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NIGERIA SECURITY & CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS & ORS v. MR. FRANK OKO (2019)

NIGERIA SECURITY & CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS & ORS v. MR. FRANK OKO

(2019)LCN/13686(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Tuesday, the 23rd day of July, 2019

CA/C/72/2018

 

JUSTICES

MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

1. NIGERIA SECURITY & CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS
2. THE STATE COMMANDANT, NIGERIA SECURITY & CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS, CROSS RIVER STATE COMMAND
3. MR. AYUK ASSAM JOHN (D.O) THE DIVISIONAL OFFICER IN CHARGE OF OGOJA DIVISION OF THE NIGERIA SECURITY & CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS
4. MR. MICHAEL AKWO
5. MR. SUNDAY ANOH
6. MR. DANIEL EBOR
7. MR. WILFRED ODEY Appellant(s)

AND

MR. FRANK OKO Respondent(s)

RATIO

THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF JURISDICTION

The law mandates the Courts to accord prime attention to issue of jurisdiction first where it germinates from any proceedings, see Okwu v. Umeh (2016) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1501) 120; Brittania-U (Nig) Ltd. v. Seplat Pet. Dev. Co. Ltd. (2016) 4 NWLR (P. 1503) 541; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193; Ngere v. Okuruket ?xiv? (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1559) 440. I will pay total obedience to this legal commandment so as not to insult the law.

Jurisdiction, a mantra in adjudication, connotes the authority/power of a Court to determine a dispute submitted to it by contending parties in any proceeding, see Ajomale v. Yaduat (No. 1) (1991) 5 SCNJ 172; Mobil Pro. Co. Unltd v. LASEPA (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 1; Ndaeyo v. Ogunaya (1977) 1 IM SLR 300; Ebhodaghe v. Okoye (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 472; Society Bic S.A. v. Charzin Ind. Ltd. (2014) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1398) 497; Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 114; A. ? G., Kwara State v. Adeyemo (2017) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1546) 210; Isah v. INEC (2016) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1544) 175.
A Court of law is invested with jurisdiction to hear a matter when: ?1. it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and 2. the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and 3. The case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction?, see Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (2006) 2 LC 2081961) NSCC (vol. 2) 374 at 379, per Bairamian F. J., Tukur v. Taraba State (1997) 6 SCNJ 81;Dairo v. UBN (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1029) 164; Okereke v. Yar? Adua (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1100); Saraki v FRN (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) 531; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193; Okpe v. Fan Milk Plc. (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1549) 282; Bello v. Damisa (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1550) 455; Osi v. Accord Party (2017) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1553) 387. These three ingredients must co-exist in order to vest jurisdiction in a Court. PER OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

DEFINITION OF A CAUSE OF ACTION

In the first place, it is foremost to understand the purport of reasonable cause of action. In Uwazuruonye v. Gov., Imo State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 28 at 51, Onnoghen, JSC (as he then was)defined it as:
a cause of action which, when only the allegation in the statement of claim and, I may add originating process, are considered to have some chances of success.
It is decipherable from the definition, that it is a statement of claim, or its equivalent in an originating process, that determines the existence or otherwise of reasonable cause of action. Put differently, a Court has to examine a statement of claim, or its equivalent, to reach a conclusion whether a suit discloses a reasonable cause of action or not. In such juridical exercise, a Court need not examine the whole averments, in the appropriate process, seriatim, but pluck out those that form the gravamen of the claim, see Seven-Up Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Abiola & Sons (2001) 5 MJSC 93/(2001) 13 NWLR (Pt. 730) 469; Yare v. N.S.W & I.C. (2013) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1367) 173; Atiba Iyalamu Savings & Loans Ltd. v. Suberu (2018) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1637) 387. PER OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT A STATEMENT OF CLAIM DETERMINES THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

Interestingly, the case-law has endorsed, in toto, a statement of claim as the major barometer to be used by the Court to measure the presence or absence of its jurisdiction, see Ikine v. Edjerode (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 745) 446; A.D.H. Ltd. v. A.T. Ltd. (2006) NWLR (Pt. 989) 635; Oni v. Cadbury (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Ladoja v. Ajimobi (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1519) 87; B.B. Apugo & Sons Ltd. v. O.H.M.B. (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 206; Yar?adua v. Yandoma (2015) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1466) 213; Akpamgbo-Okadigbo v. Chidi (No. 2) (2015) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1466) 124; Isah v. INEC (supra); Lau v. PDP (supra); Azubuogu v. Oranezi (supra); Agi v. PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1595) 386; A.-G, Fed. v. A.-G., Anambra State (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1615) 314; Roe Ltd. v. UNN (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1616) 420; F.U.T., Minna v. Olutayo (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 176; A.-G., Lagos State v. Eko Hotels (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 518.
Notably, in an action commenced by dint of an application, as in the case in hand, the affidavit in support serves as the statement of claim, see Ahmed v. Ahmed (2013) 12 SCM (Pt. 2) 55; Elelu-Habeeb v. A.-G., Fed. (2012) 3 SCM 74; Akande v. Adisa, Arowolo v. Olowookere (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1278) 280; Bakare v. Ajose-Adeogun (2014) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1403) 320; Uwazuruonye v. Gov., Imo State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 28; PDP v. Ezeonwuka (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1606) 187; Lau v. PDP (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608) 60; Owuru v. Adigwu (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 1; CBN v. Aribo (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608) 130; Mainstreet Bank Capital Ltd. v. Nig. RE (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1640) 423. PER OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT ABSENCE OF REASONABLE CAUSE OF ACTION ENTAILS LACK OF LOCUS STANDI TO FILE AN ACTION

Absence of reasonable cause of action, entails lack of locus standi to file an action, seeUwazuruonye v. Gov., Imo State (supra). Interestingly, the case-law has endorsed, in toto, a statement of claim as the major barometer to be used by the Court to measure the presence or absence of its jurisdiction, see Ikine v. Edjerode (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 745) 446; A.D.H. Ltd. v. A.T. Ltd. (2006) NWLR (Pt. 989) 635; Oni v. Cadbury (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Ladoja v. Ajimobi (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1519) 87; B.B. Apugo & Sons Ltd. v. O.H.M.B. (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 206; Yar?adua v. Yandoma (2015) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1466) 213; Akpamgbo-Okadigbo v. Chidi (No. 2) (2015) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1466) 124; Isah v. INEC (supra); Lau v. PDP (supra); Azubuogu v. Oranezi (supra); Agi v. PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1595) 386; A.-G, Fed. v. A.-G., Anambra State (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1615) 314; Roe Ltd. v. UNN (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1616) 420; F.U.T., Minna v. Olutayo (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 176; A.-G., A.G Lagos State v. Eko Hotels (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 518. PER OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT IT IS THE PRIMARY DUTY OF THE TRIAL COURT TO EVALUATE EVIDENCE OF WITNESSES CALLED BY PARTIES IN A PROCEEDINGS

The law has saddled a trial Court, like the lower Court herein, with the primary duty to evaluate relevant and material evidence, both oral and documentary, after hearing and watching the demeanour of witnesses called by the parties in any proceedings having regard to their pleadings. To discharge that bounden duty, a trial Court must show how and why it arrived at its findings of fact and final determination of the issues before it. It has to be cautious and understand the distinction between summary or restatement of evidence and evaluation of evidence which means assessment of evidence and giving them probative value. It appraises evidence by constructing an imaginary scale of justice and putting the evidence of the parties on the two different pans of the scale. Then, it weighs them to determine which is heavier, not in terms of quantity, but quality of the testimonies, see Mogaji v. Odofin (supra); Olagunju v. Adesoye (2009) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1146) 225; Oyewole v. Akande (supra); Ayuya v. Yonrin (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1254) 135; Adusei v. Adebayo (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1288) 534; Odutola v. Mabogunje (2013) 7 LR (Pt. 1356) 522; Ndulue v. Ojiakor (2013) 8 NWL.R (Pt 1356) 11; Odutola v. Mabogunje (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1354) 522. PER OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT CASE LAWS GIVE THE COURT THE NOD TO EVALUATE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

Interestingly, the case-law gives the Courts the nod to evaluate documentary evidence, see Fagunwa v. Adibi (2004) 17 NWLR (Pt. 903) 544. Admirably, the law, in order to foreclose any injustice, donates concurrent jurisdiction to this Court and the lower Court in evaluation of documentary evidence, see Gonzee (Nig.) Ltd. v. NERDC (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 943) 634; Olagunju v. Adesoye (2009) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1146) 225; Ayuya v. Yorin (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt 1254) 135; Eyibio v. Abia (2012) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1325) 51; Odutola v. Mabogunje (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1354); CPC v. Ombugadu (2013) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1385) 66; UTC (Nig) Plc. v. Lawal (2014) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1400) 221; Ogundalu v. Macjob (2015) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1460) 96; Onwuzuruike v. Edoziem (2016) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1508) 215; Ezechukwu v. Onwuka (2016) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1506) 529, C.K. & W.M.C. Ltd. v. Akingbade (2016) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1533) 487. PER OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal queries the correctness of the decision of the Federal High Court, sitting at Calabar (hereinafter addressed as ?the lower Court?), coram judice: I. E. Ekwo, J., in Suit No. FHC/CA/FHR/47/2016, delivered on 8th January, 2018. Before the lower Court, the appellants and the respondent were the respondents and the applicant respectively.

The facts of the case, which metamorphosed into the appeal, are amenable to brevity and simplicity. On 7th January, 2016, a petrol tanker, with Reg. No. UMA 77 YW, belonging to Tonimas Nigeria Limited, driven by one Nseobong James Udom, successfully, arrived Ogoja from Port-Harcourt at about 9.am. The petrol tanker, which contained Automobile Gasoline Oil (AGO), diesel, was intercepted by the third ? seventh appellants, officers of the first appellant, at the Ogoja Local Government Council gate. They commandeered it into their office in the Council?s premises on the allegation that the product therein was being diverted. Its driver, Nseobong James Udom, gave a distress call to the respondent, the manager of

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the petrol service station where it was to discharge the AGO, over the detention of the petrol tanker. The respondent, with his cashier Raphael Ogbe, rushed to the Council?s premises. On claiming ownership of the product, the third ? seventh respondents brutalised and beat him up, with legs, fists, slaps, belts and rifles, humiliated him by way of frog-jump, arrested and detained him and extorted money from him for no just cause. The respondent reported the incident to the police, but the appellants refused to honour the police invitation. Sequel to these, the respondent, beseeched the lower Court, via an application, filed on 18th May, 2016, under the fundamental right procedure, and tabled against the appellants, jointly and severally, the following reliefs:
(i) A DECLARATION that the arrest, detention, assault, battery, humiliation and brutalization of the Applicant by the Respondents, is wrongful, illegal, unconstitutional, callous, inhuman and a blatant violation of the Appellant’s fundamental rights to the dignity of his human person, personal liberty and freedom of movement as enshrined in Sections 34, 35 and

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41 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and Articles 4, 5 and 6 of Chapter 1 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap. A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.
(ii) A DECLARATION that the actions of the Respondents, particularly the 3rd to 7th Respondents, in arresting, detaining, brutalizing, intimidating and traumatizing the Applicant; extorting and seizing/confiscating monies from him without any lawful cause, all amounts to abuse of office, ultra vires their statutory responsibilities and powers as provided for in the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act, No. 6 of 2007; Cap. N146, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2010 and thus illegal, unconstitutional and tantamount to a violation of the Applicant’s fundamental rights to the dignity of his human person, personal liberty and freedom of movement as enshrined in Sections 34, 35 and 41 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) as well as Articles 4, 5 and 6 of Chapter 1 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap. A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.

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(iii) AN ORDER OF MANDATORY INJUNCTION directing the Respondents, particularly the 3rd to 7th Respondent to pay the Applicant the sum of One Hundred Thousand Naira (N100,000.00) extorted from him before the Applicant and the other three persons in the vehicle were released on 7th January, 2016 and the other sum of Eight Hundred and Sixty Thousand Naira (N860,000.00) seized, confiscated or stolen by the 3rd ? 7th Respondents from the Applicant’s Toyota Camry saloon car No. ABJ903HY driven into the Respondents’ premises by the Applicant; amounting to a total sum of Nine Hundred and Sixty Thousand Naira (N960,000.00) only.
(iv) AN ORDER directing the Respondents to jointly and severally pay the Applicant the sum of One Hundred Million Naira (N100,000,000.00) only, as damages in exemplary and aggravated nature, for the embarrassment, harassments, humiliation, torture, pains, psychological, mental and physical trauma the Applicant was exposed to and suffered as a result of the inhuman, malicious and degrading treatments of the Applicant by the Respondents and for the breach of the Applicant’s fundamental rights to the dignity

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of his human person, personal liberty and freedom of movement as enshrined in Sections 34, 35 and 41 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) as well as Articles 4, 5 and 6 of Chapter 1 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap. A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.
(v) AN ORDER OF MANDATORY INJUNCTION directing the Respondents, to jointly and severally pay to the Applicant the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Naira (N200,000,00) only being his total medical bill for his medical treatment at the Police Clinic at Ogoja occasioned by the assault and battery on him by the Respondents.
(vi) AN ORDER OF MANDATORY INJUNCTION directing the Respondents, to jointly severally pay to the Applicant the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Naira (N200,000.00) per day and for the 25 days the Respondents detained the Applicant’s truck with Reg. No. UMA 77 YW on the false and erroneous allegation that the Applicant was diverting the AGO in the tanker, amounting to a total sum of Five Million Naira (N5,000,000.00) only for depriving the Applicant of the use of the vehicle.
(vii) AN

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ORDER OF MANDATORY INJUNCTION directing the Respondents to tender a written unreserved public apology to the Applicant within thirty (30) days from the date of the judgment which should be published in at least three (3) National dailies or as may be directed by the Court.

In reaction, the appellants joined issue with the respondent and denied liability by filing a counter-affidavit.

Following the rival claims, the lower Court, duly, heard the application/suit. In a considered judgment, delivered on 8th January, 2018, found at pages 160-194 of the printed record, the lower Court granted the respondent?s claims.

The appellants were dissatisfied with the judgment. Hence, on 23rd January, 2018, they lodged a 2-ground notice of appeal seen at pages 195-198 of the record. Subsequently, the appellants, with the leave of this Court, filed an amended notice of appeal on 20th February, 2018 and deemed properly filed on 20th February, 2018, which hosts 2 grounds, and prayed this Court:
1. An Order.
(a) Of this Honourble Court allowing the Appeal, and striking out of the Applicant?s/Respondent?s suit as not being properly

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initiated by due process of law and for want of jurisdiction.
(b) Setting aside the Judgment/Ruling/Consequential order and entire decision of the learned trial judge delivered on the 8th Day of January, 2018, in Suit No. FHC/CA/FHR/47/2016.
(c) An order directing the Applicant/Respondent to pay the Respondents/Appellants the sum of Two Million Naira (N2,000,000.00) only as cost for the time and resources wasted.
Thereafter, the parties filed and exchanged their respective briefs of argument in line with the procedure regulating the hearing of civil appeals. The appeal was heard on 7th May, 2019.

During its hearing, learned counsel for the appellants, B. G. C. Ugwu, Esq., adopted the appellants? brief of argument, filed on 22nd March, 2018, as representing his arguments for the appeal. He urged the Court to allow it. Similarly, learned counsel for the respondent, Eno Edet, Esq., adopted the respondent?s brief of argument, filed on 24th May, 2018, as forming his reactions against the appeal. He urged the Court to dismiss it.

In the appellants? brief of argument, learned counsel distilled two issues for determination

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to wit:
1. Whether the learned trial Judge erred in law when he assumed jurisdiction over this case in the absence of any reasonable cause of action.
2. Whether the judgment of the lower Court in this suit is against the weight of evidence, and whether the learned trial Judge erred in law when he granted the reliefs sought by the Respondent without the Respondent placing any minimum proof or sufficient credible evidence before the lower Court to show that any of his rights under the Constitution was violated.
Admirably, learned respondent?s counsel adopted the two issues crafted by the learned appellants? counsel.

Arguments on the issues:
Issue one.
Learned counsel for the appellants explained the meaning of reasonable cause of action and how to show its existence as noted in Pfizer Specialties Ltd. v. Chyzob Pharmacy Ltd (2006) LPELR ? 11780 (CA); FRN v. Abacha (2014) LPELR ? 22355 (CA); Nokia West Africa v. 2 Shotz (2016) LPELR ? 40189 (CA). He submitted that the respondent?s originating processes did not show reasonable cause of action. He added that the Court would look at a writ of summons

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or statement of claim to find out if a case showed reasonable cause of action. He relied on Samuel Osigwe v. PSPLS Management Consortium Ltd. (2009) LPELR ? SC 244/2006. He posited that the lower Court wrongly assumed jurisdiction over the matter when no reasonable cause of action was shown. He described the lower Court?s proceedings as a nullity. He referred to Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) SCNLR 347; Oloba v. Akereja (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 84) 550; Hitech. Const. Co. Ltd. v. Ude (2016) LPELR ? 40066 (CA). He concluded that the lower Court should have dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction.

On behalf of the respondent, learned counsel contended, per contra, that the originating processes showed that respondent?s fundamental right was infringed and so the suit showed reasonable cause of action. He explained that in originating application, affidavit evidence would take the place of statement of claim. He relied on Ebirim v. Agbuaba (2016) All FWLR (Pt. 826) 675. He enumerated the factors that would show cause of action as noted in Chukwu v. Akpelu (2014) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1424) 359; Uwazuruonye v. Gov. Imo State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355)

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28; Diamond Petroleum Intern Ltd. v. Gov., CBN (2015) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1478) 179. He maintained that the suit disclosed reasonable cause of action. He referred to Faseye v. A.-G., Ogun State (2015) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1485) 216.

Issue two:
Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the judgment was against the weight of evidence. He posited that the Court had the duty to evaluate the whole evidence adduced by the parties in order to come to the right conclusion. He relied on Eze v. Okoloagu (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1180) 183; Musa v. Nugia (2014) LPELR ? 23234 (CA). He observed that based on the affidavit evidence, the preponderance of evidence weighed in favour of the appellants. He narrated the facts of the cases of both the respondent and the appellants. He asserted that the lower Court wrongly held that the appellants acted ultra vires their statutory powers under the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Act, Cap. N146, Laws of Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2010. He stated that diversion of petroleum products or dealing in petroleum products without appropriate authority were offences known to Nigerian law and any one might, on suspicion of committing

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the same, be invited by the appellants for questioning. He described the stopping of the petrol tanker as done in reasonable suspicion of the driver committing offence of diversion of petroleum products.

He posited that the respondent?s allegation was false and that after a few interrogations and undertaking, they were released on that same 7th January, 2016 at about 1.30pm. He noted that the respondent did not prove the assertion: infringement of his fundamental rights as required under Section 135(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011. He described the respondent?s affidavits, without particulars, as bare assertions. He relied on Egesimba v. Onuzuruike (2002) 9-10 SC 1. He persisted that it was the duty of the respondent to provide sufficient material evidence to enforce his fundamental rights. He referred to Fajemirokun v. Commercial Bank Nig. Ltd. (2009) LPELR ? 1231 (SC); Faith Okafor v. Lagos State Government (2016) LPELR ? 41066 (CA).

For the respondent, learned counsel argued that the evidence on record showed that the appellants violated the respondents fundamental rights provided in

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Sections 34, 35 and 41 of the Constitution, as amended. He narrated the respondent?s case as shown in the affidavit. He posited that the documentary evidence, usually used as hangers to reconcile conflicts in affidavits, showed that the respondent proved his case. He cited Alfa v. Attai (2018) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1611) 59. He stated that the lower Court, rightly held that documentary evidence could not be varied by oral evidence. He referred to Ukeje v. Ukeje (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1418) 384. He said that the lower Court?s finding on the assault on the respondent was not appealed against and binding on the appellants. He cited Ogbebor v. INEC (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1614) 1; Ibero v. Ume-Ohana, (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt. 227) 510; Oluma v. Onyuna (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt. 443) 449.

Learned counsel contended that the allegation of reasonable suspicion of commission of crime was debunked in the respondent?s further affidavit. He described the affidavit of the appellants on the release of the petrol tanker as contradictory which weakened their case. He referred to Arjay Ltd v. A.M.S. Ltd. (2003) 7 NWLR (Pt. 820) 577. He claimed that the respondent?s signatures in Exhibits MEU 1 and MEU 2 showed

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that he did not sign Exhibit CD2. He described Exhibits CD 1 and CD 2, not the first appellant?s letter headed paper, as of doubtful origin which a Court should not rely on. He relied on Garuba v. K.I.C. Ltd. (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 917) 16. He concluded that award of compensation would follow breach of fundamental right. He cited UBA v. Olawole (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 605) 375.

Resolution of the issues:
In total loyalty to the dictate of the law, I will attend to issue one first. The reason is plain. It evinces a jurisdictional question. The law mandates the Courts to accord prime attention to issue of jurisdiction first where it germinates from any proceedings, see Oku v. Umeh (2016) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1501) 120; Brittania-U (Nig) Ltd. v. Seplat Pet. Dev. Co. Ltd. (2016) 4 NWLR (P. 1503) 541; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193; Ngere v. Okuruket ?xiv? (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1559) 440. I will pay total obedience to this legal commandment so as not to insult the law.

Jurisdiction, a mantra in adjudication, connotes the authority/power of a Court to determine a dispute

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submitted to it by contending parties in any proceeding, see Ajomale v. Yaduat (No. 1) (1991) 5 SCNJ 172; Mobil Pro. Co. Unltd v. LASEPA (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 1; Ndaeyo v. Ogunaya (1977) 1 IM SLR 300; Ebhodagbe v. Okoye (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 472; Society Bic S.A. v. Charzin Ind. Ltd. (2014) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1398) 497; Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 114; A. ? G., Kwara State v. Adeyemo (2017) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1546) 210; Isah v. INEC (2016) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1544) 175.
A Court of law is invested with jurisdiction to hear a matter when: ?1. it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and 2. the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and 3. The case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction?, see Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (2006) 2 LC 2081961) NSCC (vol. 2) 374 at 379, per Bairamian F. J., Tukur v. Taraba State (1997) 6 SCNJ 81;

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Daro v. UBN (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1029) 164; Okereke v. Yar? Adua (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1100); Saraki v FRN (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) 531; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193; Okpe v. Fan Milk Plc. (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1549) 282; Bello v. Damisa (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1550) 455; Osi v. Accord Party (2017) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1553) 387. These three ingredients must co-exist in order to vest jurisdiction in a Court.

Now, the kernel of the issue, which appears/seems a nagging one, is canalised within narrow compass. It chastises the lower Court?s assumption of jurisdiction over the respondent?s suit, which mothered the appeal, when it disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

In the first place, it is foremost to understand the purport of reasonable cause of action. In Uwazuruonye v. Gov., Imo State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 28 at 51, Onnoghen, JSC (as he then was) defined it as:
a cause of action which, when only the allegation in the statement of claim and, I may add originating process, are considered to have some chances of success.
?It is decipherable from the

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definition, that it is a statement of claim, or its equivalent in an originating process, that determines the existence or otherwise of reasonable cause of action. Put differently, a Court has to examine a statement of claim, or its equivalent, to reach a conclusion whether a suit discloses a reasonable cause of action or not. In such juridical exercise, a Court need not examine the whole averments, in the appropriate process, seriatim, but pluck out those that form the gravamen of the claim, see Seven-Up Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Abiola & Sons (2001) 5 MJSC 93/(2001) 13 NWLR (Pt. 730) 469; Yare v. N.S.W & I.C. (2013) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1367) 173; Atiba Iyalamu Savings & Loans Ltd. v. Suberu (2018) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1637) 387. Absence of reasonable cause of action, entails lack of locus standi to file an action, see Uwazuronye v. Gov., Imo State (supra).

Interestingly, the case-law has endorsed, in toto, a statement of claim as the major barometer to be used by the Court to measure the presence or absence of its jurisdiction, see Ikine v. Edjerode (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 745) 446; A.D.H. Ltd. v. A.T. Ltd. (2006) NWLR (Pt. 989) 635; Oni v. Cadbury (2016) 9 NWLR

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(Pt. 1516) 80; Ladoja v. Ajimobi (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1519) 87; B.B. Apugo & Sons Ltd. v. O.H.M.B. (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 206; Yar?adua v. Yandoma (2015) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1466) 213; Akpamgbo-Okadigbo v. Chidi (No. 2) (2015) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1466) 124; Isah v. INEC (supra); Lau v. PDP (supra); Azubuogu v. Oranezi (supra); Agi v. PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1595) 386; A.-G, Fed. v. A.-G., Anambra State (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1615) 314; Roe Ltd. v. UNN (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1616) 420; F.U.T., Minna v. Olutayo (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 176; A.-G., Lagos State v. Eko Hotels (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 518.
Notably, in an action commenced by dint of an application, as in the case in hand, the affidavit in support serves as the statement of claim, see Ahmed v. Ahmed (2013) 12 SCM (Pt. 2) 55; Elelu-Habeeb v. A.-G., Fed. (2012) 3 SCM 74; Akande v. Adisa, Arowolo v. Olowookere (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1278) 280; Bakare v. Ajose-Adeogun (2014) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1403) 320; Uwazuruonye v. Gov., Imo State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 28; PDP v. Ezeonwuka (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1606) 187; Lau v. PDP (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608) 60; Owuru v. Adigwu (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 1; CBN v. Aribo (2018) 4 NWLR

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(Pt. 1608) 130; Mainstreet Bank Capital Ltd. v. Nig. RE (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1640) 423.

In due fidelity to the desire of the law, I have consulted the record, the bedrock of the appeal, especially at the residence of the respondent?s affidavit in support of the application which colonises pages 9-15 of it. I have perused the 45-paragraph affidavit. Admirably, even though it suffers from verbosity, it is submissive to easy comprehension. The meat of the respondent?s grievance, discernible from the averments in the affidavit, is simple. On 7th January, 2016, the respondent alleged that, at Ogoja Local Government Area premises, the third ? seventh appellants, who are employees and answerable to the first and second appellants, beat, assaulted (with all kinds of clubs/weapons around them), humiliated, restrained and detained him without any justification or provocation whatsoever. He labelled those acts as a violation of his inviolable right to dignity of human person, personal liberty and freedom of movement as enshrined in Sections 34, 35 and 41 of the Constitution, as amended, respectively.
?Indubitably, these fundamental rights are:

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?rights attaching to man as a man because of his humanity?, see Mustapha v. Governor of Lagos State. (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 58) 53 at 589, per Oputa, JSC. They fall within the perimeter of species of negative rights and stand atop in the pyramid of laws and other positive rights and constitute a primary condition for a civilised existence, see Kuti v. A.-G., Fed. (1996) 41 LRCN 200; Odogwu v. Kuti v. A.-G. Fed. (1996) 9-10 SCNJ 51. Due to their kingly positions in the firmament of human rights, Section 46 of the Constitution, as amended, allocates to every Nigerian citizen whose fundamental right is, or being, harmed, even qua timet, to approach the court to prosecute his complaint and obtain redress, see Sea Trucks (Nig.) Ltd. v. Anigboro (2001) 2 NWLR (Pt. 695) 159; Fajemirokun v. C. B. Nig. Ltd. (2009) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1135) 588; W.A.E.C. v. Adeyanju (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1092) 270; Lafia Local Govt. v. Gov., Nasarawa State (supra); Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517; Jack v. UNAM (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) 208; Gafar v. Government of Kwara State (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1024) 375; Amale v. Sokoto Local Govt. (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1292)

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181; Jim-jaja v. C.O.P., Rivers (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1350) 225; Denton-West v. Jack (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1377) 205; Emeka v. Okoroafor (2017) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 92; F.B.N. Plc. v. A.-G., Fed. (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 121; F.U.T., Minna v. Olutayo (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 176; EFCC v. Diamond Bank Plc (2018) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1620) 61.

The brief juridical survey, which revealed that the respondent erected the infractions of his rights on fundamental rights, with their appurtenant inelastic characteristics, with due reverence, exposes the poverty of the learned appellants? dazzling argument on the issue. The respondent?s suit, which parented this appeal, has some chances of success embedded in it. It, therefore, qualifies to receive the toga of reasonable cause of action. In effect, the appellants? charge of non-disclosure of reasonable cause of action against it is unsustainable. Indeed, it is not guilty of it. The lower Court did not, in the least, fracture the law when it entertained it. On this premise, I dishonour the appellants? enticing invitation to crucify the respondent?s action on the undeserved altar of non-disclosure of

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reasonable cause of action, or want of jurisdiction, for lack of legal justification. In the end, I have no choice than to resolve issue one against the appellants and in favour of the respondent.

Having dispensed with issue one, I proceed to settle issue two. Here, the appellant?s chief grievance orbits around the lower Court?s evaluation of the evidence. Put bluntly, the appellants accused the lower Court of improper evaluation of evidence because the judgment was against the weight of evidence.

A castigation of a decision on the premise that a judgment is against the weight of evidence, invariably couched as an omnibus ground, connotes that the decision of the trial Court cannot be supported by the weight of evidence advanced by the successful party which the Court either wrongly accepted or that the inference it drew or conclusion it reached, based on the accepted evidence, is unjustifiable in law. Also, it implies that there is no evidence, which if accepted, will buttress the finding of the trial Court. Furthermore, it denotes that when the evidence adduced by the complaining appellant is weighed against that given by the

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respondent, the judgment rendered to the respondent is against the totality of the evidence placed before the trial Court. In ascertaining the weight of evidence, the trial Court is enjoined, by law, to consider whether the evidence is admissible, relevant, credible, conclusive or more probable than that given by the other party, see Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 3 SC91; Anyaoke v. Adi (1986) 2 NSCC, Vol. 17, 799 at 806/(1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 31) 731; Nwokidu v. Okanu (supra) (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1181) 362; Akinlagun v. Oshoboja (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 993) 60; Gov., Lagos State v. Adyiga (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1293) 291; Oyewole v. Akande (2009)15 NWLR (Pt. 1163) 11; Agala v. Okusin (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1202) 412.

The law has saddled a trial Court, like the lower Court herein, with the primary duty to evaluate relevant and material evidence, both oral and documentary, after hearing and watching the demeanour of witnesses called by the parties in any proceedings having regard to their pleadings. To discharge that bounden duty, a trial Court must show how and why it arrived at its findings of fact and final determination of the issues before it. It has to be cautious and

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understand the distinction between summary or restatement of evidence and evaluation of evidence which means assessment of evidence and giving them probative value. It appraises evidence by constructing an imaginary scale of justice and putting the evidence of the parties on the two different pans of the scale. Then, it weighs them to determine which is heavier, not in terms of quantity, but quality of the testimonies, see Mogaji v. Odofin (supra); Olagunju v. Adesoye (2009) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1146) 225; Oyewole v. Akande (supra); Ayuya v. Yonrin (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1254) 135; Adusei v. Adebayo (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1288) 534; Odutola v. Mabogunje (2013) 7 LR (Pt. 1356) 522; Ndulue v. Ojiakor (2013) 8 NWL.R (Pt 1356) 11; Odutola v. Mabogunje (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1354) 522. I have married the decision of the lower Court with the positions of law displayed above with a view to deciphering their infractions or compliance.

It is germane to place on record, that sea of documentary evidence were furnished before the lower Court by the feuding parties. Interestingly, the case-law gives the Courts the nod to evaluate documentary evidence, see Fagunwa v. Adibi (2004) 17 NWLR

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(Pt. 903) 544. Admirably, the law, in order to foreclose any injustice, donates concurrent jurisdiction to this Court and the lower Court in evaluation of documentary evidence, see Gonzee (Nig.) Ltd. v. NERDC (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 943) 634; Olagungu v. Adesoye (2009) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1146) 225; Ayuya v. Yonrin (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt 1254) 135; Eyiboh v. Abia (2012) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1325) 51; Odutola v. Mabogunje (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1354); CPC v. Ombugadu (2013) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1385) 66; UTC (Nig) Plc. v. Lawal (2014) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1400) 221; Ogundalu v. Macjob (2015) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1460) 96; Onwuzuruike v. Edoziem (2016) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1508) 215; Ezechukwu v. Onwuka (2016) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1506) 529, C.K. & W.M.C. Ltd. v. Akingbade (2016) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1533) 487. I will tap from this co-ordinate jurisdiction in the appraisal of the army of documents in the appeal.

I have once again visited the record: the spinal cord of the appeal. The appellants? 41-paragraph wordy counter-affidavit is wrapped between pages 109-113 of the record. The respondent?s prolix 45-paragraph affidavit and 10-paragraph further affidavit monopolise pages 9-15 and 135-137 of the record respectively.

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I have given a clinical examination to those affidavits of the contending parties. They are obedient to appreciation.

The hub of the respondent?s case is that his fundamental rights to dignity of human person, personal liberty and freedom of movement were, unjustifiably, eroded/curtailed by the appellants. Contrariwise, the focus of the appellants? case is a complete denial of the respondent?s assertion. Thus, a juxtaposition of the affidavits of the contending parties, clearly, reveals that they are irreconcilable on the crux of the matter: the violation or otherwise of the respondent?s fundamental rights. In legal domain, conflict in affidavits denotes ?the persisting violent disagreements in the averments of the contending parties which makes it unsafe, and indeed impossible, for the Court, in the face of the disagreement, to prefer from the affidavits of both, the position of one to the other?, Ezechukwu v. Onwuka (2016) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1506) 526 at 552, per M. D. Muhammad, JSC.
?In this regard, I will deploy one cardinal principle of law to resolve the affidavit evidentiary impasse. It is this. Where the

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affidavits of the contending parties are in conflict, the Court is at liberty to use any documents, in support of them, as the beacon to gauge their veracity, see Lafia Local Govt. v. Gov., Nasarawa State (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1328) 94; Nagogo v. CPC (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1339) 448; Gbileve v. Addingi (2014) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1433) 394; Atungwu v. Ochekwu (2013) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1375) 605. Of course, the law assumes any side buttressed by the documents as speaking the truth. In any event, since the affidavits are not parol, which involves credibility of deponents, this Court is eminently qualified to assess them without seeing and assessing their demeanors, see Ezechukwu v. Onwuka (supra).

As already noted, the casus belli in the case was/is whether the appellants violated/trampled on the respondent?s inviolable rights to dignity of human person, personal liberty and freedom of movement as consecrated/entrenched in Sections 34, 35 and 41 of the Constitution, as amended. Exhibit MEU-2, Doctor?s report, encased in page 18 of the record, issued by the Nigeria Police Force, a co-law enforcement agency with the first appellant, is a concrete confirmation of the

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beatings meted to the respondent by the appellants. Exhibits MEU-3-3F, which occupy pages 20-32 of the record, are pungent visual and pictorial evidence that showcase/display the injuries sustained by the respondent in the hands of the appellants. Exhibit MEU-6, Police Investigation Report, located at pages 43-46 of the record, solidifies the respondent?s assertion and, at once, punctures the appellants? stance. It stems from these, that the exhibits MEU-2, 3-3F and 6, inter alia, demolish the feeble defence of denial erected by the appellants to castrate the respondent?s case. In sum, those exhibits lend support to the respondent?s case while treating the appellants as being economical with truth.

I have read the 22-page judgment of the lower Court, pasted at pages 160-186 of the record, which habours no ambiguity, with the finery of a tooth comb. Indubitably, the lower Court, to my mind, carried out a meticulous and thorough analyses of the evidence, oral and documentary, proffered by the warring parties after assigning them to their respective pans in the imaginary scale of justice. It attached deserving probative weight to the

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respective evidence professed by the parties. It found that the respondent?s pan in the imaginary scale of justice hosted more admissible, credible and conclusive evidence than that of the appellants?. A piece of evidence is credible when it is worthy of belief, see Agbi v. Ogbeh (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 990) 1; Dim v. Enemuo (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1149) 353; Eta v. Dazie (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 248; A. J. Inv. Ltd. v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc. (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 380; Emeka v. Chuba-Ikpeazu (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1589) 345. In the same vein, a piece of evidence is conclusive if it leads to a definite result, see Nruamah v. Ebuzoeme (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1372) 474. The lower Court found, rightly in my view, that the evidence of the respondent, based on their qualitative nature, preponderated over those of the appellants.

In the twilight of the evaluation of the evidence, at page 183, lines 19-22, of the record, the lower Court found:
This case must therefore succeed on it (sic) merit as I have evaluated the affidavit and documentary evidence of the Applicant [respondent] and found them to be admissible, relevant, credible, conclusive and more probable

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than that tendered by the respondents.

Given the legal anatomy, conducted in due consultation with the law, the lower Court?s ultimate solemn finding is immaculate and unimpeachable. The lower Court did not defile the adjectival law be guilty of improper or perfunctory evaluation of the evidence furnished before it by the parties. As a result, all the strictures, which the appellants rained against its evaluation of evidence, are rendered lame and pale into insignificance. It will smell of judicial sacrilege to intervene in a finding that is not hostile to the law. That is not the raison d? etre for appellate adjudication. In all, I will not hesitate to resolve issue two against the appellants and in favour of the respondent.

On the whole, having resolved the two issues against the appellants, the destiny of the appeal is obvious. It is devoid of any tinge of merit and deserves the penalty of dismissal. Consequently, I dismiss the appeal. Accordingly, I affirm the lower Court?s judgment delivered on 8th January, 2018 in the terms decreed in it. The parties shall bear the respective costs they incurred in the prosecution and defence

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of the ill-fated appeal.

MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment delivered by my learned brother Obande Festus Ogbuinya, JCA. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion and I also agree that the appeal be dismissed.
I abide with the order as to costs.

YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.: My learned brother, OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, JCA gave me the privilege of reading in advance the draft of the judgment delivered. I am in complete agreement with him on the detailed analysis and resolution of the issues distilled for resolution in this appeal.

The legal principle requiring a claimant to establish a cause of action is not strictly applicable to fundamental Right proceedings where a third party can initiate fundamental rights proceedings on behalf of another and as allowed by the Rules. see DILLY VS. IGP & ORS. (2016) LPELR-41452CA) where I said:
“The basic question to ask is who can apply to enforce a fundamental right. The Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rule 2009 defines who an applicant is, in the following words: “A

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party who files an application or on whose behalf an application is filed under the Rules.” It is obvious that an application can filed on of another going by definition of an applicant in the rules itself. Reinforcing the definition is the Preamble to the Rules which states thus: ‘The Court shall encourage and welcome public interest litigations in the human rights field and no human rights case may be dismissed or stuck out for want of locus standi. In particular, human rights, advocates or groups as well as any non ? governmental, organizations, may institute human rights application on behalf of potential applicant. In human rights litigation, the applicant may include any of the following.
i. Anyone acting in his interest.
ii. Anyone acting on of another.
iii. Anyone acting as a member of, or the interest of a group or class of persons.
iv. Anyone acting in public interest.
v. Association in the interest of its members or other individuals or groups.
Furthermore, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria also allowed person who suspects that his rights are likely to be breached to initiate proceedings. Therefore, the legal principles requiring that facts or events must have

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occurred to inure the right to sue in normal civil proceedings strictly speaking cannot apply to fundamental right proceedings which could be initiated by a third party who is not personally affected. Fundamental rights are too important to circumscribed by other legal principles and that is why special rules were made to guide claims where the rights of a person have been breached or likely to be breached.

The trail Court was therefore right in his findings and I agree with my learned bother in his order dismissing the appeal for lacking in merit. I also abide by the other orders made in the lead judgment.

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Appearances:

B.G.C. Ugwu, Esq.For Appellant(s)

Eno Edet, Esq. with him, A.J. Akobi, Esq., U.O. Igwenyi, Esq., R.S. Ubana, Esq. and I.J. Undiandeye, Esq.For Respondent(s)

 

Appearances

B.G.C. Ugwu, Esq.For Appellant

 

AND

Eno Edet, Esq. with him, A.J. Akobi, Esq., U.O. Igwenyi, Esq., R.S. Ubana, Esq. and I.J. Undiandeye, Esq.For Respondent