P. A. OTAIGBE v. BENDEL CEMENT COMPANY LIMITED
(2014)LCN/7129(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Tuesday, the 15th day of April, 2014
CA/B/221/2004
RATIO
EVIDENCE: ESSENCE OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
It is indisputable that documentary evidence being a hanger upon which to assess oral evidence, the former is the best evidence by which an action can be proved. Olujinle V. Adeagbo (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 75) 238; Attorney General, Bendel State v. UBA (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 37) 547; Agbareh v. Mimra (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1071) 378 at 411. Per TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
P. A. OTAIGBE Appellant(s)
AND
BENDEL CEMENT COMPANY LTD Respondent(s)
TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellant, a legal practitioner was engaged by Gamla (Nig) Ltd to draft an agreement between her and the respondent, for the refurbishment of Kiln II Machine at the respondent’s factory at kilometer 34, Auchi-Okene Road, Okpela, Edo State. Gamla (Nig) Ltd was the contractor to carry out the refurbishment and it shall hereinafter be referred to simply as the contractor.
The appellant duly prepared an agreement (Exhibit A) between the contractor and the respondent and was paid his professional fees, accordingly.
The claim of the appellant at the Edo state High court of Justice, holden at Auchi, was that he also prepared and registered a legal charge/mortgage (Exhibit B) on the assets of the respondent in order to safe guard or guarantee the continued payment for the investment of the contractor in refurbishing Kiln II Machine at the respondent’s factory and that it was the latter who was to pay him his professional fees with respect to the said Exhibit B. There were exchange of correspondences between the appellant demanding for the payment of the said professional fees of N1,478,643.00 (One Million, Four Hundred and Seventy-Eight Thousand, Six Hundred and Forty Three Naira) and the respondent who refuted the demand.
The appellant’s claim was hotly contested on pleadings. Both parties led evidence at the trial court. Documentary exhibits were tendered and received into evidence. Thereafter, both counsel to the parties addressed the court below. The learned trial judge – C. O. Idahosa, J., on 23rd October, 2003, entered judgment against the appellant by dismissing the claim as having been unproved.
This appeal against the judgment of the court below is anchored on four grounds of appeal vide the notice of appeal filed on 19th January, 2004. In prosecuting the appeal, and pursuant to the order of this court made on 13th November, 2012, the appellant’s brief of argument dated 4th December, 2012 was filed on the same date.
The sole issue for determination distilled from the four grounds of appeal, by the appellant is:
“Whether or not the learned trial judge was right in dismissing the suit of the appellant for failure to establish his case on balance of probability.”
The respondent’s brief of argument dated 15th August, 2013 and filed on 16th August, 2013 was deemed by this court as properly filed and served on 6th November, 2013. A sole issue for determination was formulated therein for determination, inter alia:
“Whether the court below was right in finding that there was no consensus that the appellant’s fees was to be paid by the respondent and that the appellant was not entitled to claim interest on his claim for professional fees.”
In my consideration and determination of this appeal, I adopt the sole issue for determination formulated by the appellant as it is more concise and encompassing.
The thrust of the contention by appellant’s learned counsel is that, the appellant having drafted/prepared the legal charge/mortgage – Exhibit B, which he equally registered at the Corporate Affairs Commission, Abuja, was entitled to his professional fees as stipulated in clause 20.2 of the main agreement – Exhibit A. that, Exhibits A and B are interwoven pursuant to clauses 20.1 and 20.2 of Exhibit A. He relied on Texaco (Nig) Plc v. Kehinde (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 798) 224 at 240.
Learned appellant’s counsel submitted that Exhibits A and B are to be read conjunctively and should be given their ordinary meaning. He placed reliance on Olatunde v. O.A.U. (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt. 549) 178 at 191. And that the appellant having expended “his time, professional skill, physical presence and mental alertness” was entitled to the payment to him of his professional fees with respect to the preparation of Exhibit B. He relied on Akingbehin v. Thompson (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1083) 270 at 294.
Furthermore, learned appellant’s counsel referred to pages 89 and 90 of the record of appeal, whereat, the learned trial judge, according to the learned counsel, made inconsistent and contradictory conclusions, which was tantamount to a judicial parody. He referred to Nwosu v. The State (1996) N.S.C.C. Vol. 17 (Pt. 2) 1029 at 1038.
Learned appellant’s counsel insisted that at clause 20.1 of Exhibit A, the express mention of the contractor’s solicitor, that is the appellant, any other solicitor not so mentioned is excluded premised on the latin maxim: Expressio unius est exclusion alterius (the express mention of one thing, automatically excludes any other which otherwise would have been included by implication). He placed reliance on Bagwai v. Goda (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1245) 28 at 57; Agbareh v. Mimra (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1071) 378. Therefore, learned appellant’s counsel faulted the finding of the learned trial judge to the effect that it was the appellant and one Suru Akele, Esq., who jointly prepared Exhibit B, which was not contemplated vide clause 20.2 of Exhibit A.
Learned appellant’s counsel referred to Olafimihan v. Nova Lay-Tech Ltd (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 547) 613; Macaulay v. NAL Merchant Bank Ltd (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 144) 283 at 294; Union Bank of Nig Ltd. v. Prof. A. Ozigi (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 333) 385 at 389; Olatunde v. O.A.U. (supra) – all to the effect that extrinsic evidence is generally not admitted to vary, alter and add to the contents of a written document/agreement.
With respect to the claim of interest by the appellant, it was submitted by learned appellant’s counsel that by virtue of order 40 Rule 7 of the Bendel State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1988, the learned trial judge ought to have awarded interest as claimed by the appellant. He placed reliance on N.E.M.G.I.A v. Martins (1968) NMLR 236 at 240 – 241; Assad Sabbagh v. Bank of West Africa Ltd. (1966) ANLR 234.
In his responses to the submissions of learned appellant’s counsel, the learned counsel to the respondent, first submitted that ground 4 of the omnibus ground of appeal cannot be a plank upon which to challenge specific findings of the court below and that only three specific findings of the court below were appealed against vide grounds 1 – 3 of the notice of appeal. He mentioned the three specific findings to include –
i. That there was no consensus that the Respondent would pay the appellant for participating in getting up Exhibit B;
ii. That the appellant is not entitled to claim interest on his professional fees;
iii. That the appellant failed to prove the expenses incurred in registering the legal charge – Exhibit B.
Respondent’s learned counsel contended that there were other crucial findings made by the learned trial judge with respect to exclusion from Exhibit B regarding the payment therefore by the respondent to the appellant which was admitted by the appellant and were not challenged by the appellant. He referred to pages 89 – 91 of the record of appeal. He urged us to hold that those findings remain binding having not been challenged. He placed reliance on Abubakar v. B.O. & A.P. Ltd (2007) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1066) 319.
It is also the contention of respondent’s learned counsel that Clauses 20.1, and 20.2 of Exhibit A did not provide that it was the respondent who was to pay the professional fees of the appellant with respect to Exhibit B. He wondered why the appellant inserted a clause in Exhibit B regarding the payment of his professional fees by the respondent for preparing the said Exhibit B, if Clauses 20.1 and 20.2 had taken care of that payment. He referred to page 50 of the record of appeal where the appellant admitted that the provision of the payment of his professional fees by the respondent, in the appellant’s draft was expunged from Exhibit B, which clearly supported the finding by the learned trial judge that there was no consensus ad idem between the parties that it was the respondent who was to pay the appellant for his participation in the preparation of Exhibit B.
It is the further contention of respondent’s counsel that the interpretation of clauses 20.01 and 20.2 of Exhibit A being an issue of law was not formulated by the appellant for determination. He relied on Saidu v. Mahmood (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt. 536) 130 at 139; Okpala v. Ibeme (1989) 1 NSCC 567; Western Steel Works Ltd v. Iron & Steel Workers Union (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 49) 284 at 304.
Learned solicitor-General, for the respondent, further submitted that the phrase “in the documentation of this facility” at clause 20.2 means no more than Exhibit A as a facility by the contractor to the respondent. He referred to the evidence of DW1 under cross-examination at page 56 of the record of appeal, which was accepted by the learned trial judge at page 91 of the record of appeal. He urged that the finding of the learned trial judge be not interfered with on the authority of Lagga v. Sarhuna (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1114) 427 at 461 – 462.
It is further contended that since the evidence of DW1 with respect to the setting up of a committee to fashion out a legal charge at pages 54 & 55 of the record of appeal was not challenged under cross-examination, that piece of evidence is deemed as conceded. He relied on American Cyanamid v. Vitality Pharmaceutical Ltd (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 171) 15 at 28; 22 NSCC (Pt. 1) 253 at 263.
With respect to the appellant’s claim of interest, learned respondent’s counsel, submitted that there was no basis laid out in the appellant’s statement of claim for it. He placed reliance on Ekwunife v. Wayne West Africa (1989) 12 SC 92 at 111.
In the appellant’s Reply brief of argument filed on 29th November, 2013 but deemed by this court as properly filed and served on 11th February, 2014; learned appellant’s counsel submitted that a perusal of the record of appeal which binds the parties and the court, ground 1 of the notice of appeal challenged the findings of the court below with respect to preparation of Exhibit B and who should pay for it. He referred to L.S.W.C. v. Sakamori Construction Nig. Ltd (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1262) 569 at 603; Turkur v. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517 at 544.
Learned appellant’s counsel contended that even if he did not appeal against the finding of the learned trial judge, the proper approach to challenging the appellant’s ground of appeal is vide a preliminary objection to it by the respondent. He relied on Muhammed v. Military Administrator, Plateau state (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt. 740) 524 at 541; NDIC v. Oranus (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 744) 183 at 195.
Learned appellant’s counsel also submitted that an appeal can be sustained on an omnibus ground of appeal where the appellate court appraises the evidence laid before the court in order to determine the correctness or otherwise of the findings made by the trial court. He relied on Osolu v. Osolu (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt. 832) 608 at 620 & 643; Lagga v. Sarhuna (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1114) 427 at 453.
It is the further contention of the appellant’s counsel that the issue of Exhibit B – being a security as contained in the respondent’s brief of argument, is a fresh issue and since no leave of this court was sought and obtained by the respondent to so raise it, that submission goes to no issue and should be discountenanced. He placed reliance on Edjekpo v. Osia (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1037) 635 at 655; Nwachukwu v. The State (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1062) 31 at 61 – 62.
Let me start by first removing the chaff from the wheat. Learned respondent’s counsel submitted at paragraph 5.1, of his brief of argument to the effect that the appellant did not offer any argument on ground 3 of the notice of appeal and that the same should be struck out as having been abandoned.
Ground 3 of the notice of appeal, without the particulars, says:
“3. The learned trial judge erred in law when he held of (sic) (as) follows “……..The only piece of evidence by plaintiff that was not challenged by the Defence is the fact that plaintiff registered Exhibit ‘B’ at the Corporate Affairs Commission in Abuja. However, he gave no details about the expenses in this regard. This court cannot, in the absence of such evidence work out how much was expended in that regard……..”
The appellant indeed formulated a sole issue for determination of the appeal. The four grounds of appeal upon which the appeal was erected, were argued together under the sole issue for determination.
I have perused the submissions of appellant’s learned counsel contained in his brief of argument. I am unable to see any reference or allusion to the findings of the learned trial judge which is the subject of the challenge vide ground 3 of the notice of appeal. I have also perused the appellant’s reply brief of argument. He did not respond to the submissions of the respondent’s learned counsel to the effect that no argument was canvassed on ground 3. I, therefore agree with learned respondent’s counsel that since no argument was canvassed with reference to ground 3, the same is deemed as abandoned. It is accordingly struck out.
The implication is that the finding by the learned trial judge that the appellant did not give “details about the expenses” he incurred in registering Exhibit ‘B’ at the Corporate Affairs Commission in Abuja, remains unappealed, unchallenged, subsisting and binding. Calabar v. Ekpo (2008) 2 SCNJ 307 at 324 – 325; All Progressive Grand Alliance & Anor. v. Chief Victor Umeh (2011) 3 SCNJ 274; Akere v. Governor, Oyo State (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 634) 53 at 81; Ime David Idiok v. The State (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1104) 225 (SC).
With respect to ground 4 of the notice of appeal, respondent’s learned counsel contended that an omnibus ground of appeal cannot be relied upon to challenge specific findings of fact made by the trial court. He did not refer to any decided authority to support his submission.
The law has been well settled by the apex court with respect to the effect of the omnibus ground of appeal. In Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 4 SC 91, per Fatayi Williams, JSC as he then was, inter alia:
“When an appellant complains that a judgment is against the weight of evidence, all he means is that when the evidence adduced by him is balanced against that adduced by the respondent, the judgment given in favour of the respondent is against the weight which should have been given to the totality of the evidence before him.”
Further see Abusi Ekwealor & Ors. v. Vincent Ekwealor & Ors. (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 302) 643 (SC); (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt. 832) 608 at 620 & 643 (SC); Belgore v. Ahmed (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 60 at 100 (SC); Odutola v. Mabogunje (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1354) 522 at 563 (SC).
Therefore, the totality of the evidence led in the action by both sides are put on an imaginary scale and weighed together. That is, the admissible and relevant evidence of the plaintiff and also for the defendant are put on each side of the scale respectively and weighed together, in order to determine whose evidence weighs more or is heavier than the other. In other words, to see where the scale of justice ponderates. Of course, this will not depend upon the number/quantity of the witnesses for either side, but by the quality or probative value of their pieces of evidence. I am satisfied that ground 4 – the omnibus ground of appeal, can sustain an appeal.
Now, to the real meat in the appeal, I have perused clauses 20.1 and 20.2 of Exhibit A. It is expedient that I reproduce them. They each say, to wit:
“20.1 Execution of a legally binding agreement prepared by the CONTRACTOR’s solicitor and vetted by the CLIENT’s Solicitor guaranteeing that payments are made unfailingly.
20.2 All Legal expenses (including professional fees for the Contractor’s Solicitor incurred in the documentation of this facility will be on the CLIENT’s account subject to verification.”
The contention of the appellant is that he prepared Exhibit ‘B’ – the legal charge/mortgage with respect to the contract executed between the respondent and his client – the contractor per Exhibit ‘A’. And that when Clause 20.2 – Exhibit A is read together with Exhibit B, it is clear that it is the respondent who bears the responsibility of paying his professional fees for the preparation of the said Exhibit B.
The evidence proferred by the appellant is that he prepared Exhibit B. On the other hand, the evidence led by DW1 for the respondent is that the appellant and one Mr. Suru Akele, prepared separate drafts of the Legal Charge and when a committee was set up, both drafts were considered before Exhibit B was fashioned out.
I have considered the submissions of appellant’s learned counsel with respect to the contention that Clause 20.2 of Exhibit A is to be tied to Exhibit B. Did the appellant lead evidence to that effect? That is, is there evidence by the appellant which created a nexus between Clause 20.2 of Exhibit A and Exhibit B?
I am afraid I have not seen any such piece of evidence. It was the duty of the appellant to have demonstrated by hard evidence, creating a nexus, a link between Exhibit B and clause 20.2 of Exhibit A. It is clear to me that ex facie, clause 20.2 did not mandate the appellant to prepare a legal charge with respect to the contract evidenced by Exhibit A and in any event, Exhibit B clearly shows that it was prepared by Peter Otaigbe, Esq., and Suru Akele & Co, that is, by the appellant and Suru Akele.
It is indisputable that documentary evidence being a hanger upon which to assess oral evidence, the former is the best evidence by which an action can be proved. Olujinle V. Adeagbo (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 75) 238; Attorney General, Bendel State v. UBA (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 37) 547; Agbareh v. Mimra (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1071) 378 at 411.
Where there are conflicting pieces of evidence, a party whose evidence is supported by documentary evidence has more credibility. Eya v. Olopade (2011) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1259) 505.
In the circumstances of the pieces of evidence proferred by the appellant vis-a-vis that proferred by DW1 for the respondent as to the preparation of Exhibit B and the fact as to who should pay the appellant’s fees for his participation in the preparation of Exhibit B, I find it difficult to disagree with the finding of the learned trial judge at page 89 of the record of appeal. His Lordship said:
“On Exhibit “B”, it is written that it was prepared by Peter Otaigbe, Esq. and Suru Akele & Co. Thus Exhibit ‘B’ does not support the testimony of plaintiff that he prepared Exhibit ‘B’ and Suru Akele, Esq. vetted it.”
The finding above by the learned trial judge clearly flowed into and culminated in the conclusion by him at page 91 of the record of appeal, to wit:
“I am therefore satisfied and hold that it was not agreed that the professional fees of the plaintiff in respect of Exhibit ‘B’ shall be paid by the Defendant. This view is fortified by the evidence of D.W.1 (which I accept) that a Committee was raised to fashion out a legal charge. This Committee directed solicitors to Gamla Nig. Ltd. i.e. plaintiff and Defendant i.e. Suru Akele Esq. to each prepare a draft legal charge. This same Committee later considered the drafts by the two lawyers and fashioned out a legal charge from them.
It cannot be correct therefore as Plaintiff asserts that he alone prepared the legal charge. The logical inference from this state of the facts is that Defendant had at no time during the making of Exhibit ‘B’, agreed to pay Plaintiff’s professional fees.”
I, entirely agree with his Lordship’s conclusion.
With respect to the interest claimed by the appellant, undoubtedly, the trial court is empowered to award interest on the sum claimed by the appellant, if his claim had succeeded.
I am of the considered opinion that order 46 Rule 7 of the Bendel State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1988 would have been actuated in favour of the appellant, if he had pleaded the facts to justify it. This view finds support in the opinion of his Lordship Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC in Ekwunife v. Wayne West Africa (1989) 12 SC 92, where he succinctly stated that:
“Interest may be claimed as a right where it is contemplated by the agreement between the parties, or under a mercantile custom, or under a principle of equity such as breach of a fiduciary relationship. See: London, Chatham & Dover Railway v. S.E. Railway (1893) A.C. 429, at p. 434. Where interest is being claimed as a matter of right, the proper practice is to claim entitlement to it on the writ and plead facts which show such an entitlement in the statement of claim.”
Undeniably, this the appellant did not do in his statement of claim.
This being a case bordering on a claim for professional legal fees by a legal practitioner, I feel it is expedient to re-echo the admonition by his Lordship, Uwaifo, JSC in Oyekanmi v. NEPA (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt. 690) 414, wherein, he said:
“…….. Legal practitioners are well advised that where they have to present their bills of charges, it is in their interest to draw up the same with due care in order that they may be explicit. This is likely to prevent unnecessary litigations over such bills but rather will make for easy understanding by clients, for proper taxation by taxing officers where necessary and for appropriate fees to be earned by legal practitioners in respect of services duly rendered. I realize that there may not have been sufficient guidelines laid down on this for legal practitioners in this country.
(iv) Form and contents of a bill
It is appropriate at this stage to refer again to s. 16(2)(a) of the Act as to the contents of a bill of charges. That provision requires that a bill of charges shall contain particulars of the principal items.
I think there is need to offer some suggestions as to what may fall under principal items. I have already indicated that there is really no distinction between contentious and non-contentious matters in regard to particulars expected in a bill of charges in this country. A general guideline as to the form, contents and purpose of a bill of charges, in my view, would be: (1) the bill should be headed to reflect the subject – matter. If it is in respect of litigation, the court, the cause and the parties should be stated: See Lewis v. Primrose (1844) 6 Q.B. 265; Dimes v. Wright (1849) 8 CB 831. (2) The bill should contain all the charges, fees and professional disbursements for which the legal practitioner is making a claim: See McCullie v. Butler (1961) 1 All ER 554. Professional disbursements include payments which ore necessarily made by the legal practitioner in pursuance of his professional duty such as court fees, witness’ fees, cost of production of records etc. if paid by him. (3) charges and fees should be particularized e.g. (a) perusing of documents and giving professional advice, (b) conducting necessary (specified) inquiries or using legal agent in another jurisdiction for a particular purpose: See Re Bishop, Exp. Langley (1879) 13 CH. D 110; Re Pomeroy and Tanner solicitors (supra), (c) drawing up the writ of summons and statement of claim or defence, (d) number of attendances in court and the dates, and (e) summarized statement of the work done (in court), indicating some peculiar difficult nature of the case (if any) so as to give on insight to the client as to what he is being asked to pay for: See Re A Solicitor (supra) at p.287. (4) It is required to give sufficient information in the bill to enable the client to obtain advice as to its taxation and for the taxing officer to tax it: See Keene v. Ward (1849) 13 Q.B. 515; Slingsby v. Attorney-General (1918) Probate 236. It is necessory therefore to indicate against each of the particulars given in the bill of charges a specific amount, taking into account the status and experience of the legal practitioner, and the time and efforts involved. See generally, Halsbury’s Laws England, 4th edn. Vol. 44(1), paras 192 and 193; The Digest, Annotated British Commonwealth and European Cases, Vol. 44 1984 reissue, paras. 2338 – 2483.”
The Act referred to by his Lordship is Section 16(2) (a) of the Legal Practitioners Act, Cap. L. 11 Laws of the Federation, 2004.
Further see: Pat Onegbedan Esq., v. Unity Bank Plc (2014) LPELR-22186 (CA); Akigbehin v. Thompson (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1083) 270 at 291 – 292 (CA).
In sum, I am satisfied that this appeal is not on a strong wicket. It is lacking in merits and deserves to be dismissed. I dismiss it accordingly.
The well considered judgment of C. O. Idahosa, J., (as he then was) on suit No. HAU/34/96 of 23rd October, 2003 is hereby affirmed.
I award costs of N50,000.00 to the respondent.
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.: I have read the judgment just delivered by my learned brother TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, JCA. I agree with my learned brother’s reasoning and conclusion that there is no merit in this appeal. The judgment of my brother is so well written and thorough that I have nothing useful to add. The judgment of C. O. Idahosa J (as he then was) in suit No. HAU/34/96 delivered on 23/10/2003 is hereby affirmed. I abide by the order as to costs.
AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the lead Judgment prepared by my learned brother, TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, JCA. His lordship has painstakingly and incisively too, dealt with the matters that call for resolution in the appeal and I am in complete agreement with the exposition of the law, reasoning and conclusions in the lead Judgment to the extent that I have nothing useful to add thereto.
Accordingly, I too, find the instant appeal to be unmeritorious and dismiss the same. The judgment of the lower court delivered on 23/10/2003 in Suit No. HAU/34/96 is hereby affirmed. I abide by the order regarding costs as contained in the lead judgment.
Appearances
Ighodalo Imadegbelo, SAN., (with him: S. A. Onokpachere, Esq., Ighedosa Imadegbelo, Esq., U. Osara, Esq.For Appellant
AND
Oluwole Iyamu, Esq., Solicitor General, Edo State (with him: Miss L. Nwane, Snr. State Counsel & Miss M. O. Eruaga, State Counsel, Ministry of Justice, Edo State)For Respondent
