PRINCE ABIODUN ADESIDA v. HON. IFEDAYO SUNDAY ABEGUNDE & ORS (2019)

PRINCE ABIODUN ADESIDA v. HON. IFEDAYO SUNDAY ABEGUNDE & ORS

(2019)LCN/13646(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Monday, the 13th day of July, 2009

CA/B/EPT/249/08

RATIO

COURTS: COURTS WILL NOT GRANTS RELIEFS THAT ARE NOT SOECIFICALLY SOUGHT BY A PARTY

Also the courts not being a father christmas, will not grant any relief not specifically sought by a party. It is therefore incumbent on a court to consider for resolution crucial issues joined by parties. See the cases of:
1. Ella v. Agbo (1999) 8NWLR (Pt. 613) p. 139 and
2. Shekete v. N.A.F. (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1053) p. 159. PER OYEBISI F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A.

COURTS: COURTS SHOULD NOT DESCEND INTO THE ARENA
In the case of: Shekete v. NA.F. supra at page 198 paras. C – Dr Adamu J.C.A, had this to say:
“It is trite that the duty or function of any court as an impartial umpire is to limit itself to the cases or issues made or canvassed by the parties before it. The court does not and cannot descend into the arena and prop up a party’s flagging case or reach a decision on any matter or issue on any evidence or point that is not properly placed or canvassed before it by the disputing parties. Consequently in the present case, since the parties are in agreement or mutual concession that it was the CAS who convened the GCM, signed the charge sheet and confirmed the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant by the GCM, I will confine myself only to that point so canvassed and I will not embark on any inquiry as to whether the alleged act of the CAS were done on his behalf by another officer or whether statutory powers under the Act can be delegated to any other officer.” (The underlining is for emphasis). PER OYEBISI F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A.

WORDS AND MEANING: SHALL

It should be noted that the operative words in Section 141 of the Act are: “SHALL BE PRESENTED WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS”. The word “shall” where used in a statute is capable of bearing many meanings depending on the context in which it is used. It may imply futurity or a mandate or implying direction or permission. If used in a directory sense, then the action to be taken must obey or fulfil the directive substantially. But if it is used in a mandatory sense as it is under the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2006, then the action to be taken must obey or fulfil the mandate exactly. See the cases of:
(1) Ifezue v. Mbadugha (1984) 1 SCNLR p. 427;
(2) Amadi v. NNPC (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 674) p. 76;
(3) Oju L.G. v. INEC (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1054) p. 242 and
(4) A.C. v. Jang supra at p. 511 paras. F – G. PER OYEBISI F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A.

WORDS AND MEANING: WITHIN

Also, the word “within” is defined as: “any time before, any time at or before, any time at the end of, or any time before the expiration of, any time not beyond, any time not exceeding, and any time not later than,” see Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, page 1602. Consequently, the law is that, compliance with statutory provisions as to time within which to file an election petition is a fundamental pre-condition, a breach of which is incurable. Failure to comply with the statutory provisions is fatal and in such a case, the court will have no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. See the cases of:
(1) Ogbebor v. Danjuma (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 843) p. 403 at p.426 and
(2) Nnonye v. Anychie (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 101) p. 117. PER OYEBISI F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A.

PRE-CONDITION: WHERE A STATUTE PROVIDES A PER-CONDITION IT MUST BE FULFILLED

It is the law that, where a statute provides for a pre-condition to the attainment of a particular situation, the pre-condition must be fulfilled or satisfied before the particular situation will be said to have been attained or reached. To put it in different words, where a pre-condition for initiating a legal process is laid down, any suit instituted in contravention of the pre-condition provision is incompetent. This is the common and popular pet expression known as: “condition precedent.” For, the commencement of a suit is very fundamental to the jurisdiction of court. An action wrongly commenced is incompetent and this will rob the court of the jurisdiction to hear and determine same. PER OYEBISI F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A.

JURISDICTION: WHEN A COURT IS SAID TO HAVE JURISDICTION

A court is said to have jurisdiction and therefore competent to determine a suit when:
(a) it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualification of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or the other;
(b) the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction; and
(c) the case comes before a court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfilment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.
These pre-conditions are conjunctive and the non-fulfillment or absence of any of them automatically robs the court the jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit.
See the cases of:
(1) Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR p. 341;
(2) Barsoum v. Clemessy International (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 632) p.516;
(3) U.B.A. Plc. v. Ekpo (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt. 834) p. 332;
(4) System Applications Products (Nig.) Ltd. v. C.B.N. (2004) 15 NWLR (Pt. 897) p. 655;
(5) Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) p. 427 and
(6) Drexel Energy and Natural Resources Ltd. & 2 Ors. v Trans International Bank Ltd. & 2 Ors. (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1119) p.399. PER OYEBISI F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A.

CHIOMA EGONDU NWOSU-IHEME (Ph.D), J.C.A.: I agree.

Appearances

Mr. I.A. Adedipe SAN, with him, Mr. S. Ojile For Appellant

AND

Dr. O.F. Ayeni, with him Messrs T. Atere, O. Fadare and Miss O.B. Aladegbami,
Mr. Ameh Igbochi,
Mr. J.C.A. Idachaba. For Respondent

JUSTICES:

OYEBISI FOLAYEMI OMOLEYE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ALI ABUBAKAR BABANDI GUMEL Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

CHIOMA EGONDU NWOSU-IHEME Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

PRINCE ABIODUN ADESIDA – Appellant(s)

AND

1. HON. IFEDAYO SUNDAY ABEGUNDE
2. THE INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC)
3. THE RESIDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSIONER, ONDO STATE
4. THE RETURNING OFFICER, AKURE NORTH AND AKURE SOUTH FEDERAL CONSTITUENCY
5. THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, ONDO STATE – Respondent(s)

OYEBISI F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A.: (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the Governorship and National Assembly Election Petitions Tribunal, Ondo State (hereinafter referred to as the lower Tribunal) sitting at Akure, delivered on 26.06.2008.
Election was held on 21.04.2007 for the office of the member to represent Akure North/Akure South Federal Constituency of Ondo State in the Federal House of Representatives. The Appellant in this appeal, Prince Abiodun Adesida contested that election on the platform of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), while the 1st Respondent, Hon. Ifedayo Sunday Abegunde was the candidate of the Labour Party.
At the conclusion of the said election wherein a total of seven candidates contested, the Appellant was returned as the winner by the 2nd – 4th Respondents having being allegedly elected with Eighty Four Thousand, Two Hundred and Twenty One (84,221) votes.
The 1st Respondent was alleged to have polled Thirteen Thousand, Eight Hundred and Thirteen (13,813) votes, thereby coming second in the said election.
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid alleged declaration by the 2nd – 4th Respondents on the 21st of April, 2007, the 1st Respondent filed a petition on the 21st of May, 2007 at the lower Tribunal to challenge the return of the Appellant. The petition was fought on the Amended Petition of twenty nine (29) paragraphs – see pages 1 – 19 of the table of contents of petitioner’s bundle of documents, in vol. 1 of the record of appeal. The petitioner generally alleged sundry corrupt practices and non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2006. The 1st Respondent in proof of his claims called thirteen (13) witnesses including himself and tendered in evidence several materials. While the Appellant in his defence called nine (9) witnesses and tendered various documents in evidence. At the close of the respective parties’ cases, addresses of their counsel were duly filed. On the 26th of June, 2008, the lower Tribunal delivered its considered judgment, allowed the petition and nullified the election of the Appellant.
The Appellant was not pleased with the said judgment of the lower Tribunal and he filed an appeal to this Court against it.
For the first time and now in this appeal, the Appellant with the permission of this Court, raised the question of the jurisdiction of the lower Tribunal in the first instance to hear the petition of the 1st Respondent on the ground that the petition was filed out of time and therefore incompetent.
The Appellant’s notice and grounds of appeal contained (10) grounds and one (1) additional ground from which seven (7) issues were distilled for determination. The seven (7) issues state thus:
“1. Whether the Petition which was filed on the 21st of May, 2007 was within time, as prescribed by Section 141 of the Electoral Act 2006 to entitle the Tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over its hearing and determination?
2. Whether the Tribunal was correct in failing to dismiss the Petition of the Petitioner and uphold the election of the Respondent, having held that only two (2) out of the 13 Petitioner’s witnesses were believed, and having further held that the Petitioner did not lead evidence to support some of the documents he tendered?
3. Whether the Tribunal was correct in holding that the difference between Exhibits ‘B1’ to ‘B17’, ‘C12’ and ‘M’ constitute a fundamental breach of a fair election and substantial non-compliance affecting the election when the Petitioner did not lead any evidence in support of the said difference?
4. Whether the opinion of the Tribunal on the disenfranchisement of voters in the election was correct, having regard to the fact that the Petitioner did not call any witness in support of the allegation?
5. Whether the Tribunal was correct to have held that because the voters called by the 1st Respondent as witnesses did not show that they were registered voters, their evidence was unreliable?
6. Whether the Tribunal was correct to have relied on the Petitioner’s counsel’s address as a basis for invalidating some ballot papers, even after it discovered that facts were misrepresented in the said written submissions?
7. Whether the Tribunal was correct to have propounded a new principle in utter disregard to the decisions of the Court of Appeal in YAR’ADUA v. BARDA (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt. 231) 638 and KURFI v. MOHAMMED (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt. 277) 602 on how to prove allegation that a candidate did not score majority of lawful votes? ”
On the other part the 1st Respondent distilled three (3) issues for the determination of this appeal. These three issues state thus:
1. Whether the Petition forming the basis of this appeal was/is statute barred?
2. Whether from the totality of evidence relied upon by the lower Tribunal, it was not justified when it held that the Petition was successfully proved and consequently nullifying the election of the Appellant?
3. Whether the lower Tribunal proceeded on the correct principles of the law in admitting documentary evidence, evaluating both documentary and oral evidence as well as in drawing inferences and conclusions on evidence adduced at the trial?
The 2nd – 4th Respondents on 25/02/2009 filed a notice of preliminary objection that the petition of the 1st Respondent before the lower Tribunal out of which this appeal arose was incurably incompetent, null and void having been filed outside the statutory period of thirty (30) days as prescribed by Section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006. That the judgment of the lower Tribunal delivered on the 26.06.2008, the subject matter of this appeal is consequently null and void ab initio for want of jurisdiction.
The grounds upon which the preliminary objection is predicated are that:
(i) Section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006 makes it mandatory that an Election Petition under the Act “shall be presented within thirty (30) days from the date the result of the election is declared”.
(ii) The result of the election in issue was declared on the 21st April, 2007 and the Petition was filed on the 21st May, 2007.
(iii) Thus, the Petition was filed a day late having being filed 31 days after the said declaration of result.
(iv) The Petition is thus statute barred.
(v) The lower Tribunal thus lacked jurisdiction to have entertained it.
(vi) The judgment of the lower Tribunal from which the present appeal arose is thus void ab initio.
The 2nd – 4th Respondents therefore herein sought the following reliefs:
(1) AN ORDER dismissing the appeal.
(2) AN ORDER setting aside the judgment of the lower Tribunal in respect of the aforementioned petition No. EPT/OND/NA/17/07 delivered on 26th June, 2008 for being void on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
(3) AN ORDER striking out Petition No. EPT/OND/NA/17/07 filed on 21st May, 2007, for reason of lack of jurisdiction.
In the alternative, the 2nd – 4th Respondents adopted the 2nd to 7th issues as formulated by the Appellant.
On 18.05.2009 when this appeal was heard in this Court, the learned senior counsel for the Appellant Mr. Ayodeji Adedipe SAN adopted and relied upon the Amended Appellant’s brief of argument which was deemed filed on 25.03.2009 and the Appellant’s Reply brief of argument which was deemed filed on 22.04.2009. Consequently, he urged this Court to allow this appeal on the ground that the petition filed by the 1st Respondent at the lower Tribunal was statute barred. Replying on points of law, the learned senior counsel for the Appellant opined that the case of Dr. Olusegun Agagu v. Dr. Olusegun Mimiko (Unreported) Appeal No. CA/B/EPT/342/08 delivered on 23rd February, 2009 referred to by the 1st Respondent’s learned counsel has not changed the law on the legal position that, the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage. That although the argument of the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent in this regard is dogged, it amounts to only a fire without heat. He urged this Court to discountenance the said argument.
The learned counsel for the 1st Respondent, Dr. O. F. Ayeni, identified, adopted and relied on the 1st Respondent’s brief of argument which was deemed properly filed on 25.03.2009 and the 1st Respondent’s Reply brief to the brief of argument in support of the preliminary objection filed by the 2nd – 4th Respondents. In urging this Court to dismiss this appeal, learned counsel submitted that in election cases, when the issue of jurisdiction bordering on the competence of the court is not raised timeously, it becomes waiveable and will not be entertained. This position was supported by the yet to be reported case of: Olusegun Agagu v. Olusegun Mimiko supra.
The learned counsel for the 2nd – 4th Respondents, Mr. Ameh Igbochi identified, adopted and relied on the 2nd – 4th Respondents’ brief of argument in support of the preliminary objection filed on 25.02.2009 and the 2nd – 4th Respondents’ brief of argument deemed filed on 22.04.2009.
However, no brief of argument was filed for the 5th Respondent, the Commissioner of Police, Ondo State Command.
It is a settled principle of law that where a preliminary objection is raised in an appeal, the appellate court has a duty to give priority attention to the preliminary objection, resolving it before venturing into the main business of the appeal. See the cases of:
1. Adetoro v. Ogooluwakitan Trading co. Ltd. (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt. 771) p. 157;
2. U.B.A. Plc. V A.C.B. (Nig.) Ltd. (2005) 12 NWLR (Pt. 939) p.232;
3. Abiola v. Olawoye (2006) 13 NWLR (Pt. 996) p. 1 and 4. Ngige v. Obi (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 999) p. 1.

Ordinarily I should consider and resolve at this stage, the arguments of counsel in support of and opposition to the preliminary objection of the 2nd – 4th Respondents against this appeal first and foremost. However, issue No.1 formulated by the Appellant for the resolution of this appeal also touches on the competence of the lower Tribunal to adjudicate upon the election, the subject matter of this appeal, filed there by the 1st Respondent. Therefore, in order to fulfil all the righteousness of this matter, I will consider and determine the preliminary objection together with issue No.1. Jurisdiction is the blood and therefore life of adjudication in a court of law. It is a threshold issue and must be considered and determined as soon as it is raised. It is now a trite and settled general principle of law that, it may be raised at any stage of the proceedings even on appeal at the Supreme Court. For, where a court lacks jurisdiction, no matter how brilliantly the case before it was conducted, the adjudication will be void, amounting to a nullity, hence an exercise in futility. Authorities are replete on this legal position, see the cases of:
(1) John Ebhodaghe v Chief Omokhafe (2004) 12 SCNJ p. 175 and
(2) Chief Eligbe v. Chief Omokhafe (2004) 12 SCNJ p. 106.

As I have stated earlier on in this judgment, in view of the importance attached to the issue of jurisdiction in law, I have the legally bound duty to and I will consider and resolve, issue no. 1 in the Appellant’s brief of argument and the preliminary objection of the 2nd – 4th Respondents to this appeal first and foremost. This is because the said resolution one way or the other will determine whether this appeal fails or succeeds.
If the issue of jurisdiction is dismissed, I shall proceed to deal with the remaining six issues formulated by the Appellant for the eventual determination of the appeal. However, if on the other hand the lower Tribunal is adjudged as having no jurisdiction to entertain and determine the said petition, consequently this Court will equally have no jurisdiction to go into the other issues in the substantive appeal. My resolve hereon is strengthened by the case of:
Alhaji B.B. Nuhu v. Alhaji I.A. Ogele (2003) 12 SCNJ p. 158.
The learned counsel for the 2nd – 4th Respondents submitted that the petition of the 1st Respondent which was filed on the 21st of May, 2007 was not within the time prescribed by Section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006 so as to entitle the lower Tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over it, having regard to the fact that the result of the election in question was declared on the 21st April, 2007.
This point clearly borders on jurisdiction. As a result, it could be raised at anytime before judgment is delivered and by any of the parties to the suit and anyhow. In support of this view, the following cases were referred to viz:
1. Nuhu v. Ogele (2004) FWLR (Pt. 193) p. 362 at p. 385. para. B;
2. Awuse v. Odili (2004) FWLR (pt. 193) p. 325 at p. 354 paras. A -B;
3. Obiakor v. State (2002) FWLR (Pt. 113) p. 299 at p. 301.
4. Emenuo v. Duru (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 304) p. 508; and
5. Menekaya v. Menekaya (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt. 738) p. 203 at p. 236.
The lower Tribunal ought not to have exercised jurisdiction over the petition according to the learned counsel for the 2nd – 4th Respondents, the petition having been filed out of time. The petition was filed outside the thirty (30) days time limit prescribed by Section 141 of the Act. Ex-facie, the petition was filed on the 21st of May, 2007 at the Registry of the lower Tribunal. The election in question was held on the 21st of April, 2007 and the result was declared that same 21st of April, 2007. Accordingly, the operative word in Section 141 is “shall”. The purport of the word “shall” in a statute is that, it implies a command, an obligation, and the courts have consistently held as such. By 21st of May, 2007 when the petitioner filed the petition, same was already late having been filed one (1) day late.
On this position, reliance was placed on the cases of:
1. Kalamu v. Gunrin (2003) 16 NWLR (Pt. 847)p. 493 at p. 517;
2. Barmo v. State (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt. 64l)p. 424 at p. 437;
3. Ogbebor v. Danjuma (2003) 1 NWLR (Pt. 843) p. 403;
4. Alataha v. Asin (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt. 600) p. 1 at p. 44,.
5. W.A.E.C. v. Adeyanju (2008) All FWLR (pt. 428)p. 206 at p. 208 and
6. AC v. Jang (unreported) Appeal No. CA/J/EP/GOV/275/2007 delivered on the 26th February, 2008.
This court was urged by the learned counsel to hold that because the petition in dispute was statute barred thereby rendering the lower Tribunal without jurisdiction to hear and determine same, that question of jurisdiction in law cannot be waived or acquiscenced. On this position reliance was placed on the case of:
Nwancho v. Elem (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 225)p. 93 at p. 110 para. A.
Replying to the preliminary objection, Dr. Ayeni for the 1st Respondent submitted that where a petition is statute barred, the implication ordinarily is that it is a nullity. Paragraph 49(2) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2006 envisages that a petition can amount to a nullity; and where this is the case, an application to set it aside can be brought at the instance of the adverse party subject however to the overriding condition that such application shall not be allowed unless it is made within a reasonable time and when the party making the application has not taken any fresh step in the proceedings after the knowledge of the defect. In the context of election litigation, an election petition which is filed outside the statutory time limit will amount to a nullity. Paragraph 49(2) ousts the jurisdiction of the lower Tribunal and eo ipso this Court from enquiring into whether an election petition is void where such issue of nullity is not raised timeously. On this point, reference was made to the cases of:
1. Olanipekun & Anor. v. Suleiman Maito (Unreported) Appeal No. CA/B/149/EPT/06 Delivered on 19th October, 2006;
2. Remi v. Sunday (1999) 8 NWLR (pt. 613 )p. 92 and
3. Olaniyonu v. Awah (1989) 5 NWLR (pt. 122)p. 493.
Arguing further, the learned counsel said that an act of commission or omission which is capable of rendering a process a nullity must be a fundamental one. The distinction which in ordinary civil proceedings is made between defects which are fundamental and those which amount to mere irregularity are both recognizable under paragraph 49(2) of the Electoral Act. The provisions do not merely enjoin that an objection should be brought timeously, but also give a mandate that they should be heard and determined before any further steps are taken in the proceedings. On this legal position, reliance was placed on the case of:
Dr. Olusegun Agagu v. Dr. Rahman Olusegun Mimiko supra. Accordingly it is clear from the judgment in Mimiko’s case that apart from the fact that the right to raise an objection to the nullity of a petition is waived when such objection is not made timeously, no tribunal or court has the jurisdiction to enquire into an alleged null petition where such objection has not been raised timeoulsy.
It was canvassed in favour of the 1st Respondent that the petition the subject matter of the present appeal was filed on 21st May, 2007, the Appellant, without objection to the competence of the petition, filed his reply on 23rd July, 2007. Throughout the hearing at the lower tribunal, and up until when judgment was delivered on 17th July, 2008, the Appellant did not raise any objection to the alleged null petition. Consequently, this Court is bereft of jurisdiction to enquire into the alleged incompetence of the petition at this appeal stage.
The learned counsel for the 1st Respondent contended again that one other point that has knocked out the bottom of the objection to the competence of the petition forming the basis of this appeal is that, the Appellant herein has not sought for and obtained the leave of this Court to raise the fresh issue to the effect that the petition is statute barred. Leave of this Court is required to raise a fresh issue or point not raised or canvassed in the court below. Where a fresh issue or point not raised in the court below is raised on appeal without the leave of an appellate court, such issue is incompetent. It really does not matter that the new issue borders on jurisdiction. On this contention, reliance was placed on the cases of:
1. Owie v. Ighiwi (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 917) p. 184 and
2. Jov v. Dom (1999) 9 NWLR (pt. 620) p. 538 at p. 547.
Furthermore, Dr. Ayeni submitted that another important reason why the preliminary objection of the 2nd – 4th Respondents is grossly incompetent is that the 2nd – 4th Respondents neither defended the petition the subject matter of the instant appeal in nor appealed against the decision of the lower Tribunal. It is settled that a party who has not appealed against an adverse decision affecting him cannot be heard to contend against it. On this principle of law reference was made to the cases of:
1. Tukur v. Government of Taraba State (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 510) p. 549 at pgs. 577 – 578;
2. Ohiaeri v. Yusuf (2004) 1 NWLR (Pt. 855) p. 548 at pg. 559;
3. Brown v. Adebanjo (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 16) p. 383 at p. 388 and
4. Kwara Investment Co. Ltd v. Garuba (2000) 10 NWLR p. 25 at p. 39.
It has long been settled, canvassed by the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent that, in the computation of the days within which to do an act after the occurrence of an event, the date of the occurrence of the event is excluded, as the law does not take account of a fraction of a day. Also where the last day for the doing of an act as prescribed by law falls on dies non juridicus, that act will be deemed to have been done within the prescribed time if it is done on the next working day. He relied in this regard on the cases of:
1. Iyirhiaro v. Usoh (1999) 4 NWLR (Pt. 597) p. 41;
2. P.D.P v. Haruna (2004) 16NWLR (Pt. 900) p. 597;
3. Akeredolu & Ors v. Akinremi (1985) 2 NSCC p. 1283 and
4. Yusuf v. Obasanjo (2003) 16 NWLR (Pt. 847)p. 554.
The learned counsel pointed out that the Electoral Act, 2006 contains no internal rule by which the various periods it prescribes for taking certain actions should be computed. Specifically, although Section 141 of the Act prescribes that a petition must be presented within thirty (30) days from the date the result of an election is declared, the section does not specify whether the date of the declaration itself must be included or excluded in the computation of the thirty (30) days. The Act is also silent on what will happen if the thirtieth day on which a petition must be presented falls on a public holiday. In such circumstances resort has to be had to the rules provided for under the Interpretation Act and Order 23 rule 1 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2000. These codified rules of computation of time have their history in the common law of England. As a matter of fact, it has long been settled at common law that, the reckoning of the number of days within which to carry out an act from the occurrence of an event is exclusive of the date the event occurred.
Cases in England where computation of time had been done inclusive of the date of the event have been overruled and criticized for bringing the law into disrepute. Therefore, the doubt as to whether the date the event occurred is to be included or excluded was finally cleared by the English Court of Appeal in the cases of:
1. In Re North Ex parte Hasluck (1895) 2 QB p. 265 at pgs. 269 – 270 and
2. Pritam Kaur v. Russels & Sons Ltd. (1973) QBD p.336 at p.348.
It was held in the cases that, in computation of days the day on which the seizure is made is to be excluded. The positions in England and Nigeria are the same on the question of when time begins to run on the computation of the number of days, months or years limited by statute, the issue having been specifically pronounced upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of:
1. Akeredolu v. Akinremi (supra) and
2. Yusuf v. Obasanjo (supra).
Under the doctrine of judicial precedent or stare decisis, the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Akeredolu v. Akinremi and Yusuf v. Obasanjo are binding on this Court. On this legal position, reliance was placed on the case of:
Kaugama v. INEC (1993) 3 NWLR (pt. 284)p. 681.
It was submitted alternatively in favour of the 1st Respondent, but without conceding to the point that, even if 21st April, 2007 were to be excluded in the computation of the thirty (30) days the instant petition was required to have been filed, then the thirty (30) days started running from 22nd April, 2007 and ended on the 20th May, 2007, a Sunday. And since the Electoral Act, 2006 does not contain any internal rule as to what ought to be done when the last day of the period prescribed for doing an act falls on a public holiday, in such circumstances, resort has to be had to the Interpretation Act and Order 23 Rule 1 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules. If that is done, the next working day to Sunday 20th May, 2007 in the present case will be Monday 21st May, 2007 and that was the date the instant petition was filed. This is the position taken by this Court in the case of:
Iyirhiaro v. Usoh (supra). In Pritam v. S. Russel & Sons (supra), the issue of what ought to be done when the last day for doing an act prescribed by a statute falls on a Sunday or other dies non, public holiday, the time is extended until the next day on which the court office is open. On the foregoing, the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent urged this Court to dismiss the preliminary objection of the 2nd – 4th Respondents.
The learned senior counsel for the Appellant contended that the petition of the 1st Respondent which was filed at the lower Tribunal was outside the thirty (30) days period prescribed by Section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006 and therefore incompetent.
The petition ex-facie was filed on the 21st May, 2007 at the registry of the Governorship/Legislative Houses Election Tribunal, Akure. On the 21st April, 2007, the election to the Akure-North and Akure-South Federal Constituency, of the State House of Representatives of the National Assembly, was held in Ondo State; that same day, the result of the Election to the Constituency was declared, and the Appellant was returned. Therefore, upon the declaration of result, and the return of the Appellant as the winner of the election, a cause of action had accrued to whosoever was dissatisfied with that declaration. Section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006 provides that, an election petition under the Act shall be presented within thirty (30) days from the date the result of the election is declared. This provision is simple and clear enough. If any petition is filed outside the thirty (30) days period, it will be statute barred. The issue that arises is: whether from the 21st April, 2007, when the result was declared, and 21st May, 2007 when the petition was filed, the thirty (30) days prescribed has been exceeded or not? In calculating the number of days, the date of declaration of the result will be included. This is because that was the date the cause of action accrued. In this connection, by the 21st of May, 2007, when the 1st Respondent filed the said petition, same was already late, having been filed a day late. This position was hinged on the cases of:
1. Ogbebor v. Danjuma (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 843) p. 403 and 2. George Akume v. Dr. Simon Lim (2008) 16 NWLR (pt. 1114) p. 490 at pgs. 506 – 507 paras. H – B; p. 507 paras. C-E.
The lower Tribunal in the opinion of the learned senior counsel for the Appellant was wrong in entertaining the petition.
For where an election petition is found to be incompetent, the only option left open to the lower Tribunal or, in this case, this Court, is to strike it out. The fact that the matter proceeded to judgment on the merit is of no moment. No amount of waiver and acquiescence can confer validity on an incompetent process or confer jurisdiction on a court which has none. Reliance in this regard was placed on the cases of:
1. Dickson v. Balat (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 215) p. 289 at p. 306 para. C;
2. Nwancho v. Elem (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 225) p. 93 at p. 110 para. A and
3. Eghobamien v. FMBN (2002) 17 NWLR (pt. 797) p.488 at 20 pgs. 500 – 501 paras. H -A.
It was reiterated in favour of the Appellant that, jurisdiction is very vital in the realm of administration of justice and therefore the bedrock of trials. Hence, the entire trial in this case which was without jurisdiction was a nullity, however well conducted. The final pronouncement made by the lower Tribunal without jurisdiction was an exercise in futility. On this position reliance was placed on the cases of:
1. Enemuo v. Duru (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 304) p. 508 and
2. Menakaya v. Menakava (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt. 738)p. 203 at p. 236.
The submissions in the reply of the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent to issue No. 1 as contained in the 1st Respondent’s brief of argument is the same, nearly verbatim, as his submissions in the 1st Respondent’s reply to the 2nd – 4th Respondents’ preliminary objection; therefore, in order not to be tautological, I shall no longer reiterate them. Suffice it to say that the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent contended on this point that since the Appellant did not raise any objection to the alleged null petition at trial, this Court is bereft of jurisdiction to enquire into the alleged incompetence of the petition at this appeal stage. This Court was urged to consequently discountenance the contention of the Appellant.
The Appellant’s learned counsel in the Reply brief filed for the Appellant reiterated that election petitions are sui generic.
That being so, the ordinary rules of civil procedure, including the application of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, are inapplicable. Also inapplicable are the common law rules of statutory interpretation. According to Black’s Law Dictionary 8th Edition, sui generic means: of its own kind or class, unique or peculiar. The uniqueness of an election petition is in relation to the procedure in its trial and determination. It is distinct and completely divorced from the regular civil proceedings thereby making it unnecessary for either seeking refuge in the common law on interpretation of statutes, or the provisions of Order 23 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules. On this position, reliance was placed on the cases of:
1. General Muhammadu Buhari & Anor. V. Alhaji Mohammed Dikko Yusuf & Anor. (2003) 14 NWLR (Pt. 841) p. 446 at pgs. 498 – 499;
2. Action Congress v. Jang (2009) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1132) pg. 475 at pgs. 504 – 505, paras. H – E and pgs. 508 – 509 and
3. A-G., Ondo State v. A-G, Ekiti State (2001) 17 NWLR (Pt. 743) p.706.
It was further contended in favour of the Appellant that the provisions of Paragraph 49(2) & (5) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2006, are procedural. Assuming but without conceding that the petition was filed late, this error could not be cured by the provisions of Paragraph 49(2) & (5). Accordingly, they cannot confer jurisdiction on the lower Tribunal in the instant matter, where, as it were, in the eye of the law, no petition was ever filed thereat. For, where by a statute, a court has no jurisdiction, the rules of procedure applicable to that court cannot confer the said jurisdiction on it. In other words, procedural blunders are what the provisions of Paragraph 49(2) & (5) are aimed at. For instance, if a party were in default of the rules, as opposed to the statute, then, he can take shelter under the provisions now under consideration. The fact that such electoral rules are fashioned into what is called schedules does not give them any higher status, they remain rules of the Election Tribunal or the court. On this position, the learned senior counsel relied on the case of Ogunremi v. Dada (1962) 2 All NLR p. 657 at p. 664.
According to the learned senior counsel, the decision of this Court in Agagu v. Mimiko & Ors. Supra relied upon by the 1st Respondent is not apposite to the issue under consideration. It is now an accepted principle in our jurisprudence that the issue of jurisdiction is so fundamental that it can be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the court of first instance, or even for the first time in an appellate court. It can even be raised by the court suo motu. On this legal principle, reference was made to the cases of:
1. Oloba v. Akereja (988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 84) p. 508 and
2. Okonkwo v. INEC & Ors. (2004) 1 NWLR (Pt. 854) p.1 at p.298.
The doctrines of estoppel and waiver encompassed in Paragraph 49(2) & (5) are inapplicable to the issue of jurisdiction. It is only when a tribunal or court has jurisdiction that it can exercise its discretion to invoke the principle of estoppel or waiver against an issue raised before it. This argument was based on the case of:
Galadima v. Tamba (2000) 6 SC (Pt. 1) p. 196 at pgs. 206 – 207.
It was further argued in favour of the Appellant that, administrative difficulties or inconveniences encountered in the course of filing processes have been held not to be justified or an excuse for breaching provisions of valid laws. This position was rested on the authority of:
Malah v. Kachallah (1999) 3 NWLR (pt. 594) p. 309.
Generally speaking, in England, where our judicial system emanated, the learned counsel argued that, the Court of Appeal in England, is bound to follow its own previous decisions, as well as those of courts of coordinate jurisdiction with three exceptions viz:
(a) It may choose between two conflicting decisions of its own.
(b) It must refuse to follow a decision of its own, though not expressly overruled, which is inconsistent with a decision of the House of Lords.
(c) It is not bound to follow a decision of its own given per incuriam.
On this argument, he referred to the case of:
Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. (1944) 2 All E.R. p. 293.
The learned counsel argued further that, the general state of the law in Nigeria is that this Court is not competent to overrule its earlier decision. The case law is to the effect that it is only the Supreme Court that has the jurisdiction to overrule the decisions of this Court. This legal position was hinged on the case of:
U.B.A. Ltd. v. Taan (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 287) p. 268 at p.378.

Before proceeding, I wish to deal with the eyebrow raised by the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent about the competence of both the instant appeal and the preliminary objection of the 2nd – 4th Respondents. Straight away, it is my view that the fresh issue of jurisdiction of the lower Tribunal to adjudicate upon the petition, the subject matter of this appeal is the common denominator of the appeal and the preliminary objection. The leave of this court was duly sought and obtained by the Appellant pursuant to the order of this Court in that regard on the 25th of March, 2009 to enable the Appellant raise and argue the said issue of jurisdiction for the very first time on appeal, it not having arisen from the judgment of the lower Tribunal that is being appealed. In the given circumstances, I hold that both the appeal and the preliminary objection are well within the law, practice and therefore competent.
I also consider it very apposite to state and rightly too that, regarding the date the result of the election in dispute was declared, parties are “ad idem”. In the briefs of argument filed for them by their respective counsel, the result was said to have been declared on the 21st of April, 2007. Issues were therefore not joined on this point.
The law is settled that appeals are argued and determined based on the briefs field and adopted by the parties thereto. In the instant appeal, the briefs filed for the parties were not only wholly adopted and relied upon by their respective counsel at the hearing of the appeal, further arguments were proffered to elaborate on the submissions of counsel in the said briefs. In essence, parties had all the opportunities to properly present their respective cases before this Court. Hence, this appeal in accordance to the law will be determined based on the said cases of the parties and not any other extraneous materials. I am not unmindful of the earlier decision of this Court in the case of:
E.E. Uzamere v. M.A. Urhoghide & 12 Ors. (Unreported) Consolidated Appeal Nos. CA/B/BPT/260 – 263/2008 delivered on the 3rd of June, 2009.
The instant case is quite distinguishable from Uzamere’s. In the said case of Uzamere v. Urhoghide supra, the actual date the result of election was declared by INEC was in serious contention. Two documents were presented to the court by each of the parties. The one document, Form EC 8E(ii) dated 21st April, 2007 and the other Form EC 8D(I) dated 22nd April, 2007. The latter referred to the final collation of results. Based upon the facts and circumstances of that case, this Court found that the most probable date the result was declared was the 22nd of April, 2007 as contained in the said Form EC 8D(I), the final collated result document. In the face of any other document, in the instant appeal, all the parties consented to argue this appeal “inter alia”, premised on the 21st April, 2007 as the date the election result in respect thereof was declared. What is more, it is a settled principle of law that, each case is determined by the court based on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, as no two cases are ever really completely the same. Also the courts not being a father christmas, will not grant any relief not specifically sought by a party. It is therefore incumbent on a court to consider for resolution crucial issues joined by parties. See the cases of:
1. Ella v. Agbo (1999) 8NWLR (Pt. 613) p. 139 and
2. Shekete v. N.A.F. (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1053) p. 159.
In the case of: Shekete v. NA.F. supra at page 198 paras. C – Dr Adamu J.C.A, had this to say:
“It is trite that the duty or function of any court as an impartial umpire is to limit itself to the cases or issues made or canvassed by the parties before it. The court does not and cannot descend into the arena and prop up a party’s flagging case or reach a decision on any matter or issue on any evidence or point that is not properly placed or canvassed before it by the disputing parties. Consequently in the present case, since the parties are in agreement or mutual concession that it was the CAS who convened the GCM, signed the charge sheet and confirmed the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant by the GCM, I will confine myself only to that point so canvassed and I will not embark on any inquiry as to whether the alleged act of the CAS were done on his behalf by another officer or whether statutory powers under the Act can be delegated to any other officer.” (The underlining is for emphasis).

My attitude in this appeal is geared at confining myself only to the point canvassed by the parties, no more, no less.
Now regarding the major business of this appeal, the fulcrum of which is, whether the petition of the 1st Respondent at the lower Tribunal was competent and as such whether the lower Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the said petition?
Section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006 provides as follows:
“An election petition under this Act shall be presented within thirty (30) days from the date the result of the election is declared.”
From the aforesaid provisions, the entire time limited for filing a petition including an amendment whenever applicable is thirty (30) days. Naturally, any petition filed outside the thirty (30) days prescribed for filing is plagued with incompetence which will make it unfit for an election petition tribunal to exercise adjudicatory power thereupon.
For the purposes of the computation of the time frame for the filing of an election petition pursuant to the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), a lot of heat has been and obviously is still being generated not only amongst litigants and their counsel but also within this middle tier of the judiciary. I wish to say that before the last general elections in Nigeria in 2007, there are legal authorities of this Court and the apex Court, the Supreme Court to the effect that, in the computation of the time within which an election petition must be filed pursuant to the provisions of Section 132 of the Election Act, 2002 which are “in par materia” with those of Section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006, the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Interpretation Act and Order 23 Rule 1 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules were applicable. Some of these cases are:
1. PDP v. Haruna (2004) 16 NWLR (Pt. 900)p. 597;
2. Galandu v. Kama (2004) 15 NWLR (Pt. 895) p.31 at p.60;
3. Agagu v. Nnamani (2004) 15 NWLR (pt. 895) p.134 at pgs. 150 – 151;
4. Kamba v. Bawa (2005) 4 NWLR (Pt. 914) p. 43 at pgs 78- 79;
5. Awuse v. Odili (2004) 8 NWLR (Pt. 876) p. 481 at p. 505 and
6. Iyirhiaro v. Usoh (1999) 4 NWLR (pt. 597) p. 41.
However, the firmly settled stand of this Court at this point in time is that, the provisions of Section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006 being clear, plain and unambiguous, extraneous provisions would not be employed in interpreting same. Consequently, the position of this Court has also remained firmly that, time starts to run on the date the election result was declared and not the day after. And that time stopped running on the thirtieth day and it will not matter that the last day falls on a non working day, for example, Saturday Sunday or “non dies jurisdicuss”, that is, a day declared by any government in Nigeria as a public holiday. This view is premised on the legal principle that, when the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, the rule of interpretation is that the courts must give the words their natural, literal, ordinary and grammatical meaning as applied to such subject matter in Nigeria unless some gross and manifest absurdity would thereby be produced. See the cases of:
(1) Toriola v. Willams (19B2) 7 SC p.27 at pgs. 47 – 48 and
(2) Santana Medical Servo Ltd. v. N.P.A. (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 630) p. 189.
There are so many reported and yet to be reported cases of this Court along this line. See the cases of:
(1) AC V. Jang (2009) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1132) p. 475;
(2) P. Ikharaiale & Anor. v. T. Okoh & 6 Ors. Consolidated Appeal Nos.CA/B/EPT/221 & 222/08 delivered on 23rd April, 2009.
(3) Terngu Tsegba V. Agber Vershina Titus CA/J/EP/HR/108/2008 & CA/J/EP/HR/108A/2008 delivered on 2/7/08;
(4) Mr. David Umar & Anor v. Muazu Babangida Aluju & Anor. Consolidated Appeal Nos. CA/A/EP/317/2007 AND CA/A/EP/232/2008 delivered on 19/2/08
(5) Hon. Sani Sha ‘Abari & Anor. v. Alh. Namadi Sambo Appeal No. CA/K/EP/GOV/22/2008 delivered on 6/3/09; and CA/K/EP/22/2008 delivered on 6/3/09;
(6) Kumalia v. Sheriff (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 431) p. 1032;
(7) Akume v. Lin (200B) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1114) p. 490;
(8) Uzamere v. Aisagbonridon supra;
(9) A.O. Braimah & Anor. v. Hon. A.E. Momoh & 19 Ors. Consolidated Appeal No. CA/B/EPT/128 & 155/2008 delivered on 7th July, 2009;
(10) J.I. Ojemenva & Anor. v. O.B. Ehi & 4 Ors. Appeal No. CA/B/EPT/181/2008 delivered on 7th July, 2009;
(11) L.O. Aigbogun & Anor. v. S. Eghe-Osazemwinde & 4 Ors. Consolidated Appeal Nos. CA/B/EPT/179 & 180/2008 delivered on 7th July, 2009 and
(12) B. Agbebaku v. F.O. Unuigbe & 5 Ors. Consolidated Appeal Nos. CA/B/EPT/129 & 130/2008 delivered on 7th July, 2009.

It is against the backdrop of the aforementioned cases amongst others that I consider it very apt to bring to the fore the standpoint of this Court at least in the now, as succinctly put by A.A.B. Gumel, JCA in the case of:
Uzamere v. Aisagbonridon supra at pgs. 16 – 18 as follows:
“There is no doubt that the provisions of S. 141 of the Electoral Act 2006 make provision for a limitation of time. The provisions allow for 30 days within which to file an Election Petition. With respect to every situation where limitation of time is involved the bottom line is when does time begin to run and when does it end. It is always very important to put these questions under proper focus and perspective. Over the years, the Courts have grappled with this issue in a number of its variant forms. The journey had not always been an easy or smooth one. It is however trite that time begins to run for purposes of limitation of time when a cause of action accrues. It may also be considered as trite that cut off period is reckoned from the date the cause of action accrued to the end of the number of days, months or years provided under the relevant limitation of time statute. It is therefore necessary for the purpose of determining the limitation period in any given case to consider the facts and circumstances of the case. This is because certain features of particular cases present unique settings that would require a unique approach.
Against this background and in the course of time, this Court has appeared to me to have taken a settled position that the words used in S. 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006 as set out hereinabove, are devoid of any esoteric or arcane connotation. They are clear and unambiguous.
This Court has also decided that in the context in which each of the operative words of the Section are used there is no need to resort to internal or other aids in the construction of the provisions.
Here I am referring to the decisions of this Court in SHERRIF v. KUMALIA; AKUME v. LIM; OGBEBOR v. DANJUMA, ALATAHA v. ASIN; ACTION CONGRESS & ANOR. v. JANG; UMARU & ANOR. v. ALIYU; etc. The combined effect of all these decisions is that all election petitions must be filed within 30 days from the date of the declaration of the result of that election.
And in the circumstance 30 days mean 30 days and no more. The curious part of all these decisions is that they are taken to mean that 30 days must include the last day even if it fell on a Sunday or any public holiday. ”
(The underlining is for emphasis)
Having stated “in extenso” the firm position of this Court regarding the interpretation and application of Section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006 and on the trite legal principle of “stare decisis” that a court is bound by its previous decision, I have the bound duty to adhere to the position of this Court in the above listed decisions on this point. See the cases of:
(1) Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. (1994) 2 All ER p.293 and
(2) Ekpuk v. Okon (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 944) p. 26.

It is clear as already founded above that the parties herein are in agreement that, the Appellant was declared winner on the 21st of April, 2007, the date the election in dispute was held. The parties are also “ad idem” that the 1st Respondent filed the petition the subject matter of this appeal on the 21st of May, 2007. Indeed, this is the reason the 1st Respondent in computing time concentrated on the fact that since the last day, that is, the thirtieth day fell on a Sunday, a non-working day, that the petition filed on the 21st of May, 2007 the day following was within time and competent. In the circumstance of the instant case, I hold that time began to run on the 21st of April, 2007, the day the result of the election was on the 21st of April, 2007, the day the result of the election was declared and that time ended for the purpose of filing a petition against the declared election result, on the 20th of May, 2007.
Therefore, the petition filed by the 1st Respondent on the 21st of May, 2007 was incompetent having been filed one day outside the statutory period stipulated for filing election petitions under Section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006.

The next pertinent question to ask at this point then is: did the 1st Respondent fulfil all these three conditions in commencing his petition before the lower Tribunal? The answer to the question is in the negative.
As I earlier on pointed out, the petition was filed a day outside the thirty (30) days mandatory period prescribed under Section 141 of the Act. I hold that, failure of the 1st Respondent to file the petition within the statutory period of thirty (30) days rendered the petition invalid and amounted to an incurable fundamental defect and not a mere irregularity which can be cured. Unhesitatingly, I declare that the said petition was bad. In effect, there was no petition before the lower Tribunal. To put it differently, the petition was not capable of being adjudicated upon by the lower Tribunal. Therefore, the entire trial of the petition of the 1st Respondent presented on 21st May, 2007 which culminated in the judgment delivered by the lower Tribunal on the 26th June, 2008 in Petition No. EPT/OND/NA/17/07 was a vain exercise and a nullity.
Before concluding this judgment, I wish to concur with the jurisprudential thought of A.A.B. Gumel, J.C.A, in the case of:
Bolodeoku v. Kalasuwe Appeal No. CA/B/EPT/277/2008 delivered earlier on today, 13th July, 2009. The facts and circumstances of that case are quite similar to the instant case. In his concluding line of reasoning, Gumel, J.C.A, had this to say:
“My deepest sympathies goes to the 1st Respondent. As the petitioner at the lower court, he mounted a very gallant and spirited prosecution of his petition. It was vigorous. He made out his case with vigor and determination. The prosecution of the petition was robust and passionate. He was rewarded with a very favourable judgment. He was victorious at that level. It has now turned out to be a pyrrhic victory. The entire trial was a nullity and an exercise in futility.
Inspite of all my sentiments, it is not possible for me to indulge them in favour of the 1st Respondent because the law has to be upheld as it is and not as any body thinks it ought to be. The law is against the victory of the 1st Respondent and so it must be “(The underlining is for emphasis)
What more can I say regarding the fate of the 1st Respondent in this matter? The odds are against him and all others in his shoes. Having resolved the point of jurisdiction of the lower Tribunal to adjudicate upon the petition of the 1st Respondent filed before it, in both the preliminary objection of the 2nd – 4th Respondents and issue no. 1 of the Appellant against the 1st Respondent, all the other issues raised for determination in this appeal become mere academic issues which can not affect the outcome of this appeal in any manner. They are in essence not worthy of attention. For, it is settled law, that once an issue is based on an academic or hypothetical in nature, a court of law will have no jurisdiction to hear or determine it. See the cases of
1.Zenith Plastics Industry Ltd. v. Sarnotech Ltd. (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1060) p. 315 at p. 341;
2.Lawani Alli & Anor. v. Gbadamosi Aleshinloye (2000) 4 SCNJ p. 264 at p. 297 and
(3) D.E.N.R. Ltd. v. Trans Int’l Bank Ltd. supra at pgs. 420 – 421 paras. H-A.
Finally, this appeal is meritorious and should be allowed. It is allowed by me. The said decision including the consequential orders of the lower Tribunal is hereby declared a nullity. The said petition of the 1st Respondent, Hon. Ifedayo Sunday Abegunde as Petitioner therein having been declared incompetent is accordingly struck out. This appeal is dismissed in its entirety. I make no order for costs.

ALI ABUBAKAR BABANDI GUMEL, J.C.A.: I agree.

CHIOMA EGONDU NWOSU-IHEME (Ph.D), J.C.A.: I agree.

Appearances

Mr. I.A. Adedipe SAN, with him, Mr. S. Ojile For Appellant

AND

Dr. O.F. Ayeni, with him Messrs T. Atere, O. Fadare and Miss O.B. Aladegbami,
Mr. Ameh Igbochi,
Mr. J.C.A. Idachaba. For Respondent