NEROLI INVESTMENT LTD v. AIR HARBOUR TECHNOLOGIES (NIG) LTD & ORS (2021)

NEROLI INVESTMENT LTD v. AIR HARBOUR TECHNOLOGIES (NIG) LTD & ORS

(2021)LCN/15067(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Thursday, March 18, 2021

CA/A/878/2019

Before Our Lordships:

Moore Aseimo Abraham Adumein Justice of the Court of Appeal

Elfrieda Oluwayemisi Williams-Dawodu Justice of the Court of Appeal

Mohammed Mustapha Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

NEROLI INVESTMENT LTD APPELANT(S)

And

AIR HARBOUR TECHNOLOGIES NIGERIA LTD 2. THE HON. MINISTER OF THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY 3. FEDERAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

MEANING OF CAUSE OF ACTION

A cause of action is a state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in Court. The facts may be (i); a right of the claimant, violated by the defendant, (ii); the threatened violation of such right, (iii); it may even be some duty or right which the claimant is entitled to have cleared up that he may safely perform his duty or enjoy his property; See SAVAGE V. UWECHIA (1972) 3 SC 213; OGOH V. ENPEE INDUSTRIES LTD (2004) 17 NWLR (PT. 903) 449; UNITED BANK FOR AFRICA PLC V. BTL INDUSTRIES LTD (2004) 18 NWLR (PT. 904) 180; ADESINA V. OJO (2012) 10 NWLR (PT 1309) 562; AKILU V. FAWEHINMI (NO.2) (1989) 2 NWLR (PT. 102) 122 @ P. 169; GBADEHAN V. KILADEJO (2012) 16 NWLR (PT. 326) 399; ALHAJI ABUDU W. AKIBU VS. ODUNTAN (2000) 10 WRN 48; OMIN III V. THE GOVERNOR, CROSS RIVER STATE (2007) 41 WRN 158 @ PP. 186 – 187 AND SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY NIGERIA LTD. VS NWAWKA (2003) 1 S. C. (PT. II) 127 @ P. 138. PER MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A.

WHEN IS A CAUSE OF ACTION REASONABLE

A cause of action is said to be reasonable when it has some reasonable chance of success, when only the allegations in the pleadings are considered. Once the statement of claim discloses some cause of action or raises some question fit to be decided by a Court, then it is said to be a reasonable cause of action. The mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed, takes nothing away from it; see SHELL B.P. PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD V. ONASANYA (1976) 6 S.C 89 @ p. 94. PER MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A.

WHEN DOES TIME BEGIN TO RUN AGAINST THE COMMENCEMENT OF AN ACTION

…in matters affecting statutes of limitation, it starts to run, only when all the facts material to the plaintiff to succeed in his claim have happened. PER MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A.

ESSENCE OF A STATUTE OF LIMITATION

The essence of a Statute of Limitation is that a prospective litigant must institute an action over a right that accrues to him in any matter within the time stipulated to claim his entitlement from the adversary who is making effort to take away his right or property. Where a Claimant instituted his action outside the time prescribed by the Statute of Limitation upon becoming aware of the wrongdoing being committed against his property, his right of action or enforcement of his right becomes terminated; see (1) OBA J.A. AREMO II VS. S. F. ADEKANYE & ORS (2004) 13 NWLR (PART 891) 572 AT 592 A-H -593 A-F; EBOIGBE VS. N.N.P.C. (1994) 5 NWLR (PART 347) 649; ODUBEKO VS. FOWLER (1993) 7 NWLR (PART 308) 637; SANDA VS. KUKAWA LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1991) 2 NWLR (PART 174) 379 AND EKEOGU VS. ALIRI (1991) 3 NWLR (PART 179) 258. PER MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A.

WHETHER LIMITATION LAW APPLIES TO CONTINUING DAMAGE

In every respect, the fact of any continuing damage or injury removes an action from the adverse effect of the limitation Law; see DOSUMU V. NNPC (SUPRA), ADEPOJU V. OKE (SUPRA), AMACHERE V. SPDC (NIG.) LTD. (SUPRA) AND GULD OIL CO. (NIG.) LTD. V. OLUBA (SUPRA) AT 112. In AREMO II V. ADEKANYE (2004) 13 NWLR (PT. 891) 572 AT 593 – 594, the Supreme Court held to the effect that where there has been continuance of damage or injury, a fresh cause of action arises from time to time, as often as damage or injury is caused. See also ADEPOJU V. OKE (1999) 3 NWLR (PT.594) 154 AT 164, A-G., RIVERS STATE V. A-G., BAYELSA STATE (2013) 3 NWLR (PT.1340) 123 AT 148 – 149. PER MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A.

WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO DELIVER ITS JUDGMENT WITHIN THE STIPULATED TIME UNDER THE SECTION 294(1) OF THE 1999 CONSTITUTION WILL RENDER THE JUDGEMENT A NULLITY

Section 294 (1) of the 1999 Constitution stipulates as follows: “Every Court established under this Constitution shall deliver its decision in writing not later than ninety days after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses and furnish all parties to the cause or matter determined with duly authenticated copies of the decision within seven days of the delivery thereof”. The main objective of Section 294(1) of the 1999 Constitution is to compel Courts to deliver their decisions in writing not later than Ninety days after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses. From the records in this case, the parties adopted their respective addresses on 11th day of March, 2019, while the ruling in question was delivered on the 1st of July, 2019. This is clearly about 112 days after the adoption of written addresses by the parties. This appears to be in clear violation of the 90 day rule. Now, even though the said ruling was delivered outside the ninety (90) day period stipulated by the Constitution, it does not ipso facto render the judgment a nullity. For the said decision to be rendered a nullity the Appellant has to establish that the said decision occasioned a miscarriage of justice; see OFULUE vs. OKOH (2014) LPELR (23218) 1 at 22-23 and Section 294 (5) of 1999 Constitution which provides as follows: “The decision of a Court shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of Sub-section (1) of this Section unless the Court exercising jurisdiction by way of appeal or review of that decision is satisfied that the party complaining has suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason thereof.” Accordingly, I am unable to agree with the Appellant that the decision of the lower Court occasioned a miscarriage of justice, because there is nothing to show that the appellant suffered any miscarriage of justice. Even though the ruling was delivered outside the stipulated ninety (90) day period, the judgment is not liable to be set aside since there is nothing anywhere to show that a miscarriage of justice had been occasioned; see ATUNGWU vs. OCHEKWU (2004) 17 NWLR (PT 901) 18; IGWE vs. KALU (2002) 5 NWLR (PT 761) 678; ACB vs. AJUGWO (2011) LPELR (3637) 1 at 34 – 35 and MOLEGBEMI vs. AJAYI (2011) LPELR (4501) 1 at 30 -32. PER MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A.

MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the ruling of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja delivered on the 1st of July, 2019 by Hon justice Baba Yusuf.

The Appellant who was the 8th Defendant at trial upon joinder as a party on the 17th of October, 2017, in the suit FCT/HC/CV/237/2010 brought by the 1st Respondent as plaintiff prayed for the striking out of the 1st Respondent/Plaintiff’s claims on the ground that the suit is statute barred; the trial Court refused the application of the Appellant, dismissing same.

Dissatisfied, the Appellant filed a notice of appeal on the 15th of July, 2019 on three grounds as follows:
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
GROUND ONE:
The learned trial Judge erred in Law when His Lordship held that the suit of 1st Respondent is not statute barred.
GROUND TWO
The learned trial Judge erred in Law when His Lordship delivered the Court’s Ruling Ninety-Eight days after the final address of parties in the interlocutory application before the Court in violation of the provisions of Section 294(1) of the Constitution, Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended.

GROUND THREE:
The learned trial Judge of the High Court misdirected himself in Law and/or the facts in holding that the claim of 1st Respondent as Plaintiff before the trial Court is for recovery of land.

From these grounds, three issues were formulated for determination on behalf of the Appellant by Olagoke Fakunle Esq., SAN in the brief filed on the 5th of November, 2019 and adopted by Osaro Eghobamien SAN for the 1st Respondent, in the brief filed on the 18th of February, 2020; the issues are as follows:
1. Whether or not the claim of the 1st respondent as plaintiff before the trial Court is for recovery of land/title to land.
2. Whether or not the action of the plaintiff/1st respondent herein before the lower Court is statute barred and ought to be struck out
3. Whether or not the ruling of the High Court delivered on the 1st of July, 2019, 112 days after final adoption of written addresses by counsel nay parties on the 11th of March, 2019 is a nullity in view of the provisions of Section 294 (1) and (5) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended.

ISSUE ONE:
Whether or not the claim of the 1st

Respondent as plaintiff before the trial Court is for recovery of land/title to land.

It is submitted for the Appellant that the trial Court erred by holding that the claim of the 1st Respondent is for recovery of land, when the writ of summons and statement of claim should have guided it otherwise; ABUBAKAR V B.O. & A.P LTD (2007) 18 NWLR part 1066.

That the 1st Respondent having admitted that its claim is founded on breach of contract; the Court cannot be heard to set up or formulate a case for a party different from the one admitted by the party; ACB LTD v. OBA (1993) 7 NWLR part 304 page 173.

That the offer made to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents for development of integrated tourism resort, upon terms which the 1st Respondent accepted and pursuant to which it was issued a statutory Certificate of Occupancy in respect of Plot 49 Kubwaba Zone B00 Abuja is a contract within the meaning of Section 8 of the Land Use Act.

It is submitted for the 1st Respondent in response that the nature of the suit is clearly based on the recovery of land/title and not breach of contract; TOKUNBO AGORO V HON MINISTER OF FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY (2018)

LPELR-44452-CA.

That the Appellant misconceived the true position of this case by contending in one breath that it is a simple case of contract and in another that it is statute barred, thus deliberately distorting the case of the 1st Respondent; RONDEL V WORSLEY (1967) 1 QB 443.

That the mere fact that land transaction in Nigeria is formulated by the basic elements of a contract does not detract from the purview of the Land Use Act, as it vests unfettered powers on the Governor of a State or Minister of the Federal Capital Territory to grant a statutory right of occupancy to any applicant which can be evidenced by a certificate of occupancy.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE ONE:
The best and safest method of ascertaining the date on which an act occurred, for the purpose of determining whether a suit is statute barred or not is through a careful scrutiny of the writ of summons, statement of claim, and especially the reliefs sought. For the avoidance of doubt, the reliefs sought by the 1st Respondent in its amended statement of claim at pages 12 to 13 of the record of appeal are:
i. A DECLARATION that the plaintiff, upon issuance of the Terms

of Grant/Conveyance of Approval dated 31/08/2000 and Certificate of Occupancy dated 4/9/2000 with No: FCT/ABU/MISC.17571 in respect parcels of land measuring approximately 57 hectares and more particularly described as Plot No. MTV 49 Kubwaba National Park FCT acquired a vested right and is the rightful and valid/beneficial owner of the property.
ii. A DECLARATION that the 1st and 2nd defendants’ purported revocation of the plaintiff’s Right of Occupancy of land measuring approximately 57 hectares and more particularly described as Plot NO. MTV 49 Kubwaba National Park, FCT covered by certificate of occupancy dated 4/9/2000 with No: FCT/ABU/MISC.17571 is reckless, illegal, null and void, unconstitutional and abuse of office, for not following due process of Law and not affording the plaintiff any fair hearing.
iii. AN ORDER setting aside the purported revocation of the Plaintiff’s Right of Occupancy by the 1st and 2nd Defendants as same was unconstitutional, null and void.
iv. A sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) as Damages against the 1st and 2nd defendants for reckless action in revoking the plaintiff’s Right of occupancy MISC

101691 over plot 1191 granted to the plaintiff.
v. A DECLARATION that the plaintiff, having complied satisfactorily with the conditions for re-certification exercise of its land, making all statutory payments and charges for thereto, is entitled to grant of a fresh certificate of occupancy in respect of parcels of land measuring approximately 57 Hectares and particularly described as Plot No. MTV 49 Kubwaba National Park FCT.
vi. A DECLARATION that the plaintiff, having complied satisfactorily with the conditions for re-certification exercise of its land, making all statutory payments and charges for thereto, is entitled to actualize and enjoy all rights pursuant to the statutory right of occupancy in respect of the parcels of land measuring approximately 57 Hectares and particularly described as Plot No; MTV 49 Kubwaba National Park FCT.
vii. Further to (v) & (vi) above, AN ORDER of specific performance directing the 1st and 2nd defendant to issue a fresh certificate of Occupancy in respect of parcels of land measuring approximately 57 Hectares and particularly described as Plot No. MN 49 Kubwaba National Park FCT.

viii. AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, servants, agents and or/privies from entering into the land, trespassing and performing any (further) act adverse to the Plaintiff’s right of ownership over the land approximately 57 Hectares and more particularly described as Plot No. MTV 49 Kubwaba National Park FCT covered by a certificate of Occupancy dated 4/9/2000.
ix. COST of instituting and maintaining this action.

These reliefs are very clear and unambiguous in referring to the subject matter of the suit as being land; they are also borne out by paragraphs 6, 7,8,9,10,11 and 12 of the 2nd amended statement of claim; see pages 8 to 9 of the record of appeal.

The trial Court’s decision that the suit instituted by the 1st Respondent related to title to land was informed by the findings that the writ of summons, statement of claim and the reliefs clearly demonstrate the suit is related to title to land and not contract or its breach. In that regard, the trial Court was impeccable.

The 1st Respondent’s grouse, leading to the institution of the suit is the revocation of its right of occupancy, in respect of the land known as plot MTV 49

Kubwaba National park FCT. From the writ and statement of claim, as well as the reliefs sought, one is left in no doubt as to the intention behind the suit and its objective, which is to restore the 1st Respondent’s interest in respect of the land, and definitely not an enforcement of a contract between the 1st Respondent and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents as contended for the Appellant.

The fact that land transactions are guided by contract does not in itself detract from the fact that the Land Use Act is the bedrock of all title to land; and it is in an effort to comply with the provisions of the Land Use Act that the 1st Respondent applied to the 2nd Respondent; BUKAR V BASHIR supra.
It is for these reasons that I now resolve the first issue in favour of the 1st Respondent, against the Appellant.

ISSUE TWO:
Whether or not the action of the plaintiff/1st Respondent herein before the lower Court is statute barred and ought to be struck out.
It is submitted for the Appellant that the trial Court erred when it held that the 1st Respondent’s suit is not statute barred; and that the only way of knowing whether a suit is statute barred

or not is from the writ of summons and the statement of claim, as once the cause of action is beyond the period allowed, the action is statute barred; ADEKOYA V FHA (2008) 11 NWLR part 1099 page 551; AKIBU V ODUNTAN (2000) 13 NWLR part685 page 446.

That the 1st Respondent’s claim is for enforcement of the contract between itself on one hand and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents on the other hand for development of integrated tourism resort, which was withdrawn by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents vide letter dated 24th of January, 2002.

That notwithstanding any intervening discussions or negotiations between the 1st Respondent and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents the cause of action arose on the 24th of January, 2002, even as the letter of the 24th of January, 2002 continues to subsist.

That also all the material facts of which proof thereof are necessary to entitle the 1st Respondent to the grant of reliefs happened in the year 2002; AKINBOBOLA V PLISSON FISKO NIG. LTD (1991) 1 NWLR part 167 page 270 and FGN V ZEBBRA ENERGY LTD (2002) 18 NWLR part 798 page 162.

It is submitted for the 1st Respondent in response that there is a continuance of damage,

when a fresh cause of action arises from time to time; AJAO V PERMANENT SEC MINISTRY OF ECON PLANNING, BUDGET, CIVIL SERVICE, PENSIONS OFFICE & ANR (2016) LPELR-41407-CA.

That the instant suit was commenced in November, 2010 following several failed attempts by the 1st Respondent to obtain a certificate of occupancy after receiving demand notice, for which the 1st Respondent paid N12, 989, 797, 50 on the 12th of May, 2005 to the Abuja Geographical Information System, an agency of the 2nd defendant, who undertook re-certification exercise.

That the cause of action in this suit arose in 2006 and not 2002 when the 2nd and 3rd Respondent refused to issue a fresh certificate of occupancy; A.G. ADAMAWA STATE V A.G. FEDERATION (2014) NWLR part 1428 page 515; and also that where it is shown that the defendant admitted liability to the plaintiff, limitation Law will not apply; SPDC V UZOARU (1994) 9 NWLR part 366 page 70 and COMFORT V ALMO GASES NIG LTD (2006) ALL FWLR part 335 page 93.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE TWO:
A cause of action is a state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in Court. The facts may be (i); a right of the

claimant, violated by the defendant, (ii); the threatened violation of such right, (iii); it may even be some duty or right which the claimant is entitled to have cleared up that he may safely perform his duty or enjoy his property; See SAVAGE V. UWECHIA (1972) 3 SC 213; OGOH V. ENPEE INDUSTRIES LTD (2004) 17 NWLR (PT. 903) 449; UNITED BANK FOR AFRICA PLC V. BTL INDUSTRIES LTD (2004) 18 NWLR (PT. 904) 180; ADESINA V. OJO (2012) 10 NWLR (PT 1309) 562; AKILU V. FAWEHINMI (NO.2) (1989) 2 NWLR (PT. 102) 122 @ P. 169; GBADEHAN V. KILADEJO (2012) 16 NWLR (PT. 326) 399; ALHAJI ABUDU W. AKIBU VS. ODUNTAN (2000) 10 WRN 48; OMIN III V. THE GOVERNOR, CROSS RIVER STATE (2007) 41 WRN 158 @ PP. 186 – 187 AND SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY NIGERIA LTD. VS NWAWKA (2003) 1 S. C. (PT. II) 127 @ P. 138.

succeed, takes nothing away from it; see SHELL B.P. PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD V. ONASANYA (1976) 6 S.C 89 @ p. 94.

With regard to time, in matters affecting statutes of limitation, it starts to run, only when all the facts material to the plaintiff to succeed in his claim have happened.

It is always very important in deciding

whether an action is statute barred, for the Court to ascertain when the cause of action arose, and in doing so scrutinize the facts of the case when the cause of action leading to the dispute arose.

In every respect, the fact of any continuing damage or injury removes an action from the adverse effect of the limitation Law; see DOSUMU V. NNPC (SUPRA), ADEPOJU V. OKE (SUPRA), AMACHERE V. SPDC (NIG.) LTD. (SUPRA) AND GULD OIL CO. (NIG.) LTD. V. OLUBA (SUPRA) AT 112.
In AREMO II V. ADEKANYE (2004) 13 NWLR (PT. 891) 572 AT 593 – 594, the Supreme Court held to the effect that where there has been continuance of damage or injury, a fresh cause of action arises from time to time, as often as damage or injury is caused. See also ADEPOJU V. OKE (1999) 3 NWLR (PT.594) 154 AT 164, A-G., RIVERS STATE V. A-G., BAYELSA STATE (2013) 3 NWLR (PT.1340) 123 AT 148 – 149.

It is instructive in this case that prior to the pending suit, the 1st defendant instituted an action at the Federal High Court with number FHC/ABJ/CS/220 for the purpose of redressing the revocation of its certificate of occupancy over the same parcel of land now in dispute, but withdrew same

to solve the dispute amicably. This led to the payment of N12,989,797,50 as ground rent believing that it would be re-issued a new certificate, however the 2nd and 3rd Respondents were unable to re-issue a fresh certificate to the 1st Respondent, thus leaving it with no option but to institute a fresh action on the 29th of August, 2006; see pages 34 to 38 of the record of appeal.

So, in the light of these, it is therefore clear that the cause of action in this present suit arose in 2006 and not 2002, as contended, when the 2nd and 3rd Respondents refused to issue the 1st Respondent a new certificate of occupancy.

The Court below was right in holding that the action was not statute-barred, accordingly this issue is resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent, against the Appellant.

ISSUE THREE:
Whether or not the ruling of the High Court delivered on the 1st of July, 2019, 112 days after final adoption of written addresses by counsel nay parties on the 11th of March, 2019 is a nullity in view of the provisions of Section 294 (1) and (5) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended.
It is submitted that parties adopted their respective briefs

on the 11th of March, 2019, and on the 1st of July, 2019, one hundred and twelve days after, the lower Court delivered its ruling on whether or not the action filed in Court by the 1st Respondent as plaintiff is statute barred.

That ‘decision’ as used in Section 294 (1) of the Constitution has its interpretation in Section 318 (1) and it includes any judgment, decree, order, conviction, sentence or recommendation.

That the ruling of the trial Court delivered on the 2019 is a decision within the meaning of Section 318 (1) of the Constitution; and it is also trite that the period of limitation in a suit is determined by looking at the writ of summons and the statement of claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave the plaintiff a cause of action and by comparing that date with the date on which the writ of summons was filed, without taking oral evidence from witnesses; EGBE V ADEFARASIN (1987) 1 NWLR part 47 page 1.

That where a Court delivers its ruling outside the period allowed, in a matter where no evidence was taken at all, such a decision shall not be saved by the provision of Section 284(5); OKONKWO V UDOH (1997) 9 NWLR part

519 page 20.

It is submitted for the 1st Respondent in response that the only basis an appellate Court would nullify the decision of a trial Court for failure to deliver a decision within 90 days would be where the party complaining of the delay has satisfied the appellate Court that miscarriage of justice was suffered as a result of the delay; HILARY FARM LTD & ORS V MAHTRA & ORS (2007) LPELR-1365-SC.

That the appellant has failed to discharge the burden of establishing that he suffered miscarriage of justice on the basis of the delay; OME-EBO & ORS V EGBUNIKE & ANR (2019) LPELR- 47166-CA.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE THREE:
Section 294 (1) of the 1999 Constitution stipulates as follows:
“Every Court established under this Constitution shall deliver its decision in writing not later than ninety days after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses and furnish all parties to the cause or matter determined with duly authenticated copies of the decision within seven days of the delivery thereof”.
The main objective of Section 294(1) of the 1999 Constitution is to compel Courts to deliver their decisions in writing

not later than Ninety days after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses. From the records in this case, the parties adopted their respective addresses on 11th day of March, 2019, while the ruling in question was delivered on the 1st of July, 2019. This is clearly about 112 days after the adoption of written addresses by the parties. This appears to be in clear violation of the 90 day rule. Now, even though the said ruling was delivered outside the ninety (90) day period stipulated by the Constitution, it does not ipso facto render the judgment a nullity. For the said decision to be rendered a nullity the Appellant has to establish that the said decision occasioned a miscarriage of justice; see OFULUE vs. OKOH (2014) LPELR (23218) 1 at 22-23 and Section 294 (5) of 1999 Constitution which provides as follows:
“The decision of a Court shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of Sub-section (1) of this Section unless the Court exercising jurisdiction by way of appeal or review of that decision is satisfied that the party complaining has suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason

thereof.”
Accordingly, I am unable to agree with the Appellant that the decision of the lower Court occasioned a miscarriage of justice, because there is nothing to show that the appellant suffered any miscarriage of justice. Even though the ruling was delivered outside the stipulated ninety (90) day period, the judgment is not liable to be set aside since there is nothing anywhere to show that a miscarriage of justice had been occasioned; see ATUNGWU vs. OCHEKWU (2004) 17 NWLR (PT 901) 18; IGWE vs. KALU (2002) 5 NWLR (PT 761) 678; ACB vs. AJUGWO (2011) LPELR (3637) 1 at 34 – 35 and MOLEGBEMI vs. AJAYI (2011) LPELR (4501) 1 at 30 -32.

Accordingly, this issue is resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent, against the appellant without much ado.

Having resolved all the three issues that call for determination in favour of the 1st Respondent, against the Appellant, the appeal fails for lack of merit and it is accordingly dismissed. The ruling of the trial High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, by Hon Justice Baba Yusuf, delivered on the 1st day of July, 2019 is hereby affirmed.

MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.C.A.: I read before

now the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Mohammed Mustapha, JCA.
I agree that the appeal is devoid of merit and, for the reasons advanced by my learned brother, I also dismiss it.

ELFRIEDA OLUWAYEMISI WILLIAMS-DAWODU, J.C.A.: I had the benefit of reading in advance the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother Mohammed Mustapha, JCA.

I am in complete agreement with the reasoning and conclusion reached therein. I therefore affirm the Ruling of the trial High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, by Hon Justice Baba Yusuf, delivered on the 1st day of July, 2019.
I make no order as to costs.

Appearances:

Olagoke Fakunle, SAN with him, I. Fakunle For Appellant(s)

Osaro Eghobamien SAN with him, Ikechukwu Ajokanma Esq. – for 1st Respondent. For Respondent(s)