NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL RESEARCH v. NATIONAL UNION OF ROAD TRANSPORT WORKERS
(2010)LCN/3813(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 21st day of May, 2010
CA/L/808/07
RATIO
JURISDICTION: IMPORTANCE OF JURISDICTION
The issue of jurisdiction is very fundamental as it goes to the competence of a court or tribunal, hence it can be raised at any stage. It is the centre pin that the entire litigation hinges upon. It can be raised for the first time on appeal without necessarily obtaining leave to do so, and can be raised by the court suo motu. See Oyakhire v. State (2006)15 NWLR (Pt. 1001)157, Omagbhomi v. Nigeria Airways Ltd (2006)16 NWLR (Pt. 1011) 310. Oloriode v. Oyebi 0984)5 SC 260 at 282. Bronik Motors v. Wema Bank Ltd (1983)1 SCNLR 296. Senate President v. Nzeribe (2004)9 NWLR (Pt. 878)251, Oloba v. Akereja 0988) 3 NWLR (pt. 84)508. Moses v. State (2006)11 NWLR (Pt. 992)458, Faghola v. KC.C.LMA (2006)6 NWLR (Pt. 977)43 Gombe v. P.W. Nigeria Ltd (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 402) 402. D.E.N.R. Ltd v. Trans Int’l Bank Ltd (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1119) 399.
It is trite that jurisdiction being a threshold issue, it is fundamental to the exercise by a court of the powers conferred on it by Section 6(6) (a) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Jurisdiction of court is the life line of an action. It is the font et origo of the authority of the court to hear and determine a suit. Consequently any adjudication or trial conducted without jurisdiction is a nullity, no matter how well conducted. See Equity Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. Halilco (Nig) Ltd (2006)7 NWLR (Pt. 980)568 at 586, N.D.LC v. C.B.N. (2002)7 NWLR (Pt. 766)272. PER HON. JUSTICE ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
JURISDICTION: CONDITION FOR THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION BY A COURT
For a court to exercise jurisdiction in a matter or a case, it must satisfy the following conditions:
“(i). it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another;
(ii). the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevent the court from exercising its jurisdiction; and
(iii). the case comes before the court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.”
See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962)2 SCNLR 341, Sea Trucks (Nig) Ltd v. Anigboro (2001)2 NWLR (Pt. 696)159, A.G. Lagos State v. Dosunmu (1989)3 NWLR (Pt. 111)552, Altine v. Afribank Plc (2000)15 NWLR (Pt. 689)181, Mark v. Eke (2004)5 NWLR (Pt. 865)54, Cotecna International Ltd v. Ivory Merchant Bank Ltd & 2 Ors (2006)9 NWLR (Pt. 985)275. PER HON. JUSTICE ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
JURISDICTION: HOW IS JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY COURT
It has also long been settled by a plethora of authorities, that jurisdiction of court is determined by reference to the plaintiff’s claim or reliefs sought. In a way, it is the claim before the court that has to be examined in order to ascertain whether or not it comes within the jurisdiction of the court. This is because only the claims or reliefs donate jurisdiction to the court. See Tukur v. Govt. of Gongola State (No. 2) (1989)4 NWLR (Pt. 117)517, Western Steel Works v. Iron and Steel Workers (No.2) (1987)1 NWLR (Pt. 49) 284, Abdulhamid v. Talal Akar (2006)13 NWLR (Pt. 996)127, Adeyemi v. Opeyori (1976) 9-10 SC 31 Mustapha v. Governor of Lagos State (1987) 2 NWLR (pt. 58) 539 at 568. PER HON. JUSTICE ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
COURT: WHICH COURT HAS JURISDICTION IN RESPECT OF LAND MATTERS
I wish to start by the Land Use Act, which is an existing law by virtue of Section 315(5) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’). The Land Use Act is a special Federal enactment which has been accorded extraordinary status by the aforementioned section of the constitution. Though it is not an integral part of the constitution, but claims special protection under Section 9(2) of the constitution in terms of its amendment. See Adisa v. Oyinwola (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 674) 116, Nkwocha v. Govt. Ananmbra State (984) 1 SC NLR 634, Sections 39(1) (a) (b) and 41 of the Land Use Act, Cap 202 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 provides thus:
39(1). The High Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in respect of the following proceedings:
(a). proceedings in respect of any land the subject of a statutory right of occupancy granted by the Governor or deemed to be granted by him under this Act; and for the purposes of this paragraph, proceedings includes proceedings for a declaration of title to a statutory right of occupancy.
(b). proceedings to determine any question as to the persons entitled to compensation payable for improvements on land under this Act.
41. An area court or customary court or other court of equivalent jurisdiction in a State shall have jurisdiction in respect of proceedings in respect of a customary right of occupancy granted by a Local Government under this Act; and for the purposes of this paragraph ‘proceedings’ includes proceedings for a declaration of title to a customary right of occupancy and all laws including rules of court regulating practice and procedure of such courts shall have effect with such modifications as would enable effect to be given to this section.”
The above reproduced sections of the Land Use Act, have denoted and delineated the courts that are vested with jurisdiction to entertain actions in land matters which do not include the Federal High Court. This point has been settled beyond any peradventure by the Supreme Court in the case of Adisa v. Oyinwola (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 674) 116. The point is well captured at page 217 of the law report where the apex court, elaborated thus:
“…while the State High Court has exclusive jurisdiction over lands in urban area by virtue of section 39(1) of the Land Use Act, it shares concurrent jurisdiction with the customary or other court of equivalent jurisdiction by virtue both of its entrenched unlimited jurisdiction under section 236(1) of the Constitution and the jurisdiction conferred on the said customary court or other court by section 41 of the Land Use Act.”
It is clear from the foregoing exposition of the jurisdiction of courts in land matters, that the Federal High Court is not one of the courts vested with jurisdiction by Sections 39 and 41 of the Land Use Act, to entertain land matters. See Achebe v. Nwosu (2003) 7 NWLR (pt. 818) 103, Omotosho v. Abdullahi (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt.1072) 526, Sanni v. Ademiluyi (2003) 3 NWLR (pt. 807) 381, Patrick Erhunmwunse v. John Ehanire (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt.837) 353. PER HON. JUSTICE ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
RAPHAEL CHIKWE AGBO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ADZIRA GANA MSHELIA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ADAMU JAURO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL RESEARCH Appellant(s)
AND
NATIONAL UNION OF ROAD TRANSPORT WORKERS Respondent(s)
HON. JUSTICE ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment) :This is an appeal against the ruling of the Federal High Court Lagos, coram B. B. Aliyu J, delivered on 7th May, 2007 striking out the plaintiffs/appellant’s suit for want of jurisdiction.
The facts culminating in this appeal are very simple and straight forward and can be aptly summarized thus: The plaintiff now appellant, a parastatal under the Federal Ministry of Health, was established by the National Science and Technology Development Agency Decree No.5 of 1977. The plaintiff instituted the suit leading to this appeal at the Federal High Court Lagos on 14/6/06 claiming ownership of a triangular piece of land measuring 8.8 acres situated at Edmund Crescent, Yaba Lagos and occupied by the defendant now respondent. The defendant neither entered appearance nor filed any defence to the plaintiff’s claim. The matter came up before the trial court on 16/11/06, 1/2/07 and 22/2/07, respectively. The trial court raised the issue of jurisdiction on 22/2/07 and directed the plaintiff to address it, on whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
The plaintiff now appellant addressed the trial court on the issue of jurisdiction on 7/5/07, and the matter was adjourned for ruling. In a considered ruling delivered on 7/5/07, the trial court struck out the plaintiff’s suit in the following words at pages 34-35 of the record:
“Land is not one of the items on which the State High Court exclusive jurisdiction is taken away, nor is it listed under section 251 of the 1999 constitution. The State High Court retains its jurisdiction exclusively. It is note worthy to state that the plaintiff also seeks damages for trespass, if its title is established, and trespass to land is not a subject matter within the jurisdiction of this Court. In the final analysis, I hold that this Court does not have jurisdiction to determine the plaintiffs claim. It is hereby struck out.”
Aggrieved with the said ruling, the plaintiff lodged an appeal against it, pursuant to a notice of appeal anchored on a lone ground dated and filed on 3/8/07. The notice of appeal can be found at pages 36 and 37 of the records. For the purposes of this judgment, the plaintiff and the defendant will hereinafter be referred to as appellant and respondent, respectively. In compliance with the Rules of Court, the appellant’s brief dated 17/12/07 was filed on 27/12/07. Pursuant to an application by the appellant, an order for the substituted service of the processes in this appeal on the respondent was granted on 16/12/09. Consequently the respondent was served the appellant’s brief of argument dated 17/12/07 by substituted means. The respondent however did not file any brief of argument.
On 10th March, 2010 the date fixed for hearing the appeal, the respondent was not represented, though served hearing notice on 3/3/10. Mr. Jude Odome for the appellant adopted and relied on the appellant’s brief which was settled by Mr. O.E. Abang, in urging this court to allow the appeal. Learned counsel submitted that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction under Section 251(1) (r) of the 1999 Constitution to entertain the action, hence urged this court to resolve the lone issue for determination in favour of the appellant and allow the appeal. As earlier indicated in this judgment, the respondent did not file any brief of argument, so the merits of the appeal will be determined on the appellant’s brief of argument. The lone and singular issue for determination distilled from the sole and only ground of appeal is this:
‘Having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in NEPA v. Edegbenro (supra), whether the trial court was right in striking out the suit in want of jurisdiction’.
Learned counsel started by saying that the jurisdiction of any court to hear and determine any suit is provided by statute and the law in existence when the cause of action arose. Learned counsel further stated the general position of the law to the effect that in determining whether a court has jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs claim, the writ of summons and the statement of claim must be considered to determine the nature of the Claim as disclosed by the facts. Learned counsel however submitted that under Section 251(1) (r) of the 1999 Constitution, where an agency of the Federal Government is a party whether sued as the defendant or suing as the plaintiff, it is the party or parties that determine the jurisdiction of the court, irrespective of the nature of the claim. Learned counsel further submits that the claim of the appellant being in respect of title to land, ordinarily ought to have been filed at the State High Court but because the appellant is an agency of the Federal Government, section 251(1) (r) of the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court.
Learned counsel stated that the Supreme Court interpreted Section 230(1) of Decree 107 of 1993, which is in pari material with Section 251(1) (r) of the 1999 Constitution in the case of NEPA v. Edegbenro (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798)79 at 97. Learned counsel submits that ‘any action’ as stated in Section 251 (1) (r) of the Constitution has been interpreted by the apex court in the aforementioned case to mean, any claim involving agencies of Federal Government of Nigeria, can only be entertained by the Federal High Court. Learned counsel posits that the trial court was in error to have declined jurisdiction relying on Section 39(1) of the Land Use Act, as conferring exclusive jurisdiction on State High Court on a claim of title to land. Learned counsel submits that that Land Use Act is deemed to be an Act of the National Assembly and where the said Act is in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution, the Constitution prevails. Learned counsel therefore argued that Section 39(1) of the Land Use Act should be read subject to the provisions of Section 251(l) (r) of the Constitution, which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court where an agency of the Federal Government is a party notwithstanding the nature of the claim in the suit.
Learned counsel further argued that the position has been settled by a full panel of this court to the effect that Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain suits involving Federal Government or its agencies, notwithstanding the fact that the subject matter of the suit involves title to land. In support of this contention, reference was made to the case of Minister of Works v. Shittu (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1060) 351 at 374. Learned counsel contended that the facts in the instant case and NEPA v. Edegbenro (supra) on the one hand, are distinguishable from the case of Onuorah v. KRPC Ltd (2005)6 NWLR (Pt. 922) 393 which the trial court relied on in striking out the suit for want of jurisdiction. Learned counsel attempted making a faint distinction between the instant case and 0nuorah’s case and argued that the apex court in Onuorah’s case never overruled its position in NEPA v. Edegbenro (supra). Learned counsel therefore contended that the principle of law stated in NEPA v. Edegbenro (supra) is still the law and that the trial court applied Onuorah’s case out of con. In concluding, learned counsel urged the court to allow the appeal and hold that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s case.
The issue involved in this appeal, once more brings into fore the jurisdictional aluta and friction between the Federal High Court on the one hand and the High Court of a State.The issue of jurisdiction is very fundamental as it goes to the competence of a court or tribunal, hence it can be raised at any stage. It is the centre pin that the entire litigation hinges upon. It can be raised for the first time on appeal without necessarily obtaining leave to do so, and can be raised by the court suo motu. See Oyakhire v. State (2006)15 NWLR (Pt. 1001)157, Omagbhomi v. Nigeria Airways Ltd (2006)16 NWLR (Pt. 1011) 310. Oloriode v. Oyebi 0984)5 SC 260 at 282. Bronik Motors v. Wema Bank Ltd (1983)1 SCNLR 296. Senate President v. Nzeribe (2004)9 NWLR (Pt. 878)251, Oloba v. Akereja 0988) 3 NWLR (pt. 84)508. Moses v. State (2006)11 NWLR (Pt. 992)458, Faghola v. KC.C.LMA (2006)6 NWLR (Pt. 977)43 Gombe v. P.W. Nigeria Ltd (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 402) 402. D.E.N.R. Ltd v. Trans Int’l Bank Ltd (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1119) 399.
It is trite that jurisdiction being a threshold issue, it is fundamental to the exercise by a court of the powers conferred on it by Section 6(6) (a) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Jurisdiction of court is the life line of an action. It is the font et origo of the authority of the court to hear and determine a suit. Consequently any adjudication or trial conducted without jurisdiction is a nullity, no matter how well conducted. See Equity Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. Halilco (Nig) Ltd (2006)7 NWLR (Pt. 980)568 at 586, N.D.LC v. C.B.N. (2002)7 NWLR (Pt. 766)272.
For a court to exercise jurisdiction in a matter or a case, it must satisfy the following conditions:
“(i). it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another;
(ii). the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevent the court from exercising its jurisdiction; and
(iii). the case comes before the court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.”
See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962)2 SCNLR 341, Sea Trucks (Nig) Ltd v. Anigboro (2001)2 NWLR (Pt. 696)159, A.G. Lagos State v. Dosunmu (1989)3 NWLR (Pt. 111)552, Altine v. Afribank Plc (2000)15 NWLR (Pt. 689)181, Mark v. Eke (2004)5 NWLR (Pt. 865)54, Cotecna International Ltd v. Ivory Merchant Bank Ltd & 2 Ors (2006)9 NWLR (Pt. 985)275.
It has also long been settled by a plethora of authorities, that jurisdiction of court is determined by reference to the plaintiff’s claim or reliefs sought. In a way, it is the claim before the court that has to be examined in order to ascertain whether or not it comes within the jurisdiction of the court. This is because only the claims or reliefs donate jurisdiction to the court. See Tukur v. Govt. of Gongola State (No. 2) (1989)4 NWLR (Pt. 117)517, Western Steel Works v. Iron and Steel Workers (No.2) (1987)1 NWLR (Pt. 49) 284, Abdulhamid v. Talal Akar (2006)13 NWLR (Pt. 996)127, Adeyemi v. Opeyori (1976) 9-10 SC 31 Mustapha v. Governor of Lagos State (1987) 2 NWLR (pt. 58) 539 at 568.
What then are the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff in order to determine whether they fall within the perimeter and jurisdictional ambit of the lower court.
The appellant by its writ of summons and statement of claim, both dated 14th June, 2006 claimed against the respondent, the following reliefs:
WHERE THE PLAINTIFF CLAIMS AS FOLLOWS:
(a) A declaration that the deed of conveyance dated 14/11/55 registered as MOO172 at the Lands registry Lagos on 2/7/56 vesting title of 8.8 acre triangular piece of land (including the portion occupied by the defendant lying and situate at Edmund Crescent/Yaba Lagos city way Yaba on the plaintiff by virtue of sections 16 and 17 of West African Council for Medical research Act Cap 215 laws of the Federation 1954 being an existing law having regards to the provisions of section 315 of 1999 Constitution is valid and subsisting.
(b) A declaration that the plaintiff is the owner of a portion of 8.8 acre piece of land illegally occupied by the defendant subject matter of this suit situate at Edmund Crescent/Yaba City Way, Yaba Lagos.
(c) A declaration that any act of alienation, partitioning, allocation or sale of a portion of 8.8 acre triangular piece of land subject matter of this suit by any person in favour of the defendant is unlawful, illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(d) An Order nullifying any contract and/or setting aside any purported certificate of occupancy or any deed of transfer issued by any person any being the plaintiff in this suit in favour of the defendant.
(e) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant either by itself or its agents, servants, privies and assigns or however from trespassing or entering on the land or erecting on the land in a manner inconsistent with the interest of the plaintiff pending the hearing and determination of this suit and with N500,000.00 against the defendants as damages for trespass.”
As earlier indicated in this judgment, all the reliefs sought zero down on declaration of title to land.
The contention of the appellant is that, on the authority of NEPA v. Edegbenro (supra), the plaintiff being an agency of the Federal Government, only the Federal High Court is seized with jurisdiction to entertain the matter. In support of this contention, learned counsel heavily relied on the case of Minister of Works and Housing v. Shittu (supra). Learned counsel further submitted that the case of Onuorah v. K.R.P.C. Ltd (supra) never overruled the decision in NEPA v. Edegbenro (supra). Learned counsel further contended that Section 251(1) (r) of the 1999 Constitution has vested the Federal High Court with exclusive jurisdiction to entertain any matter where the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party, irrespective of the nature of the case or claims sought. The foregoing submissions forming the backbone supporting the appeal will be meticulously x-rayed and dissected vis-a-vis other Constitutional provisions, relevant laws and decided authorities.
I wish to start by the Land Use Act, which is an existing law by virtue of Section 315(5) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’). The Land Use Act is a special Federal enactment which has been accorded extraordinary status by the aforementioned section of the constitution. Though it is not an integral part of the constitution, but claims special protection under Section 9(2) of the constitution in terms of its amendment. See Adisa v. Oyinwola (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 674) 116, Nkwocha v. Govt. Ananmbra State (984) 1 SC NLR 634, Sections 39(1) (a) (b) and 41 of the Land Use Act, Cap 202 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 provides thus:
39(1). The High Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in respect of the following proceedings:
(a). proceedings in respect of any land the subject of a statutory right of occupancy granted by the Governor or deemed to be granted by him under this Act; and for the purposes of this paragraph, proceedings includes proceedings for a declaration of title to a statutory right of occupancy.
(b). proceedings to determine any question as to the persons entitled to compensation payable for improvements on land under this Act.
41. An area court or customary court or other court of equivalent jurisdiction in a State shall have jurisdiction in respect of proceedings in respect of a customary right of occupancy granted by a Local Government under this Act; and for the purposes of this paragraph ‘proceedings’ includes proceedings for a declaration of title to a customary right of occupancy and all laws including rules of court regulating practice and procedure of such courts shall have effect with such modifications as would enable effect to be given to this section.”
The above reproduced sections of the Land Use Act, have denoted and delineated the courts that are vested with jurisdiction to entertain actions in land matters which do not include the Federal High Court. This point has been settled beyond any peradventure by the Supreme Court in the case of Adisa v. Oyinwola (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 674) 116. The point is well captured at page 217 of the law report where the apex court, elaborated thus:
“…while the State High Court has exclusive jurisdiction over lands in urban area by virtue of section 39(1) of the Land Use Act, it shares concurrent jurisdiction with the customary or other court of equivalent jurisdiction by virtue both of its entrenched unlimited jurisdiction under section 236(1) of the Constitution and the jurisdiction conferred on the said customary court or other court by section 41 of the Land Use Act.”
It is clear from the foregoing exposition of the jurisdiction of courts in land matters, that the Federal High Court is not one of the courts vested with jurisdiction by Sections 39 and 41 of the Land Use Act, to entertain land matters. See Achebe v. Nwosu (2003) 7 NWLR (pt. 818) 103, Omotosho v. Abdullahi (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt.1072) 526, Sanni v. Ademiluyi (2003) 3 NWLR (pt. 807) 381, Patrick Erhunmwunse v. John Ehanire (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt.837) 353.
I now move to Section 272(2) of the 1999 Constitution which conferred unlimited jurisdiction on the State High Court and it provides thus:
“272 (1). Subject to the provisions of Section 251 and other provisions of this Constitution, the High Court of a State shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear and determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any person.”
The jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is provided for under Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution. S. 251(1) (p) (q) (r) and (8) being the relevant subsections to this case, will be reproduced hereunder for ease of reference.
“251 (1). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and an addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters :
(a)-(o) ……
(P) the administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies.
(q) subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the operation and interpretation of this Constitution in so far as it affects the Federal Government or any of its agencies;
(r) any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies.
(s)…..
Provided that nothing in the provisions of paragraphs (p), (q) and (r) of this subsection shall prevent a person from seeking redress against the Federal Government or any of its agencies in an action for damages, injunction or specific performance where the action is based on any enactment, law or equity.”
The contention of the appellant is that Section 251(1) (r) of the 1999 Constitution has vested the Federal High Court with jurisdiction to entertain any matter, once the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party irrespective of the nature of the case or claims sought. Learned counsel relying on NEPA v. Edegbenro (supra), argued that though the case as constituted is a land matter, the appellant being an agency of the Federal Government only the Federal High Court is seized with jurisdiction. The case of NEPA v. Adegbenro (supra) was decided in 2002 and followed by this court in Minister of Works & Housing v. Shittu (supra). At this juncture, I find it apposite to make a reference to the case of Onuorah v. K.R.P.C Ltd (2005) 6 NWLR (pt. 921) 393. The aforesaid case was an appeal against the decision of the Federal High Court in respect of a case on simple contract for the purchase of specified number of empty tins at an agreed price. The main contention of the appellant was that the Federal High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the action based on Section 230(1) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree No. 107 of 1993 because the respondent is a subsidiary of NNPC hence an agency of the Federal Government. The apex court stated that the determining factor of jurisdiction is the plaintiff’s claim as endorsed in the writ of summons and statement of claim and the question whether the respondent is a subsidiary or agent of the NNPC or not has no role when a consideration of jurisdiction is being made. Consequently, the apex court held that the Federal High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a claim based on simple contract. The case of Onuorah v. KRPC Ltd (supra) is no doubt a fresh breath of judicial air in the suffocating ambience of controversy over the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.The case being the latest in time and having settled the controversy, I am bound by it.
The aforementioned provision of the constitution namely section 251(1) (a)-(s) does not confer blanket jurisdiction to the effect that any action against the Federal Government or its agencies, notwithstanding the nature of the claim must be instituted at the Federal High Court. To confer jurisdiction exclusively on the Federal High Court, the matter must be civil and must relate or seek participation or role in the administration, management or control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies. The process must also disclose an action or proceedings for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive, administrative action or decision by the federal Government or any of its agencies. The section does not confer jurisdiction on parties but on the subject matter of the suit. The plaintiff/appellant’s claims in the instant case do not fall within the area exclusively reserved for the federal High Court, but were seeking for declaration of title to land, injunction and damages.
In Omotosho v. Abdullalli (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1072) 526 at 547 D-F, my noble lord, Salami JCA now PCA had this to say:
“The mere making the Federal Government or its agencies party in a process does not automatically vest jurisdiction in the Federal High Court by dint of section 230(1) of 1979 Constitution as amended which is repeated ipsissima verba in section 251 of 1999 Constitution. The provisions of the two sections are in pari materia. They do not confer jurisdiction on parties but on subject matter or nature of the suit. Once a matter, such as this, arises, the claim of the plaintiff or claimant must be carefully examined to determine to which of the High Courts, State or Federal, does jurisdiction belong. The Supreme Court in the case of Onuorah v. Kaduna Refining and Petrochemical Co. Ltd. (2005) All FWLR: (Pt. 256) 1356, (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) 393 seems to have finally put the controversy at rest.”
1 Another authority in point is the case of Omosowan v. Chiedozie (1998) 9 NWLR (Pt. 566) 477 at 484 wherein Akpabio JCA stated thus:
“To shorten the whole matter, I have to say that I have myself gone through the whole of S. 230(1)(a) – (s) of Decree 107 of 1993 and can see no blanket provision that says that any suit against the Federal Government’ regardless of the subject matter of the suit must be justiciable or entertained in the Federal High Court and no where else. Only a few selected topics are made the exclusive preserve of the Federal High Court. See the cases of the 7up Bottling Co. v. Abiola & Sons Bottling Co. Ltd. (1996) 7NWLR (Pt. 463) 714; University of Abuja v. Ologe (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt. 445) 706 and Akegbejo v. Dr. Ataga (1998) 1 NWLR (Pt.534) 459.” My lord, Olagunju JCA (of blessed memory) in agreeing with the views of Akpabio JCA stated above, had this to say in Achebe v. Nwosu (2003) 7NWLR (Pt. 818) 107 at pages 134 -135.
“Therefore, I agree with the view of my learned brother, Akpabio, JCA. In Omosowan v. Chiedozie supra quoted above, the subsection 230(1) of the Constitution does not contain a blanket provision that any suit against the Federal Government or any of her agencies must be heard by only the Federal High Court regardless of the subject matter. This calls to mind a similar caution to the Federal High Court in Mandara v. A-G., Federation (supra) at page 331, over the inordinate disposition of that court to assume jurisdiction over any matter on the slightest pre as long as such matter is embossed with the logo of the Federal Government or of any of her agencies.
It cannot be over-emphasised the axiom that the anatomy of the Federal High’ Court like that of an individual should not be made to bite off more than it can chew for the good of its digestive system.”
See also P.P.M.C. Ltd v. Delphi Petroleum Inc. (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt. 928) 458 at 490 – 491, Nkuma v. Odili (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt.977) 587 at 602.
In FMBN v. Lagos State Govt & Ors (2010)5 NWLR (Pt.1188) 570 at page 601 E-G, my learned brother Mshelia JCA, made the point succinctly in the following words:
“From all what I have said above since land matter is not included on the list mentioned under section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution, it would still be within the competence of State High Court to entertain claim relating to land matters.
In other words it is State High Court that has jurisdiction to entertain claim relating to land matters. I am of the firm view that Federal High Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a suit in which the applicant is a party and which involves or affects land given the provisions of section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as well as the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria Act (Cap. F16) LFN, 2004, from the foregoings therefore, the answer to question two is in the negative.”
A combined effect of the foregoing, is that Section 251(1) (r) does not confer jurisdiction on the Federal High Court because the appellant is an agency of the Federal Government, as contended by the learned counsel. The section does not confer jurisdiction on parties but on the subject matter of the suit. The mere fact that an action or suit is embossed with the logo of Federal Government or any of its agencies does not confer jurisdiction on the Federal High Court, resort must be made to the claims of the plaintiff. See Tukur v. Govt of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117. Orthopaedic Hospitals Management Board vs. Garba (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 788) 538 at 563 Adelekan v. Ecu-Line N. V. (2006) 12 NWLR Pt. 993 33 at 52 N.N.P.C v. SLB Consortium Ltd 1008 16 NWLR (Pt. 1113) 297. By a conflation of Sections 39(1) and 41 of the Land Use Act and Section 251 (1) (P) (q) (r) of the constitution, the action as constituted being for declaration of title to land, does not fall within the areas exclusively reserved for the Federal High Court, even where Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party. Hence the decision of the learned trial judge that Federal High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the action founded on declaration of title to land is on a sound legal footing and cannot be faulted.
As a consequence of the foregoing, the appeal is totally lacking in merit and substance and is hereby dismissed. The ruling of the Federal High Court Lagos delivered on 7th May, 2007 is hereby affirmed. There will be no order as to costs as the respondent neither put in any appearance nor filed brief of argument.
RAPHAEL CHIKWE AGBO, J.C.A: I have read before now the lead judgment written and read by my learned brother JAURO, JCA and I completely agree with his reasoning and conclusions. He has in the lead judgment dealt effectively and comprehensively with the issue of the limited subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. I have nothing to add. I abide by all the orders contained in the lead judgment.
.
ADZIRA GANA MSHELIA, J.C.A: I read in advance the judgment just delivered by my learned brother Jauro, J.C.A. and I agree with the reasoning contained therein and the conclusion arrived thereat.
Jurisdiction is a threshold issue. It is the lifeline of an action, thus once a court lacks jurisdiction, it lacks the necessary competence to try the case at all. See: Achebe v. Nwosu (2003) 7 NWLR (Pt 818) 103, Akeem v. UNIBADAN (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt 829) 584 and Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341.
The Federal High Court is a creature of statute conferred with specific jurisdiction by the Federal High Court Act and Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
The Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction in matters listed in Section 251(1) of the Constitution. All other items not set out in the section would still be within the competence of the State High Court. I have examined the provisions of S.251(1) of the 1999 Constitution, but I have not seen where it is stated or suggested that the Federal High Court is empowered or has jurisdiction to entertain claims relating to land matters. It is apparent that land matter is not included in the additional jurisdiction vested in the Federal High Court. See: Onuorah v. Kaduna Refining & Petrochemical Co. Ltd. (2005) 6 NWLR (pt 921) 393. The apex court per Akintan JSC at pages 405 while construing section 230(1) which is in pari materia with section 251(1) stated as follows:
“In other words, section 230(1) provides a limitation to the general and all embracing jurisdiction of the State High Court because the items listed under the said section 230(1) can only be determined exclusively by the Federal High Court. All other items not included in the list would therefore still be within the jurisdiction of the State High Court.”
In resolving the issue of jurisdiction as it relates to S.251 (1) of the Constitution the apex court identified two guiding factors that is subject matter of litigation and parties. Where Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party to a case, it is not automatic that the said matter must be brought to Federal High Court for hearing and determination. See: NNPC v. SLB Consortium Ltd. (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt 1113) 297.
For the above reasons and the more detailed reasons given in the lead judgment, I too dismiss the appeal as lacking in merit. I also affirm the ruling of the Federal High Court Lagos delivered on 7th May, 2007 and abide by the order made as to cost.
Appearances
Jude Odome Esq.For Appellant
AND
Absent and not represented.For Respondent



