OMILADE v. STATE (2020)

OMILADE v. STATE

(2020)LCN/15476(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Thursday, December 03, 2020

CA/L/480C/2018

RATIO

DISCRETION OF COURT: WHETHER THE IMPOSITION OF SENTENCES IS WITHIN THE DISCRETIONARY POWER OF THE COURT

Now, the general rule is that sentencing is at the discretion of the trial Court, provided the discretion is exercised judicially and judiciously within the law. An appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the lower Court unless the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive in the circumstances or wrong in principle. See ABIODUN vs. FRN (2018) LPELR (43838) 1 at 24-26, OMOKUWAJO vs. FRN (2013) LPELR (20184) 1 at 32 and IDAM vs. FRN (2020) LPELR (49564) 1 at 9-10. It is my firm view that the sentence of twelve years for an offence attracting a maximum sentence of fourteen years improvement is a proper exercise of discretion and there is no reason for an appellate Court to interfere.

The punishment for the offence of murder is the mandatory sentence of death as provided for in Section 223 of the Criminal Law of Lagos State. The sentence is mandatory and does not admit of any exercise of discretion by the Court. See TANKO vs. THE STATE (2009) LPELR (3136) 1 at 25-27, AMOSHIMA vs. THE STATE (2008) LPELR (4369) 1 at 33-36 and SEGUN BALOGUN vs. A-G OGUN STATE (2002) LPELR (726) 1 at 21-25. The lower Court having convicted the Appellant for the offence of murder had no discretion in the sentence to be passed on him. The lower Court was duty bound to pass the sentence of death on the Appellant, which it did. PER UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.

DUTY OF COURT: EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

It is abecedarian law that the evaluation of evidence and ascription of probative value thereto is in the province of the trial Court, which had the opportunity of hearing the testimony of the witnesses and observing their demeanour and that an appellate Court would not generally interfere with the findings of a trial Court in this regard unless the same is shown to be perverse: see ONOGWU vs. THE STATE (1995) 6 NWLR (PT 401) 276 at 552. Put differently, an appellate Court will not ordinarily interfere with the findings of facts made by a trial Court on credibility of witnesses unless it is shown that such findings are perverse or are not the result of proper evaluation of the evidence. See SANYAOLU vs. THE STATE (1976) 5 SC 37, RABIU vs. THE STATE (1980) 8-11 SC 130, ADELUMOLA vs. THE STATE (1988) 1 NWLR (PT 73) 683; SUGH vs. THE STATE (1988) 2 NWLR (PT 77) 475 and THE STATE vs. NNOLIM (1994) 5 NWLR (PT 345) 394. The findings of facts and conclusions reached on the evidence by the lower Court are definitely not perverse. The Appellant’s failure to show that the findings are perverse signifies the lack of merit in this appeal. See SANDE vs. THE STATE (1982) 4 SC 41, THE STATE vs. AIBANGBEE (1998) 3 NWLR (PT 84) 548 and DIBIE vs. THE STATE (2007) All FWLR (PT 353) 83 at 102 and 110. PER UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.

CRIMINAL LAW: ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENCE OF CONSPIRACY

In splice, the essential ingredients of the offence of conspiracy, id est, the agreement between two or more persons, in the sense of the meeting of the minds, to carry out an unlawful or illegal act, which is an offence. The bare agreement to commit an offence suffices and the actions showing that the persons involved were engaged in accomplishing a common object or objective; see KAZA vs. THE STATE (2008) LPELR (1683) 1 at 56-57, ADEKUNLE vs. THE STATE (1989) LPELR (108) 1 at 22 and ABDULLAHI vs. THE STATE (2008) LPELR (28) 1 at 20, was established by inference from the surrounding circumstances of the manner in which the deceased was killed: SULE vs. THE STATE (supra) and ADEJOBI vs. THE STATE (supra). PER UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.

CRIMINAL LAW: MENS REA: CONSIDERABLE FACTS TO DETERMINE INTENT TO MURDER

EVIDENCE: PROSECUTION’S OBLIGATION TO CALL FORTH WITNESS

It seems to me that the law is now firmly settled beyond peradventure that there is no obligation on the prosecution to call a host of witnesses, provided that the material witnesses are called. What really matters is not the number of witnesses called, but the quality of evidence adduced. See OKONOFUA vs. THE STATE (1979) 6-9 SC 18, ALABI vs. THE STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (PT 307) 511, OLAYINKA vs. THE STATE (2007) 9 NWLR (PT 1040) 561 at 576 and 584 and ADEDARA vs. THE STATE (2009) LPELR (8194) 1 at 76. As stated by Tobi, JCA (as he then was) in his usual fecund style offer vid prose in AKINYEMI vs. THE STATE (1996) 6 NWLR (PT 607) 449 at 466:
“The prosecution has no duty to call a village or community of witnesses to prove the charge of murder or any other charge. It is not the number of witnesses that interests a Court of law, but whether the ingredients of the offence are proved.” PER UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.

TAINTED WITNESS: WHETHER THE FACT THAT THERE IS A BLOOD RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A VICTIM AND THE PROSECUTION WITNESS IS NOT SUFFICIENT, IN ITSELF, TO MAKE HIM A TAINTED WITNESS

It is well settled that the fact that there is a blood relationship between a victim and the prosecution witness is not sufficient, in itself, to make him a tainted witness whose evidence is to be treated with caution and is unreliable unless corroborated. See ADETOLA vs. THE STATE (1992) 4 NWLR (PT 235) 267, EGWUMI vs. THE STATE (2013) 13 NWLR (PT 1372) 525, OMOTOLA vs. THE STATE (2009) LPELR-2663 (SC), OMOTOLA vs. THE STATE (2009) 7 NWLR (PT 1139) 148 and UZIM vs. THE STATE (2019) LPELR (48983) 1 at 30-32. PER UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.

WORDS A ND PHRASES: CONSPIRACY

Now, conspiracy as an offence is the agreement by two (not being husband and wife) or more persons, to do or cause to be done an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. In HARUNA vs. STATE (1972) 8 – 9 SC 108 or (1972) LPELR (1356) 1 at 23 – 24, Fatayi-Williams, JSC (as he then was) stated as follows:
“Conspiracy as an offence is nowhere defined in the Criminal Code….It means under common law, an agreement of two or more persons to do an act which it is an offence to agree to do. The very plot is an act in itself, and the act of each of the parties promise against promise, actus contra actum, capable of being enforced if lawful, is punishable if it is for a criminal object or the use of criminal means; (See Archbold 37th Edition paragraph 4051). In short, it is the agreement to do an act which it is an offence to agree to do which constitutes the offence of conspiracy under the Criminal Code.”
The actual agreement alone constitutes the offence of conspiracy and it is not necessary to prove that the act had in fact been committed. Actual commission of the offence may however show the common intention formed before the offence was committed and therefore be proof of the conspiracy: JOHN vs. THE STATE (2016) LPELR (40103) 1 at 10. The offence of conspiracy is rarely or seldom proved by direct evidence but by circumstantial evidence and inference from certain proved acts. This is so because persons who agree to do an illegal act or achieve a legitimate end by illegal means do not invite a witness or witnesses to attest to their agreement. See JOHN vs. THE STATE (supra) at 10, OBIAKOR vs. THE STATE (2002) 36 WRN 1 at 10, EGUNJOBI vs. F.R.N. (2001) 53 WRN 20 at 54 and THE STATE vs. OSOBA (2004) 21 WRN 113.
Since by its very nature, the offence of conspiracy consists in the meeting of minds for a criminal purpose, whereby the minds proceed from a secret intention to the overt act of mutual consultation and agreement, the offence can be proved through inference drawn from the surrounding circumstances. See SULE vs. THE STATE (2009) 17 NWLR (PT 1169) 33 and ADEJOBI vs. THE STATE (2011) LPELR (97) 1 at 36. The circumstantial evidence on which a successful conviction for conspiracy can be predicated is evidence not of the fact in issue, but of other facts from which the fact in issue can be inferred. The evidence in this connection must be of such quality that irresistibly compels to make an inference as to the guilt of the accused person. See ODUNEYE vs. THE STATE (2001) 13 WRN 88.
The general principle of law is that a charge of conspiracy is proved either by leading direct evidence in proof of the common criminal design or it can be proved by inference derived from the commission of the substantive offence. See LAWSON vs. THE STATE (1975) 4 SC 115 at 123, AKANO vs. A-G BENDEL STATE (1988) 2 NWLR (PT 201) 232, AMACHREE vs. NIGERIAN ARMY (2003) 3 NWLR (PT 807) 256 at 281 and NWOSU vs. THE STATE (2004) 15 NWLR (PT 897) 466. PER UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.

CRIMINAL LAW: BURDEN OF PROOF

It is exoteric that in criminal trials, the burden is on the prosecution to prove the offence charged beyond reasonable doubt. However, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all shadow of doubt and where the evidence adduced is strong as to leave only a remote probability in favour of the defendant, then the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the words of Oputa, JSC (of most blessed memory) in BAKARE vs. THE STATE (1987) 3 S.C.1 or (1987) LPELR (714) 1 at 12-13:
“Proof beyond reasonable doubt stems out of the compelling presumption of innocence inherent in our adversary system of criminal justice. To displace this presumption, the evidence of the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, not beyond the shadow of any doubt that the person accused is guilty of the offence charged. Absolute certainty is impossible in any human adventure including the administration of criminal justice. Proof beyond reasonable doubt means just what it says. It does not admit of plausible and fanciful possibilities but it does admit of a high degree of cogency, consistent with an equally high degree of probability. As Denning, J. (as he then was) observed in Miller v. Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 ALL E.R. 373:-
“The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence – “of course it is possible but not in the least probable” the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt.”
Proof beyond reasonable doubt means proof of an offence with the certainty required in a criminal trial. That certainty is that the offence was committed, which is established by proving the essential ingredients of the offence, and that it is the person charged therewith that committed the offence. PER UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.

Before Our Lordships:

Joseph Shagbaor Ikyegh Justice of the Court of Appeal

Ugochukwu Anthony Ogakwu Justice of the Court of Appeal

Gabriel Omoniyi Kolawole Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

IBRAHIM OMILADE APPELANT(S)

And

THE STATE OF LAGOS RESPONDENT(S)

UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): It was Christmas Day; 25th December, 2012. The Appellant was one of several friends who went out to have drinks at the invitation of one of their friends. In the course of their binge, an information was brought to the Appellant about someone who was said to have threatened to deal with him. The Appellant and his friends decided to go and find out why the threat was made. The person who was said to have made the threat is a relation of the deceased; so they headed to the home of the deceased, armed with machetes and cutlasses. The altercation that arose resulted in the fatal infliction of machete and cutlass cuts and injuries on the deceased, which led to his death. The Appellant and two others were arrested, arraigned and tried on two counts of conspiracy to murder and murder. It was in CHARGE NO. ID/244C/2013: THE STATE OF LAGOS vs. IBRAHIM OMILADE & ORS. At the end of the trial, the Appellant was convicted and sentenced to twelve years imprisonment on the first count and to death on the second count. The judgment was delivered on 22nd November, 2016.

This appeal is against the said judgment. The Notice of Appeal was filed on 20th February, 2017. The Records of Appeal were compiled and transmitted. The parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument which they adopted and relied upon at the hearing of the appeal. The Appellant’s Brief was filed on 21st May, 2018. The Respondent filed its brief on 19th June, 2020, but it was deemed as properly filed on 9th July, 2020. The Appellant further filed a Reply brief on 22nd July, 2020. Even though the Appellant correctly submitted in its Reply Brief that the purpose of a Reply Brief is not to re-argue the points already taken in the Appellant’s Brief, the Appellant ended up doing just that. I am minded to discountenance the Reply Brief; but considering that this appeal is against a decision in which the supreme punishment of the death penalty was imposed on the Appellant, I would still consider the submissions made in the Reply Brief. Howbeit, I iterate that the purpose of a Reply Brief is to deal with new points raised in a respondent’s brief which had not been properly dealt with in the appellant’s brief. It is not an avenue to re-argue the points already argued in the appellant’s brief: NWALI vs. THE STATE (1991) 3 NWLR (PT 182) 662 at 671.

The Appellant distilled five issues for determination as follows:
1. Whether the guilt of the Appellant was proved by the Prosecution beyond reasonable doubt as required by law – Ground 1
2. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in rejecting Exhibit P1 – Extra-Judicial Statement of the Appellant at the State CID, Panti Street, Adekunle, Yaba, Lagos and his oral testimony on Oath and treated them as unreliable and incapable of establishing the truth without giving him the opportunity to explain the inconsistency or conflict therein through cross-examination-Ground 2.
3. Whether in the circumstances of this case, the Appellant had fair trial or hearing as guaranteed under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria – Grounds 1 and 2.
4. Whether the sentences passed by the Trial Court on the Appellant was not harsh, severe and excessive as a first offender – Ground 4.
5. Whether from the findings of facts or inferences drawn from the facts of this case, the decision of the Trial Court to convict the Appellant was not unreasonable, unwarranted and unsupportable having regard to the evidence in the matter – Ground 3 and 5.

On its part, the Respondent formulated two issues for determination, namely:
1. Whether the Learned trial Judge was right in convicting the Appellant taking into consideration the testimony of the oral testimonies of the Respondent’s witnesses?
2. Having regard to the evidence placed before the trial Court is it safe to conclude that the Respondent has proved the guilt of Appellant beyond reasonable doubt so as to convict him for the Murder of one Suleiman Lamidi Afolabi?

This is a criminal appeal. Our adversary criminal justice system is accusatorial, the onus is on the prosecution to establish the offences charged beyond reasonable doubt. The lower Court in its judgment held that this standard of proof was attained, consequent upon which it convicted the Appellant. Bearing in mind that the hub of all criminal trials is to prove the offences charged beyond reasonable doubt, an expansive and dilatable issue which captures the hub of all criminal trials will suffice for the determination of the appeal. The sole issue which I find apt in this regard and on the basis of which I will consider the submissions of learned counsel and resolve this appeal is whether the charge against the Appellant was proved beyond reasonable doubt to warrant his conviction for the offences charged. It is on the basis of this issue as crafted by the Court, which is not an alternative to the issues distilled by the parties, but is in fact cumulative with them; since the distensible nature of the issue will accommodate and encompass all the submissions made by the parties, that I will consider and resolve this appeal seamlessly en bloc.

ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION
Whether the charge against the Appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt to warrant his conviction for the offences charged.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT’S COUNSEL
The Appellant contends that the offences charged were not proved beyond reasonable doubt and that the constitutional presumption of innocence under Section 36(5) of the Constitution placed the evidential burden of proving guilt on the prosecution, which burden never shifts. The case of THE STATE vs. DANJUMA (1997) 5 NWLR (PT 506) 512 at 529 was referred to. It was stated that the prosecution had the burden of proving the ingredients of the offences charged beyond reasonable doubt and that where the Court is left in a state of doubt, the burden is not discharged and the defendant will be entitled to an acquittal vide UZOKA vs. FRN (2010) 2 NWLR (PT 1177) 119, JUA vs. THE STATE (2010) 4 NWLR (PT 1184) 217, GABRIEL vs. THE STATE (2010) 6 NWLR (PT 1190) 280, UKE vs. THE STATE (2010) 5 NWLR (PT 1186) 41 and Section 135 (1) and (2) of the Evidence Act.

The three ways or methods of proving the commission of an offence as laid down in the cases of IGABELE vs. THE STATE (2006) 6 NWLR (PT 975) 103, LORI vs. THE STATE (1980) 8-11 SC 81, SAADU DERIBA (DRIVER) vs. THE STATE (2016) LPELR-40345 (CA) were set out and it was asserted that the ingredients of conspiracy were not proved as there was no evidence of common intention towards prosecuting an unlawful purpose. The cases of ADELANI vs. THE STATE (2012) LPELR-8664 (CA), SOWEMIMO vs. THE STATE (2012) 2 NWLR (PT 1284) 386, ODUNEYE vs. THE STATE (2001) 2 NWLR (PT 697) 311 at 324, IKARIA vs. THE STATE (2011) 19 WRN 64, ONUOHA vs. THE STATE (1998) 5 NWLR (PT 548) 118 among other cases were relied upon.

Referring to the essential elements or ingredients to be proved in a charge of murder, the Appellant contended that the said elements which must co-exist were not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The cases of AKINLOLU vs. THE STATE (2015) LPELR-25986, ABOGEDE vs. THE STATE (1996) LPELR-45 (SC), KABAKA vs. THE STATE (2011) ALL FWLR (PT 574) 192 at 202 and OGBA vs. THE STATE (1992) 2 NWLR (PT 222) 164 were cited in support.

While conceding that it is not in doubt that the deceased died on 25th December, 2012, the Appellant maintained that the evidence did not establish that his act caused the death of the deceased and that the act was done with the intention of causing death or grievous bodily harm. It was asserted that the prosecution has to establish the cause of death with certainty and clarity and show that the act of the defendant caused the death. The cases of ONAH vs. THE STATE (1985) 3 NWLR (PT 12) 236, LORI vs. THE STATE (1980) 8-11 SC 81 at 95 and OSADIAYE vs. THE STATE (1977) 4 SC 69 were called in aid.

It was opined that PW1 and PW2, the brother and father of the deceased respectively, were tainted witnesses whose evidence is to be accepted with caution and corroboration, which the lower Court failed to do vide MBENU vs. THE STATE (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 84) 615 and JIMOH ISHOLA vs. THE STATE (1978) 9-11 SC 81.

The Appellant conceded that the prosecution has the discretion on who to call as witness, but stated that vital witnesses must be called to testify and that the failure by the prosecution to call one Mrs. Rukayat Ayoade, who was an eyewitness, was fatal as it left a big gap in the case and amounted to withholding evidence under Section 167 (d) of the Evidence Act. The cases of ADAJE vs. THE STATE (1979) 6-9 SC 18, ONAH vs. THE STATE (supra) and OKONOFUA vs. THE STATE (1981) 6-7 SC 1 were referred to.

It was posited that the cause of death of the deceased was not established with certainty and clarity as the Prosecution failed to tender the post mortem/autopsy report performed on the deceased and that the circumstantial evidence of cause of death relied upon by the lower Court was deficient and based on suspicion, rumours, imagination and loose deduction from the evidence of the PW1 and PW2. It was further stated that no machete, cutlass or bottle was recovered from the Appellant or tendered in evidence on account of which it cannot be said that the death of the deceased was premeditated as there was no prior quarrel or misunderstanding between the Appellant and the deceased, so no act or omission of the Appellant with the knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was a probable consequence, was proved in evidence.

The Appellant contended that he did not have a fair trial on account of the lower Court having rejected his oral testimony on the ground that his extra-judicial statement conflicted or contradicted the testimony, without giving him the opportunity to explain the contradictions and inconsistencies. The Appellant maintained that before the evidence of a witness can be discredited and rejected, his attention must first be called to the portion of the previous statement that is in conflict with his testimony and give him the opportunity to explain the inconsistencies. The cases of ONUBOGU vs. THE STATE (1974) 9 SC at 17-19 and ESANGBEDO vs. THE STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (PT 113) 57 were relied upon. The Appellant further submitted that the failure to tender the extra-judicial statement of the prosecution witnesses deprived him of a fair trial as he could not cross examine them on the inconsistencies in their extra-judicial statements.

The lower Court, it was opined, failed to identify the material contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution, and held that they were not material contradictions that would make the Court to disbelieve the PW1 and PW2. It was maintained that the lower Court gave a discriminatory or unequal treatment to the prosecution and defence which was a breach of the right to fair hearing. The cases of UDO vs. THE STATE (1988) 3 NWLR (PT 88) 316, JOSIAH vs. THE STATE (1985) 1 SC 406 at 416 and UDOFIA vs. THE STATE (1988) 3 NWLR (PT 84) 553 were cited in support.

The Appellant’s submission on evaluation of evidence is that the lower Court did not properly evaluate the evidence in line with the rule in MOGAJI vs. ODOFIN (1978) 4 SC 94, as it failed to weigh the evidence on the imaginary scale of justice. It was maintained that no evidence was adduced which, if believed, can ground a conviction, thus making the decision of the lower Court unreasonable, unwarranted and which cannot be supported by the evidence vide ALI vs. THE STATE (1988) 1 NWLR (PT 68) 1.

The Appellant conclusively submitted that the sentences imposed by the lower Court were harsh, severe and excessive. It was stated that the lower Court did not exercise its discretion judiciously, in considering the terms of imprisonment provided by Sections 231 and 221 of the Criminal Law of Lagos State. The cases of TSAKU vs. THE STATE (1986) 1 NWLR (PT 17) 516, UDO vs. THE STATE (1988) 3 NWLR (PT 82) 316, UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS vs. AIGORO (1985) 1 NWLR (PT 1) 143 at 148 among other cases were referred to

SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL
The Respondent submits that the burden on the prosecution is to prove the offences charged beyond reasonable doubt, not beyond all doubt or all shadow of doubt vide AYINDE vs. THE STATE (2019) LPELR -47835 (SC). The three ways of proving the guilt of a defendant were referred to and it was submitted that the eyewitness testimony of PW1 and PW2, who knew the Appellant before the incident, established the offences charged. The cases of SAMINU vs. THE STATE (2019) LPELR-47622 (SC) and SHURUMO vs. THE STATE (2010) LPELR-3069 (SC) were relied upon.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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The ingredients to prove offences of conspiracy and murder were referred to and it was opined that the evidence of PW1 and PW2 established the ingredients based on their eyewitness testimony. The cases of PETER vs. THE STATE (2015) LPELR-25574 (CA), AFOLABI vs. THE STATE (2013) LPELR-20700 (SC) and BASSEY vs. THE STATE (2019) LPELR-46910 (SC) were cited in support. It was further submitted that the findings of the lower Court, which heard and saw the witnesses, were not perverse and should not be overturned on appeal. The case of THE STATE vs. SHONTO (2019) LPELR-47431 (SC) was called in aid.

It is the contention of the Respondent that the prosecution is not bound to call all witnesses listed in the proof of evidence and that the withholding evidence provision in the Evidence Act is not failing to call a particular witness vide OGUONZEE vs. THE STATE (1998) LPELR-2357 (SC). The failure to call Madam Rukayat Ayoade as a witness, it was asserted, was not fatal. It was further stated that the blood relationship between the PW1 and PW2 and the deceased did not make them tainted witnesses vide IDAGU vs. THE STATE (2018) LPELR-44343 (SC), and that there was no need to treat their evidence with caution.

The Respondent further contended that the evidence of motive to commit a crime is not an essential ingredient in a case of murder, even though motive, where available would serve to strengthen the case. The case of NWEKE vs. THE STATE (2001) LPELR-2119 (SC) was referred to. It was further posited that it is not every minor contradiction in testimony that will make a Court to disbelieve a witness. The contradiction, it was stated, had to be on a material point. The cases of KALU vs. THE STATE (1988) 4 NWLR (PT 90) 503, OCHEMAJE vs. THE STATE (2008) 15 NWLR (PT 1109) 57 and IFEDAYO vs. THE STATE (2018) LPELR-44374 (SC) were relied upon.

On the inconsistency in the extra-judicial statement of the Appellant and his testimony in Court, it was argued that the Appellant had the onus of explaining the inconsistency failing which the Court will regard the evidence as unreliable. The case of ORISA vs. THE STATE (2018) LPELR-43896 (SC) was called in aid. The extra-judicial statements of the PW1 and PW2 were said to be part of the proof of evidence, but that the Appellant did not cross-examine them on any inconsistencies in their evidence and that on the authorities of ESANGBEDO vs. THE STATE (1989) NWLR (PT 113) 57 and OKEKE vs. THE STATE (2016) LPELR-40024 (CA), the extra-judicial statement of a witness is inadmissible save for purpose of cross examination.

The Respondent’s submission on the sentence imposed on the Appellant is that the punishment for murder is a mandatory sentence and that the Court has no discretion to exercise. Section 223 of the Criminal Law of Lagos State and the case of EZEANI vs. FRN (2019) LPELR-46800 (SC) were relied upon. It was posited that the punishment for conspiracy to commit murder by Section 231 for the Criminal Law of Lagos State is a maximum sentence of fourteen years imprisonment and that the lower Court, in exercise of discretion, imposed a sentence of twelve years; and that being a proper exercise of discretion, an appellate Court will not interfere vide EROMOSELE vs. FRN (2018) LPELR-43851 (SC).

APPELLANT’S REPLY ON LAW
In the Reply Brief, the Appellant’s asserts that the lower Court did not properly consider all the essential ingredients of the offence of conspiracy and the guidelines laid down in SHURUMO vs. THE STATE (supra) before convicting. It was maintained that no cutlass, machete or broken bottle was recovered from the Appellant or tendered in evidence and that the lower Court acted on speculation in its decision on the offence of conspiracy. The prosecution, it was asserted, did not creditably discharge its burden on the offences charged, as the evidence of PW1 and PW2 relied upon, was given against the Appellant in bitterness as the said witnesses were on a revenge mission; given that there is nothing on the record to show that it was the act of the Appellant that caused the death of the deceased.

RESOLUTION
The information preferred against the Appellant reads as follows:
“STATEMENT OF OFFENCE
Conspiracy to murder contrary to Section 231 of the Criminal Law of Lagos State 2011.
PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
IBRAHIM OMILADE KAYODE ONI and SHOLA ONI on or about the 25th of December. 2012 2012 [sic] at about 16.00hrs, at No 16, Eyinogun Street, Mafoluku, Oshodi in the Ikeja Judicial Division of Lagos State did conspire to kill one Suleiman Lamidi Afolabi.
STATEMENT OF OFFENCE
Murder Contrary to Section 221 of the Criminal Law of Lagos State 2011.
PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
IBRAHIM OMILADE, KAYODE ONI and SHOLA ONI on or about the 25th of December, 2012 at about 16.00hrs, at No 16, Eyinogun Street, Mafoluku, Oshodi, Ikeja Judicial Division of Lagos State did Murder Suleiman Lamidi Afolabi.”

At nisi prius, it was held that the prosecution discharged the burden on it, consequent upon which the

Appellant was convicted as charged. The Appellant has contended in this appeal that the essential ingredients of the offences charged were not proved beyond reasonable doubt and that the lower Court was wrong to convict. For good measure, the Appellant argues that he did not have a fair trial.

The Appellant is charged in Count One with conspiracy to commit murder. Now, conspiracy as an offence is the agreement by two (not being husband and wife) or more persons, to do or cause to be done an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. In HARUNA vs. STATE (1972) 8 – 9 SC 108 or (1972) LPELR (1356) 1 at 23 – 24, Fatayi-Williams, JSC (as he then was) stated as follows:
“Conspiracy as an offence is nowhere defined in the Criminal Code….It means under common law, an agreement of two or more persons to do an act which it is an offence to agree to do. The very plot is an act in itself, and the act of each of the parties promise against promise, actus contra actum, capable of being enforced if lawful, is punishable if it is for a criminal object or the use of criminal means; (See Archbold 37th Edition paragraph 4051). In short, it is the agreement to do an act which it is an offence to agree to do which constitutes the offence of conspiracy under the Criminal Code.”
The actual agreement alone constitutes the offence of conspiracy and it is not necessary to prove that the act had in fact been committed. Actual commission of the offence may however show the common intention formed before the offence was committed and therefore be proof of the conspiracy: JOHN vs. THE STATE (2016) LPELR (40103) 1 at 10. The offence of conspiracy is rarely or seldom proved by direct evidence but by circumstantial evidence and inference from certain proved acts. This is so because persons who agree to do an illegal act or achieve a legitimate end by illegal means do not invite a witness or witnesses to attest to their agreement. See JOHN vs. THE STATE (supra) at 10, OBIAKOR vs. THE STATE (2002) 36 WRN 1 at 10, EGUNJOBI vs. F.R.N. (2001) 53 WRN 20 at 54 and THE STATE vs. OSOBA (2004) 21 WRN 113.
Since by its very nature, the offence of conspiracy consists in the meeting of minds for a criminal purpose, whereby the minds proceed from a secret intention to the overt act of mutual consultation and agreement, the offence can be proved through inference drawn from the surrounding circumstances. See SULE vs. THE STATE (2009) 17 NWLR (PT 1169) 33 and ADEJOBI vs. THE STATE (2011) LPELR (97) 1 at 36. The circumstantial evidence on which a successful conviction for conspiracy can be predicated is evidence not of the fact in issue, but of other facts from which the fact in issue can be inferred. The evidence in this connection must be of such quality that irresistibly compels to make an inference as to the guilt of the accused person. See ODUNEYE vs. THE STATE (2001) 13 WRN 88.
The general principle of law is that a charge of conspiracy is proved either by leading direct evidence in proof of the common criminal design or it can be proved by inference derived from the commission of the substantive offence. See LAWSON vs. THE STATE (1975) 4 SC 115 at 123, AKANO vs. A-G BENDEL STATE (1988) 2 NWLR (PT 201) 232, AMACHREE vs. NIGERIAN ARMY (2003) 3 NWLR (PT 807) 256 at 281 and NWOSU vs. THE STATE (2004) 15 NWLR (PT 897) 466. The focal point of the authorities is that for the offence of conspiracy to be established there must exist a common criminal design or agreement by two or more persons to do or omit to do an act criminally. Since the gist of the offence of conspiracy is embedded in the agreement or plot between the parties, it is rarely capable of direct proof; it is invariably an offence that is inferentially deduced from the acts of the parties thereto which are focused towards the realization of their common or mutual criminal purpose. See KAZEEM vs. THE STATE (2009) 29 WRN 43 and SALAWU vs. THE STATE (2010) LPELR (9106) 1 at 35-36.

At page 185 of the Records, the lower Court stated that it would first examine the substantive count of murder and if made out, infer and deduce proof of the offence of conspiracy therefrom. This the lower Court did, and having held that the substantive offence of murder was proved, it equally held at pages 197-198 of the Records that the conspiracy charged was also proved. The implication of the approach of the lower Court, is that if the Appellant succeeds in his appeal against his conviction for murder, then by parity of reasoning or analogous reasoning, the conviction for conspiracy will equally not stand. I will follow this approach of the lower Court by first considering the substantive offence of murder.

The learned counsel on both sides of the divide have redacted the essential ingredients to establish in a charge for murder, id est,
1. That the deceased is dead
2. That the death of the deceased is the result of the act or omission of the accused person (the Appellant herein)
3. That the act or omission of the accused person (Appellant) which has caused the death of the deceased is intentional with full knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm is the probable consequence.
See ILODIGWE vs. THE STATE (2012) LPELR (9342) 1 and UWAGBOE vs. THE STATE (2008) LPELR (3444) 1 at 29. In order to secure a conviction for murder, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the death of the deceased was caused directly or indirectly by the act of the defendant. The prosecution has to establish not only that the act of the defendant caused the death of the deceased but that in actual fact the deceased died as a result of the act of the defendant to the exclusion of all other possibilities.

It is settled law that where a person is attacked with a lethal weapon and he dies on the spot or shortly afterwards, it is reasonable to infer that the injury inflicted on him caused the death. See EDOHO vs. THE STATE (2010) LPELR (1015) 1 at 18-19.

From the disceptation in this matter, there is no contention with regard to the first ingredient. It is agreed on all sides that the deceased, Suleiman Lamidi Afolabi is dead. The contention is with regards to the second and third elements. In its judgment the lower Court held that the prosecution established the charge beyond reasonable doubt.

After due consideration and evaluation of the evidence with regard to the second and third elements, the lower Court conclusively held as follows at pages 196-197 of the Records:
“The evidence of PW1 and PW2 shows clearly that the Defendants and some other persons went to meet the deceased and PW1 outside their house and attacked them and that they inflicted cutlass cuts on the deceased. They testified that the deceased was rushed to the hospital where he was pronounced dead. The only inference that can therefore be drawn is that the death of the deceased was accused [sic] by the acts of the Defendants.
The final question is whether the act or omission of the Defendants which caused the death of the deceased was intentional with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence. On this, it is my view that anybody who goes to another and stabs or cuts him with a cutlass must have intended to cause the person stabbed or cut death or he knew that grievous harm was a probable consequence of his act. It is therefore my view that the acts of the Defendants was intentional with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence.
Based upon all that has been said above, the Court would hold that the prosecution has proved the count of murder beyond reasonable doubt against each of the Defendants. The Defendants are pronounced guilty on the charge of murder.”

I have insightfully considered the evidence on record and I am not in any doubt whatsoever that the lower Court properly evaluated the same and correctly believed the eyewitness account of the PW1 and PW2 as to what transpired on that fateful Christmas day of 25th December 2012, in holding that the offence of murder was proved beyond reasonable doubt. I am mindful of the Appellant’s contention that on account of the blood relationship between the deceased and the PW1 and PW2; that they were tainted witnesses and the lower Court should have accepted their evidence with caution.
Undoubtedly, the PW1 is the brother, while the PW2 is the father of the deceased. But this blood relationship does not ineluctably make them tainted witnesses. The accepted definition of a tainted witness is a person who is either an accomplice or who by the evidence he gives may and could be regarded as having some personal purpose to serve. It is well settled that the fact that there is a blood relationship between a victim and the prosecution witness is not sufficient, in itself, to make him a tainted witness whose evidence is to be treated with caution and is unreliable unless corroborated. See ADETOLA vs. THE STATE (1992) 4 NWLR (PT 235) 267, EGWUMI vs. THE STATE (2013) 13 NWLR (PT 1372) 525, OMOTOLA vs. THE STATE (2009) LPELR-2663 (SC), OMOTOLA vs. THE STATE (2009) 7 NWLR (PT 1139) 148 and UZIM vs. THE STATE (2019) LPELR (48983) 1 at 30-32. The lower Court was therefore right when it held at pages 192-193 of the Records that the PW1 and PW2 were not tainted witnesses and having found their testimony credible accorded weight and value to the same.

The Appellant further argued that the prosecution’s failure to call one Mrs. Rukayat Ayoade, the owner of the beer parlour, where they were revelling on the fateful day is fatal to the case of the prosecution. It seems to me that the law is now firmly settled beyond peradventure that there is no obligation on the prosecution to call a host of witnesses, provided that the material witnesses are called. What really matters is not the number of witnesses called, but the quality of evidence adduced. See OKONOFUA vs. THE STATE (1979) 6-9 SC 18, ALABI vs. THE STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (PT 307) 511, OLAYINKA vs. THE STATE (2007) 9 NWLR (PT 1040) 561 at 576 and 584 and ADEDARA vs. THE STATE (2009) LPELR (8194) 1 at 76. As stated by Tobi, JCA (as he then was) in his usual fecund style offer vid prose in AKINYEMI vs. THE STATE (1996) 6 NWLR (PT 607) 449 at 466:
“The prosecution has no duty to call a village or community of witnesses to prove the charge of murder or any other charge. It is not the number of witnesses that interests a Court of law, but whether the ingredients of the offence are proved.”
As a matter of fact, I do not think that the Appellant can be heard to argue that a particular witness was not called by the prosecution as there was nothing stopping the Appellant from calling the witnesses in his defence: OCHIBA vs. THE STATE (2011) 17 NWLR (PT 1277) 663 at 695 and OKOROJI vs. THE STATE (2002) 5 NWLR (PT 759) 21.

Generally, in criminal cases, the crucial issue is not ordinarily whether or not the offence was committed. More often than not, the controversy always rages over the identification of the person or persons alleged as the actual perpetrators of the offence charged: NDIDI vs. THE STATE (2007) 13 NWLR (PT 1052) 633 at 651.The evidence on record is that the Appellant and the deceased live on the same street. The PW1 and PW2 who gave eyewitness testimony of what transpired knew the Appellant before the day of the incident, so there can be no question of their identification of the Appellant as one of the culprits. See THE STATE vs. SALAWU (2011) LPELR (8252) 1 at 49-50 and ATTAH vs. THE STATE (2010) 10 NWLR (PT. 1201) 190 at 225-226.

It is trite law that a person intends the natural consequences of his action and where there is an intention to cause grievous bodily harm and death results, then the defendant must be held culpable for the offence of murder. See NWOKEARU vs. THE STATE (2013) LPELR (20642) 1 at 36. In order to determine whether a defendant really had an intention to murder, the criteria which have been laid down by law include:
1. The nature of the weapon used, which has to be a lethal weapon in the sense that it is a weapon which can be deadly or cause death;
2. The part of the body which was brutalized by the lethal weapon, and;
3. The extent of proximity of the victim with the lethal weapon used by the accused person.
See IDEN vs. THE STATE (1994) 8 NWLR (PT 365) 719.
In this matter, the evidence discloses that the Appellant and his cohorts had attacked the deceased with machete and cutlass and inflicted several cuts and wounds on him which ultimately led to his death. In ONYE vs. THE STATE (1994) 10 SC 81, the apex Court held that every man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his deliberate act and that a knife is an instrument which when used as the appellant used it in the said case (as in this case, machete and cutlass), can cause death or grievous bodily harm. Equally, in NWOKEARU vs. THE STATE (supra), the appellant stabbed the deceased in the stomach with a knife and the Supreme Court held that it showed an intention by the appellant to cause grievous harm to the deceased. Also in EJEKA vs. THE STATE (2003) 7 NWLR (PT 819) 408 where the appellant stabbed the deceased with a jack knife in the heart, the apex Court held that it manifested the appellants intention to cause grievous injury to the deceased.
In defining the intention that would establish guilt in criminal law, Ngwuta, JSC stated as follows in NWOKEARU vs. THE STATE (supra) at 27 – 28:
“One may ask: What is ‘intention’ from which the word ‘intentional’ is derived? Intention is the purpose or design with which an act is performed. It is the foreknowledge of the act coupled with the desire to do the act. The foreknowledge and desire form the cause of the act in so far as they fulfil themselves through the operation of the will.
An act is intentional if, and in so far as it exists in idea before it exists in the realm of facts; the idea realising itself in the fact because of the desire by which it is accompanied. See Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition Reprint 2009, page 2394.
In criminal law, to involve guilt, accused must have done or omitted something contrary to law as criminal responsibility for conduct depends on intention. See Quinn v. Lethem (1901) AC 491, 533 where Lord Lindley said:
‘It would revolutionise criminal law to say that criminal responsibility for conduct never depends on intention.’ ‘INTENTIO MEA IMPONIT NAMIEN OPERI MEO’ – My intention gives a name to my action.”
In his contribution, Ariwoola, JSC stated as follows at pages 41 – 42:
“The one point in the instant case is the intention, which it is necessary to impute to the appellant in order to find him guilty of the crime of murder.
The following had been proposed in answer to the above question of general public importance.
‘(1) Before an act can be murder, it must be ‘aimed at someone’ and must in addition be an act committed with one of the following intentions, the test of which is always subjective to the actual accused person.
(i) The intention to cause death;
(ii) the intention to cause grievous bodily harm, that is, really serious injury;
(iii) where the accused person knows that there is a serious risk that death or grievous bodily harm will ensue from his acts, and commits those acts deliberately and without lawful excuse, the intention to expose a potential victim to that risk as the result of those acts. It does not matter in such circumstances whether the accused desires those consequences to ensue or not and in none of these cases, does it matter that the act and the intention were aimed at a potential victim other than the one who succumbed.
See: Director of Public Prosecution vs. Smith (1960) 2 ALL ER 161.
2. Without an intention of one of these three types, the mere fact that the accused conduct is done in the knowledge that grievous bodily harm is likely or highly likely to ensue from his conduct is not by itself enough to convert a homicide into the crime of murder.’
See; Hyam Vs Director of Public Prosecution (1974) 2 ALL ER 41 at 43, 56 per Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone.
In the instant case, from the type of instrument used (a dagger) and the particular part of the body of the deceased stabbed by the appellant, that is on the left side of the chest where the heart of the body is said to lay, there is no doubt that the appellant, at the very least, intended to cause grievous bodily harm resulting into serious injury that was most likely to cause death of his victim.”
I kowtow.

I am not enthused by the Appellant’s contention that no machete or cutlass was recovered from him. The evidence is that the Appellant was not arrested at the locus criminis on the day of the incident, so the fact that no machete was recovered from the Appellant when he was later arrested does not impact negatively on the eyewitness testimony of the PW1 and PW2, neither does it exculpate him from the consequences of his action as found and held by the lower Court which had the unparalleled advantage of seeing, hearing and observing the witnesses and making deductions as to their credibility from their body language. The lower Court found the PW1 and PW2 as credible witnesses. When it comes to the issue of credibility, an appellate Court is handicapped. This is because accessing the credibility of witnesses is the pre-eminent duty of a trial Court, and there is a presumption that its findings are right and correct until the contrary is shown: UZIM vs. THE STATE (supra) at 32.

I have not lost sight of the Appellant’s argument that he did not have a fair trial because the extra-judicial statements of the prosecution witnesses were not tendered so that the Appellant could cross examine them on the inconsistences in the said statement and their testimony in Court. With respect, this is chop sense and logic. The extra-judicial statement of a prosecution witness is not ordinarily admissible in evidence except for the purpose of cross examination. The Appellant cross examined the PW1 and PW2 and did not call for their extra-judicial statements in order to cross examine them on it so as to discredit them based on any inconsistency vide OKEKE vs. THE STATE (supra) and ESANGBEDO vs. THE STATE (supra). The Appellant further made platitudes about contradiction in their testimony without highlighting and specific contradiction. The lower Court rightly held at pages 195-196 of the Records that the extra-judicial statements of the prosecution witnesses not having been tendered in evidence was not legal evidence and cannot be acted upon by a Court. The extra-judicial statement of a defendant is usually tendered in evidence at the trial as part of the investigation activities. The fact that the Appellant’s extra-judicial statement was tendered in evidence and the Appellant did not take advantage of the provisions of the law to tender the extra-judicial statements of the prosecution witnesses in order to discredit them, cannot by any stretch of imagination be construed to imply that the lower Court did not afford the Appellant a fair trial.

After considering the evidence on the cold printed records with the finery of a toothcomb, the evidence, as found by the lower Court, established and proved the ingredients of the offence of murder beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the prosecution discharged the burden of proof in that regard. See FASHEUN vs. A-G FEDERATION (2008) ALL FWLR (PT 423) 1396 at 1411.
The lower Court having found the substantive offence of murder proved inferred conspiracy to commit murder from the proof of the substantive offence. Hear the lower Court at pages 197-198 of the Records:
“I will now look at the 2nd count of conspiracy to commit murder. In BABATUNDE ADELANI v. THE STATE (2012) LPELR-8664(CA) which was relied upon by the defence Counsel the Court of Appeal stated that:
Conspiracy simply means the meeting of the minds to carry out a lawful purpose in an unlawful way. In effect the meeting of the two or more minds is to commit an offence. In law it takes at least two minds to meet and the two minds must really meet with a common intention and common purpose. The ordinary meeting of the minds does not fuel the offence of conspiracy without the corresponding or associated element of crime commission. Therefore in a charge of conspiracy, the prosecution has the burden to prove not only the inchoate or rudimentary nature of the offence but also meeting of at least two criminal minds with a common intention and purpose to commit a particular offence or offences… The law is trite that for the purposes of convicting on conspiracy, direct and distinct evidence though most desirable is not invariably indispensable. It is open to the trial judge to infer conspiracy from the fact of doing things towards a common and [sic] by the execution of a planned and premeditated common intention and common purpose. This is because the crime of conspiracy is usually hatched with utmost secrecy and the law leads direct and distinct evidence. See NWOSU vs. STATE (2004) 15 NWLR (PT. 897) 466; ODUNEYE vs. STATE (2001) 2 NWLR (PT.697) 311 AND OBIAKOR vs. STATE (2002) 10 NWLR (PT. 77) 612.
Here from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses which the Court has accepted, it is clear that the Defendants went to the house of the deceased or its environs to fight him and PW1 with cutlasses and that in the course of said fight the deceased was cut to death with cutlass. In my view by going to the scene of the incident as a group and being armed with cutlasses it can be inferred that the Defendants had formed a common [sic] to go and prosecute the unlawful purpose of attacking people with cutlasses. Definitely the crime of murder committed in the prosecution of this unlawful purpose was a natural consequence of their act. The Court will therefore hold that the offence of conspiracy to commit murder has been proved against the Defendant.
Based on the above findings, the Court holds that the prosecution has proved the charge of conspiracy to commit murder beyond reasonable doubt against the Defendants and they are pronounced guilty in respect of this charge.”
Just like the lower Court, I equally inferentially deduce from the acts of the Appellant and his cohorts which resulted in the death of the deceased, that the said acts were focused towards the realization of their common or mutual criminal purpose: KAZEEM vs. THE STATE (supra), SALAWU vs. THE STATE (supra) and JOHN vs. THE STATE (supra).
In splice, the essential ingredients of the offence of conspiracy, id est, the agreement between two or more persons, in the sense of the meeting of the minds, to carry out an unlawful or illegal act, which is an offence. The bare agreement to commit an offence suffices and the actions showing that the persons involved were engaged in accomplishing a common object or objective; see KAZA vs. THE STATE (2008) LPELR (1683) 1 at 56-57, ADEKUNLE vs. THE STATE (1989) LPELR (108) 1 at 22 and ABDULLAHI vs. THE STATE (2008) LPELR (28) 1 at 20, was established by inference from the surrounding circumstances of the manner in which the deceased was killed: SULE vs. THE STATE (supra) and ADEJOBI vs. THE STATE (supra).

In order to come full circle, the Appellant contended that the punishment imposed on him was excessive. By Section 231 of the Criminal Law of Lagos State, the maximum punishment upon conviction for the offence of conspiracy to commit murder is fourteen years imprisonment. The lower Court imposed a sentence of twelve years. Now, the general rule is that sentencing is at the discretion of the trial Court, provided the discretion is exercised judicially and judiciously within the law. An appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the lower Court unless the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive in the circumstances or wrong in principle. See ABIODUN vs. FRN (2018) LPELR (43838) 1 at 24-26, OMOKUWAJO vs. FRN (2013) LPELR (20184) 1 at 32 and IDAM vs. FRN (2020) LPELR (49564) 1 at 9-10. It is my firm view that the sentence of twelve years for an offence attracting a maximum sentence of fourteen years improvement is a proper exercise of discretion and there is no reason for an appellate Court to interfere.

In conclusion, the lower Court rightly held that the substantive charge of murder was proved beyond reasonable doubt and was correct to inferentially deduce therefrom that the count of conspiracy was equally proved beyond reasonable doubt. See GABRIEL OGOGOVIE vs. THE STATE (2016) LPELR (40501) 1 at 23-26. Therefore the issue for determination as distilled by the Court is resolved against the Appellant. This appeal is lacking in merit, it fails and it is hereby dismissed. The decision of the lower Court embodying the conviction and sentence imposed on the Appellant is hereby affirmed.
Appeal Dismissed.

JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.: I agree with the comprehensive judgment prepared by my learned brother, Ugochukwu Anthony Ogakwu, J.C.A

GABRIEL OMONIYI KOLAWOLE, J.C.A.: I have been privileged to read in draft, the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, JCA in which he adjudged the instant appeal as lacking in merit.

I agree with analysis of the issues raised and of the regulations he made in coming to the decision.
I too dismiss the appeal.

Appearances:

Olawale Kareem, Esq. For Appellant(s)

A. O. Idowu, Esq., Director, Ministry of Justice, Lagos State For Respondent(s)

Appearances:

Olawale Kareem, Esq. For Appellant(s)

A. O. Idowu, Esq., Director, Ministry of Justice, Lagos State For Respondent(s)