PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP) v. ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS (APC) & ORS (2015)

PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP) v. ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS (APC) & ORS

(2015)LCN/8008(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Friday, the 23rd day of October, 2015

CA/A/194/2015

RATIO

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION AS TO WHO QUALIFIES FOR APPOINTMENT AS MEMBER OF THE STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION

The law, as far as Section 200 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, before the amendment in 2011 is concerned, is that a person can be qualified to be a member of the State Independent Electoral Commission, even if he belongs to a political party; for the avoidance of doubt the said law provides inter alia:
200(1) “no person shall be qualified for appointment as a member of any of the bodies as aforesaid if –
(a) he is not qualified or if he is disqualified for election as a member of a house of assembly”
On qualification for election into a state house of assembly Section 106 (d) of the same Constitution also provides that:
“Subject to the provisions of Section 107 of this Constitution, a person shall be qualified for election as a member of a House of Assembly if-
(d) He is a member of a political party and is sponsored by that party.”
It follows from this provision therefore that one had to be a member of a political party to be qualified to be a member of the 4th respondent as of 2008, when the 5th to 9th respondents were in fact appointed a chairman and members of the 104th respondent. per. MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A.

PUBLIC OFFICERS; WHETHER THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, STATE GOVERNMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ALL THEIR AGENCIES FALL WITHIN THE MEANING OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

It is trite that the Federal Government, State Government, Local Government and all their agencies fall within the meaning of public officers; see OFFILI V CSC supra, LADOKE AKINTOLA UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY v OGUNWOBI (2006) 4 NWLR part 971 at 589. per. MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: WHETHER IT IS A FUTILE EXERCISE TO MAKE AN ORDER AGAINST A PERSON WHO IS NOT A PARTY TO A CASE

It is a futile exercise that bears no fruit to make an order against a person who is not a party to a case; see KASIMU V NNPC (2008) 3 NWLR part 1075 at 586; worst still, a court of law has no jurisdiction to decide the fate of a person who is not a party to the case before it, regardless of the purity of intention. The Supreme Court had this scenario in when it held in BABATOLA V ALADEJANA (2001) 12 NWLR part 728 at 615 that:
‘…the court cannot give judgment against a person who will be affected by its decision, if such person is not made a party or has no opportunity of defending the suit…”. per. MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: THE TEST OF INTEREST TO DETERMINE A PERSON INTEREST IN A SUIT

The test of “interest” to determine a person interested is, whether the person should have been joined as a party to the suit. A person interested therefore includes, a person affected or likely to be affected or aggrieved or likely to be aggrieved by the proceedings. OJUKWU v. MILITARY GOVERNOR OF LAGOS STATE (1985) 2 NWIR (pt. 10) 806. But the most apt description for our purpose is the holding of the Supreme Court in A.G. LAGOS STATE V A.G, FEDERATION (2004) NWLR part 904 at 94, where it held:
“… the declaration being sought to the effect that the elections conducted by the plaintiff on the 27th March 2004 cannot take effect since they are inchoate; cannot be granted because not all the parties interested in the elections, namely Chairman elect as well as the Lagos State Independent Electoral Commission have been joined in this case…” per. MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A.

Justice

MOORE A.A. ADUMEIN Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

TANI YUSUF HASSAN Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

Justice

PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP)Appellant(s)

AND

1. ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS (APC)
2. KOGI STATE GOVERNMENT
3. ATTORNEY ? GENERAL AND COMMISSIONER FOR JUSTICE, KOGI STATE
4. KOGI STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION (KGSIEC)
5. BARRISTER ABRAHAM A. OLANIRAN
6. HON. DAVID O. APEH
7. HON. HARUNA IBRAHIM
8. HON. AHMED A. SAMARI
9. HON. AMOKA SUBERURespondent(s

MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the Kogi State High Court of Justice sitting at Koton Karfe, delivered on the 8th of December 2014 by an Amended Notice of Appeal filed on the 18th of May, 2015, as per pages 1061 to 1068 of the records of appeal.

Facts In Brief:
In 2008 the 2nd respondent appointed the 5th to 9th respondents as chairman and members of the 4th respondent. On the 20th of March 2013, the 1st respondent filed an action challenging the composition of the 4th respondent on the ground that the 5th to 9th respondents were not qualified as chairman and members of the 4th respondent.

It was the case of the 1st respondent that the 5th to 9th respondents were partisan members of the appellant, and since the 4th respondent ought to be an impartial arbiter in the contest for political offices between the 1st respondent and the appellant, members of the 4th respondent should not belong to any political party.

The appellant on the other hand denied that the 6th, 7th and 9th respondents were its members; contending at the trial that the 5th and 8th respondents were at one time its members, but had

?1
since resigned and as such the composition of the 4th respondent was constitutional, because at the time of the amendment which excluded members of a political party from membership of the 4th respondent the 5th to 9th respondents were no longer members of the appellant.

The 1st respondent instituted the suit at the lower court, and claimed the following reliefs by its amended statement of claim filed on the 28th of October, 2013:
a) A DECLARATION that members of political parties registered in Nigeria are not competent and qualified to be members of the 3rd Defendant rather only men and women of integrity who are not partisans are entitled to be made members of the 3rd Defendant.
b) A DECLARATION that 4th ? 8th Defendants are not qualified to hold any office of Chairman and Members of the 3rd Defendant being members of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).
c) A DECLARATION that the composition of the 3rd Defendant by the 1st Defendant with the Chairmanship and member of the 4th – 8th Defendants is unconstitutional, illegal, null and void.
d) A DECLARATION that all the actions and steps taken by the 3rd Defendant with the 4th – 8th Defendants as Chairman and

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members of the 3rd Defendant are illegal, null and void owed to their disqualification.
e) AN ORDER nullifying the appointment of the 4th – 8th Defendants as Chairman and members of the 3rd Defendant.
f) AN ORDER declaring all the actions, taken by the 4th ? 8th Defendants as chairman and members of the 3rd Defendant as illegal, wrongful, unlawful, null, void and of no effect.
g) AN ORDER nullifying the composition and membership of the 3rd Defendant owing to the disqualification of the 4th ? 8th Defendants as the Chairman and members.
h) AN ORDER directing the 1st Defendant to appoint person of proven integrity who are not members of PDP or any other political parties as Chairman and members of the 3rd Defendant.
i) AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the 4th- 8th Defendants from performing the functions of the Chairman and members of the 3rd Defendants and an order restraining the 1st and 2nd Defendants from recognizing the 4th ? 8th Defendants as Chairman and members of the 3rd Defendant. (See pages 510 to 511 of Vol. 2 of the Record of Appeal).

Only the appellant and the 1st respondent filed briefs and so this appeal is decided on the

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briefs of the appellant and the 1st respondent.

In the brief settled by Kingsley Chifum Wisdom Esq., the following issues were formulated for determination by the appellant:
1. Whether the learned trial judge was right to apply the provisions of the Constitution (first alteration) Act 2011 to nullify the composition of the 4th respondent when from the evidence adduced at the trial it was apparent that the 5th respondent and 6th respondents were not members of the appellant when the said Act came into force; grounds 5, 6 and 14.
2. Whether this action was not statute barred in view of the fact that it was filed more than 2 years after the accrual of the cause of action; ground 13.
3. Whether the learned trial judge was right to nullify the election of the Local Government Chairmen and Councilors in Kogi State when the said chairmen and councilors were not parties to the action before him; grounds 4, 9, 10, 11 and 12.
4. Whether the learned trial judge was right to nullify the composition of the 4th respondent by reason only of disqualification of 2 out of 5 members of the 4th respondent; grounds 7 and 8.

In the brief settled by learned senior counsel Ocholi James, SAN,

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for the 1st respondent the following issues were formulated for determination:
1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in entertaining the 1st Respondent in the suit filed at the trial court and nullifying the composition of the 4th Respondent; grounds 5, 6, 7, 8 and 14 of the Notice of Appeal)
2. Whether Suit No KG/KK/KV/002/2013 was statute barred; ground 13.
3. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in entertaining the 1st Respondent suit filed at the trial court and nullifying the election of the Local Government Chairmen and Councilors of Kogi State; grounds 4, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the Notice of Appeal.

After carefully going through the records of appeal, and submissions of learned counsel, this court is satisfied that the issues as formulated by the 1st respondent suffice for the determination of this appeal, albeit with little modification.

Issue One:
Whether the learned trial judge was right in nullifying the composition of the 4th.

It is submitted for the appellant that the law as at 2008 rather than prohibit members of a political party from becoming members of the state Independent Electoral Commission actually made it mandatory for them to be

?5
members of a political party, by implication; learned counsel referred the court to Section 200(1) (a) of the Constitution, 1999; before the amendment in 2011.

That being so, even if the 5th to 9th respondents were members of the People’s Democratic Party as at 2008, when they were appointed, their appointment was proper and valid, and the appointment vested them with a right to five years in office by the provisions of Section 199 (1) (c) of the Constitution.

That the 1st respondent failed to prove that the 5th to 6th respondents were members of the PDP, and the trial court was wrong to have found so, especially as the burden was on the 1st respondent to establish that fact, but he failed; learned counsel referred the court to APC V INEC (2015) 8 NWLR part 1462 at 586.

That the finding of the trial Court that the Constitution (first amendment alteration) Act came into effect on the 4th of January 2011 is not correct because it came into effect on the 10th of January 2011.

That the provisions of Section 21 of the Act does not apply to the 5th respondent who was no longer a member of any political party, as the Constitution does not operate retrospectively; learned

?6 counsel referred the court to EZE V ABIA STATE (2010) 15 NWLR part 1216 and MARWA V NYAKO (2012) 6 NWLR part 1296 at 299.

In response it is submitted for the 1st respondent that courts of law are bound to enforce and give effect to the mandatory provisions of a statute; learned counsel referred this court to INYANG V EBONG (2002) 2 NWLR part 752 at 331, and contended that the 1st respondent established during the trial that the 5th and 6th respondents were members of the appellant, and therefore not competent to be members of the 4th respondent; and therefore the 4th respondent was not properly composed to conduct local government elections in Kogi State as required by Sections 197 and 200 (1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).

That Section 200(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) clearly excludes members of a political party from membership of State Independent Electoral Commission, and the trial court was properly guided by the principles of interpretation; learned counsel referred this court to page 1046 of volume 3 of the records of appeal.

That the 1st had established that the 5th respondent was a member of the

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appellant, and the appellant did not call any evidence at the trial on the membership of the 5th respondent.

That the 6th respondent by his own admission, at paragraph 10 of his counter affidavit tendered as Exhibit P12 on the 15th of April, 2013 only ceased to be a member of the PDP after becoming a member of the 4th respondent; learned counsel referred the court to OSIEGBE & ORS V OKWARANYA & ORS (1962) 2 S.C.C 386 at 388.

Learned counsel submitted also that the law is trite that the findings of a trial court are rarely disturbed, except when the finding is perverse; he referred the court to AWUSE v ODILI (2005) 16 NWLR part 952 at 485 and AGUOCHA v AGUOCHA (2005) 1 NWLR part 906 at 192.

That also in respect of the 6th respondent’s membership of the appellant the 1st respondent is expected only to plead material facts by reason of Order 2 (1) of the Kogi State High Court Civil Procedure Rules and the authority of DOSUMU V DADA (2003) FWLR part 151 at 1958, and not evidence as expected by the appellant.

That by reason of Section 200(1) (a) of the Constitution the 5th and 6th respondents cannot continue to be members of the 4th respondent even if they had

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resigned from the 4th respondent; learned counsel referred this court to the unreported case of the Ado Ekiti High Court in HAD/196/2011 which he commended as persuasive.

Learned counsel submitted that since the trial court found that the 5th and 6th respondents were not qualified by reason of their partisanship, it had to nullify their membership of the 4th respondent; and the remaining members of the 4th respondent cannot constitute a quorum of the 4th respondent by a combine effect of Section 197 (2) and PART 2 of the Third Schedule of the Constitution which set membership as the chairman and at least five members.

That the operative date of the Constitution (first amendment) Act volume 1 2010 is 16th July, 2010 i.e. the commencement date, and from that date any member of a political party cannot be a member of the 4th respondent or its chairman.

?Now it is important for the resolution of this issue to first note that it is not disputed by either side that the 5th to 9th respondents were appointed in April 2008 as chairman and members of the 4th respondent by the 2nd respondent. That is supported by the evidence of the sole witness of the 1st respondent at

9page 992 lines 13 to 16 of the record of appeal, volume 3.

?104th respondent.
Now if that was the position of the law at that point in time, even if they were indeed members of a political party, say the PDP, their appointments could be said to be not only proper, but valid in the circumstances; and if their appointments were valid at that point in time, the same appointments as rightly argued for the appellant were for a term of five years in that office, by reason of Section 199 (1) of the same Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
In view of this finding, the question of whether the 5th to 9th respondents were members of the PDP, or had resigned from the PDP counts for very little, as it has become academic and needless to dwell on for the purpose of this case, see the decision of this court in OGUNLEYE V AINA (2012) LPELR-7877-CA.

It also follows as a consequence that the trial court was wrong in nullifying the composition of the 4th respondent; accordingly this issue is resolved in favour of the appellant, and against the 1st respondent.

Issue Two:
Whether suit no. KG/KK/KV/002/2013 was statute barred.
It is submitted for the appellant on this issue that the challenge at the trial court is against the act of

?11 the 2nd respondent, the Kogi State Government in appointing the 5th to 9th respondents into the 4th respondent; and that brings to fore the question whether the 2nd respondent, whose act is being challenged by the 1st respondent is a public officer? Learned counsel further submitted that the law is settled that Federal, State and Local Governments, as well as all their agencies are public officers within the meaning of the Public Officers’ Protection Law; he referred the court to OFFILI V CSC (2008) 2 NWLR part 1071 at 254 and FGN V ZEBRA ENERGY LTD (2002) 18 NWLR part 789 at 195.

That the act of the 2nd respondent being challenged by tie 1st respondent is the appointment of the 5th to 9th respondents, as chairman and members of the Kogi State Independent Electoral Commission.

That when the 2nd respondent purported to appoint the 5th to 9th respondents it was exercising a statutory power within the contemplation of the Public Officers, protection Law; and time began to run, for the purpose of Limitation Law on the 10th of January 2011 when all facts necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to succeed occurred.

That since the 2nd respondent was exercising

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its statutory powers of appointing the 5th to 9th respondents as members of the Kogi State Independent Electoral Commission, the 1st respondent ought to have filed the action within three months when the Constitution prohibited members of a political party from being members of State INEC, and having failed to do so the court was wrong to have assumed jurisdiction.

In response it is submitted for the 1st respondent that there are exceptions to the public officers’ protection law, and one of such exceptions is where the public officer fails to act in good faith, in abuse of office or maliciously or with no jurisdiction; learned counsel referred the court to ALHAJI JIBRIN BALA HASSAN V DR. MUAZU BABANGIDA ALIYU (2010) 7 SCNJ 35 at 58-59.

That the appointment of the 5th and 6th respondents as members of the 4th respondent was contrary to the provisions of Section 200(1) of the Constitution (as amended) and therefore an abuse of office, with no legal justification; as a consequence of which learned counsel argued the 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents can be said to have acted outside their authorities in the composition of 4th respondent; the 2nd to 9th respondents he

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contends are in clear violation of the Constitution; he referred the court to A.G. RIVERS STATE V A.G. BAYELSA STATE & ORS (2013) NWLR part 1340 at 148.

That at the trial court the major issue was the Constitutionality of the composition and membership of the 4th respondent, as it related to the provisions of Section 200(1) of the Constitution; and that in itself took this case out of the realm of invocation of Section 2(1) of the Public Officers’ Protection Law, as an exception.

That composition and structure of the 4th respondent was a continuous process, and so the wrong, subject of the complaint at tie trial court was a continuous one, only after its cessation that time will begin to count; learned counsel referred the court to CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA V JACOB OLADELE AMAO & 2 ORS (2010) 5 SCNJ A62 at 83 and OJUKWU V OJUKWU (2000) 11 NWLR part 677 at 91.

That from the pleadings of the 1st respondent the case was not statute barred, as the facts were not limited to the composition of the 4th respondent and the membership of the appellant by the 5th to 9th respondents.

This court had earlier resolved, while resolving issue number one that the appointments

?14of the 5th to 9th respondents were constitutionally valid in the circumstances, it is needless being repetitive.

The question that begs for resolution now is whether or not Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act applies to this case; and for the avoidance of doubt it reads thus: “where any action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any act or law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in execution of any act, law duty, authority; the following provisions shall cause effect.
(a) The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained as of in case of continuance of damage or injury within three months after ceasing thereof…”
Before these provisions will apply to a situation:
a) The person seeking to take advantage of the law must as of necessity be a public officer within the meaning of the law,
b)The act leading to the complaint must have arisen in the course of the performance of a public duty.
?c) The

?15 action filed against the said officer within three months from the date of accrual of the cause of action.

The 1st respondent is clearly complaining about the act of the 2nd respondent in appointing the 5th to 9th respondents into the 4th respondent at the trial court; that much is clear from paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the amended statement of claim,

Paragraph 9 for instance reads:
“The 1st defendant in defiance to the position of the law appointed the 4th to 8th Defendants as chairman and members of the 3rd Defendant knowing fully well that they are members of the 9th Defendant and therefore not qualified to hold the positions…”

It is very important at this juncture to determine whether the 2nd respondent, whose action is being questioned, is a public officer within the meaning of the law.

The protection offered by the Public Officers Protection Act covers and protects all public officers, that is, all civil servants in their individual capacity and all government bodies, public institutions and agencies, ministries, and departments, by whatever name called and whether corporate or unincorporated; see RAHAMANIYYA UNITED NIGERIA LTD V MINISTRY FOR FEDERAL CAPITAL

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TERRITORY & ORS (2008) LPELR-8391-CA.

It is clear from these authorities that the 2nd respondent is a public officer within the meaning of the Public Officers, Protection Act; and it follows therefore that when the 2nd respondent appointed the 5th to 9th respondents into the 4th respondent it was exercising a statutory power.

Even though the constitutionality of the appointments has been settled for all intents and purposes it ought to be borne in mind that before the amendment in 2011 Section 200(1) (a) of the Constitution regulated persons to be appointed as members of state INEC; it provided to the effect that no person shall be qualified for appointment as member or chairman of state INEC, if he is not qualified for election as a member of the state house of assembly; and this presupposes that such a person is a member of a political party, because one cannot qualify for election as a member of a State House of

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Assembly without first being a member of a political party, see Section 106 (d) of the Constitution which makes membership of a political party a condition precedent for election into the state House of Assembly.
That law was changed effectively on the 10th of January 2011 with the coming into effect of the First Alteration Act, which amended Section 200(1) (a) of the Constitution; it prohibited members of a political party from becoming members of state INEC; effectively that means from that date the cause of action accrued to the plaintiff in this case at hand, see ADIMORA V AJUFO (1988) 3 NSCC 1005 AT 1008.

But the plaintiff did not file this action until the 20th of March, 2013, more than two years after the cause of action accrued, see page 1 of volume 1 of the record of appeal.

It is therefore the considered opinion of this court that the 2nd respondent was exercising its statutory powers when it appointed the 5th to 9th respondent as members of the Kogi State INEC; the 1st respondent ought therefore to have filed its case within three months from the date the alteration Act came into effect i.e. on the 10th of January 2011, as earlier pointed out; having

18 failed to do so rendered the suit statute barred, thus robbing the trial court of the necessary jurisdiction to hear and determine same; accordingly this issue too is resolved in favour of the appellant, and against the respondents.

Issue Three:
Whether the trial court was right to nullify the election of the Local Government Chairmen and Councilors in Kogi State, even though they were not parties before the court.

It is submitted for the appellant that a court has no jurisdiction to decide the fate of a person when such person is not a party to the action; learned counsel referred the court to BABATOLA v ALADEJANA (2001) 12 NWLR part 728 at 615.

That the 1st respondent only amended its Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim to pray for the nullification of the Local Government Election, and for a consequential order directing the chairmen and councilors to vacate their seats as a product of a void election.

Learned counsel further submitted that where a court grants an order against a person who is not a party, such a judgment must be set aside; he referred the court to ANYANWOK V OKOYE (2010) 5 NWLR part 1188 at 521.

?In response it is submitted for the 1st

19
respondent that the complaints in this case do not relate to actions of the elected Chairmen and Councilors, as a result of which they are not necessary parties; learned counsel referred the court to Order 14 Rule 16(1) of the Kogi State High Court Civil Procedure Rules, 2006, which is to the effect that no proceeding shall be defeated by reason of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties.

That the issues raised could be resolved with the parties before the court, especially as the case has nothing to do with of the manner the election was conducted.

Learned counsel further submitted that there was no denial of fair hearing; the Chairmen and Councilors not being necessary parties whose joinder is needed; and reliefs K and L are merely consequential, flowing naturally from the primary matter; learned counsel referred the court B.O.N LTD V MURI (1998) 2 NWLR part 536 at 168.

Prayers K and L in the amended statement of claim at pages 1 to 3 respectively read as follows:
“An order nullifying the Local Government election conducted on the 4th of May, 2013 by the 3rd Defendant.” “A consequential order directing all purportedly elected Local Government Chairmen and Councilors

20
from the said election to vacate office same, being a product of null and void election.”

These prayers were clearly included after the action was filed with only the 1st respondent, the 2nd to 9th and the appellant as parties, with the intention of affecting the interests of the chairmen and councilors at whom they are directed; and eventually the election of the chairmen and councilors were nullified by the trial court, as per page 1049 of the volume three of the record of appeal.

21
On the whole it is the considered opinion of this court that the trial judge erred in granting orders that affected the interest of persons who were not parties to the case; because orders cannot stand by reason of the fact that such orders are null and void.
This issue too for that reason is accordingly resolved in favour of the appellant, and against the respondents, the appeal succeeds perforce; and it is allowed.

The judgment of the Kogi State High Court, sitting in Koton Karfo, delivered on the 8th day of December, 2014 is hereby set aside.
Parties to bear their respective costs.

MOORE A.A. ADUMEIN, J.C.A.: I read in draft form the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Mohammed Mustapha, JCA. My learned brother has elaborately dealt with all the issues in the appeal.

For the comprehensive reasons given by my learned brother I also allow this appeal.
I abide by the order as to costs.

TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A.: I agree with the reason and conclusion in the lead Judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Mohammed Mustapha, JCA, which I read before now.
I abide by the order of cost.

Appearances
A.M. Aliyu SAN with: For the Appellant
E.A. Osayomi Esq., and
K.C. Wisdom Esq.

Olukayode Enitan Esq., with For 1st Respondent
Isaac E. Epa Esq., and
Andrew Eche Esq.

K.A. Dandaso Esq. For 2nd to 9th Respondent

22>

Appearances

A.M Aliyu SAN with: E.A. Osayomi Esq., and K.C. Wisdom Esq.,For Appellant

AND

Olukayode Enitan Esq., with Isaac E. Epa Esq., and Andrew
Eche Esq., for the 1st Respondent,
K.A. Dandaso Esq., for the 2nd to 9th Respondents.For Respondent

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