P. O. P. MARTINS V. NICANNAR FOOD CO. LTD. & ANOR
In The Supreme Court of Nigeria
On Friday, the 25th day of March, 1988
SC.230/1986
JUSTICES
AUGUSTINE NNAMANI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
MUHAMMADU LAWAL UWAIS Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
SALIHU MODIBBO ALFA BELGORE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
PHILLIP NNAEMEKA-AGU Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
ABUBAKAR BASHIR WALI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
O. P. MARTINS Appellant(s)
AND
- NICANNAR FOOD CO. LTD.
2. SAVANNAH BANK OF NIG. LTD. Respondent(s)
RATIO
WHETHER THE SUPREME COURT CAN ENTERTAIN AN APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION WHEN THERE IS NO PENDING APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL
This Court has in recent years taken the view that it cannot entertain an application for stay of execution except there is a pending appeal from the Court of Appeal to this Court. In Abina v. Tika Tore Press (1968) 1 All N.L.R. 210, a case clearly decided before the creation of the Court of Appeal, this Court decided that an application for stay of execution hitherto refused by the High Court but directed later to the Supreme Court would be entertained, even where an appeal has not been formally entered, if it is shown that the party presenting the application is genuinely interested in prosecuting the appeal. In the spirit and intendment of the present constitutional provisions such applications, before filing an appeal, would, in my view be more properly taken in the High Court and Court of Appeal. PER NNAMANI, J.S.C
THE APPLICABLE PRINCIPLE ON THE GRANT OF STAY OF EXECUTION BY THE APPEAL COURT AS STATED IN THE LOCUS CLASSICUS CASE OF VASWANI V SAVALAKH (1972) 2 S.C..77
I think it is appropriate to start from Vaswani v. Savalakh (1972) 12 S.C. 77 which is still the locus classicus in this matter of Stay of Execution. There the words of Coker, J.S.C. which have stood the test of time, set down the applicable principles. At page 81 of the report the learned Justice said-
“When the order or judgment of a lower court is not manifestly illegal or wrong, it is right for a Court of Appeal to presume that the order or judgment appealed against is correct or rightly made until the contrary be proved or established and for this reason the Court of Appeal, and indeed any court, will not make practice of depriving a successful litigant of the fruits of his success unless under very special circumstances. (See in this connection the observations of Bowen, L.J. in The Annot Lyle (1886) II P.114 at 116) ………………………………………….
when it is stated that the circumstances or conditions for granting a stay should be special or strong we take it as involving a consideration of some collateral circumstances or and perhaps in some cases inherent matters which may, unless the order for stay is granted, destroy the subject-matter of the proceedings or foist upon the Court, especially the Court of Appeal, a situation of complete helplessness or render nugatory any order or orders of the Court of Appeal or paralyse, in one way or the other, the exercise by the litigant of his constitutional right to appeal, or generally provide a situation in which whatever happens to the case, and in particular even if the appellant succeeds in the Court of Appeal, there could be no return to the status quo.”. PER NNAMANI, J.S.C.
WHEN DOES AN APPLICATION FOR THE STAY OF EXECUTION OF A JUDGEMENT OF A TRIAL COURT BY AN APPELLANT BECOME NECCESSARY
When a party is successful in a litigation he is not to be disturbed from the enjoyment of it even if appeal is pending on it unless substantial reasons are shown. This is because subsisting judgments are clear orders of the Court and unless reversed on appeal, must not be vitiated. But on substantial reasons being shown that the judgment’s execution will not be in the interest of justice, as when it will destroy the res to the extent that if subsequent appeal is successful the successful party will not have any benefit from it; or when substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and question to be decided is to some extent in law recondite; stay of execution is necessary. [Balogun v. Balogun (1969) 1 All N.L.R. 349, 351; Vaswani Trading Co. Ltd. v. Savalakh Co. Ltd. (1972) 1 All N.L.R. (2) 483, 487]. PER BELGORE, J.S.C.
PRINCIPLE THAT GUIDES AN APPELLANT TO OBTAIN AN ORDER OF STAY OF EXECUTION FROM THE APPELLATE COURT
Again in Michael Olasunbomi Balogun v. Doccas Oluwale Balogun (1969) 1 All N.L.R. 349, at p.351, this Court held:
“We are in full agreement with the principle that in order to obtain a stay of execution of judgment against a successful party an applicant must show substantial reasons to warrant a deprivation of the successful party of the fruits of his judgment by the court. We are in no doubt whatsoever that where grounds exist on the motion suggesting a substantial issue of law to be decided on the appeal in an area in which the law is to some extent recondite and where either side may have a decision in his favour such substantial grounds as would warrant an interference clearly exist.”. PER NNAEMEKA, J.S.C.
WHAT IS A SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE THAT MUST BE PROVED BY AN APPELLANT TO BE ENTITLED TO AN ORDER OF STAY OF EXECUTION OF JUDGEMENT AGAINST A SUCCESSFUL PARTY
What then is a special circumstance for purposes of a stay of execution I would here refer to the definition of that expression by Coker, J.S.C., in Vaswani Trading Co. v. Savalakh & Co. (1972) 1 All N.L.R. (Part 2) 483, at p.487 where he said:
“We take it that the word “special” in this con is not used in antithesis to the words “common” or “normal” for that would be tantamount to pre-judging the appeal on a determination of an application for a stay of execution. When it is stated that the circumstances or conditions for granting a stay should be special or strong we take -it as involving a consideration of some collateral circumstances and perhaps in some cases inherent matters which may, unless the order for stay is granted, destroy the subject-matter of the proceedings or foist upon the court, especially the Court of Appeal, a situation of complete helplessness or render nugatory any order or orders of the Court of Appeal or paralyse, in one way or the other, the exercise by the litigant of his constitutional right of appeal or generally provide a situation in which whatever happens to the case, and in particular even if the appellant succeeds in the Court of Appeal, there could be no return to the status quo.” PER NNAEMEKA, J.S.C.
NNAMANI, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): On 13th January, 1988, the appeal to this Court in this Suit was argued. After hearing learned counsel, and having read all the papers, I allowed the appeal and granted a conditional stay of execution of the judgment of the Federal High Court dated 4th March, 1985 pending the determination of the appeal in the Court of Appeal. I indicated that I would give my reasons for this judgment today. I now give my reasons.
In Suit No. FHC/L/27/81, the Plaintiff/Respondent sued the 1st defendant/appellant/applicant and 4 others claiming the following reliefs:-
“(1) An order for the refund of the sum of N700,000.00 (Seven hundred thousand Naira) paid by the plaintiff to the 1st defendant by two separate cheques No. 0028199 of the 3rd October, 1977 and No. 0018218 of the 24th October, 1977 being the full purchase price of 223,000 bags of cement sold to the plaintiff by the 1st defendant. The cement was said to have been shipped by the 3rd Defendant in the “M.V. Eurosailor” owned by the 4th Defendant.
(2) A further order for the payment of interest on the said sum of N700,000 calculated on the current commercial rate of interest from the 24th day of October, 1977 to the date of the order of this Honourable Court.
(3) A declaration that the whole transaction between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant in relation to the supply of the said cement is a calculated fraud as between all the Defendants as a clever means of transferring the purchase money illegally out of Nigeria.
(4) A further declaration against the 2nd Defendant that in the transfer of the said money abroad they have ignored Central Bank of Nigeria regulations directions and guidelines and their action has greatly contributed to the illegal transfer of the said money to Western Germany.
(5) An order for the arrest and seizure of the vessel “M.V. Eurosailor” anytime it appears on Nigeria territorial waters.
In the course of the trial the 1st Plaintiff/Respondent felt obliged to withdraw her claims against the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants “as it became clear that these defendants were fictitious persons” as per the 1st Respondent’s counsel’s brief of argument. After hearing evidence etc., Anyaegbunam, C.J. gave judgment in favour of the Plaintiff/Respondent against the 1st defendant/appellant. The case against the 2nd defendant, 2nd defendant/respondent herein, was dismissed.
The 1st Defendant/Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal against this judgment on 5th March, 1986.An application to the Federal High Court for stay of execution of the judgment was refused. A similar application to the Court of Appeal also failed. In a ruling in which Uthman Mohammed and Kutigi, JJCA concurred, Ademola JCA. ruled quite summarily-
“reading through the affidavit of applicant, no special circumstances are disclosed in the affidavit as to why a stay should be granted. Application dismissed N50 costs each to the Respondents”
With leave of this Court, the appellant filed 2 grounds of appeal which I do not propose to set down. Suffice it to say that they complained of error of law in that the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal refused to grant stay of execution when the issue of jurisdiction of the trial Court had been raised on appeal and also when, in appellant’s view, recondite points of law triable on appeal are contained in the grounds of appeal to the Court of Appeal.
The appellant’s counsel identified 4 issues for determination in his brief of argument and I think I ought to set them down. These were as follows:-
“1. Whether a party who has shown that there is a substantial issue of law to be decided on appeal is entitled to a stay of Execution following the decision of this Honourable Court in Balogun v. Balogun (1969) 1 All NLR 349-351.
2. Whether an appellant (sic) Court should grant a stay of execution where it is shown that the trial Court had no jurisdiction, based on the recent decisions of this Honourable Court in the cases of Akinsanya v U.B.A. (1986)4 N.W.L.R. 273 Part 35 at page 412; Nisaralai Ent. Ltd. v. Arab Bank (1986) 4 N.W.L.R. 409 (Pt.36)
3. That the Defendant/Applicant is entitled to a stay of execution in order not to render his appeal nugatory if he wins on appeal.
4. That justice of this matter demands that the status quo be maintained.”
The principles governing the grant of Stay of Execution by this Court are very well settled and I shall just visit them briefly in dealing with this matter. First, the power of this Court to grant the relief of Stay of Execution of judgment has been given statutory effect in Section 24 of the Supreme Court Act, 1960. That section provides that-
“An appeal under this part shall not operate as a stay of execution, but the Supreme Court may order a Stay of execution either unconditionally or upon the performance of such conditions as may be imposed in accordance with rules of Court.”
This Part mentioned is on “Appeals in Civil Cases.” This Court has in recent years taken the view that it cannot entertain an application for stay of execution except there is a pending appeal from the Court of Appeal to this Court. In Abina v. Tika Tore Press (1968) 1 All N.L.R. 210, a case clearly decided before the creation of the Court of Appeal, this Court decided that an application for stay of execution hitherto refused by the High Court but directed later to the Supreme Court would be entertained, even where an appeal has not been formally entered, if it is shown that the party presenting the application is genuinely interested in prosecuting the appeal. In the spirit and intendment of the present constitutional provisions such applications, before filing an appeal, would, in my view be more properly taken in the High Court and Court of Appeal.
I think it is appropriate to start from Vaswani v. Savalakh (1972) 12 S.C. 77 which is still the locus classicus in this matter of Stay of Execution. There the words of Coker, J.S.C. which have stood the test of time, set down the applicable principles. At page 81 of the report the learned Justice said-
“When the order or judgment of a lower court is not manifestly illegal or wrong, it is right for a Court of Appeal to presume that the order or judgment appealed against is correct or rightly made until the contrary be proved or established and for this reason the Court of Appeal, and indeed any court, will not make practice of depriving a successful litigant of the fruits of his success unless under very special circumstances. (See in this connection the observations of Bowen, L.J. in The Annot Lyle (1886) II P.114 at 116) ………………………………………….
when it is stated that the circumstances or conditions for granting a stay should be special or strong we take it as involving a consideration of some collateral circumstances or and perhaps in some cases inherent matters which may, unless the order for stay is granted, destroy the subject-matter of the proceedings or foist upon the Court, especially the Court of Appeal, a situation of complete helplessness or render nugatory any order or orders of the Court of Appeal or paralyse, in one way or the other, the exercise by the litigant of his constitutional right to appeal, or generally provide a situation in which whatever happens to the case, and in particular even if the appellant succeeds in the Court of Appeal, there could be no return to the status quo.”
In his book Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Courts of NIGERIA First Edition, para. 44. 29, page 535, Dr. T. A. Aguda, noted a few other applicable principles elicited from the cases over the years. These include,
“(a) The chances of the applicant on appeal. If the chances are virtually nil, then a stay may be refused. Vaswani Trading Co. v. Savalakh and Co. (1972) 12 S.C.77; Wey v. Wey (1975) 1 S.C. 1; Olusesan Shogo v. Latifu Musa (1975) 1 N.M.L.R.133, W.S.C.A; Odufaye v. Fatoke (1975) 1 N.M.L.R.222.
(b) The nature of the subject matter in dispute whether maintaining the status quo until a final determination of the appeal in the case will meet the justice of the case Dr. T. o. Dada v. The University of Lagos and Ors. (1971) 1 U.I.L.R. 344; Utilgas Nigerian & Overseas Co. Ltd. v. Pan African Bank Ltd. (1974) 10S.c. 105.
(c) Whether if the appeal succeeds, the applicant will not be able to reap the benefit of the judgment on appeal. See Wilson v. Church (No.2) (1879) 2 Ch.D 454, 458.
(d) Where the judgment is in respect of money and costs whether there is a reasonable probability of recovering these back from the respondent if the appeal succeeds. Lawrence Ogobegu Ebegbuna v. Janet Omotunde Ebegbuna (1974) 3 W.S.C.A. 23.
(e) Poverty is not a special ground for granting a stay of execution except where the effect will be to deprive the appellant of the means of prosecuting his appeal. Nwajekwu Emefisi and Ors v. Michael Mbanugwo and Ors (1970-71) 1 E.C.S.L.R. 100”.
The court’s discretion to grant stay of execution must be exercised judiciously and it would be so exercised where it is shown that the appeal involves substantial points of law necessitating the parties and issues being in status quo until the legal issues are resolved.
Vaswani’s case (supra); Utilgas case (supra). It is clear that this Court would consider granting a stay of execution where as Coker, J .S.C. put it Vaswani’s case” the grounds of appeal filed do raise vital issues of law and there are substantial issues to be argued on them as they are”. In Balogun v. Balogun (1969) 1 All N.L.R. 349 at 351, this Court, again as per Coker, J.S.C. held that where grounds exist suggesting that a substantial issue of law is to be decided on appeal in an area in which the law is to some extent recondite, and where either side could have a decision in his favour, a stay ought to be granted. I am not unaware of the decision of this Court in which the scope of this case appears to have been restricted. This is Okafor v. Nnaife (1987) 4 N.W.L.R. Pt. 64 129. With all respect, I think this Court was swayed in the Nnaife case by the facts of that case which involved continuous acts of trespass. In a case in which a substantial point of law, such as on jurisdiction, does arise Balogun’s case would still have full force. These cases have been followed by myriads of cases in this Court and other courts. See U.N.O. v. P.A.B. (1974) 10 S.C. 105; Kigo v. Holman Bros Ltd. (1980) 5/7 S.C.; El-Khalil v. Oredein (1985) 3 N.W.L.R. Pt. 12 371 C.A.; Okafor v. Nnaife (1987) 4 N.W.L.R. Pt. 64 129: See also Monk v. Bartram (1891) 1 Q.B. 346; Becker v. Earl’s Court Ltd. (1911) 56 S. J. 206; The Ratata (1897) P. at 132; Cooper v. Cooper (1876) 2 Ch. D. 293; Emmerson v. Ind. Coope (1886) 56 L. J. Ch. 905; Youssoup off v. Metro Goldwyson Mayer Pictures (1934) 50 T.L.R. 581, 586. How do these principles affect the present appeal It is clear that the Court of Appeal after looking at the affidavits before it decided that there were no special circumstances justifying the grant of stay of execution. Going through the affidavit in support of the motion before the Court of Appeal, there is no direct reference to the issue of jurisdiction. In paragraphs 7,8 and 9, the Appellant herein deposed as follows:-
“7. That by refusing to grant the stay of execution, the lower Court has refused to preserve the res pending the determination of my appeal.
8. That the judgment creditor is making every effort to levy execution on my properties while my appeal is still pending.
9. That if I succeed on appeal, I will find it difficult, if not impossible, to recover any money and property from the judgment creditor”
Considered on the basis of this sort of information, it is not surprising that the Court of Appeal refused the Appellant’s application. The facts of this case do not make it easy for any Court to exercise its discretion to grant this equitable remedy in appellant’s favour. Whatever may be the appellant’s defence, and the issues are yet to be sorted out by the Court of Appeal, it is not in dispute that the Plaintiff/Respondent paid him personally N700,000 in 1977! It is not also in dispute that judgment was entered in favour of Plaintiff/Respondent almost ten years later in 1986! It sounds ridiculous to me too that the appellant could have been seeking stay of execution in the Court of Appeal on the ground that if his appeal succeeded, the Plaintiff/Respondent would be unable to repay him whatever it had recovered in execution. But it was the same Plaintiff/Respondent which in 1977 handed over N700,000 to him. Nothing was produced to show that the circumstances of the Plaintiff company had changed adversely in 1986 to make repayment impossible. Incidentally, it was the same contention which was made before Anyaegbunam, C. J. when an application was made to the Federal High Court for stay of execution. Nor if one considers the conduct of the appellant in this case, particularly the manner in which he evaded service of process and, later appearance in Court for over 3 years, can one talk of the justice of the case being on his side.
But that was not all that was before the Court of Appeal. In paragraph 3 of the Appellant’s affidavit before the Court of Appeal, the appellant deposed that –
“being dissatisfied with the judgment, I filed an appeal against the said judgment at the Court of Appeal on 5th March, 1986. A copy of the Notice of Appeal is attached as Exhibit ‘B’.”
Ground 1 in Exhibit B complained that”
“The learned trial Judge erred in law in assuming jurisdiction when the transaction between all the parties was an ordinary business transaction”.
Incidentally this issue of jurisdiction is the first ground of appeal to this Court. From the short judgment of the Court of Appeal, it does not appear that this ground of appeal was considered before that Court decided that there were no special circumstances to justify the grant of stay of execution. Yet if a notice of appeal does disclose substantial grounds of appeal to be argued on appeal, there is every justification for the exercise of the discretion to grant stay. The issue of jurisdiction has been raised by the appellant from the start of the proceedings. It was extensively canvassed before the learned trial Chief Judge, and in his judgment he held as follows:-
“Among the points raised in course of the address by learned counsel for the 2nd Defendant/Bank was the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this action. This issue will always echo and reecho in this Court……………………………………………………..From the Statement of Claim, Statement of Defence and evidence adduced by both the Plaintiff/Company and the 1st Defendant, this is a claim arising out of an agreement relating to the carriage of goods in a ship. Vide Exhibits F. to F.6 British Shipping Laws, Vol. 1, Admiralty Practice, page 2; Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 1 paragraph 311. This will bring this action within the Admiralty Jurisdiction of this Court. See Section 7 paragraph 1(c)(ii)(d) of the Federal High Court Act, 1973, No. 13……………In the case of St. Elefteria (1957-58) P.179 at 186, it held that Section 1(1)(h) of the Administration of Justice Act, 1956, is wide enough to cover claims arising out of any agreement relating to carriage of goods in a ship, whether such claim was based on contract or tort.”
The question here is whether this was indeed an agreement of carriage of goods by sea or, as the appellant’s counsel has contended, a contract for supply of cement simpliciter. If it was the latter, then of course the Federal High Court had no jurisdiction. Although by the recent decision of this Court in Savannah Bank v. Pan Atlantic (1987) 1 N.W.L.R. Pt.49, 212, the Federal High Court and State High Courts now have concurrent jurisdiction in admiralty matters, in 1977 jurisdiction in admiralty matters lay clearly with the Federal High Court. If the learned Chief Judge was right, then his Court had jurisdiction.
This is certainly not an area in which it can be said that the law is well settled. Until the Savannah case (supra) ended controversy on the issue, the question whether the suit was to be taken in the Admiralty Court or not was a live one in those circumstances in which contracts involved carriage of the goods by sea. In the recent decision of this Court. Akinsanya v. U.B.A. Ltd. (1986) 4 N.W.L.R. Pt.35, 273 the facts were not ton dissimilar to the present suit. There the appellant had decided to import 10,000 metric tons of cement. He contracted with a Swiss Company, ASDECAMO, to supply him with the cement. The appellant approached the respondent to open a letter of credit in favour of ASDECAMO. The respondent later confirmed the letter of credit with a Swiss Bank. No cement was shipped to the Appellant, and the vessel named on the Bill of Lading – “Thomas Mann” was found not to be in existence. Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s claim holding that it was an admiralty matter and that the High Court of Lagos had no jurisdiction. This Court allowed the appeal, holding among other things, that “as the whole transaction is documentary credit and that the Bill of Lading is not itself the contract of carriage between the shipper and the charterer, but is merely evidence of its terms, the learned Justice is therefore in serious misconception of the law of documentary credit to have concluded that the contract is concerned with the contents, which would lead the Court to engage itself in bothering on how the cement was carried in a ship to Apapa or whether Thomas Mann was in fact Conference Line Vessel or not.”
In the instant suit, the contract on the face of it was for the supply of cement to the Plaintiff/Respondent by the appellant. As in the Akinsanya case, a letter of credit was opened in the 2nd Defendant Bank in favour of 3rd Defendant’s Managing Director, Hanslock. The cement was to be carried in a ship “M.V. Eurosailor.” The cement never arrived and no ship like M.V. Eurosailor was in existence. It was alleged that based on forged bill of lading, the money paid for the cement was transferred abroad by the 2nd Defendant/Respondent. See also Nasaralia v. Arab Bank (1986) 4 N.W.L.R. Pt. 36, 409. I also have to take note of two decisions of this Court in which the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as it is affected by the Administration of Justice Act 1956 (on which the learned trial Chief Judge relied) was considered. See American International Insurance Company v. Ceekay Traders Ltd. (1981) 5 S.C.81 and Aluminium Manufacturing Company (Nigeria) Ltd v. Nigerian Ports Authority (1987) 1 N.W.L.R. Pt. 51 475 at 486. Do the facts of this case bring it within “any claim arising out of any agreement relating to the carriage of goods in a ship or to use or hire of a ship” (Section 1(1)(h) Administration of Justice Act).
I do not have to decide whether jurisdiction lay in this matter in 1977 with the Federal High Court or the High Court. It is sufficient if after looking at the facts mentioned above, I am satisfied that the ground of appeal does disclose a substantial arguable point of law. Ground I of the grounds of appeal, as I stated earlier has raised the issue of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of a Court is a fundamental issue, for if the Federal High Court did not have it in 1977, its judgment as well as the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the subject of the appeal to this Court, would be a nullity. See Unuakhoni v. State (1985) 3 N.W.L.R. Pt.12 364 C.A. I am of the view therefore that the ground of appeal on jurisdiction raises a substantial arguable point of law which would justify holding the matter in status quo until the legal issues are resolved. Is this then a special circumstance justifying stay of execution I would answer in the affirmative. In defining special circumstance in Vaswani’s case (supra), Coker, J.S.C. referred to consideration of collateral circumstances or inherent matters. I think a substantial arguable ground of law on appeal is a collateral circumstance worthy of consideration in deciding whether to grant stay of execution or not. Although I was inclined to grant stay of execution on the sole ground discussed above, I was not unmindful of the facts I have also set down above which would have placed the equity in this matter completely on the side of the Plaintiff/Respondent. It was for this reason that I made a conditional order of stay of execution, ordering the Appellant within 7 days from 13th January, 1988, to deposit his title deeds to the property known as and situated at 20, Yesufu Street, Papa Ajao Mushin, Lagos with the Chief Registrar of the Court of Appeal, Lagos.
It was for the reasons set down above that I gave my said judgment on 13th January, 1988.
M. L. UWAIS, J.S.C.: This appeal was allowed on the 13th January, 1988 and our reasons for doing so were reserved until today. I now give my reasons. I have had the opportunity of reading in draft the reasons for judgment read by my learned brother Nnamani, J.S.C. I agree with the reasons and adopt them as mine. I wish to reiterate the conditional order I made on the 13th January, 1988 for the stay of execution granted to the appellant, which is, that-
“The ruling of the Court of Appeal is set-aside and the stay of execution is granted on condition that the title deed of the appellant on house No. 22 Yesufu Street. Papa-Ajao, Mushin Local Government Area, Lagos is deposited with the Chief Registrar of the Court of Appeal, Lagos within 7 days.”
S. M. A. BELGORE, J.S.C.: On 13th day of January 1988, I allowed this appeal reserving reasons for doing so to today. I have read the lead reasons for judgment by Nnamani, J.S.C. with which I agree entirely. When a party is successful in a litigation he is not to be disturbed from the enjoyment of it even if appeal is pending on it unless substantial reasons are shown. This is because subsisting judgments are clear orders of the Court and unless reversed on appeal, must not be vitiated. But on substantial reasons being shown that the judgment’s execution will not be in the interest of justice, as when it will destroy the res to the extent that if subsequent appeal is successful the successful party will not have any benefit from it; or when substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and question to be decided is to some extent in law recondite; stay of execution is necessary. [Balogun v. Balogun (1969) 1 All N.L.R. 349, 351; Vaswani Trading Co. Ltd. v. Savalakh Co. Ltd. (1972) 1 All N.L.R. (2) 483, 487]. In the instant case, question of jurisdiction as provided in the statute of the trial court vis-a-vis provisions of the Constitution is raised. The matter could on appeal be decided either way on this all important question; it is recondite, and it is in the interest of justice that status quo be maintained on certain conditions till the appeal is heard. It is for the above reasons and reasons ably advanced in the lead reasons for judgment by my learned brother, Nnamani, J.S.C., that I allowed this appeal.
P. NNAEMEKA-AGU, J.S.C.: On the 13th day of January, 1988, I allowed this appeal and fixed to-day for giving reasons for my judgment. I now give the reasons. I allowed the appeal on one point. In the short ruling of the Court of Appeal, per Ademola, J.C.A., to which the other two Justices of the Court concurred, he held that no special circumstances have been disclosed – and on that ground alone dismissed the applicant’s application.
It is clear from the grounds of appeal before the Court of Appeal as well as the appellant’s brief of argument that the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to try the case is the main issue. Considering the gamut of decided cases on the point and the serious conflicts in the opinions of the different courts, including this Court no one can really say that when the issue of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is genuinely and substantially raised it is not a difficult and recondite point of Law. These cases include: Jammat Steel Structures Ltd. v. A.C.B. Ltd. (1973) 11 S.C. 72; Bronik Motors Ltd. & Ors. v. Wema Bank Ltd. (1983) 6 S.C.158, p.276; Akinsanya v. U.B.A. Ltd. (1986) 4 NW.L.R. 273, p.279.
Indeed the main dispute in this case is as to whether the transaction was an admiralty matter at all, which only can make it cognizable by the Federal High Court. Claims numbers (3) and (4) which might have brought in the question of the revenue of the Federal Government do not appear to have been adverted to.
What then is a special circumstance for purposes of a stay of execution I would here refer to the definition of that expression by Coker, J.S.C., in Vaswani Trading Co. v. Savalakh & Co. (1972) 1 All N.L.R. (Part 2) 483, at p.487 where he said:
“We take it that the word “special” in this con is not used in antithesis to the words “common” or “normal” for that would be tantamount to pre-judging the appeal on a determination of an application for a stay of execution. When it is stated that the circumstances or conditions for granting a stay should be special or strong we take -it as involving a consideration of some collateral circumstances and perhaps in some cases inherent matters which may, unless the order for stay is granted, destroy the subject-matter of the proceedings or foist upon the court, especially the Court of Appeal, a situation of complete helplessness or render nugatory any order or orders of the Court of Appeal or paralyse, in one way or the other, the exercise by the litigant of his constitutional right of appeal or generally provide a situation in which whatever happens to the case, and in particular even if the appellant succeeds in the Court of Appeal, there could be no return to the status quo.”
Again in Michael Olasunbomi Balogun v. Doccas Oluwale Balogun (1969) 1 All N.L.R. 349, at p.351, this Court held:
“We are in full agreement with the principle that in order to obtain a stay of execution of judgment against a successful party an applicant must show substantial reasons to warrant a deprivation of the successful party of the fruits of his judgment by the court. We are in no doubt whatsoever that where grounds exist on the motion suggesting a substantial issue of law to be decided on the appeal in an area in which the law is to some extent recondite and where either side may have a decision in his favour such substantial grounds as would warrant an interference clearly exist.”
Applying the above principles to the instant appeal, I am clearly of the view that where an appellant has exercised his constitutional right of appeal against a judgment of a lower court, and the appeal genuinely raises a substantial issue as to the jurisdiction of the court below, there exists a special circumstance for which the court below or the appellate court could, and ought to, grant a stay of execution. This must be the case on the premises that if the issue of jurisdiction is upheld in appellant’s favour, the judgment of the court below and all the consequential orders flowing therefrom will be instantly reduced into complete nullity. If a stay was not granted and the res in litigation was disposed of before the judgment on appeal, an irreversible situation arising from a void judgment shall have resulted. This is, to say the least, undesirable. It appears to me therefore that a special circumstance which makes it necessary that a stay of execution should be granted in this case is the need to avoid a situation in which the res shall have been disposed of on the basis of a judgment which may turn out to be void. This will result in injustice to the appellant in the event of his appeal succeeding.
For the above reasons and the fuller reasons given by my brother, Nnamani, J.S.C., I allowed the appeal. But because of the nature of the case against the appellant I believe it was an application in which the Court of Appeal would have been within its rights to have granted a conditional stay of execution. This Court, therefore, had to impose a condition for the stay of execution. It was, therefore, ordered that the appellant’s title deeds to his house at No. 20 Yesufu Street, Papa Ajao, Mushin, be deposited with the Registrar of the Court of Appeal pending the determination of the appeal. I also subscribed to the other orders made in the lead judgment.
A. B. WALI, J.S.C.: On 9th of March, 1981 Nicannar Food Co. Ltd. as plaintiff filed an action in the Federal High Court, Lagos against:
(1) P.O.P. Martins,
(2) Savannah Bank Of Nigeria Limited,
(3) LHZ Lagerhanz-Und Handels-Gmbh,
(4) Ship “M.V. Eurosailor”
And
(5) Osena Shipping Company Limited, as 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants respectively, claiming as follows:-
“(1) An order for the refund of the sum of N700,000 (Seven Hundred Thousand Naira) paid by the plaintiff to the 1st Defendant by two separate cheques No. 0028199 of the 3rd October, 1977, and No. 0018218 of the 24th October, 1977 being the full purchase price of 223,000 bags of cement sold to the plaintiff by the 1st Defendant. The cement was said to have been shipped by the 3rd Defendant in the “M.V. Eurosailor” owned by the 4th Defendant.
(2) A further order for the payment of interest on the said sum of N200.00 calculated on the current commercial rate of interest from the 24th day of October, 1977 to the date of the order of this Honourable Court.
(3) A declaration that the whole transaction between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant in relation to the supply of the said cement is a calculated fraud as between all the Defendants as a clever means of transferring the purchase money illegally out of Nigeria.
(4) A further declaration against the 2nd Defendant that in the transfer of the said money abroad they have ignored Central Bank of Nigeria regulations directives and guideline and their action has greatly contributed to the illegal transfer of the said money to Western Germany.
(5) An order for the arrest and seizure of the vessel “M.V. Eurosailor” anytime it appears on Nigeria territorial waters,”
The claims against the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants were withdrawn. Pleadings were ordered and exchanged between the plaintiff and the 1st and 2nd Defendants. At the end of the trial, the learned trial judge made the following findings:-
“From the Statement of Claim, Statement of Defence and evidence adduced by both the Plaintiff/Company and the 1st Defendant, this is a claim arising out of an agreement relating to the carriage of goods in a ship. Vide Exhibits F. 10 F.6, British Shipping Laws, Vol. 1, Admiralty Practice, page 2, Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition. Vol. 1, paragraph 311. This will bring this action within the Admiralty Jurisdiction of this Court. See Section 7, paragraph 1(c) (ii) (d) of the Federal High Court Act 1973, No.13. The testimony of Mr. Christopher Ademola Adediran an official of 2nd Defendant/Bank shows that in 1977, 1st Defendant established a Letter of Credit for the importation of cement. 1st Defendant completed all the necessary forms and returned them to 2nd Defendant Bank. See Exhs. GG, HH and JJ. In the case of St. Elefterio (1957-58) P.179, at page 186 it held that Section 1(1)(h) of the Administration of Justice Act, 1956, is wide enough to cover claims arising out of any agreement relating to carriage of goods in a ship, whether such claim was based in contract or tort.
In the case now in hand, the claim is based on a contract between the Plaintiff/Company and the 1st defendant. It is this contract that made the Plaintiff/Company pay the first Defendant the sum of N700,000. This is not disputed at all. It is also not controversial as a matter of fact, it is admitted by the first Defendant that the goods for which he received the sum of N700,000 were not delivered to the Plaintiff/Company and they were to have been brought in a ship called M.V. “Eurosailor.”
As I said above, the 1st Defendant handed over to the Plaintiff/Company some of the shipping documents. Now coming to the counter-claim put up by the 1st Defendant I have considered all the evidence adduced in support of the counter-claim. None of them appears to me impressive. I have no convincing evidence that the sum of N150,000 was paid to Mr. Locks. There is no other evidence in support of it except ipse dixit of the 1st Defendant which I do not find impressive.
With regards to the other arm of the counter-claim i.e. the sum of N30,000 alleged paid to International Maritime Limited, it is once again the sole evidence of the 1st Defendant. He did not tell us what purpose this amount was paid and no evidence was given on whose account it was paid. I find the story of Mr. S.A.A. Adebiyi in connection with the N100,000 alleged paid to him by Alhaja Ashiru out of the amount deposited with the 2nd Defendant like a fairy tale. It was the 1st Defendant who tendered Exhibit Y, the Banker’s cheque and nobody from the Bank or 2nd Defendant/Bank brought any documents to show that this amount was paid out of the N700,000 deposited by the Plaintiff/Company in the name and in the account of the 1st Defendant. I do not believe the evidence of Adebiyi. He did not speak with any conviction. He gave his evidence as if he was brought to Court to recite an incantation. Having performed this ritual, he does not know any other thing. I disbelieve him. In the result, there will be judgment for the Plaintiff/Company against the 1st Defendant in the sum of N700,000 with interest at 6%.”
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
“The 2nd Defendant Bank should not have been brought into this case at all. They have no transaction with the Plaintiff/Company as far as Apapa Branch is concerned, and there is no believable evidence that the Plaintiff/Company had any control over the amount of N700,000 deposited in the name of the 1st Defendant. The claim against the 2nd Defendant/Bank is therefore dismissed.
With regards to the other arms of the claim, I dismiss them.” First Defendant appealed against the judgment of the Federal High Court to the Court of Appeal, Lagos and in the interim he brought an application for a stay of execution of the judgment before the trial court presided over by the same judge, which was considered and refused. Another application brought before the Court of Appeal was also refused.
From now on the 1st Defendant shall be referred to as the Appellant while the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant shall be referred to as the 1st and 2nd Respondents respectively.
With the leave of this Court, the appellant appealed against the brief Ruling of the Court of Appeal in which his application for a stay of execution of the trial court’s judgment was refused. He filed two grounds of appeal. In the 1st ground the jurisdiction of the trial court to deal with the case was challenged while in the second ground the complaint was against the refusal of the said court “to preserve the Res and maintain the status quo of the parties pending the determination of the appeal filed….”
Briefs of arguments were filed and exchanged followed by oral submissions, at the end of which I allowed the appeal and granted a stay of execution of the trial court’s judgment with the following conditions attached –
“that the appellant deposit the Title Deed of his property at No. 20 Yesufu Street, Papa Ajao Mushin, Lagos with the Chief Registrar, Court of Appeal, Lagos, within 7 days of this order.”
On that date, I reserved reasons for my judgment to today’s date which I now give.
I have had the privilege of reading in advance, ‘Reasons for Judgment’ of my learned brother Nnamani, J.S.C. and with which I entirely agree. He has ably dealt with all the points raised and argued and has also reviewed the leading authorities dealing with stay of execution of judgment. I adopt these reasons as mine.
As a general rule, the Court does not take to the practice of making an order for a stay of execution of judgment to deprive a successful party of the fruits of his litigation, but will be guided by the special circumstances shown in the application which it considers necessary to maintain the balance of justice in the case.
Appeal Allowed
Appearances
- A. Oshodi with Tunde Seriki For Appellant
AND
- A. Sanda with S. Laniyan
F. O. Sofoluwe Bakare with Miss A.A. Aguiyi-Ironsi For Respondent



