OTUNBA ADEBAYO CHRISTOPHER ALAO AKALA v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2014)

OTUNBA ADEBAYO CHRISTOPHER ALAO AKALA v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

(2014)LCN/7128(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Tuesday, the 15th day of April, 2014

CA/I/154/2013

JUSTICES

MONICA BOLNA’AN DONGBAN-MENSEM Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

CHIDI NWAOMA UWA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

OTUNBA ADEBAYO CHRISTOPHER ALAO AKALA Appellant(s)

AND

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA Respondent(s)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT IT IS EVERY MISTAKE OR ERROR IN A JUDGEMENT THAT VITIATES THAT JUDGEMENT

I am intrigued by this decision by the dictum of Tabai, JSC in Eyiboh v. Abia (2012) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1325) p. 83-83 to the effect that:
“It is settled law however that not every mistake or error in a judgment necessarily vitiates that judgment. For a mistake or error in judgment to warrant the intervention of an appellate court it must be substantial in the sense that it has occasioned or is likely to have occasioned some miscarriage of justice.”
I am further strengthened by the decision of the Supreme Court in Ikomi v. State (1986) 1 NSCC VOL. 17 PAGE 730 @ 743. The Court did not overturn the decision because the trial Court considered additional evidence made shortly before the appellants were arraigned. The Apex Court discountenanced the said additional evidence in these terms:
“Let me say straightaway that I do not propose to consider the statements made by Mr. and Mrs. Ehiagwina as they relate to “Oga don kill me o”. PER DONGBAN-MENSEM, J.C.A.

THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE OF CONSPIRACY

Conspiracy is a subject which is difficult to address for numerous reasons. First, it is an act, criminal in nature, which is mostly inferred from the conduct of the persons involved. Conspiracy consists in the agreement between two or more people to do an act which is illegal or legal act by illegal means. The commission of the offence is complete once an agreement is made between two or more people. The actual commission of the act or the omission to commit the act is the second stage of the agreement which is distinct from the conspiracy. The conspiracy could be by a set of people totally different from the actors i.e. the persons who execute the planned act. Thus, like with Mark Anthony in the Shakespearian “Julius Ceasar.” the executor of the act may be innocent of the general conspiracy but be smeared with the blood of execution which he is neck deep in. In the case of Atano & Ors v. A.G. (Bendel) (1988) 2 NWLR PT. 75 201 @ 232. Oputa J.S.C. held that:
“Conspiracy and the offence committed in pursuance thereof are two separate and distinct offences.”
It follows therefore that count one is competent inspite of count two, and indeed, that is the correct procedure (See CLARK V. THE STATE (1986) 4 NWLR (PT. 35) 381 @ 401 PARAS B – G.). PER DONGBAN-MENSEM, J.C.A.

MEANING OF AN APPLICATION TO QUASH A CHARGE

An application to quash a charge is one which if successful can terminate a trial at inception; hence the court must be circumspective in considering such an application. The purpose of the application in most cases is to enable the court to filter the proof of evidence filed to ensure that the accused person is not subjected to the ordeal of a criminal trial with the attendant stigma when there is in fact no good reason in law to so proceed. The good reason in law pertains to the disclosure of a known offence in law which must also tend to link the accused person to the alleged commission of the said offence. This is an essential requirement which has its source in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
Section 36 (6) (a) of the Constitution requires that:
‘”Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to be informed promptly in the language that he understands and in detail of the nature of the offence.”
Has the Appellant not been duly informed in detail of the nature of the offence? As to counts, Section 36 (12) requires that,
“….a person shall not be convicted of a criminal offence unless that offence is defined and the penalty therefore is prescribed in a written law…” PER DONGBAN-MENSEM, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OMISSIONS AND ERRORS WHICH ARE TRIVIAL AND NOT MATERIAL

In the case of OGOMOR V. STATE (1995) 1 NWLR PT. 2 PG. 233 @ 234, the Supreme Court per Karibi-Whyte JSC acknowledged that there is a difference between omissions and errors which are trivial and not material. In my Lord’s own words:-
“Thus, the law distinguishes between omissions and errors which are trivial and not material and will not vitiate a trial, and those which are material and will vitiate the trial. Where the omission or error is material to the charge, it necessarily misleads and will vitiate the trial. For instance, where the information refers to a repealed enactment, and there is no similar offence known to law, the error would be regarded to as material and fundamental and will undoubtedly mislead the accused.”
(See also per Tabai JCA (AHTW) in ESSIEN V. C.O.P (1996) 5 NWLR PT. 449 PG 489 @ 449)
“Accordingly, a charge which does not contain the exact words in the charging section is not necessarily bad, if the accused person is not misled in the circumstances.” PER DONGBAN-MENSEM, J.C.A.

MONICA BOLNA’AN DONGBAN-MENSEM, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the Ruling of the High Court of Oyo State delivered by Hon. Justice O. A. Boade (AHTW) on the 12th December, 2012. The Ruling was against the Appellant as an accused person and in favour of the Respondent as the Prosecutor (pages 608-625 of the record)

In this judgment the parties are referred to simply as the Appellant and the Respondent.
A succinct statement of the facts of this appeal is that the Appellant is the 1st accused of three persons standing trial at the High Court of Oyo State.

The prosecution alleges that the Appellant, when he was the Governor of Oyo State, was involved in some conspiracy to defraud the Government of Oyo State by the award of several contracts without budgetary provision among other allegations revealed by investigations conducted by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC).

The Appellant was arraigned for trial before the Oyo State High Court.
At the trial court, the Appellant and two others were arraigned before the Oyo State High Court on Eleven (11) counts charge and the Appellant pleaded not guilty to the counts. Bail was granted to the Appellant. Subsequently, the Appellant filed an application to quash the charge and it was dismissed by the court.

Agitated, the Appellant filed a notice of appeal against the aspect of the ruling to the effect that a prima facie case has been made against the Appellant.

On the 12th day of March, 2014, when this appeal was heard, both parties each identified their respective briefs.
Chief Lateef O. Fagbemi SAN leading other learned silk and several other learned counsel among whom were Chief Mike Osuman SAN, Chief Bolaji Ayorinde SAN, Otunba Kunle Kalejaye SAN, Chief N. O. O. Oke SAN, Dr. Joseph Nwobike SAN, G. M. O. Oguntade SAN, Prof. O. Oyewo, adopted and relied on the Appellant’s main and reply briefs of argument. The briefs were respectively dated the 10th November, 2013 and the 10th February, 2014 but respectively filed on the 11th November, 2013 and 10th February, 2014. Some brief words of oral elucidation were also addressed in support of the briefs of the Appellant.

The Respondent’s brief of argument dated the 28th January, 2014 was filed on the 30th January, 2014 and was adopted and relied upon by Chief Godwin Obla, SAN, FCIArb, leading other learned counsel.

Three issues were raised for the Appellant as follows:-
1. Whether the learned trial judge was right in relying on additional proof of evidence to determine and come to the conclusion that there is a prima facie case against the Appellant. (Grounds 2, 3 & 7).
2. Whether in law, count 1 dealing with conspiracy to award contract for road construction is competent in the face of count 2 dealing with the substantive offence of awarding contract without budgetary provision. Ground 9.
3. Whether in any event, the entire proof of evidence (even including the additional proof of evidence) disclosed the essential ingredients of the offences brought against the Appellant to warrant the criminal complaints against his proceeding to trial? Grounds 1, 4, 5, 6 and 8.

The Respondent adopted issues two and three as raised by the Appellant but re-formulated issue one as follows:-
On the totality of the proceedings as revealed on the record of appeal, did the lower court only rely on the additional proof of evidence to arrive at the conclusion that there is a prima facie case against the Appellant?
This appeal will be determined on the issues formulated by the Appellant.

Issue one
The learned silk for the Appellant queries in this issue the alleged reliance on additional proof of evidence to determine whether a prima facie case was made against the Appellant. That the reliance by the learned trial Judge on the additional proof of evidence filed, the trial court lacks the jurisdiction to rely on additional proof of evidence, as evidence laid before the court initially was enough against the Appellant. The Appellant cites Section 240 (2) b of the Criminal Code Laws of Oyo State, Cap 39 to the effect that an indictable offence can only be filed at the High Court, once the lower court Judge is satisfied that the information against the Appellant is proper.

Submits further that the essence of the application to quash the charge was that the essential ingredients of the offences were not made out in the proof of evidence and no prima facie case was disclosed. That the jurisdiction of the court was thereby challenged and the issue must be resolved before any other step is taken. (See State v. Onagoruwa (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 221) 33 @ 46).

That additional proof of evidence put before the court after the challenge of the jurisdiction of the court was done without legal authority. (Ikomi v. State (1986) NSCC Vol. 17 page 730 @ 743). That placing reliance on the additional proof of evidence before delivering its ruling is an error as there was no application before the court to admit the said document nor deemed same as being properly filed.
The learned silk urges the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant.

The learned silk for the Respondent submits that the court did not only rely on the additional proof of evidence filed on 20th February, 2012. That the court considered the evidence filed along with charge before reaching its conclusion. (Refers to page 622 of the records).

How did the learned trial Judge decide?
At page 622 of the record for the records for this appeal, the court held as follows:-
“…It is in the light of the above that I will consider the proof…”

At pages 623-624 of the records for this appeal. His lordship proceeded as follows:-
“…I have carefully gone through the proof of evidence and the additional proof of evidence and the submissions of counsel both in their written addresses and their oral submissions in court and having regard to the settled principle that proof of evidence must disclose prima facie case against the accused person, otherwise the charge would be incompetent and would have to be struck out…
It is in the light of the above principle that I have treated the proof of evidence vis-a-vis counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10 and 11 against the 1st accused person. As I have said earlier, I have carefully gone through the proof of evidence (including the additional proof of evidence) particularly the statement of the CSP Tahir Usman, who led the investigating team of the EFCC on the matter, the statements of the three accused persons at page 306 and 320 of the information. I am of the strong view that the proof of evidence has disclosed prima facie case in respect of each of the various counts against the 1st accused person that warrants the 1st accused person being called upon to explain at the hearing of the case.” Emphasis mine

From the above, it is evident that the court considered the proof of evidence filed, the accused persons’ statements filed along with the charge and including the additional proof.

Upon the authority of Sule v. State (2009) 17 NWLR PT 1169 PG 3364 cited by the Respondent, I agree that the acceptance and consideration of the additional evidence by the learned Trial Judge does not vitiate the entire proceedings. It would have, if there were nothing else before the court. The records have shown clearly that his Lordship had considered other pieces of proof of evidence including the additional evidence before arriving at the conclusion that a prima facie case had been made out against the Appellant. I find no good reason to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the learned trial Judge. I am intrigued by this decision by the dictum of Tabai, JSC in Eyiboh v. Abia (2012) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1325) p. 83-83 to the effect that:
“It is settled law however that not every mistake or error in a judgment necessarily vitiates that judgment. For a mistake or error in judgment to warrant the intervention of an appellate court it must be substantial in the sense that it has occasioned or is likely to have occasioned some miscarriage of justice.”
I am further strengthened by the decision of the Supreme Court in Ikomi v. State (1986) 1 NSCC VOL. 17 PAGE 730 @ 743. The Court did not overturn the decision because the trial Court considered additional evidence made shortly before the appellants were arraigned. The Apex Court discountenanced the said additional evidence in these terms:
“Let me say straightaway that I do not propose to consider the statements made by Mr. and Mrs. Ehiagwina as they relate to “Oga don kill me o”. It is conceded on all sides that their statements were proffered as additional evidence shortly before the appellants were arraigned, and were never before the learned Chief Judge at the time he considered the application for his consent. It is my view, therefore, that it cannot properly be taken into account in any examination of the exercise of the learned Chief Judge’s discretion. Nor can the prospect of further evidence at the trial be relevant at the time of considering whether to grant consent. To that extent I completely endorse the views of Uthman Mohammed J.C.A. in Egbe v. The State (supra) where the learned Justice said at page 346 –
“I do not think it is relevant as the learned trial Judge did that further evidence and documents might be introduced later.”

Similarly, in this case, without the additional evidence, the court can proceed with the trial of the Appellant.

Issue 2
The learned silk of the Appellant posits that it is wrong to charge an accused person for conspiracy to commit an offence when he has been charged with the commission of the substantive offence in another count, (Refers: Clark v. The State (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 35) 381 @ 401, Kolawole JCA cites Aiyeola & Ors v. The State SC/27/69 (Unreported) of 7th August, 1970, Amachere v. Nigerian Army (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt. 807) 256 @ 281-282).

Obla SAN finds no error in separating the conspiracy charge from the main charge.
The learned silk for the Respondent argues that count one deals with conspiracy to award contract without budgetary provision contrary to Section 22 (4) of the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000 while count 2 deals with the actual offence of awarding contract.

That count one which is an offence of conspiracy is a separate and distinct offence and that the Appellant can be punished separately for the offences. (Refers: Obasanjo-Bello v. FRN (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1256) 605 @ 625, Ayano & Ors v. AG (Bendel) (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 75) 201 @ 232.

In the case of Atano & Ors v. A.G. (Bendel) (1988) 2 NWLR PT. 75 201 @ 232. Oputa J.S.C. held that:
“Conspiracy and the offence committed in pursuance thereof are two separate and distinct offences.”
It follows therefore that count one is competent inspite of count two, and indeed, that is the correct procedure (See CLARK V. THE STATE (1986) 4 NWLR (PT. 35) 381 @ 401 PARAS B – G.)

The submission of the learned silk for the respondent in paragraphs 5.13 – 5.14 adequately makes the distinction as raised in Clark’s case. The evidence required to proof the offence of conspiracy in the instant case cannot be the same with that for proving an alleged offence of awarding contract without budgetary provisions and under Section 22 (4) of the ICPC Act, 2000. A person needs not be a public servant to be involved in an offence of conspiracy pursuant to Section 26 (1) (c) of the ICPC Act, 2000.
I prefer the submission of the learned silk for the Respondent as the correct state of the law.

Issue 3
The learned silk for the Appellant, has with due respect, fragmented the argument under issue three into the counts of charge complained about. The learned senior counsel however kept adopting the argument on the one count to the next; clearly admitting to repetition. I shall therefore address all the counts together. The reason is that each of the counts pertains to either the allegation of the offence of awarding contract without budgetary provision, the concealment of the acquisition of property or the purchase of properties with illegal money. Each of the offences alleged are contrary to the provisions of either the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004, or the Advanced Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act 2006.

The agitation of the Appellant is that the ingredients of the offence in the counts were not established by the proof of evidence before the court nor was there any linkage of the Appellant with the commission of any of the offence preferred against him, Citing Coker JSC in Ikomi v. The State (supra), the learned silk for the Appellant stump up the ingredients of the offences as follows:-
1. The accused must be shown to be a public officer.
2. It must be shown to have awarded or signed the contract in question in the discharge of his official duties.
3. The contract must have been signed without each of these:
a. Budget provision
b. Approval
c. Cash backing

The learned silk maintains that the ingredients must co-exist and cannot be independent of each other and submits that the ingredient of an offence must be clearly stated or captured in the charge. (See Sonoma v. IGP (2007) LPELR-20833 (CA/A/332C/2012) of the 7th June, 2013)

The learned silk submits that the absence of details in the counts renders counts 2 grossly incompetent and should all be struck out i.e. counts two, three and four.
Count 5 is also on conspiracy and is sought to be struck out for sundry reason.

On count 8 and 9, Appellant posits that the section quoted was wrong as Section 17 (1) (a) seems to be the appropriate section and urges the court to set aside both counts. The sections did not show that:
(i) Properties in counts 8 and 9 had prior to the purchase by the Appellant being acquired by anybody by means which constitute an offence under Section 17 (1) of the EFCC Act, 2004.
(ii) The name or identity of anybody that acquired the properties through illegal means before the Appellant purchase the properties were not disclosed by proof of evidence.

Equally the case of the Appellant on counts 10 and 11 is that the counts do not conform to Section 18 (1) of the EFCC Act as Section 18 (1) deals with jurisdiction only.

In summation of the essence of the appeal of the Appellant, the learned silk Chief Fagbemi SAN drew a distinction between “prima facie case” in the con of a consideration of a “no case to answer” and a proof of evidence not meeting the essential ingredients of an offence. The learned silk maintains that the two situations are mutually exclusive and the considerations are totally different. The point in focus purports the learned silk, are the essential ingredients of the charge which the Appellant argues have not been met nor satisfied by the materials contained in the proof of evidence. There is thus no need to proceed with the trial, the accused person should not be put through the ordeal of a trial on such whimsical materials. The issue of credibility of witnesses is a matter totally out of the realm of consideration at this stage. To buttress his position the learned silk cites the cases of Abacha v. State (2002) 11 NWLR (PT. 779) 437 @ 485, Ohwovoriole V. F.R.N. (2003) 2 NWLR (PT. 803) 176 @ 194 – 195. Grange V. F.R.N. (2010) 7 NWLR (PT. 1192) 135 @ 169 – 170 and Ikomi. V. State (1986) 1 NSCC VOL. 17 PAGE 730 @ 743 PARAS. 5 – 15.

Counts 2, 3 & 4:
With the preliminary set out, the learned silk identifies the main thrust of issues two, three and four as the absence of the essential ingredients, non-linkage of the Appellant with the commission of any of the offences proffered against the Appellant and dwells on the duty of the prosecution to perform their constitutional duty of proof of allegation beyond reasonable doubt.

The learned silk next serialised the different heads of counts, highlighted the perceived defects in each count or groups of heads of counts. Counts 2, 3 & 4 were taken together. It is the submission of the learned silk upon the authority of the decision in Joseph v. State (2011) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1273) 226 @ 241, Egwaba v. F.R.N (2004) ALL FWLR (PT. 232) PAGE 1512 @ 1520 Sonoma v. IGP (2007) LPELR-20833 (CA/A/332C/2012) of the 7th June, 2013 & Adeniyi v. State, among several other cases that the essential ingredients of the offence in counts 2, 3 & 4 are not stated. This omission, submits the learned silk, renders the three counts liable to be quashed. These missing ingredients are “without approval and cash backing” as spelt out in Section 22(4) of the ICPC Act. That charge in counts 2, 3 & 4 is incurably bad and beyond redemption for not inserting those phrases and the learned trial Judge was in serious error by holding that there is a prima facie case against the Appellant. It is further the case of the Appellant that no shred or shreds of fact can be found in the proof of evidence that can establish the essential ingredients of want of “approval and cash backing” for the award of three hundred and fifty-five million twenty-five thousand naira (N355, 025,000.00) for the supply of twenty (20) trucks and 200 pieces of skip bins inter alia. Equally fatal, argues the learned silk, is the failure of the Respondents to place before the court, the relevant budgets in issue.

Count 1:
The grouse here is the separate count of conspiracy when there is another count for the commission of the offence. Further, upon the authority of Njovens V. STATE (1973) NSCC 257 @ 280, the duty of the prosecutor to show the meeting of minds to do an illegal act was highlighted. That the prosecutor failed to show that the appellant not only conspired to award contract without budgetary provision but that the said contract was to be awarded without approval and cash backing. Maintains that no offence can be committed under Section 22 (4) of the ICPC Act without materials to show that the contract in question was awarded without approval and cash backing. That the criminal intent for the commission of the said offence is also lacking in the proof of evidence.

Respondent states that counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 state the necessary ingredients of the offence referred to by law. That since the Appellant is a public officer and the fact that the ingredients of the offence do not indicate the words “without approval and cash backing” does not render the counts incompetent.

That the essential components of the offence in count 1, 2, 3, and 4 show that the applicant is a public officer. That in drafting a count, all that is required is to ensure that the counts reflect as much as possible the essential ingredients or elements of the offence created. (See Asuquo v. The State (1967) ALL NLR 132, Essien v. COP (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 449) page 489 @ 449).

The learned silk for the Respondent points to Section 166 Criminal Procedure Law of Oyo State, which states that error on the face of the count, cannot render the counts invalid.

It is further argued that the Appellant understands the charge after being read to him therefore he was not in any way misled and that no objection was raised against the counts when read out to the Appellant. The learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent Obla SAN, dismisses as fallacious, the argument of the Appellant. The head counts of charge made out against the Appellant do not contain the basic ingredients of the offence due to the absence of the words “without approval or cash backing.” The learned Silk points to the fact that the basic and essential ingredients of the offence under counts 2, 3 & 4 are; that the Appellant is a public officer and the contract in issue was awarded and signed by the Appellant in the discharge of his official duties. Also, that the contracts were awarded without budgetary provision. These facts, purports the learned Counsel, are basic and essential ingredients of the offence under Section 22 (4) of the Corrupt Practice & other related Offences Act and constitute sufficient notice of the nature of the offences to the Appellant. (Refers to Asuquo v. The State (1967) ALL NLR 132, and Essien V. C.O.P (1996) 5 NWLR PT. 449 PG 489 @ 449 where Tobi JCA (AHTW) held that: “Accordingly, a charge which does not contain the exact words in the charging section is not necessarily bad, if the accused person is not misled in the circumstances.”

Further, that by the provisions of Sections 166 and 167 of the CPA, the alleged errors, it cannot render the counts of charge invalid. The Appellant has also not pleaded any confusion in terms of not understanding the offences he stands charged with. That upon transfer of the case from M. A. A. Abass (J) to O. A. Boade (J), the Appellant was thus arraigned two times, at the second time before Boade J, and the Appellant, among other accused persons, responded that he understands the particulars of offence read out to him.
Also refers to the case of TIMOTHY V. F.R.N. (2013) 4 NWLR PT. 1344 213 @ 230 -231, and OGOMOR V. STATE (1995) 1 NWLR PT. 2 PG. 233 @ 234 where the Apex Court stated the conditions for holding a charge read.

The learned SAN also drew a distinction between the cases of EGWABA v. FRN (2004) ALL FWLR (PT. 232) PAGE 1512 @ 1520 PARAGRAPHS C-D, and SONOMA V. I.G.P (2013) LPELR- 20833 (CA/A/382C/2012) OF 7TH JUNE, 2013 which are heavily relied on by the Appellant.

The offences for which the Appellant stands charged are all defined with the respective penalty therefore clearly stated. An error or omission in reproducing the exact wordings in the relevant law should not be a reason for declaring the law unwritten or non-existent.
In the case of OGOMOR V. STATE (1995) 1 NWLR PT. 2 PG. 233 @ 234, the Supreme Court per Karibi-Whyte JSC acknowledged that there is a difference between omissions and errors which are trivial and not material. In my Lord’s own words:-
“Thus, the law distinguishes between omissions and errors which are trivial and not material and will not vitiate a trial, and those which are material and will vitiate the trial. Where the omission or error is material to the charge, it necessarily misleads and will vitiate the trial. For instance, where the information refers to a repealed enactment, and there is no similar offence known to law, the error would be regarded to as material and fundamental and will undoubtedly mislead the accused.”
(See also per Tabai JCA (AHTW) in ESSIEN V. C.O.P (1996) 5 NWLR PT. 449 PG 489 @ 449)
“Accordingly, a charge which does not contain the exact words in the charging section is not necessarily bad, if the accused person is not misled in the circumstances.”

The case of Ikomi v. State (1986) 1 NSCC VOL 17 PAGE 730 @ 743 PARAS 5-15 held that neither additional evidence nor the prospect of further evidence should be considered at the point of determining whether or not a prima facie case has been disclosed to support the charges made out against the accused. In other words, the prospect that some additional evidence could be available which might strengthen the prosecution’s case in the course of trial must not be a point of reference at the consideration of the proof of evidence produced in support of an application to proffer a charge(s) against an accused person. The court must proceed strictly on the material placed before it at the time of the application to proffer the charge(s).

In this appeal and citing Ikomi’s case, the learned Silk posits that there was no sufficient material placed before the court to sway it to grant its consent for the preferment of the charges against the Appellant. His Lordship therefore acted in error by scavenging for more materials and relying on the additional proof of evidence filed. That was the position in Ikomi v. The State. The damning evidence, vital as it was, came too close to the time of arraignment it was an essential evidence in the line of a dying declaration; “Oga don kill me oh!”
Why such a vital piece of material came after the collection of all other material evidence is no doubt suspect and was rightly excluded in the consideration of the material placed before the court at that particular time. The piece of evidence was graphic, it was peculiar and it came late yet the learned trial Judge accepted and relied on it. The wrongful admittance of the additional evidence did not however vitiate the entire proceedings. The said piece of evidence was merely discountenanced.
The same principle can be adopted in this appeal. The filing and receipt of the additional evidence procured by the prosecution cannot vitiate the entire procedure. Furthermore, the facts of the case are different. Nonetheless, let the additional evidence go. Thus, without the additional evidence, had the prosecution produced sufficient material to enable the learned trial Judge grant his consent for the prosecution to proceed to trial? In the ruling his Lordship stated that the proof of evidence filed, including the statements of the accused persons, along with the additional evidence were considered.
It is pertinent to point out that this is not the stage of considering whether a prima facie case has been made out against the Appellant to warrant a further continuation with the trial. The trial has not started, but is at the stage of arraignment. The Appellant had just taken his plea when the motion to quash the charges was taken up.

I find it necessary to reproduce the heads of count of the charge in contention for the ease of reference:-
“IN THE IBADAN STATE HIGH COURT
IN THE IBADAN JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT IBADAN
CHARGE NO. I/5EFCC/2011

BETWEEN
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA – COMPLAINANT

AND

OTUNBA ADEBAYO CHRISTOPHER ALAO-AKALA
HONOURABLE HOSEA AYOOLA AGBOOLA
OLUFEMI ADEMOLA BABALOLA – ACCUSED PERSONS

INFORMATION
At the sessions Holden at Ibadan on the …….Day of …….2011, the court is informed by the Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission on behalf of the State that:

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE – COUNT 1
Conspiracy to award contract without budget provision contrary to Section 26 (1) (c) and punishable under Section 22 (4) of the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
Otunba Adebayo Christopher Alao-Akala, whilst being the Executive Governor of Oyo State, Hon. Hosea Ayoola Agboola, whilst being the Commissioner of Local Government and Chieftaincy Matters and Olufemi Ademola Babalola whilst trading under the name and style of Pentagon Engineering Services within the jurisdiction of this honourable Court sometime between 2007-2009, conspired among yourselves to award contract without budget provision for the sum of N8,500,000,000:00 (Eight Billion, Five Hundred Million Naira) for the construction of roads in the 33 Local Government Council Areas in Oyo State on behalf of the said Local Govt. Councils.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE – COUNT 2
Awarding contract without budget provision contrary to and punishable under Section 22(4) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
Otunba Adebayo Christopher Alao-Akala, whilst being the Executive Governor of Oyo State, Hon. Hosea Ayoola Agboola, whilst being the Commissioner of Local Government and Chieftaincy Matters within the jurisdiction of this honourable court sometime between 2007-2009, awarded contract without budget provision for the sum of N8, 500,000,000:00 (Eight Billion, Five Hundred Million Naira) for the construction of roads in the 33 Local Government Council Areas in Oyo State on behalf of the said Local Govt. Councils.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE – COUNT 3
Awarding contract without budget provision contrary to and punishable under Section 22(4) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
Otunba Adebayo Christopher Alao-Akala, whilst being the Executive Governor of Oyo State, Hon. Hosea Ayoola Agboola, whilst being the Commissioner of Local Government and Chieftaincy Matters within the jurisdiction of this honourable court sometime in 2007, awarded contract in the sum of N2, 270,565,000.00 (Two Billion, Two Hundred and Seventy Million, Five Hundred and Sixty Five Thousand Naira) for the supply of 33 drilling machines on behalf of all the Local Govt. Councils in Oyo State without budget provision.
STATEMENT OF OFFENCE – COUNT 4
Awarding contract without budget provision contrary to and punishable under Section 22(4) of the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
Otunba Adebayo Christopher Alao-Akala, whilst being the Executive Governor of Oyo State, Hon. Hosea Ayoola Agboola, whilst being the Commissioner of Local Government and chieftaincy Matters within the jurisdiction of this honourable court sometime in 2007, awarded contract for the sum of N355,025,000.00 (Three Hundred and Fifty Five Million, Twenty Five Thousand Naira) totaling in the aggregate, for the supply of 20 Roro trucks and 200 pieces of skip bins without budget provision.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE – COUNT 5
Conspiracy to obtain by false pretence contrary to Section 8 punishable under Section 1 (3) of the Advanced Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act, 2006

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
Otunba Adebayo Christopher Alao-Akala, whilst being the Executive Governor of Oyo State, Hon. Hosea Ayoola Agboola, whilst being the Commissioner of Local Government and Chieftaincy Matters and Olufemi Ademola Babalola whilst trading under the name and style of Pentagon Engineering Services within the jurisdiction of this honourable court sometime between 2008-2009, conspired among yourselves to obtain by false pretence the net sum of N269,156,250.00 (Two Hundred and Sixty Nine Million, One Hundred and Fifty Six Thousand, Two Hundred and Fifty Naira) from the Oyo State Government Local Government Joint Account.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE – COUNT 6
Obtaining by false pretence contrary to Section 1 and punishable under Section 1 (3) of the Advanced Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act 2006

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
Olufemi Ademola Babalola whilst trading under the name and style of Pentagon Engineering Services within the jurisdiction of this honourable court sometime between 2008-2009, by false pretence with intent to defraud obtained the sum of N269, 156,250:00 (Two Hundred and Sixty Nine Million, One Hundred and Fifty Six Thousand, Two Hundred and Fifty Naira) from the Oyo State Government Local Government Joint Account.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE – COUNT 7
Obtaining by false pretence contrary to Section 1 and punishable under Section 1 (3) of the Advanced Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act 2006

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
Olufemi Ademola Babalola whilst trading under the name and style of Pentagon Engineering Services within the jurisdiction of this honourable court sometime between 2008-2009, by false pretence with intent to defraud obtained the aggregate sum of N347, 350,000.00 (Three Hundred and Forty Seven Million, Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira) from various contractors engaged in road construction in the 33 Local Government council Areas of Account Oyo State.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE – COUNT 8
Acquiring property with money derived from illegal act contrary to Section 18 (1) (a) and punishable under Section 18(2) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
Otunba Adebayo Christopher Aloa-Akala, whilst being the Executive Governor of Oyo State sometime in 2009 engaged in the acquisition of a property known as Ile-Ifesiwaju located at No. 32 Oba Adebimpe Road, Old Gbagi Ibadan Oyo State within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court knowing that the money used in acquiring the said property was derived from illegal act.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE – COUNT 9
Acquiring property with money derived from illegal act contrary to Section 18 (1) (a) and punishable under Section 18(2) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
Otunba Adebayo Christopher Aloa-Akala, whilst being the Executive Governor of Oyo State sometime in 2009 engaged in the acquisition of a property located at Old Bodija off Rotimi Williams Street Ibadan Oyo State within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court knowing that the money used in acquiring the said property was derived from illegal act.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE – COUNT 10
Engaged in concealing the genuine nature of the ownership of property contrary to Section 18 (1) (d) and punishable under Section 18(2) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
Otunba Adebayo Christopher Aloa-Akala, whilst being the Executive Governor of Oyo State sometime in 2006, within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court engaged in concealing the genuine nature of the ownership of a property at 4 Bromholm Road, Abbeywood, London SE2 9ND in the name of one Oyewole Aiyemidara Akala, which said property was derived from criminal act.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE – COUNT 11
Engaged in concealing the genuine nature of the ownership of property contrary to Section 18 (1) (d) and punishable under Section 18(2) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
Otunba Adebayo Christopher Aloa-Akala, whilst being the Executive Governor of Oyo State sometime in 2006, within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court engaged in concealing the genuine nature of the ownership of a property at 124 Gladstone Road, Merton SW 19 QW London in the name of one Magdalene Mojisola Akala, which said property was derived from criminal act.

Dated this day of October 2011

…………….
MARY ONOJA
PROSECUTOR
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION
4, FORMELLA STREET,
WUSE 2, ABUJA”

Each head of count clearly states the law under which the accused person is charged. The particulars of each count allege expenditures “without budget provisions.”

Budget means “the money that is available to a person or an organization and a plan of how it will be spent over a period of time.”
See page 185 Oxford Advance Learners Dictionary by A. S. Hornby.
From the meaning of budget, I am humbly of the opinion that the phrase “budget provisions” is explicit enough to be understood by a person in an executive public office. To determine the existence of a prima facie case and the availability of the essential ingredients of an offence everything needs not to be spilled out at this stage. By the definition of prima facie case, Belgore JSC in the case of Abacha v. The State (2002) LPELR-16 (SC) @ 21-22 held that:-
“…what is meant by prima facie case? It only means that there is ground for proceeding… But a prima facie case is not the same as proof which comes later when the court has to find whether the accused is guilty or not guilty, and “the evidence discloses a prima facie case when it is such that if uncontradicted and if believed it will be sufficient to prove the case against the accused”.

When the charges were read out to the Appellant, he did not express any confusion as to non-comprehension of the charges. It is necessary to state that the facts of this appeal are clearly distinguishable from those of Abacha v. The State (supra). The difference is explicit in the dictum of Belgore JSC (AHTW) which is hereby reproduced:-
“The information as laid is therefore to my mind very defective indeed. It is a muddle, confusion. The information as laid I repeat is inherently defective and bad in material particulars. Whoever drafted it must have been in a confused state of mind. Without looking at or reading the proofs of evidence one can easily come to the irresistible conclusion that the prosecution or the respondent is gambling. It does not appear to know who committed the murder and who to charge in this case. And if it does, the information does not point to that direction…..The Respondent must not be allowed to gamble. Prosecution is not a game of chess! If I may ask, where are these Mohammed Abdul a.k.a. Katako and Aminu Mohammed? If they exist, have they been charged in a Court of law?
There is no indication anywhere. There is no doubt that they could among others be the murderers of Kudirat Abiola (f) as stated in counts 3 & 4? Joinder of all the 4-counts in a single information is not proper being offences committed individually by three sets of people that have nothing to do with one another….The information is clearly misleading, embarrassing as well as uncertain to say the least. It must therefore not be allowed to stand”

There is no confusion in the counts of charge read out to the Appellant nothing similar to that in the Abacha case.

It is instructive that the charges were read out at two different occasions by two different Judges Hon. Justice Mashud A. A. Abass (J) and Hon. Justice O. A. Boade (J) and the Appellant affirmatively stated that he understood the charges and plead not guilty. That to my understanding is sufficient ground to proceed with the proof of evidence filed along with the charge. I am fortified in this by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Milton P. Ohwovoriole SAN v. FRN & 3 Ors (2003) 1 SC (Pt. 1) p. 1 @ 7, which gives an inkling to the substance expected in a proof of evidence which should move the discretion of a learned trial Judge to grant leave to prefer a charge. I crave the indulgence to quote in extenso, the lead Judgment of Kalgo JSC as follows:-
“there is no doubt that the learned trial Judge has the discretion to grant or refuse leave to prefer the charge but the discretion, as usual, must be exercised judicially and judiciously. In that exercise, he must ensure that he has taken into consideration all the materials placed before him including the relevant law applicable thereto. See U.B.A. Limited v. Stahibu GMBH & Co. KG (1989) 6 S.C. (Pt. 1) 22; (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 110) 374.
In the instant case, the relevant materials placed before the trial Judge for the exercise of his discretion are his proofs of evidence and the written caution statement of the accused persons. These are contained in the 1st volume of the record of appeal from pages 6-28. The so-called proof of evidence on pages 6 and 7 of the record contained the name of 6 witnesses and merely stated what each witness was going to testify at the trial. In none of them was it shown that the appellant was involved in conspiring to offer the alleged bribe of N3.5 million or that he actually gave the said amount as bribe to anybody. Also, on the caution statements of the accused persons including the appellants on pages 9-28, none of the 3 accused persons now respondents 2, 3 and 4, said in his statement that the appellant was involved in any discussion or agreement with him to give the N3.5 million bribe or took part in actual giving of the aid bribe, to any person as alleged in the charge. It was true that the 3rd respondent stated in his statement that the appellant was their counsel in the matter, and no more. The appellant, in his own statement did not deny that the 3rd respondent was his client in the matter, but he vehemently denied that he discussed the issue of the N3.5 million with anybody and his client did not at any time inform him that he gave the said amount to anybody in connection with this matter. The appellant also denied discussing the issue of the N3.5 million with one Chief Adefulu whom he wanted to tarnish his character and image as the reason for framing him in this matter.”
In this appeal, in addition to the proof of evidence, there are exhibits some of which are minutes of meetings, instructions or approval given in respect of the subject matter of the alleged offence. The details are left to the trial. If at the trial, all the ingredients of the offences are not made out, the court must discharge the Appellant.
Placing before the court the “relevant budgets” is not a requirement at this stage of the trial. These are matters of supporting material evidence which details should build up the case of the prosecution at the full trial.
The non-production of such evidence would amount to failure to establish the case as to evidence or withholding relevant evidence which should, be and is not produced & consequences will naturally follow.
(Section 167 (d) of the Evidence Act, 2011).

Counts 8, 9, 10 & 11
A cursory look at the counts of charge disclose a vivid citation of the law under which the Appellant is charged to be prosecuted. The offences are well rooted in legislation which are cited with detail in the charges.
The ideal situation is that the charges should spell out the entire elements of the offence as stated in the law. There is however, no ideal situation with the work of fallible man. This explains the relevance of Section 166 of the Criminal Procedure Law of Oyo State which provides that:
“No error in stating the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge and no omission to state the offence or those particulars shall be regarded at any stage of the case as material unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission.” (Emphasis mine)
To the extent that a budget provision is required and such is outside the powers of the Governor, the need for authorization is implied. The Appellant has not been shown to have been in anyway misled into answering to some strange and illegal issues without legislative backing.
The charges made out against the Appellant are known in law, they all are offences created by the EFCC Act of 2004, ICPC Act of 2000 & The Advance Fee Fraud Act of 2002. Each count was read out to the Appellant, he understood the charges and pleaded his innocence – “Not guilty.” The law under which the charge is made is also stated. The law does not allow the courts to render as incompetent a process filed in due process of law, simply because the wrong law is cited. Section 36 of the Constitution requires an accused to be charged with an offence known to law. The Apex Court has given a judicial flesh to this provision in the case of Timothy v. FRN (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1344) 213 @ 230-231.

The learned silk for the Appellant has cited several cases in support of the application to quash the charges. With utmost respect to the learned silk, none of the cases cited considered the provisions of Section 166 of the Criminal Procedure Law of Oyo State. By that provision, no defect shall affect the charge unless such defect misled the accused person. It has been shown that the Appellant was in any way misled at the institution of this process when he made his plea.

Do the Counts link the Appellants with the offence?

In the particulars of offence stated in support of each count of charge, the name of the Appellant was mentioned in Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10 & 11, as having done one thing or the other. Whether the Appellant did, engaged or procured or not, is a matter of proof at the trial court.

It is therefore difficult to comprehend the allegation of non linkage of the Appellant to the counts of charge made out.

The demand of the Appellant for details of allegation, are beyond the scope of an application to proffer charges. The learned trial Judge has no power to stop the prosecution of the Appellant. It is the Hon. Attorney-General of the Federation or of the State that has such powers by the provisions of Section 174 and 211 respectively, of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

The province of the learned trial court at the point of the preferment of a case for prosecution is to take a cursory look at the proof of evidence to determine if facts have been raised which appear in law, to constitute offences known in law. (Refers Section 36 (12) of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999). It is not the duty of the Court to investigate and determine if the facts are provable once they tend to bring the conduct of a person within the purview of acts prohibited by the law. This explains why the prosecution is subjected to interjections by the defence at the close of the prosecution case, or even before the close of the prosecution. The defence is at liberty to apply to make a submission of no case, to answer. (Refers Dabor & Anor. v. Sate (1977) 5 SC p.197 @ 209). This can be done after the evidence of one or two of the prosecution witnesses where it appears to the defence that the essential ingredients of the offence charged have not been established by the witnesses called. The alternative is to rest the defence case on that of the prosecution, if the defence is so confident that no reasonable tribunal can convict on the evidence before it. (Obiziako v. COP…)
In this appeal, the scheme is to stop the prosecution of the Appellant completely on the counts highlighted as affecting the Appellant. It is a very precarious strategy which the courts must be very circumspect in managing. This is a stage at which the barest minimum materials suffice to allow the prosecution to proceed. The court must however intently consider the facts in proof of evidence and the law cited to determine that they are not just fanciful allegations without deep roots. The facts must also be clothed with the requisite legal toga upon which the prosecution must ride.

In this appeal, the legal domain of the facts – constituting the allegations made against the Appellant are situated in different sections of the EFCC Act of 2004, the ICPC Act of 2000 and the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act of 2006. These are all Acts of the National Assembly enacted for the good governance of the Nation of Nigeria.

Ex-facie, they are laws which provisions are alleged to have been breached by the Appellant. The prosecution seek passage, an entrance into the premise of the Court to lay its complaints fully aware that it has the full burden of proof. (Refers Section 36 (5) 1999 Constitution, Section 139 of the Evidence Act 2011). It is not the stage at which the court determines the weight of the evidence or the propriety for proceedings. It has not been contested that the Appellant was a public servant with the advantage and opportunity to act as it is alleged by the prosecution. I am unable to decipher the reason for the challenge at this infancy stage, of the prosecution of the appellant who has already taken his plea.
Chukwuma-Eneh JSC in the case of Tongo v. C.O.P (2007) 12 NWLR PT 1049 pg 525 @ 550, counselled that:
“….the Appellant could still come on appeal at the conclusion of the case on the ground that no prima facie case has been made out against the Appellants at the stage the no case submission was overruled….”

This statement is even more apt in this appeal where the trial has not even started, the Appellant can still raise a submission of no case to answer on the ground that no prima facie case has been made out to necessitate a continuation with the trial and argue all the issues in one scoop!

In the circumstances, I am of the candid opinion, with all due deference to the learned Counsel for the Appellant, that there is good reason to proceed with the prosecution of the Appellant.

I find this case as lacking in merit and is hereby dismissed.

The decision of the learned trial Judge is hereby affirmed and the trial of the Appellant shall proceed accordingly.
It is hereby so ordered.

CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.C.A.: I was privileged to have read before now the judgment delivered by my learned brother, M. B. DONGBAN-MENSEM, J.C.A. His Lordship has comprehensively dealt with all the issues that arose in this appeal and resolved same. I adopt same as mine. I also hold that the appeal is lacking in merit and dismiss it. I abide by the order that the case proceed to trial.

HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in advance the judgment delivered by my learned brother, M. B. Dongban-Mensem, JCA.

My learned brother has clearly, lucidly and admirably delved into, considered and resolved all the pertinent issues that were presented to us for determination in this appeal. I only wish to add that, at the time the Appellant was arraigned before the court below, he pleaded not guilty to all the counts or charges in the information preferred against him. The law has, been settled by the Supreme Court in a plethora of cases that, once an accused person pleads to a charge before the court, without any objection, it pre-supposes that he understands the charge preferred and read against him. If he did not understand the charge, especially in a situation where he is represented by counsel who is expected to guide him on the technical details of the charge, he would ordinarily be expected to object and say that he does not understand the technical details of the charge. The objection is expected to be raised timeously at the time the charge is read to him. See Ogunye v. The State (1999) 5 FWLR (pt. 604) p. 545; Adeniji v. The State (2001) 13 NWLR (pt. 730) p. 375; Gozie Okeke v. The State (2003) 5 SCM p. 131 at 185 – 186 and Monsuru Solola & anor v. The State (2005) 6 SCM p. 137 at 147, all cited with approval by Ariwoola; JSC in Elijah Ameh Okewo v. F.R.N. (2012) LPELR – 7834 (S.C.) at p. 21 paragraphs E-G.
It is perhaps for that reason that Section 166 of the Criminal Procedure Law of Oyo State stipulates that:
“No error in stating the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge and no omission to state the offence or those particulars shall be regarded at any stage of the case as material unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission.”

It is not the case of the Appellant that he was misled by any error or omission in the charge or information to which he clearly, unreservedly and unequivocably pleaded to. All the offences for which he was charged are offences known under Acts of the National Assembly and the validity of such Laws is not in contention here. Furthermore, the factual situations as contained in the proofs of evidence are said to have arisen or occurred when the Appellant was the Executive Governor of Oyo State and thus was exposed to those factual situations. It has not been contended that he could not have acted as alleged by the prosecution. Whether he in fact acted as alleged should be left to be determined at the trial. To go into an appraisal of the evidence or proofs of evidence as presented to the court be the prosecution at this stage, would definitely lead to determining the case before those facts are tested in a full trial. If at the trial the prosecutions fail to establish those facts as presented in the proofs of evidence, or even link the Appellant with the commission of those facts, the Appellant may make a no case submission contending that no prima facie case has been made out against him by the evidence presented by the prosecution.

At this stage however, it is my view that for the Appellant to succeed, he must show that the charge preferred against him is totally or completely a hopeless one such that it would amount to persecution and not prosecution, if the prosecution is allowed to proceed against him on the bases of the proofs of evidence presented to the court. Such a situation arose in the case of Abacha v. The State (2002) 11 NWLR (Pt. 779) p. 437. In the instant case, the learned trial judge found from the proofs of evidence in the information presented before him that prima facie case had been disclosed and which links the Appellant with the commission thereof upon a careful perusal of the record of appeal, containing such proofs of evidence. I do not see any reason for disturbing the conclusion of the learned trial Judge as it is supported by the proofs of evidence.

It is for the above stated reason and the detailed reasons contained in the lead judgment, which I unhesitatingly adopt, that I am in total agreement with my learned brother that this appeal has no merit. I accordingly dismiss same and affirm the RULING of the court below delivered on the 12th day of December, 2012.

Appearances

Chief L. O. Fagbemi SAN with Mamman Mike Osuman SAN, N. O. O. Oke SAN, A. Ogunyimi ESQ, H. O. Afolabi, Sikuru Adewoye, L. L. Akanbi, W. A. Olajide, Tosin Ogwezi Mrs., Segun Adebayo, R. Isamotu, A. O. Oladele, J. O. Abdul-Salam, Sunbo Durowoju Mrs, Azeez Adebayo, R. A. Amuda, A. A. Ademodi, H. K. Onimagbo, E. S. YekeniFor Appellant

AND

Godwin Obla SAN with Olayinka Bolanle, Edward Okpe and Olugbenga BamgboseFor Respondent