PEOPLES REDEMPTION PARTY v. ONDO STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS
(2012)LCN/5401(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 9th day of March, 2018
CA/AK/124/2017(R)
RATIO
PROCEDURE: MEANING AND NATURE OF AMENDMENT
It is foremost, in order to ease appreciation and lay proper foundation, to display salient features of the concept of amendment combed out from case-law authorities. Unarguably, the issue of amendment has become ubiquitous in daily adjudications in the Courts. It is invariably precipitated by the accepted fallibility of man in the process of writing documents. Etymologically, amendment traces its lexical roots to the Latin verb, emendo-emendere, meaning “to cure, to add to, to correct an error”. In its wide Con, amendment is: A formal revision or addition proposed or made to a statute, Constitution, pleading, order, or other instrument; specify a change made by addition, deletion or correction, esp., an alteration in wording”, see Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, page 89. In the immaculate words of Oputa, JSC, in Awote v. Owodunni (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 46) 941/(1986) 2 NSCC (vol. 17) 1359 at 1366, “amendment involves and implies an alteration, an addition to or subtraction from….” Even, substitution is held as an act of amendment, see Agbabiaka v. Saibu (1998) 7 SCNJ 305/(1998) 10 NWLR (Pt. 517) 534; SPDCN Ltd. v. Edamkue (2009) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1160) 1. PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.
PROCEDURE: RATIONALE FOR AMENDMENT OF PROCESS/PLEADINGS
The raison d’etre for amendment is to determine, in an existing suit, the real question(s) in controversy between the litigating parties. It is a time-honoured principle of law that amendment can be made at any stage of proceedings in Court before judgment. Most rules of Courts do not circumscribe the number of times a party can apply to a Courts for an amendment during the pendency of proceedings. It is trite, that amendments could be effected before trial Courts as well as appellate Courts, that is, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. Sometimes, the Courts make amendments suo motu. These attributes of amendment have been confirmed by the apex Court in sea of authorities, see Alsthom v. Saraki (2000) 11 SCNJ 1; Abey v. Alex (1999) 12 SCNJ 234; Solanke v. Somefun (1974) 1 SC 141/(1974) NSCC, vol. 9, 14; Mamman v. Salaudeen (2005) 18 NWLR (Pt.958) 474; Kode v. Yussuf (2001) 4 NWLR (Pt. 703) 3921 (2001) 2 SCNJ 49; Akaninwo v. Nsirim (2008) 1 SC (Pt. 111) 151; Okolo v. UBN Ltd. (1999) 6 SCNJ 193; Ehidimhen v. Musa (2008) 8 NWLR (Pt 669) 540; SPDCN Ltd. v: Edamkue (2009) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1160) 1; Ipadeola v. Oshowole (1987) 5 SCNJ 2001(1987) 2 NSCC (vol. 18) 755. PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.
PLEADINGS: CIRCUMSTANCES AN AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED
There are certain principles, evolved by the Supreme Court, to guide the Courts in their herculean responsibility of attending to amendments of Court processes. In Chief Ojah v. Chief Eyo Ogboni (1976) 4 SC (Reprint) 87 at 92, Madarikan, JSC, stated:
“It is well settled law that an amendment of pleadings should be allowed unless –
- it will entail injustice to the respondent;
- the applicant is acting mala fide ….or
- by his blunder, the applicant has done some injury to the respondent which cannot be compensated by costs or otherwise….”
Recently, these cardinal principles have been re-echoed by the apex Court, see Eze v. Ene (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1579) 313.
Similarly, amendment will be granted if it: relates to a mere misnomer; does not change the nature of the claim; does not create a new suit; will cure the defects in the proceedings; will be consistent with the testimonies of witnesses being considered on appeal or will not embarrass or surprise the opponent in the proceedings. The apex Court had given its blessing to these agelong guiding principles in litany of judicial authorities, see Oguntimehin v. Gubere (1964) All NLR 169; Amadi v. Thomas Aplin & Co. Ltd. (1972) AII NLR 413;Mamman v. Salaudeen (supra); Kode v. Yussuf (supra); Adetutu v. Aderohunmu (1984) 1 SCNLR 575; Gowon v. Ike-Okongwa (2003) 1 SCNJ 453: Okolo v. UBN (supra); Ehidimhen v. Musa (supra); Okafor v. Ikeanyi (1979) 3-4 SC 99/(1979) NSCC (vol. 12) 43. PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.
JUSTICE
UZO IFEYINWA NDUKWE-ANYANWUJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYAJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
RIDWAN MAIWADA ABDULLAHIJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
PEOPLES REDEMPTION PARTYAppellant(s)
AND
1. ONDO STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION
2. PROFESSOR OLUGBENGA IGE (CHAIRMAN, ODIEC)
3. ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND COMMISSIONER FOR JUSTICE, ONDO STATE.
4. MR. ALLI SAMSON OLUWAFEMI
5. MR. AYANTOLA OLUWAGBENGA
6. MR. IBUKUN ARIJELOYE
7. PRINCE BANJI AYELABOLA HENRYRespondent(s)
OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Lead Ruling): By a motion on notice, dated 9th January, 2018, and filed 10th January, 2018, the sixth and seventh respondents, as applicants, qua counsel, prayed the Court as follows.
1. AN ORDER for leave of the Court to amend the 6th and 7th Respondents Brief of Argument (erroneously caption (sic) “6th and 7th Respondents’ Reply Brief) dated 2nd day of November, 2017 and filed 13/11/17, of which proposed amendment is as specified hereunder as follows.
(a) To delete the caption “6th and 7th Respondents’ Reply Brief and replace some with “The Amended 6th and 7th Respondents’ Brief of Argument Incorporating Notice of Preliminary Objection”:
(b) To incorporate the Notice of Preliminary Objection hitherto filed by the 6th and 7th Respondents in pursuant to Order 10 Rule 1 of the Court of Appeal Rule, 2016 together with the Argument in respect of the Preliminary Objection into the process herein sought to be amended.
2. AN ORDER of the Honourable Court deeming the Applicants/Respondents’ perfected Amended 6th and 7th Respondents’ Brief of Argument
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Incorporating Notice of Preliminary Objection, which had been filed alongside this Motion Papers as properly filed and served on the Appellant/Respondent as the filing fee in respect thereof had been duly paid.
3. AN ORDER of the Honourable Court for any other Order or such further Orders as the Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance of this case.
The application was predicated on two grounds. It was supported by a 12 – paragraph affidavit and a 12 – paragraph further affidavit filed on 1st February, 2018. There were written address and further written address attached to both affidavits respectively.
The appellant, as respondent, greeted the application with a stiff opposition. In consequence, it filed, on 15th January, 2018, a 26 – paragraph counter-affidavit with a written address attached;
The application was heard on 6th February, 2018. During its hearing, learned counsel for the applicants, A. C. Ajakaiye, Esq., adopted the applicants’ written addresses as representing his arguments for the application. He urged the Court to grant it. Similarly, learned counsel for the respondent, Femi Aborishade, Esq.,
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adopted the respondent’s written address as forming his submissions against the application. He urged the Court to dismiss it.
In the applicants’ written address, they distilled two issues for determination to wit:
1. Whether the Applicants/Respondents had placed before this Honourable Court sufficient facts as will entitle them to the Court exercising its discretion in their favour? And
2. Whether the course of justice will not be better enhanced if this application is granted in favour of the Applicants/Respondents.
The respondent, in its written address, crafted a sole issue for determination viz:
Whether an amendment that will overreach the Appellant is permitted in law to be granted.
A close look at the two sets of issues shows that they are identical in substance. Indeed, the respondent’s issues can be conveniently subsumed under the applicants’. For this reason of sameness, I will decide the application on the issues formulated by the applicants: the undoubted owners of the application.
Argument on the two issues
Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the Court should exercise
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its discretion in granting the application because it was meant to elicit the issues in controversy, remove injustice without overreaching the respondents. He relied on NNB Plc. v. Denclag Ltd. (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 228) 606. He asserted that the applicants had discharged their burden in the application in their affidavits. He referred to NIWA v. SPDCN Ltd. (2008) 49 WRN 11; Shittu v. Peugeot Automobile Nig. Ltd. (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 253) 282; Egbe v. FRN (2003) FWLR (Pt. 177) 941. He enumerated the purposes for amendment in law. He cited Bank of Baroda v. Iyalabani (2002) 13 NWLR (Pt.785) 551. He listed the principles that guide the grant of application for amendment. He relied on Akaninwo v. Nsirim (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1093) 439. He insisted that the application was not made in bad faith. He cited Celtel (Nig.) Ltd. v. Econet Wireless Ltd. (2011) 3 NWLR (Pt 1233) 156. He reasoned that the amendment would serve course of justice. He referred to Adewumi v. A. -G., Ekiti State (2002) 2 NWLR (Pt. 751) 474. He posited that the amendment arose out of inadvertence of counsel. He cited Celtel (Nig.) Ltd. v. Econet Wireless Ltd. (supra); Vulcan Gases Ltd. v. G. F.
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Industry (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt 719) 601. He explained that the amendment would not throw different complexion to the brief nor would it add fresh argument to it. He relied on Fasuan v. Awoyemi (2006) All FWLR (Pt 334) 1906 / (2006) 13 NWLR (Pt. 996) 86; Ehidimhen v. Musa (2000) 8 NWLR (Pt. 669) 540.
On behalf of the respondents, learned counsel contended that the amendment should not be granted as it would overreach the respondent. He relied on C.G.G. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Idorenyin (2015) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1 475) 149; NNB Plc. v. Denclag Ltd. (2005) 4 NWLR (Pt. 916) 549. He noted that the respondent had timeously raised the incurable incompetence in the applicants’ brief and the manner of raising their objections. He postulated that the applicants had not shown good and convincing reasons for the amendment. He relied on C.G.G. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Idorenyin (supra); NNB Plc. v. Denclag Ltd. (supra); Williams y. Hope Rising Voluntary Funds Society (1982) 1-2 SC (Reprint) 70 He posited that Courts were bound by their rules. He referred to Bhojsons Plc. v. Daniel-Kalio (2006) 2 SCNJ 156; Magna Maritime Service Ltd. v. S. A. Oteju (2005) 6 SCM 109. He declared the rules
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cited by the applicants as irrelevant. He persisted that the proper and mandatory provision was Order 10 Rule 1 of the Court of Appeal Rules which used the word “shall”. He cited Miscellaneous Offence Tribunal v. Okoroafor (2001) 12 SCM; Eweka v. Rawson (2001) 10 NWLR (Pt. 722) 723. He argued that incompetent processes could not be amended. He referred to NNB Plc. v. Denclag Ltd. (supra); Mobil Oil (Nig.) Ltd. v. Yusuf (2012) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1304) 47. He maintained that injustice would affect victim of non-compliance with the rules of Court. He relied on Okoye v. Centre Point Merc. Bank Ltd. (2008) 7-12 SC 1. He urged the Court to make reference to other authorities on the application. He cited Okochi v. Animkwoi (2004) 114 LECN 2924. He placed reliance on Bamgbose, O. J. (2014) Digest of Judgment of the Supreme Court of Nigeria on the points canvassed.
Resolution of the issues
In the interest of orderliness, I will attend to the two issues in their manner of presentation by the feuding parties. The parties fused the arguments on them, I will in order to conserve the scarce juridical time, amalgamate their considerations. Afterall, they share a
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common target: the grant or otherwise of the applicants’ application for amendment of their brief of argument.
It is foremost, in order to ease appreciation and lay proper foundation, to display salient features of the concept of amendment combed out from case-law authorities. Unarguably, the issue of amendment has become ubiquitous in daily adjudications in the Courts. It is invariably precipitated by the accepted fallibility of man in the process of writing documents. Etymologically, amendment traces its lexical roots to the Latin verb, emendo-emendere, meaning “to cure, to add to, to correct an error”. In its wide Con, amendment is: A formal revision or addition proposed or made to a statute, Constitution, pleading, order, or other instrument; specify a change made by addition, deletion or correction, esp., an alteration in wording”, see Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, page 89. In the immaculate words of Oputa, JSC, in Awote v. Owodunni (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 46) 941/(1986) 2 NSCC (vol. 17) 1359 at 1366, “amendment involves and implies an alteration, an addition to or subtraction from….” Even, substitution is held as an act of
7
amendment, see Agbabiaka v. Saibu (1998) 7 SCNJ 305/(1998) 10 NWLR (Pt. 517) 534; SPDCN Ltd. v. Edamkue (2009) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1160) 1.
The raison d’etre for amendment is to determine, in an existing suit, the real question(s) in controversy between the litigating parties. It is a time-honoured principle of law that amendment can be made at any stage of proceedings in Court before judgment. Most rules of Courts do not circumscribe the number of times a party can apply to a Courts for an amendment during the pendency of proceedings. It is trite, that amendments could be effected before trial Courts as well as appellate Courts, that is, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. Sometimes, the Courts make amendments suo motu. These attributes of amendment have been confirmed by the apex Court in sea of authorities, see Alsthom v. Saraki (2000) 11 SCNJ 1; Abey v. Alex (1999) 12 SCNJ 234; Solanke v. Somefun (1974) 1 SC 141/(1974) NSCC, vol. 9, 14; Mamman v. Salaudeen (2005) 18 NWLR (Pt.958) 474; Kode v. Yussuf (2001) 4 NWLR (Pt. 703) 3921 (2001) 2 SCNJ 49; Akaninwo v. Nsirim (2008) 1 SC (Pt. 111) 151; Okolo v. UBN Ltd. (1999) 6 SCNJ 193; Ehidimhen
8
v. Musa (2008) 8 NWLR (Pt 669) 540; SPDCN Ltd. v: Edamkue (2009) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1160) 1; Ipadeola v. Oshowole (1987) 5 SCNJ 2001(1987) 2 NSCC (vol. 18) 755.
There are certain principles, evolved by the Supreme Court, to guide the Courts in their herculean responsibility of attending to amendments of Court processes. In Chief Ojah v. Chief Eyo Ogboni (1976) 4 SC (Reprint) 87 at 92, Madarikan, JSC, stated:
“It is well settled law that an amendment of pleadings should be allowed unless –
1. it will entail injustice to the respondent;
2. the applicant is acting mala fide ….or
3. by his blunder, the applicant has done some injury to the respondent which cannot be compensated by costs or otherwise….”
Recently, these cardinal principles have been re-echoed by the apex Court, see Eze v. Ene (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1579) 313.
Similarly, amendment will be granted if it: relates to a mere misnomer; does not change the nature of the claim; does not create a new suit; will cure the defects in the proceedings; will be consistent with the testimonies of witnesses being considered on appeal or will not embarrass or surprise the
9
opponent in the proceedings. The apex Court had given its blessing to these agelong guiding principles in litany of judicial authorities, see Oguntimehin v. Gubere (1964) All NLR 169; Amadi v. Thomas Aplin & Co. Ltd. (1972) AII NLR 413;Mamman v. Salaudeen (supra); Kode v. Yussuf (supra); Adetutu v. Aderohunmu (1984) 1 SCNLR 575; Gowon v. Ike-Okongwa (2003) 1 SCNJ 453: Okolo v. UBN (supra); Ehidimhen v. Musa (supra); Okafor v. Ikeanyi (1979) 3-4 SC 99/(1979) NSCC (vol. 12) 43.
I have meticulously perused the applicants copious affidavits with the finery of a tooth comb. Interestingly, they are comprehension-friendly. I have in total allegiance to the law, situated the facts in those affidavits with the position of the law displayed above. The wisdom behind the juxtaposition is plain. It is to ascertain if the applicants satisfied the latter by dint of the material facts furnished before the Court.
A communal reading of the affidavits amply, disclose that the applicants intend to ostracise the process captioned/described as “6th and 7th Respondents’ Reply Brief” and supplant it with the sixth and seventh respondent’s brief of argument.
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To begin with, that appellation, respondents’ reply brief is alien and offensive to the Court of Appeal Rules , 2016 (hereinafter abridged to as “the Rules”). While a respondent’s brief of argument is ordained by the provision of Order 18 Rule 4 of the Rules, a reply brief, which is personal to an appellant, is accommodated by the prescription of Order 18 Rule 5 of the Rules. In other words, the applicants are soliciting for the Court’s discretion to expel the incongruous nomenclature from the appeal by replacing it with the one that is legitimate. Such a correction, to my mind, will properly equip this Court to appreciate the processes before it, cognizable by the Rules, so that its sense of justice will not be confused and beclouded.
Admirably, learned counsel owned up the wrong configuration in the process as an error on his part. This is a quintessence of a good advocacy. In the eyes of the law, an error is: “something done by a person which is incorrect or which should not have been done”, see Ugwu v. Ararume (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt.1048) 367 at 513, per Muhammad, JSC. Human beings are amenable to mistakes or errors on the ground of their fallibility.
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That has received judicial recognition or sanction in Adegoke Motors Ltd. V Adesanya (1989) 5 SC 113/(1989) 3 NWLR (pt. 109) 250 at 274. In law, sins of counsel are never visited on the innocent litigants, see Wassah V. Kara (2015) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1449) 37,Abah V. Monday (2015) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1480) 569; SPDCN Ltd. V. Agbara (2016) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1496) 353. To penalize the applicants for their counsel’s error will be insulting the law.
Besides, the applicants intend to factor their preliminary objection into their brief of argument. In the first place, the applicants had filed a notice of preliminary objection on 29th November, 2017. I have married that with the one counted in at pages 5 and 6 of the threshold of their amended brief of argument. Indeed, they mirror themselves in all ramifications minus the arguments canvassed in the latter. Thus, the applicants had ab initio fulfilled the sacred requirement of Order 10 Rule 1 of the Rules when they filed that of 29th November, 2017. The rationale behind the provision of Order 10 Rule 1 of the Rules is to avoid springing surprise on an appellant and afford him an ample opportunity to react to a preliminary
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objection. Nevertheless, “It is now accepted practice for a respondent to argue his preliminary objection in his brief as the respondent has done thereby obviating the necessity of filing notice of preliminary objection”, see Umanah (Jnr) v. NDIC (2016) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1533) 458 at 475, per Rhodes-Vivour, JSC. This magisterial pronouncement, in the ex cathedra authority, punctures the respondent’s castigation of the procedure adopted by the applicants. The applicants’ have not, in the least, fractured the adjectival law. I therefore hold that their intention to incorporate the preliminary objection in their brief of argument does not constitute a coup de grace in the success of the application.
In a bid to castrate the application, the respondent weaved the defence that it was made mala fide. In Akaninwo v. Nsirim (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1093) 439 at 475, Tobi, JSC, captured, graphically, the purport of mala fide in these illuminating words:
Mala fide is the opposite of bona fide. It simply means bad faith as opposed to bona fide, which is good faith.
Mala fide projects a sinister motive designed to mislead or deceive another.
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Mala fide is more than bad judgment or mere negligence. It is a conscious doing of a wrong arising from dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. Mala fide is not a mistake or error but a deliberate wrong emanation from ill-will.
The above brief juridical survey, done in due consultation with the law, reveals that counsel admitted the mistake in the process that gave birth to the solicitation for amendment. Put differently, the mistake does not fall within the perimeter of mala fide. It is totally divorced from it. Curiously, the respondent, in its infinite wisdom, starved this Court of the incidents of mala fide which germinate from the application for amendment of the applicants’ brief. The glaring absence of such elements, exhibited by the applicants, renders the defence of mala fide, erected by the respondent to snuff life out of the application lame. It cannot fly.
Not done, the respondent invented another defence of overreaching it since it had objected to the competence of the process. The purport and tentacles of overreaching were expounded by Tobi, JSC, in the case of Yusuf vs. Adegoke (2007 ) 4 SCNJ 103 thus:
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An overreaching conduct is a circumventing conduct to outwit the adverse party by cunning or artifice. It is designed to defeat the object or objective of the respondent’s case by going too far, in the sense of destroying the core or fulcrum of the respondent’s case.
See, also, NIWA v. SPDCN Ltd. (supra); Akaninwo v. Nsirim (supra).
I had shown, at the dawn of this ruling, that the applicants did not desecrate/defile the provision of Order 10 Rule 1 of the Rules having filed a notice of preliminary objection on 29th November, 2017. I found too that the applicants’ inclusion of a preliminary objection, which is on all fours with the previous one save the arguments is not hostile to the law. The respondent has not furnished this Court of any extenuating circumstances that will propel/compel me to disturb the solemn finding reached with the aid of the law. These apart, the law gives a party in blunder the licence to correct a process, not an incompetent one, notwithstanding an objection raised by the adversary to its competence. In Shanu v. Afribank (2000) 13 NWLR (Pt. 684) 392 at 404; Ayoola, JSC, incisively, intoned. The contention that this application should not be
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granted because a preliminary objection has been raised showing the errors in the process of the applicant’s appeal, is without substance. The applicant is not foreclosed by the preliminary objection from correcting those errors or starting the process afresh on a more appropriate footing.
See also Nalsa & Team Associates v. NNPC (1991) 8 NWLR (Pt.212) 652; Ani v. Effiok (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1567) 281.
It can be gleaned from the legal expositions, x-rayed above, that the process sought to be remedied by an amendment is not tainted with incompetence so as to make it not amenable to amendment. The dazzling argument of the respondent would have been fruitful were the improper process plagued by incompetence which would contaminate its submission to amendment. To top it all, the respondent, if the application succeeds, is all liberty to file an amended appellant’s reply brief of argument to neutralise any new points articulated in the applicants’ brief of argument, see Umanah (Jnr.) v. NDIC (supra); Eze v. Ene (supra). Put bluntly, the amendment sought does not in any way demolish/erode the kernel of the respondent’s case.
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In the light of these, I wholly dishonour the respondent’s enticing invitation to crucify the application on the undeserved altar/shrine of overreaching for want of legal justification.
For the sake of completeness, an extension of the respondent’s stance is that the application is not grantable in that parties had filed their briefs of argument and the appeal, de jure, ripe for hearing. In FBN Plc. v. May Med. Clinics (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt. 717) 28 at 44, Uwaifo, JSC, stated:
The fact that briefs of argument have been filed and exchanged and an appeal is virtually ready for hearing will not prevent the Court from exercising its undoubted discretion to allow an amendment both to the notice and grounds of appeal and the brief of argument so long as the amendment would serve the ends of justice and fairness, and the other party can be compensated by cost.
The respondent’s sterling contention takes to flight in the presence of this golden pronouncement. Put simply, the delivery and exchange of briefs of argument between parties is not a bar to amendment in deserving circumstance such as in the instant case. In effect, the defence is not a dent on the
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applicants’ application.
Flowing from these legal dissections, the applicants have showcased sufficient reasons to fetch them the discretion/indulgence of this Court regarding their application. It will meet the ends of justice to accede to the application. I dare say, all the strictures, which the respondent rained on the application, fly in the face of the law. In the end, I have no option than to resolve the conflated issues in favour of the applicants and against the respondent.
On the whole, having resolved the two issues in favour of the applicants, the destiny of the application is obvious. It is imbued with merit. Accordingly, the application is granted. Consequently:
1. Leave is granted to the applicants: (a) To delete the caption “6th and 7th Respondents’ Reply Brief” and replace it with Amended 6th and 7th Respondents’ Brief of Argument Incorporating Notice of Preliminary Objection. (b) To incorporate the Notice of Preliminary Objection hitherto filed by the 6th and 7th Respondent in pursuant to Order 10 Rule 1 of the Court of Appeal Rule, (sic) 2016 together with the Argument in respect of the Preliminary Objection into the
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process herein sought to be amended.
2. The Amended 6th and 7th Respondents’ Brief of Argument, Incorporating Notice of Preliminary Objection, filed on 10th January, 2018, is deemed as properly filed and served today, 9th March, 2018, appropriate filing fees thereon having been duly paid.
3. The parties shall bear the respective costs they incurred in the prosecution and defence application.
UZO IFEYINWA NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.: I had read in draft form, the Ruling just delivered by my learned brother Obande Festus Ogbuinya, JCA. I agree with his reasoning and final conclusions. I also abide by all the orders contained in this Ruling and adopt them as mine, including that on cost.
RIDWAN MAIWADA ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the lead Ruling just delivered by my learned brother, OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, JCA who treated the two issues formulated by the Applicants in a fine tune with due regard to the Rules of Court in respect of such application. The reasoning and conclusion arrived at by my noble Lord are acceptable to me and adopted
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same.
I too resolve the issues in favour of the Applicants as done in the lead Ruling. Accordingly, the application is granted by me and abide by the consequential orders in the said lead judgment including order as to costs.
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Appearances:
Femi Aborishade, Esq. with him, E. Udofot, Esq. and Samuel Ogueri, Esq.For Appellant(s)
Charles Titiloye, Esq. with him, K. Olowo, Esq. for the 1st-3rd Respondents.
Rotimi Ologunye, Esq. for 4th & 5th Respondents.
A.C. Ajakaiye, Esq. for 6th & 7th RespondentsFor Respondent(s)
>
Appearances
Femi Aborishade, Esq. with him, E. Udofot, Esq. and Samuel Ogueri, Esq.For Appellant
AND
Charles Titiloye, Esq. with him, K. Olowo, Esq. for the 1st-3rd Respondents.
Rotimi Ologunye, Esq. for 4th & 5th Respondents.
A.C. Ajakaiye, Esq. for 6th & 7th RespondentsFor Respondent
