NETWORK SECURITIES LTD v. DAHIRU & ORS (2022)

NETWORK SECURITIES LTD v. DAHIRU & ORS

(2022)LCN/5025(SC)

In The Supreme Court

On Friday, June 03, 2022

SC.205/2007

Before Our Lordships:

Chima Centus Nweze Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Amina Adamu Augie Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Helen Moronkeji Ogunwumiju Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Ibrahim Mohammed Musa Saulawa Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Emmanuel Akomaye Agim Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Between

NETWORK SECURITIES LIMITED APPELANT(S)

And

1. ALHAJI UMARU DAHIRU 2. THE HON. MINISTER, FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY 3. THE FEDERAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (FCDA) RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO:

WHETHER OR NOT A LAW FIRM IS COMPETENT IN LAW TO SIGN OR FILE ANY PROCESS

This Court maintained its position that a law firm “cannot legally sign and/or file any process in the Courts”; and that any process signed by a law firm is “incompetent in law”, in SLB Consortium V. NNPC (supra), wherein it held:
The signature of “Adewale Adesokan & Co” on the originating summons robs the process of competence ab initio as the said firm is not a registered legal practitioner enrolled to practice law as Barrister and Solicitor in this Court. All the proceedings, which rested on the inchoate originating summons, are deemed not to have taken place in law. One cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stand. It has been established that the originating summons signed by a Law Firm was not initiated by due process. As same is incompetent, this appeal rests on nothing. AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.S.C.

POSITION OF LAW WHEN A LAW FIRM SIGN OR FILE ANY COURT PROCESS

The decision in Okafor V. Nweke (supra) is here to stay; that is the message entrenched in the decisions of this Court thereafter— see Hamzat & Anor V. Sanni & Ors (2015) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1453) 486, wherein Galadima, JSC, stated:
In SLB Consortium V. NNPC this Court citing the case of Okafor V. Nweke struck out the Plaintiff’s Originating summons and Statement of claim, both having been signed by “Adewale Adesokan & Co”, who was held not to be a legal practitioner known to law – – – In view of our clear position in Okafor V. Nweke and other similar cases, I hold that the Appellant’s Statement of Claim on which evidence was led, were a nullity, same having been signed in the name of a law firm.
In this case, the Application for Issue of Writ of Summons at pages 2-3 of the Record was signed by “Plaintiffs Solicitors, A. A. Gulak and Company”; and the Statement of Claim at pages 78-81, was signed by “A. A. Gulak and Company (Plaintiffs Solicitors)”. The originating processes were, therefore, not signed by a legal practitioner, which means that the Appellant is right that the said suit was dead on arrival – see Min. of W. & T., Adamawa State V. Yakubu (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1351) 481, wherein this Court observed that:
The fatal effect of the signing of an originating process by a law firm is that the entire suit was incompetent ab initio. It was dead at the point of filing. The originating process is fundamentally defective and incompetent. It is inchoate, legally non-existent. AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.S.C.

POSITION OF LAW WHEN A LAW FIRM SIGN OR FILE ANY COURT PROCESS

WHETHER OR NOT A LAW FIRM CAN SIGN OR FILE ANY COURT PROCESS

It is established by sufficient authority that a condition precedent necessary to validate an originating process is that, it must contain therein a signature of either the Appellant or Appellant’s counsel, Okpe v Fan Plc & Anor LPELR-42562 (SC); Nigerian Army v Samuel (2013) 14 NWLR (pt. 1375) 466 at 482; Kida v Ogunmola 13 NWLR (pt. 997) 377.
Section 2(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act reads: –
“Subject to the provisions of the Act, a person shall be entitled to practice as a barrister and solicitor if, and only if, his name is on the roll.”
Section 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act provides thus: –
“In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, the following expressions have the meanings hereby assigned to them respectively, that is to say-
‘legal practitioner’ means a person entitled in accordance with the provisions of this Act to practice as a barrister or as a barrister and a solicitor, either generally or for the purpose of any particular office or proceedings”
The purpose of the foregoing sections is to ensure that only a legal practitioner whose name is on the roll of this Court should sign Court processes.
A firm of lawyers is not a legal practitioner within the meaning and intendment of Section 24 of the Act. The effect of signing an originating process by a law firm is that such process is fundamentally defective, It is therefore, incompetent. An originating process confers jurisdiction on a Court, and where such process is incompetent, this ousts the jurisdiction of such Court to entertain the matter, Okpe v Fan Milk Plc & Anor (supra); SLB Consortium v NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR (pt.1251) 317; Kente v Ishaku (2017) LPELR-4207 (SC); Madukolu v Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341. CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.S.C.:

WHETHER OR NOT A LAW FIRM CAN SIGN OR FILE ANY COURT PROCESS

The notion that a legal practitioner practicing law by a known name, cannot use his firm name to prepare and file legal processes with a signature over the firm name is not realistic and is contrary to law. The fact that legal practitioners practice law by their firm name, that the firm is one consisting of only lawyers is common knowledge in Nigeria, is not reasonably open to question and does not require proof by virtue of S. 124 of the Evidence Act. The notion disregards the provisions of S.573 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA).
S.573 of the CAMA provides that

WHETHER OR NOT A LAW FIRM CAN SIGN OR FILE ANY COURT PROCESS

The notion that the non-signing or irregular signing of an application for the issue of the writ or other originating process is a jurisdictional issue and not a procedural one that must be raised timeously before taking any further step at the trial proceedings is not correct. Even in cases where the signature required to issue the process is absent, this Court has held that it is a procedural requirement that will not vitiate the process. In Anyankwoko v Okoye (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1188) 497 at 516 the Supreme Court held thusly- “…it occurs to me that the issue of non-signing of the originating summons by the Registrar of the trial Court or an officer of the Court duly authorise to sign same is mere lapse on the side of the Registrar of the trial Court. It is non-compliance with the Court Rules of Procedure which regulate the exercise of jurisdiction conferred on a Court by a statute. It has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of that Court.” EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.S.C.

POSITION OF LAW ON FAILURE OF THE JUDGE TO SIGN THE ORIGINATING SUMMONS

In Famfa Oil Ltd V AG of the Federation & Anor (2003) LPELR-1239(SC) this Court held that the “failure of the Judge to sign the originating summons is mere procedural irregularity”, that “a procedural irregularity should not… This Court vitiate a suit once it can be shown that no party that has suffered miscarriage of justice”, that “any non-compliance with any Rules of Court is prima facie an irregularity and not a ground for nullity, unless such non-compliance amounts to a denial of natural justice.”
This Court in Famfa Oil case followed its earlier decision in exactly similar circumstances in Saude V Abdullahi (1989)7 SC (Pt.ii) 116 that failure of a Judge to sign an originating summons is a procedural irregularity. EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.S.C.

AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The first Respondent, as Plaintiff, instituted the action that culminated in this Appeal at the Federal High Court, wherein he claimed the following Reliefs –
a) A Declaration that the Plaintiff is entitled to the Statutory Right of Occupancy over Plot 109, located at Area A8, Wuse II District, Abuja, covered by Certificate of Occupancy No. FCT/ABU/BA. 50.
b) A Declaration that the purported revocation of the Plaintiff’s right of Occupancy and the purported allocation of same piece of land to the 3rd Defendant was and still is null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
c) A Perpetual Injunction restraining the Defendants by themselves, their servants, agents, or privies from entering, doing anything on, or taking anything from the piece of land known as Plot 109, Wuse Il District, Abuja, and which is in the Plaintiff’s possession.
d) The sum of Two Million Naira (N2,000,000.00) damages against the 1st and 2nd Defendants.

Initially, there were only two Defendants – the second and third Respondents. But, by an Order of the Court dated 20/1/1997, one “Nanfa Ponfa”, who was allocated the said Plot of land during the pendency of the suit, was joined as the “3rd Defendant’, and though, he was served with Court processes, he did not defend the action at the trial Court. He was not a Party in the appeal filed at the Court of Appeal, and he is also not a Party to the appeal in this Court.

The Appellant, who bought the said plot of land from Nanfa Ponfa, was joined on its own motion as 4th Defendant by Order of Court dated 13/3/2000. At the trial, the first Respondent, as Plaintiff, testified and called one Witness. The second and third Respondents, as the first and second Defendants, called one Witness. The third Defendant did not participate at the trial at all. The Appellant, as fourth Defendant, called its Property Manager, as Witness.

Learned Counsel filed and adopted their respective Written Addresses. In the trial Court’s judgment written by Okeke, J., who heard the matter, but delivered in open Court on 11/6/2003 by Egbo-Egbo, J., he held as follows:
The 1st and 2nd Defendants woefully failed to prove that the revocation notice, which is a sine qua non for a valid revocation of Plaintiff’s right of occupancy was served on him… Having failed to prove the service of the mandatory revocation notice on the Plaintiff, the purported revocation of the Plaintiff’s right of occupancy over Plot 109, A8, Wuse II District, Abuja is null and void and of no effect whatsoever. The Plaintiff is, therefore, still entitled to the Statutory Right of Occupancy over the said Plot 109 located at A8, Wuse Il District, Abuja. It is trite that you cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stand. As the re-allocation of the Plot to 3rd Defendant is based on the purported revocation of the Plaintiff’s right, which revocation has been declared null and void, the 1st and 2nd Defendants had nothing to re-allocate to 3rd Defendant. The 3rd Defendant, therefore, had nothing to sell or transfer to the 4th Defendant. In view of the Declarations made, perpetual injunction is ordered against each of the Defendants in favour of the Plaintiff. General damages of N500,000.00 is awarded against the 1st and 2nd Defendants in favour of the Plaintiff.

Aggrieved, the Appellant filed an appeal at the Court of Appeal, which failed; the Court of Appeal in its judgment delivered on 24/1/2007, concluded that:
The law will aid those, who are watchful and not those, who are asleep, a situation that seems to have been the lot of the Appellant. If the Appellant or his agent had conducted proper search, as is required in a land transaction, they would have not only found the much earlier title of the 1st Respondent obtained ten years before, and that the 1st Respondent was fighting not to have that title or right taken away by the 2nd Respondent, which process was pending for two years before the acquisition by the Appellant. It is for the prevailing circumstances that I cannot indulge the frustration of the Appellant, who has exhibited a degree of carelessness. How to reward that lack of carefulness to the disadvantage of the one, who rightly possesses the title or right, especially since in his case against his opponent, he showed sufficient proof that the attempt to revoke his title was outside the terms of his Certificate of Occupancy and the law, being the Land Use Act to which he and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents were bound… This appeal fails as lacking in merit. I dismiss it and affirm the judgment of the Court below with the Orders that accompanied that decision.

Still aggrieved, the Appellant appealed to this Court with a Notice of Appeal that contains eight Grounds of Appeal, however, at the hearing of the appeal, it abandoned Grounds 1-7 thereof, and they were accordingly struck out. The extant Ground of Appeal is Ground 8, wherein it complained as follows –
The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law by confirming the judgment of the Federal High Court, which Court had no jurisdiction to try issues of Title to Land, land transactions and trespass to land having regard to Section 230(1) of Decree No. 107 of 1993 and Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution.

PARTICULARS OF ERROR
a. The Court of Appeal wrongly affirmed the judgment of the Federal High Court, which acted without jurisdiction.
b. Having regard to Section 230(1) of Decree No. 107 of 1993 and Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution, the Federal High Court lacked/lacks the jurisdiction to try causes dealing with Title to Land, land contract/transactions and trespass to land.
c. The jurisdiction of Federal High Court in respect of land disputes/transactions has been ousted by Section 39(1) of the Land Use Act 1978, which vests exclusive jurisdiction in the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory.
d. The decision of the Court of Appeal confirming the judgment of the trial Court is a nullity.

The Appellant distilled five Issues for Determination in its Brief of Argument. Apart from Issue i., which is distilled from Ground 8 of the Grounds of Appeal, Issues ii-v are formulated from the abandoned Grounds of Appeal, which have been struck out, therefore, the said Issues have no legs to stand on and they are, hereby, ignored -WAEC V. Adeyanju (2008) 9 NWLR (1091) 207. The only surviving Issue from the extant Ground of Appeal is Issue i.; that is:
Whether the trial Court having regard to the nature of the claim/causes of action i.e., title to land/trespass to land had jurisdiction to entertain the Suit.

The first Respondent formulated six Issues for Determination in his own Brief. Issues 1 to 5 are tied to the complaints in the abandoned Grounds of Appeal, which are of no moment in this appeal, but as he put it at page 8 of his Brief: And lastly, as a new issue now being converse (sic) by the Appellant, whether the trial Court (the Federal High Court) at the time it heard the matter, had jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter brought before it.

The second and third Respondents formulated only one Issue in their Brief –
Whether the trial Federal High Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the suit when it was instituted.

As the Appellant submitted in its Brief, the Issue of whether the trial Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit that led to this appeal is being raised for the first time in this Court. But the Appellant is right that being a threshold issue, jurisdiction can be raised for the first time in this Court, and it can be raised suo motu by this Court – see Galadima V. Tambai (2000) 6 SC (Pt. 1) 133, Jeric Ltd. V. Union Bank (2000) 6 SC (Pt. 1) 206, MPPP V. INEC (No. 2) (2015) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1491) 251, cited by Appellant. Even so, the Appellant addressed this Issue from two standpoints – that Federal High Court has no jurisdiction to try the causes of action; and the judgments and proceedings are nullities because they were based on improperly signed Court processes.
The issue of whether the proceedings and the lower Courts’ judgments are nullities must take centre stage in this appeal because this is not an issue that is treated lightly by this Court. The issue goes to the root of jurisdiction, which is aptly described as the pillar upon which the entire case stands, and once it is shown that a Court lacks jurisdiction, the case crumbles into pieces.

In this case, the Appellant submitted that the Writ of Summons dated 17/9/1996 and the Statement of Claim that accompanied it, were both signed in the name of a law firm, which is not a legal practitioner on the Register/Roll of legal practitioners, therefore, the suit was dead on arrival because the Writ and Statement of Claim were not signed by a legal practitioner; and that the non-signing of the processes by a known legal practitioner, renders the Writ and the Statement of Claim incurably defective, invalid, null and void. It cited:
Sections 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act
– First Bank Plc. V. Maiwada (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt 1348) 444 at 494
– SLB Consortium Ltd. V NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1252) 312 at 337
– Peak Merchant Bank V. NDIC (2011) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1261) 253 at 262
– MTN (Nig.) Ltd. V. C.C. Inv. Ltd. (2015) 7 NWLR (PT. 1459) 437/465
– Okafor V Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 521

And further argued that an improperly signed Court process is void ab initio; that it bears no good fruits, and nothing good can emerge out of it because it remains void; and that nothing can be put or super imposed on such process, citing Macfoy V UAC (1961) 3 WLR 1405, SLB Consortium Ltd. V NNPC (supra) and E.B.N. Ltd. V. Halilco (Nig.) Ltd. (2006) 7 NWLR (Pt. 980) 568. It urged this Court to so hold and set aside the Court of Appeal’s judgment.

The first Respondent did not address the issue in his Brief of Argument. The second and third Respondents made no reference to it in their own Brief, therefore, the resolution of this Issue rests on the Appellant’s arguments only.

Firstly, the Appellant stated the correct position of the law on this issue. Section 2(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act, which it cited, provides as follows:
Subject to the provisions of this Act, a person shall be entitled to practice as barrister and solicitor if, and only if, his name is on the roll.
Section 24 (Interpretation Section) of the said Act further explains as follows:
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, the following expressions have the meaning assigned to them respectively, that is to say “legal Practitioner” means a person entitled in accordance with the provisions of this Act to practice as a barrister or solicitor, either generally or for the purposes of any particular office or proceedings.
In the noted case of Okafor v. Nweke (supra), where a Motion on Notice was signed by “J.H.C. Okolo, SAN & Co”, Onnoghen, JSC (as he then was), said:
The combined effect of the above provisions is that for a person to be qualified to practice as a legal practitioner he must have his name on the roll, otherwise, he cannot engage in any form of legal practice in Nigeria. – The law does not say that what should be in the roll should be the signature of the legal practitioner but his name. That apart, it is very clear by looking at the documents, the signature which learned counsel claimed to be his really belongs to J.H.C. Okolo SAN & Co or was appended on its behalf since it was signed on top of that name. Since counsel agree that J.H.C. Okolo SAN & Co is not a legal practitioner recognized by the law, it follows that the said J.H.C. Okolo SAN & Co cannot legally sign and/or file any process in the Courts and as such the Motion on Notice and Brief of Argument all signed and issued by the firm known and called J.H.C. Okolo SAN & Co are incompetent in law particularly as the said firm of J.H.C. Okolo, SAN & Co is not a registered legal practitioner.
This Court maintained its position that a law firm “cannot legally sign and/or file any process in the Courts”; and that any process signed by a law firm is “incompetent in law”, in SLB Consortium V. NNPC (supra), wherein it held:
The signature of “Adewale Adesokan & Co” on the originating summons robs the process of competence ab initio as the said firm is not a registered legal practitioner enrolled to practice law as Barrister and Solicitor in this Court. All the proceedings, which rested on the inchoate originating summons, are deemed not to have taken place in law. One cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stand. It has been established that the originating summons signed by a Law Firm was not initiated by due process. As same is incompetent, this appeal rests on nothing.
This Court, per Fabiyi, JSC, also held as follows in FBN V. Maiwada (supra)-
We are interpreting a law, which seeks to make legal practitioners responsible and accountable in modern times. I see nothing technical in insisting that a legal practitioner should abide by dictates of law in signing Court processes. If the decision in Okafor V. Nweke is revisited as urged, more confusion will be created. The decision in Okafor V. Nweke is not in any respect wrong in law. The convenience of counsel should have no pre-eminence over the dictates of the law. The law, as enacted, should be followed. I do not for one moment see any valid reason why the decision in Okafor V. Nweke should be revisited. It has come to stay, and legal practitioners should reframe their minds to live by it for due accountability and responsibility on their part and for due protection of our profession.
The decision in Okafor V. Nweke (supra) is here to stay; that is the message entrenched in the decisions of this Court thereafter— see Hamzat & Anor V. Sanni & Ors (2015) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1453) 486, wherein Galadima, JSC, stated:
In SLB Consortium V. NNPC this Court citing the case of Okafor V. Nweke struck out the Plaintiff’s Originating summons and Statement of claim, both having been signed by “Adewale Adesokan & Co”, who was held not to be a legal practitioner known to law – – – In view of our clear position in Okafor V. Nweke and other similar cases, I hold that the Appellant’s Statement of Claim on which evidence was led, were a nullity, same having been signed in the name of a law firm.
In this case, the Application for Issue of Writ of Summons at pages 2-3 of the Record was signed by “Plaintiffs Solicitors, A. A. Gulak and Company”; and the Statement of Claim at pages 78-81, was signed by “A. A. Gulak and Company (Plaintiffs Solicitors)”. The originating processes were, therefore, not signed by a legal practitioner, which means that the Appellant is right that the said suit was dead on arrival – see Min. of W. & T., Adamawa State V. Yakubu (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1351) 481, wherein this Court observed that:
The fatal effect of the signing of an originating process by a law firm is that the entire suit was incompetent ab initio. It was dead at the point of filing. The originating process is fundamentally defective and incompetent. It is inchoate, legally non-existent.
This Court clearly stated in FBN V. Maiwada (supra) that the provisions of Section 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act, which are unambiguous, affect the jurisdiction of the Court as a matter of substantive law and not as a matter of procedural law, therefore, they cannot be waived. As the Appellant rightly submitted, Sections 2(1) and 24 of the said Act mandatorily prescribed that all Court processes must be signed by an identified legal practitioner, therefore, the non-signing of the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim by a known legal practitioner in the law firm of A. A. Gulak & Company renders the Writ and Statement of Claim “incurably defective, invalid, null and void”.
Simply put, the processes filed by the law firm were dead on the point of filing, and in the eyes of the law, they are defective and legally non-existent – Min. of W. & T., Adamawa State V. Yakubu (supra). The said processes are incompetent; and so, the judgments of the two lower Courts are nullities.

In the circumstances, this appeal succeeds, and it is, hereby, allowed. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is a nullity; it is, accordingly, struck out. The suit filed at the trial Court was incompetent ab initio, and it is struck out.
There will be no order as to costs.

CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.S.C.: My Lord, Augie, JSC, obliged me with the draft of the leading judgment and I agree with His Lordship that this appeal must be struck out.

The decision, Okafor v Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (pt. 1043) 521, has assumed a pre-eminent position in the jurisprudence of permissible signatures on Court processes in this country. The consistent posture with which the Courts of this country have followed this decision takes care of the sole standing issue raised for determination in this appeal. Only a handful will be cited here: Ajibode & Ors v Gbadamosi & Ors (2021) LPELR-53089 (SC); Salami v Muse (2019) LPELR- 47038 (SC); Yusuf v Mobil Oil (Nig,) Plc. (2020) 3 NWLR (pt. 1710); Braithwaite v Skye Bank Plc (2012) LPELR-15532 (SC); Ministry of Works & Transport, Adamawa State v Yakubu (2013) 6 NWLR (pt.1351) 481.
It is established by sufficient authority that a condition precedent necessary to validate an originating process is that, it must contain therein a signature of either the Appellant or Appellant’s counsel, Okpe v Fan Plc & Anor LPELR-42562 (SC); Nigerian Army v Samuel (2013) 14 NWLR (pt. 1375) 466 at 482; Kida v Ogunmola 13 NWLR (pt. 997) 377.
Section 2(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act reads: –
“Subject to the provisions of the Act, a person shall be entitled to practice as a barrister and solicitor if, and only if, his name is on the roll.”
Section 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act provides thus: –
“In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, the following expressions have the meanings hereby assigned to them respectively, that is to say-
‘legal practitioner’ means a person entitled in accordance with the provisions of this Act to practice as a barrister or as a barrister and a solicitor, either generally or for the purpose of any particular office or proceedings”
The purpose of the foregoing sections is to ensure that only a legal practitioner whose name is on the roll of this Court should sign Court processes.
A firm of lawyers is not a legal practitioner within the meaning and intendment of Section 24 of the Act. The effect of signing an originating process by a law firm is that such process is fundamentally defective, It is therefore, incompetent. An originating process confers jurisdiction on a Court, and where such process is incompetent, this ousts the jurisdiction of such Court to entertain the matter, Okpe v Fan Milk Plc & Anor (supra); SLB Consortium v NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR (pt.1251) 317; Kente v Ishaku (2017) LPELR-4207 (SC); Madukolu v Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341.
In the instant case, the application for issue of writ of summons was signed by: “Plaintiff’s Solicitors, A.A. Gulak and Company”. The statement of claim was signed by “A.A. Gulak and Company (Plaintiff’s Solicitors). Certainly, this nomenclature is not that of a legal practitioner within the meaning of the Act.
Where a condition precedent for the doing of an act has not been complied with, no act subsequent thereto can be regarded as valid. It is however a different consideration where the non-compliance relates to a condition not fundamental to the constitutive elements but is subsequent to the act sought to be done.
Flowing from the above, the judgment delivered by the trial Court in the instant case, is null and void, as it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit ab initio, and I so hold.

It is for these, and the more elaborate reasons in the leading judgment that I too, shall enter an order striking out this appeal. I also abide by the order as to costs in the leading judgment.

HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.S.C.: I have read the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother AMINA ADAM AUGIE, JSC and I am in agreement that the suit filed in contravention of S. 2 (1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioner Act. (a substantive Law) is a nullity. The Court of Appeal judgment is also a nullity. This Court is deprived of jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Thus, the new issue formulated for determination by the Appellant succeeds. Appeal allowed. No order as to costs.

IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.S.C.: My learned brother, the Hon. Justice Amina Adamu Augie, JSC has graciously accorded me the privilege of a preview of the judgment just delivered. Having equally read the briefs of argument of the respective parties vis-a-vis the record of appeal, I cannot but concur with the reasoning reached therein, to the conclusive effect that the instant appeal is grossly meritorious.

It is obvious on the face of the record of appeal (pages 2&3) that the writ of summons and the statement of claim filed by the 1st Respondent (plaintiff) were purportedly signed by:
“Plaintiff’s solicitors A.A Gulak and Company suit 1, Total Filling Station Opp. Wuse Police Station Zone 5, Wuse-Abuja. ”
Contrariwise, however, the provisions of Sections 2 (1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act mandatorily prescribed that all Court processes ought to be signed by legal practitioner duly known to law. Thus, the writ of summons and the statement of claim signed by an unidentified legal practitioner in the Law Firm of AA. Gulak and company is incurably defective, incompetent, invalid, null and void.

In the circumstances, the appeal succeeds, and it is allowed by me. The judgment of the Court of Appeal No. CA/A/176/03 is a nullity, and it is hereby struck out by me. The suit (FHC/ABJ/CS/68/96) being incompetent, null and void ought to be, and it is hereby struck out.

There shall be no order as to costs.

EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.S.C. (DISSENTING JUDGMENT): This Court is again faced with a situation where a plaintiff’s 25 year pursuit of justice with concurrent decisions of the two lower Courts in his favour declaring the revocation of his statutory right of occupancy illegal, is sought to be nullified by an objection raised for the first time in this Court on the sole ground that an unnamed legal practitioner in a firm of legal practitioners signed the application to issue the writ of summons when it is not disputed that the writ of summons was regularly issued by the competent authority of Court in accordance with the Federal Capital Territory High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules and when, at the date the writ of summons was filed, the prevailing legal regime established then by the decisions of this Court in Cole V Martins & Anor (1968) 5 NSCC 120 and Buhari V Yabo (2006) 17 NWLR(Pt.1007) 162 @ 178-181 permitted the signing of Court processes in that manner. I have in previous decisions of this Court highlighted the undesirability of this kind of objection, the injustice that will certainly result from upholding it and stated that the objection is against the procedure employed in filing the suit and is not in pursuit of justice in the case.
In Solumade & Ors. v. Kuti & Ors. (SC/327/2010 decided on 11-6-2021) I held thusly — “The suit leading to this appeal was filed on 19-10-1998. Litigation in the case has lasted over 23 years from that date, from the trial Court through the Court of Appeal to this Court. If the appellant had raised this issue of non-compliance with Order 2 Rules 1 and 2 of the Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 1994 within the time limited by Order 2 Rule 2, it would have been determined in limine before the appellant filed his statement of defence or at the trial. If the objection is upheld it would frustrate the respondents’ 23 years quest for justice in the Courts and make a mockery of the Courts. It would disrepute the Court to wait till after 23 years of litigating in three Courts, to tell the claimants that an originating process they filed 23 years ago is incompetent for non-compliance with Rules of Court and that for that reason all the proceedings of the two Courts and the judgment of the Court of Appeal in their favour are nullified. It is obvious that at this stage the respondents who would have exhausted much of their resources, would have become litigation weary and too exhausted to commence another case. Such a situation makes fair hearing of the case within a reasonable time impossible and violates S.36(1) of the 1999 Constitution that provides “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within reasonable by a Court or other Tribunal established by law and constituted in such a manner as to secure its independence and impartiality.”
In Aya v. Nkanu & Anor. (SC/940/2015 delivered on 11- 6-2021) I had made the same point that “If the objection is upheld it would frustrate the respondents’ 9 years quest for justice in the Courts and make a mockery of the Courts. It would disrepute the Court to wait till after 9 years of litigating in three Courts, to tell the claimants that an originating process they filed 9 years ago is incompetent for non-compliance with Rules of Court and that for that reason all the proceedings and the judgments of the two Courts in their favour are nullified. It is obvious that at this stage the respondents who would have exhausted much of their resources, would have become litigation weary and too exhausted to commence another case.
To uphold such an objection would elevate technicality over the pursuit of the justice of the case.
The notion that a legal practitioner practicing law by a known name, cannot use his firm name to prepare and file legal processes with a signature over the firm name is not realistic and is contrary to law. The fact that legal practitioners practice law by their firm name, that the firm is one consisting of only lawyers is common knowledge in Nigeria, is not reasonably open to question and does not require proof by virtue of S. 124 of the Evidence Act. The notion disregards the provisions of S.573 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA).
S.573 of the CAMA provides that

“1. Every individual, firm or corporation having a place of business in Nigeria and carrying on business under a business name shall be registered in the manner provided in his Part of this Act if —
a. in the case of a firm, the name does not consist of the true surname of all partners without any addition other than the true forenames of the individual partners or the initials of such forenames;
b. in the case of an individual the name does not consist of his true surname without any addition other than his true forenames or the initials thereof;
c. in the case of a corporation whether or not registered under this Act, the names does not consist of its corporate name without any addition.
2. Notwithstanding Subsection (1) of this Section where —
a. the addition merely indicates that the business is carried on in succession to a former owner of the business, that addition shall not of itself render registration necessary;
b. two or more individual partners have the same surname, the addition of an ‘s’ at the end of that surname shall not of itself render registration necessary; and
c. the business is carried on by a receiver or manager appointed by any Court, registration shall not be necessary.”
There is no doubt that A. A. Gulak is a legal practitioner and he practices under the firm name of A.A. Gulak and Company in keeping with S. 573 CAMA. There is no contention or even suggestion that A.A. Gulak and Company does not consist of only legal practitioners or that the signature over the said firm name is not that of a legal practitioner. There is no basis for assuming that the signature is not that of a legal practitioner in the firm. It does not help the substantial justice of the case to ignore all other records and processes in the case that clearly identify the name of the legal practitioner in the law firm of A. A. Gulak and company that signed the writ of summons and statement of claim and look at only the lack of name of the particular legal practitioner in the law firm that made the signature over the name of the law firm in the writ and statement of claim. The objection seems to be more concerned with how the signature was made or should be made and not that the person who signed it is not a legal practitioner. The Legal Practitioners Act in Ss 2 and 24 provides for who is entitled to practice law in Nigeria. The legal Practitioners in a firm consisting of only Legal practitioners can practice law in the name and style of that law firm by virtue of S.573 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA). See the decision of this Court in Buhari V Yabo (2006) 17 NWLR(Pt.1007) 162 @ 178-181 that followed Cole V Martins & Anor (1968) 5 NSCC 120 and held that — It is frequently done by solicitors in England as the Law list shows. In signing both notices of appeal, Mr. A.I. Kutigi used the name Kutigi and Co. which he uses in practice I am of the firm view that no possible doubt or confusion can arise in these circumstances. Courts are expected to at all times to ensure they do substantial justice between the parties, and in that regard, the rules of Court must be interpreted as to prevent undue adherence to technicalities….lt would be denying an appellant substantial justice if he is denied his constitutional right of appeal due to his counsel not affixing his name or not properly signing the notice of appeal”. The decision was overruled by this Court in Okafor V Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR(Pt.1043) 521 on the ground that without the name the signatory has not held himself out as practicing under the said firm name. With the greatest respect to the very distinguished jurists in that panel, I think that we should depart from Okafor V Nweke(supra) and similar decisions and return to Buhari V Yabo because grave injustice will continue to result from following the judicial precedent in Okafor V Nweke and similar cases. This Court in Veepee Industries Ltd V Cocoa Industries Ltd (2008) 4-5 SC(Pt. 1)16 held that it can depart from its previous decision if continuous adherence to it will occasion injustice on the principle that it is better to admit an error than to persevere in error. A situation where, a defendant whose concurrent decisions have held not to have a defence to a plaintiff’s claim, can in this Court use this kind of objection to nullify the proceedings and processes, including the judgments against him, after litigation that has lasted for many years, wreaks grave injustice on the plaintiff and results in a complete destruction of his right of access to Court and right to have his claim determined within a reasonable time.
In a case such as this one, where the legal practitioner adds “and Company” or the like to his name and is conducting the case, is it not glaring that he has held himself out as practicing under that name. In law, since A.A. Gulak and Company is not an incorporated company or body, it is one and the same with its owner A.A. Gulak. Both have the same personality. In Cole V Martins(supra) this Court held that “The effect, however of registering a business name under the Registration of Business Name Act 1961, is that where only one person constitutes that business it is correct to describe that person as in the terms of the registered business name.” See also Iyke Medical Merchandise v. Pfizer Inc & Anor. (2001) 5 SC (Pt. 1) 58.
A Court should be interested in searching for the truth of the matter and consider the totality of the records before it in determining any issue in the case. Such an isolated consideration of the writ of summons and statement of claim in the midst of abundant records providing answers to the question amounts to fault finding and not pursuit of justice.
The notion that the non-signing or irregular signing of an application for the issue of the writ or other originating process is a jurisdictional issue and not a procedural one that must be raised timeously before taking any further step at the trial proceedings is not correct. Even in cases where the signature required to issue the process is absent, this Court has held that it is a procedural requirement that will not vitiate the process. In Anyankwoko v Okoye (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1188) 497 at 516 the Supreme Court held thusly- “…it occurs to me that the issue of non-signing of the originating summons by the Registrar of the trial Court or an officer of the Court duly authorise to sign same is mere lapse on the side of the Registrar of the trial Court. It is non-compliance with the Court Rules of Procedure which regulate the exercise of jurisdiction conferred on a Court by a statute. It has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of that Court.”
In Famfa Oil Ltd V AG of the Federation & Anor (2003) LPELR-1239(SC) this Court held that the “failure of the Judge to sign the originating summons is mere procedural irregularity”, that “a procedural irregularity should not… This Court vitiate a suit once it can be shown that no party that has suffered miscarriage of justice”, that “any non-compliance with any Rules of Court is prima facie an irregularity and not a ground for nullity, unless such non-compliance amounts to a denial of natural justice.”
This Court in Famfa Oil case followed its earlier decision in exactly similar circumstances in Saude V Abdullahi (1989)7 SC (Pt.ii) 116 that failure of a Judge to sign an originating summons is a procedural irregularity.
In the light of the foregoing, I hold that the writ of summons and statement of claim are valid and that the Court of Appeal and the trial Court validly exercised jurisdiction.

The appeal lacks merit as the Appellant has failed to show the perverseness of the concurrent findings of the Court of Appeal and trial Court that the revocation of the 1st respondent’s statutory right of occupancy to the land is illegal and void.

The appeal is hereby dismissed. The appellant shall pay costs of Two Million Naira to the 1st respondent.

Appearances:

Abimbola Kayode, Esq. For Appellant(s)

Christopher Okeke, Esq, with him Cynthia Ogbodu, Esq.,
For First Respondent

Dr. James Agbonhese, Esq. with him M. l. Emokpaire, Esq., for Second and Third Respondents For Respondent(s)