NKWANKWO v. AGU & ORS (2020)

NKWANKWO v. AGU & ORS

(2020)LCN/14709(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(OWERRI JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, November 20, 2020

CA/OW/249/2017

RATIO

PARTIES TO AN ACTION: RULES GOVERNING JOINDER OF A PERSON AS AN INTERESTED PARTY TO A SUIT

The rules governing joinder of a person as an interested party to a Suit is trite, that he must be a necessary party to the action, such that the case cannot be effectively determined and disposed of in his absence, and/or that he would be affected and bound by the outcome of the case, and so his joinder is inevitable to protect his right of fair hearing, before a decision can be entered against him. The authorities on this are replete.
In the case of APC Vs PDP & Ors (2015) LPELR – 24349 CA, it was held:
“The law relating to necessary party and joinder is well defined, and a person who is a necessary party must be sufficiently interested in the case, or possess such interest which will make the case incapable of being determined effectively and finally in his absence. See the case of B.A.T.N. LTD Vs INT’L TOBACCO COY PLC (2012) LPELR – 7875 CA. To qualify to join or be joined as party in a Suit, the Applicant must establish that he has sufficient legal interest in the subject of the Suit to qualify him as a necessary party, and to attain that status, he must establish that his absence in the case as a party will defeat a fair hearing and complete trial; that the issues in controversy cannot be effectively and completely adjudicated upon and settled, in his absence. Apart from proving such proprietary interest in the subject matter of the Suit, the Applicant has to show that he will be affected by the order(s) that will be reached by the Court after the trial. See also Green Vs Green (2001) FWLR (Pt.75) 795; Mobil Oil Plc Vs Denr Ltd (2004) 1 NWLR (Pt.853) 142; Lawal Vs PGP Nig. Ltd (2001) NWLR (Pt.742) 393; Obasanjo Vs Yusuf (2004) 9 NWLR (Pt.877) 144.”
See also Poroye & Ors Vs Makarfi & Ors (2017) LPELR – 42738 SC:
“It is settled law that a necessary party is a person whose presence in an action is essential for the effectual and complete determination of the claim before the Court. See Re: Yesufu Faleki (Mogaji) (1986) 2 SC 431 at 449; (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.19) 7591; Ige Vs Farinde (1994) 7 – 8 SCNJ 284.” Per Onnoghen JSC (later CJN)
In the case of Azubuike Vs PDP & Ors (2014) LPELR – 22258 (SC), the Supreme Court approached the issue of joinder with rhetorical questions, adopted from the case of Green Vs Green (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.60) 480, where Oputa JSC said:
“… in order to decide the effect of non-joinder or mis-joinder of a party the Court should ask the following questions:
a) Is the cause or matter liable to be defeated by non-joinder?
b) Is it possible to adjudicate on the cause or matter unless the 3rd party is added as defendant?
c) Is the 3rd party a person who should have been joined in the first instance?
d) Is the 3rd party a person whose presence before the Court as a defendant will be necessary in order to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate or settle all the questions involved in the cause or matter? PER MBABA, J.C.A.

INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION: ATTITUDE OF THE COURT TO DELVING INTO THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN AN INTERLCUTORY APPLICATION

Courts are forbidden to delve into the merits of substantive issues before it at the point of considering interlocutory application. See Agwu & Ors Vs Julius Berger Nig. Plc (2011) LPELR – 4731 (CA); In Re: Abdullahi (2018) LPELR – 45202 (SC) and Buremoh Vs Akande (2017) LPELR – 41565 (SC), where Mohammad JSC, said:
“A Court must avoid the determination of a substantive issue at the interlocutory stage. It is never proper for a Court to make pronouncement in the course of interlocutory proceedings on issues before the Court. Interlocutory applications must remain the handmaid and aid that enable the Court reach the ultimate goal of doing substantial justice between the parties in the real issues in litigation between parties.” Per Augie JSC. PER MBABA, J.C.A.
JURISDICTION: CARDINAL REQUIREMENT TO IMBUE A COURT WITH JURISDICTION

In the case of Makarfi & Anor Vs Poroye & Ors (2016) LPELR – 41296 CA, it was held (relying on Ogolo Vs Ogolo (2003) LPELR – 2309 SC and Ayoade Vs Spring Bank Plc, that:
“One of the cardinal requirements of law, to imbue a Court with jurisdiction to hear a case is that all the parties/persons to be affected by its decision must be duly summoned/served with the process of Court and given opportunities to be heard/defend themselves. That is an inalienable constitutional right of every person. See Section 36(1)(3)(6) of the 1999 Constitution as amended.” PER MBABA, J.C.A.

Before Our Lordships:

Raphael Chikwe Agbo Justice of the Court of Appeal

Ita George Mbaba Justice of the Court of Appeal

Ibrahim Ali Andenyangtso Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

HRH EZE AGWU NKWANKWO (Suing For Himself And As Representing Member Of Agbajah Nkporo Autonomous Community Of Ohafia Local Government Area) APPELANT(S)

And

NDUKWE OJI AGU 2. UKO UDE 3. EZE-OGO OJUKWU KALU IMO 4. CHIEF DAVID OKOCHA 5. CHIEF MARTIN OKE 6. ABIA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY 7. THE SPEAKER, ABIA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY 8. THE GOVERNMENT OF ABIA STATE 9. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND COMMISSIONER FOR JUSTICE, ABIA STATE 10. ABIA STATE MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND CHIEFTAINCY AFFAIRS 11. OHAFIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA RESPONDENT(S)

ITA GEORGE MBABA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This Appeal is against the decision of Abia State High Court in Suit No. HU/136/2016, delivered on 26/4/2017 by Hon. Justice Amanze Chikwendu Chioma, allowing the joining of the 1st to 5th Defendants in the Suit, as 2nd Set of Defendants, on their claim to be interested parties.

Appellant was the Claimant at the Lower Court, in an originating summons process, filed on 19/7/2016, wherein the Claimant placed the following issues before the Court for determination:
(a) Whether the Creation of Agbajah Nkporo Autonomous Community in the year 2000, the recognition of and Issuance of Staff of Office to the Claimant as its Traditional Ruler in the year 2001, was not done in substantial compliance with the Enabling Law of Abia State Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities Law enacted in 1991 but contained in Cap No. 166 Vol. 7 of the Laws of Abia State of Nigeria, 2005.
(b) Whether in view of the provisions of Section 6(1)(b)(c) of the Interpretation Act, Chapter 123 Volume 8 of the Laws of the Federation 2004, the Abia State Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities (Amendment No.1)

Law No.8 of 2015, invalidated and rendered void all acts duly and lawfully carried out, including the creation of Agbaja Nkporo Autonomous Community and recognition of the Claimant as its traditional ruler in the year 2001, under the then existing law of Abia State Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities Law, Cap 166, Volume 7, Laws of Abia State.
(c) Whether the amendment of Section 33 of the Abia State of Nigeria Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities Law by the Abia State of Nigeria Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities (amendment No.1) Law, No.8 of 2015, that delisted Agbaja Nkporo Autonomous Community as a recognized Autonomous Community in Abia State, is not discriminatory and violation of Section 42(1) (a) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended).
(d) Whether the Abia State House of Assembly can legislate to dethrone or withdraw recognition of the Claimant as a traditional ruler and abolish Agbaja Nkporo Autonomous Community, without complying with the provisions of Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended), and the provisions of

Section 16 of the Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities Law of Abia State (as amended), by law No.8 of 2015, and in breach of Public Policy.

The Claimant (Appellant) thereupon sought some declarations, namely:
(1) A declaration of this Honourable Court, that the creation of Agbaja Nkporo Autonomous Community in the year 2001 (sic) by the Government of Abia State, and the recognition and issuance of staff of office to the claimant, as its traditional Ruler, was done in substantial compliance with the relevant provisions of the Enabling Law, Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities Law, Cap 166 Volume 7, Laws of Abia State.
(2) A declaration… that the Amendment made by the Abia State House of Assembly to Abia State Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities Law, Cap 166 Volume 7, Laws of Abia State by the Abia State Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities (Amendment No.1) Law No.8 of 2015, has not rendered as void or nullified all acts duly and lawfully carried out under the then Abia State Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities Law, Cap 166 Volume 7, Laws of Abia State, including the creation of Agbaja Nkporo Autonomous Community, the recognition and issuance of staff of

office to the claimant as its traditional ruler by the Government of Abia State in 2001.
(3) A declaration … that it is against Public Policy and unconstitutional for the Abia State House of Assembly to legislate the abrogation of the rights vested on the claimant as recognized traditional ruler and the indigenes of Agbaja Nkporo Autonomous Community, created in 2000 by the Government of Abia State, without giving the claimant and members of Agbaja Nkporo the opportunity to defend any petition or complaint against them, as envisaged under Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).
(4) A declaration… that the purported dissolution of Agbaja Nkporo Autonomous Community by the Abia State Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities (Amendment No.1) Law No.8 of 2015, is illegal, null and void.
(5) A declaration… that the schedule to law No.8 of 2015 (Abia State Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities (Amendment No.1) Law, made pursuant to Section 3 of the said Law, that excluded Agbaja Nkporo Autonomous Community, is not exhaustive of all validly created Autonomous Communities in

Abia State.
(6) An Order of this Honourable Court, declaring as void the provisions of the Abia State… traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities (Amendment No.1) Law, No.8 of 2015, to the extent that it excludes Autonomous Communities, lawfully created under the provisions of the principal law of Abia State (Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities Law, Cap 166, Volume 7 of the Laws of Abia State, 2005).
(7) A declaration… that the Abia State of Nigeria Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities (Amendment No.1) Law No.8 of 2015 was made in breach of the spirit and intendment of the provisions of Section 42(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended.
(8) An Order of injunction, restraining the defendants, either by themselves, their agents, servants and or (sic) disturbing the operations of Agbaja Nkporo Autonomous Area as a lawfully created Autonomous Community in Abia State.”

The Suit was originated, basically, against the Abia State House of Assembly, its Speaker and the Government of Abia State, A.G. Abia State, Abia State Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs

as well as Ohafia Local Government Area, as defendants (1st to 6th Defendants). But on 15/7/2017 some persons, namely: Ndukwe Oji Agu, Uko Oke Ude, Eze-Ogo Ojukwu Kalu Imo, Chief David Okocha and Martin Oke, filed an application, seeking to be joined in the Suit, as interested parties (as 2nd Set of Defendants). The application was, strenuously, opposed by the Claimant, who filed Counter affidavit against the motion. (See pages 226 – 316 of the Records of Appeal). The 1st and 2nd Defendants also raised a preliminary objection against the Suit. (Pages 317 to 327).

After hearing the application and for joinder considering the affidavit evidence and addresses of Counsel, the trial Court ruled in favour of the Applicants, joining them as persons interested in the Suit, as 2nd Set of Defendants. The trial Court held:
“From the foregoing, there are 2 possible interpretation (sic) of this mix up in the membership of both communities. It is either that the Applicants are correct, when they stated that part of the aforesaid villages are in Agbajah Nkporo Autonomous Community and part of it in Achi Aliobi Autonomous Community or possibly Achi

Aliobi a child of circumstance, created to checkmate or deflate the claimant, by transferring the villages that make up Agbaja Nkporo Autonomous Community which he superintend, into Achi Aliobi Autonomous Community, otherwise I don’t see how the same village or part of the same villages that make up Agbajah Nkporo Autonomous Community constituting the same village that make up Achi Allobi Autonomous.
Again, what is the idea of splitting villages or kindred that have common heritage into different Autonomous Communities?… Be that as it may, the fact before me show that the Applicants fall into the Claimants representation and belong to Agbaja Nkporo Autonomous Community. Again, evidence shows that there has been series of dispute between the claimant and the Applicants, bothering on the same issue of the status of the Autonomous Community, which makes it clear that whatever decision that is arrived at, will affect their interest and in order to be bound by whatever decision that is arrived at it is necessary to join them as a party in this Suit, to present their own side of the case to enable all issue that arise in this case to be completely and

effectually determined by the Court. The law is that the only reason which makes a party necessary party to an action is that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled in the action. See Ajayi Vs Jolayemi (2001) 10 NWLR (Pt.722) 516.” (Pages 337 – 338 of the Records)

That is the decision, Appellant appealed against, being aggrieved, as per the Notice and grounds of Appeal, filed on 9/5/2017 (Pages 340 to 345 of the Records of Appeal). Appellant, however, re-arranged the parties in the Notice of Appeal by making the 2nd set of Defendants, 1st to 5th Respondents. He filed his brief of arguments on 18/7/2017 and distilled a lone Issue for the determination of the Appeal, namely:
“Whether the Learned trial Judge was right to have ordered that the 1st – 5th Respondents in this Appeal be joined as the 2nd Set of defendants in the Suit. (Grounds 1 and 2)

The Respondents (1st to 5th) filed their Brief of arguments on 14/8/2017 and adopted the sole Issue distilled by Appellant for the determination of the appeal.

Arguing the Appeal, on 3/11/2020, the Appellant’s Brief, settled by

Anaga Kalu Anaga Esq, was adopted, wherein Counsel argued, as follows, as to the portion of the judgment of the Lower Court giving rise to the appeal, namely:
“However, looking at the Claimant’s claim, it bothers strictly on interpretation or statute and the constitution as to whether the amendment made by the 1st Defendant is proper or not, it is an issue of law that may not require evidence to construe, contrary to the impression being created by the Applicants. See the case of Bello Vs INEC… However, as stated earlier, having regard to the representation of the Claimant, which made all members of the Community parties and the various dispute that has existed between the Claimant and the Applicants regarding the status of the Community for which, according to the Applicants, they were heard before the Community dissolved or deleted as an Autonomous Community. Whatever decision that is taken by the Court will certainty affect the Applicants…” (Pages 338 – 339 of the Records)

Counsel was faulting the trial Court on the above findings and reasoning. He said that 1st to 5th Respondents ceased to be members of

Agbaja Nkporo Autonomous Community, in September, 2011, when Achi Aliobi was created by the Government of Abia State; that Appellant had placed before the trial Court Exhibits A, C, and D – the application, Constitution and Area Map, with which the 1st – 5th Respondents submitted their application to the Abia State Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs and with which Achi Aliobi Autonomous Community was created. He said that the said Exhibits were duly certified by the Government; that the Schedule of law No.8 of 2015 of Abia State, wherein Achi Aliobi has been shown at page 44, the following villages are its component units to wit; Amakwu, Obichie, Utuka, Okai, Ndi Ibe, Okou Ifu and Ochuiyi.

He said that, in the light of the above argument, and the fact that the Exhibits B and C were signed by the 1st and 2nd Respondents and same had specified that they belonged to their respective Villages (Utuka and Obichie), the effect of same was that, from that date Achi Aliobi Autonomous Community was created in 2011, all the Villages therein listed (formally of Agbaja Nkporo Autonomous Community) became an integral part of Achi Aliobi

Autonomous Community, and as indigenes of Achi Aliobi, the 1st to 5th Respondents cannot claim to have interest or be affected by events that took place in Agbaja Nkporo Autonomous Community, after the 27th day of September, 2011, when their membership of Agbaja Nkporo Autonomous Community ceased.

Counsel argued that a party seeking to be joined in a Suit, must establish his direct legal interest in the subject matter (Bala Vs Dikko & Ors (2013) ALL FWLR (Pt.647) 65); that in view of the content of Exhibits B, C and D and the Law No.8 of 2015 of Abia State, the 1st – 5th Respondents cannot be said to have established any direct legal interest in the subject matter of this Suit, not being members of Agbajah Nkporo Autonomous Community, when the cause of action arose. He added that the issues he placed before the Lower Court in the Suit can be resolved, without the need for 1st – 5th Respondents and they will not be affected by the outcome of the Suit, not being, and still no longer indigenes of Agbajah Nkporo Autonomous Community, when the cause of action arose.

Counsel added that the trial Court misconstrued the essence of the claim of

Appellant in Suit No. HOH/12/2012, wherein 1st Applicant complained that his nomination as Eze-elect of Agbajah Nkporo Autonomous Community was frustrated, because he ceased to be part of Agbajah Nkporo Autonomous Community, as a result of the creation of Achi Aliobi Autonomous Community, following the new law, No.8 of 2015. Appellant said that in that Suit (HOH/12/2012) he did not admit that 1st Respondent was a member of Agbajah Nkporo Autonomous Community, but was of Achi Aliobi Autonomous Community, at the time of that Suit.

Responding, Learned Counsel for the 1st – 5th Respondents, Chidozie Ogunji, Esq, said that the Lower Court had exercised its discretion, properly, when it held that 1st – 5th Respondents were interested parties to the Suit. Counsel referred us to paragraphs 9, 13, 14, 15, 17, 20 and 21 of the 1st to 5th Respondents affidavit in support of their application to be joined in the Suit (Page 231 of the Records), as well as Appellant’s Counter affidavit thereto on pages 258 to 263 of the Records (particularly Paragraph 4 of the Counter Affidavit), wherein Appellant averred, as follows:
“That the attempt made

by the applicant to have himself presented as the Eze-Elect of Agbajah Nkporo Autonomous Community was aborted following the institution of Suit No. HOH/12/2012 by me and the fact that the government discovered that at the time the 1st Applicant attempted to be made Eze of Agbajah Nkporo Autonomous Community, the 1st Applicant no longer belonged to Agbajah Nkporo Autonomous Community but to Achi-Aliobi Autonomous Community.”

Counsel said, surprisingly, that was Appellant’s answer made by him on 13/3/2017 in respect of the Application for joinder. But, curiously, on 3/10/2012, five (5) years, earlier, the same Appellant had averred differently in a document, thus:
“The Claimants aver that notwithstanding the foregoing, the 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th Defendants and others, on the 23rd day of February, 2012, presented the 3rd Defendant as the Eze-Elect of Agbajah Nkporo Autonomous Community to take the place of the 1st Claimant, as the duly recognized traditional ruler of Agbajah Nkporo Autonomous Community.”

(That was paragraph 17 of Suit No. HOH/12/2012 filed by Appellant (and others) in this Case – page 241 of the

Records. Of course, 1st Claimant in that Suit is the Claimant in this Suit and the 3rd Defendant in that Suit (HOH/12/2012) is the 1st Appellant in the Application to be joined as interested party in this Suit. Counsel also referred us to the reliefs sought by the Appellant in the Suit No. HOH/12/2012, paragraphs C and I, (Pages 249 – 250 of the Records), to show the interest of the 1st to 5th Respondents in this Suit, on appeal, and asserted that the trial Court was right in its findings and reasoning on pages 338 – 339 of the Records, when he held that “whatever decision that is taken by the Court will certainly affect the Applicants.”

He urged us to affirm the decision of the Lower Court and to dismiss the Appeal, placing reliance on Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, Yakubu Vs Gov. Kogi State (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt.414) 386; Mobil Oil Plc Vs DREXEL ENERGY & NATURAL RESOURCES LTD & ORS (2004) 1 NWLR (Pt.853) 142 at 146, on the need to join interested parties to a Suit.

RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE
The rules governing joinder of a person as an interested party to a Suit is trite, that he must be a necessary party to

the action, such that the case cannot be effectively determined and disposed of in his absence, and/or that he would be affected and bound by the outcome of the case, and so his joinder is inevitable to protect his right of fair hearing, before a decision can be entered against him. The authorities on this are replete.
In the case of APC Vs PDP & Ors (2015) LPELR – 24349 CA, it was held:
“The law relating to necessary party and joinder is well defined, and a person who is a necessary party must be sufficiently interested in the case, or possess such interest which will make the case incapable of being determined effectively and finally in his absence. See the case of B.A.T.N. LTD Vs INT’L TOBACCO COY PLC (2012) LPELR – 7875 CA. To qualify to join or be joined as party in a Suit, the Applicant must establish that he has sufficient legal interest in the subject of the Suit to qualify him as a necessary party, and to attain that status, he must establish that his absence in the case as a party will defeat a fair hearing and complete trial; that the issues in controversy cannot be effectively and completely adjudicated upon

and settled, in his absence. Apart from proving such proprietary interest in the subject matter of the Suit, the Applicant has to show that he will be affected by the order(s) that will be reached by the Court after the trial. See also Green Vs Green (2001) FWLR (Pt.75) 795; Mobil Oil Plc Vs Denr Ltd (2004) 1 NWLR (Pt.853) 142; Lawal Vs PGP Nig. Ltd (2001) NWLR (Pt.742) 393; Obasanjo Vs Yusuf (2004) 9 NWLR (Pt.877) 144.”
See also Poroye & Ors Vs Makarfi & Ors (2017) LPELR – 42738 SC:
“It is settled law that a necessary party is a person whose presence in an action is essential for the effectual and complete determination of the claim before the Court. See Re: Yesufu Faleki (Mogaji) (1986) 2 SC 431 at 449; (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.19) 7591; Ige Vs Farinde (1994) 7 – 8 SCNJ 284.” Per Onnoghen JSC (later CJN)
In the case of Azubuike Vs PDP & Ors (2014) LPELR – 22258 (SC), the Supreme Court approached the issue of joinder with rhetorical questions, adopted from the case of Green Vs Green (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.60) 480, where Oputa JSC said:
“… in order to decide the effect of non-joinder or

mis-joinder of a party the Court should ask the following questions:
a) Is the cause or matter liable to be defeated by non-joinder?
b) Is it possible to adjudicate on the cause or matter unless the 3rd party is added as defendant?
c) Is the 3rd party a person who should have been joined in the first instance?
d) Is the 3rd party a person whose presence before the Court as a defendant will be necessary in order to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate or settle all the questions involved in the cause or matter?

I believe all those questions should be considered, in whole, in coming to a decision for joinder of a party to defend a Suit. In this case, at hand, the trial Court appears to have considered the questions and the relevant law, when it held:
“… having regards to the representation of the Claimant, which made all members of the Community parties and the various dispute that has existed between the Claimant and the Applicants regarding the status of the Community for which, according to the Applicants, they were heard before the Community dissolved or deleted as an Autonomous Community.

Whatever decision that is taken by the Court will certainly affect the Applicants. The Supreme Court has in the case of A.G. Federation Vs A.G. Abia State & Ors (supra) held that in such a situation, the Applicants should be joined, although the dispute is not between the Claimant and the Applicants, in so far as the decision of the Court will affect the Applicants. See Pages 338 – 339 of the Records.

In contesting that findings/holding of the trial Court, Appellant had argued that Applicants would not be affected by the decision in this case, because they are no longer part of Agbajah (also variously spelt as Agbaja) Nkporo Autonomous Community, having been excised or split into Achi Aliobi Autonomous Community by the Abia State Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities (Amendment No.1) Law No.8 of 2015. In paragraph 4.14 of Appellant’s brief, he argued:
“… the attention of the Learned trial Judge was adequately drawn to the provisions of Law No.8 of 2015 of Abia State (the Schedule thereto) with respect to the Communities listed therein as constituting Achi Aliobi Autonomous Community and the trial Court failed to

examine and pronounce on the provisions of that Law and its effect on the application of the Applicants to be joined as the 2nd Set of the Defendants in the Suit.”

With due respect to the Learned Counsel for Appellant, I think that was a flawed reasoning, calling on the trial Court to consider and rule on the substance of the main case before it, at the point interlocutory application! Courts are forbidden to delve into the merits of substantive issues before it at the point of considering interlocutory application. See Agwu & Ors Vs Julius Berger Nig. Plc (2011) LPELR – 4731 (CA); In Re: Abdullahi (2018) LPELR – 45202 (SC) and Buremoh Vs Akande (2017) LPELR – 41565 (SC), where Mohammad JSC, said:
“A Court must avoid the determination of a substantive issue at the interlocutory stage. It is never proper for a Court to make pronouncement in the course of interlocutory proceedings on issues before the Court. Interlocutory applications must remain the handmaid and aid that enable the Court reach the ultimate goal of doing substantial justice between the parties in the real issues in litigation between parties.”

Per Augie JSC.
Appellant appears to have forgotten that the said Law No.8 of 2015 formed the centre of the dispute in the case before the trial Court, whereof he sought the Court’s interpretation, whether the said law “invalidated and rendered void all acts dully and lawfully carried out including the creation of Agbajah Nkporo Autonomous Community and recognition of the Claimant as it Traditional Ruler”, and:
“Whether the amendment of Section 33 of the Abia State of Nigeria Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities Law by the Abia State of Nigeria Traditional Rulers & Autonomous Communities (Amendment No.1) Law No.8 of 2015, that delisted Agbajah Nkporo Autonomous Community as a recognized Autonomous Community in Abia State, is not discriminatory and a violation of Section 42(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended); and
“ Whether the Abia State House of Assembly can legislate to dethrone or withdraw the recognition of the Claimant as a traditional ruler and abolish Agbajah Autonomous Community without complying with the provisions of Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended)

and the provisions of Section 16 of the Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities Law of Abia State, as amended, by Law No.8 of 2015 of Abia State and in breach of Public Policy” (See paragraphs (b) (c) and (d) of the questions for determination of the Suit, Pages 4 – 5 of the Records of Appeal)
The trial Court could not therefore have jumped the gun, to consider the status of the Achi Aliobi Autonomous Community, created by the Abia State Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities (Amendment No.1) Law No.8 of 2015, vis-à-vis, the interest of and/or exclusion of the Applicants from everything concerning the troubled Agbajah Autonomous Community, when the status of the said Law No.8 of 2015, was yet to be determined, as prayed by Appellant, especially the earlier Suit No. HOH/12/2012 had also, clearly, spelt out the interest of the Applicants (particularly 1st Applicant) in the Office of Eze-ship of the Agbajah Autonomous Community, which was aborted by the creation of Achi Aliobi Autonomous Community by the same Amended Law – No.8 of 2015. Appellant could not be questioning the legitimacy or status of the Law No.8

of 2015 in the Suit and at the same time rely on the same law to refuse the joinder of 1st to 5th Respondents to the Suit!

I agree with the Learned Trial Court, that Applicants (1st – 5th Respondents) had established sufficient interest in the Suit, to qualify to be joined as defendants, as they stood the risk of being affected by whatever decision to be reached by the trial Court at the end of the Suit No. HU/136/2016.
In the case of Makarfi & Anor Vs Poroye & Ors (2016) LPELR – 41296 CA, it was held (relying on Ogolo Vs Ogolo (2003) LPELR – 2309 SC and Ayoade Vs Spring Bank Plc, that:
“One of the cardinal requirements of law, to imbue a Court with jurisdiction to hear a case is that all the parties/persons to be affected by its decision must be duly summoned/served with the process of Court and given opportunities to be heard/defend themselves. That is an inalienable constitutional right of every person. See Section 36(1)(3)(6) of the 1999 Constitution as amended.”

I see no merit in this Appeal, and it is, accordingly, dismissed, with cost assessed at N50,000.000 to 1st to 5th Respondents, payable

by Appellant.

RAPHAEL CHIKWE AGBO, J.C.A.: I agree.

IBRAHIM ALI ANDENYANGTSO, J.C.A.: Having read in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother Hon. Justice Ita George Mbaba, JCA, I agree in toto with his reasoning and conclusion that this appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed by me.

I abide by the order as to cost.

Appearances:

ANAGA KALU ANAGA ESQ. For Appellant(s)

CHIDOZIE OGUNJI ESQ. – for 1st to 5th Respondents
6th to 11th Respondents: UNREPRESENTED For Respondent(s)