NIGER PROGRESS LIMITED V. NORTH EAST LINE CORPORATION
In The Supreme Court of Nigeria
On Friday, the 28th day of April, 1989
SC.46/1988
JUSTICES
ANDREWS OTUTU OBASEKI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
AUGUSTINE NNAMANI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
ADOLPHUS GODWIN KARIBI-WHYTE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
SALIHU MODIBBO ALFA BELGORE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
PHILLIP NNAEMEKA-AGU Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
NIGER PROGRESS LIMITED Appellant(s)
AND
NORTH EAST LINE CORPORATION Respondent(s)
RATIO
THE LAW ON AGENCY GOVERNING DISCLOSED AGENT, DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL
The law on agency governing disclosed agent, disclosed principal is not in doubt and their rights and liabilities to third parties are clearly set out in Bowstead on Agency 14th Ed. p. 231 Article 78.
A disclosed principal may sue or be sued on any contract made on his behalf and in respect of any money paid or received on his behalf by his agent acting within the scope of his actual authority (Duke of Norfolk v. Worthy (1808) 1 Camp 337). PER OBASEKI, J.S.C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE SUPREME COURT WILL GRANT LEAVE FOR A NEW MATTER TO BE RAISED BEFORE IT
It is settled by a long line of cases that this Court will grant leave for a new matter to be raised in this Court only if such a matter raises substantial issues of law and procedure and is essential to avoid a miscarriage of justice. But leave is granted under well defined and settled principles one of the most important of which is that such leave will not be granted when to grant it will be to allow the applicant take out a new case not previously taken in the lower Courts – see Akpene v. Barclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd. & Anor. (1977) 1 S.C. 471; Agnes Deborah Ejiofodomi v. H.C. Okonkwo (1982) 11 S.C. 74; Samuel Fadiora v. Festus Gbadebo (1978) 3 S.C. 219, 247, 249; I.P.D. Abaye v. Ofili and Anor. (1986) 1 S.C. 231, at 234, 235; Attorney-General of Oyo State & Anor. v. Fairlakes Hotel Ltd. (1988) 5 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 92) 1. PER NNAMAI, J.S.C.
OBASEKI, J.S.C. (Delivering The Leading Judgment): The short point in this appeal is whether the appellant is entitled to have proceedings in the claim before the High Court stayed pending its reference to an arbitrator and the hearing and determination of the arbitration.
The appellant’s brief gave a brief genesis of this action when it reads:
“The suit arose out of a contract agreement Exhibit “A” entered into on 19th July, 1981 between the respondent on the one hand and a Yugoslavian duly incorporated company called SOUR FAP-Farnos Beograd. The contract agreement incorporated in Article seven (7) reference to arbitration in the event of “any dispute that may arise from this agreement.” As at the time the respondent took out the writ, no reference was made to arbitration. Thereupon, the appellant filed the objection in limine aforementioned.”
The preliminary points of objection raised by the appellant before the High Court of Justice, Borno State of Nigeria, holden at Maiduguri are as follows:
“(i) That the action is incompetent;
(ii) The suit is not properly constituted and it should be dismissed, and
(iii) The Honourable Court has no jurisdiction.”
The grounds upon which the said objection was founded were:
(a) A condition precedent to the institution of this suit has not been fulfilled by the plaintiffs, that is to say, compliance with the provisions of Article SEVEN (7) of the Contract Agreement between Sour Fap-Famos Beograd and the 1st plaintiff (defendant erroneously put down in the record) of 19th July, 1981 relating to reference to settlement by arbitration;
(b) The 2nd plaintiff is not a juristic person with capacity to sue and be sued eo nomine. In the result the second plaintiff has no locus standi.
The Contract Agreement was concluded between SOUR FAP-FAMOS BEOGRAD of BELGRADE, Francusha 61-65 (hereinafter referred to as Seller) which expression within the con of this Agreement shall also include its successors and assignees. AND the Company, Messrs. NORTH EAST LINE CORPORATION, Maiduguri, Nigeria (hereinafter referred to as Buyer) which expression within the con of this Agreement shall also include its successors and assignees. Article 7 of the Contract Agreement reads.
“Any dispute that may arise from this agreement, the contracting parties will try to solve in a peaceful way. Otherwise, the contracting parties will solve the dispute in accordance with Arbitration Laws of Nigeria or Yugoslavia provided however that any party not satisfied with the decision of the Nigerian or Yugoslav Arbitration can apply for appeal to the Arbitration Council of the Chamber of Commerce in Zurich, whose decision is final.”
After hearing arguments of counsel on the preliminary objection, the learned trial Judge, Ikeotuonye, J. delivered a considered ruling upholding the objection and made the orders prayed for in the following terms;
“(1) The Borno State Government, the second plaintiff is struck out from this action;
(2) The action itself is stayed pending reference to arbitration in terms of Article 7 of the Contract Agreement Exhibit ‘A’. I make no order as to costs.”
Before making the second order, the learned trial Judge said in his Ruling:
“The learned defendant’s counsel has also submitted that for the plaintiffs suit to be properly constituted, the plaintiff must have capacity to take out the writ and the defendant must have capacity to defend the action. He contended that the taking out of the action was a violation of sections 2 and 5 of the Arbitration Act, Cap.13, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos 1958. He argued that it was a condition precedent to the commencement of the action under Article 7 of the Exhibit ‘A’ that any dispute that might arise under that Agreement, the contracting parties would try to resolve it in a peaceful way, failing which they should resolve the dispute in accordance with the Arbitration Laws of Nigeria or Yugoslavia. This, he said, the plaintiffs have failed to do. The defendant’s principal, the foreign company, by affidavit evidence had disclosed its readiness and willingness to arbitrate.
The learned plaintiff’s counsel had countered that submission by contending that there was no evidence before this Court, whether affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant had authority of the foreign company to receive the sum of N620,000.00 from the plaintiff – a contention which this Court rejected.”
After quoting section 5 of the Arbitration Act, the learned trial Judge said:
“In the matter in hand, I am satisfied that the question in dispute, that is the payment by the first plaintiff to the foreign company of the sum of N620,000.00 representing 15% of the contract amount shown in Exhibit’ A’. It has never been disputed that the first plaintiff and the foreign company entered into Exhibit ‘A’ which I consider a binding contract.
2. The defendant has taken no step in the proceedings alter entering a conditional though unnecessary, appearance.
3. The foreign company, that is, Sour Fap-Famos Beograd, was ready and willing to arbitrate before the commencement of this suit and has stated in its further affidavit that the time for arbitration has not expired.
4. There is no sufficient reason why this matter should not be referred to arbitration in accordance with the Agreement Exhibit ‘A’.”
What were the claims made against the appellant. They are as endorsed in the writ of summons and set out at page 2 of the record and read:
“1. The first plaintiff is a state owned corporation established under the Borno State Law and has its main office at Commercial Road, Maiduguri while the 2nd plaintiff is the Borno State Government.
2. The defendant on or about the 25th day of January, 1982 received from the plaintiff the sum of N20.000.00 representing 15% of total contract value of vehicles to he supplied by the defendant’s partners Sour Fap-Famos Beograd of Belgrade under a written contract dated 19th June, 1981.
3. The defendant undertook to remit the money through the Central Bank of Nigeria to the said defendant’s partners in Belgrade.
4. The defendant did not remit the money to Sour Fap-Famos of Belgrade and the vehicles were by that reason not supplied to the plaintiff.
5. In the premises, the consideration for the payment of N620.000.00 has wholly failed and the defendant has had and received the said sum to the use of the plaintiff:-
Being dissatisfied with the Ruling, the 1st plaintiff appealed successfully to the Court of Appeal. Two grounds of appeal were filed and argued. Without some of their particulars, they read:
Ground (1) The learned trial Judge misdirected himself in law in holding that under the written contract reference to arbitration was a condition precedent to the institution of the action against the respondent
Particulars
(a) Omitted
(b) The respondent was never a party to the written agreement; (Exhibit A) and cannot take the benefit arising from that agreement
(c) The terms of the contract cannot consistently with settled principles of Nigerian Law, be construed as giving the respondent any right to demand reference to arbitration as a condition precedent to the institution of the action;
(d) Omitted
(e) The appellant had no action against Sour Fap Famos Beograd, the party to the Agreement because of the stipulations in Article 9 of the Agreement read in conjunction with Article 4 and the respondent had not set up further stipulations contrary to the written Agreement;
Ground 2 The learned trial Judge misdirected himself in law in holding that under Article 8 of the written Agreement (Exhibit A) the respondent was the Agent of Sour Fap Famos Beograd.
Particulars of Misdirections
Since the contract has been reduced into writing, it is the writing that the learned trial Judge must look (a) for the whole of the terms made by the parties. Article 8 relates to matters yet to be agreed between Sour Fap Famos Beograd and the respondent and can only mean that the parties mentioned therein have not agreed on all the essential terms.”
After reading the briefs of argument filed by the parties and hearing counsel to the parties in oral arguments, the Court of Appeal (coram Akanbi, Abdullahi and Joe Jacks, JJ.C.A.) unanimously allowed the appeal, set aside the ruling of the learned trial Judge staying proceedings in the suit and referring the matter to arbitration and ordered the hearing of the substantive suit. Akanbi, J.C.A., delivering the lead judgment of the Court of Appeal, said in the closing paragraphs:
“Indeed, the learned trial Judge found and I agree that the respondent is not a party to (the agreement) Exhibit A. He held this to be common ground. No where in Exhibit A was it alleged that the respondent was to act as the agent of the foreign company. And the learned trial Judge must have appreciated this when in his judgment, he said:
“It is reasonable to infer the circumstances of the case that the defendant was to play the role of the agent of the foreign company.”
With respect, I do not think that on the materials before the court, that can be a proper and legitimate inference to draw.
That said, I am led to the conclusion that the trial Judge was wrong to have held that the respondent was/is an agent of the foreign company. Exhibit A clearly did not create such relationship.
In the circumstances, the respondent ought not have been allowed to invoke Article 7 to stay the action in the High Court. In the results, I allow this appeal, set aside the ruling of the Maiduguri High Court in suit No.M/I5/86 delivered on 16th July, 1986 and order that the hearing of the substantive suit be proceeded with accordingly.”
The defendant/respondent was not satisfied with the judgment and has accordingly brought this appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Court of Appeal Six grounds of appeal were filed but as the length of the grounds will not permit full reproduction here, I will set out the part germane and relevant to the issues raised:
1. The Court of Appeal, Jos Division erred in law and misdirected itself when it adjudged that the appellant was not an agent of a disclosed principal, a foreign company.
Particulars
(i) The respondent is in law, in fact and on record an agent of a disclosed principal, the foreign company, Sour Fap Famos Beograd of Belgrade Yugoslavia (hereinafter called “the foreign company”);
(ii) Omitted
(iii) Omitted
(iv) Omitted
(v) The respondent ought to have sued the foreign company since the hitherto legal inhibition that a foreign company (as the disclosed principal) could not be sued in Nigeria has been lifted by the Court of Appeal in suit FCA/4/17/82 Kitchen Equip. v. Steins (unreported) decided on 28th February, 1983).
Ground 2 – Omitted
Ground 4 – Omitted
Ground 5 – Omitted
Ground 6 – Omitted
Ground 7 – The decision is against the weight of evidence.”
Briefs of argument were filed by the parties in this appeal and the appellant’s counsel was heard in oral argument before this Court. The appellant’s counsel formulated 5 issues as questions for determination in this appeal in his brief and they read as follows:
“1. whether the writ of summons is not void for failure of the respondent to endorse on the writ the statutory mandatory endorsement as required by section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (Cap.189) Laws of Nigeria;
2. whether sections 97, 99 and 102 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap. 189, Laws of Nigeria are not violated with reference to the constitution of this suit;
3. whether the action is properly constituted;
4. whether the action is not properly stayed by the High Court or the ground that the condition precedent to the taking out of the writ that is to say, reference to arbitration was not fulfilled;
5. whether ‘the appellants are agents of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd’ a disclosed principal on record.
Having regard to the grounds of appeal and the decisions of the Court of Appeal, issues Nos. 1, 2 and 3 do not arise for decision in this appeal. The appellant agrees with this opinion when he stated in his brief at page 2 paragraph 3.1 that:
“Questions No.1 and 2 as formulated above did not arise in either the trial High Court or in the Court of Appeal.”
If the grounds on which the preliminary objection were based did not raise these questions in the High Court, they could not possibly be raised in any ground of appeal in the Court of Appeal and in this Court. The two issues identified and formulated by the respondent are:
“(1) whether the plaintiff (appellant in the Court of Appeal complied with Order 6 Rule 10 of the Court of Appeal Rules relating to the filing of briefs.
(2) whether or not, on the materials before the Court, the defendant is an agent of Sour Fap Famos Beograd, a foreign company and can take the benefit of any arbitration clause contained in the contract between the appellant and Sour Fap- Famos Beograd.”
The first issue does not arise for determination in this appeal in that it does not arise from a complaint against the decision of the Court of Appeal in any of the grounds of appeal.
Questions or issues for determination in any appeal must be issues culled from the grounds of appeal. They are not complaints of failure to comply with the Rules of Court governing the filing of briefs. It is desirable for counsel to examine the grounds of appeal argued or to be argued to ascertain the issues raised. Issues from complaints of failure to comply with Rules of Court, although issues for determination by the court, are not questions for determination in the appeal. They are issues for determination before hearing the appeal in which issues for determination are raised.
In the instant appeal, issue No.1 no longer arose for determination because before the hearing of the appeal application was made for enlargement of time in which to file appellant’s brief. The only issue properly formulated in the respondent’s brief which arise for determination in the appeal is issue No.2.
What were the facts placed before the learned trial Judge (Ikeotuonye, J) There was no oral testimony. All the facts were contained in the affidavit evidence filed with the motion and the counter-affidavit evidence filed in opposition. The affidavit was deposed to by Stojan Zdravic, Managing Director of the defendant company. The counter affidavit was deposed to by Alhaji Kaumi Abba Kyari, the General Manager of the 1st plaintiff company now respondent. Paragraphs 3, 1 and-5 of the affidavit and paragraphs 4, 5, 7 and 8 of the counter-affidavit are very relevant and portray the respective contention of the parties. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the affidavit read:
“3. That a contract agreement which forms part of the subject-matter of this suit was reached between a Yugoslavian duly incorporated company named Sour Fap Famos Beograd and the 1st plaintiff in this case on 19th July, 1981 for the purchase of 45 buses of various categories. Attached herewith is a copy of the said agreement marked Exhibit ‘A’.
4. That further to paragraph 3 above, the defendant in this suit are the agents/representatives in Nigeria of the said Sour Fap-Famos Beograd who are the principal.
5. That Article seven (7) of Exhibit ‘A’ herein attached which is still subsisting and binding to parties to the said contract Agreement of 19th July, 1981 provides:
“Any dispute that may arise from this Agreement, the contracting parties will try to solve in a peaceful way. Otherwise, the contracting parties will solve the dispute in accordance with Arbitration Laws of Nigeria or Yugoslavia provided however that any party not satisfied with the decision of the Nigerian or Yugoslavian arbitration can apply for appeal to the Arbitration Council of the Chamber of Commerce in Zurich.
Paragraphs 4,5,7,8 and 9 of the counter-affidavit read:
4. That the contract agreement referred to in paragraph 3 of the affidavit of Stojan Zdravic and attached to the said affidavit marked ‘Exhibit A’ is an agreement between the 1st plaintiff and a Yugoslavian company named Sour Fap Famos Beograd and the defendant is not a party to the agreement.
5. That the said agreement referred to as Exhibit ‘A’ in paragraph 3 of the affidavit of the said Stojan Zdravic has never come into force because one of the conditions for its coming into force as stipulated under Article 9 read in conjunction with Article 4 of the said “Exhibit A” that 15% down payment be made to Sour Fap-Famos Beograd to their account No.60811-628-05-25730-421-01259 with Investbank of Belgrade was never made to that account.
7. That it was as a result of the intention of the plaintiffs to bring the contract agreement ‘Exhibit A’ into force that it paid the sum of N620.000.00 to the defendant company, which undertook to remit the same into the foreign account of Sour Fap Famos Beograd in the manner referred to in paragraph 5 above but it did not and also neglected or refused to return the money to the plaintiffs despite repeated demands hence the institution of the action.
8. That the decision to pay the said N620,000.00 to the defendant by the plaintiffs for the purpose of remitting the same to the foreign account of Sour Fap Famos Beograd was based on a separate arrangement between the plaintiffs and the defendants, the Yugoslavian company Sour Fap Famos was not committed in the arrangement which was not part of the agreement ‘Exhibit A’ and the defendant did not, in receiving the N620,000.00, act as the agent of Sour Fap Famos.
9. That no dispute has arisen between the plaintiffs and Sour Fap Famos which may necessitate the coming into operation of Article 7 of “Exhibit A.”
I do not intend to deal with issues No. 1, 2 and 3 as they are not issues for determination in this appeal. With regard to issues No.4 and 5, the argument of the appellant is twofold. According to the submission of learned counsel for the appellant, Chief Akinrinsola, in any dispute arising from the contract agreement between the respondents and Sour Fap-Famos Beograd, it is to an arbitration that the dispute must first be submitted. Learned counsel relied on the provision of section 5 of the Arbitration Act Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958, as authority for this submission.
Secondly, it was submitted by counsel that the appellants are agents of a disclosed principal Sour Fap-Famos Beograd and that the proper party to be sued under Nigerian Laws is Sour Fap-Famos Beograd the disclosed principal. Learned counsel then cited the case of Dommit Khonam v. Elizabeth Fife John (1939) 15 N.L.R. p.12 at 15 where Butler Lloyd held that a defendant acting on behalf of a known and disclosed principal incurs no liability. The fact that the disclosed principal incurs foreigner does not affect the question of liability.
This submission, in my view, totally determines the appeal in favour of the respondent. If the appellant is an agent of a disclosed principal and is not a party to the contract Exhibit A, he cannot exercise any power under Exhibit A, which properly belongs to his principal who is a party to the contract.
Learned counsel to the respondent’s short submission in reply is that the appellant is not a party to the contract Exhibit A between Sour Fap Famos Beograd and the respondent. The further submission is that the finding of the High Court that the appellant was an agent of the foreign company was expressly reversed by the Court of Appeal when it held that Article 8 of Exhibit A does not constitute the appellant an agent of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd.
Learned counsel further emphasised that:
“(1) there is nothing in Exhibit A (the written Agreement) to show that the appellant is the agent of the foreign company Sour Fap-Famos Beograd;
(2) the provision of Article 8 is irrelevant following the observation of Denning, L.J. in Nicolene Ltd. v. Simmonds (1953) 1 All E.R. 822 at 825.
(3) the respondent did not deal with the appellant as an agent of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd;
(4) Articles 4 and 9 cannot admit of any payment to the appellant as agent of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd.”
Since Exhibit ‘A’ is the principal document on which the appellant based his claim to agency and right to demand arbitration, it is necessary to examine the document particularly Articles 4, 7, 8 and 9 thereof.
I have already set out in full at the beginning of this judgment the full provision of Article 7. That article gives right to the parties to the agreement to demand arbitration in the event of any dispute between the parties. I have already set out the names of the parties to the agreement. The appellant is not mentioned in the agreement as a party. Article 4 of the agreement reads:
“The BUYER is obliged to pay agreed value of the goods from the Article 1, items I – 6 of this Agreement amounting to US $6,472,200 in the following way:
Down payment being 15% of the total value of vehicles and spare parts, what amounts to US $970.830 – will be paid to the SELLERS’ Account No.60811-620-05-25730-421-01259 with Investbank Belgrade within 30 days from the signing of this agreement. The remaining amount of US $5,501,370 – representing 85% of the total contract value of vehicles and spare parts will be paid in 10 equal semi-annual instalments with regular interest of 8% on reducing balance. First instalment being 8 months from the date of Bill of Lading of the last consignment. The buyer is obliged to pay due instalments to the seller’s above account with Investbank in Belgrade. For credit amount of the Agreement value, the seller will prepare annuity plan and send it to the buyer within 15 days upon the elate of coming of this Agreement into force.
Article 8 which mentions the appellant reads:
“The company Niger Progress Ltd. is engaged with the Seller in treatment and conclusion of this business, the seller and Niger Progress Ltd. will conclude a separate agreement on it (Italics mine).
The above provision of Article 8 does not and cannot constitute the appellant an agent of the seller under the contract. It only acknowledges the part played by the appellant in securing the contract for the seller and expressed intention to conclude a separate agreement on it with the appellant.
The respondent was not mentioned as a prospective party to that separate agreement. The Court of Appeal is right on the construction of the expressed provision of Article 8 and properly reversed the High Court Judge on the interpretation of the provision. There is no ambiguity in the expressed meaning of the provision. Where words are plain on the face of it, the literal meaning should, in accordance with the cannons of interpretation of contract documents, be given to it.
Article 9 contains a very important provision. It stipulates the conditions under which the agreement will come into force. Without the agreement coming into force the agreement cannot form the basis of the preliminary objection raised by the appellant. No claim can be founded on it. Article 9 reads:
“This agreement will come into force when signed by both contracting parties and approved by Borno State Government and the competent authorities of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd, upon effecting 15% down payment of the total Agreement value by the Buyer”
The respondent admits that it has not made the down payment and contends that the amount claimed from the appellant now was the amount the appellant was given and authorised by the respondent to pay into the account of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd as stipulated in Article 4 of the Agreement.
Even if the appellant were appointed agent of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd, he cannot demand arbitration until the 15% down payment has been made ‘in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. It is not a term of the agreement that the 15% of the total value be paid to the agent.
The law on agency governing disclosed agent, disclosed principal is not in doubt and their rights and liabilities to third parties are clearly set out in Bowstead on Agency 14th Ed. p. 231 Article 78.
A disclosed principal may sue or be sued on any contract made on his behalf and in respect of any money paid or received on his behalf by his agent acting within the scope of his actual authority (Duke of Norfolk v. Worthy (1808) 1 Camp 337).
The appellant has not established the existence of a contract of agency between Sour Fap-Famos Beograd and itself. It has also not established the scope of its actual authority and has failed to establish that he received the amount claimed from him as agent acting within the scope of his authority to enable it demand arbitration.
I see no merit in the appeal. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with N500.00 costs to the respondent. The decision of the Court of Appeal is hereby affirmed.
NNAMANI, J.S.C.: I had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Obaseki, J.S.C. I entirely agree with his reasoning and conclusions. This is yet one other case in which the substantive Suit sits in the High Court while an interlocutory matter has been pursued to this Court. As I shall show later, this may not even be the end of the interlocutory matters since the present one seems to have been erroneously pursued so far.
In the High Court of Borno State, the respondent as plaintiff brought an action against the appellant herein as defendant. They will both be referred to as plaintiff and defendant in this judgment. The action was by way of an application to the Registrar of the High Court, Maiduguri, for the writ of summons pursuant to Order 2 Borno State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1979. In paragraphs 2,3,4,5 and 6, the plaintiff set out the basis of the claim. According to it,
“2. The defendant on or about the 25th day of January, 1982, received from the plaintiffs the sum of N620,000 representing 15% of total contract value of vehicles to be supplied by the defendant’s partners, Sour Fap-Famos Beograd of Belgrade, under a written contract dated 19th June, 1981.
3. The defendant undertook to remit the money through the Central Bank of Nigeria to the said defendant’s partners in Belgrade.
4. The defendant did not remit the money to Sour Fap- Famos of Belgrade and the vehicles were by that reason not supplied to the plaintiffs.
5. In the premises, the consideration for the payment of the said sum of N620,000 has wholly failed and the defendant has had and received the said sum to the use of the plaintiffs. And the plaintiffs claim the sum of N620,000 and interest on the said amount at the Court’s rate.
It is pertinent at this stage to mention that the written contract dated 19th June, 1981, between the plaintiff and the foreign company, Sour Fap-Famo Beograd of Belgrade (and it was tendered as Exhibit A in the proceedings) made provision in Article 7 thereof for a reference to Arbitration in the event of dispute. This Article 7 is at the centre of this interlocutory matter and so I have to set it down. It states as follows:
“Any dispute that may arise from this agreement the contracting parties will try to solve in a peaceful way. Otherwise the contracting parties will solve the dispute in accordance with Arbitration Laws of Nigeria or Yugoslavia provided however that any party not satisfied with the decision of the Nigerian or Yugoslav Arbitration can apply for appeal to the Arbitration Council of the Chambers of Commerce in Zurich, whose decision is final.”
Following the application for summons referred to above, and the service of the summons on defendant, an unconditional appearance was entered on its behalf by Chief Akinrinsola of counsel. Then immediately after this, the defendant filed a motion of preliminary objection in the following terms:-
“TAKE NOTICE that the defendant/applicant will on 29th May, 1986 or at subsequent adjourned date(s) raise by its counsel the following preliminary objection on points of law to this action:
(i) That the action is incompetent.
(ii) The Suit is not properly constituted and as such it should be dismissed with costs.
(iii) The Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine this action.
FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that the grounds of the said objection are among others as follows:-
(a) A condition precedent to the institution of this Suit has not been fulfilled by the plaintiffs, that is to say, compliance with the provisions of Article SEVEN (7) of the Contract Agreement between Sour Fap-Famos Beograd and the 1st plaintiff of 19th July, 1981 relating to reference to settlement by Arbitration.
(b) The Second plaintiff is not a juristic person with capacity to sue and be sued eo nomine. In the result the second plaintiff has no LOCUS STANDI.”
It is essential to set down some paragraphs of the affidavit supporting this application as well as paragraphs of the counter-affidavit in opposition. This is because they are relevant to the resolution of the main issue in this appeal. In paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the affidavit sworn to by an official of the defendant company it was averred as follows:-
“3. That a contract agreement which forms part of the subject-matter of this suit was reached between a Yugoslavian duly incorporated company named Sour Fap-Famos Beograd and the 1st plaintiff in this case on 19th July, 1981, for the purchase of 45 buses of various categories. Attached herewith is a copy of the said agreement marked Exhibit A.
4. That further to paragraph 3 above, the defendant in this Suit are the agents/representatives in Nigeria of the said Sour Fap-Famos Beograd who are the Principal.
5. That Article Seven (7) of Exhibit ‘A’ herein attached is still subsisting and binding on the parties to the said Contract Agreement of 19th July, 1981 provided.
6. That the dispute that has arisen which is the subject-matter of this action has not been referred to any Arbitration for solution either in Nigeria or Yugoslavia before the institution of this action by the plaintiffs.”
In their counter-affidavit, paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 thereof, a representative of the 1st plaintiff averred as follows:-
“4. That the contract agreement referred to in paragraph 3 of the affidavit of Stojan Zdravic and attached to the said affidavit marked Exhibit’ A’ is an agreement between the 1st plaintiff and a Yugoslavian Company named Sour Fap-Famos Beograd and the defendant is not a party to the agreement.
5. That the said agreement referred to as “EXHIBIT A” in paragraph 3 of the affidavit of the said Stojan Zdravic has never come into force because one of the conditions for the coming into force as stipulated under Article 9 read in conjunction with Article 4 of the said ‘EXHIBIT A’ that 15% down payment be made to Sour Fap-Famos Beograd to their account No.60811- 628-05-25730-421-01259 with lnvestbank of Belgrade was never made to that account.
6. That the said 15% down payment referred to in paragraph 5 above amount to US $967,320.00 equivalent by the rate of exchange as (sic) that to about N620,000.00.
7. That it was as a result of the plaintiffs’ desire to bring the contract agreement, ‘EXHIBIT A’ into force that it paid the sum of N620,000.00 to the defendant company, which undertook to remit the same into the foreign account of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd in the manner referred to in paragraph 5 above but it did not and also neglected or refused to return the money to the plaintiffs despite repeated demands hence the institution of the court action.
8. That the decision to pay the said N620,000.00 to the defendant by the plaintiffs for the purpose of remitting the same to the foreign account of Sour Fap-Famos was based on a separate arrangement between the plaintiffs and the defendant, the Yugoslavian Company Sour Fap-Famos was not committed in the arrangement which was not part of the agreement in EXHIBIT A and the defendant did not, in receiving the N620,00 act as the agent of Sour Fap-Famos.”
No evidence was taken by the High Court. After addresses of Counsel, Ikeotuonye, J., in a ruling dated 16/7/86 upheld the objection and made the following orders:-
1. The Borno State Government, the second plaintiff, was struck out from the action.
2. The action itself was stayed pending reference to Arbitration in terms of Article 7 of the Contract Agreement Exhibit A.
The plaintiff then appealed to the Court of Appeal ‘which on 15th December, 1987 allowed the appeal. That Court held that the learned trial Judge was wrong to infer from the provisions of Article 7 of the said agreement of 19 July, 1981that the appellants were the agents of a disclosed principal who ought to have been sued.
The defendant then appealed to this Court, 6 Grounds of appeal were filed, five of them dealing with the question whether the defendant was an agent of a disclosed principal and so whether Article 7 of Exhibit A would have applied. The sixth ground which raised Sections 97, 99 and 102 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, (Cap.189) Laws of the Federation was never taken before the Court of Appeal. It is perhaps pertinent to mention that the defendant brought an application in this Court for an order “granting the appellant/applicant leave to introduce new points of law which were not taken in the Court of Appeal in this appeal and to deem as filed and/or properly filed all such new grounds of appeal as embodied in the Notice of Appeal and in addition all such arguments in the new points of law contained in the appellant/applicant’s Brief filed on 2nd December, 1988.”
In argument in support of the application (Mr. Sanyaolu for the plaintiff strongly opposed it), Chief Akinrinsola contended that there was no need for fresh evidence; that the new grounds raise substantial issues of law and procedure; that this would not raise a new case but raise issues arising necessarily from grounds of appeal though not taken in the Court of Appeal.
It is settled by a long line of cases that this Court will grant leave for a new matter to be raised in this Court only if such a matter raises substantial issues of law and procedure and is essential to avoid a miscarriage of justice. But leave is granted under well defined and settled principles one of the most important of which is that such leave will not be granted when to grant it will be to allow the applicant take out a new case not previously taken in the lower Courts – see Akpene v. Barclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd. & Anor. (1977) 1 S.C. 471; Agnes Deborah Ejiofodomi v. H.C. Okonkwo (1982) 11 S.C. 74; Samuel Fadiora v. Festus Gbadebo (1978) 3 S.C. 219, 247, 249; I.P.D. Abaye v. Ofili and Anor. (1986) 1 S.C. 231, at 234, 235; Attorney-General of Oyo State & Anor. v. Fairlakes Hotel Ltd. (1988) 5 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 92) 1. It was in consideration of all these that this Court refused that application. The effect of that refusal is that ground 6 of the grounds of appeal is struck out and parts of the defendant/appellant’s brief of argument are equally struck out. It necessarily affected the issues for determination as formulated by the defendant. Of the 5 issues raised, only issues 4 and 5 are relevant to this appeal. These were in these terms:
“4. Whether the action was not properly stayed by the High Court on the ground that the condition precedent to the taking out of the writ, that is to say, Reference to Arbitration, was not fulfilled.
5. Whether the appellants are agents of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd a disclosed principal on record.”
I think that issue 2 of the issues for determination as formulated by the plaintiff in the Court of Appeal appears to bring out the real issue before this Court in the appeal. The issue as formulated there was:
“whether or not, on the materials before the Court, the defendant is an agent of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd, a foreign company and can take the benefit of any arbitration clause contained in the contract between the appellant and Sour Fap-Famos Beograd. (Italics mine)
In the High Court, Ikeotuonye, J., saw the issues before him as “is Niger Progress Ltd., the defendant, the agent/representative in Nigeria of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd, the Yugoslavian company; did the defendant receive the sum of N620,000.00 from the plaintiffs as the agents/representative in Nigeria of the foreign company or under a separate arrangement between it and the plaintiffs” The learned trial Judge after a long discourse on the law of agency, and after considering the affidavits of the parties, came to the following conclusion:
“After treating and regarding the dcfendant as the partner of the foreign company in their particulars of claim, the plaintiffs turned round to aver in paragraph 8 of their counter-affidavit that their decision to pay N620,000.00 to the defendant for the purpose of remitting the same to the foreign company was based on a separate agreement between them (the plaintiffs and the defendant) although they gave no particulars of that separate agreement.
It should be expected that the affidavit evidence of the plaintiffs should support the facts set out by them in their particulars of claim and not otherwise. The plaintiffs cannot approbate and reprobate. In my judgment, Article 8 of Exhibit A shows that it was within the contemplation of the first plaintiff and the foreign company that the defendant was to play some part in the “treatment and conclusion” of the contract made between them. Since the defendant was not a party to the said agreement (Exhibit A), it is reasonable to infer from the circumstances of the case that the defendant was to play the role of an agent to the foreign company. And the defendant has expressly averred in its affidavit in support of this application that it was the agent of the foreign company, an averment which the plaintiffs did not specifically deny in their counter-affidavit.”
In the Court of Appeal, Akanbi, J.C.A., who wrote the lead judgment, adverted to two main issues in the appeal before the Court:
(a) whether the defendant was the agent of the foreign company;
(b) whether as such agent it has the competence to invoke the arbitration clause in aid of the application to stay proceedings.
The learned Justice of Appeal, after reviewing the findings of the learned trial Judge and after considering the submissions of counsel, came to the following conclusions. At page 85 of the record he said:
“No doubt in holding tenaciously to the view that the respondent was an agent, the trial Judge was greatly influenced by Article 8 of Exhibit A; and this is evident from the following passages of his judgment:………….
To my mind, too much has been read into Article 8 of Exhibit A and several assumptions appeared to have been made in the passages noted above. For my part, I do not think that Article 8 has created any agency relationship at all. If anything it merely indicated that a sort of business association/relationship existed between the respondent and the foreign company, and that in due course, a separate agreement quite different from Exhibit A will be concluded by the two – perhaps for their mutual benefit…..
……………
That said I am led to the conclusion that me trial Judge was wrong to have held that the respondent was/is an agent of the foreign company. Exhibit A clearly did not create any such relationship.”
It is pertinent to note that the Court of Appeal in its judgment did not raise the issue of the propriety of the learned trial Judge deciding such contentious issues on the affidavit evidence before him. I shall return to this later. For the moment, I wish to say that on the race of the preliminary objection filed by the defendant, the issues could have been concluded without going into such details on Agency. Ex facie, the defendant sought to rely on Article 7 of Exhibit A. Ground (a) on which the objection was based merely stated that the plaintiff had not complied with the condition precedent – i.e. reference to arbitration – as per the agreement between the plaintiff and Sour Fap-Famos Beograd. It was only in paragraph 4 of the affidavit in support of the application that the defendant averred that they are the agents/representatives in Nigeria of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd. The objection could quite easily have been framed to raise the issue of agency more directly. In that case the objection would have been that being the agents of a disclosed principal, the defendant could not be sued, and that in any case, even the Principal could not be sued without first complying with Article 7 of Exhibit A. This was not the objection raised, at least not expressly. I think the matter could have been dealt with quite simply. It is common ground that the defendant is not a party to the agreement of 19th July, 1981 i.e. Exhibit A. It cannot, therefore, take advantage of Article 7 thereof or indeed any other article unless it was so expressly provided in the agreement. It seems it was the implications of the application that the trial Court, and then the Court of Appeal, followed. By this, the defendant as agent of the foreign company claims benefit of Article 7 of Exhibit A, and contends that this having not been first complied with, the suit must be dismissed. Indeed Chief Akinrinsola had submitted to the Court of Appeal, and this is also the substance of his case before this Court that:-
“Respondent was “the agent of a disclosed principal, the foreign company and if anybody was to be a party, it ought to be the disclosed principal – the disclosed principal is the foreign company…. I submit that in invoking clause 7 of Exhibit A, the respondent being an agent of a disclosed principal in this case the foreign company, was exercising the right vested in the disclosed principal by Exhibit A. Appellant so recognised respondent and it will be contradictory to resile from that position.”
I think I ought to start my consideration of the issues here by stating that some principles of law to which the defendant made reference in its brief of argument are settled and are not in dispute. Mr. Sanyaolu made such a concession in his brief of argument where he said:
“The submission in the Appellant’s brief, that where parties to a contract, have under the terms of their contract, agreed to submit to arbitration, if there is any dispute between them, a defendant who has not taken any steps in the proceedings commenced by the other party, may apply to the court for a stay of proceedings in the action to allow the parties go to arbitration; and the power of the High Court to stay such proceedings is excisable under and by virtue of section 5 of the Arbitration Law, represents the correct statement of law.”
It is not disputed that a disclosed principal may sue or be sued on any contract made on his behalf, and in respect of any money paid or received on his behalf by his agent acting within the scope of his actual authority. See Duke of Norfolk v. Worthy (1808) 1 Camp 337; Freeman Lockyer v. Buckhurst Park Property (Manejal) Ltd. (1964) 2 Q.B. 480 at 502; Lewis v. Nicholson (1852) 18 Q.B. 503; Also Bowstead on Agency 14th Edition pp.231 – 235.
It is also settled as stated by Mr. Sanyaolu in the portion of his brief referred to above that Section 5 of the Arbitration Ordinance, Cap. B, Laws of the Federation, 1958, gives the court jurisdiction, if satisfied that there is not sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the submission, to stay proceedings where the parties in their contract have agreed to a submission to arbitration as a condition precedent to a suit, and the other party has done nothing more after appearance As to when application for stay of proceedings can be brought See Lane v. Herman (1939) 3 All E.R. 353, and Heyman and Anor. v. Darwins Ltd. (1942) 1All E.R. 337.
The central issue remains whether on the materials before the High Court it could be said that the defendants were agents/representatives of the foreign company so as to benefit from Article 7 of Exhibit A. The relationship of principal and agent may arise in 3 ways:
(i) by agreement, whether contractual or not, between principal and agent which may be express or implied from the conduct or situation of the parties;
(ii) retrospectively, by subsequent ratification by the principal of acts done on his behalf
(iii) by operation of law under the doctrine of agency of necessity and in certain other cases.
A relation of Agency is generally said to exist whenever one person called the ‘agent’ has authority to act on behalf of another called ‘the Principal’ and consents to act. Whether that relationship exists in any situation depends not on the precise terminology employed by the parties to describe their relationship, but on the true nature of the agreement, or the exact circumstances of the relationship between the alleged principal and agent – see Samson v Artchison (1912) A.C. 844 P.C.; Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. King (1919) 1 K.B 307 and generally Halsbury’s Laws of England 4th Edition paragraph 701 and flg.
There is, therefore, no doubt that an agency can arise impliedly from the nature and condition of the parties or from the circumstances of the case. See further Ryan v. Sams (1848) 12 Q.B. 460 where an agency was implied to exist from the cohabitation as man and wife or Vandyke v. Fender, Sun Insurance Office Ltd. Third Party (1969) 2 Q.B. 581, (1969) 3 All E.R. 1291; (1970) 2 All E.R. 335 at 339, 342 (Employee driving fellow employees to work on behalf of employer).
To return to the instant case, it was open to the learned trial Judge to try to see an agency between the foreign company and the defendant hence he said:
“It is reasonable to infer from the circumstances of the case that the defendant was to play the role of agent of the foreign company.” Were there indeed such circumstances from which an agency could be inferred What were the materials before the Court from which such inference was drawn One has only the application to the High Court as no evidence was taken in this matter.
In the whole application, the only reference to Agency is the averment of the defendant in paragraph 4 of the supporting affidavit that defendants are agents/representatives of the foreign company in Nigeria. This averment was denied even if not very positively in paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit of the plaintiff. Among other things it averred that –
“the defendant did not, in receiving the N620,000.00, act as agent of Sour Fap-Famos.”
Be it noted that the learned trial Judge had expressed the view that the averment of agency stated above was not denied, a view which was not quite correct.
The next material in the application is Exhibit A, the agreement of 19th July, 1981, between the plaintiff and the foreign company, Sour Fap-Famos Beograd. Looking through Exhibit A there is no provision for agency, nor was it provided that the N620,000 should be paid to the foreign company through any agent either by Article 4 of the Agreement, 15% of the total value of the vehicles and spare parts which amounts to US $967-320 was to be paid to the seller’s account. It was only Article 8 that made any mention of defendant. That article provided as follows:
“As the company NIGER-PROGRESS LTD. is engaged together with the Seller in treatment and conclusion of this business, the SELLER and NIGER-PROGRESS LTD. will conclude a separate agreement on it.”
It was this article that the learned trial Judge said shows it was in contemplation of the parties that the defendant was to play some part in the treatment and conclusion of the business. I do not think one can put it higher than that there is a business association between the foreign company and the defendant, the terms of which may be reduced into writing in future. If they are engaged together in treatment and conclusion of the business. It suggests a “partnership” the terms of which are yet to be agreed. Perhaps one can even put it as some understanding. I think the learned trial Judge put it too high to say this article suggests that the defendant was to play the role of an agent.
I am of the view that it was not possible to decide there was indeed an agency between the parties without taking some evidence. It was not a matter that could have been resolved on affidavit evidence. For instance, in paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit, the plaintiff averred that – “the decision to pay the said N620,000 to the defendant by the plaintiffs for the purpose of remitting same to the foreign account of Sour Fap-Famos was based on a separate arrangement between the plaintiffs and the defendant.” Only evidence could have indicated what this arrangement was. The learned trial Judge dismissed this averment by saying that no particulars of this arrangement were shown. Surely, if the plaintiff was able to show in evidence this special relationship or arrangement, it would have, more than anything else, destroyed any inference of agency between the defendant and the foreign company was conceived at least in respect of the receipt of the N620,000.
In my view, this preliminary objection is not one that ought to have been sorted out without resolving the conflicts in the affidavit evidence by taking oral evidence. The learned trial Judge contented himself with drawing inferences from the materials before him. I do not think those materials support the inference he drew. The Court of Appeal took the same approach and held that he could not have drawn the inference he did. Although the Court of Appeal was right in its conclusion that the defendant could not take advantage of the arbitration clause in Exhibit A, it ought to have remitted the case to the High Court so that the issue of agency raised in the conflicting affidavits can be resolved by evidence. It has always been the view of this Court that where there are conflicting affidavits the issues should be resolved by oral evidence – See N.N.S.C. v. Alhaji Hamajoda Sabana Ltd. (1988 2 N.W.L.R. (Pt.74) 23.
In all the circumstances, this appeal must fail. I have however thought of what order to make. That there is some association or understanding between the defendant and the foreign company seems clear. What is not clear is whether it amounts to the defendant being an agent or representative in Nigeria. To avoid a multiplicity of actions, I would and do remit this case to another Judge of the High Court of Borno State to resolve the conflicts in the affidavits of the parties to this suit. Such resolution will help in the determination of whether the defendant was indeed an agent.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. I set aside that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeal lifting the stay of proceedings granted by the High Court. I award N500 costs to the plaintiff/respondent.
KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.: The crux of the issue in this appeal is whether appellant/defendant is entitled to rely on the provisions of a contract between the plaintiff/respondent and another to ask that the action against him be stayed in compliance with an arbitration clause in the contract.
I have read the judgment of my learned brother Obaseki, J.S.C., in this appeal, and I agree entirely with his views, his much fuller statement of the facts of the case and his conclusion that the appeal be dismissed. I will only state in brief the salient facts necessary and on which I rest my own reasoning and decision. The grounds of Appeal having been reproduced in the lead judgment of learned brother Obaseki, J.S.C., I adopt them.
The facts as stated in appellant’s brief of argument were that plaintiff/respondent on the 19th July, 1981 entered into a contract expressed in Exhibit A with Sour Fap Famos Beograd, a company duly incorporated in Yugoslavia. Article 7 of Exhibit A, provides that-
“Any dispute that may arise from this agreement, the contracting parties will try to solve in a peaceful way. Otherwise, the contracting parties, will solve the dispute in accordance with Arbitration Laws of Nigeria, or Yugoslavia provided however that any party not satisfied with the decision of the Nigerian or Yugoslav Arbitration can apply for Appeal to the Arbitration Council of the Chamber of Commerce in Zurich, whose decision is final.”
The action of the plaintiff/respondent against the defendant/appellant is for the claim of the sum of N620,000.00 for money had and received representing 15% of the total contract value of vehicles to be supplied by Sour Fap- Famos Beograd of Belgrade who were described as defendant’s Partners received from the plaintiff by the defendant for the purpose of remitting the said money to the said Sour Fap-Famos Beograd of Belgrade. The defendant failed to remit the money and the vehicles were not supplied to the plaintiffs.
The defendant raised a preliminary objection to the hearing of the action on the grounds that
(i) A condition precedent to the institution of the suit has not been fulfilled by the plaintiffs, i.e. compliance with the provisions of Article 7 of the Contract agreement between the 1st plaintiff and Sour Fap-Famos Beograd dated 19th July, 1981.
(ii) The 2nd plaintiff is not a juristic person.
It is not in dispute that there is a contract between 1st plaintiff and Sour Fap-Famos Beograd. It is also admitted that Article 7 thereof provides for disputes arising therefrom to be referred to Arbitration. The issue has been whether defendant, not a party to the Agreement expressed in Exhibit A, can rely on a provision of that Agreement.
Ikeotuonye. J., of the Maiduguri High Court holding that appellant can, upheld the preliminary objection, struck out the 2nd plaintiff from the action and stayed further proceedings pending reference to Arbitration in terms of Article 7 of Exhibit “A”, the Contract agreement.
Aggrieved by this decision, 1st plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal. The grounds of complaint were that Arbitration was not a condition precedent to action by the plaintiff/appellant against the defendant/respondent who was not a party to the Agreement containing the condition, and that respondent now appellant was not the agent of the party to the Agreement – Sour Fap-Famos Beograd. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal and set aside the ruling of the learned trial Judge staying the proceedings; and ordered hearing of the substantive suit.
The Court of Appeal held that
“…the trial Judge was wrong to have held that the respondent was/is an agent of the foreign company. Exhibit A clearly did not create such relationship.
In the circumstances, the respondent ought not to have been allowed to invoke Article 7 to stay the action in the High Court …”
The respondent has appealed against the judgment of the Court of Appeal on six grounds. The complaints inter alia, grounds 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, of which are not relevant were against the holding that appellant was not the agent of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd. It was also contended that the decision is against the weight of evidence.
Counsel to parties filed their briefs of argument which they adopted and relied upon in their oral argument before us. Counsel to the appellant formulated five issues for determination. Questions 1, 2, 3, which were not issues in the preliminary objection, and not raised in the Court below, were raised first before this Court. They are as follows-
“1. Whether the writ of summons is not void for failure of the respondent to endorse on the writ the statutory mandatory endorsement as required by section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (Cap.189) Laws of Nigeria;
“2. Whether section 97, 99 and 102 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap.189, Laws of Nigeria are not violated with reference to the constitution of this suit.
“3. Whether the action is properly constituted.”
These issues in view of the grounds of appeal clearly do not arise. I will therefore not discuss them for the purposes of this judgment.
The only issues which are relevant are 4, and 5, which are as follows –
“4. Whether the action is not properly stayed by the High Court on the ground that the condition precedent to the taking out of the writ, that is to say, reference to arbitration was not fulfilled.
5. Whether “the appellants are agents of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd” a disclosed principal on record.”
On the other hand, counsel to the respondent formulated two issues.
“(1) Whether the plaintiff (appellant in the Court of Appeal) complied with Order 6, Rule 10 of the Court of Appeal Rules relating to the filing of briefs;
(2) Whether or not, on the materials before the Court, the defendant is an agent of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd, a foreign company and can take the benefit of any arbitration clause contained in the contract between the Appellant and Sour Fap- Famos Beograd.”
Like the appellants’ the first issue does not arise from a complaint in any of the grounds of appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Appellant having obtained enlargement of time before the hearing of the appeal, and having complied with the rule relating to filing of briefs, the issue of noncompliance with Order 6 r. 10 of the Rules of Court of Appeal is no longer an issue. Issue No.2 in respondent’s brief is therefore the only issue relevant in this appeal. Thus the issues relevant for my consideration are 4 and 5 as formulated by counsel to the appellant, and 2 as formulated by counsel to the respondents. All the formulation of the issues taken together raise the issues whether –
“(1) the Court of Appeal was right in holding that the action of plaintiff was not properly stayed because the condition precedent has not been fulfilled;
(2) appellants are agents of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd.”
The two issues are closely interrelated and taken together will determine the appeal. It is whether appellants are entitled to enforce the terms of Exhibit A with respect to dispute between the respondent and Sour Fap-Famos Beograd.
Mr. Akinrinsola for the appellant relying on Section 5 of the Arbitration Act submitted that on the terms of the contract, Exhibit “A”, any dispute arising from the contract between the parties should first be submitted to arbitration. Mr. Akinrinsola conceded that the parties to the contract – in Exhibit “A” are the respondent and Sour Fap-Famos Beograd. It was further submitted on the authority of Khonam v. Elizabeth Fife John (1939) 15 N.L.R. 12 that appellant is the agent of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd, and is entitled and is the proper party to be sued, being the agent of a disclosed principal. The reply of Counsel to the respondent was that appellant is not entitled to enforce a term of the contract Exh. A not being a party to the Contract. Again that the finding that appellant is the agent of the contracting Party Sour Fap-Famos Beograd was expressly reversed by the Court of Appeal when it held that Article 8 did not constitute appellant an agent of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd. It was also submitted that respondent did not deal with the appellant as the agent of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd.
It is common ground that appellant relies only on Exhibit A for his claim to the Agency and his right to demand arbitration in any dispute arising from the Agreement between the respondent and his principal. It is well settled that a disclosed principal can sue or be sued on any contract made on his behalf by his agent acting within the scope of his actual authority. Thus even if appellant were the agent of Sour Fap Famos Beograd, being a disclosed principal, this action will lie against the latter -See Duke of Norfolk v. Worthy (1808) 1 Camp. 337. Appellant relies on Article 8 of Exh. A for the Agency he claims. Article 8 provides as follows-
“The company Niger Progress Ltd. is engaged with the seller in treatment and conclusion of this business; the Seller and Niger Progress Ltd. will conclude a separate agreement on it.”
There is nothing in this article to suggest the appointment of the appellant an agent of the seller under the contract. It seems to me that the words merely acknowledged the role played by the appellant in securing the business for the seller, and the underlined sentence is an expression of intention to conclude a separate agreement with the appellant. The respondent was not intended as a possible party to that separate agreement.
I think the construction placed on the words of Article 8 by the Court of Appeal was correct and inescapable. The words of the article are clear and unambiguous and effect must be given to them. Accordingly, appellant is not an agent of Sour Fap Famos Beograd as held by the Court of Appeal.
The next important and crucial consideration is the condition for coming into effect of the agreement which was provided by Article 9 which states “This Agreement will come into force when signed by both contracting parties and approved by Borno State Government and the competent authorities of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd, upon effecting 15% down payment of the total Agreement value by the Buyer.”
Thus, the commencement is subject to (a) the agreement being signed by the respondent and Sour Fap-Famos Beograd which was satisfied, and (b) respondent effecting down payment of 15% of the total Agreement value, which is the subject-matter of the action, giving rise to the preliminary objection.
The evidence before the trial Judge is that the amount claimed from appellant in the substantive action is the 15% of the value of the contract which should be paid to Sour Fap-Famos Beograd but has not been paid. The condition for the agreement coming into force having not been satisfied, the contract is not yet in force. The status of a dispute arising from a contract which is not yet in force is too plain for any controversy. A dispute can only arise when the contract is in force. So no dispute properly so called has arisen between the parties to warrant an enforcement of article 7 even by any the contracting parties.
Even if the contract were in force, only a party to it can enforce its terms. Appellant not being a party to Exhibit “A” cannot exercise any power under Exhibit A.
Appellant having not established the existence of a contract of Agency between itself and Sour Fap-Famos Beograd, and having not shown other-wise that he is entitled to enforce the terms of the contract in article 7 of Exhibit A, to demand an arbitration in any dispute between the parties, I can see no merit whatsoever in this appeal. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with N500 costs to the respondents.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is accordingly hereby affirmed.
BELGORE, J.S.C.: I have read in advance the judgment of my learned brother, Obaseki, J.S.C., with which I agree entirely. The appellant never discharged the onus of proving any agency agreement between itself and SOUR FAP FAMOS BEOGRAD. There is hardly any evidence to lead any Court to the conclusion of any agency agreement to justify any resort to arbitration in which the appellant will be a party. I see no merit in this appeal and I also dismiss it with N500.00 costs to the respondent.
NNAEMEKA-AGU, J.S.C.: Part of the main problem in this appeal was to determine what really is or are the correct issues for this Court to determine. This is because from the inception of the interlocutory contest in the High Court, the issues appear to have been multiplying at every stage of the proceedings. Initially there were two grounds for a preliminary objection, namely:
(i) Whether the action could be proceeded with without the matter first going into arbitration under Article 7 of the contract agreement between Sour Fap-Famos Beograd, a foreign company, and the respondent (the 1st plaintiff); and
(ii) Whether the Borno State Government, the 2nd plaintiff would sue eo nomine.
The learned trial Judge, Ikeotuonye, J. upheld the objection, struck out the 2nd plaintiff and stayed the action pending reference to arbitration.
The remaining plaintiff (to be hereinafter referred to as the respondent) appealed to the Court of Appeal, Jos Division, against the order for stay of proceedings pending arbitration. In the lead judgment of Akanbi, J.C.A., with whom Abdulahi, J.C.A. (as he then was) and Joe Jacks, J.C.A., concurred held that the defendant (appellant in this appeal) was not a party to the agreement and, so, ought not to be allowed to take advantage of an arbitration clause in an agreement of which it was not a party. That court further ordered that the substantive suit be proceeded with between the parties.
Rather than bowing to the decision of the Court of Appeal, the appellant has appealed further to this Court. Of course, it is within its constitutional rights, even if, as it now turns out, all that it has gained is a delay in proceeding to trial. What I must, however, deprecate in the strongest possible terms is the unwarrantable attempt of the appellant to multiply issues by introducing new original issues in this Court. Obviously from the substance of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the only proper issue for a contest should be whether the appellants are parties to the contract agreement in question and, if they were not, whether they can take advantage of the arbitration clause therein. Rather than facing these legitimate issues the appellant has framed the following questions for determination in his brief, namely:
“1. Whether the writ of summons is not void for the failure of the respondents to endorse on the writ, the statutory mandatory endorsement as required by section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (Cap. 189) Laws of Nigeria.
2. Whether sections 97, 99 and 102 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (Cap.189) Laws of Nigeria are not violated with reference to the constitution of this suit.
3. Whether the action was properly constituted.
4. Whether the action was not properly stayed by the High Court on the ground that the condition precedent to the taking out of the writ, that is to say, Reference to Arbitration, was not fulfilled.
5. Whether the Appellants are agents of Sour Fap-Famos Beograd a disclosed principal on record,”
It is clear that questions numbered 1 and 2 do not arise in this appeal. They are original questions which the appellant ought to have raised in the High Court, if he was minded to do so. Question No.3 is already dead, the Borno State Government having been struck out by the High Court, and there was no appeal against the striking out order to the Court of Appeal. Question No.5 is only peripheral to Question No.4. In the end, only question No.4 is properly relevant and material to the appeal. In my opinion, introduction of irrelevant questions and issues into an appeal has a way of befogging and watering down relevant and material ones. It is no good practice.
I wish to seize this opportunity to state that although, on the rules, an appellant may apply for leave to take up points not raised in the court below, to file his brief on it and argue it on appeal, yet the granting of it is predicated on three conditions. First the power of this Court under section 22 of the Supreme Court Act, 1960, is to “make any order necessary for determining the real question in controversy in the appeal.” The power does not extend to making orders which are in the nature of original orders nor has the Court any original jurisdiction in any matter apart from that under section 212 of the Constitution of 1979 which is not relevant here. Secondly, even where the subject-matter of the new point is such that this Court may have entertained it on appeal, it will not do so unless the conditions which have been stipulated in several cases have been fulfilled, namely, it must be shown to be a substantial point of law, substantive or adjectival and that no further evidence which could have been called in the Court below if it was raised there could have affected the decision one way or the other. See on these: Stool of Abinabina v. Chief Kaja Enyimadu (1953) 12 W.A.C.A. 171, PC: Shonekan v. Smith (1964) 1 All N.L.R. 168, p. 173; K. Akpene v. Barclays Bank of Nig. Ltd. & Anor. (1977) 1 S.C.47. Thirdly, even where the just mentioned condition has been satisfied, this Court may take the view that without the benefit of the opinions of the courts below, it should not profer an opinion in the new point. See Debesi Djukpan v. Rhorhadjor Orovuyovbe & Anor. (1967) 1 All N.L.R. 134, p.137-138; United Marketing Co. v. Kara (1936) 1 W.L.R. 523, p.524. In the instant case whether or not the writ was duly indorsed for service outside the State of issue is not only new; but one which should have been resolved one way or the other in the court of trial. It ought to have occurred to learned counsel that this Court cannot make any pronouncement on the endorsement or service of the writ when such an issue was never placed before the lower courts. Its jurisdiction in the matter is appellate, not original. Even if a notice to raise a point not raised in the court below were duly filed and served, such a notice can only serve to enable a party to bring up new points to support the material already before the Court on the issue in controversy in the appeal. It can never serve as a licence for introducing new and separate issues. This was why this Court refused leave to the appellant to introduce these new issues at this stage.
On the issue properly before the Court I have had a preview of the judgment of my learned brother, Obaseki, J.S.C., and I agree with him that the appellants are not parties to the agreement. If they are agents at all, they are agents to the respondent under a separate agreement and not to the foreign company. They cannot therefore take advantage of the arbitration clause between the parties under an agreement to which they are complete strangers. The respondents appear to have sued the appellants in respect of the sum of N620,000.00 which they said they paid to them. The appellants should go and defend the action as best as they can. It appears to me that Akanbi, J.C.A., was right when he stated:
“In the circumstances the respondent ought not have been allowed to stay the action in the High Court.”
In my judgment, for the above reasons and the fuller reasons contained in the judgment of my learned brother, Obaseki, J.S.C., with which I agree, I dismiss the appeal with N500.00 costs.
Appeal dismissed.
Appearances
Chief Fola Akinrinsola (with him, Miss Yemi Akintan and Miss Onyi Anezi-Okoro) For Appellant
AND
L.O. Sanyaolu (with him, Mrs. L. J. Nggilari, Acting Deputy Solicitor-General Borno State) For Respondent



