Anambra South Senatorial Primary Election held on the 3rd of October, 2018 at Ekwulobia Township Stadium, having been improperly conducted and in breach of the Party’s Guidelines and the Electoral Act, 2010, as amended, is hereby nullified. All subsequent actions taken by the 1st Defendant hereof are thereby declared null, void and of no effect whatsoever.”
It is against this decision that the Appellant herein has appealed to this Court, vide his Notice of Appeal dated and filed on the 21st of December, 2018. The said notice appeal which appears on pages 1794 ? 1814 of the printed record is upon Nineteen grounds.
The record of appeal was compiled and transmitted to this Court on the 24th of December 2018. The briefs of argument were subsequently filed and exchanged by the parties in accordance with the Rules of this Court. The Appellants’ brief of argument is dated and filed 27th December 2018, while the 1st Respondent’s Brief of Argument on the other hand, is dated the 19th of January, 2019, filed on the 21st of January 2019 but deemed properly filed and served on the 21st of January 2019. A Reply brief dated 22nd of January 2019 was also filed on behalf of the Appellant, on the same date.
On 24th of January, 2019, the appeal was heard before the Court. The Appellant’s Counsel adopted the Appellant’s brief of argument. He urged the Court to allow the appeal. The 1st Respondent’s Counsel on his part adopted the 1st Respondent’s brief of argument and urged the Court to dismiss the appeal for lacking in merit.
The Appellant from her 19 grounds of appeal distilled three issues for determination as follows:
1. Whether the Trial Court was not in a grave error which occasioned a miscarriage of justice when despite the vehement and compelling opposition, the Court assumed jurisdiction over the case and gave judgment against the Appellant.
2. Considering the clear facts of this case, whether the Trial Court was not wrong in nullifying the 2nd Respondent’s Primary Election of 2nd October, 2018 from which the Appellant emerged as the 2nd Respondent’s candidate for the Anambra South Senatorial District, Anambra State for the 2019 general election on the unfounded ground that same was not conducted in breach of the party’s Guidelines and Electoral Act, 2010, as amended.
3. Whether the Trial Court was right in its failure to consider and resolve issues properly raised, raising and considering issues not raised by the parties and failing to review and evaluate relevant and material evidence placed before it by the Appellant and whether the said Court was not wrong in suo motu raising and resolving allegations against the Appellant thereby abridging his constitutional right to Fair Hearing.
These three issues were adopted by learned counsel for the 1st Respondent.
The three issues formulated by the Appellant are hereby adopted by me in the determination of this appeal. They shall be determined together.
Learned counsel on both sides have proffered arguments with regards to the issues arising for determination. These arguments form part of the Records of this Court. I shall however for emphasis, highlight some salient points in their respective submissions.
It is submitted for the Appellant that the Trial Court was wrong to have assumed jurisdiction in that the case of the 1st Respondent was statute barred by reason of Section 285(9) of the 1999 Constitution.
Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant listed a plethora of authorities, at PAGE 5 of his brief, including the locus classicus case of MADUKOLU v. NKEMDILIM (1962) 1 ALL NLR 587, and submitted that where a Court lacks jurisdiction, the proceedings, no matter how well conducted, is a nullity.
He went further to posit that the 1st Respondent’s case is statute barred and therefore robbed the Trial Court of its jurisdiction in relation to the case. On what determines whether a case is statute barred, learned SAN called in aid the following cases:
TEXACO PANAMA INC. v. SDPC NIG LTD (2002) FWLR (PT 96) 579;
ATOLAGBE v. AWUNI (1997) 9 NWLR (PT 522) 536;
ELABANJO v. DAWODU (2006) ALL FWLR (PT 326) 604.
Learned Silk opined that by the community reading of Sections 87(9) and 285 (9) (14) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, an aspirant has 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event (in the instant case, the Primary Election held on the 3rd of October 2018, for the purpose of nominating the 2nd Respondent’s candidate for the Anambra South Senatorial District, Anambra State); within which every pre-election matter shall be filed.
Relying on the case of MARWA & ORS v. NYAKO & ORS (2012) 6 NWLR (PT 1296), Learned senior counsel for the Appellant submitted that the time fixed by the Constitution for the doing of anything cannot be extended. It is immutable. It cannot be extended, enlarged or stretched beyond what it states. He cited also the case of OMISORE v. AREGBESOLA & ORS (2015) 15 NWLR (PT 1482) 228.
He maintained that the Trial Court’s judgment which upheld an action instituted after the 14 days allowed by the Constitution, after the occurrence of the event of the primary election is erroneous and constitutes an affront to the provisions of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. He relied on the case of GASSOL v. TUTARE (2013) 14 NWLR (PT 1374) 221.
He argued also that it is not the duty of the Court by means of ingenuous arguments or propositions to alter, qualify, change, modify or narrow the clear meaning of the provisions of statute or the Constitution once those provisions are plain, clear, unequivocal and unambiguous.
He commended this Court to the following cases:
AGWUNA v. A.G. FEDERATION (1995) 5 NWLR (PT 396) 418;
BUHARI v. INEC (2008) 18 NWLR (PT 1120) 246;
UGWU v. ARARUME (2007) ALL FWLR (PT 377) 909
On the issue of territorial jurisdiction, learned Silk submitted that the subject matter of the 2nd Respondent’s Primary Election was held on 3rd October 2018 for Anambra South Senatorial District at Ekwulobia Township Stadium in Anambra State outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Trial Court, and therefore, the Trial Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the 1st Respondent’s suit at the trial. He referred to these cases:
DALHATU v. TURAKI (2003) 7 SC 1;
MAILANTARKI v. TONGO (2018) 6 NWLR (PT 1614) 69;
Learned Senior counsel for the Appellant opined that a Claimant who claims declaratory reliefs, as in the instant case, must succeed on the strength of his own case, and not on the weakness or even admission of the claim, by the Defendant. The case of EMENIKE v. P.D.P (2012) 12 NWLR (PT 1315) 556, was cited in reliance.
He noted that the Trial Court suo motu raised and resolved the issue of the allegation of misconduct or non compliance against the Appellant, without giving the Appellant an opportunity to be heard, thereby infringing on his constitutional right to fair hearing. He relied inter alia, on the case of EBUCHU v. CONTINENTAL MARSHAL BANK PLC (2016) 8 NWLR (PT 1513) 192.
In conclusion, this Court is urged to resolve these issues in favour of the Appellant, allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Trial Court.
In his response, it is submitted for the 1st Respondent that the Trial Court was not in error to have assumed jurisdiction.
In response, it is submitted for the 1st Respondent that pivot of the 1st Respondent’s case at the Trial Court was result of the primary election and the issuance on the 9th of October 2018 of the Certificate of Return for the election on the 4th Respondent.
Learned counsel for the 1st Respondent posited that the 1st Respondent’s case became activated by virtue of Section 285 (14) (a) of the 1999 Constitution (4th Alteration), because while he patiently waited for his petition to be treated by the Appeal Panel, he discovered that a Certificate of Return had been issued to the 4th Respondent. In his opinion, the computation of time began on the 9th of October 2018, as rightly held by the Trial Court and not 3rd of October 2018. He referred to the Trial Court’s decision at page 1778 of the Record
He maintained that the 1st Respondent’s case at the Trial Court is not caught up by Section 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution, as the actions complained about were not completed on the 3rd of October, 2018, but on the 9th of October 2018. He commended this Court to these cases:
EGBE v. ADEFARASIN (1987) 1 NWLR (PT 47) 20;
WOHEREM v. EMEREUWA (2004) 6-7 SC 161
Learned counsel for the 1st Respondent opined that time began to run, in the instant case, from the 9th of October 2018, which is the date the Appellant was given the Certificate of Return, after that date when the last event which constitutes the cause of action occurred. He placed reliance on the cases of:
ELABANJO v. DAWODU (2006) 6 SCNJ 204;
OKAFOR v. A.G ANAMBRA STATE (2005) ALL FWLR Pt 274) 252;
N.P.A. v. AJOBI (2006) 13 NWLR (PT 998) 477
On the issue of territorial jurisdiction, it is submitted for the 1st Respondent that other than the primary election which took place in Anambra State, all other events took place at the Appellant’s National Office at the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Trial Court. He referred to:
ORDER 3 RULE 4(1) OF THE FCT HIGH COURT RULES 2018;
KAKIH v. PDP (2014) 15 NWLR (PT 1430) 37; PAGE 1773 OF THE RECORD;
Learned counsel for the 1st Respondent maintained that the jurisdiction of the Trial Court to determine pre-election matters is derived from Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act 2010, as amended. It is his view that the cases of:
DALHATU v. TURAKI (2003) 7 SC 1;
MAILANTARKI v. TONGO (2018) 6 NWLR (PT 1614) 69; support the submissions that the Trial Court has the jurisdiction and competence to entertain the suit.
On whether the decision of the Trial Court was perverse, learned counsel for the 1st Respondent opined that it is not correct, as enthused by the Appellant, that the Trial Court resorted to extraneous matters in coming to its decision, but rather that the Trial Court came to its decision, after considering all the documentary and other evidence placed before it. He placed reliance on Sections 131 and 132 of the Evidence Act, 2011 and submitted that the Appellant, who failed to discharge the burden placed on it by the above Sections of the Evidence Act, cannot turn around to argue that the judgment of the Trial Court was perverse.
In conclusion, this Court is urged to reject all the submissions proffered by the Appellant, resolve these issues in favour of the 1st Respondent and dismiss the appeal.
In resolving these issues, it is pertinent to consider the import of Section 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution (4th Alteration Act 2017). The said section, for ease of reference, is hereunder reproduced.
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, every pre-election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit.”
The dictionary meaning of the word “pre” is “before”, and when used as a prefix to the noun “election”, it therefore means before the election. In other words, pre-election matter means actions, conduct or any event taking place or occurring before the election. See
ADEOGUN VS. FASHOGBON (2008) 17 NWLR (PT.1115) 149 AT 181; IBRAHIM v. UMAR (2013) LPELR 22805 (CA).
In the instant case, the 1st Respondent herein is contending that the events which culminated in his cause of action were continuous up until when the Certificate of Return was issued by the Appellant to the 4th Respondent. I have carefully perused the 1st Respondent’s originating processes filed at the Trial Court and the 1st Respondent’s counsel contention that his claims are not brought pursuant to Section 87 of the Electoral Act 2010 as amended, is grossly misconceived, because, the issue of disqualification, nomination, substitution and sponsorship of candidates for an election precede election and are therefore pre-election matters. See the 1st Respondent/Claimant’s Reliefs at pages 3-5 of the Record.
In particular, Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act 2010, as amended, provides thus:
“(9) Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act or Rules of a political party, an aspirant who complains that any of the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a political party has not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election, may apply to the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State or FCT, for redress.”
The 1st Respondent’s action was filed at the Trial Court on 19th of October 2018 on an event (primary election) which took place on 3rd of October, 2018 in Ekwulobia, Anambra State. That is 17 days after the primary election. Election related matters are sui generis. They are unlike ordinary civil proceedings without a time bar. See: HASSAN V. ALIYU (2010) ALL FWLR (PT. 539) 1007 AT 1046. In the instant case, the failure of the 1st Respondent to file his suit not later than 14 days after the action complained, as required by Section 285 (9) of the CFRN (4th alteration Act 2017) is fatal to his case and ousted the Trial Court of its jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
It is not in contention that the act of the nomination of the Appellant by the 2nd Respondent as its candidate to contest the 2019 Senatorial Election for Anambra South Senatorial District was done on a specified date, which is the 3rd of October 2018. This is in compliance with Section 87(4)(c)(i) of the Electoral Act 2010, as amended, which states as follows:
(4) A political party that adopts the system of indirect primaries for the choice of its candidate shall adopt the procedure outlined below-
(c) in the case of nomination to the position of a candidate to the Senate, House of Representatives and State House of Assembly, a political party shall, where it intends to sponsor candidates-
(I) hold special congresses in the Senatorial District, Federal Constituency and the State Assembly constituency respectively, with delegates voting for each of the aspirants in designated centre on specified date;
On the issue of territorial jurisdiction of the Trial Court, the civil jurisdiction of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja is provided for under Section 257 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 which provides thus
“257. (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 251 and any other provisions of this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by law, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear and determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any Person.
(2) The reference to civil or criminal Proceedings in this section includes a reference to the proceedings which originate in the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja and those which are brought before the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja to be dealt with by the Court in the exercise of its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction.”
The Appellant’s complaint borders on the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The Constitution is silent on the “territorial jurisdiction” of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. It should be noted, however, that in CHIEF CHIKA OKAFOR & ANOR V. ALHAJI TIJANI HASHIM & 2 ORS (2001) 1 NWLR (PT. 693) 183 AT 190 this Court, PER BULKACHUWA, JCA (as he then was, now PCA) held, and I agree with my learned brother that “the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory is confined to the Federal Capital Territory, (Abuja).”
It is not in dispute as can be seen from the 1st Respondent’s originating processes that, the 1st Respondent and other aspirants, indicated their interest to contest for the Anambra South Senatorial District in the 2019 Senatorial elections. It is also not in dispute that the primary election to nominate the candidate for the said Anambra South Senatorial District to contest the 2019 Senatorial Election, was held at Ekwulobia Township Stadium, in Anambra State. To this extent, I agree with the Appellant that it is the Anambra State High Court that has territorial jurisdiction in respect of the 1st Respondent’s claim, but not FCT High Court Abuja. This is because a Court in one state does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine a matter which is exclusively within the jurisdiction of another state; See RIVERS STATE GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA V. SPECIALIST KONSULT (SWEDISH GROUP) (2005) 2 S.C. (PT.11) 121.
In DALHATU VS. TURAKI (2003) 15 NWLR (PT. 843) 310; OGUNDARE, JSC stated the position on the matter inter alia thus: –
“I have taken pains to discuss this judgment on territorial jurisdiction of a Court in view of recent developments whereby litigants rather than suing in the proper Courts come to the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. I think their Lordships of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory ought to be circumspect before deciding whether or not it is wise and correct to exercise jurisdiction in matters outside the territory of the Federal Capital Territory. Their Court, unlike the Federal High Court, has jurisdiction only in matters arising out of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.”
The issue of territorial jurisdiction of the trial Court can be raised at any time, even in the Supreme Court for the first time without leave. See SHELIM VS. GOBANG (2009) 12 NWLR PT. 1156 AT 460. In the instant case the primary election, the subject matter that led to the 1st Respondent’s action at the Trial Court was conducted in Anambra State. This is not contested. The action was instituted at the FCT High Court Abuja, which has no territorial jurisdiction over the action conducted in Anambra State by virtue of Section 255 of the CFRN 1999. See also the case of MAILANTARKI v. TONGO & ORS (SUPRA).
Learned Silk had argued for the 1st Respondent that the cases of DALHATU v. TURAKI SUPRA as well as MAILANTARKI v. TONGO SUPRA, are not on all fours with the instant case and therefore support the case of the 1st Respondent. I do not agree with these submissions.
In MAILANTARKI v. TONGO supra the case of the Appellant therein was that the Appellant’s suit, filed at the FCT High Court touched on the primaries held by the APC on the 8th December, 2014, that the suit was filed to enforce the decision/finding already taken by the National Assembly Election Appeal Committee of the APC and which decision had been duly forwarded to the headquarters of the APC for implementation. ?The implementation of the findings of the Appeal Committee entails forwarding of the name of the winner of the primary election conducted on 8th December, 2014 to INEC at its headquarters in the FCT. Exhibit I, the senior counsel for the Appellant submits, is the report of the Appeal Committee which must be submitted and which was in fact submitted to APC at its headquarter in FCT, Abuja, for implementation. Senior Counsel further submitted that the suit was filed to enforce the decision of the Appeal Committee which was to be implemented in the FCT, Abuja, hence the decision to file the suit at the FCT High Court. The learned senior counsel submitted further that though the facts leading to the report of the Appeal Committee relate to the primary election held in Gombe State, the cause of action or the act over which the Appellant is aggrieved, took place in Abuja. And that by virtue of Order 9 Rule 4(1) and Order 22 Rule 5 of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (Civil Procedure) Rules 2004 read with Section 257 (1) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, Section 9 of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Act and Section 87 (9) Electoral Act, 2010 as amended, the High Court of the FCT has jurisdiction to entertain the Appellant’s suit.
In addressing the issue of territorial jurisdiction, the apex Court posited thus, per Eko JSC:
“Let me quickly deal with the argument of the learned Senior Counsel to the effect that, by dint of Order 9 Rule 4(1) and Order 22 Rule 5 of the FCT High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, the FCT High Court can exercise jurisdiction over the cause of action that arose in Gombe State. The law is settled that the jurisdiction of a Court of record, in its broad and substantive sense, cannot be conferred by the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court are only made, pursuant to the powers conferred on the heads of Courts by the Constitution to make Rules, to regulate practice and procedure in their respective Courts. The Rules they make are only to regulate the practice and procedure in their respective Courts. The Rules do not confer jurisdiction on the Court to entertain causes or matters. Rather, the jurisdiction of Courts in Nigeria is either conferred or vested by the Constitution or the enabling statute establishing the Court.
This is my understanding of the dictum of Obaseki. JSC in CLEMENT v. IWUANYANWU (1989) 4 SC (pt. ii) 89; (1989) NWLR (pt. 107) 39 on the question whether Rules of Court confer substantive jurisdiction on the Court they relate to. My answer therefore to the submission of the Appellant’s Senior Counsel on this, is that the FCT High Court does not derive any jurisdiction from its Rules of practice and procedure to entertain any cause or matter, the dispute in respect of which arose in Gombe State or any other place outside the Federal Capital Territory. Abuja. It is my considered view that the jurisdiction vested in the FCT High Court by Section 257(1) of the 1999 Constitution to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue is only to the extent of the disputes that arise within the territory of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.
In RIVERS STATE GOVERNMENT & ANOR. v. SPECIALIST KONSULT (SWEDISH GROUP) (supra) the poignant statement of the law, relevant and very material to our Federal structure, is that a Court in one State of the Federation does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine a matter either exclusively within the jurisdiction of another State or which arose within the territory of another State. No Court in any State, including the FCT High Court, has extra territorial jurisdiction. This Court had earlier categorically re-stated the law on this in DALHATU v. TURAKI (supra), where it was stated, with all clarity, that because the 1999 Constitution, particularly Section 2(2) thereof, declares that Nigeria is a Federation consisting of States and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, each State of the Federation is independent of the other and the jurisdiction of each State is limited to matters arising in the State.
The Judges of the FCT High Court were more than ever before or more than the Judges of other State High Courts, admonished to heed the words wisdom put across to them by Ogundare, JSC, pages 339 – 340 in DALHATU v. TURAKI (supra), to wit – “I have taken pains to discuss (in) this judgment on territorial jurisdiction of a Court in view of recent developments whereby litigants rather than suing in the proper Courts come to the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. I think their Lordships of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory ought to be circumspect before deciding whether or not it is wise and correct to exercise jurisdiction in Capital Territory. Their Court unlike the Federal High Court, has jurisdiction only in matters arising out of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja.”
The facts constituting the cause of action in this appeal are not different from the facts constituting the cause of action in DALHATU v. TURAKI (supra). The two sets of facts are substantially the same or similar. The cause of action in this case arose in Gombe State. In DALHATU v. TURAKI (supra), the cause of action arose in Jigawa State. In the two cases, the disputes were over the primary elections to elect the candidates of political parties. In the instant appeal, like in DALHATU v. TURAKI (supra), the Appellant came all the way from the State, where the dispute arose, to the FCT High Court to sue claiming inter alla that he was the rightful candidate, or ought to be the candidate of the political party he is a member of The lower Court has rightly in my view held relying on DALHATU v. TURAKI (supra) that the jurisdiction of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, which is regarded as a State High Court by virtue of Section 299 (a) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, does not extend to matters that arise outside the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.
I also agree with their Lordships of the lower Court that each State of the Federation is independent of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja and vice versa and that the judicial powers of each State are vested in the Courts established for that State, Gombe State and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja are distinct and independent of each other, It follows therefore, that this matter which arose in Gombe State and has to do with the parties in Gombe State should have been commenced in the High Court of Gombe State, and not in the FCT High Court. The FCT High Court has in the circumstance acted ultra vires in assuming jurisdiction over a cause of action that arose in Gombe State and outside its jurisdictional territory. The proceedings in the Suit No. FCT/CV/934/2015 before the FCT High Court, being incompetent, deserved to be and were correctly struck out by the lower Court.”
I adopt in toto, this erudite and comprehensive reasoning of the apex Court, and find that in the instant case there is nothing shown by the 1st Respondent to have occurred in Abuja, for the FCT High Court to have jurisdiction, except that the expression of interest forms and the nomination forms were submitted to the Appellant’s Headquarters at Abuja.
These issues are resolved against the 1st Respondent.
In the final analysis, I adjudge this appeal to be meritorious and it is hereby allowed. The decision of the Trial Court is hereby set aside as the Trial Court had no jurisdiction whatsoever to entertain the 1st Respondent’s suit.
Parties to bear their own costs.
STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A.: I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Abdu Aboki, JCA.
My learned brother has given due consideration to the issues raised. I adopt the reasoning and the conclusion in the lead judgment. I too hold that there is merit in the appeal. I allow the appeal and I abide by the consequential order made thereat.
PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.: I agree.
Appearances:
Chief Olusola Oke, SAN with him, B.A. Foluronsho Esq., and J.M Mathias Esq.For Appellant(s)
Ahmed Rap SAN with him,R.A. Oluyele Esq., Charles Ndukwe Esq., Adeola Adedipe Esq., W.A. Adeniran Esq., and Deborah Opete Esq., for the 1st Respondent.
C.I. Mbaeri Esq., for the 2hd Respondent.
I.G. Ogugua Esq., for the 3rd & 4th Respondents.
Oluwafemi Okumbo Esq., for the 5th Respondent.
For Respondent(s)
