ORJI UZOR KALU v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & ORS (2012)

ORJI UZOR KALU v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & ORS

(2012)LCN/5335(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Friday, the 27th day of April, 2012

CA/A/224C/2009

RATIO

COURT: WHETHER SENTIMENTS HAS PLACE IN JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS

It is trite that sentiments command no place in judicial deliberations. See EZEUGO v. OHANYERE (1978) 6 SC 171; MOHAMMED IORISSU v. MODUPE OBAFEMI (2004) 11 NWLR [pt.884] 396 at 409. PER EJEMBI EKO, J.C.A.

EVIDENCE: BURDEN OF PROOF WHERE THERE IS AN ASSERTION

It is not enough to allege. He who asserts has the duty to establish his assertion in order to succeed. That is the essence of sections 135 and 136 of the Evidence Act (now sections 131 and 132of the Evidence Act, 2011). PER EJEMBI EKO, J.C.A.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: DUTY OF A PROSECUTOR WHILE DRAFTING A COUNT

All that the prosecutor, while drafting the count, needs to do is to draft a count that is precise and specific, and which is tied to a known offence under a section of the penal statute. See F.R.N. v. IFEGWU (2003) 15 NWLR [pt. 842] 113 at 214; OFUANI v. NIGERIAN NAVY (2007) 8 NWLR [pt.1037] 470. And the count must be borne by the facts in the proofs of evidence. PER EJEMBI EKO, J.C.A.

APPEAL: ATTITUDE OF THE APPELLATE COURT TOWARDS INTERFERING WITH THE FINDINGS OF FACTS MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT

EVIDENCE: EFFECT OF EVIDENCE UNCONTRADICTED

That is when the evidence, at this stage, if uncontradicted and is believed, is sufficient to prove the case against the accused person. see AJIDAGBA v. IGP (1958) SCNLR 60; (1959) 1 NSCC 20; ABACHA v. THE STATE (2002] 11 NWLR [pt.779] 437. PER EJEMBI EKO, J.C.A.

Justices

JIMI OLUKAYODE BADA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

EJEMBI EKO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

REGINA OBIAGELI NWODO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

ORJI UZOR KALU – CA/A/224C/2009

AND

1. UDEH JONES UDEOGU
2. SLOK NIGERIA LIMITED
(CONSOLIDATED)Appellant(s)

AND

1. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA – CA/A/229C/2009
2. UDEH JONES UDEOGU
3. SLOK NIGERIA LIMITED

AND

1. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
2. ORJI UZOR KALU
– (CONSOLIDATED)Respondent(s)

EJEMBI EKO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The two appeals were heard on 15th March, 2012, as consolidated appeals. They emanate from one proceeding in the matter No FHC/AB/CR/56/2007 at the Federal High Court, Abuja. The Appellant, ORJI UZOR KALU, in the appeal No CA/A/224C/2009, and the appellants, UDEH JONES UDEOGU and SLOK NIGERIA LIMITED, in appeal No CA/A/229C/2009 are jointly being tried on several heads of counts for money laundering offences at the Federal High Court, Abuja. In the course of the proceedings the Appellants, as accused persons, had brought applications seeking the quashing of the amended charges preferred against them. The Federal High Court presided by Justice A. Bello, in the ruling delivered on 8th May, 2009, dismissed the Appellants’ applications seeking to quash the charges preferred against them. The appeals are against the Ruling of 8th May, 2009 dismissing the applications to quash the amended charges of money laundering offences preferred against the Appellants.
The charges were preferred against the Appellants by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) which had received written complaint by some concerned citizens of Abia State. The citizens made allegations that Mr. Orji Uzor Kalu, as Governor of Abia State, had corruptly enriched himself using his company, Slok Nigeria Limited. It was alleged that Mr. Orji Uzor Kalu, using his personal aides, had stolen various sums of money, running into Billions of Naira, from the funds of Abia State Government held in bank accounts, had them converted into drafts and paid into the account of Slok Nigeria Limited.
The EFCC investigated the allegations of the Abia State Citizen and was apparently convinced that there was some substance in the allegations. The EFCC could not then, because Mr. Orji Uzor Kalu, being a sitting Governor of Abia State by 2005, and enjoying immunity to criminal proceedings by dint of section 308 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, proceed against him. They had filed charges against some of the personal aides of the then Governor Orji Uzor Kalu and Slok Nigeria Limited. The EFCC had apparently issued statements to the effect that as soon as Mr. Orji Uzor Kalu ceased to be Governor, and thereby losing his immunity, they would proceed against him. He claimed to be aggrieved thereby. Just immediately at the end of his tenure as Governor of Abia State he, through his lawyers, took out proceedings against the EFCC and others at Abia State High Court for the enforcement of his fundamental rights to the dignity of his person (guaranteed by section 34 of the Constitution), to his personal liberty (guaranteed by section 35 of the Constitution), and freedom of movement, guaranteed by section 41 of the same Constitution, 1999. The High Court of Abia State sitting at Umuahia, heard the ex parte application for leave to enforce Mr. Orji Uzor Kalu’s rights against the EFCC; granted the leave and ordered ex parte:
That the leave so granted shall operate as a stay of all actions or matters relating to or connected with the complaint hereof until the determination of the motion on Notice.
The suit was intended to intercept EFCC’s missiles aimed at him. Mr. Orji Uzor Kalu (Appellant in appeal No CA/A/224C/2009) is of the opinion that the subsistence of this order of the Abia State High Court in suit No HU/177/2007 estops and restrains the EFCC, in whatever manner, whether or not in accordance with any procedure permitted by law or constitution, or lawfully and/or unlawfully, from any steps to arrest and prosecute him for the money laundering offences or any other offences.
That is the basis or ground, inter alia, for seeking an order to quash the charges against him. He argues, through his counsel, that the warrant for his arrest issued by the Federal High Court, at the instance of EFCC, during the subsistence of the ex parte order of the Abia State High Court in suit No HU/177/2007, his arrest and arraignment at the Federal High Court in the extant proceedings at the Federal High Court are all a nullity. It is on that footing, amongst others, that he prayed the Federal High Court to quash the charges in the case No FHC/ABJ/CR /56/2007. Hon Justice A. Bello of the Federal High Court, Abuja, not impressed by the argument, dismissed, on 8th May, 2009, the application to quash the charges against ex Governor Orji Uzor Kalu.
Mr. Ude Jones Udeogu and Slok Nigeria Limited, appellants in the appeal No CA/A/229C/2009, sought the quashing of the charges preferred against them on 4 grounds, namely:
1. The Accused/Applicants were arraigned under non existing laws. They are no laws known as Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2003 and Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004 in Nigeria under which the 2nd and 3rd Accused persons were charged. Both Acts are not existing laws in Nigeria.
2. The proof of evidence before this Honourable Court does not and cannot sustain or support the charges brought against the 2nd and 3rd Accused/Applicants under the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2003 or 2004 or at all. The proof of evidence does not disclose any prima facie case against the Accused persons and the charges are fundamentally defective.
3. The charges against the Accused/Applicants bother on revenue of Abia State Government and by virtue of section 251 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, the Federal High Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
4. That the Complainant/Prosecutor in this matter lacks the competence to institute and prosecute this matter, the subject matter being revenue of Abia State Government and thereby deprive this Honourable Court the jurisdiction to entertain abuse of process.
The court below heard the applications or Mr. Orji Uzor Kalu and M/s Ude Jones Udeogu and Slok Nigeria Limited and in a single Ruling of 8th May, 2009 it dismissed the applications. The Ruling is at pages 1040 to 1090 of the Record of Appeal. The Appellants, not satisfied, appealed the Ruling. Mr. Orji Uzor Kalu filed a separate appeal. His appeal is No CA/A/224C/2009. The appeal of M/S Ude Jones Udeogu and Slok Nigeria Ltd is the appeal no CA/A/229C/2009. The appeals were consolidated and were heard on 15th March, 2012. Each appeal retains its separate identity and I shall consider each appeal in that manner.

APPEAL NO. CA/A/224C/2009
The Notice of Appeal was filed on 20th May, 2009. The Appellant, with leave of this Court, filed additional grounds of appeal on 12th October, 2010. The Appellant filed his Brief of Argument on 20th April, 2010. The brief was deemed properly filed and served on 11th October, 2010. On 8th November, 2010 the 1st Respondent, through Rotimi Jacobs Esq. of counsel, filed his Brief of Argument. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents, M/S Ude Jones Udeogu and Slok Nigeria Ltd, elected not to file any brief of argument in this appeal. The Appellant’s Reply to the Brief of 1st Respondent was filed on 15th September, 2011 but it was deemed filed and served on 22nd February, 2012.
On 15th March, 2012 Mr. Awa Kalu, SAN of counsel to the Appellant identified and adopted the Appellant’s Brief filed on 20th April, 2010 but deemed filed on 11th October, 2010, and the Appellant’s Reply to 1st Respondent’s Brief. The two briefs were settled by Livy Uzoukwu, SAN. They were adopted as Appellant’s argument in the appeal by Awa Kalu, SAN who urged that the appeal be allowed. The Brief of 1stt Respondent, settled by Rotimi Jacobs, was adopted by Mr. Adebisi Adeniyi of counsel as the 1st Respondent’s argument in opposition to the appeal. Mr. Akuma, SAN for 2nd and 3rd Respondents conceded the appeal and further announced that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents had filed no brief.
Both the Appellant and 1st Respondent formulated two issues from the several grounds of appeal. The Appellant’s two issues read as follows:-
i. whether the trial court was right in holding that the charge preferred against the Appellant was not vitiated by reason of the order made by the Abia State High Court in suit No HU/177 /2007? [Ground 1, 2 and 7].
ii. whether the trial court was right in law when it held that the proof of evidence discloses a prima facie case in respect of all the counts in the charge preferred against the Appellant thereby requiring his explanation? [Grounds 3, 4, 6 and 7].

In substance there is no difference between the two issues formulated by the 1st Respondent and the two formulated by the Appellant as above reproduced. The 1st Respondent’s issues are as follows:-
1. whether having regard to the circumstances of this case, the learned trial Judge was bound by the ex parte order of the Abia State High Court as to vitiate the charge preferred against the Appellant? [Grounds 1, 2, 3 and 5].
2. whether the learned trial Judge was not right when His Lordship held that a prima facie case was disclosed against the Accused/Appellant? [Grounds 4 and 5].
I shall treat the issues of the Appellant as if they are the same with those formulated by the 1st Respondent.

ISSUE NO. 1
It was submitted to the court below that the subsistence of the ex parte order of the Abia State High Court in suit No HU/177/2007 made on 31st May, 2007 estopped the EFCC (1st Respondent) from obtaining from the Federal High Court warrant for the arrest of the Appellant, arresting and prosecuting the Appellant for the offences of money laundering in the charge No FHC/ABU/CR/56/2007. Consequently, the Appellant urged the court below to quash the charge or information against the Appellant. It was submitted that the action of the EFCC was a “clear, brazen and blatant disobedience to the order” of the Abia State High Court made on 31st May, 2007 and that the court below should respect that order and a quash the information or charge No FHC/ABJ/CR/56/2007. A number of authorities were cited to the court below to impress it that it accords with judicial discipline for every court to respect the decision of another court of equal jurisdiction in a subject-matter involving the same parties and that courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction should not make contradictory orders or disregard subsisting orders of another court of equal jurisdiction.
Before us here, the Appellant submitted that the trial court had an abiding duty to respect and follow the principles of law enunciated in ABACHA v. FAWEHINMI (2006) 6 NWLR [pt.600] 288 at 317; NDIC v. SAVANAH BANK OF NIGERIA PLC (2003) 1 NWLR [pt.801] 311 at 363; PETER v. ASHAMU (1995) 4 NWLR [pt.388] 206 at 222; N.I.M.B. v. UNION BANK OF NIGERIA.
The substance of the Appellant’s argument under this issue is that the court below erred not to have quashed the charge or information no FHC/AB J/CR/56/2007 which they say was filed by EFCC, the 1st Respondent, in brazen and blatant disregard of the ex parte order of Abia State High Court on 31st May, 2007 in the suit No HU.177.2007. The Appellant has in mind the consequences of acting in defiance of a subsisting court order or in the face of lis pendes. The principle of law for this conduct is as stated in DANIEL v. FERGUSON (1991) 2 Ch.D.2 adopted and applied in GOVERNOR of LAGOS STATE v. CHIEF OJUKWU (1986) 1 NWLR [pt.81] 621. and EZEGBU v. F.A.T.B (1992) 1 NWLR [220] 699. That is; whatever a litigant had done during lis pendens calculated to overreach his adversary would be undone or reversed by the court in its disciplinary jurisdiction.
At the court below the 1st Respondent here (the EFCC) had persuaded the court to apply the authorities of OLUTOLA v. UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN (2004) NWLR [pt.905] 452 and UWAZURUIKE v. A.G, FEDERATION (2008) 10 NWLR [pt.1096] 444 at 458 – 459; which held that, courts of similar or concurrent jurisdiction are not bound to follow the decision of each other. The court below agreed and held that the Federal High Court was not bound by the ex parte order of the Abia State High Court of 31st May, 2007 in HU/177/2007. This is what has provoked the appeal under this issue.
With all deference to the learned Senior Advocate for the Appellant and notwithstanding the vehemence with which he has strongly argued the appeal on this issue, I am of the firm view, and in agreement with the court below, that the ex parte order of the Abia State High Court made on 31st May, 2007 in the suit No. HU/177/2007 would not avail the Appellant to argue that the order was binding on the Federal High Court so much as to render its warrant for the arrest of the Appellant and its proceedings in FHC/ABJ/CR/56/2007 a nullity. This case is almost on all fours with UWAZURUIKE v. A.G., FEDERATION (supra) wherein at pages 458 – 459 my learned brother, Bada JCA stated clearly that:
It is apparent that the Federal High Court, Owerri and Federal High court, Abuja are courts of concurrent jurisdiction, therefore the contention by the counsel for the Appellant that 1st Appellant was charged to court maliciously in flagrant disrespect of an order of Federal High Court, Owerri can not be correct, because courts that are of similar or concurrent jurisdiction are not bound to follow the decision of each other. See – PROF. A.D. OLUTOLA v. UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN (2005) 3 WRN page 22; (2004) 18 WNLR (pt.905) 416.Â Â
I also agree with the submission of learned counsel for the respondent that an order granted by the Federal High Court, Owerri was an ex parte order for the applicant i.e. the 1st Appellant in this court, to enforce his fundamental human rights. It was not an order directed to the proceedings before the same court sitting in Abuja… Consequently, it is my view that the trial Judge was right not to have given credence to the order of the Federal High Court, Owerri as the order given by that court was not binding on her.
The statement of the law in UWAZURUIKE v. A.G., FEDERATION (supra) stands on the existing protocol that a superior court of record can not issue an order prohibiting or restraining the proceedings of another superior court of record. See CHIEF REGISTRAR v. VAMOS (1976) 1 SCÂ Â 33. At common law the court never did, by injunction, restrain proceedings in another court. What it did was to restrain a party to a cause from going on. See NELSON’S LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 2nd Ed. Law Publishers, 1984. In the Indian case: VENKATESA TAWKER v. RAMASAML CHETTIAR I.L.R. 18 Mad.338 at 341 the rationale for this principle is stated thus –
that the injunctions issued by the courts of Chancery in England for controlling proceedings in other suits are not issued to such other courts, but to the party,Â Â such party being amendable to the jurisdiction of the court granting the injunction, and they are infact orders in personam. Let it be emphasized; that injunction is a remedy in personam which is directed against the litigant and not the court. At common law, from the decision in HART v. HART L.R. 18 Ch DIV 670 at 679- 681; what is forbidden is an injunction to restrain a pending judicial proceeding. Injunction is a remedy in personam: the violation of it attracts sanctions of contempt against the party it is directed. Because of that the courts insist that orders of injunction shall not be at large and must be specific restrictions. See OZUEH v. EZEWEPUTA (2005) 4 NWLR [pt.915]Â Â 221 at 241. This point, that an order of injunction must be “definite clear and cogent”, was emphasized in ONAGORUWA v. ADENIJI (1993) 5 NWLR [pt.293] 317 at 339 and ORHUE v. EDO (1996) 9 NWLR [pt.473] 475 at 448. Bearing in mind this principle, Mr. Rotimi Jacobs, of counsel to 1st Respondent, submitted, correctly in my view, that the order made by Hon. Justice Kalu of Abia State High Court on 31st May, 2007 in the suit No HU/177/2007 was at large, ambiguous and non specific.

The order goes thus:-
IT IS ALSO ORDERED:
That the leave so granted shall operate as a stay of all actions or matters relating to or connected with the complaint hereof until the determination of the motion on notice.
This sweeping order is like Otapia-pia, or any weapon of mass destruction.
It restrains everything on its way – good or bad, including demand for and payment of Appellant’s counsel fees; discussion of this matter of public interest in the press, in so far as they relate to or are connected with the complaint of the Appellant!
What then was the complaint of the Appellant in his application for leave to enforce his fundamental rights to the dignity of his person (guaranteed by section 34 of the Constitution); his personal liberty (guaranteed by section 41 of the Constitution? Paragraphs 15 – 18 of the “facts Relied upon by the Applicant” at page 661 of the Record seem to say it all. They are:
15. The Applicant has never been confronted with any allegation of criminality. That the Applicant has committed no offence
16. The objective of the Respondents particularly the 1st Respondent is to publicly humiliate the Applicant, subject him to degrading treatment, deny his right to personal liberty and freedom of movement.
17. That in consequence of the foregoing, it is therefore expedient for the Honourable Court to restrain the Respondents from carrying out their threat which is calculated solely to embarrass and humiliate hereof.
18. That the Respondents would not suffer any detriment if they are restrained from arresting, detaining or prosecuting the Applicant until the constitutionality and legality of the said threat is determined.
Question: on what hard facts has the Appellant come to these conclusions, that the EFCC threat to arrest and prosecute him have the objective of merely to publicly humiliate and subject him to degrading treatment, capriciously deny him his right to personal liberty and freedom of movement? The EFCC has not yet confronted him with any allegation of criminality, as he avers. Even the Devil, as the old adage says, knows not the intent of a man. These are all speculations interspersed with sentiments founded largely on conspiracy theory, that is completely political.
It is trite that sentiments command no place in judicial deliberations. See EZEUGO v. OHANYERE (1978) 6 SC 171; MOHAMMED IORISSU v. MODUPE OBAFEMI (2004) 11 NWLR [pt.884] 396 at 409.
This man who comes to court, led by a battery of senior lawyers, to enforce his fundamental rights against a third party is, in my view, saying that the alleged violation or threat to violate his fundamental rights violate the constitutional provisions as they relate to the rights he is seeking to protect and that the due process of the law has not been or will not be followed by the third party. It is not enough to speculate that the due process of law or procedure permitted by law will not be followed in the alleged threat to arrest and prosecute him for an alleged offence. The courts, including the Federal High Court, know the law and would not do things to whimsically undermine the rights of parties guaranteed by the Constitution.
The rights to personal liberty and freedom of movement, guaranteed respectively by sections 35 and 41 of the 1999 Constitution, are not absolute. Section 35 (f) (c) of the Constitution says that no person shall be deprived of his right to personal liberty save in accordance with a procedure permitted by law and for the purpose of bringing him before a court of law in execution of a court order or upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed a criminal offence. And section 41 (2) (a) of the Constitution says that the right to freedom of movement may be deprived under a law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society that imposes restrictions on the “movement of any person who has committed or is reasonably suspected to have committed a criminal offence in order to prevent him from leaving Nigeria”.
An application for enforcement of a party’s fundamental right presupposes the right has been, is being or is likely to be violated otherwise than in accordance with the procedure permitted by law. That argument will be defeated when it is apparent that the right has been deprived of in accordance with the procedure permitted by law.

In this case, there is evidence that the EFCC, the 1st Respondent, applied to the Federal High Court and obtained warrant for the arrest of the Appellant and thereafter arraigned him in a court of law for his prosecution for the alleged offences of money laundering. The Respondent had attached to the information the proofs of evidence. This satisfies section 36 (6) (b) of the Constitution, 1999 that enjoins the prosecutor to give to the accused person “adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence.”
The suit no HU/177/2007 filed at the Abia State High Court by the Appellant was nothing but a gagging suit. The order issued on 31st May, 2007 was designed to attain that objective of gagging the 1st Respondent from discharging its office created by its enabling law. The passage in the opinion of Lord Denning, MR, in WALLER STEINER v. MOIR (1974) 3 ALL E.R. 217 is for, our purpose here, very apposite. This was an action for libel. The plaintiff, upon taking out the writ, tried hard to stop any investigation to his past actions or conduct. At page 230 of the Report Lord Denning, MR., restated the law thus:
I know that it is commonly supposed that once a writ is issued, it puts a stop to discussion. If any one wishes to canvass the matter in the press or in public, it can not be permitted. It is said to be sub judice. I venture to suggest that it is complete misconception. The sooner it is corrected, the better. It is a matter of public interest. It can be discussed at large without fear of there being in contempt of court. Criticisms can continue to be made and can be repeated. Fair comment does not prejudice a fair trial. That was pointed out by Salmon, LJ in THOMSON v. TIMES NEWSPAPERS LTD (1969) 3 ALL E.R. 648 at 650, 651; (1969) 1 WLR 1236 at 1239, 1240. The law says – and says emphatically – that the issue of writ is not to be used so as to be a muzzle or prevent discussion. Jacob Factor tried to suppress the Daily Mail on that score, but failed: see R. v. DAILY MAIL (EDITOR), ex parte FACTOR (1928) 44 TLR 303. And Lord Reid has said that a “gagging writ” ought to have no effect: see SUNDAY TIMES case (1973) 3 All E.R 54 at 65; (1974) A.C.273 at 301.
In ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. TIMES NEWSPAPERS LTD (1973) 3 ALL E.R. 54 at 60 Lord Reid of the English House of Lords gives the reason for this principle as follows:
The law on this subject is and must be founded entirely on public policy. It is not there to protect the private rights of parties to litigation or prosecution. It is there to prevent interference with the administration of justice and it should, in my judgment, be limited to what is reasonably necessary for that purpose. Public policy generally requires a balancing of interests which conflict.
His Lordship further adds at page 65 that:
If the law is to be developed in accord with public policy we must not be too legalistic in our general approach. No doubt public policy is an unruly horse to ride but in a chapter of the law so intimately associated with public policy as contempt of court we must not be too pedestrian.
Since this aspect of the law is used to prevent interference with administration of justice, it can not also be used to prevent the due process of law or administration of justice.
The suit of the Appellant, and the general and ambiguous order made on 31st May, 2007 (suit no HU/177 /2007) –
That the leave so granted shall operate as a stay of all actions or matters connected with the complaint hereof until the determination of the motion on notice were clearly intended to be a muzzle or to prevent the exercise or discharge of the 1st Respondent’s statutory function of investigating and prosecuting persons, who it has reasonable grounds to believe had committed economic crimes. That itself is an abuse of the due process of the law. My Lord, Bulkachuwa JCA said so in ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF ANAMBRA v. UBA (2005) 15 NWLR [pt.947] 44 at 67 that -Â Â
For a person, therefore, to go to court to be shielded against criminal investigation and prosecution is an interference (with) the powers given by the constitution to law officers in the control of criminal investigation.
Before I leave this issue, let me reiterate that it is sections 6 (m) and 45 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission [Establishment] that vest in EFCC the function or duty of investigating and prosecuting persons reasonably suspected to have committed economic and financial crimes.
Â Â I have demonstrated that there is no substance in this issue 1, as argued by the Appellant. The issue is accordingly resolved against the Appellant, and in favour of the 1st Respondent.

ISSUE 2
The issue raises the question, whether the proofs of evidence filed by the prosecutor, the 1st Respondent, have disclosed a prima facie case against the Appellant. The Appellant and the 1st Respondent are unanimous as to the definition of a prima facie case or what the term means. They all agree, and they are correct, that a prima facie case is not the same thing as the proof which comes later when the court has to find whether the accused is guilty or not guilty. The standard of proof as to whether or not the accused is guilty of the criminal allegation is one of proof beyond reasonable doubt. See section 138 of Evidence Act (now S. 135 of the Evidence Act 2011). A prima facie case is disclosed, as held by the Supreme Court in AJIDAGBA v. I.G.P (1958) 1 NSCC 20 at 21, when the facts are such that if uncontradicted and if believed they are sufficient to prove the case against the accused person. See also ABACHA v. THE STATE (2000) 11 NWLR [pt.779] 437 at 495. The proofs of evidence must on its face show that an offence has been committed and there must be evidence which could possibly ground the conviction of the accused person. For this, there must be evidence or facts to meet all the essential elements of the offence charged. See IKOMI v. THE STATE (1986) 3 NWLR [pt.28] 340 at 376.
Aniagolu, JSC at page 375 of the report gives the rationale for this as follows:
A citizen does not deserve to go through the rigours of a criminal trial if no prima facie case is established against him and his innocence can thus be established before he is called upon to bear that burden.
Conversely, it is not in the public interest that a person accused of committing a crime should gleefully be let go when there is evidence for him to be prosecuted for the crime. It is all about balance of public interest. The citizen accused of a criminal offence is entitled to be presumed to be innocent until his accusers had proved his guilt. I agree with the learned senior counsel for the Appellant that, in considering an application to quash a charge on the ground that the proof of evidence does not disclose a prima facie case the court, before which the application is made, has an obligation to closely examine the evidential materials in the proofs of evidence before it.

The court below had before it the proofs of evidence. But before I proceed to examine the proofs of evidence let me comment briefly on the posture of the learned trial Judge at pages 1085 – 1088 of the Record which tends to suggest that the prosecutor was doing the accused person at the Federal High Court a favour by supplying to him the proofs of evidence. I am sure the learned trial Judge was not totally correct on this. Section 36 (6) (a) & (b) of the 1999 Constitution impose obligations on the prosecutor in the following words –
36. (6) Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to
(a) to be informed promptly in the language that he understands and in detail the nature of the offence;
(b) to be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence.
The mere fact that the accused person is subjected to summary trial does not in any way detract from his right to be given proofs of evidence, being adequate facilities, for the preparation of his defence. Making available to the accused person the proofs of evidence, even in summary trial procedure, satisfies the mandatory provisions of the Constitution for audi alteram partem and indeed fair hearing. Summary trial simply, in my view, means that the trial shall not be proceeded with in the old fashioned and cumbersome preliminary investigation or inquiry conducted by a magistrate before the accused person is formally charged and committed for trial at the High Court or superior court of Record. In the summary trial procedure the charge and the proofs of evidence, verifying the charge, would have been previously served on the accused person and the trial court is invited to proceed to trial of the accused on the proofs of evidence.
The proofs of evidence are like statement of claim in civil proceedings, which these days are supported by frontloaded depositions of witnesses and documents to be used as exhibits. Providing the accused person, who is facing summary trial for a criminal offence, with proofs of evidence is, in my view, a basic fundamental right enuring to him by dint of section 36 (6) of the 1999 Constitution. It is not a privilege. The prosecutor owes him that obligation or duty.

The complaint in this issue 2 turns on the question, whether the learned trial Judge was right in his finding that the proofs of evidence disclose prima facie case? This is largely a question of fact.
The Appellant, at page 32, paragraph 4.9 of his Brief, had arranged the total number of counts in the amended charge into three (3) categories, that is:
a. Counts 1-16
b. Counts 17 – 44 and 45 – 64
c. Counts 65 -97

Before I proceed to analyzing the facts in the proofs of evidence viz-a-viz the counts or heads of the charge, in order to decide whether the proofs of evidence disclose prima facie case, I shall try the definition of the term “money laundering”. Money laundering, according to Toby Graham, Evan Beil & Nicholas Elliot in their book: MONEY LAUNDERING Butterworths Lexis-Nexis 2003 at page 3 paragraph 1.3, is the “varied means used by criminals to conceal the origin of their activities. The term “laundering” is used because these techniques are intended to turn “dirty” money into “clean” money, but laundering is not confined to cash.”
Section 17 of Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004 creates the offence of conspiracy, aiding and abetting the offence of money laundering in the following words:
17. A person who-
(a) conspires with, aids, abets or counsels any other person to commit an offence; or
(b) attempts to commit or is an accessory to an act or offence; or
(c) incites, procures or induces any other person by any means whatsoever to commit any offence, under this Act, commits an offence and is liable on conviction to the same punishment as is prescribed for that offence under this Act.
Section 16 of the Act criminalizes the retention of the proceeds of a crime or an illegal act on behalf of another. The provisions are as follows:-
16. Any person who –
a. whether by concealment, removal from jurisdiction, transfers to nominees or otherwise retains the proceeds of a crime or suspecting that other person to be engaged in a criminal conduct or has benefited from a criminal conduct, or conspiracy aiding, etc
b. knowing that any property either in whole or in part directly or indirectly represents another person’s proceeds of a criminal conduct, acquires or uses that property or has possession of it, commits an offence under this Act and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than 5 years or to a fine equivalent to 5 times the value of the proceeds of the criminal conduct or to both such imprisonment and fine.
The Appellant argues that the particulars given in respect of counts 1 – 15, apart from being incompetent and confusing, are inconsistent with the provisions of section 17 of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004. He did not show how incompetent and/or confusing the particulars were. It is not enough to allege. He who asserts has the duty to establish his assertion in order to succeed. That is the essence of sections 135 and 136 of the Evidence Act (now sections 131 and 132of the Evidence Act, 2011).
Count 1, which is a sample of counts 1 – 16, is as follows-
That you, ORJI UZOR KALU, on or about 10th December, 2003 within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court did procure SLOK NIGERIA LTD a company solely owned by you and members of your family) to retain in its account with First Inland Bank PLC through Manny Bank Ltd PLC (now Fidelity Bank PLC) the sum of N75,000,000.00 (Seventy Five Million Naira) which sum formed part of funds illegally withdrawn of Abia State Government and you thereby committed an offence contrary to section 17 and punishable under section 16 of Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2003
The active ingredients of the count are that
i. the accused person did procure Slok Nig Ltd
ii. to retain in its account with First Inland Bank PLC the sum of N75.000.000.00
iii. forming parts of the funds illegally withdrawn from the account of Abia State Government.
I do not see how the allegation is inconsistent with the provisions of section 17 of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004, or does, in any way, mislead or confuse the Appellant. The Appellant did not say, and I can not myself see, what makes the allegation incompetent.

The Appellant has argued that he neither had shares in nor was he the alter ego of Slok Nigeria Ltd. From the proofs of evidence the 1st Respondent, EFCC, has facts to show that between 1999 and October, 2004, at all times material to the charge and while he was the Governor of Abia State, the Appellant was a director, amongst other members of his family, managing the affairs of Slok Nig Ltd. Pages 176 – 184 of the Record tend to show that the Appellant resigned his directorship of Slok Nigeria Ltd on 24th October, 2004. EFCC intends to show that he was the Governor, the Chief Executive, of Abia State at all times material to the counts. They say he was the Governor of Abia State from 1999 to May 2007.
I do not think the Appellant is correct, in his submission that, “the account wherein the alleged sum was retained was not stated”. The counts clearly show that the various sums were retained in the “account of Slok Nigeria Ltd with First Inland Bank PLC.”
The argument of the Appellant, that he does not know what informed the averment of “funds illegally withdrawn” and that it was not stated from which account the funds were illegally withdrawn and that neither the illegal manner nor conduct was stated and that the account of Abia State Government from where the sum was “illegally withdrawn” was never stated, did not take into consideration the statements of Michael A. Udo and T.A. Orji contained in the proofs of evidence, particularly in the supplementary Record.
Since a prima facie case only means that there is ground for proceeding [AJIDAGBA v. IGP (supra)] and at this stage what the information must disclose is certainly not the guilt of the accused person, but only a prima facie case for the accused to answer [IKOMI v. THE STATE (supra)1, and having read counts 1 – 16 viz-a-viz the proofs of evidence in the Record of Appeal together with the relevant provisions of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004, I am of the firm view that I should overrule the appellant as it pertains to counts 1 – 16. They disclose a prima facie case under section 17 of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004. It is therefore necessary that the trial proceeds on these counts for the Appellant to explain himself.

Counts 17 -44 and 65 – 97 are laid under section 14 (1) (a) of Money Laundering (Prohibition) act, 2004 which provides –
Any person who –
(a) converts or transfers resources or properties derived directly from illicit traffic in drugs and psychotropic substances or any other crime or illegal act, with the aim or concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the resources or properties or aiding any person involved in the illicit traffic in narcotic drug or psychotropic substances or any other crime or illegal act to avoid the illegal consequences of his action.
Commits an offence under this section and is liable on conviction to a term of not less than 2 years or more than 3 years.
Count 17, the straw sample of counts 17 – 44 and 65 – 97, states – that you ORJI UZOR KALU, UDEH JONES UDEOGU, SLOK NIGERIA LIMITED, EMEKA ABONE (now at large) and EUNICE AGWU (now at large) on or about July 7th, 2005 within the jurisdiction of honourable court did transfer through Manny Bank Ltd (now Fidelity Bank PLC) the sum of N12,500,000.00 (Twelve Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira) into Slok Nigeria Ltd’s account with First Inland Bank PLC (a company solely owned by Orji Uzor Kalu and members of his family) which sum formed part of the funds you illegally withdraw from the account of Abia State Government with the aim of concealing the illicit origin of the sand funds and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 14 (1) (a) of Money laundering (prohibition) Act, 2004.

The ingredients of the offence under section 14 (1) (a) of Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, are, as submitted by Rotimi Jacobs of counsel to the 1st Respondent (EFCC) that
i. the accused converted or transferred resources or property;
ii. the resources or property must have been derived directly or indirectly from drug related offences, or any other crime or illegal acts;
iii. the conversion or transfer of the resources or property must be with the aim of
a. concealing or disguising the origin of the resources or property, or
b. aiding any person involved in any of the acts of drug related offences or any other crime or illegal act so as to evade illegal consequences of his action.

I have painstakingly read the Record of appeal, containing the proofs of evidence, and the briefs of argument exchanged. From the statements of witnesses listed, including M.A. Udo and T.A. Orji, the 1st Respondent intends to prove that the amount, the subject of each count, was stolen from the account of Abia State Government, where and when the Appellant was the Governor, and transferred on the instruction of the Appellant to the account of Slok Nigeria Ltd. The witnesses stated the accounts from where the funds were withdrawn. The cheques and other documents detailing the withdrawals are all included in the proofs of evidence. The funds paid into the account of Slok Nigeria Ltd were part of funds withdrawn from the account of Abia State Government. The funds were allegedly paid into account of Slok Nigeria Ltd on the Appellant’s instructions. Prima facie, the facts support the allegation under section 14 (1) (a) of Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004. I do not agree with the senior counsel to the Appellant that there is no iota of evidence in the proofs of evidence in support of the counts. In my view, the learned trial Judge was right in holding that a prima facie case had been disclosed by the proofs of evidence to warrant the Appellant to explain the legitimacy of the withdrawals from Abia State Government accounts and the subsequent payment or transfers into the account of Slok Nigeria Ltd, a private company with no government linkage, and in which the Appellant and family allegedly have substantial interest.
Appellant submitted that there is evidence that the 3rd Respondent, Slok Nigeria Ltd, is a contractor with Abia State Government and that the payments alleged were made to her in respect of contracts executed by Slok Nigeria Ltd for Abia State Government. One can only attach any credibility or veracity to this assertion only at the trial. That is a defence on the merits, which at this interlocutory stage is not safe to comment on.
It is further submitted that the statements of prosecution witnesses did not state that the payments were illegal or unlawfully lodged into the account of Slok Nigeria Ltd, 3rd Respondent. Suffice for now to say that the proof of this allegation, like allegation of concealment, can be by either direct or circumstantial evidence.
On this tranche of issue 2, I do not think that the finding of the learned trial Judge is perverse, and it should not be lightly interfered with. There are facts in the proofs of evidence to sustain the finding that a prima facie case had been disclosed.

The substratum of counts 45 – 64 is section 14 (1) (b) of Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004 that says –
Any person who collaborates in concealing or disguising the genuine nature, origin, location, disposition, movement or ownership of the resources, property or right thereto derived directly or indirectly from illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances or any other crime or illegal act. Commits an offence under this section and is liable on conviction to a term of not less than 2 years and more than 3 years.
A viable count under section 14 (1) (b) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act only needs to show that the accused collaborated in concealing or disguising the genuine nature, origin, movement or ownership of resources or money derived directly or indirectly from drug offences or any other crime or illegal act. The sum total of the allegations in counts 45 – 54 is that the named accused persons, by collaborating in the warehousing of moneys stolen from Abia State Government in the account of Slok Nigeria Ltd at First Inland Bank PLC, were guilty of concealing the genuine nature or source of the said sums. Count 45, which is a sample count avers –
That you, ORJI UZOR KALU, UDEH JONES UDEOGU, SLOK NIGERIA LIMITED, EMEKA ABONE (now at large) and EUNICE AGWU (now at large) on or about 2nd of August, 2005 within the jurisdiction of this Honourable court did collaborate in concealing the genuine origin of the sum of N26,000,000.00 (Twenty Six Million Naira) which sum formed part of the funds illegally withdrawn from the account of Abia State Government by lodging same into the account of SLOK NIGERIA LIMITED’s account with First Inland Bank PLC (a company solely owned by Orji Uzor Kalu and members of his family) and you thereby committed an offence punishable under section 14 (1) (b) of Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004.

I have read each of the counts. They are not, contrary to the submission of the Appellant, devoid of material particulars under section 14 (1) (b) of the Act, which I had earlier reproduced the provisions of. All that the prosecutor, while drafting the count, needs to do is to draft a count that is precise and specific, and which is tied to a known offence under a section of the penal statute. See F.R.N. v. IFEGWU (2003) 15 NWLR [pt. 842] 113 at 214; OFUANI v. NIGERIAN NAVY (2007) 8 NWLR [pt.1037] 470. And the count must be borne by the facts in the proofs of evidence.
There are facts in the proofs of evidence, in this case, that suggest that between 1999 and October, 2004 the Appellant was a director or alter ego of Slok Nigeria Ltd, and that the Appellant was also the governor of Abia State between 1999 and May 2007. And that the Appellant, whilst the Governor of Abia State, approved withdrawals from the coffers of Abia State Government, under security votes. And further that at the instance of the Appellant, amounts usually less than the sums withdrawn were used to buy drafts which were subsequently paid into the account of Slok Nigeria Ltd, which the Appellant had interest in, it seems to me, and the learned trial Judge is correct on this, that the prosecution intends to show that these alleged manipulations were done by all the accused in collaboration, and with the aim of concealing the origin of moneys taken from the Abia State Government for the purpose, other than that of the said Abia State Government.
My Lords, I had earlier attempted to give the loose definition of money laundering. It includes turning moneys illegally acquired into a legitimate account in order for the said money to wear a semblance of legitimacy, it having been laundered in the legitimate or lawful account. Notwithstanding the intricacies involved, these are matters of facts. In this case the proofs of evidence are borne by the Record of appeal. The facts contained in the proofs of evidence, in my view, sufficiently raise a prima facie case warranting the trial to proceed at the trial court. That will enable the accused persons to give some explanations for the various sums which the EFCC had alleged were stolen from the account of the Abia State Government and laundered in the account of Slok Nigeria Ltd.
From the totality of all I have been saying I have no doubt that the Appellant has not sustained issue 2 in this appeal, which I hereby resolve against him and in favour of the 1st Respondent. In other words, it is my firm view that the facts contained in the proofs of evidence disclose a prima facie case against the Appellant.

Under this issue 2, the Appellant had argued and urged us to hold that to stretch the provisions of section 14 (1) of Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004 to “other crimes or illegal acts” will lead to manifest absurdity. He had further prayed that in interpreting the provisions of section 14 (1) of the Act, the learned trial Judge did not follow the general rule of construction as espoused in the ejusdem generis rule of construction. That is, that the phrase “any other crime or illegal act” used in the section refers to only funds derived from offences traceable to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. This submission is clearly off targent or tangent. In the first place, it can not be sustained under this issue 2 which raises a question of fact, whether the proofs of evidence filed by the prosecutor disclose any prima facie case against the Appellant. This question of interpretation now being urged on us can not be addressed under issue 2.
Secondly, the phrase “any other crime or illegal act” as used in section 14 (1) of the Act is clearly intended to criminalise not only laundering of proceeds of drug offences but also proceeds of any other crimes or illegal acts. Here the history of money laundering prohibition offences becomes material. The international community had faced the menace of cross border drug trafficking offences. With time international terrorist activities became an issue of global concern. To check the menace of organized terrorist organizations and their activities it became necessary to criminalise the laundering of moneys derived not only from drug related offences, but also illegally acquired funds from criminal and/or corrupt activities. I do not think the rule of ejusdem generis would avail the Appellant in the submission that “any other crimes or illegal acts” should only relate to funds or property derived from drug related offences. The phrase “or by any other” is intended by the Legislature to emphasise strongly that any other crimes or illegal acts are not construed in terms of ejusdem generis to limit the offence under the section to only drug related offences. Sections 1 to 13 of the Act dealing with sundry matters and obligations of financial institution to make or accept cash payment to certain limits, their duty to report a transfer to or foreign country of funds in excess of 10,000 US Dollars or its equivalent and proper identification of prospective customers before allowing them to open accounts etc clearly reveal the intention of the legislature not to limit laundering offences to only drug related crimes. The Act, particularly section 14 (1) thereof, is broad based and it extends to funds or property derived from drug related offence as well as any other crime or illegal acts. Section 14 (1) is intended not to be exhaustive.

The argument that, by the rule of ejusdem generis section 14 (1) criminalises only the laundering of proceeds of drug related offences is lame and it is hereby dismissed.
I find no merit in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed in its entirety.

CA/A/229C/2009.
In this appeal the Appellants are UDEH JONES UDEOGU and SLOK NIGERIA LIMITED who are/were co-accused being jointly tried and prosecuted for money laundering offences with ORJI UZOR KALU, 2nd Respondent in this appeal. The said Orji Uzor Kalu was the appellant in the appeal no. CA/A/224/2009. Since this appeal and appeal no. CA/A/224/2009 have been consolidated I shall, in this appeal, be making references to my findings and conclusions in appeal no CA/A/224/2009 where the issues are identical or similar in both appeals, since the two appeals emanate from the single Ruling of the court below in the two consolidated applications.
At the court below these Appellants had applied for an order quashing the amended charge no FHC/ABJ/CR/56/2007: FRN v. ORJI UZOR KALU & 2 OTHERS dated 11th February, 2009 but filed on 14th February, 2008. The four grounds the Appellants, as accused/applicants relied upon for the order they sought are that –
1. That they were arraigned under non existing laws, as the money laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2003 and Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004, under which they were charged and arraigned in the court are non existent laws in Nigeria.
2. the proof of evidence before the trial court does not disclose any prima facie case against them (the appellants) and further that the charges preferred
3. The charges bother on the revenue of Abia State Government, which by virtue of Section 251 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, the Federal High Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain.
4. The complainant/prosecutor in this matter is not competent to institute and/or prosecute them on the
allegations, the subject matter of which is the revenue of Abia State Government. Accordingly, the lower court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain same, as same was brought in bad faith and constitutes an abuse of judicial process.
The application was heard, and in the joint Ruling delivered on 8th May, 2009 the application was dismissed. The appeal of the appellants was brought on several grounds, including ground 11 which they pray this Court to strike out. The said ground 11 is hereby struck out accordingly. From the remaining 14 grounds of appeal, the appellants through their counsel, Chief Solo U. Akoma, SAN has formulated 8 issues for determination as follows –
3.1. whether the proof of evidence discloses any prima Facie evidence of illegal withdrawal of funds from the Account of Abia State Government? (Ground 2).
3.2. whether having regard to the charge, whether the proof of evidence discloses any prima facie case against the Appellants? (Grounds 3, 6 and 15).
3.3. Whether the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, are competent to investigate, institute and prosecute this charge where the subject matter of the charge is the revenue of Abia State Government? (Grounds 4, 13 and 10).
3.4. whether summary trial envisaged under section 33 of the Federal High Court Act, Cap F12 LFN 2004 precludes the Federal High Court from examining the proof of evidence attached to the charge in order to determine if there is a prima facie evidence to sustain the charge? (Ground 1).
3.5. Whether the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to entertain criminal matters relating to the revenue of Abia State Government? (Grounds 5 and 14).
3.6. Whether the investigative powers of the Auditor- General of Abia State and Abia State House of Assembly under Sections 125 (2) and 128 of the 1999 Constitution extends to financial crimes in respect of funds appropriated in the Appropriation Law by Abia State House of Assembly? (Ground 9).
3.7. Whether the failure of the Appellants to raise their preliminary objection before plea was taken could justify the action of the court below in not considering the Appellants’ preliminary objection on the competence of the charge? (Ground 7).
3.8. In the circumstances of this case, is it the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004 or Money Laundering Act Cap M18 LFN 2004 that is applicable or both laws can co-exist in respect of this charge?
(Grounds 8 and 12).

Rotimi Jacobs, Esq. of counsel to the 1st Respondent, has on behalf of 1st Respondent, formulated 4 issues from the remaining grounds of appeal as follows:-
i. Whether having regards to the relevant provisions of the Federal High Court Act and the proof of evidence before the lower court, the learned trial Judge was not right when his Lordship held that the application to quash the charge filed by the Appellant was inappropriate and that in any event, a prima facie case was disclosed against the Accused/Appellants? (see Grounds 1, 2, 3, 6 and 15).
ii. Whether the 1st Respondent does not possess the requisite locus standi to prosecute the Appellants in respect of the offences charged (see Grounds 4,5, 9, 10, 13 and 14).
iii. Whether the charges preferred against the Appellants under Money Laundering (Prohibition) Acts 2003 and 2004 were improper? (see Grounds 8 and 12).
iv. Whether the learned trial Judge was not right to have discountenanced the Appellants’ preliminary objection to the alleged formal defects on the face of the charge when the objection was not raised before the Appellants took their plea? (see Ground 7).
The 2nd Respondent filed no brief of argument. At the hearing of this appeal Mr. Awa Kalu, SAN for 2nd Respondent was content to merely say that with respect to appeal no CA/A/229/2009 “we concede the appeal” and accordingly, did not file any brief.
Rotimi Jacobs Esq. of counsel to the 1st Respondent has formulated a single issue for determination from grounds 4,5,9, 10, 13 and 14 of the grounds of appeal. On the other hand counsel for the Appellants formulated three issues from the said grounds of appeal. They are Appellants’ issues 3.3, 3.5 and 3.6. Since the 3 issues are closely related in substance, I will treat them under the 1st Respondent’s issue II. The single thread that runs through Appellants’ issues 3.3, 3.5 and 3.6 is the argument, that the funds allegedly stolen or misappropriated and laundered in the account of Slok Nigeria Limited belong to Abia State Government. That therefore, it is no business of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, EFCC, the 1st Respondent, “to investigate, institute and prosecute this charge” (since) the subject matter of the charge is the revenue of Abia State Government” over which the Auditor-General of Abia State and the House of Assembly of Abia State have powers, respectively under Sections 125 (2) and 128 of the 1999 Constitution, to conduct investigation with the view inter alia of exposing corruption. On this premise, the Appellants argue that the EFCC, the 1st Respondent, which is a Federal Agency established by the EFCC (Establishment) Act. The legislative competence of the National Assembly to enact the EFCC Act is not an issue in this appeal. The issue in the appeal is whether the EFCC is competent to investigate and prosecute the Appellants for money laundering offences involving funds of Abia State and the competence of the Federal High Court to entertain the allegations of the EFCC against the Appellants.
I would like to believe that the National Assembly enacted the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act and the Economic and Financial Crimes Act (Cap E1 LFN 2004 in pursuit or pursuance of its obligation or duty “to abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power” under Section 15 (5) of the 1999 Constitution. The issue in this appeal, I repeat, is not whether the National Assembly can constitutionally enact these statues.

I have read the submissions of the Appellants under issues 3.3, 3.5 and 3.5 in their joint Brief of Argument. The Appellants failed to appreciate the distinction between the investigatory powers of the Auditor-General of Abia State and the Abia State House of Assembly, respectively, under Sections 125 (2) and 128 of the 1999 Constitution, on one hand and investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the EFCC vested or conferred on it by its enabling statute. Essentially, the investigatory powers of the State Auditor-General and the State House of Assembly are for the purpose of exposing corruption and preventing of waste. For the House of Assembly, the power extends to making laws, and to correcting defects in the existing law, with respect to the subject of investigation. The powers vested under Sections 125 (2) and 128 on these bodies do not include the power to prosecute. On the other hand, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, which establishes the EFCC, the 1st Respondent, has specifically in Sections 6 and 7 thereof vested the EFCC with investigatory and prosecutorial powers. The EFCC derives its competence to investigate and prosecute the Appellants for money laundering offences, under the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act from Sections 6 and 7 of the EFCC Act. The argument that, because the money, the subject matter of the allegations of money laundering offences, belong exclusively to the Abia State Government and therefore the EFCC has no powers to investigate and prosecute the Appellants in the Federal High Court has been answered in JOLLY TEVORU NYAME v. F.R.N (2010) 11 NWLR [pt.1193] 344 where the Supreme Court, per Adekeye JSC, states:-
The claim that the money exclusively belongs to Taraba State and that the State has exclusive claim on it to the exclusion of any other authority by virtue of section 120 of the 1999 Constitution can not stand in the face of the pronouncement ofÂ Â this Court in the case of A.G., ONDO STATE v. A.G., FEDERATION (2002) 9 NWLR [pt.772] page 222 at page 308 where this Court stated as follows: –
It has been pointed out that the provisions of the Act impinge on the cardinal principle of federalism, namely, the requirement of equality and autonomy of the State Government and non-inter-ference with the functions of State Government. This is true, but as seen above, both the Federal and state Government share the power to legislate in order to abolish corruption and abuse of office. If this is a breach of the principle of Federalism, then, I am afraid, it is the constitution that makes the provisions that have facilitated the breach of the principle. As far as the aberration is supported by the provision of the constitution, I think it can not rightly be argued that an illegality has occurred by the failure of the constitution to adhere to the cardinal principles which are at best ideals to follow or guidance for an ideal situation. And let me add: each country enacts its constitution and statues according to its peculiar circumstances. Section 15 (5) of the Constitution is intended to instigate the Federal and State Governments to embark on, and wage, total war on corruption that has become endemic in this country. As Shakespeare would put it, desperate malady deserves desperate remedy. I am sure, this is what has informed the enactment of this constitutional provision that is apparently an aberration on the ideals of federalism.
There is again the desperate argument of the Appellants to the effect that the 1st Respondent can not prosecute them because those who made the complaint against them did not do so on behalf of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and therefore that the EFCC should not have commenced the information against them in the name of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. All these are part of the rigmarole around the point that the money allegedly stolen and laundered belongs to the Abia State Government, and not the Federal Government of Nigeria. In the first place, the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act is a federal statute. The offence of money laundering under the Act is a federal offence. In answer to this Rotimi Jacobs Esq. of counsel to 1st Respondent has rightly let down his anchor firmly on the passage in the opinion of Adekeye, JSC in NYAME v. FRN (supra) to the effect that –
The Economic and Financial crimes commission which initiated the charges can only do so in the name of the Federal Government, and not Taraba state, as an agency of the Federal Government.
I have not seen, nor have I been told, what substantial miscarriage of justice the Appellants have suffered by the EFCC prosecuting them for money laundering offences under the name of Federal Republic of Nigeria.
Let me repeat that Section 15 (5) of the 1999 Constitution obligates the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as a State, “to abolish corrupt practices and abuse of power”. The enactments of the EFCC Act and the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act are all in a bid to discharge not only this constitutional obligation, but also the Country’s International obligation in the global war against corruption, terrorism, drugs and other cross-border crimes.
The Appellants, in view of the pronouncement of Lokulo-Sodipe JCA in E.O. WIKE v. FRN (NO CA/A/85C/2009 of 17th July, 2009), can not possibly maintain their argument that since the proper complainants were not before the lower court and that in the absence of proper complainants the lower court lacks jurisdiction to try them. I hereby adopt the following passage in the opinion of His Lordship in WIKE v. FRN (supra) to dismiss the submission. That is:
The provisions of Section [6(1)] of the EFCC Act, Cap E1 LFN 2004, have been set out verbatim in both the Appellant’s and Respondent’s Briefs of Argument. I have painstakingly perused the provisions of the said section and guided by the principles and canons of interpretation, as stated in the cases cited above, I am of the considered view that the EFCC indeed does not need to receive any complaint or request, formal or informal, from a particular orgainsation or victim, before it can carry out investigation in respect of the commission of an economic crime in relation to that organization or victim. The provision of Section 5(1) (e) of the EFCC Act, provides for the “adoption of measures to eradicate the commission of economic and financial crimes”. Now, if the commission can on its own volition embark on the “unsolicited” investigation of the commission of economic and financial crimes pursuant to information it digs up by itself or from faceless persons writing petitions, will this not serve towards the eradication of the commission of economic crimes, when the generality of the people know that they can at any time be the object of investigation by the EFCC even without any identifiable person lodging a formal complaint against them with the said EFCC? The clear answer in my considered view is that unsolicited investigation by the EFCC is within its powers, having regard to the literal reading of Section 6(1)(e) of the EFCC Act… In the light of all that I have stated above, I do not see anything wrong in the reasoning and conclusion of the lower court – to wit: …” the Rivers State Government itself need not complain of missing funds before the EFCC can cause investigation and prosecution in relation to the affairs of the Rivers State Government and I so hold.” I have found the lower court to be eminently correct.
The point has been made by, and I agree entirely with, 1st Respondent’s counsel that the combined reading of Sections 6(m) and 46 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004 clearly shows that the EFCC has powers to investigate and prosecute for all crimes connected with or related to economic and financial crimes, which include various forms of fraud, money laundering, corrupt practices, and drug related offences. I also agree that the definition of economic and financial crimes is wide enough to accommodate the offences the Appellants have been charged with at the lower court.
The Appellants have, incorrectly in my view, argued that the money laundering offences alleged against them are offences against Abia State Government that owns the funds allegedly stolen and laundered in the account of Slok Nigeria Limited. This argument is rooted in another fallacious ground that the funds allegedly stolen and paid into the account of Slok Nigeria Limited was from the Security Votes of Abia State that were managed by the 2nd Respondent, as the Governor of Abia State, and that the said Security Votes are “unaccountable and unretireable.” The argument does not say, and it can not be further stretched to mean, that because the funds from Security Votes are “unaccountable and unretireable” they are stealable or and can be pilfered with impunity.
I agree with 1st Respondent that it merely conducted investigation to determine whether the Appellants, and not the Abia State, committed money laundering offences. Criminal responsibility is completely personal. The Appellants are not being prosecuted vicariously for offences committed by Abia State Government. The individuals, who were officers or officials of Abia State Government, are being prosecuted because they, individually, committed, as alleged, money laundering offences under Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act enacted to enforce the obligations of both the Federal and State Governments to abolish corrupt practices and abuse of office under Section 15(5) of the 1999 Constitution. Abuse of office by a public officer is also prohibited by paragraph 9 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution dealing with “Code of Conduct for Public Officers.”

On whether, the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the allegations against the Appellants, the lower court stated, and I agree, that the National Assembly has exclusively conferred jurisdiction on the Federal High Court under the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Acts 2003 and 2004. Section 251 of the Constitution is not exhaustive on the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. Section 252 (2) of the same Constitution expressly empowers the National Assembly to enact laws that may confer additional jurisdiction or powers on the Federal High Court notwithstanding the provisions of Section 251 (1) of the Constitution, if it is “necessary or desirable for enabling the court more effectively to exercise its jurisdiction.” Pursuant to this the National Assembly has provided in Section 19 (1) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004 that:
The Federal High Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to try offences under this Act.
The constitutional authority for enacting this provision is not in doubt. Not impressed by the argument of the Appellants on this, I hereby dismiss it. From all I have said in respect of the Appellants’ issues 3.3, 3.5 and 3.6 and the 1st Respondent’s issue II, I have no doubt whatsoever that the issues should be resolved against the Appellants and in favour of the 1st Respondent. The issues are accordingly so resolved.
The Appellants’ issues 3.1., 3.2 and 3.4 distilled from Grounds 2, 3, 6, 15, and 1 of their grounds of appeal are what the 1st Respondent has condensed into one issue under his issue 1. I have held in Appeal no CA/A/224c/2009, that in view of Section 36 (6) of the 1999 Constitution it is a basic fundamental right of the accused person to be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation in every criminal proceedings whether in a summary trial or any other and it serves the purpose of fair hearing or audi alteram. It is not a privilege, but a right of the accused person conferred by the constitution. Because it is the right of the accused person it becomes a duty or an obligation imposed by the constitution on the prosecutor.
Section 33 (2)Â Â of the Federal High Court Act that says that “all criminal causes or matters before the court shall be tried summarily”Â Â merely dispenses with the cumbersome procedure of subjecting the prosecutor and the accused to preliminary investigation or inquiry by the magistrate before the accused could be committed for trial at the High Court or superior court of Record upon the magistrate finding that a prima facie case has been established against him. In the summary trial procedure the prosecutor prefers the charge straight at the High Court which is supported by proofs of evidence, containing statements of witnesses and/or other documents which the prosecutor intends to rely on and use against the accused person. As I stated in appeal no CA/A/224C/2009 making available to the accused person the proofs of evidence is not in any way doing the accused a favour nor is it a privilege. It is the right of the accused to be given the proofs of evidence before his trial commences.
Much as I agree that the learned trial Judge slipped when, at pages 1085 – 1088 of the Record, he had suggested that proofs of evidence, in a summary trial procedure, are unnecessary; I do not think that there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice. At the trial court each accused person, not appellants, were given the proofs for evidence verifying the allegations against them.
It is evident from pages 1087 and 1088 of the Record that the proofs of evidence were before the trial Judge and that upon his examining the same he was satisfied that there is sufficient evidence that will require explanations from the three Accused/Applicants. For me, that is sufficient for the court to proceed with the trial of the Accused/Applicants. consequently, in view of the reasons adumbrated above I hold that having regard to the charge, the proof of evidence discloses sufficient evidence to warrant the trial of the Accused persons summarily in conformity with the procedure of the court.

The findings are not perverse. There are sufficient facts borne by the Record of Appeal to support them. It is trite that the appellate court will not interfere with findings of fact made by the trial court unless the findings of fact are perverse and/or are not supported by evidence on the record. See OGIDI v. THE STATE (2003) 9 NWLR [pt.824] 1; AJIBULU v. AJAYI (2004) 11 NWLR [pt.885] 458.
As I stated earlier in the judgment in appeal no CA/A/224C/2001 consolidated with the instant appeal, a prima facie case is disclosed when there is ground for proceeding. That is when the evidence, at this stage, if uncontradicted and is believed, is sufficient to prove the case against the accused person. see AJIDAGBA v. IGP (1958) SCNLR 60; (1959) 1 NSCC 20; ABACHA v. THE STATE (2002] 11 NWLR [pt.779] 437.
I will not belabour this point whether the facts contained in the proofs of evidence disclose prima facie case on all the counts against the Appellants, having disclosed the matter exhaustively in appeal no CA/A/224C/2009 and had held that the facts disclose prima facie case against the Accused/Appellants. My judgment on this issue in appeal no CA/A/224C/2009 is hereby adopted and incorporated in the judgment in this appeal (No CA/A/229C/2009) under 1st Respondent’s issue 1 and the Appellants issues 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4. Though I agree that the learned trial Judge was not correct in holding that proofs of evidence are not necessary in summary trials at the Federal High Court; I hold however, that there is no failure in this matter as the Appellants were infact served proofs of evidence. It is just a mere slip that has not occasioned any miscarriage of justice. It would have been otherwise, if no proofs of evidence were available to the Accused/Appellant at the trial court. In that case, the law would have been that there is automatic failure of justice if any of the fundamental rights is found to have been breached as they relate to the Appellants. See DAMINA v. THE STATE (1995) 9 SCNJ 254; KALU v. THE STATE (1998) 12 SCNJ 1 AT 27.There is no such case here.
In substance I resolve issues 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4 formulated by the Appellants (and 1st Respondent’s issue t) against the Appellants and in favour of the 1st Respondent.
In view of my stance that the proofs of evidence disclose a prima facie case of the allegations of money laundering preferred against the Appellants and that the prosecutor, the EFCC, is competent to institute and prosecute this matter, it will seem that Appellants’ issue 3.7 is now academic. This issue appears to sprout from grounds 2 and 4 on which the application to quash the charge was founded, which state –
2. The proof of evidence before this Honourable Court does not and can not sustain or support the charges brought against the 2nd and 3rd Accused/Applicants under Money Laundering (Prohibition) Acts 2003 and 2004 or at all. The proof of evidence does not disclose any prima facie case against the Accused persons and the charges are defective.
4. That the complainant/prosecutor in this matter lacks the competence to institute and prosecute this matter, the subject matter being revenue of Abia State Government and thereby deprive this Honourable court of the jurisdiction to entertain same, as same was brought in bad faith and constitutes abuse of judicial process.
The Appellants, in paragraph 10.2 of their Brief, have narrowed down the issue to the failure of the learned trial Judge to consider their objection on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter “due to the lack of competence of the complainant”, and have invited us, my Lords, to invoke section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act and consider the point. The issue is now spent since under issues 3.3,3.5 and 3.6 formulated by the Appellants and the 1st Respondent’s issue II, I have held that by virtue of Sections 6, 7 and 46 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004 read together with Section 15 (5) of the 1999 Constitution the EFCC is competent to investigate and prosecute the appellants for allegations of money laundering offences.
The Appellants before us are now extending the frontiers of their application to the trial court to quash the charges. They can not, without leave of court, present at the appeal court a case that is completely different from the case they had presented at the trial court. It is because an appeal is regarded as a continuation of the original suit or claim, rather than the inception of a new or fresh action, that the parties are confined to their case as pleaded in the court of first instance. See ADEGBITE MOTORS LTD v. ADESANYA (1989) 3 NWLR [pt.109] 250 at 266; AKPA v. ITODO (1997) 5 NWLR [pt.506 589 at 604; NGIGE v. OBI (2006) 14 NWLR [pt.999] 1 at 225.
Accordingly, I do not think it is right for the Appellants to be heard here now complaining that counts 98 – 112, brought against the 2nd Appellant alone, under Section 15 of Money Laundering (Prohibition) Acts 2003 and 2004, are defective because they failed to give sufficient particulars.
The complaint under issue 7 is whether the trial Judge was right in his failure to consider whether the counts are defective for not disclosing the particulars after the 2nd Appellant had entered his plea. The learned trial Judge stated at page 1088 –
When the charge was read to all the three Accused/Applicants for each count in the charge, they were asked whether or not they understood the count in the charge to which they all answered in affirmative before pleading not guilty. None of them has said he did not understand the charge. So the application of the learned counsel for Accused/Applicants that they were indeed misled such statement did not emanate from the Accused person when they took their plea in open court.
The submission of the Appellants is that by failing to state which of the several paragraphs of Section 16 was contravened by the 2nd Appellant, counts 98 -112 are incurably defective. Much reliance was placed on Section 151 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Act that says –
The written law and the section of written law against which the offence is said to have been committed shall be stated. I do not think that a count of charge that states the section of the penal statute and the statute under which the offence is alleged to have been committed is fundamentally defective, unless it is shown that the section creates more than one offence. Section 16 of Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004 creates one offence of retention of proceeds of a crime or an illegal act for oneself or another knowing or suspecting that the same represents another person’s proceeds of criminal conduct. Section 16 provides –
Any person who
a. whether by concealment, removal from jurisdiction transfer to nominees or otherwise retains of a crime or an illegal act on behalf of another person knowing or suspecting that other person to be engaged in a criminal conduct or has benefited from a criminal conduct, or conspiracy, aiding, etc
b. knowing that any property either in whole or in part directly or indirectly represents another person’s proceeds of a criminal conduct, acquires or uses that property or has possession of it, commits an offence under this Act and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than 5 years or to a fine equivalent to 5 times the value of the proceeds of the criminal conduct or to both such imprisonment and fine.

Appellants submit that the 2nd Appellant (3rd Accused) “was misled” without, in any way, showing how he had been misled. The appellant who asserts that he has been misled has the burden of showing how he has been misled. As Karibi-Whyte, JSC stated in OGBOMOR v. THE STATE (1985) 1 NWLR [pt.2] 223 at 235, those omissions or errors which are trivial and not material will not vitiate a trial, but only those which are material vitiate the trial. His Lordship held in the case that there is substantial compliance with Section 151 (3) of the CPA if the count states the written law and the section of it which the offence is alleged have been committed. Where there has been a clear effort to comply with Section 151 (3) of CPA, Section 166 CPA will cure the defect. Section 156 provides –
No error in stating the offence or particulars required to be stated in the charge and no omission to state the offence or those particulars shall be regarded at any stage of the case as material unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission.
Finally, on this issue; I am in complete agreement with counsel for 1st Respondent on authority of OBAKPOLOR v. THE STATE (1991) 1 NWLR [pt.165] 113, that by virtue of Section 167 CPA any objection to a charge for any formal defect on the face thereof must be taken immediately after the charge had been read over to the accused person and later.

The argument of the Appellants that no consent, waiver or no acquiescence can confer jurisdiction where none existed; founded on A.G., FEDERATION v. ISONG (1986) QLRN 75 and OGBORU v. SPDC NIG LTD (2008) 17 NWLR [pt.955] 596 made no effort, how be it feeble, to make any distinction between procedural jurisdiction and substantive jurisdiction. The former can be waived, but the latter can not. See ARIORI v. ELEMO (1983) 1 SC 13. The defect complained of here falls within the brackets of the former. Appellants’ issue 3.7 and the 1st Respondent’s issue IV are hereby resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent and against the Appellants.
Appellants’ issue 3.8 is the 1st Respondent’s issue III, both are differently phrased. For the Appellants the issue is whether the Money Laundering (Prohibition) 2004 co-exists with the Money Laundering Act, 2003 in respect of the information. There has been confusion as to which of the statutes is the existing law. The recourse, as adopted by counsel to 1st Respondent, appears to me a more reasonable approach.

In the Federal Government Extraordinary Gazette No 110, VOL. 91 of 31st December, 2004 the Government Notice No 559 published the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, No 10 of 2004. Section23 (1) of the Act No 10, specifically repeals the Money Laundering Act, 2003. The short title of the Act No 10, 2004, passed by the National Assembly on 23rd March, 2004 is Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004. The date of commencement of this Act is 29th March, 2009.
There is in the statute books the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act Cap M18 of 2004. The commencement date is 24th March, 2003. The long title of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act No 10, 2004 is –
An Act to repeal the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2003; and enact the money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004; and for matters connected therewith.”
Consistent with this long title Appellants’ counsel had highlighted some differences between the Act No M18, 2004 (No 7 of 2003) and the Act No 10, 2004 as follows –
a. Section 14 (1) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004 included the phrase – “or any other crime or illegal act” and made the punishment for contravention to a prison term of not less than 2 years or more than 3 years. While Section 14 (1) of Money Laundering Act (Prohibition) Act, Cap. M18 LFN 2004 omitted the phrase – “or any other crime or illegal act” and made prison term upon conviction of not less than 15 years or more than 25 years.
b. Under the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, No 10 of 2004 a new offence of retention of proceeds of criminal conduct was created under section 16 of the said Act while Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act Cap. M18 LFN 2004 had no such provision.

As submitted by the Appellants, there is a repeal of the earlier statute by implication when the provisions of the new statute are so repugnant to the provisions of the earlier statute and no effect can not be given to both at the same time. See LEADWAY ASSURANCE CO LTD v. JUMBO UNITED CO. LTD (2005) 5 NWLR [pt.919] 539 at 556 and CHARNOCK v. MERCHANT (1900) 1 Q.B 474.
Appellants further submit that as a result the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act No.10, 2004 is inapplicable to the information, so much so that the offences allegedly committed in 2005 (i.e. counts 16 – 112) should be quashed, having been brought under a wrong law. The argument is untenable. The offences allegedly committed in 2005 were committed after the commencement of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, No 10 of 2004 on 29th March, 2004. This position I have taken does not affect the offences committed when the repealed Act was extant and subsisting until its date of repeal. Section 23 (2) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act No 10, 2004 says so categorically that –
The repeal of the Act specified in subsection 1 of this section shall not affect anything done or purported to be done under or pursuant to the Act.
See also Section 5 (1) (b), (c) & (e) of the Interpretation Act Cap 123 LFN 2004.
I am not the least persuaded by the Appellants’ submission on this issue. Accordingly, I resolve the issue in favour of the 1st Respondent and against the Appellants.
On the whole, the appeal lacks substance, and it is hereby dismissed in its entirety.
Both appeals nos CA/A/224C/2009 and CA/A/229C/2009 are hereby dismissed. The Ruling of the trial court (A. Bello, J) delivered on 8th May, 2009 in the case No FHC/AB UCR/56/2007, except on issues otherwise stated, is hereby affirmed.

JIMI OLUKAYODE BADA, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in advance, the lead Judgment of my learned brother, EJEMBI EKO, JCA in the consolidated appeals just delivered.
The issues for determination in the two consolidated appeals have been meticulously and exhaustively dealt with. I am of the view that the consolidated appeals with Nos. CA/A/224C/2009 and CA/A/229C/2009 lacks merit and they are hereby dismissed.
I abide by the consequential orders made in the lead Judgment.

REGINA OBIAGELI NWODO, J.C.A.: The Appellant sought leave to apply to enforce his fundamental right under the fundamental Right Enforcement Procedure rules at the Abia State High Court in suit No. HU/177/2007 and an order for the leave to operate as stay of actions in the matter.
The Abia State High Court granted leave to the appellant to apply to enforce his fundamental right on 31st May,2007 and ordered thus:
That the leave so granted shall operate as a stay of all actions or matters relating to or connected with the complaint hereof until the determination of the motion on notice.”
There is no evidence from the Record of appeal that the above reproduced order has been set aside nor that the motion on notice have been moved or determined. It is evident from the record that the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was a respondent in the suit at the Abia State High Court. The EFCC did not take any step as is obvious from the record to set aside that order of leave granted to operate as stay of all actions.
A diligent Financial Crimes Commission will be proactive in defending that action since they were respondents by taking positive steps on the action before the Abia State High Court on the ex parte order rather than display lassitude and move their strength to another court. This negative attitude ought to be frowned at and condemned. It is this ineptitude of the EFCC in responding to the suit in Abia State High Court that led to the objection in the criminal charge in the Federal High Court which then culminated in Issue One in this appeal. The chore of Issue one formulated by the Appellant is whether the ex-parte order of the Abia state High court made on 31st May, 2007 would not avail the Appellant to argue that the order was binding on the Federal Order of the Abia State High Court made on 31sy May, 2007 would not avail the Appellant to argue that the order was binding on the FederalÂ Â High Court so much as to render the warrant for the arrest of the appellant and its proceedings in FHC/ABJ/CR/56/2007 a nullity.
In general, orders of a competent court should not be flagrantly disobeyed. Our nascent democracy and the constitutional provision enjoins orders of court to be respected. This is corollary to strict adherence to the rule of law. Obeying of courts orders is not just legal but also a moral obligation.
However, it is imperative and fundamental that a court of competent jurisdiction in making an order should be conscious and wary of the nature and manner of order made in order to avoid a diminution of the vast powers of the court, the image of the court and the exposure of its authority to ridicule. Therefore orders of court must be devoid of vagueness, it must be clear and explicit on what it contains and the Parties it will affect.
The order made by the Abia state High court that leave granted operates as stay was absolutely vague. It was not specific against who the order is directed at and which action is stayed. I have read the complaints set out in the processes in support of the application for leave to enforce the Appellant fundamental right at the Abia state High court. There is nothing therein seeking a restraining order against the Federal High court. It is trite that an injunction would not lie against proceedings in another court of co-ordinate jurisdiction but an order to restrain a party to a cause can be made. Furthermore, a court cannot speculate on what the other court intends to convey, in particular when the exparte order is not on appeal.
It has to be borne in mind that the order to arrest was made by the Federal High Court though initiated by EFCC. Any order as in the instance case touching on rights of individuals and duties of law enforcement officers that is vague will become ineffective once it is a clog in the wheel of justice.
It is a fruitless effort for a court to make an incoherent order. The Supreme Court per Oputa JCA in Onwuka v. Ediala (1989) 1 S.C. (P.11) 1 had this to say:
“An order of injunction should neither be vague nor uncertain. It should be clear and precise and it should inform the defendants what the opinion of the court is as to the limits of their rights and/or privileges in and over the land in dispute. The order should not as in this case, be such as to expose the defendant’s appellants to the consequences of violating a vague and imprecise injunction”
Therefore when an order is projected as an injunction and it is vague, it will be difficult to enforce it, as it is not definite and certain on what it is meant to say and who to restrain and against who. The EFCC has the statutory function to investigate and prosecute persons reasonably suspected to have committed economic and financial crime. The courts have a duty not to stall the exercise of that responsibility by unwarranted orders.
The officers of the EFCC equally should not abuse such duty and power of investigation by brazenly disobeying competent orders of the court. Notwithstanding that the dignity and honour of court cannot be maintained if orders are treated disdainfully and scornfully without due respect, it is not desirable for the court to make unbridled orders’ see Shugaba v. UBN Plc (1999)11 NWLR (Pt.627).
In the instant appeal because the order of the Abia state High court is not specific on who the action is directed to stop, the proceedings in the Federal High Court cannot be stalled by such vague order. I am cognizance of the caution that a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction must respect the powers vested in each court and orders made by each court against specific parties but the order has to be explicit and definite. There cannot be a restraining order by a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction against another like I earlier stated. There is nothing manifest in the present appeal for the trial court to quash the charges as urged on the court.
I agree with my learned brother Ejembi Eko, JCA that the order of Abia State High Court cannot avail the appellant on his submission that the order was binding on the Federal High court and thus render the warrant of arrest of the appellant and its proceedings a nullity. For the fuller reasoning in the lead judgment delivered now which I adopt as mine. I agree that this appeal is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. I abide by the consequential orders made in the leading judgment.
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Appearances

Awa Kalu, SAN with Stanley Ojigbo, S.L. Okonwo, A.A. Nwodu, C.C. Obidike, M.T. Emebo;
Alex Igwe and N. Okocha for Appellant in CA/A/224C/2009 and 2nd Respondent in CA/A/229C/2009.For Appellant

AND

Chief Solo Akuma, SAN with Chief Emeka Nwalo, I.L. Umudu and Uchenna Ogunedo for
Appellants in CA/A/229C/2009 and 2nd & 3rd Respondents in CA/A/224C/2009.
Adebisi Adeniyi for 1st Respondent in both appeals [Rotimi Jacobs settled the Briefs].For Respondent

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