Governors of the Peabody Donation Fund
(Appellants)
v.
Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Company Limited and others
(Respondents)
JUDGMENT
Die Jovis 18° Octobris 1984
Upon Report from the Appellate Committee to whom was
referred the Cause Governors of the Peabody Donation Fund
against Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Company Limited and others,
That the Committee had heard Counsel on Thursday the 5th,
Monday the 9th, Tuesday the 10th and Wednesday the 11th days
of July last upon the Petition and Appeal of the Governors
of the Peabody Donation Fund of 207 Waterloo Road, London
SE1 8XW praying that the matter of the Order set forth in
the Schedule thereto, namely an Order of Her Majesty’s Court
of Appeal of the 29th day of July 1983, might be reviewed
before Her Majesty the Queen in Her Court of Parliament and
that the said Order might be reversed, varied or altered or
that the Petitioners might have such other relief in the
premises as to tier Majesty the Queen in Her Court of
Parliament might seem meet; as also upon the Case of Sir
Lindsay Parkinson & Company Limited and others lodged in
answer to the said Appeal; and due consideration had this
day of what was offered on either side in this Cause:
It is Ordered and Adjudged, by the Lords Spiritual and
Temporal in the Court of Parliament of Her Majesty the Queen
assembled, That the said Order of tier Majesty’s Court of
Appeal of the 29th day of July 1983 complained of in the
said Appeal be, and the same is hereby, Affirmed and that
the said Petition and Appeal be, and the same is hereby,
dismissed this House: And it is further Ordered, That the
Appellants do pay or cause to be paid to the said
Respondents the Costs incurred by them in respect of the
said Appeal, the amount thereof to be certified by the Clerk
of the Parliaments if not agreed between the parties.
Cler: Parliamentor:
HOUSE OF LORDS
GOVERNORS OF THE PEABODY DONATION FUND
(APPELLANTS)
v.
SIR LINDSAY PARKINSON & COMPANY LIMITED AND OTHERS
(RESPONDENTS)
Lord Keith of Kinkel
Lord Scarman
Lord Bridge of Harwich
Lord Brandon of Oakbrook
Lord Templeman
LORD KEITH OF KINKEL
My Lords,
In 1972 the appellants, the Governors of the Peabody
Donation Fund (“Peabody”) decided to undertake the development
for housing of a site known as Knights Hill, in the London Borough
of Lambeth. They engaged as contractors for the project Sir
Lindsay Parkinson & Co. Ltd. (“the contractors”) and as architects
Austin Vernon & Partners (“the architects”). Consulting engineers
were also instructed.
The site of the development, which was for 245 houses,
presented certain problems. It required to be terraced and the
nature of the subsoil was London clay, which tends to expand and
contract with the seasons and to give rise to movement. For this
reason it was appreciated by the architects, and the consulting
engineers advising them, that the traditional rigid type of drainage
system was likely to be unsuitable for the project, since there
would be a high probability of failure, and the architects therefore
designed a system which incorporated flexible joints between pipes
at various critical points and submitted plans for approval to the
respondents, the London Borough of Lambeth (“Lambeth”).
The application for approval was made in pursuance of
paragraphs 13(1) and 15(1) and (2) of Part III of Schedule 9 to the
London Government Act 1963, which provide:
“13(1) It shall not be lawful in an inner London borough (a)
to erect any house or other building, or (b) to rebuild any
house or other building which has been pulled down to a
level below, the floor commonly called the ground floor,
unless there are provided to the satisfaction of the borough
council drains conforming with the requirements of this
paragraph and all such drains and ail works and apparatus in
connection therewith are constructed to the satisfaction of
the council and, in particular, are constructed of such
materials and size, at such level and with such fall, as are
approved by the council and are provided with a water
supply . . .”
– 1 –
“15(1) No person shall – (a) begin to lay or dig out the
foundations of any house or building in an inner London
borough, or to rebuild any house or building therein; or (b)
begin to make any drain for the purpose of draining directly
or indirectly into a sewer under the control of the council
of such a borough, unless, at least seven days previously, he
has given to the borough council notice of his intention so
to do, and if any person begins to lay or dig out the
foundations of any such house or building, or to make any
drain for the purpose aforesaid, in contravention of this
paragraph, he shall be liable to a fine not exceeding £5 and
to a further fine not exceeding £2 for every day thereafter
until the notice is given. (2) If any house or building, or
any drain for draining directly or indirectly into a sewer
under the control of the council of a London borough, or
any connections to such a drain, or any works, apparatus or
water supply in connection with such a drain, is or are
begun, erected, made or provided in an inner London
borough in contravention of the provisions of this Part of
this Schedule or of the corresponding provisions of any
enactment repealed by this Act, the council of the borough
at their option may either – (a) serve upon the owner of
the house or building or of the drain (as the case may be) a
notice requiring him to cause the house or building to be
demolished or altered or to cause the drain or the
connections or other works and apparatus in connection
therewith or the water supply to be relaid, remade, altered
or added to, as the case may require; or (b) recover from
the person in default, as a debt due from him to the
council, a penalty not exceeding £5, and a further penalty
not exceeding £2 for every day on which the contravention
continues.”
The application was made on 6 April 1972, and an informal
indication seems to have been given by Lambeth that it was likely
to be approved. Early in 1973 the contractors were ready to
begin the construction of the drainage system. The architects’
representative on the site was a trainee architect named Mitchell.
Lambeth had instructed a drainage inspector named Marlow to
carry out inspections of the drainage installation. On 2 February
1973 Mitchell and Marlow met and agreed between themselves that
in certain parts of the system the planned flexible joints should be
abandoned and fixed joints substituted. On 7 February 1973,
Mitchell wrote a letter to the contractors’ site agent, who had
also been present at the meeting, confirming the agreement to this
variation. It does not appear that either Mitchell or Marlow ever
informed their respective principals about what they had done. In
the result, the trial judge found, and the finding is not disputed by
the appellants, that Marlow had neither actual nor ostensible
authority to agree the variation so that Lambeth itself bears no
responsibility for his action.
Very soon afterwards, on 14 February 1973, Lambeth,
through their senior assistant director (civil engineering), wrote to
the architects intimating approval in principle of the plans
originally submitted by the latter, i.e. those showing flexible joints
throughout. However, the contractors commenced the construction
of drains incorporating rigid joints on the lines agreed between
Mitchell and Marlow.
– 2 –
The next development was that Marlow was superseded by
another drainage inspector, named Toogood, who had little
experience in this field having previously been employed as a
plumber. He asked the contractors’ site agent for information
about the nature of the drains which were being constructed. The
site agent wrote a letter, addressed to the Lambeth Public Health
Department and headed “For the attention of Mr. Toogood,”
indicating inter alia that runs and connections into and abutting
the dwelling houses were laid with rigid joints. Toogood took no
action on this letter and in particular did not bring it to the
attention of any of his superiors in the department. Had he done
so there can be no doubt that steps would have been taken to
ensure that flexible joints were installed throughout the system.
The upshot was that construction with fixed joints proceeded
and in due course tests carried out in late 1975 and early 1976
revealed that many of the drains had failed. Reconstruction was
necessary, at a cost of some £118,000, completion of the
development was delayed for about three years, with consequent
loss of rents for Peabody, and Peabody were faced with substantial
claims by the contractors for additional payments said to be due
to them because of the delay.
In these circumstances, Peabody started proceedings against
the contractors, the architects and Lambeth. Their case against
the contractors was based on the allegation that the failure of the
drains was caused by faulty workmanship. Against the architects
it was alleged that they failed to check the contractors’ faulty
workmanship and further that they instructed the contractors to
install drains lacking the requisite flexible joints. In the event the
claim against the architects was compromised. As regards
Lambeth the material averment of negligence against them was in
these terms:
“Knowing that rigid drains were being installed between the
vertical stacks in the buildings and the manholes following
receipt of the said letter of 4 May 1973, thereafter failing
to require flexibly jointed drains wherever rigid drains had
been or were to be installed.”
The case came for trial on issues of liability before Judge Oddie
sitting as a deputy official referee. On 24 January 1983 he gave
judgment holding that, although there had been some faulty
workmanship on the part of the contractors, this was not the
cause of the failure of the drains, and that the cause of the
failure was the design change instructed by Mitchell from flexible
joints to rigid joints. He did not have to deal with the claim
against the architects since that, as mentioned above, had been
compromised. He went on to find that Lambeth were liable in
damages to Peabody on the ground of failure to take steps to
ensure that the drainage system as installed complied with the
design originally approved by them.
Lambeth appealed to the Court of Appeal against the latter
part of the judgment, and on 29 July 1983 that court (Lawton, Fox
and Slade L.JJ.) allowed the appeal and reversed the decision of
the trial judge. Peabody now appeal to your Lordships’ House.
– 3 –
Peabody’s case, in substance, is that Lambeth were under a
duty of care, owed to Peabody, when they became aware through
the letter of 4 May 1973 that the contractors were installing
drains with rigid joints, to invoke their powers under paragraph 15
of Part III of Schedule 9 to the Act of 1963 so as to require a
reversion to the flexible joint design which they had previously
approved. The duty is not said to be a statutory one, but one
that arose on common law principles because Lambeth ought to
have foreseen that, if they did not take steps to stop the
installation of drains with rigid joints, severe economic loss would
ensue to Peabody through the necessity at some future date of
taking up these drains and replacing them with others of the
approved design, as in fact happened.
It may be accepted that knowledge of the contents of the
letter of 4 May 1973 is to be imputed to Lambeth. It was
addressed to Lambeth’s Public Health Department, albeit for the
attention of Mr. Toogood, and the latter was clearly under a duty
to bring it to the notice of higher authority. It may also be
accepted that Lambeth had power under paragraph 15 of Part III
of Schedule 9 to stop the unauthorised installation. No doubt it
would have been sufficient, in fact, to draw to Peabody’s attention
that the rigid joints were unauthorised. So the issue really comes
to be whether Lambeth owed a duty to Peabody to warn them
that they were heading for financial disaster.
Lord Atkin’s famous enunciation of the general principles
upon which the law of negligence is founded, in Donoghue v.
Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580, has long been recognised as not
intended to afford a comprehensive definition, to the effect that
every situation which is capable of falling within the terms of the
utterance and which results in loss automatically affords a remedy
in damages. Lord Reid said in Dorset Yacht Co. v. Home Office
[1970] AC 1004, 1027:
“It is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition.
It will require qualification in new circumstances. But I
think that the time has come when we can and should say
that it ought to apply unless there is some justification or
valid explanation for its exclusion. For example, causing
economic loss is a different matter; for one thing, it is
often caused by deliberate action. Competition involves
traders being entitled to damage their rivals’ interests by
promoting their own, and there is a long chapter of the law
determining in what circumstances owners of land can and
in what circumstances they may not use their proprietary
rights so as to injure their neighbours. But where
negligence is involved the tendency has been to apply
principles analogous to those stated by Lord Atkin: cf.
Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd, v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964]
A.C. 465. And when a person has done nothing to put
himself in any relationship with another person in distress or
with his property mere accidental propinquity does not
require him to go to that person’s assistance. There may
be a moral duty to do so, but it is not practicable to make
it a legal duty.”
Lord Wilberforce spoke on similar lines in Anns v. Merton London
Borough Council [1978] AC 728, 751-752:
– 4 –
“Through the trilogy of cases in this House – Donoghue v.
Stevenson [1932] AC 562, Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v.
Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] AC 465, and Dorset Yacht
Co. Ltd, v. Home Office [1970] AC 1004, the position has
now been reached that in order to establish that a duty of
care arises in a particular situation, it is not necessary to
bring the facts of that situation within those of previous
situations in which a duty of care has been held to exist.
Rather the question has to be approached in two stages.
First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged
wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is
a sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such
that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former,
carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to
the latter – in which case a prima facie duty of care arises.
Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it
is necessary to consider whether there are any
considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit
the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is
owed or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise:
see Dorset Yacht case [1970] AC 1004, per Lord Reid at
p. 1027.”
There has been a tendency in some recent cases to treat
these passages as being themselves of a definitive character. This
is a temptation which should be resisted. The true question in
each case is whether the particular defendant owed to the
particular plaintiff a duty of care having the scope which is
contended for, and whether he was in breach of that duty with
consequent loss to the plaintiff. A relationship of proximity in
Lord Atkin’s sense must exist before any duty of care can arise,
but the scope of the duty must depend on all the circumstances of
the case. In Dorset Yacht Co. v. Home Office [1970] AC 1004,
1038, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, after observing that at the
conclusion of his speech in Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562,
Lord Atkin said that it was advantageous if the law “is in
accordance with sound common sense” and expressing the view that
a special relation existed between the prison officers and the
yacht company which gave rise to a duty on the former to control
their charges so as to prevent them doing damage, continued, at
p.1039:
“Apart from this I would conclude that, in the situation
stipulated in the present case, it would not only be fair and
reasonable that a duty of care should exist but that it
would be contrary to the fitness of things were it not so. I
doubt whether it is necessary to say, in cases where the
court is asked whether in a particular situation a duty
existed, that the court is called upon to make a decision as
to policy. Policy need not be invoked where reason and
good sense will at once point the way. If the test as to
whether in some particular situation a duty of care arises
may in some cases have to be whether it is fair and
reasonable that it should so arise, the court must not shrink
from being the arbiter. As Lord Radcliffe said in his
speech in Davis Contractors Ltd, v. Fareham Urban District
Council [1956] AC 696, 728, the court is ‘the spokesman of
the fair and reasonable man.'”
– 5 –
So in determining whether or not a duty of care of particular
scope was incumbent upon a defendant it is material to take into
consideration whether it is just and reasonable that it should be
so.
In the instant case Peabody, the owners of the building site
and the undertakers of the development thereon, bore
responsibility, under paragraph 13 of Part III of Schedule 9 to the
Act of 1963, for securing that the drains conformed to the design
approved by Lambeth. Mr. Dyson, for Peabody, brought to the
attention of the House certain drainage byelaws made by the
Greater London Council in 1962 under the statutory predecessor of
the Act of 1963. These undoubtedly place certain very specific
obligations upon contractors carrying out building operations, but
they do nothing to detract from what is clearly the proper
construction of paragraph 13(1), namely, that observance of its
provisions is incumbent upon any person who puts in train a house
building project. Peabody no doubt had no personal knowledge or
understanding of what was going on. They relied on the advice of
their architects, engineers and contractors, and in the event they
were sadly let down, particularly by the architects. But it would
be neither reasonable nor just, in these circumstances, to impose
upon Lambeth a liability to indemnify Peabody against loss
resulting from such disastrous reliance.
The purpose for which the powers contained in paragraph 15
of Part III of Schedule 9 have been conferred on Lambeth is not
to safeguard building developers against economic loss resulting
from their failure to comply with approved plans. It is in my
opinion to safeguard the occupiers of houses built in the local
authority’s area, and also members of the public generally, against
dangers to their health which may arise from defective drainage
installations. The provisions are public health measures. In Anns
v. Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728, a case
concerned with defective foundations, Lord Wilberforce said at p.
758, under the heading “To whom the duty is owed”;
“There is, In my opinion, no difficulty about this. A
reasonable man in the position of the inspector must realise
that if the foundations are covered in without adequate
depth or strength as required by the byelaws, injury to
safety or health may be suffered by owners or occupiers of
the house. The duty is owed to them – not to a negligent
building owner, the source of his own loss.”
The plaintiffs in that case were lessees under long leases which
they had acquired from a building developer, either directly or at
a certain remove. The damages which they were held entitled to
recover consisted in such sums as each of them required to expend
in order to put his house in such a state that it was no longer a
danger to safety or health. (See per Lord Wilberforce at p. 759).
It is important to notice that these sums were not recoverable as
economic loss pure and simple, but as representing expenditure
necessary to avert injury to safety or health. The passage I have
quoted from the speech of Lord Wilberforce raises certain
difficulties. In particular, it is difficult to see how, having regard
to the scope of the duty held to exist, a non-resident owner could
fail within the ambit of it, since he would not be subject to any
possible injury to safety or health. Yet Lord Wilberforce would
– 6 –
appear to be saying that the duty is owed separately to owners
and to occupiers. In fact, the plaintiffs, as long lessees, were in
substance both owners and occupiers, and in my opinion the
decision should be treated as restricted to that situation. Further,
the reference to “a negligent building owner, the source of his own
loss” to some extent begs the question whether a duty is owed to
the owner since negligence on the part of a claimant does not
necessarily, since the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act
1945, preclude recovery of damages against a negligent defendant,
though it may reduce them. The question whether a building
owner’s negligence is the sole cause of his loss raises a question
of causation, not liability. It is also to be observed that the basis
upon which the measure of damages was arrived at would present
difficulties in the case of a claim by one occupying upon terms
which did not permit of his carrying out any alterations to the
structure of the house. The solution of these difficulties is not,
however, necessary to the determination of the instant appeal. It
is sufficient to hold that Lambeth owed no duty to Peabody to
activate their paragraph 15 powers, notwithstanding that they
might reasonably have foreseen that failure to do so would result
in economic loss to Peabody, because the purpose of avoiding such
loss was not one of the purposes for which these powers were
vested in them. I find myself in respectful agreement with the
following passage in the judgment of Slade L.J. in the court below
[1983] 3 W.L.R. 754, 767-768):
“Can it have been the intention of the legislature, in
conferring on a borough council power to enforce against a
defaulting site owner requirements made by it in accordance
with paragraph 13 of Part III of Schedule 9, to protect such
owner against damage which he himself might suffer through
his own failure to comply with such requirements? In my
opinion, this question can only be answered in the negative.
This particular power exists for the protection of other
persons – not for that of the person in default. I say
nothing about the case where a local authority have failed
to make known their requirements or where they have made
requirements of an inadequate or defective nature.
However, I can see no justification for extending the law of
negligence by imposing on a local authority, over and above
their public law powers and duties under paragraphs 13 and
15, a duty to exercise their powers of enforcement under
paragraph 15(2), owed in private law towards a site owner,
who, whether with or without personal negligence, disregards
the proper requirements of the local authority, duly made
under paragraph 13 and duly communicated to him or
persons authorised to receive them on his behalf. The
practical implications of giving the defaulting owner a right
to sue the local authority for damages in such circumstances
need consideration, but no elaboration.”
Mr. Dyson relied strongly on two recent cases decided by
different divisions of the Court of Appeal within a week of each
other, apparently without either division knowing of the case
before the other. In the first of these, Acrecrest Ltd, v. W. S.
Hattrell & Partners [1983] Q.B. 260, the owners of a site employed
independent architects and contractors to build a block of flats
and garages, which they subsequently leased out. The architects
had prepared plans providing for foundations 3 feet 6 inches deep,
– 7 –
but at the owner’s request revised them so as to provide for
foundations only 3 feet deep. The local authority’s building
inspector instructed that the foundations should be 5 feet deep in
some places and 3 feet 6 inches to 4 feet deep elsewhere. The
nature of the site was such that it was necessary for stability that
the foundations be 5 feet deep overall. Defects developed in
respect of which the tenants claimed against the owners. The
owners sued the architects for damages for negligence and breach
of contract, and the architects joined the local authority as third
parties, claiming contribution. The action against the architects
was compromised, but their claim for contribution proceeded to
trial. The trial judge held that the local authority were liable for
breach of a duty of care owed to the owners, and assessed their
contribution at 25 per cent. His decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeal. Stephenson L.J., giving the leading judgment,
construed the passages which I have quoted from the speech of
Lord Wilberforce in the Anns case [1978] AC 728 as intended to
lay down that a local authority, in the exercise of its supervisory
functions over building projects, owed a duty of care to a building
developer to see that his property did not suffer damage, even
though there was no question of apprehended injury to the health
or safety of the developer. Donaldson L.J. expressed a similar
view, as did Sir David Cairns. In my opinion they failed to
appreciate correctly the course of Lord Wilberforce’s reasoning and
consequently misapplied the decision in Anns. In the result, the
Acrecrest case [1983] Q.B. 260 was wrongly decided and should in
my opinion be overruled.
The second case to which I have referred is Dennis v.
Charnwood Borough Council [1983] Q.B. 409. The facts were that
in 1955 the plaintiffs commissioned a builder to construct a house
for their own occupation upon a site which consisted partly of an
infilled sand pit. Plans were submitted to the local authority
under byelaws which corresponded in material respects with
paragraph 13 of Part III of Schedule 9 to the Act of 1963. The
plans snowed the foundation to consist of a concrete raft and were
duly approved by the local authority. This was in fact an
unsuitable foundation for the site, and many years later subsidence
led to serious cracking of the structure. The plaintiffs sued the
statutory successors of the local authority for damages on the
ground of negligence in passing plans indicating an inadequate
foundation, and judgment in their favour was given by Forbes J.
and affirmed by the Court of Appeal (Lawton, Templeman and Fox
L.JJ.). The argument turned principally upon whether the trial
judge’s conclusions on liability were justified on the evidence, and
also upon the question of limitation. Templeman L.J., delivering
the leading judgment, did not find it necessary to give any
elaborate consideration to the question whether the local authority
owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs, regarding the matter as
concluded in the latter ‘s favour by the decision of this House in
Anns [1978] AC 728. He said,[1983] Q.B. 409, 414-415:
“The first question is whether the council, when they
considered and passed the plan of the house owed any duty
of care to Mr. Dennis. In Anns v. Merton London Borough
Council [1978] AC 728 the House of Lords decided that
under the Public Health Act 1936 local authorities owe a
duty to give proper consideration to the question whether
they should inspect the carrying out of any building work.
– 8 –
If they decide to inspect, they are under a duty to use
reasonable care in carrying out their supervisory function of
ensuring compliance with the building byelaws but only
within the limits of discretion bona fide exercised as to the
time and manner of inspection: per Lord Wilberforce at p.
755. The duty is owed to the owner or occupier at the
date when damage occurs as a result of a breach of duty by
the local authority. The duty is not owed to a negligent
building owner who is the source of his own loss: per Lord
Wilberforce at p. 758. In my judgment, if local authorities
are liable within the limits prescribed in the Anns case for
negligence in connection with the discretionary inspection of
building works, they must similarly be liable for negligence
in failing to use reasonable care in considering and
approving plans. There is no suggestion that Mr. and Mrs.
Dennis, the building owners, were negligent or the source of
their own loss. They were entitled to trust the builder and
the council. They were entitled to claim damages against
the builder if he was negligent. They were entitled to
claim damages against the council if the council were
negligent in breach of their duty to take reasonable care in
the consideration of the plan of the house or in the exercise
of their supervisory and discretionary power of inspection.”
The decision is in my opinion to be justified on the basis that the
plaintiffs, as owners who were the intended occupiers of the house,
were within the ambit of the duty of care laid down in Anns.
They were persons injury to whose safety or health might
necessarily be expected to occur if the foundations of the house
were inadequate. There can be no doubt that, under the ratio
decidendi of Anns, a remedy against the local authority would have
been available to any subsequent occupier who had purchased the
house. The plaintiffs were in breach of certain material provisions
of the relevant byelaws dealing with the adequacy of foundations,
but the fact remains that plans showing the intended foundations
had been submitted with their authority and had been approved.
This approval might reasonably be taken as an indication that the
foundations were satisfatory, and considering that the plaintiffs
themselves had no technical knowledge nor understanding of the
position and that their own safety and health were in issue, it
would be unreasonable and unjust to hold that the local authority
owed them no duty. The decision does not, however, assist
Peabody in the present case, because not only was there no
question of injury to health or safety at issue so far as they were
concerned, but they were proceeding to install drains with fixed
joints in flat disregard of Lambeth’s requirements.
My Lords, for these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal.
LORD SCARMAN
My Lords,
I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech to
be delivered by my noble and learned friend Lord Keith of Kinkel.
I agree with it, and for the reasons he gives I would dismiss the
appeal.
– 9 –
LORD BRIDGE OF HARWICH
My Lords,
For the reasons given in the speech of my noble and learned
friend Lord Keith of Kinkel, with which I agree, I too would
dismiss the appeal.
LORD BRANDON OF OAKBROOK
My Lords,
I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech
prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Keith of Kinkel. I
agree with it, and for the reasons which he gives I would dismiss
the appeal.
LORD TEMPLEMAN
My Lords,
I agree with the speech of my noble and learned friend,
Lord Keith of Kinkel, and for the reasons he gives I too would
dismiss the appeal.
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