PAT ONEGBEDAN, ESQ v. UNITY BANK PLC
(2014)LCN/6783(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Wednesday, the 22nd day of January, 2014
CA/B/85/2011
RATIO
WORDS AND PHRASES: NOVATION
Contract by novation is a form of assignment in which by consent of all parties thereto, a new contract is made and substituted for an existing contract. Hence one of the essentials of the new contract, that is, novation, is that the consent of all the parties must be obtained. However, such consent need not be in writing; it may be inferred from the conduct of the parties, without express words. See Halbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 8 at pages 262 – 263. George Ashibogwu V. Attorney General, Bendel State & Anor. (1988) 1 SC. 248.
The learned authors of Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition at page 1094, defined Novation as, to wit:
“(1) The act of substituting for an old obligation, a new one that either replaces an existing obligation with a new obligation or replaces an original party with a new party. A novation may substitute (1) a new obligation between the same parties, (2) a new debtor, or (3) a new creditor.”
Furthermore, the distinguished and learned authors of G.C. Cheshire and C.H.S. Fifoot, 8th Edition, at page 504 thereof, said:
“Novation is a transaction by which, with the consent of all the parties concerned, a new contract is substituted for the one already made. The new contract may be between the original parties e.g where a written agreement is later incorporated in a deed, or between different parties, e.g
where a new person is substituted for the original debtor or creditor.”
Also see Mercantile Bank V. Adelma (1990) 5 NWLR (pt. 153) 747 at 762 (CA). Per TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
PAT ONEGBEDAN, ESQ Appellant(s)
AND
UNITY BANK PLC Respondent(s)
TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellant, a Legal practitioner, was retained as an external solicitor by the respondent. He was engaged to defend an appeal for the respondent in this court in CA/B/91/94 – Jessica Trading Co. Ltd V. New Nigeria Bank Plc. The agreed and approved professional fee for the said handling of the aforementioned appeal by the appellant was N35,000.00. This was in 1992. The appellant was paid 50% of the said fee, that is, the sum of N17,500.00, at the onset of the agreement.
The said appeal lasted at this court for upwards of twelve years and the appellant had made thirty one (31) appearances in it. The appellant in May, 2004, wrote to the respondent, requesting for a review of his professional fee. The respondent in response, intimated the appellant that his request for a review of the professional fee would be considered at the conclusion of the appeal and upon the issuance of a final invoice by the appellant.
Judgment on the said appeal was delivered on 19th October, 2006, in favour of the respondent. Prior to that date, upon conclusion of arguments by counsel on the appeal which was adjourned for judgment, the appellant had on 4th October, 2006 forwarded a letter incorporating the Bill of Charges or Professional Fee, to the tune of N2,500,000.= (Two million, five hundred thousand Naira) only, to the respondent, for payment/settlement.
Thereafter, on 21st November, 2006, the appellant gave a one month statutory notice to the respondent for the payment of his professional fee or Bill of Charges on or before 22nd December, 2006.
It was the failure of the respondent to settle the appellant’s professional fee as at 22nd December, 2006 which led to the filing of the suit No. B/41/07 on 22nd January, 2007 by the appellant claiming the said N2.5m against the respondent.
The claim was vide a writ of summons. Upon an application by the appellant, the suit was placed under the Undefended List. The respondent in response to it, filed a Notice of Intention to defend the action, with an affidavit of 21 paragraphs in support thereof.
Pleadings were filed and exchanged between the parties. The appellant gave evidence for himself and tendered in evidence some documentary exhibits. So also, a witness testified for the respondent and tendered in evidence, some documentary exhibits too. Learned counsel for the parties, submitted written addresses to the trial court.
In his judgment, the learned trial judge, found against the appellant and dismissed his claim, “except as to the extent of liability admitted by the Defendant”; which was N17,500.00 the balance of the agreed fee of N35,000.00 plus N654,000.00 filing fees. The appellant, not unnaturally, felt dissatisfied with the judgment of the learned trial judge. Hence, the appeal to this court, which was anchored on three grounds of appeal.
In order to effectively prosecute the appeal and in compliance with the rules of this court, the appellant prepared his brief of argument dated and filed on 7th April, 2011. He identified three issues for determination, therein as follows:
“1. Whether or not the learned Trial Court did not misdirect itself in the evaluation of the evidence placed before it and thereby erred in law.
2. Whether or not the learned Trial Court was right in its interpretation of Exhibits B and C respectively by concluding that “there is no novation in the contract entered by the parties.”
3. Whether or not the eighteen (18) months delay in delivering the judgment did not occasion a miscarriage of justice detrimental to the Appellant.”
The respondent’s brief of argument settled by Ogaga Ovrawah, Esq., was dated and filed on 20th April, 2011. He adopted the issues distilled for determination of the appeal by the appellant.
The appeal was argued on 19th November, 2013 and each counsel adopted his brief of argument and urged us to allow or dismiss the appeal, respectively.
Arguing issue 1, the appellant, appearing for himself, submitted that the learned trial judge did not properly evaluate Exhibits D and F when he came to the conclusion that,
“the condition precedent have not been met as section 16(2) (sic) Legal Practitioner (sic) Act imposes a mandatory condition precedent to the instituting of an action such as this”.
It is the contention of the appellant that the issuance of Exhibit D which contains:
(i) Summary of processes filed;
(ii) Number of appearances made which spanned 12 years;
(iii) Total amount claimed;
(iv) Signature of the Appellant and
(v) Address to which the same was forwarded to the Respondent by post;
was in compliance with Section 16 (2)(a) of the Legal Practitioners Act. He relied on Oyekanmi V. NEPA (2000) 15 NWLR (pt. 690) 414; Akingbehin V. Thompson (2008) 6 NWLR (pt. 1083) 270 at 291 & 292.
With regard to Exhibit F, the appellant submitted that since Exhibit D had complied with Section 16(2)(a) of the Legal Practitioners Act, it was unnecessary to itemize the details of the bill of charges in Exhibit F and that in any event, that is not the requirement in section 16 (2) (b) of the said Act.
Respondent’s learned counsel, arguing this issue, submitted that the appellant’s bill of charges did not comply with the mandatory provision of Section 16(2) (a) of the Legal Practitioners Act, because the said bill of charges was devoid of particularising any specific amount of money against the items on it, allegedly performed by the appellant. He relied on Oyekanmi V. NEPA (supra) and Akingbehin V. Thompson (supra).
Resolution of Issue 1
It is expedient to first peruse Section 16(2) (a) & (b) of the Legal Practitioners Act, Cap. L. 11 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.
It says:
“Subject as aforesaid, a legal practitioner shall not be entitled to begin an action to recover his charges unless:
(a) a bill for the charges containing particulars of the principal items included in the bill and signed by him, or on the case of a firm by one of the partners or in the name of the firm, has been served on the client personally or left for him at last address as known to the legal practitioner or sent by post address to the client at that address; and
(b) the period of one month beginning with the date of delivery of the bill has expired.”
In order for a Legal Practitioner to recover his charges upon the conclusion of his brief at the instance of his client, he must first intimate his client of the conclusion of his brief and prepare his bill of charges; secondly, he must send to the client, his bill of charges-containing the particulars of the principal items contained in the said bill of charges and signed by him and thirdly, the Legal Practitioner must allow a period of at least one month to lapse from the date of delivery of the bill of charges to his client, before he initiates an action in court, to recover his charges.
In the circumstances of the present case, the appellant in his bid to recover his charges upon the conclusion of the appeal at this court which he defended in favour of the respondent, wrote a letter dated 4th October, 2006; to the Managing Director of the respondent thus, to wit:
“APPEAL NO CA/B/91/94
JESSICA TRADING CO. LTD V. N.N.B. PLC.
At long last this appeal was finally argued on Wednesday, September 27, 2006 and adjourned for judgment.
The appeal lasted 12 years due to the antics of the Appellant and we made 31 court appearances excluding one more day when we shall be invited to take the judgment.
Attached hereto are two letters which are relevant to the processing of my bill.
Below is my Professional fee note:
Motion to amend Notice of Appeal
And to file additional grounds:
Motion to file Respondent’s Brief:
Five Motions filed and argued at various times by Appellant.
Total appearances made
Thirty-one (31) spanning 12 years.
Payment on Account – N2,500 only in May, 92
Two million, five hundred thousand Naira only N2,500,000.00
May I have your cheque early please.
Yours faithfully
PAT ONEGBEDAN ESQ.”
That is the bill of charges in question. It was admitted in evidence at the trial and marked Exhibit D.
It seems to me, unarguable that Exhibit D was economical as to the details or particulars of the motion to amend Notice of Appeal and filing of additional grounds and the costs of doing so; The cost of the motion to file Respondent’s Brief; The cost of the Five motions filed and argued at various times by Appellant; The costs of the total of 31 appearances made by the appellant, spanning 12 years; before arriving at the lump sum of N2,500,000.00 (Two Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira) only.
The appellant, at paragraph 11 of his amended statement of claim averred that:
“11. Plaintiff discovered subsequently that the Bill of Charges which did not give a detailed break-down of the fees, did not also include payments for several other works and communications made during the pendency of the appeal.”
And at the trial, the appellant at pages 40 – 41, of the record of appeal, was cross-examined wherein he admitted, inter alia:
“Exhibit D is my professional fee, exhibit D does not contain the number of motion I handled in court but my statement of claim has them. It does not contain my charges fee (sic) (for) appearance but are in my statement of claim. It does not contain the number of phone calls but they are in my statement of claim. It does not contain the number of time I went to the registry to follow up with the record of appeal compilation but they are in my statement of claim.”
Undisputedly therefore, it is crystal and clear to me that the mandatory pre-condition laid down or stipulated under Section 16(2)(a) of the Legal Practitioners Act, 2004, of particularising the principal items carried out by the appellant in the defence of the appeal for the respondent, was lacking in his bill of charges – Exhibit D.
I am of the considered and firm opinion that the particularisation of the principal items in a bill of charges by a legal practitioner in order to recover his charges from his client, per force, precedes the particularisation of such principal items in a statement of claim.
I was bound to and did painstakingly peruse the authorities of Oyekanmi V. NEPA (supra) and Thompson V. Akingbehin (supra) heavily relied upon by both learned counsel herein. In Oyekanmi V. NEPA, my Lord, Uwaifor, JSC (as he then was) graciously and copiously provided a road map to guide Legal Practitioners, such as the appellant herein, who may wish to recover their charges after the conclusion of their briefs, from their clients. Hear his Lordship’s admonition, to wit:
“………. Legal practitioners are well advised that where they have to present their bills of charges, it is in their interest to draw up the same with due care in order that they may be explicit. This is likely to prevent unnecessary litigations over such bills but rather will make for easy understanding by clients, for proper taxation by taxing officers where necessary and for appropriate fees to be earned by legal practitioners in respect of services duly rendered. I realize that there may not have been sufficient guidelines laid down on this for legal practitioners in this country.
(iv) Form and contents of a bill
It is appropriate at this stage to refer again to s. 16(2)(a) of the Act as to the contents of a bill of charges. That provision requires that a bill of charges shall contain particulars of the principal items. I think there is need to offer some suggestions as to what may fall under principal items. I have already indicated that there is really no distinction between contentious and non-contentious matters in regard to particulars expected in a bill of charges in this country. A general guideline as to the form, contents and purpose of a bill of charges, in my view, would be: (1) the bill should be headed to reflect the subject – matter. If it is in respect of litigation, the court, the cause and the parties should be stated: See Lewis v. Primrose (1844) 6 Q.B. 265; Dimes v. Wright (1849) 8 CB 831. (2) The bill should contain all the charges, fees and professional disbursements for which the legal practitioner is making a claim: See McCullie v. Butler (1961) 1 All ER 554. Professional disbursements include payments which are necessarily made by the legal practitioner in pursuance of his professional duty such as court fees, witness’ fees, cost of production of records etc. if paid by him. (3) charges and fees should be particularised e.g (a) perusing of documents and giving professional advice, (b) conducting necessary (specified) inquiries or using legal agent in another jurisdiction for a particular purpose: See Re Bishop, Exp. Langley (1879) 13 CH. D 110; Re Pomeroy and Tanner solicitors (supra), (c) drawing up the writ of summons and statement of claim or defence, (d) number of attendances in court and the dates, and (e) summarized statement of the work done (in court), indicating some peculiar difficult nature of the case (if any) so as to give an insight to the client as to what he is being asked to pay for: See Re A Solicitor (supra) at p. 287. (4) It is required to give sufficient information in the bill to enable the client to obtain advice as to its taxation and for the taxing officer to tax it: See Keene v Ward (1849) 13 Q.B. 515; Slingsby v. Attorney-General (1918) Probate 236. It is necessary therefore to indicate against each of the particulars given in the bill of charges a specific amount, taking into account the status and experience of the legal practitioner, and the time and efforts involved. See generally, Halsbury’s Laws England, 4th edn. Vol. 44(1),. Paras 192 and 193; The Digest, Annotated British Commonwealth and European Cases, Vol. 44 1984 reissue, paras. 2338 – 2483.”
I am afraid, the appellant herein, did not heed this admonition in October, 2006 when he made Exhibit D, seven (7) good years, after the decision in Oyekanmi V. NEPA by the apex court. On the other hand, learned counsel to the respondent, appear to me, to be legally minded of the said decision in Oyekanmi V. NEPA when at paragraph 15 of the statement of defence, it was averred that at the trial, the respondent was going to contend that the Professional Fee Note or Bill of Charges was incurably defective for non-compliance with the provisions of relevant statutes regulating same.
It is noteworthy that Exhibit D in the instant case, is a far cry from Exhibit J – the bill of charges in Oyekanmi V. NEPA (supra). For ease of reference, guide and appreciation, it is reproduced, inter alia:
“SUIT NO KWS/223/84
P. OKEDARE & ORS v. NATIONAL ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY
We are pleased to formally inform you that the above suit in which we defended your authority had been concluded and judgment delivered on the 26th May 1988 by the presiding Judge Mr. Justice T.A. Oyeyipo – Chief Judge of Kwara State. In the judgment the plaintiffs’ claim against your authority for the sum of N3,270,400.00 (Three million two hundred and seventy thousand four hundred naira) was dismissed and N200.00 (Two hundred naira) cost awarded in favour of your Authority. We have thus by our professional expertee (sic), resourcefulness (sic) and diligence saved your Authority the said sum which the plaintiffs would have otherwise looted from the treasury all in the name of judicial process.
Pursuant to your Authority’s letters of instructions Ref. DLL/CF.389/84/561 of 31st December 1984 and DLL/CF.339/85/081 of 21st January 1985 respectively and our’s (sic) of acceptance dated 3rd January 1985 and (sic) hereunder submit our Bill for the professional fees and expenses for settlement forthwith.
Nature of Brief – Litigation
Subject Matter – Defending a claim for N3,270.000.00
Client – National Electric Power Authority
(Defendant)
1. Towards Professional Fees all stages N495,060.00
2. Transport Charges N7,500.00
3. Expenses filing process witness
(official receipts attached) N1,182.60
4. Sundry expenses on witnesses,
Investigation etc. N2,500.00
5. Accommodation (provided by NEPA)
Nil
TOTAL N506,243.20
Less Deposit Paid N30,000.00
Balance Payable N476,243.20
14
FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-THREE NAIRA TWENTY KOBO ONLY)
We will appreciate your efforts to make your Authority’s cheque for the sum of N476,243.20 available within the next TEN DAYS for collection by any member of the Chambers duly authorised in writing.”
Well, it is glaring that the difference between Exhibit D herein and Exhibit J in Oyekanmi V. NEPA, is very clear. And with that, I am done with issue 1 which is resolved against the appellant.
Issue 2 has to do with Exhibit B – the letter dated 12th May, 2004 written by the appellant to the company Secretary/Legal Adviser of the respondent. It says:
“APPEAL NO CA/B/91/94
JESSICA TRADING COMPANY LIMITED V NEW NIGERIA BANK PLC.
It has become compelling that I bring to your notice the frustrating experience I have been having in the handling of this appeal since I was briefed in 1992.
The Appellant Counsel who doubles as a Director in the Appellant Company has by her style of practice become the log in the progress of the appeal. On May 10th, 2004 when the appeal last came up for hearing the counsel’s excuse for the appeal not going on was that she had missed her file with all her jottings therein. That was our twenty-first (21st) appearance in the appeal spanning ten years.
Your Officials in Benin who represent the bank regularly will attest to it that I have never, ever sought an adjournment in the appeal.
Appellant has refused to exhibit the courage to rely on the briefs since settled and the Court has decided to give the appellant a long rope whilst appellant is taking advantage of the regular changes/transfer of the Justices. The appeal is again adjourned to June 17, 2004.
Therefore I require a review of my professional fee which you will agree is long overdue.
Please find attached the original approval dated 16th December 1992 for guidance.
Yours faithfully,
PAT ONEGBEDAN ESQ.”
The respondent, in reacting to Exhibit B, intimated the appellant to the effect that his request for an upward review of his professional fees, will be considered at the conclusion of the appeal. See Exhibit C and the evidence of DW1 at page 48 of the record of appeal.
The appellant contended that Exhibit B created a new contract of novation between him and the respondent, which the latter argued per contra.
Contract by novation is a form of assignment in which by consent of all parties thereto, a new contract is made and substituted for an existing contract. Hence one of the essentials of the new contract, that is, novation, is that the consent of all the parties must be obtained. However, such consent need not be in writing; it may be inferred from the conduct of the parties, without express words. See Halbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 8 at pages 262 – 263. George Ashibogwu V. Attorney General, Bendel State & Anor. (1988) 1 SC. 248.
The learned authors of Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition at page 1094, defined Novation as, to wit:
“(1) The act of substituting for an old obligation, a new one that either replaces an existing obligation with a new obligation or replaces an original party with a new party. A novation may substitute (1) a new obligation between the same parties, (2) a new debtor, or (3) a new creditor.”
Furthermore, the distinguished and learned authors of G.C. Cheshire and C.H.S. Fifoot, 8th Edition, at page 504 thereof, said:
“Novation is a transaction by which, with the consent of all the parties concerned, a new contract is substituted for the one already made. The new contract may be between the original parties e.g where a written agreement is later incorporated in a deed, or between different parties, e.g
where a new person is substituted for the original debtor or creditor.”
Also see Mercantile Bank V. Adelma (1990) 5 NWLR (pt. 153) 747 at 762 (CA).
Now, it is indisputable that the original contract between the parties herein, is Exhibit ‘H’. The crucial question is, does Exhibit B create any obligation between the parties, for it to tantamount to a novation? What are the terms of Exhibit B? Is there any monetary figure proposed by the appellant in Exhibit B and agreed to by the respondent in Exhibit C?
The above questions beg for answers which are non-existent in Exhibits B and C. Therefore, to my mind and with due respect, the contention of the appellant to the effect that Exhibit B created a novation contract between him and the respondent, can be likened to a formation of heavy or thick clouds which produced no expected and resultant rainfall!
In effect, I resolve issue 2 against the appellant.
With respect to issue 3, it is the contention of the appellant that since the learned trial judge did not deliver judgment on the case, until 18 months after learned counsel at the trial offered their written addresses, the said judge had lost track of the facts of the case, hence he could not comprehend the nuances thrown up in the case of the parties. And this according to the appellant, led to a miscarriage of justice to him.
Section 294(1) & (5) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended provides, inter alia:
“294(1) Every court established under this Constitution shall deliver its decision in writing not later than
ninety days after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses and furnish all parties to the cause or matter determined with duly authenticated copies of the decision within seven days of the delivery thereof.
(5) The decision of a court shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on the ground of noncompliance with the provisions of subsection (1) of this section unless the court exercising jurisdiction by way of appeal or review of that decision is satisfied that the party complaining has suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason thereof.”
It is constitutionally incumbent on the judex such as the learned trial judge that by virtue of section 294(1) of the 1999 Constitution, he was obliged to have delivered his opinion/judgment on the case within 90 days (three months) and not later than that after learned counsel proferred and submitted their written addresses to him. His failure to do so, though inexcusable and perhaps condemnable, nevertheless does not translate without more, to a miscarriage of justice suffered by the complainant such as the appellant herein.
The appellant who established that the judgment was delivered outside the three months period after final addresses by counsel, stipulated by the 1999 Constitution for the delivery of judgments, in order to have such a judgment set aside, on the ground that it was delivered outside the constitutional limit, is not to stop at the establishment of contravention of the constitutional provision. He must go further and establish that a miscarriage of justice has been caused him by reason of the contravention by the judge. James Ogundele V. Dare Julius Fasu (1999) 9 SCNJ 105; Owoyemi V. Adekoya (2003) 12 SCM 277; Joshua Oto & Ors V. J. M. Adojo & Ors. (2004) All FWLR (pt. 203) 2151 (CA);
I believe that the legislative wisdom embedded in subsection (5) of section 294 of the 1999 Constitution, is to obviate the injustice that would be caused where an otherwise sound judgment could be over-turned by an appellate court, on the mere complaint and without more that a judgment was delivered outside the period mandated or prescribed by the Constitution. Hence, the onus is now placed on the complaining appellant, to establish that the delay in delivery of a judgment outside the constitutional limit indeed and in fact caused him a miscarriage of justice.
In the circumstances of this case, the appellant failed to convincingly demonstrate that the non-compliance with Section 20 294(1) of the 1999 Constitution by the learned trial judge, occasioned a miscarriage of justice to him. The evaluation and analysis of the evidence placed before the learned trial judge, was not perfunctory, but a product of logical reasoning. For example, at lines 1 – 5 of page 83 of the record of appeal, the learned trial judge recapulated thus:
“I notice a slight anomaly in this Exht “E”. It is not Exht “E” but Exht “F” as marked by court. Learned counsel inadvertently referred to it as Exht “E”. It is Exht “F” from court’s record while Exht “E” is a courier receipt. I shall henceforth refer to it as Exht “F” wherever it appears as Exht “E” in address of learned defence counsel.”
The above analysis could not have been made by an absent – minded judge. Therefore, the fact that the learned trial judge did not comply with section 294 (1) of the 1999 Constitution in the delivery of the judgment at the court below did not amount to the suggestion by the appellant, that the former had lost track of or suffered from a loss of memory of the pieces of evidence proferred before him, when he did not timeously deliver his judgment after the final addresses submitted to him by learned counsel.
I am satisfied that the learned trial judge, appropriately appraised the evidence before him and came to the conclusion as he did rightly, that the appellant’s claim failed to get up, hence, it was dismissed, with the exception of the admission of the respondent that the appellant was entitled to a recovery of the balance of the original professional fee of N17,500.00 as per Exhibit “H” and the out of pocket expenses, that is filing fees of N654,000.00 only. That, to my mind, is fair and square.
Issue 3 is therefore resolved, also against the appellant.
In sum, the appeal failed on all issues. The appeal is fluffy and straw. It has no onions, hence it is accordingly dismissed in its entirety.
The well-considered judgment of A. N. Ehigiamusoe, J., in suit No. B/41/2007, dated 21st December, 2010 is hereby affirmed.
Costs of N50,000.00 is awarded against the appellant, in favour of the respondent.
IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.C.A.: My learned brother, the Hon. Justice Tom Shaibu Yakubu, JCA, has graciously obliged me with a draft of the judgment just delivered by him. I have no hesitation in concurring with the reasoning and conclusion thereby reached in the said judgment, to the effect that the instant appeal is grossly unmeritorious. Thus, the appeal is equally dismissed by me. The judgment of the High Court of Edo State holden at Benin Judicial Division, delivered on 21/12/10 by A. N. Ehigiamusoe, J.; is hereby affirmed. I abide by the order of cost of N50,000.00 awarded in favour of the Respondent.
AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the lead judgment prepared by my learned brother, TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A. His lordship in my considered view, has dealt incisively with the issues that call for determination in the appeal and I am in completed agreement with the reasoning and conclusions thereon. I wholeheartedly adopt the lead judgment as mine as any attempt on my part to take up any of the issues dealt with in the lead judgment will only amount to a rehash of his lordship’s reasoning and conclusions.
In the circumstances, I too find the appeal to be unmeritorious and dismiss it accordingly. Furthermore, I abide by the order relating to costs, as made in the lead judgment.
Appearances
Appellant appeared for himself.For Appellant
AND
M. N. Aigbe, Esq (with M. Oghagbon, Esq., holding the brief of Ogaga Ovrawah, Esq.,)For Respondent
