PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY V. SEN. DANIEL I. SAROR & ORS (2012)

PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY V. SEN. DANIEL I. SAROR & ORS

(2012)LCN/5156(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Thursday, the 16th day of February, 2012

CA/MK/EPT/03/2012

RATIO

THE POSITION OF THE LAW WHERE THE FACTS AND CON JUSTICE IN A CASE IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE DECISION OF A SUPERIOR COURT

THE SIXTEEN RULES OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

In A.G. of Bendel State v. The A.G, of the Federation (1981) 10 SC 1; (1931) 1 FNCR 179, Obaseki JSC set out the following 12 point rule of interpretation:-
1. Effect should be given to every word used in the Constitution.
2. A Constitution nullifying a specific clause in the Constitution shall not be tolerated unless where absolutely necessary.
3. A constitutional power should not be used to attain an unconstitutional result,
4. The language of the Constitution, where clear and unambiguous must be given its plain and evident meaning.
5. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is an organic scheme of government to be dealt with as an entirety hence a particular provision should not be severed from the rest of the Constitution.
6. While the language of the Constitution does not change the changing circumstances of a progressive society for which it was designed, it can yield new and further import of its meaning.
7. A constitutional provision should not be construed in such a way as to defeat its evident purpose.
8. Under the Constitution granting specific powers, a particular power must be granted before it can be exercised.
9. Declaration by the National Assembly of its essential legislative functions is precluded by the Constitution.
10. Words are the common signs that men make use of to declare their intentions one to another, and when the words of a man express his intentions plainly, there is no need to have recourse to other means of interpretation of such words,
11. The principles upon which the Constitution was established rather than the direct operation or literal meaning of the words used should measure the purpose and scope of its provisions,
12, Words of the Constitution are, therefore, not to be read with “stultifying narrowness.”
See also Consolidated appeal Brig. Gen Marwa & Another v. Admiral Nyako & others (supra).
In Ishola v. Ajiboye (1994) 7-8 SCNJ (Pt. 1) 1 at 35 Ogundare JSC adopting the twelve point Rule added four point rule which read thus:-
“1. Constitutional language is to be given a reasonable construction, and absurd consequences are to be avoided;
2. Constitutional provisions dealing with the same subject matter are to be construed together;
3. Seemingly conflicting parts are to be harmonized, if possible, so that effect can be given to all parts of the Constitution.
4. The position of an article or clause in the constitution influences its construction.”
Furthermore on interpretation the apex Court in Rabiu v. Kano State (1980) 8-11 SC/130 at 149 per Sir Udo Udoma JSC stated inter alia:-
“My Lords, it is my view that the approach of this court to the construction of the constitution should be, and so has been, one of liberalism probably a variation on the theme of the general maxim ut re magi valeat quam pereat. I do not conceive it to be the duty of this court so to construe any of the provisions of the constitution as to defeat the obvious ends the constitution was designed to serve where another construction equally in accord and consistent with the words sense of such provisions will serve to such ends.” PER. REGINA OBIAGELI NWODO, J.C.A.

APPEAL: WHETHER AN APPEAL LODEGED IN THE APPEAL COURT CAN BE ORDERED TO THE TRIBUNAL TO HEAR THE MATTER ON MERIT

The intendment of the framers of the constitution cannot be such that where an appeal is lodged in the Appeal Court pursuant to the constitution as amended any consequential order of the appeal court to the tribunal to hear the matter on merit will be rendered nugatory if the 180 days from date of filing of the petition had lapsed therefore, whilst the words of the provision in section 285(6) are clear, their literary interpretation in the present situation will not convey the purport of the entire section. This is not an amendment to the constitution by this Court nor any guise to change the words in the constitution. It is an attempt not to interpret the provision of the constitution by adopting an approach that will defeat its evident purpose. In the present circumstance section 285 of the constitution must be read together with related sections. This is in line with settled law that provisions of a constitution are not to be interpreted in isolation but other provisions must be taken into consideration in the exercise. An appeal is a constitutional right which should not be taken away from an aggrieved party. The constitutional right of appeal is conferred on an aggrieved person upon whom a decision has been pronounced, which decision has affected him, either he is refused something or the order adversely affected him. Therefore, where the appeal is successful it cannot be in vain. See Savanna Bank Nig. Ltd. v. Ajilo (2001) FWLR (Pt. 75) pg. 513 at 543 per Uwais, (CJN). PER. REGINA OBIAGELI NWODO, J.C.A.

THE DISCRETIONARY RIGHT OF THE COURT TO PRESERVE AND PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS BY PROVIDING REMEDY FOR THE CITIZEN

“Where the Constitution bestows a right on its citizen and does not expressly take away or provide how the right should lost or forfeited in the circumstance, we have the duty and indeed the obligation to ensure that the ensured right is not lost or denied the citizen by Constitution that is narrow and not purposive. To this end the established practice of this Court is where the Constitutional right in particular, and indeed any right in general, of a citizen is threatened or violate, it is left for the Court to be creative in its decision in order to ensure that it preserves and protects the right by providing remedy for the citizen.” The orders of the Supreme Court are founded on the jurisdiction under section 233(1) of the 1999 constitution and section 6(6) of the 1999 constitution. PER. REGINA OBIAGELI NWODO, J.C.A.

Justice

MONICA B. DONGBAN-MENSEM Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

THERESA NGOLIKA ORJI-ABADUA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

REGINA OBIAGELI NWODO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

Justice

PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTYAppellant(s)

AND

1. SEN. DANIEL I. SAROR
2. ALL NIGERIAN PEOPLES PARTY
3. HON. GABRIEL TORWUA SUSWAM
4. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
5. WEST AFRICAN EXAMINATIONS COUNCIL
6. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, BENUE STATERespondent(s)

REGINA OBIAGELI NWODO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The decision of this court in respect of this appeal was pronounced on the 2nd of February 2012 and the reasons reserved to a later date. I hereunder set out my reasoning in support of the decision. The Governorship Elections in Benue State was conducted by the Independent National Electoral Commission INEC, on the 26th of April, 2011. The Appellant, Peoples Democratic Party sponsored the 3rd Respondent as its governorship candidate while the 2nd Respondent sponsored the 1st Respondent as candidate of the All Nigerian Peoples Party. The 4th Respondent at the conclusion of the general election returned the 3rd Respondent as the winner of the election on 27th April, 2011. The 1st and 2nd Respondents were not satisfied with the return of the 3rd Respondent, and preceded to the Governorship Election Tribunal sitting in Makurdi Benue State (hereinafter referred to as Tribunal) and filed a petition on 17 May, 2011 against the 3rd Respondent, Appellant and the 4th Respondent. The Appellant, 3rd and 4th Respondents in response filed separate Preliminary Objections challenging the competence of the petition.
The Tribunal considered the objection in upholding same, and dismissed the petition on 11th August, 2011. The 1st and 2nd Respondents dissatisfied with the decision of the tribunal appealed to the Court of Appeal vide Appeal No. CA/MK/EPT/12/2011. The Court of Appeal on 29/9/2011 set aside the Ruling of the Tribunal, dismissed the petition and ordered the hearing of the petition by a new panel. The Appellant and 3rd Respondent aggrieved appealed to the Supreme Court. The Apex Court dismissed the appeal on 28/11/2011 and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Following the decision of the Supreme Court a new Governorship Election Petition Tribunal was constituted.
The new panel of the Tribunal commenced sitting on 22/11/2011, a period of about 189 days from 17/5/2011 when the petition was filed. As at 14/11/2011 when the Supreme Court heard the 1st and 2nd Respondents appeal and restored the order of the Tribunal the 180 days prescribed in Section 285(6) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) had passed.
The Appellant filed a Motion on Notice objecting to the hearing of the petition on the ground that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to hear the petition outside the 180 days stipulated by Section 285(6) of the 1999 Constitution. The Tribunal dismissed the objection, and assumed jurisdiction. Hence the present appeal against the ruling of the Tribunal dismissing the objection to its jurisdiction.
The Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 8/12/2011 containing four grounds of appeal. Parties settled, filed and exchanged Briefs of Argument with the exclusion of the 3rd, 5th and 6th Respondents.
At the hearing of the Appeal on 2/2/2012, the learned Counsel for the appellant Chief A.A. Ochoga adopted the appellant’s brief filed on 10/1/12 settled by Chief Solo U. Akuma, MON, SAN. He urged the Court to allow the appeal.
Learned Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents C.S. Orpin adopted the 1st and 2nd Respondents brief deemed filed on 2/2/12. He urged the Court to dismiss the appeal. The 4th Respondent’s Counsel N.D. Ter (Mrs.) adopted their brief of argument filed on 23/1/12. The 3rd, 5th and 6th Respondents did not file any brief.
In the Appellant’s Brief the following Issues were distilled for determination:-
(1) Whether the Governorship Election Tribunal sitting in Makurdi, Benue State was right to assume jurisdiction to hear and determine this petition after the expiration of the 180 days from the date the petition was filed. (Grounds 1, 2 and 3),
(2) Whether the order of the Supreme Court of 14h November, 2011 in Appeal No. SC, 360/2011, that this petition be heard on merits tantamount to an extension of time to hear the petition after the expiration of 180 days from the date it was filed. (Ground 4).”
The 1st and 2nd Respondents in their brief of argument formulated one sole Issue for determination. It reads thus:-
Whether the re-constituted panel of Governorship Election Tribunal has jurisdiction, in the light of the provisions of Section 285(6) of the 1999 Constitution, to entertain the petition after the expiration of 180 days calculated from the date of filing thereof”.
The 4th Respondent also formulated one sole Issue for determination which is “whether the petition is Statute barred.”
I have read the Issues formulated in the respective briefs in relation to the grounds of appeal in the notice of appeal. It is imperative at this stage before deciding on which of the issues to adopt; to look at the submission of the 1st and 2nd Respondents Counsel that Issue 2 distilled from ground 4 by the appellant has no bearing to the decision as it emanated from the Supreme Court judgment in Appeal No. SC. 360/11 – Prof. Steve Ugba v. PDP which is not related to the petition. This submission appears to be an objection to the competency of Issue 2 tied to ground 4. The appellant did not file a reply brief to the Respondent submission on the competence of ground 4. I must observe that there is no formal Notice of objection filed by the 1st and 2nd Respondents. However, this Court will not proceed to consider Issue 2 without being convinced that it is competent, the 1st and 2nd Respondents having raised the point and urged the Court to discountenance Issue 2. The Appellant had the opportunity to file a reply brief on points of law but he chose not to so respond. An issue for determination must arise from a valid ground of appeal, when the ground is challenged on the ground of competency the court cannot overlook such argument, notwithstanding the party did not file a notice of preliminary objection.
Ground 4 of the Notice of Appeal filed on 8/12/2011 with its particulars reads thus:-
”GROUND FOUR: ERROR IN LAW
The Governorship Election Tribunal erred in law which occasioned a miscarriage of Justice when it held that 180 days provided in Section 285(6) of the 1999 Constitution begins to run from the date the Supreme Court made an order that the petition be heard on the merit.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
(i) The enactment of statutes is outside the jurisdiction of courts and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Legislature.
(ii) The Legislature expressly enacted in Section 285(6) of the Constitution that the 180 days shall run from the date of the filing of the petition.
(iii) The decision of the honourable Tribunal amended he provisions of Section 285(6) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended).
(iv) The Supreme Court in its decision dated November 14/2011 in Appeal No, SC. 360/2011; Prof. Steve Torkuma Ugba and Anor v. PDP and 2 Ors did not order any date of commencement of the 180 days outside the date expressly provided in the 1999 Constitution.
(v) The Tribunal amended the judgment of the Supreme Court by reading a commencement date into the judgment.”
Having scrutinized Ground 4, I am not in doubt that it arose from the decision of the Tribunal. The particulars in support of the grounds contain statements emanating from the Ruling of the Tribunal. It is instructive that the Supreme Court decision in the case of Prof. Steve Ugba and Anor v. PDP supra was cited by the Tribunal in their ruling of 8/12/2011.
A ground of appeal consists of the error of law or fact alleged by an appellant as the defect on a judgment appealed against. Ground 4 in the Notice of Appeal arose from the decision of the Tribunal and Issue 2 distilled therefrom is competent. The submission of learned Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondent on Issue 2 lacks substance. I will adopt the Issues formulated by the appellant as appropriate for the determination of this appeal. The sole issues raised in the other briefs are similar and encompassed in the appellants issues.
ISSUE ONE
“Whether the Tribunal was right to assume jurisdiction to hear and determine this petition after the expiration of the 180 days from the date of the petition was filed.”
It is the submission of learned senior counsel that the determination of the first issue depends solely on the interpretation of Section 285(6) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) by this Honourable Court.
Learned Counsel on the principles of interpretation of Statutes cited the following cases:-
Action Congress v. INEC 2007 12 NWLR Pt. 1048 page 222. Bronik Motors v. Wema Bank (1983) 1 SCNLR 296.
Ansaldo (Nig.) Ltd. v. N.P.F.M.B. 1991 2 NWLR Pt. 174 page 392.
Basinco Motors Ltd. v. Woermann-line & anor 2010 10 WRN 1 at pages 20-30.
The learned senior counsel submitted that the laid down principles of interpretation in the cases cited apply in this appeal to the various interpretation of the relevant provision of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). He cited Section 285(6) of the Constitution which provides as follows:-
(6) “An Election Tribunal shall deliver its judgment in writing within 180 days from the date of the filing of the petition.”
Learned counsel contended that the Governorship Election Tribunal erred in law when it assumed jurisdiction to hear and determine this petition outside 180 days from the date of the filing of the petition in its ruling of 8th December, 2011 on the ground inter alia that a “broader and liberal “approach to the interpretation of Section 285(6) of the 1999 Constitution would be adopted.
He contends that in arriving at its decision to adopt a “broader and liberal” approach to the interpretation of section 285(6) (supra), the Honourable Tribunal with all respect, ran foul of the principles of interpretation enunciated in the case referred to earlier in this Brief and in particular, against the doctrine of stare decisis. He argued that the Tribunal failed to follow the literal interpretation of the provisions of section 285 of the Constitution adopted by the Supreme Court in two very recent unreported decisions of the court delivered on 31st October, 2011.
It is his further submission that the apex Court has had an opportunity to interpret and pronounce on the effect of the provisions of section 285 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and all courts are bound to adopt the principles of interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court in interpreting the provisions of the said section.
He referred to the unreported judgment in the consolidated Appeals Nos. SC. 272/11 and SC. 276/11 PDP v. CPC and 47 Ors.
Learned counsel then submitted that the wordings and intention of the legislature in enacting sections 285(6) and 285 (7) of the 1999 Constitution are same. While the Tribunal or Court is allotted 180 days to hear the petition from the date of the filing of the petition, the appellate Court is allotted 60 days to hear an appeal from the date of the decision appealed against.
He noted that the lower Tribunal in arriving at its conclusion that it has jurisdiction to hear and determine this petition despite the efflusion of 180 days from the date of filing of the petition reasoned that an “all encompassing interpretation” of the provisions of sections 285(6) and (7), 233 and 287(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) shall be adopted, He submits that the Tribunal’s decision cannot stand as it is clearly against the decisions of the Supreme Court in PDP v. CPC & 41 Ors (supra) and Shettima v. Goni & 4 Ors. (supra) where the apex Court interpreted provisions of section 285 (supra) and stated that the words used are not subject to any interpretation at all and that they are to be given their natural meanings.
The Tribunal in assuming jurisdiction to hear this petition outside the 180 days provided for by the Constitution used the principles of interpretation other than that adopted by the Supreme Court in the two decisions referred to and which were brought to the attention of the Tribunal by the Appellant and thus breached the principle of stare decisis as laid down in a long line of cases and particularly in Uba v, Etiaba (2005) 6 NWLR Pt. 1082 pg. 154 at 182 paras. HE submits therefore that the Honourable Tribunal had no basis to employ “encompassing interpretation”, “liberal approach”, “broader interpretation” and/or “non-isolated interpretation” in the interpretation of section 285(6) of the 1999 constitution when the Supreme Court had already laid down the guiding principle for the interpretation of the section.
It is his submission that the Honourable Tribunal had no basis to hold that it has jurisdiction to hear this petition outside the time allowed by section 285(6) supra and he urged the court to resolve issue number 1 in the negative and in favour of the Appellant.
The 1st and 2nd Respondents contend that-
In constitutional or statutory interpretation, the general position is that where the wording of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a literal interpretation should be given to it.
Owners of MV “Arabella” v. Nig. Agric, Ins, corp. (2008) 4-5 SC. 189, 211 lines 29-34.
The wordings of section 285 (6) of 1999 constitution is clear and unambiguous. The sub-section provides as follows:-
(6) “An Election Tribunal shall deliver its judgment in writing within 180 days from the date of the filing of the petition.”
A literal interpretation of the section however, will be “irrational unreasonable, absurd or inconvenient” as we shall hereunder establish, Learned counsel argued that it is clear from the above that mischief will be caused by a literal interpretation of Section 285(6) of the 1999 Constitution. A literal interpretation of Section 285(6) of the 1999 Constitution will do violence to the constitutional guarantee of the right of fair hearing under the Constitution in cases such as the present petition.
He contends that a community reading of the above Sections and many others in the Constitution points unerringly to the ideals set out in the preamble to the Constitution quoted above. It is a canon of interpretation that a statute should not be interpreted so as to give an interpretation that will defeat its purpose. See Olaomi Ind., Ltd., V. N.I.D.B. Ltd. (2009) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1167) 266, 277 ratio 11.
He argued the above position is further supported by the provisions of paragraph 12(5) of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 as amended by Section 38(c) of the Electoral (Amendment) Act, 2010.
He referred the notable pronouncement of Onnoghen, JSC in Hope Uzodinma V. Sen, Izunaso (unreported) SC/117/2011 (judgment delivered on 20/5/11).
He argued the above provisions of Section 294(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) have been judicially interpreted by the Supreme Court so as not to defeat the intention of the legislature. He cited the case of Igwe V. Kalu (2002) FWLR (Pt. 97) 677 at 694, paras, F-G, where Mohammed, JSC construed the provisions of section 285(1) of the 1979 Constitution which is in pari materia with section 294(1) of the 1999 constitution.
The reasoning of the court in that case is that where an application is interrupted the flow of the three months limitation period will be affected He referred also to, Obaseki, JSC pronouncement in the earlier case of Mustapha V. Gov. of Lagos State (1987) 2 NWLR (pt. 58) 39.
He argued that the dismissal of the petition by the tribunal below on 11/8/2011 “interrupted” the flow of the period of 180 days stipulated by section 285(6). An interpretation in line with the above cases would therefore mean that time will “start running” afresh from the date the dismissed petition was restored, that is 28/09/2011.
He contends that section 285(6) does not envisage a situation where the 180 days will be interrupted by dismissal of the petition, on appeal to the court of Appeal and return to the tribunal; what the section envisages is a full 180 days for the tribunal and nothing less unless the tribunal is able to determine the petition on its merits before the expiration of the 180 days.
He contends that is the purport of the subsection especially when read along with paragraph, 12(5) of the 1st schedule to Electoral Act, 2011 quoted in paragraph, 4.26 above. The intention of the legislature is that all preliminary objections should be taken along with the substantive petition so that at the time of judgment the tribunal would have finished its work once and for all within an uninterrupted period of 180 days calculated from the date of filing of the petition. Where the tribunal ultimately dismisses a petition based not on the merits but on a preliminary objection as was done by the Ladan panel in this case, the court of Appeal, upon the success of the appeal before it would proceed and evaluate the evidence already taken but not evaluated by the tribunal below.
In conclusion he submits the present petition provides another opportunity for purposive and proactive constitutional interpretation.
The 4th Respondent in his brief submitted that the provision S285 supra have stipulated the lifespan of an election petition filed under the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) in a clear and unambiguous terms. That where the wordings of the provision of a statute are clear and unambiguous the court is bound to accord them their literal, natural and grammatical meaning. He cited the case of Maitsdau v. Chidari (2008) WLR (Pt 1114) 553.
In the instant Appeal, he argued it is more than 180 days since the election into the Office of the Governor of Benue State was conducted and by the provision of section 285(6) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and Section 134(2) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) any petition challenging the conduct of the said election ought to have been determined before now. Since the petition challenging the conduct of the election into the Office of the Governor of Benue State has not been determined within the time frame provided by the law, it is his further submission that the petition has by the operation of the law become statute bared and the Honourable Tribunal lacks the jurisdiction to entertain the petition. He urged this Court to so hold.
The Appellant has presented to this Court for determination the issue of whether the tribunal can assume jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition after the expiration of 180 days from the date the petition was filed. The tribunal in their ruling of 08/12/12 held:-
“It is therefore our candid opinion that the provisions of Section 285(6) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria does not preclude this Tribunal from hearing this petition on the merit as ordered by the Supreme Court. See Nwankwo V. Yar’Adua (supra), Udokpo v. Archibong & 2 ors. Appeal No. CA/C/NAGA/257/11 delivered on 17/11/2011, which are to the effect that the 180 days prescribed by the Constitution is to start running from the date the order for trial on the merit was made.”
The above reproduced statement of the tribunal is the fulcrum of this appeal. The Tribunal adopted the broader and liberal approach in the interpretation of Section 285(6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended. The Appellant is dissatisfied with the adoption of that approach contending that the tribunal should have adopted the literal interpretation of the provisions of Section 285 of the Constitution adopted by the Supreme Court where the apex court in PDP v. CPC & 41 ors. SC/272/2011, SC/276/2011 Unreported and SHETTIMA v. GONI & 4 ORS SC/332/2011, SC/333/2011, SC/352/2011, the consolidated appeal, delivered on 31st October 2011, interpreted the provisions of Section 285 when the held that the words in that section are not subject to any interpretation and are to be given their natural meaning.
The principle of stare decisis is fundamental in the jurisprudence of this country. All courts in Nigeria are bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria. This is a settled principle of Judicial Policy which the lower Courts must strictly adhere to. The caveat is that the lower Court must follow the ratio decidendi.

Where the facts and con Justice in a case is distinguishable from the decision of a superior Court the principle may not apply the application of the established principle of law will always apply in the con Justice of the characteristic of the case in issue.
For ease of reference and detail I will set out the relevant provisions in this appeal from the 1999 Constitution as amended hereunder:
”Section 285(6):-
An Election Tribunal shall deliver its judgment in writing within 180 days from Section 285(7):-
An Appeal from a decision of an Election Tribunal or Court shall be heard and disposed of within sixty days from the date of the delivery of judgment of the Tribunal.”
Looking at the above reproduced provisions, I poise to question which principle of interpretation should be adopted by this Court in the interpretation of Section 285(6) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. I must first by the doctrine of stare decisis look at the two Unreported decisions of the Supreme Court relied upon by the Appellant in submitting that Section 285(6) of the 1999 Constitution as amended have been interpreted already.
In PDP v. CPC & Ors. (supra) the Appellants at the Court of Appeal sitting in its first instance as a Presidential Electoral Petition Court challenged the competence of the petition, The Court of Appeal overruled the objection on 14 July 2011 and held that the petition was competent, The parties proceeded to the Supreme Court filing interlocutory appeals. The Supreme Court started its vacation on 18th July, 2011. When the appeal was called for hearing on 27th October, 2011, the 60 days mandated by the provisions of Section 285(7) of the 1999 Constitution as amended had passed. The Supreme Court raised the issue of jurisdiction suo motu and invited learned Counsel to the parties to address the Court. At the conclusion of address the Supreme Court in its Ruling delivered by Onnoghen JSC held:-
“I have read over and over the provisions of Section 285(7) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and have found the words used therein to be clear, unambiguous and simple and straight forward.
I therefore hold that the words used herein are not subject to any interpretation at all, they are to be given their natural meanings; that the natural meanings of the words are that appeals from a decision of an election tribunal or the Court of Appeal in an election matter shall be heard and determined within sixty (60) days from the date the judgment/decision appealed against was delivered, by the tribunal or Court of Appeal.
It is clear that by the use of the word “shall” in Section 285(7) of the 1999 Constitution the framers of the Constitution meant to make and did make the provision mandatory as it admits of no discretion whatsoever. It means that the sixty (60) days allotted in Section 285(7) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) cannot be extended even for one second as the decision of the appellate court must be rendered “within” sixty (60) days of the delivery of the judgment on appeal.”
Reading the entirety of the decision of the Supreme Court in PDP v. CPC (supra) it is crystal clear that the main issue before the apex Court was the interpretation of Section 285(7) of the Constitution as amended. It is instructive that in the same consolidated appeal the Supreme Court per Onnoghen JSC went further to hold:-
“I hold the considered view that in terms of time to do anything relating to an election petition or judgment thereon or arising therefrom, it is the above provisions that apply and that no Court has the power to extend the times as constitutionally provided in section 285(5)-(7) of the 1999 constitution (as amended), by interpretation of the sections or otherwise.”
Following the above reproduced pronouncement I am not in doubt of the legal position that no court has the power to extend the times as constitutionally provided in Section 285(5) – (7) of the 1999 Constitution relating to filing an election petition within twenty one (21) days after declaration of results and delivery of judgment in writing 180 days from the date of filing of the petition. What is garnered from that decision is that the constitutional provision on time to deliver judgment in the petition and determination of an appeal within the stipulated period cannot be extended. The Supreme Court in pronouncing on the 60 days period for the Court of Appeal to conclude an appeal pronounced that no court has the jurisdiction to extend the times as constitutionally stated in Section 285(5), (6) and (7) of the constitution as amended.
The second case relied upon by Appellant is the consolidated appeal SHETTIMA v. GONI & ORS. (supra) in Appeals Nos. SC/332/2011 and SC/333/2011. The Issue was whether the Court of Appeal was right when they made an interim order arresting or staying the delivery of a pending ruling of the Tribunal scheduled for 20th September, 2011 whilst Appeal No. SC/352/2011 is challenging the decision of this Court in adjourning the appeal sine die. The common issue between the appeals is whether the lower Court has the power to arrest a ruling or adjourn proceedings sine die in an election matter.
The question of the purport of Section 285(7) of the Constitution as amended arose in that case and Onnoghen JSC held that the provision is clear and unambiguous and do not need any interpretation, his lordship went further to hold:-
“The above being the case, it is clear and I hereby hold that by the provisions of Section 285(7) of the 1999 Constitution an appeal from a decision of an election tribunal or court either in an interlocutory proceeding or final decision must be heard by the appellate court and disposed of within sixty (60) days from the date of the delivery of judgment/decision/order/decree/conviction/sentence or recommendation of the tribunal or court.”
The Supreme Court found that the 60 days had expired even before the appeal was lodged in the Supreme Court and the period cannot be extended.
The facts in the instant case are different. In the instant appeal, the Supreme Court remitted the petition back to the Tribunal for hearing on the merit. The circumstance that obtained in the cases of PDP & Others v. CPC & Others (supra) and Goni case is different from the instant case. The interpretation of Section 285(7) of the 1999 Constitution as amended in the two Unreported Supreme Court decision was on the limitation period of hearing the appeal within 60 days. The issue before this Court is whether the 180 days stipulated in Section 285(6) of the 1999 Constitution is part of the period for hearing and determination of the appeal from court of appeal stage to the Supreme Court, or whether the 180 days will commence afresh from the date the Supreme Court delivered its judgment and made the order for trial on merit. The Apex court in the two unreported decisions GONI case and PDP (supra) were not faced with the circumstance where an order of retrial is made by the appellate court, such as in the instance case which gave rise to the dispute as to whether the provision in S285 (6) will allow a fresh calculation from the date of judgment of the Supreme Court or from date the petition was filed. The circumstances are different. I however note that in Goni case the words in S285 of the constitution as amended were described as clear and should be ascribed its ordinary meaning this interpretation is binding in all courts. In effect reading S285 exfacia it is clear as relates to delivery of judgment within 180 days but when the apex court orders trial on the merit after appeal the ascription of the ordinary meaning to the words in S285 raises a question on the intendment of the framers who are not specific on what happens in such circumstance. This we will see later in this judgment. The decision of the Supreme Court that where there is an alternative construction to the literary meaning and the alternative will accord with the intention of the framers and conform to the running of the system, the alternative approach of interpretation should be adopted is an approach on interpretation that is apt in this circumstance.
For purposes of elucidation and at the guilt of repetition I will reproduce S285 (6) again.
“An Election Tribunal shall deliver its judgment in writing within 180 days from the date of the filing of the Petition.”
One fundamental point to note is that Section 285(6) is a Section of the Constitution of this country. The task of construction of a constitution is crucially different from that of construing a Statute whilst a Statute generally defines present rights and obligations, a Constitution provides a continuing frame work for the legitimate exercise of powers and must be capable of growth over time to meet new social and political realities unimagined by the framers. This point must be in the minds of the interpreters of the Constitution. See A.G. of Bendel State v. The A.G. of the Federation (1981) 10 SC 1 and Ishola v. Ajiboye 1994 7-8 SCNJ (Pt. 1) 1; Hunter v. Southam INC 1984 2 SCR 145 at 146.

It is my view that the duty of the Judge is to give a meaning to the words of a Constitution that best reflects the purpose and intendment of the Constitution. Where the words used in a provision in the constitution are clear and unambiguous it should be ascribed its ordinary and grammatical meaning. I am guided by the decision of the apex Court in the case of CPC & Another v. Admiral Nyako & Another Unreported SC/141/2011, SC/267/2011 SC/356/2011, SC/266/2011, SC/282/2011, SC/357/2011 (consolidated) on the principle of interpretation Dahiru Musdapher, CJN held:-
“Every legal document including the Constitution has a purpose without which it is meaningless. This purpose, or ratio legit, is made up of the objectives, the goals, the interests, the values, the policy and the function that by law it is designed to actualize. It is the duty of the judge to give the meaning of the words that best realizes its purpose and intent and intendment.”
In PDP v. CPC & others (supra), the Supreme Court on interpretation of the Constitution held:-
“It is settled law that in interpreting a constitutional provision the court should adopt a broad approach to the process. Also settled is the principle that where the words of the Constitution or Statute are plain, clear and unambiguous, they must be given their natural, ordinary meanings as there is nothing, in effect to be interpreted, fn that caser the words must be given their plain/natural meanings, as there is nothing to interpret.”
The Supreme Court as the apex Court is cognizance of the need to set the trend on interpretation and has propounded in a catalogue of cases the cardinal principles of interpretation.

Guided by the above principles on interpretation, I am fortified in my view that the ordinary words in Section 285(6) in the con Justice of the present facts in the instant case cannot be read in isolation of the entire section and related Sections in the Constitution. I am not in doubt that the words in Section 285(6) of the Constitution as amended are clear by its natural meaning.
Nevertheless it cannot be read alone but must be read with other related sections to give effect to the intention of the draftsmen in the prevailing facts of this appeal. The duty of this Court is to interpret the provisions of the Constitution to reflect the intendment of the framers. The Supreme Court in the unreported case of Shettima v. Goni & 4 Ors (supra) said the words in Section 285 are plain and the ordinary meaning should be deployed. I am bound by that pronouncement. But it is my view that the section should be read together with other related sections the reason will be manifest later in this judgment. Section 285(6) contains 3 dominant arms which are:
(a) the Election tribunal and judgment;
(b) within a period of 180 days;
(c) from the filing of the petition.
I will now look at its ordinary meaning under the first arm. The Election tribunal is the Governorship tribunal in Makurdi. The word “Judgment” is a decision of the tribunal whether interlocutory or final decision.
Under the second arm (b) the limitation period of 180 days is sacrosanct. The constitutional period of 180 days within which the tribunal is to deliver judgment on the petition enjoins them to hear it on merit or determine any interlocutory application within that period. The connotation is that once 180 days have lapsed from the date of filing of the petition, whether the hearing in the petition has been concluded or not the tribunal lacks jurisdiction to proceed.
Where the petition has been heard on merit within the mandatory period, judgment must be delivered within that 180 days it does not give any power to the Tribunal to extend. Therefore the ordinary meaning of the words in Section 285(6) is that the Election Tribunal not the Court of Appeal must deliver its judgment whether described as an interlocutory ruling or final judgment within 180 days from the date of filing of the petition. The Election Tribunal referred to cannot be interpreted to include the Court of Appeal. In effect, the 180 days cannot by any imagination include the period the decision of the tribunal is on appeal in the Court of Appeal. That cannot be the intendment of the draftsmen otherwise Section 285(7) of the Constitution on 60 days statutory period would not have been necessary. What is not specifically included in the constitutional provision is excluded if the framers of the constitution had intended to include 180 days as part of period the appellate court will deliver judgment it would have stated same. S285 (6) is specific that the instruction is directed at the Tribunal not court of appeal. Therefore, the 180 days statutory period on delivery of judgment is limited to the Tribunal from date of filing of the petition. I must add that from the language of the provision it is crystal clear that the section did not state the petition must be determined within 180 days; the limitation time is limited to delivery of judgment. This point is fundamental it cannot be imputed Under S285 (7) of the constitution the framers were specific on time for hearing and determination by the court of appeal. That provision is excluded in S285 (6) supra.
The Appellants contend that the literal interpretation of the provisions of Section 285 of the Constitution was adopted by the Supreme Court in the two recent unreported decisions of the apex Court. The Supreme Court adopted the literal interpretation on the period of 60 days. The same analogy can be given to 180 days period to deliver judgment from the date the petition was filed. It is instructive to note that under subsection (6) the key words used is to deliver its judgment. Unlike under subparagraph 7 wherein the words used are to be heard and disposed of. In effect the appeal must be heard and disposed of within 60 days. Under subsection (6) of Section 285 the election tribunal must dispose of any application or petition for which a decision is to be delivered within 180 days if one is going by the literal interpretation. What it imports is that judgment which has been defined to mean an interlocutory decision whether the petition was heard or whether intercepted by any application the decision must be given within 180 days. In the instant case the Tribunal determined the application within 180 days. The interlocutory decision then went on appeal up to the Supreme Court. The Appellant’s contention is that the Supreme Court Order presupposes that the remnant of the 180 days from the date of filing petition will be utilised to hear the petition on merit and deliver judgment. This argument cannot reflect the intendment of the framers of the Constitution. The circumstances of this case cannot allow literal interpretation of 5285(6) after the appellate court had given a decision, because it will lead to conflict with other related sections of the constitution on right of appeal. It cannot be the intendment of the constitution that one section will override another, otherwise it will be clearly stated, and the phrase “subject to” used.
In the circumstance of the instance case the cardinal principle of interpretation of the Constitution will apply which is that the entire section 285 and related sections of the constitution should be interpreted and applied liberally. My role is to construe provision of the constitution to preserve what it sets out to protect. In Arch. Bishop Okojie v. A.G. Lagos State (1981) 2 NCLR 337 at 340 the Court held:-
“By its very nature and by necessity a Constitution must be interpreted broadly in order not to defeat the clear intention of its framers.”
My position is also fortified by the 12 point rules on interpretation and the approach adopted in a galaxy of other Supreme Court decisions that the provision in section 285 (6) should be read together with other related sections in order to actualize the intendment of the framers of the constitution. Once the question arises as in the instant case whether the expression under section 285(6) on delivery of judgment is limited to calculation from the time of filing of the petition the answer lies in the interpretation of the sections in the wider or narrower sense. The court should in response to the demands of Justice lean to the broader interpretation unless there is something in the constitution to indicate that the narrower interpretation will best convey the objects and purpose of the construction.

The intendment of the framers of the constitution cannot be such that where an appeal is lodged in the Appeal Court pursuant to the constitution as amended any consequential order of the appeal court to the tribunal to hear the matter on merit will be rendered nugatory if the 180 days from date of filing of the petition had lapsed therefore, whilst the words of the provision in section 285(6) are clear, their literary interpretation in the present situation will not convey the purport of the entire section. This is not an amendment to the constitution by this Court nor any guise to change the words in the constitution. It is an attempt not to interpret the provision of the constitution by adopting an approach that will defeat its evident purpose. In the present circumstance section 285 of the constitution must be read together with related sections. This is in line with settled law that provisions of a constitution are not to be interpreted in isolation but other provisions must be taken into consideration in the exercise. An appeal is a constitutional right which should not be taken away from an aggrieved party. The constitutional right of appeal is conferred on an aggrieved person upon whom a decision has been pronounced, which decision has affected him, either he is refused something or the order adversely affected him. Therefore, where the appeal is successful it cannot be in vain.
See Savanna Bank Nig. Ltd. v. Ajilo (2001) FWLR (Pt. 75) pg. 513 at 543 per Uwais, (CJN)

“Where the Constitution bestows a right on its citizen and does not expressly take away or provide how the right should lost or forfeited in the circumstance, we have the duty and indeed the obligation to ensure that the ensured right is not lost or denied the citizen by Constitution that is narrow and not purposive. To this end the established practice of this Court is where the Constitutional right in particular, and indeed any right in general, of a citizen is threatened or violate, it is left for the Court to be creative in its decision in order to ensure that it preserves and protects the right by providing remedy for the citizen.”
The orders of the Supreme Court are founded on the jurisdiction under section 233(1) of the 1999 constitution and section 6(6) of the 1999 constitution.

The provisions in section 285(6) and section 285(7) of the constitution 1999 cannot be intended to stultify related provisions in section 233(2) iv of the same constitution which grants the parties the right of appeal to the Supreme Court in governorship election petitions and section 287(1) of the constitution which commands all courts including the election tribunal to enforce the decisions of the Supreme Court in any part of the federation. The constitution must never be construed to defeat the effect of a related section of the constitution nor to defeat its evident purpose. The rationale to construe them together is to achieve consistency and a harmonious effect. The purport of section 287(1) of the constitution is that all orders made by the Supreme Court must be enforced. When the Apex court allowed the appeal and directed the petition be heard on merit, the Tribunal was bound to comply. It is by virtue of the right of the appeal and provisions under section 287(1) that it is my firm view that the period of 180 days which commenced when the petition was filed started afresh with the order of trial on merit. It is an order which amounts to commencement de novo. It is imperative to emphasize the distinction between hearing of the petition when filed and hearing of the petition following an order and decision of the appellate court. When the appellant filed the petition in the election tribunal and proceedings commenced, the tribunal must deliver judgment within 180 days. This is what the tribunal did when within that period it delivered a ruling dismissing the petition. The literal and grammatical meaning of the words therein are clear and applicable in that circumstance.
However, where the appellant proceeded to the court of appeal and Supreme Court to address his grievance, and exercising his constitutional right of appeal, the scenario changed, the calculation for delivery of judgment cannot commence from the date of filing of the petition. The intervening factor is the appeal. The constitutional provision under section 285(7) that the Court of appeal must deliver judgment within 60 days from date of decision in the tribunal is a clear expression by the constitution that the 180 days period cannot be running whilst on appeal but terminated when the Tribunal delivered its decision that went on appeal.
The decision of the Tribunal in the instant case within 180 days from date of petition was in compliance to Section 285(6). This is consistent with the intention and purpose of the provision to attain quick disposition of election matters. Consequently, once an appellate court allows an interlocutory appeal and directs hearing on the merit, the provision in section 285(6) cannot be read in isolation from related section, the broader interpretation to avoid absurdity and in Justice should be adopted.
I am further guided by the decision of the Supreme Court in A.T Ltd. v. A.D.H Ltd. (2007) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1056) 118 at 166-167.
“It is settled law when a court is faced with the interpretation of a constitutional provision, the entire provision must be read together as whole so as to determine the object of that provision.
Secondly, it is settled principle of law that where a court is faced with alternatives in the course of interpreting the constitution or statute, the alternative construction that is consistent with smooth running of the system shall prevail as held in Tukar V. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.117) at 579; I must remember that this court has said it several times that the provisions of the constitution ought to be read and interpreted as a whole in that related sections must be construed together….”
The learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondent referred the court to the interpretation of a similar provision of section 294(1) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. In Igwe v. Kalu (2002) FWLR (Pt. 97) 677 at 694 wherein Mohammed JSC construed the provisions of section 258(1) of the 1999 constitution which is in pari material with section 294(7) of the 1999 constitution.
The analogy on interpretation of section 294(1) of the constitution which stipulates that judgment be delivered within 90 days after conclusion of evidence and final addresses is very strong. The Apex court in several cases has pronounced on the 90 days period to deliver judgment in line with the constitutional provision.
What is significant is that when the appellate court after hearing an appeal orders for retrial. The file is remitted back to the High Court for trial on the merit; the 90 days constitutional period to deliver judgment will again run afresh from date of final address after hearing denovo. The High court is enjoined to start the proceedings a new.
This supports my position that section 285(6) of the 1999 constitution can only be interpreted to give effect to the intendment of the constitution by reading it in community with other related sections 285(7) and 287(1) of the constitution as amended. I am aware of the injunction that the judges do not make laws or by construction of the provision in the constitution amend the constitution. However, as custodians of the constitution the groundnorm of this country, the court whilst interpreting the constitution must interpret it and apply the words liberally when absolutely necessary so as to reflect the intention of the draftsman, achieve the purpose and the rights it set out to protect. Therefore, I have interpreted section 285(6) by adopting the broad approach which is alternative to the literal approach as that will achieve the intention of the makers of the constitution.
This Court have also in a five man panel interpreted section 285(6) of the constitution to mean that the 180 days within which to deliver judgment will commence from the date of the decision of the appellate court.
See CA/E/EPT/68/2011 Dr. Chris Nwabueze Ngige v. Prof. Nkem Akunyili & 2 others 26 January, 2011 CA/E/EPT/HR/11/2012 Ben Nwankwo v. Okechukwu Ude & 3 others.
I therefore, resolve issue one against the appellant.
ISSUE TWO:
Whether the order of the Supreme Court of 14 November, 2011 that the petition be heard on merits is tantamount to an extension of time to hear the petition after the expiration of 180 days from date it was filed. The submission of the learned senior counsel is that the provision in section 287(1) Supra is inapplicable in the interpretation of section 285(6).
The learned senior counsel submitted that the invitation to the Tribunal to decline jurisdiction to hear this petition on grounds of efflusion of time is not an invitation to disobey the order of the Supreme Court or to contravene the provisions of section 287(7) of the 1999 Constitution. The order of the Supreme Court that this petition be heard on the merits was obeyed in fall when the Tribunal issued hearing notices to the parties and convened to hear the petition, every other step in the hearing of the petition on its merits is still governed by the applicable provisions of the constitution and the Electoral Act.
This second issue relates to my discourse in issue one. The orders of the Supreme Court cannot be in vain. The 1999 constitution enshrined provisions to protect vested rights not to frustrate same by the same constitution as amended. I adopt my reasoning under issue 1 to hold that the order of the Supreme Court does not tantamount to enlargement of time; the tribunal must comply to the 180 days provision whilst hearing the petition on the merit as ordered. The learned senior counsel contended that S287 (1) is a general provision and not applicable. I do agree that S285 (6) is a specific provision and I must say is specific in relation to time within which to deliver judgment. The language of S285 (6) is that judgment must be delivered within 180 days, an interlocutory appeal may not determine the petition so when an order is made as in the instance case to hear the petition on merit it must be enforced. Therefore to achieve the intention of the framers of the constitution, S287 (1) and S285 (6) of the constitution as amended should be read together. In conclusion election matters are of a special breed. This is evident in all the provisions in the constitution and the electoral Act. The provisions are characterized with limitation period to file process, take steps and deliver judgment, these features are all aimed at quick disposition of election matters, and they underscore the urgency. However the quest for disposition of cases cannot be at the expense of disregarding the constitutional provision on right of appeal. Speed cannot override vested rights. Issue 2 is resolved against the appellant. From the forgoing I hold this appeal is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed.
The parties should proceed with hearing as ordered by the Supreme Court. Each party to bear its own cost.

M. B. DONGBAN – MENSEM: I Agree.

THERESA NGOLIKA ORJI-ABADUA, J.C.A.: I had perused the opinion expressed in the leading judgment of this Court prepared and delivered by my learned brother, NWODO, J.C.A., and I agree with the reasoning and conclusion therein, I, too, dismiss the appeal and abide by the orders made in the leading judgment.
I only want to add that for proper comprehension and dissection of the provisions of section 285 sub-section (6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), and determination of the issues sifted herein, it is desirable that they be approached from three different perspectives.
The first approach is by drawing an analogy between the said section 285(6) and section 294(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which prescribed the period within which the Courts created by the said Constitution of 1999, shall deliver their judgments in the matters or suits before them, and, which I am entitled to take judicial notice of, by virtue of section 122 of the Evidence Act, 2011; secondly, by considering the said section 285(6) vis-a-vis the provisions of section 285(7) that granted the appellate Courts a period of sixty days to hear and determine appeals emanating from the decision or judgment of the Tribunal and the constitutionally guaranteed right of appeal of the party who is dissatisfied with the decision or judgment of the Tribunal and, thirdly, by identifying the implications of the provisions of section 287(1) of the said Constitution which commanded every Court, authority or person to enforce the decision of the Supreme Court.
Now, considering the first approach and, for an in-depth appreciation of the wording of section 285(6); by drawing an analogy between the said section 285(6) and section 294(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) which may have a burning effect of exposing the intendment of the Law makers and aid in ascertaining the purports of the two sections, it is imperative and, of immense necessity, to reproduce hereunder, the provisions of the said two sections thus:
“285 (6) An election tribunal shall deliver its judgment in writing within 180 days from the date of the filing of the Petition”.
“294 (1). Every Court established under this Constitution shall deliver its decision in writing not later than ninety days after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses and furnish all the parties to the cause or matter determined with duly authenticated copies of the decision within seven days of the delivery thereof”.
There is clear manifestation in sections 285(6) and 294(1) respectively of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended) as to what the election Tribunal and every Court created by the said Constitution were mandated to carry out by the respective sections. It is trite that the object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of the law makers which can only be ascertained from the words used in the section. Once the meaning is clear, the Courts are to give effect to it. The Courts are not to defeat the plain meaning of an enactment by importing into the section, the words that were never contemplated by the law makers. It was held in Nokes vs. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, Ltd (1940) A.C. 1014 at 1022 that where there are two choices of interpretation, the Courts must avoid the choice which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the other choice on the principle that the legislature would legislate only for purpose of bringing about an effective result.
It is further of great necessity to ascertain the background leading to enactment of section 285 sub-section (6) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
It is a notorious fact that prior to the enactment of section 285 subsection (6) of the 1999 Constitution (as Amended), some election Petitions and election appeals lingered and dragged on to about three years due to some unending applications and deliberate attempts by the parties and their Counsel to delay hearing in the election proceedings and appeals arising therefrom and punctual delivery of judgments thereon by the Courts. Some, embarrassingly, were prolonged till 2011. It was against this background and agitation by Nigerians for amendment of the Constitution to prescribe a time limit within which hearing in an election petition could be concluded and judgment delivered therein, that, there were introduced into the Constitution, this section 285 (6) and other sections on the issue of time limit within which judgments in election petition proceedings shall be delivered. The period within which an election Tribunal shall deliver its judgment has been clearly and unambiguously defined unlike what was obtainable prior to the amendment of the Constitution 1999 and the Electoral Act. What the amendment secured was removing delay on the part of the Tribunal to hear and deliver judgment in any given election petition. It categorically defined the period within which the Election Tribunal shall deliver its judgment. So long as the Petition is pending before the Tribunal, and is not appealed against on any point that will state is being proceeded with at the Tribunal, it must be heard and judgment delivered thereupon by the Tribunal within 180 days from the date it was filed. As long as the Petition is pending thereat and has not left the adjudicative precincts of the Tribunal, the Tribunal must complete its adjudicative process thereon and deliver its judgment within 180 days.
Microscopic analysis of the wording of section 285(6) reveals a mandatory obligation placed on the election Tribunal to deliver its judgment within 180 days which shall be computed from the date of filing of the Petition. It is quite explicit in the said Constitution, that no mention whatsoever was made about the lifespan of the Petition unlike what obtains in the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules of each State of the Federation, wherein the validity or lifespan of the Writ of Summons or any other originating process issued thereunder, were specifically stated to be a period of either 6 months or 12 months from the date of issuance. It is extravagantly clear that if the Legislators had intended an election Petition’s lifespan to be 6 months or the 180 days stated therein, whether, heard or not, it would have expressly, and, distinctly stated so in the said Constitution. Therefore, since there is complete silence on the lifespan of a petition in the said Constitution, it would amount to importing into the Constitution, words the Legislators never envisaged nor contemplated, if the 180 days mentioned therein, were construed to mean the inextensible lifespan of a petition.
It is instructive to note as I earlier demonstrated, that the unmistakable command given in section 285 (6) to election Tribunals is for them to deliver their judgments within 180 days. The emphasis in the said section is only on “delivery of judgment”, which must be accomplished within 180 days from the date of fifing the petition. Also, the emphasis in section 294(1) of the Constitution with regard to regular courts established under the Constitution is on ‘delivery of their decisions not later than 90 days which are computed from the date of conclusion of evidence and final addresses of Counsel.
It is quite distinct in section 285(6) that the provision applies to only election Tribunals, it merely defined the period within which election Tribunals shall deliver their judgments in respect of election petitions pending before them and being heard by them without any interruption or intervening circumstances, such as appeals, just like the Courts established by the Constitution are commanded to deliver their decisions in writing not later than 90 days after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses. The said period of 180 days, undoubtedly applies to only election Tribunals. There is nothing suggestive of any other interpretation in the wording of the said section that the said period of 180 days given to the Tribunals is inclusive of the respective 60 days given to the Court of Appeal to hear appeals from the Tribunals and the Supreme Court in respect of appeals on gubernatorial and Presidential election petitions. Just like in the wording of section 294(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), there is no restriction in section 285(6) of the said 1999 Constitution (as amended) precluding an appellate Court from ordering a retrial where the order is found most appropriate or excluding any retrial that may be ordered by appellate courts or stating the impermissibility of such retrial. The section simply commanded the Tribunal to deliver it’s own judgment within 180 days from the date the petition was filed, just like the manner in which section 294(1) commanded the regular courts established by the said Constitution to deliver their judgments not later than 90 days from the date of conclusion of evidence and final addresses of Counsel.
It is absolutely necessary for this Court to ascertain the connotation of the word “within” used in limiting the 180 days period. The word, “within” is described in Word Web as “not more or further than; “in the limits of”. Then in Oxford Advance Learner’s Dictionary, it is stated to mean, before a particular period of time has passed; during a particular period of time; not further than a particular distance from something; inside the range or limits of something; or inside something.” What all these dictate or portray is that the judgment of the election Tribunal must be delivered either before the expiration of the 180 days or on the last day of the 180 days i.e. on the 180th day from the date of filing the petition. It is glaringly obvious that the 180 days prescribed by section 285(6) relates to only the proceedings before the Tribunal. Another obvious point that worths mentioning is; all that the Tribunal is expected to achieve with regard to an election petition is the conclusion of its duty in the petition within the 180 days, meaning, therefore, that if before the expiration of the 180 days, the Tribunal made an order that would have the effect of terminating the proceedings in the petition or dismissing it for one reason or the other without actually conducting hearing in the election proceedings, the Tribunal has, by every connotation, complied with the period of 180 days prescribed.
It is similar to the 90 days period given to the High Courts either at the Federal or State level, as part of the Courts created by the said constitution of 1999, to deliver their judgments in any matter before them from the date of conclusion of evidence or final addresses of Counsel.
It is imperative to note that an appellate court does not conduct trials. It reviews documents/papers, exhibits and record of proceedings from the trial Court or Tribunal i.e., the record of appeal. After the record had been reviewed, it is also important to note that Court of Appeal or Supreme Court Justices have three main choices when making a decision, that is to say;
i. Affirm (agree with) the judgment of the lower Court’s decision or in the case of the Supreme Court affirm the judgment of the lower Court which means that the judgment is final or
iii. In the case of the Supreme Court, reverse (disagree with) the decision of the lower Court, meaning the Supreme Court’s decision must be carried out and/or
iii. Remand the case, (send it back to the trial Court for further action and possible retrial).
Judgment is defined as the Court’s final determination of the rights and obligations of the parties in a case. It includes an equitable decree and any order from which an appeal lies. In legal parlance, it refers to a final finding, statement, or ruling based on a considered weighing of evidence.
Further, judgment is defined in law to include the determination by a Court of competent jurisdiction on matters submitted to it or the act of determining, as in Courts of law, what is conformable to law and Justice, also, the determination, decision or sentence of a Court or of a judge, deliver judgment i.e. its opinion. In Merrian Webster dictionary, judgment is also defined as a formal decision by a Court. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary defined it as including, the decision of a Court or a judge.
It is stark in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) that it did not, and, has not, under any guise or pretence, rendered futile or null and void any decision of the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court arising from election appeals delivered by them outside the 180 days period prescribed by section 285 (6) within which election Tribunal only, shall deliver its judgment, nor did it stipulate that any decision of the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court arising from election Petition shall be null and void if delivered outside the 180 days period prescribed for the Tribunal to deliver its own judgment. Just like under the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria the Constitution rendered null and void any judgment delivered by any of the Courts created by the Constitution outside the mandatory 90 days (3 months) period. What the Constitution clearly prescribed in section 285 sub-section (7) of the said Constitution (as amended) is that;
“An appeal from a decision of an election Tribunal or court shall be heard and disposed of within 50 days from the date of the delivery of judgment of the Tribunal.”
Further, when such approach introduced in the 1979 Constitution proved much hardship, the lawmakers then deemed it necessary to amend the Constitutional provisions to what is now, section 294 (5) of the 1999 Constitution (as Amended) which reads;
“294 (5) The decision of a Court shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of this section unless the Court exercising jurisdiction by way of appeal from or review of that decision is satisfied that the party complaining has suffered a miscarriage of Justice by reason thereof”.
It became necessary to reproduce the above-stated provisions to establish the readiness of the lawmakers to expressly state when they intend to invalidate or void a proceeding or decision/judgment of a Court due to failure to deliver judgment within the period stipulated in the Constitution.
Already the Tribunal has been given 180 days within which to deliver it’s judgment. It follows, therefore, that if the Tribunal delivered it’s judgment on the very last dry, the 180 days is to expire or elapse, then, the period of 60 days allotted to the Court of Appeal by section 285(7) of the Constitution aforestated, to hear and deliver it’s judgment in the appeal arising from that judgment of the election Tribunal delivered on the 180th day, shall commence from that last day. It is clear that the appellate Court’s period of 60 days to hear and dispose of the election appeal will start to run only from the date the Tribunal delivered it’s judgment, and not otherwise. By this scenario, it is explicit that the 180 days prescribed by the Constitution within which the Tribunal shall deliver its judgment in the petition do not comprise the 60 days respectively allocated to the Appellate Courts. The two sets of period are quite distinctive and do not run concurrently or conjunctively. The Appeal Court’s period would start counting from the date the Tribunal discharged its obligation by delivering a decision or judgment that would have the effect of bringing to an end before the Tribunal, every proceeding in the Petition.
It is obvious that the 60 days period given to the Court of Appeal do not form part of the 180 days granted to the Tribunal to deliver it’s judgment, otherwise, the jurisdictional competence of the Court of Appeal specially entrenched in section 246(1)(b) (ii) and (iii) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) to hear appeals from the decisions of the National Assembly Election Tribunals and Governorship and Legislative Houses Election Tribunal on any question as to whether-(ii) any person has been validly elected to the office of Governor or Deputy Governor, or (iii) the term of office of any person has ceased or the seat of any such person has become vacant; ought not to have been inserted therein and would have, from the inception, been scuttled. I completely resist the temptation to believing that the Law makers on the one hand guaranteed a party’s right of appeal against any decision of the Election Tribunal in an election petition he was distraught with, and, on the other hand robbed the same party of the right to the result or fruit of the appeal or the hallowed decision of the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court, the Final Court of the land in respect of the same election Petition.
If I may ask; is it possible for the Constitution to contradict itself, approbate and reprobate at the same time, and render futile or invalid the appellate Courts’ i.e., Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court’s functions/decisions in relation to election appeals heard by them within the respective 60 days given to them by the same Constitution? What then was the essence of enacting the provisions relating to appeals in election matters if the eventual decisions of the appellate Courts in that respect were supposedly ousted by the Constitution or that whatever order they might have handed down would have been ineffectual? I must say that I find myself unable to accept that proposition as the intendment of the law makers. What they strictly did was to regulate the period within which judgment at each stratum of court created by the Constitution is to be delivered but not the lifespan of the originating process that would set the machinery in motion.
It is an established fact and, a matter of common knowledge which this Court is bound to take judicial notice of, that where a High Court delivered its decision in an ordinary suit within the first 90 days it had under the Constitution to deliver it’s judgment, and the decision is appealed against to the Court of Appeal and even up to the Supreme Court with the result that the matter or case involved is remitted to the High Court for retrial or trial on the merits, and, retrial then commenced before the same High Court that previously heard and delivered its judgment in it. It has never been contended nor has it been enunciated in any case that, the trial Court, having previously delivered its first decision or judgment in the matter within 90 days from the date of final addresses of Counsel, no longer possess the authority in law to hear and the determine the same case the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, had remanded to it for retrial; or that the 90 days granted to it under the Constitution to deliver it’s judgment in respect of that suit had expired. There has never been any challenge against the said period of 90 days granted to the regular Courts. Furthermore, it has never been interpreted that the 90 days period given to the High Courts only once in a matter as is being contended thereat. The said 90 days period has never been interpreted to include the period given to the Appellate Courts to hear and deliver their judgments in appeals arising therefrom.
In Unongo vs. Aku, Uwais, JSC (as he then was) opined thus;
“I do not see how a reasonable person will have the impression that a party has a fair hearing where his petition which has been instituted within the time limit stipulated by the Electoral Act cannot be concluded because the time available to the court for the petition to be heard will not be sufficient for either or both parties to the petition to present their cases or will not allow the court at the close of the parties’ cases sufficient time to deliver its judgment. There can be no doubt that the provisions of sections 129 subsection (3) and 140 subsection (2) of the Electoral Act 1982 neither allow a petitioner or respondent reasonable time to have fair hearing, nor give the court the maximum period of 3 months to deliver its judgment after hearing a petition as envisaged by sections 33 subsection (1) and 258 subsection (1) of the Constitution, respectively”.
Further, section 287 of the 1999 Constitution provides as follows:
“1. The decisions of the Supreme Court shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons and by courts with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Court of Appeal.

2. The decisions of the court of Appeal shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons and by courts with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Court of Appeal.
3. The decisions of the Federal High Court, a Court and of all other Courts established by this Constitution shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons and by Courts with subordinate with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Federal High Court, a High Court and those other Courts, respectively”.
The aforestated section of the Constitution of 1999 (as Amended) is clear. It asserted affirming the supremacy of the decisions of the Supreme Court, commanding all and sundry, that is to say; all authorities, and persons and Courts with sub-ordinate jurisdiction to that of the Supreme Court to enforce the decisions of the Supreme Court.
Certainly, Election Tribunal is sub-ordinate to the Supreme Court and must, without any pretence, obey and enforce the decisions of the Supreme Court.
As I noted earlier, there is no specific provision of the Constitution ousting the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court the moment the 180 days granted to the election Tribunal to deliver its judgment in the proceedings before it had elapsed. One cannot then, in the absence of such provision read into the Constitution what was never intended by its makers. This would, obviously lead to mangled Justice and denying the citizens of this Country their constitutionally entrenched rights. It is on this basis I find no merit in this appeal and I hereby dismiss the same. I make no order as to costs.
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Appearances

Chief Solo Akuma SAN with John A. A. Ochoga, C.A. Gbehe, G.E. Ukaegbo, T.J. Henkyaa, P.N. Joji (Miss) and CT MueFor Appellant

AND

C.S. Orpin for the 1st & 2nd respondent
Chief E.K. Achiekaa with J.S.E., Anchauer, Musa Tendi, S.A. Udaga, T.T. Igba, N. L. Ikyaagba (Mrs.) and F.T. Itusugh for the 3rd respondent,

M.D. Ter (Mrs.) with E.P Echor and G.N. Kanu (Miss) for the 4th respondentFor Respondent