NWANORUE v. FRN & ANOR
(2020)LCN/14400(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Monday, July 27, 2020
CA/LAG/CR/574/2019
Before Our Lordships:
Joseph Shagbaor Ikyegh Justice of the Court of Appeal
Tijjani Abubakar Justice of the Court of Appeal
Gabriel Omoniyi Kolawole Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
PHILOMENA NWANORUE APPELANT(S)
And
1. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA 2. ADLINE IFEYINVVA EKE ALU RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT EXTRA-JUDICIAL STATEMENT OF A CO-ACCUSED IS BINDING ON HIM ONLY AND IS IRRELEVANT IN A TRIAL OF HIS COMRADE-IN-CRIME
It is necessary to stress that the extra-judicial statement of a co-accused is binding on him only and is irrelevant in a trial of his comrade-in crime; however, evidence of a co-accused incriminating another co-accused tried together with him could be relied upon as credible and reliable evidence. And the fact that although the 2nd respondent was discharged and acquitted his evidence in the joint trial with the appellant, not his extra-judicial statement, was relevant as it related to the appellant per the lead judgment prepared by His Lordship, Augie, J.S.C. in the case of Nwodo v. State (200) 3 NWLR (pt.1659) 228 at 240 and 242 following the cases of Suberu v. State (2010) 8 NWLR (pt.1197) 586, Dairo v. State (2017) LPELR – 43724, Michael v. State (2008) 13 NWLR (pt.1104) 361. See also The State v. Ibrahim (2019) 8 NWLR (pt.1674) 294 at 312 — 314 per the lead judgment prepared by His Lordship, Kekere-Ekun, J.S.C. PER IKYEGH, J.C.A.
THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE OF CONSPIRACY
For it was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ikumonihan v. State (2018) 14 NWLR (pt. 1640) 456 at 486 — 487 where His Lordship, Augie, J.S.C., held in the lead judgment that conspiracy to commit an offence is independent of the actual commission of the offence, to which the conspiracy is related vide Balogun v. A.-G., Ogun State (2002) 2 SC (reprint) (pt.11) 89 at 96, Nozie v. State (2016) 8 NWLR (pt. 1513) 1; that an accused may be found guilty of conspiracy, even where the commission of the actual or substantive offence is not proved; and that in the same rendering a discharge on a count of conspiracy would not automatically lead to a discharge on the count alleging the commission of the actual or substantive offence.
The offence of conspiracy as stated by the Supreme Court in Njovens and Ors. v. The State (1973) N.N.L.R. 76 at 96, is such that it is not necessary to prove that the conspirators, like those who murdered Julius Caesar (Shakespeare’s play: Julius Caesar), were seen together coming out of the same place at the same time and that indeed conspirators need not know each other and they need not all have started the conspiracy at the same time, for a conspiracy started by some persons may be joined at a later stage or later stages by others. And that, conspiracy being in most cases, invariably, a matter of inference from certain criminal acts of the conspirators concerned in the pursuance of an unlawful act in an unlawful way, the acts or omissions of any of the conspirators attach to each and everyone concerned with the conspiracy. PER IKYEGH, J.C.A.
JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appeal is from a judgment of the High Court of Lagos State (the Court below) by which it had convicted the appellant on the 1st and 3rd counts of the charge for the offences of conspiracy to corruptly and knowingly give false documents to an agent with the intention of misleading the principal contrary to Sections 26(1)(C) and 17(d)(c) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 (the Act); upon which the appellant was sentenced to 5 years and 3 years in prison, respectively, for the sentence to run concurrently.
The 1st respondent’s case, in outline, was that it received a petition from Indian Embassy that some documents were forged by an intending immigrant, the 2nd respondent, and the appellant was arrested subsequently for conspiracy for feeding the documents online to Indian Embassy for the Visa of the 2nd respondent to be processed for immigration to India based on the alleged forged documents.
The appellant, in her defence, denied knowledge
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of the origin of the documents but agreed that the 2nd respondent gave the documents to her to help fill online Visa application for her since the 2nd respondent was not computer literate. The 2nd respondent had admitted in her statement to the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and her evidence on oath that she had procured the two vital forged documents and gave them to the appellant as stated by the appellant which led to the investigation and subsequent prosecution of the appellant and the 2nd respondent at the Court below.
The Court below found the appellant guilty on the 1st and 3rd counts of the charge (supra), whilst the 2nd respondent was discharged and acquitted by the Court below.
Not satisfied with the decision, the appellant filed a notice of appeal with 3 grounds challenging the said decision. The appellant filed a brief of argument on 11.02.2020, which it was deemed as properly filed on 28.05.2020. The appellant identified the following issues for determination in the appeal –
“ISSUE 1
The Apex Court has stated in a plethora of cases that conspiracy is hatched between two or more persons, and where two
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persons have been charged for an offence involving common intention and one is discharged of such offence, the other one cannot also be found guilty of that offence. Is it proper for the Appellant to be convicted of the offence involving conspiracy while the co-conspirator was discharged and acquitted by the trial Court?
ISSUE 2
Guilty is a legal term which suggest that prosecution has met the burden required by the extant law, and a finding of fact by a Court that is not supported having regard to the evidence is perverse. Is it proper for the Court to shift criminal liability from the 2nd Respondent to the Appellant by overlooking the voluntary confession of 2nd Respondent which was not contested at the trial, and hold that the prosecution has proved their case against the Appellant while it held that the 2nd Respondent was an innocent agent?
ISSUE 3
Confessional statement is the best evidence in our criminal procedure. It is a statement of admission of guilt by the accused, and the Court must admit it in evidence, unless it is contested at the trial. Exhibits “P11″ the confessional statement of 2nd Respondent was admitted in evidence as it
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was not contested at the trial, 2nd Respondent unequivocally admitted to have procured single handedly the two key forged documents that gave rise to the trial, is it proper for the Court to neglect such vital and decisive admission, and hold otherwise by finding another person culpable for an offence which has already been admitted by 2nd Respondent?”
The appellant submitted on the first issue that with the discharge and acquittal of the 2nd respondent who was charged together with the appellant for conspiracy, the Court below should have also discharged and acquitted the appellant as conspiracy is hatched between or among two or more persons it would be incongruous to make a finding of conspiracy against only one defendant citing in support the cases of Kwaghshir v. State (1995) 4 SCNJ 222, Osho v. State (2012) 8 NWLR (pt.1302) 243, Clark and Anor. v. State (1992) 4 NWLR (pt.35) 381 at 395, State v. Osoba (2004) 21 W.R.N. 13 at 117.
It was also submitted that on the totality of the evidence before the Court below that the 2nd respondent alone forged the two vital documents, Exhibits P4 and P6, as well as Exhibit P11, where the 2nd respondent
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admitted that she paid the sum of N5,000 to one boy at Indian Embassy to get the statement of account and that she brought the referral letter from Abia State Hospital Management Board, therefore the said admission needed no further proof and was a relevant fact against the party who made it; and that in this case, only the 2nd respondent or her agent(s) were bound by the admission citing in support the cases of Federal Ministry of Health v. C.S.A. Ltd. (2009) All FWLR (pt.483) 1260, Taiwo v. Adegboro (2011) All FWLR (pt.584) 52 at 67, Salawu v. Yusuf (2007) All FWLR (pt.384) 230 at 252.
The appellant also submitted that parties and the Court are bound by the evidence placed before the Court; and that it is “more worrisome and shocking” that the Court below acquitted and discharged the 2nd respondent of the offence of forgery, the substantive offence, but convicted the appellant of conspiring to forge a document when the Court below failed to make a pronouncement on the charge of forgery, as it is clear that a person cannot be found guilty of aiding and abetting the commission of an offence if the person who did the principal act or made the omission
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constituting the substantive offence is acquitted, the reason being that the crime of aiding and abetting cannot stand “aloof’ on its own as it must be based on the actual commission of the offence citing in support the case of Nwobodo v. Nwobodo (1995) 1 NWLR (pt.370) (no pagination).
The appellant submitted on the second issue that had the Court properly evaluated the evidence it would have found that there was no evidence to link the appellant with the procurement of Exhibits P4 and P6 showing the finding of guilt entered by the Court below against the appellant was speculative, inquisitorial and perverse and should be set aside citing in support the cases of Sodipo v. Lemminkainen and Anor. (No.1) (1985) 2 NWLR (pt.8) 547, Ikoniyi v. Ofunne (1985) 2 NWLR (pt.5) 1, Olorunfemi v. N.E.B. Ltd. (2003) 5 NWLR (pt.812) 1 at 25.
The appellant submitted on the third issue that since the confessional statement of the 2nd respondent, Exhibit P11, was admitted without objection the evidence of the 2nd respondent retracting the confessional statement would be disregarded and the confessional statement, Exhibit P11, prevailed as the evidence in the
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case; and that having regard to the confessional statement the Court below should have found that the forged documents, Exhibits P4 and P6, were not packaged by the appellant upon which it ought to have found the appellant not guilty of the offence of conspiracy citing in support the cases ofGabriel v. State (1989) 5 NWLR (pt.122) 457, F.R.N. v. lweka (2013) 3 NWLR (pt.1314) 209.
Consequently, the appellant submitted that the Court should draw proper inferences from the admitted and proved facts on the record which leaned in favour of the appellant vide Edwards v. Barstow & Anor. (1995) 3 All ER 48 at 55, Benmax v. Motor Co. Ltd. (1945) All ER 326 at 327; upon which the appellant advocated that the appeal should be allowed and the judgment of the Court below quashed and the appellant be discharged and acquitted.
The 1st respondent filed its own brief on 27.05.2020 in which the respondent contended that the burden of proof placed on her is proof beyond reasonable doubt, not proof beyond all shadow of doubt vide Michael v. The State (2008) 3 NCC 666 at 690.
The 1st respondent then contended that there was the meeting of minds between the
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appellant and the 2nd respondent which was established by the evidence of PW1 to the effect that the 2nd respondent paid the appellant N70,000 to assist her in procuring Indian Visa which the appellant did by filling the Visa application online which was corroborated by Exhibit P12, the appellant’s statement to the ICPC; as well as the 2nd respondent’s statement to the ICPC, Exhibit P11, and her evidence contained in pages 362 — 363 of the record of appeal (the record).
It was argued thenceforward that it turned out that Exhibits 7 and 8 which were letters from the Guaranty Trust Bank (GTB) and Hospital Management Board, Abia State, respectively disclosed that Exhibits 4 and 6 were forged as they did not emanate from them thereby establishing the agreement to do an unlawful thing by unlawful means or to commit an unlawful act which consummated the offence of conspiracy under Section 17(1)(c) of the Act read with Section 8 of the Criminal Code Act and the cases of Ajayi v. State (2013) 8 NCC 1 at 26, Njovens v. State (1998) 1 ACLR 224 at 263 – 264, Omotola v. State (2009) 4 NCC 89 at 134, Aduku v. F.R.N. (2009) 4 NCC 350 at 378.
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The 1st respondent contended that the Court below discharged and acquitted the 2nd respondent because she was deceived by the appellant and one Emeka who linked the 2nd respondent to the appellant to enter into the transaction and that as held in the cases of Osho v. State (2012) 8 NWLR (pt.1302) 243 and Sule v. State (2009) LPELR – 3125 (SC) to convict only one for conspiracy suggested that the others were equally guilty, though acquitted and discharged, or though the charge against the other had been withdrawn by the prosecution the conviction of the other still stands; consequently, the 1st respondent urged that the appeal should be dismissed.
The appellant filed a reply brief on 11.06.2020, in which it was argued that a conspiracy must receive the concurrence of all the conspirators and that as the 2nd respondent acted alone in forging the documents, the appellant should not have been found guilty of conspiracy to forge the documents, therefore the offence of conspiracy was not proved beyond reasonable doubt in that the said stated facts were compatible with either the innocence or guilt of the appellant in which case the Court below should have given the
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appellant the benefit of the doubt and found the said offence of conspiracy not proved beyond reasonable doubt citing in support the cases of Bassey v. The State (2012) LPELR — 7813 (SC), Umar v. The State (2016) LPELR – 41182 (CA).
The reply brief then went on to refer to evidence in the case to the effect that the appellant was not guilty of the offence of conspiracy and ended by inviting the Court to allow the appeal and discharge and acquit the appellant.
The 2nd respondent did not file brief of argument.
The Court below found as a fact in part of its judgment contained in pages 391 — 392 and 393 — 394 of the record that —
“The facts of this case are fairly straight forward. A man from India who the 1st Defendant got to know on Facebook phoned her that he would want to do business with her (i.e., the 1st Defendant). The man in diaspora who was later known as Emeka connected the 1st Defendant with the 2nd Defendant that the latter would assist the former to procure India Visa. N100,000.00 was charged. The 1st Defendant paid the 2nd Defendant N70,00.00 leaving a balance of N30,000.00. The 2nd Defendant prepared the
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papers and led the Defendant into the Indian Embassy in Victoria Island, Lagos where the 1st Defendant was arrested as presenting fake documents. The arrest of the 1st Defendant led to the arrest of the 2nd Defendant at First Bank, Ejigbo, Lagos.
From the arrest of the 2nd Defendant she initially denied knowing the 1st Defendant but when she was confronted with facts and documents, she admitted knowing her and having transaction with her.
It is common ground between the parties that —
(1) One Emeka said to be based in India introduced the 2nd Defendant to the 1st Defendant on phone with the instruction that the latter shall deal with the former.
(2) That the business relates to procurement of India Visa.
(3) That N100, 000.00 was charged by the 2nd Defendant out of which N70,000.00 was paid leaving a balance of N30, 000.00.
(4) That in consideration the 2nd Defendant procured some documents, gave the same to the 1st Defendant led her into India Embassy where she was arrested as presenting fake documents to procure Visa.
Clearly from the above facts which are not in dispute. it was the 2nd Defendant in connivance with
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Emeka who is resident abroad that procured the documents without the knowledge of the 1st Defendant who innocently believing in its genuineness presented the same at the Embassy. The 2nd Defendant after procuring the documents led the 1st Defendant into Indian Embassy where she (1st Defendant) was arrested. The 1st Defendant can at best be described as an Innocent Agent.
It is also pertinent to state that the 2nd Defendant initially denied knowing the 1st Defendant when she was arrested at First Bank, Ejigbo, Lagos in October, 2013.
Upon being confronted with facts and documents, she later admitted not only owing the 1st Defendant but having transacted with her in relation to the Defendant’s interview at the Indian Embassy. This attitude of the 2nd Defendant further confirms the criminal intent exhibited with respect to the entire transaction from the totality of the evidence led the offence stipulated under Section 26(1) of the Independent Corrupt Practices Act 2000 has been established against the 2nd Defendant and I so hold…
In this case, Emeka who is resident abroad whom the 1st Defendant met on Facebook connected the 1st Defendant with the
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2nd Defendant to assist the former in procuring Indian Visa. The 2nd Defendant knew that she is not an employee of the Embassy: took up the assignment: gave the 1st Defendant an appointment, met with her charged N100,000.00 out of which N70,000.00 was paid leaving a balance of N30,000.00. The 2nd Defendant admitted charging N100, 000.00 and also admitted that N70,000.00 was paid by the 1st Defendant into her account. It is also common ground that she gave some documents to be presented to the 1st Defendant which documents she (2nd Defendant) represented to the 1st Defendant as genuine. She also led the 1st Defendant to Indian Embassy in Lagos where the latter (1st Defendant) was arrested.
The offences contemplated under Section 26(1)(c) of the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000 has been established against the 2nd Defendant and I so hold.”
It is clear from the credible evidence in the record that there were distinct roles played by the appellant and the 2nd respondent in the web of the criminal enterprise. The strand of the 2nd respondent dealt with the supply of the bank statement from GTB, Exhibit 4, and the referral letter,
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Exhibit 6, from the Abia State Health Management Board, to the appellant for the criminal transaction. On the other hand, the role of the appellant was the strand that had to do with feeding the information from the bank statement of account, Exhibit 4, and the referral letter, Exhibit 6, online to Indian Embassy which he executed or performed.
The segment of the appellant was not therefore, interwoven with that of the 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent handled the stage that supplied the raw data or information to the appellant. While the appellant who was not a travel agent and ordinarily had no business to fill the online Visa application handled the critical or focal stage of sending or feeding the data or information online to Indian Embassy for the 2nd respondent to obtain an immigrant Visa to India: Each role was distinct in the chain of the criminal enterprise/transaction.
It was proved that the statement of account, Exhibit 4, and the referral letter, Exhibit 6, were fictitious vide Exhibits 7 and 8 from the GTB and the Abia State Health Management Board, respectively, and it was by means of the false representations contained in Exhibits 4
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and 6 as established by Exhibit 7 and 8, that the appellant fed the said false information online to Indian Embassy for processing the Visa of the 2nd respondent thus executing a distinct part of the offence charged and thereby helped in the commission of the offence charged and was, in that wise, criminally responsible for supplying the forged information online to Indian Embassy vide by analogy the case of Agbeyegbe and Anor. v. I.G.P. (1955) 15 W.A.C.A.37 where one of the accused who helped in the commission of the forgery by signing one of the documents was held to be criminally liable for his role in the matter with regard to the part played by him.
That the appellant was paid N70,000 as “logistics” and travelled from Onitsha in Anambra State to Lagos to do the online processing of the Indian Visa for the 2nd respondent could reasonably be inferred that the appellant was hired by the 2nd respondent to use the forged documents to misrepresent and induce the Visa Officer of Indian Embassy representing his principal, the Consular-General of the Indian Consulate in Lagos for the purpose of issuing immigrant India Visa to the 2nd respondent when the
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appellant had reason to believe if upon discovery by inquiry on the source and genuineness of Exhibits 4 and 6 that the said documents, Exhibits 4 and 6, for processing the Visa were not genuine as he was bound to make an inquiry on the source and genuineness of the said documents as a reasonable person was expected to take elementary caution before acting on the said documents, which established the doing of an unlawful act in an unlawful way or the doing of a lawful act in an unlawful way by the appellant which consummated the offence of conspiracy.
The findings earlier copied in the discourse are amply supported by the evidence in the record and established that the facts or evidence relating to the role of the appellant in the conspiracy are distinct or polar to the part played by the 2nd respondent showing their case was not interwoven or tied together or intertwined like Siamese twins from the womb. The discharge and acquittal of the 2nd respondent on different set of facts in the chain of events constituting the conspiracy could not have led to the discharge and acquittal of the appellant as rightly held by the Court below. The documentary evidence
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particularly Exhibits 4, 6, 7 and 8 and the oral evidence not only implicated the appellant with complicity in the offence of conspiracy charged but established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was indeed guilty of the offence of conspiracy as charged as rightly held by the Court below.
Accordingly, I affirm the said findings of fact which are amply supported by the evidence and arrive at the conclusion that the Court below rightly convicted the appellant of conspiracy on counts 1 and 3 of the charge vide Sani v. State (2018) 8 NWLR (pt.1622) 412.
It is necessary to stress that the extra-judicial statement of a co-accused is binding on him only and is irrelevant in a trial of his comrade-in crime; however, evidence of a co-accused incriminating another co-accused tried together with him could be relied upon as credible and reliable evidence. And the fact that although the 2nd respondent was discharged and acquitted his evidence in the joint trial with the appellant, not his extra-judicial statement, was relevant as it related to the appellant per the lead judgment prepared by His Lordship, Augie, J.S.C. in the case of Nwodo v. State (200) 3
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NWLR (pt.1659) 228 at 240 and 242 following the cases of Suberu v. State (2010) 8 NWLR (pt.1197) 586, Dairo v. State (2017) LPELR – 43724, Michael v. State (2008) 13 NWLR (pt.1104) 361. See also The State v. Ibrahim (2019) 8 NWLR (pt.1674) 294 at 312 — 314 per the lead judgment prepared by His Lordship, Kekere-Ekun, J.S.C.
Further, Section 8(2) of the Evidence Act states in respect of conspiracy that statements made by individual conspirators as to measures taken in the execution or furtherance of the common intention for the conspiracy are not deemed to be relevant as such as against any conspirator, except those by whom or in whose presence such statements are made. In the instant case, it was not shown that the 2nd respondent’s extra-judicial statement, Exhibit P11, was made in the presence of the appellant and/or adopted by the appellant so the said extra-judicial statement is no evidence against the appellant.
In any event, the discharge and acquittal of the 2nd respondent on the substantive offence had no tangible effect on the charge of conspiracy upon which the appellant was tried and convicted. For it was held by the Supreme
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Court in the case of Ikumonihan v. State (2018) 14 NWLR (pt. 1640) 456 at 486 — 487 where His Lordship, Augie, J.S.C., held in the lead judgment that conspiracy to commit an offence is independent of the actual commission of the offence, to which the conspiracy is related vide Balogun v. A.-G., Ogun State (2002) 2 SC (reprint) (pt.11) 89 at 96, Nozie v. State (2016) 8 NWLR (pt. 1513) 1; that an accused may be found guilty of conspiracy, even where the commission of the actual or substantive offence is not proved; and that in the same rendering a discharge on a count of conspiracy would not automatically lead to a discharge on the count alleging the commission of the actual or substantive offence.
The offence of conspiracy as stated by the Supreme Court in Njovens and Ors. v. The State (1973) N.N.L.R. 76 at 96, is such that it is not necessary to prove that the conspirators, like those who murdered Julius Caesar (Shakespeare’s play: Julius Caesar), were seen together coming out of the same place at the same time and that indeed conspirators need not know each other and they need not all have started the conspiracy at the same time, for a conspiracy
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started by some persons may be joined at a later stage or later stages by others. And that, conspiracy being in most cases, invariably, a matter of inference from certain criminal acts of the conspirators concerned in the pursuance of an unlawful act in an unlawful way, the acts or omissions of any of the conspirators attach to each and everyone concerned with the conspiracy.
The Supreme Court had reiterated in the case of Yusuf v. F.R.N. (supra) that when the evidence against one accused is different from that against the other, the discharge of one would not lead to the discharge of the other jointly charged and tried together; therefore each case is to be considered on its own peculiar facts and merits; consequently, where some extenuating circumstances which inured only to the advantage of the co-accused, the other co-accused could not be so considered together with the co-accused as his circumstances had made a distinct peculiar presentation distancing his case from the other accused that had been discharged and acquitted.
The 2nd respondent’s acquittal and discharge for the offence of conspiracy when she was charged together with the appellant
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who was convicted of the offence would not automatically lead to the acquittal and discharge of the appellant. For it was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ikemson and Ors. v. The State (1989) 3 NWLR (pt. 110) 455 at 480 that the submission that since all the accused were charged with the same offence and the same evidence was tendered in proof, the acquittal of one of them should have also led to the acquittal of the other was a fallacy in that if there was mistake in acquitting one of the accused, an appellate Court is not expected to persevere in that error as two wrongs do not make one right.
The case of Idiok v. State (2006) 12 NWLR (pt.993) 1 at 32 has it that it is not in every case where an accused is tried jointly with another that the discharge of one must lead to the discharge of the other, particularly so when the evidence against one accused is different from that against the other. All will therefore depend on the evidence in each case.
The case of Sule v. State (2009) 17 NWLR (pt.1169) 33 at 63 also emphasized that whether an accused can be convicted of conspiracy if the other alleged conspirators are acquitted was a matter to
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be considered on the peculiar facts of each case.
The scope and implication of the status of co-conspirators charged together for the offence of conspiracy was exhaustively stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Osho v. State (2018) 13 NWLR (pt.1637) 474 at 492 per the lead judgment prepared by His Lordship, l.T. Muhammad, J.S.C., (now Hon. C.J.N.) thus –
“Lest I forget, I should re-iterate the position of the law that the discharge of a co-accused or a co-conspirator (on valid ground) cannot confer equal right on the other co-accused or co-conspirator(s) where evidence was not heard before that discharge. 2nd accused person, Sunday Awe was discharged before commencement of trial, on medical ground. Thus, where a trial Court had, on proper evaluation of the evidence against two people charged with an offence and it comes to the conclusion that the offence has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt against one and consequently discharges and acquits him, it cannot convict the other or others of the offence based on the same evidence. This is where a trial in which there was full evaluation of the quality and credibility of the evidence
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adduced by the prosecution in proof of that offence against the two or more persons charged, was conducted. Thus, depending on the different circumstances, each case must be considered on its own facts. See: Sule v. State (2009) 17 NWLR (Pt. 169) 33 at page 63″.
(My emphasis).
Much of the arguments for and against the appeal kept going back to or hammering on whether the 2nd respondent should have been discharged and acquitted. There is no appeal against the discharge and acquittal of the 2nd respondent, therefore these arguments are of moment and nothing further need be said about her case.
It has to be observed that count 1 upon which the appellant was tried and convicted of conspiracy stated in pages 4 — 5 of the record that the conspiracy was also with one Dayo, now at large, which made the conviction good vide Yusuf v. F.R.N. (2018) 8 NWLR (pt.1622) 502 at 522 where His Lordship, Peter-Odili, J.S.C., stated that a person can be convicted of conspiring with a co-conspirator who is at large as all that is required is evidence on record in support of the conviction placing reliance on Ogugu v. State (1990) 2 NWLR (pt.134) 539 at 553.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>
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In the result, I find no merit in the appeal and hereby dismiss it and affirm the decision of the Court below.
TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, J.C.A.: I read before now the comprehensive leading Judgment prepared and rendered in this appeal by my learned brother Ikyegh, JCA. I am in complete agreement, I therefore adopt the Judgment as my own and endorse all consequential orders including the order on costs.
GABRIEL OMONIYI KOLAWOLE, J.C.A.: I had the privilege to read in draft, the lead judgment of my Lord, the Hon. Justice J.S. IKYEGH which has just been delivered and in which he found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it.
I agree with the said judgment and I also dismiss the appeal as it lacks merit.
Appeal is dismissed.
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Appearances:
Mr. C. Obiaka (with A. Rogers) For Appellant(s)
Y. William-Mbata Esqr. appeared for the 1st Respondent.
2nd Respondent unrepresented though put on notice of the case. For Respondent(s)
