NZE BENSON OBIALOR & ANOR v. JOSIAH UCHENDU & ORS
(2013)LCN/6235(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 24th day of May, 2013
CA/OW/345/2011
JUSTICES
JOHN INYANG OKORO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
PHILOMENA EKPE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
HARUNA S. TSAMMANI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. NZE BENSON OBIALOR
2. AJA JACOB
For themselves and as representing the people of Amaaku, Isa Umuakwua in Isuikwuato Local Government Area of Abia State. Appellant(s)
AND
1. JOSIAH UCHENDU
2. OGBONNA ORJI
3. MONDAY ORJI
4. ANTHONY UCHENDU
For themselves and as representing the people of Ndi Ikwegbu, Isa Umuakwua in Isuikwuato Local Government Area of Abia State. Respondent(s)
RATIO
ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION IN AN APPEAL
It has been held in a plethora of decided cases that an issue for determination in an appeal must not only arise from and relate to the grounds of appeal filed, and no more, but also must be such a proposition of law or fact or both so cogent, weighty and compelling that a decision on it in favour of a party to the appeal will entitle him to the judgment of the court. See CHIEF ONWUKA KALU v. CHIEF VICTOR ODILI & ORS (1992) 6 SCNJ 76; CHUKWUMA OKWUDILI UGA v. AMAMCHUKWU OBIEKWE & ANOR (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 99) 566; STANDARD CONSOLIDATED DREDGING & CONSTRUCTION COMPANY v. KATON-CREST NIG. LTD (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 44) 791; OKOYE v. NCR Co. LTD (1991) 6 NWLR (pt. 199) 501; IDIKA & ORS v. ERISI & ORS. (1988) 2 NWLR (pt. 78) 563.
It is well settled that issues formulated by a party for determination in an appeal which do not arise out of the grounds of appeal will be deemed irrelevant and will not be countenanced in the determination of the appeal. It is not open to a respondent to formulate issues for determination on an appeal in total disregard of the grounds of appeal. See GENERAL OIL LTD v. CHIEF OGUNYADE (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 501) 613; CHINWUBA v. ALADE (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt.507) 85; OGBUANYINYA & 5 ORS. v. OBI OKUDO & 2 ORS (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 551.
Having said that, the truth of the matter is that the two issues formulated by the Respondents are incompetent having not been based on, related to or arisen from any of the grounds of appeal. Accordingly, the two issues and the arguments made there from are hereby struck out. Again the Appellants have formulated their three issues from grounds 1, 2, and 5 only. No issues have been formulated from grounds 3 and 4. It is trite that any ground of appeal from which no issue has been formulated is deemed abandoned. Accordingly ground 3 and 4 in the notice of appeal are hereby struck out. I shall therefore determine this appeal based on the three issues submitted by the Appellant which I intend to resolve together since they are interrelated. PER OKORO, J.C.A.
THE OBJECT OF PLEADINGS
The object of pleadings is to enable the adverse party and the court know the case before the date of hearing. Accordingly, once the pleadings are settled, parties cannot move in or out of them with reckless abandon, unless by the process of amendment. See SAMUEL ISHENO v. JULIUS BERGER NIGERIA PLC (2008) 6 NWLR (pt. 1084) 582, (2008) 2-3 S.C (pt. 11) 78. PER OKORO, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT AN AMENDMENT TO THE PLEADINGS CAN BE MADE AT ANY STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
I need to emphasize that although by the Rules, an amendment to the pleadings can be made at any stage of the proceedings, different considerations apply depending on whether the amendment is being sought before or after the close of evidence by the parties. At the pre-trial stage, an amendment can be made by the leave of court. The parties are not restricted to the number of times an amendment can be made at that stage. But after the trial has commenced, only two amendments can be allowed. Generally, before the close of evidence, such amendments are allowed to make such evidence as may be called admissible as any evidence on an issue which was not pleaded or a claim not on record is strictly inadmissible. See CHIEF J. A. Y. IMONIKHE & ANOR v. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BENDEL STATE & ORS (1992) NWLR (pt. 248) 396; ANIEMEKA EMEGOKWE v. JAMES OKADIGBO (1973) 1 ALL NLR (Pt. 1) 379; OBIJURU v. OZIMS (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.6) 167.
However, once the calling of evidence has been concluded, any amendment of the pleading or statement of claim or defence, can be justified or allowed only on the premises that evidence in support of it is already on record. Therefore, it is necessary and in the interest of justice to allow the amendment in order to make the pleading or the claim accord with the evidence already on record. In OKOLO v. UNION BANK OF NIGERIA LTD. (1999) 10 NWLR (pt. 623) 429, the Supreme Court held that although parties are bound by their pleadings, a party may amend his pleadings before the end of hearing or judgment and sometimes on appeal. See also OGUMA INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR WEST AFRICA (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 20) 124; SALAMI v. OKE (1987) 14 NWLR (pt. 63) 1; EZEANI v. ONWORDI (1986) 4 NWLR (pt. 33) 27; KATE ENTERPRISES LTD v. DAEWOO NIG LTD (1985) 2 NWLR (pt. 5) 116.
Generally, from a preponderance of judicial opinion, it is well settled that an amendment of pleadings should be allowed unless:
1. It will entail injustice to the respondent
2. The applicant is acting mala fide or
3. By his blander, the applicant has done some injury to the respondent which cannot be compensated by costs or otherwise. See CHIEF OJAH & ORS CHIEF EYO OGBOIN & ORS (1976) 4 SC 87; TILDESLAY v. HARPER (1878) 10 CH. D 393 at 396; OGUNTIMEHIN v. GUBERE (1964) 1 ALL NLR 176 at 179.
Let me add also that any amendment of the pleadings in a case made or ordered at any stage of the proceedings before judgment or even made in an appeal, dates back to the date when the pleadings were originally filed. This means that once pleadings are amended, what stood before the amendment is no longer material before the court and no longer defines the issues to be tried. See ARCHBISHOP PETER YARIYOK JATAU V. ALHAJI MANSUR AHMED & ORS (2003) 1 SC (Pt. 11) 118, (2003) 4 NWLR (Pt. 811) 498; ENIGBOKAN v. A. I. I. CO NIG. LTD (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt. 348) 1 at 15 – 16. PER OKORO, J.C.A.
JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.C.A (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellants commenced this suit at the lower court on 28/5/10 with their writ of summons, statement of claim, written deposition of Nze Benson Obialor and list of witnesses. By a motion dated 20/8/10 but filed on 23/8/10, the Appellants applied to amend their statement of claim by bringing in a 3rd claimant and other amendments. By a ruling made on 11/10/10, the learned trial judge granted the amendment of the statement of claim save the request to bring in a 3rd claimant. Again, by a motion on notice dated the 21st October, 2011 and filed on 26th October, 2011, the Appellants sought to further amend their statement of claim. The further amendment is to bring in a witness and a document annexed to the affidavit in support said to be a judgment of the District Court of Isuikwuato as well as new facts which emerged after the 1st Claimant had testified.
The said motion on notice was argued on 9th December, 2011 and the Respondents opposed the said application having filed a counter affidavit to that effect. The learned trial judge, after hearing both parties on the motion, made an instant ruling refusing the application for lacking in merit. The said Ruling was delivered on 9th December, 2011 as contained on pages 70 -71 of the record of appeal.
Dissatisfied with the said Ruling, the Appellant filed notice of appeal on 16th December, 2011. The notice of appeal alluded to above contains five (5) grounds of appeal out of which the learned counsel for the Appellants, Chief Nnamdi D. Uchendu has distilled three issues for the determination of this appeal. The five issues are contained on page 2 of the brief of the Appellants which was adopted by learned counsel for the Appellants on 8/4/13 when the appeal was heard. They are:
“(a) Whether the Learned Trial Judge was right in refusing the Appellants’ application to further amend their statement of claim on the ground that the Appellants ought to have determined from the onset what to aver in their pleadings and nor to omit facts and later seek to bring them in by an amendment and turn the Court’s Record into a patch work. (Ground 1)
(b) Whether the learned trial judge was right to refuse the Appellants’ application to further amend their statement of claim on the ground that the Appellants had previously been granted leave to amend their statement of claim relating to the Traditional History of the Appellants’ People. (Ground 2).
(c) Whether the learned trial judge was right not to look at the document sought to be introduced by the further amendment of the statement of claim and to base his decision to refuse the amendment sought on the conjecture that the said document was the same as the document previously sought unsuccessfully to be tendered in the course of proceedings by the Appellants. (Ground 5).”
In the brief settled on behalf of the Respondents by Chika Odoemenam Esq, two issues are distilled. The issues are as follows:
“i) whether the appellants’ interlocutory appeal, as constituted, is not incompetent for want of leave to appeal.
ii) whether the appellants have adduced enough grounds to justify this Honourable Court to interfere with the exercise of discretion of the trial court refusing the application of (sic) amendment.
Before I take any further step in this appeal, I wish to observe that the learned counsel for the Respondents has formulated two issues which I cannot find expression on any ground of appeal contained in the notice of appeal. And for the avoidance of doubt, I hereby reproduce the five grounds of appeal, without their particulars. They are:
“GROUND 1
That the learned trial judge erred in law when he held that a party to a suit must from the onset, determine what to aver in his pleadings and not to omit facts and later seek to bring them in by an amendment which may turn the court’s record into a patch work by which holding the learned trial judge came to a wrong decision of refusing Appellants’ application to further amend their statement of claim.
GROUND 2
That the learned trial judge erred in law by refusing the Appellants’ application to further amend their statement of claim on the ground that the Appellants had on a previous occasion, been granted leave to amend their statement to the traditional history of the Appellants’ people.
GROUND 3
That the learned trial judge erred in law by refusing the Appellants’ application for a further amendment of the statement of claim on the ground that facts sought to be introduced by the amendment sought relating to the boundaries of the land in dispute would overreach the defendants: the 1st witness called by the appellants – the 1st Appellant having testified and cross – examined.
GROUND 4
That the learned trial judge erred in law and ignored the provision of Order 36 rule 1 of Abia State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules which provides that a party may not amend more than twice during the hearing and by refusing Appellants’ application to further amend their statement of claim the 1st application for an amendment made during the trial of this case.
GROUND 5
That the learned trial judge erred in law by refusing to examine or look at the document sought to be introduced by the further amendment of the statement of claim sought by the Appellants – to find out that it was not the document earlier on tendered and marked “rejected” in the course of trial and thus wrongfully refused the Appellants’ application for an amendment of the statement of claim on the ground that the said document is the same as the one previously tendered but marked rejected in the course of hearing.”
It is thus crystal clear that when the above five grounds of appeal are placed vis-a-vis the two issues formulated by the learned counsel for the Respondents, the said two issues have no bearing at all with any of the grounds of appeal listed above. It has been held in a plethora of decided cases that an issue for determination in an appeal must not only arise from and relate to the grounds of appeal filed, and no more, but also must be such a proposition of law or fact or both so cogent, weighty and compelling that a decision on it in favour of a party to the appeal will entitle him to the judgment of the court. See CHIEF ONWUKA KALU v. CHIEF VICTOR ODILI & ORS (1992) 6 SCNJ 76; CHUKWUMA OKWUDILI UGA v. AMAMCHUKWU OBIEKWE & ANOR (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 99) 566; STANDARD CONSOLIDATED DREDGING & CONSTRUCTION COMPANY v. KATON-CREST NIG. LTD (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 44) 791; OKOYE v. NCR Co. LTD (1991) 6 NWLR (pt. 199) 501; IDIKA & ORS v. ERISI & ORS. (1988) 2 NWLR (pt. 78) 563.
It is well settled that issues formulated by a party for determination in an appeal which do not arise out of the grounds of appeal will be deemed irrelevant and will not be countenanced in the determination of the appeal. It is not open to a respondent to formulate issues for determination on an appeal in total disregard of the grounds of appeal. See GENERAL OIL LTD v. CHIEF OGUNYADE (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 501) 613; CHINWUBA v. ALADE (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt.507) 85; OGBUANYINYA & 5 ORS. v. OBI OKUDO & 2 ORS (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 551.
Having said that, the truth of the matter is that the two issues formulated by the Respondents are incompetent having not been based on, related to or arisen from any of the grounds of appeal. Accordingly, the two issues and the arguments made there from are hereby struck out. Again the Appellants have formulated their three issues from grounds 1, 2, and 5 only. No issues have been formulated from grounds 3 and 4. It is trite that any ground of appeal from which no issue has been formulated is deemed abandoned. Accordingly ground 3 and 4 in the notice of appeal are hereby struck out. I shall therefore determine this appeal based on the three issues submitted by the Appellant which I intend to resolve together since they are interrelated.
On the 1st issue, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that contrary to the decision of the learned trial judge on this issue, the law is that courts are enjoined to liberally grant applications for an amendment save where to do so would occasion a miscarriage of justice or overreach the other party. It is his further submission that judicial policy from pristine time has leaned in favour of granting applications for amendment on the principle that courts do not exist for the purpose of discipline concerning mistakes made by parties in the course of presenting their case but to decide in accordance with their rights, citing the cases of CROPPER v. SMITH (1884) 26 CH. D 700 at 710 and FOLORUNSHO v. WAEC (2011) ALL FWLR (Pt.556) 422 at 485. Finally on this issue, it was submitted that the holding by the learned trial judge that the appellants ought to aver everything that needs to be averred in his pleadings from the onset, in order to avert a recourse to an amendment is misconceived in law.
On the second issue, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned trial judge did not say that the facts sought to be introduced in the further amendment were the same as those introduced in the previous amendment and yet he held that the application to further amend the statement of claim was designed to overreach the Respondents because no reason was given by the Appellants in their supporting affidavit why they did not incorporate the facts sought to be introduced in the further amendment in the previous application for the amendment of the statement of claim. Learned counsel further submitted that the overreaching effect of an application for amendment in a legal process does not lie in how many times the application is brought on a particular issue but on the effect the amendment even if the application was brought only once, relying on the cases of IFEDOLUN LOCAL GOVERNMENT v. BELAMO & ORS (2005) ALL FWLR (Pt. 420) 710-717 and YUSUF v. ADEGOKE (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1045) 332 at 370. Learned counsel then urged this court to find from the undisputed facts deducible from the record of appeal that there was no argument before the learned trial judge that the core of the Respondents’ case was anticipated by the amendment with a view to circumventing the same or destroying the fulcrum of the Respondent’s case.
On the 3rd issue, he submitted that the learned trial judge did not look at the document sought to be introduced by the amendment which the learned trial judge described as “proceedings now being pleaded.” That it was a mistake for the court to equate the judgment of the Supreme Court in Appeal No. SC/253/1973 with the judgment of Isuikwuato District Court sought to be introduced. He submitted finally that the learned trial judge, in basing his decision on the conjecture that the proceeding now being pleaded had, unsuccessfully been tendered previously, erred in law because the court deals with only issues and matters that are before it and not to speculate or assume things that have not appeared before it for consideration. Two cases were cited in support as follows: TONY ANTHONY NIG LTD v. NDIC (2011) ALL FWLR (Pt. 598) 909 at EUPETO v. WANOGHO (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt.245) 1191. He then urged this court to resolve the three issues in favour of the Appellants.
The learned counsel for the Respondents replied to the argument of the Appellants on their issue 3 only. According to him, the document sought to be tendered and rejected by the lower court was in existence, known to the Appellants and equally in their possession when their pleadings were amended the first time. He submitted that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Appeal No. SC.253/73 rejected was an appeal on the District Court judgment sought to be brought on board. According to learned counsel, the two cases are the same and ought not to be allowed because once a document is rejected by a court; it cannot be of any use in the same proceedings and cannot come back under any guise. He relies on the cases of ITA v. EKPEYONG (2001) 1 NWLR (Pt. 695) 587 and BABALOLA v. ALADE JANA (2001) 12 NWLR (Pt.728) 597 at 608. He urged this court to resolve this issue in favour of the Respondents. The learned counsel for the Respondents did not however file any response as regards the 1st and 2nd issues distilled and argued by the appellants.
By order 36 Rule 1 of the Abia State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2009, a party may amend his original process and/or pleadings with leave of the judge at any time before the close of pretrial and not more than twice during the trial. By rule 2 thereof, application to amend may be made to a judge and such application shall be supported by an exhibit of the proposed amendment and may be allowed upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as may be just. By the Rules of the Abia State High Court alluded to above, a party may with the leave of court, amend his pleadings after it has been filed in court. The object of pleadings is to enable the adverse party and the court know the case before the date of hearing. Accordingly, once the pleadings are settled, parties cannot move in or out of them with reckless abandon, unless by the process of amendment. See SAMUEL ISHENO v. JULIUS BERGER NIGERIA PLC (2008) 6 NWLR (pt. 1084) 582, (2008) 2-3 S.C (pt. 11) 78.
I need to emphasize that although by the Rules, an amendment to the pleadings can be made at any stage of the proceedings, different considerations apply depending on whether the amendment is being sought before or after the close of evidence by the parties. At the pre-trial stage, an amendment can be made by the leave of court. The parties are not restricted to the number of times an amendment can be made at that stage. But after the trial has commenced, only two amendments can be allowed. Generally, before the close of evidence, such amendments are allowed to make such evidence as may be called admissible as any evidence on an issue which was not pleaded or a claim not on record is strictly inadmissible. See CHIEF J. A. Y. IMONIKHE & ANOR v. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BENDEL STATE & ORS (1992) NWLR (pt. 248) 396; ANIEMEKA EMEGOKWE v. JAMES OKADIGBO (1973) 1 ALL NLR (Pt. 1) 379; OBIJURU v. OZIMS (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.6) 167.
However, once the calling of evidence has been concluded, any amendment of the pleading or statement of claim or defence, can be justified or allowed only on the premises that evidence in support of it is already on record. Therefore, it is necessary and in the interest of justice to allow the amendment in order to make the pleading or the claim accord with the evidence already on record. In OKOLO v. UNION BANK OF NIGERIA LTD. (1999) 10 NWLR (pt. 623) 429, the Supreme Court held that although parties are bound by their pleadings, a party may amend his pleadings before the end of hearing or judgment and sometimes on appeal. See also OGUMA INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR WEST AFRICA (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 20) 124; SALAMI v. OKE (1987) 14 NWLR (pt. 63) 1; EZEANI v. ONWORDI (1986) 4 NWLR (pt. 33) 27; KATE ENTERPRISES LTD v. DAEWOO NIG LTD (1985) 2 NWLR (pt. 5) 116.
Generally, from a preponderance of judicial opinion, it is well settled that an amendment of pleadings should be allowed unless:
1. It will entail injustice to the respondent
2. The applicant is acting mala fide or
3. By his blander, the applicant has done some injury to the respondent which cannot be compensated by costs or otherwise. See CHIEF OJAH & ORS CHIEF EYO OGBOIN & ORS (1976) 4 SC 87; TILDESLAY v. HARPER (1878) 10 CH. D 393 at 396; OGUNTIMEHIN v. GUBERE (1964) 1 ALL NLR 176 at 179.
Let me add also that any amendment of the pleadings in a case made or ordered at any stage of the proceedings before judgment or even made in an appeal, dates back to the date when the pleadings were originally filed. This means that once pleadings are amended, what stood before the amendment is no longer material before the court and no longer defines the issues to be tried. See ARCHBISHOP PETER YARIYOK JATAU V. ALHAJI MANSUR AHMED & ORS (2003) 1 SC (Pt. 11) 118, (2003) 4 NWLR (Pt. 811) 498; ENIGBOKAN v. A. I. I. CO NIG. LTD (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt. 348) 1 at 15 – 16.
In the instant case, the appellants sought by the rules of the High Court of Abia State to amend his statement of claim. The learned trial judge refused on the ground that the Appellants had earlier made an amendment of their pleading and should not be allowed to amend in piecemeal. For me, this reason by the court below has no legal backing at all. The learned trial judge also held that by this second amendment, the appellants have made his record to “look like patch-patch.” Again, this reason does not find expression in any rule of court or even in substantive law. By this ruling of the learned trial judge, he has made nonsense of the provision in order 36 Rule 1 of the Abia State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2009 which gives unfettered allowance to any party to amend his pleadings during pre-trial period and thereafter twice after trial has begun.
The need for amendment is to take care of the mistakes or blunders of counsel in the process of filing processes. It has been held that the object of the court is not to punish litigants for their mistakes or that of their counsel. Where an amendment does not cause injustice to the adverse party, I hold that it must be granted. See CROPPER v. SMITH (Supra) and FOLORUNSHO v. WAEC (Supra).
Throughout the short ruling by the learned trial judge, he did not show how the amendment would overreach the Respondents. Merely stating that the amendment would overreach the Respondents without giving details does not make the ruling justifiable. Such a blanket pronouncement does not hold water at all. Learned counsel for the Appellant had in their brief allege that the learned trial judge was in a haste to refuse the application and as such he did not take time to compare the judgment sought to be introduced and the one earlier rejected by the court. Learned counsel for the Respondent had argued that the two judgments are the same. With due respect, I disagree. The judgment rejected by the court (for whatever reason) was a judgment of the Supreme Court in Appeal No. SC 253/73 while the one sought to be introduced is the judgment of Isuikwuato District Court. For me, although it was the District Court judgment which led to the Supreme Court case, both ate not the same. Each has its own value and purpose. Therefore, the fact that the Supreme Court case was rejected is no reason why an amendment should not be granted to bring in the judgment of the District Court. Having said that, I hereby resolve the three issues in favour of the Appellants.
Having therefore resolved the three issues in favour of the Appellants, I hold that there is merit in this appeal and it is hereby allowed. I set aside the Ruling of the court below made on 9/12/11 which refused the application of the Appellants for further amendment. I order that this suit be returned to the Chief Judge of Abia State who shall re-assign it to another judge of the Abia State High Court to be heard de novo. I make no order as to costs.
PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE, J.C.A: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother JOHN I. OKORO, JCA. I agree with all the reasoning and conclusions thereat. I however wish to add a few words of my own simply by way of emphasis.
On the issue of amendment, the learned trial judge held that the Appellants ought to over everything that needs to be averred in his pleadings from the onset, in order to avoid any amendment in the course of adjudication. The law is quite clear on this issue. In the case of AKAIVINWO & ORS. V. NSIRIM (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1093) 439 the Supreme Court held as follows:
“Our adjectival law leans heavily favour of amendments and is generally against the refusal of amendments. Although the pendulum weights or trits in favour of granting amendments, courts of law are entitled to refuse amendments in reserving cases. Trial courts must examine the application for amendment very carefully in the light of the appellant evidence. In the exercise, the courts will consider the peculiari facts of each case.”
In the instant appeal, the learned trial judge lost track of the above principle of law and refused the amendment. In the light of the above, I have considered it necessary to allow the said amendment in the interest of justice bearing in mind that although parties are bound by their pleadings, a party may amend his pleadings before the end of hearing or judgment. See also MAMMAN VS. SALAUDEEN (2005) 18 NWLR (Pt. 958) 478. For the foregoing reason and more particularly on the comprehensive and fuller reasons by my learned brother John I. Okoro, JCA, in his lead judgment I also agree that the appeal be allowed and the matter should be sent back to Chief Judge of Abia State to re-assign it to another judge to be heard de novo. I too make no order as to costs.
HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI, J.C.A: I was privileged to have a preview of the judgment delivered by my learned brother JOHN INYANG OKORO; JCA.
My learned brother adequately considered and resolved the questions that came up for determination in this appeal. I therefore adopt the view expressed in the lead judgment of my learned brother, as mine. Consequently, I too, hold that this appeal has merit and is hereby allowed. In that respect, I set aside the Ruling of the Court below made on the 09/12/2011. I also remit this Suit to the Chief Judge of Abia State to be reassigned to another Judge to be heard de novo.
I abide by the order on costs.
Appearances
M. O. Onyeka Esq. with C. N. Ijoma Esq.For Appellant
AND
P. U. Nnodum Esq. with J. C. Okafor Esq. and N. R. Chibuisi (Mrs)For Respondent
