NATIONAL UNITY PARTY v. INEC (2020)

NATIONAL UNITY PARTY v. INEC

(2020)LCN/14409(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Wednesday, July 29, 2020

CA/A/CV/426/2020

Before Our Lordships:

Peter Olabisi Ige Justice of the Court of Appeal

Yargata Byenchit Nimpar Justice of the Court of Appeal

Mohammed Baba Idris Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

NATIONAL UNITY PARTY APPELANT(S)

And

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

THE MEANING OF “SEMI-COLON, COLON, FULL STOP AND DASH”

According to the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, 7th Edition the punctuation marks, semi-colon, colon, full stop and dash means:
“Semi-Colon (;) it is used to separate the parts of a complicated sentence or items in a detailed list, showing a pause that is longer than a comma but shorter than a full stop/Period.
Colon (:) it is used to introduce a list, a summary, an explanation, etc or before reporting what some body has said.
Full stop (.) used at the end of a sentence and in some abbreviations, for example e.g. come ‘Come to a full stop’ to stop completely.
Dash (-) used to separate parts of a sentence often instead of a colon or in pairs instead of a brackets/parentheses.
‘OR’: “The word “or” is a disjunctive participle used to express an alternative or to give a choice of one among two or more things. It separates the provision preceding it from the provision coming after it. Its role is to show that the provision in which it is appearing are distinct and separate one from the other. See the cases of BUHARI V. INEC (2008) 4 NWLR (PT. 1078) 546 AT PP. 643-644, PARAS. ARUBO V. AIYELERU (1993) 3 NWLR (PT. 280) 126; ABIA STATE UNIVERSITY V. ANYAIBE (1996) 3 NWLR (PT. 439) 646.” (Emphasis Mine) From the above definitions and explanation of the terms, it is clear that the colon, semi colon and dash used in the provisions signifies a continuation of a sentence to be connoted as a whole but the use of the word ‘OR’ signifies the point where the sentence becomes disjunctive. Not only does the use of the word ‘OR’ signify that Subsections (b) and (c) are disjunctive, the full stop used at the end of Subsection(b) before the continuation of Subsection (c) shows that both subsections are disjunctive. PER IDRIS, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT AVERMENTS NOT SPECIFICALLY DENIED ARE DEEMED AS ACCEPTED

It is trite that these averments/depositions not having been specifically denied are deemed as accepted and unchallenged facts and the Court can act on them and has rightly acted on them. See the case of UGWUANYI VS. NICON INSURANCE PLC (2013) LPELR – 20092 (SC). PER IDRIS, J.C.A.

MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): By an Originating Summons dated 21st of February, 2020 and filed on the 24th February, 2020, the Appellant as Plaintiff at the trial Court instituted an action against the Respondent as Defendant and sought for the following reliefs against the Defendant:
1. A DECLARATION that the Defendant does not have the Constitutional vires under Section 225A of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (Fourth Alteration No. 9, Act 2017 to de-register the Plaintiff as a political party or any other political party for failure to win any of the offices mentioned therein or score certain percent of votes mention therein without the Completion of election in the 774 local government Area in Nigeria and all the state in Nigeria and all the state of the Federation.
2. A DECLARATION that the Defendant cannot validly invoke Section 225A of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (Fourth Alteration No 9, Act 2017) to de-register or impose any sanction or take any other administrative action against the Plaintiff when the Plaintiff has not breached any of the Provision

in Section 222 of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).
3. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the Defendant, either by itself, staff, officers, agents, privies or howsoever described from de-registering, sanctioning or taking any other administrative decision against the Plaintiff as a duly registered political party in Nigeria.
4. AN ORDER OF COURT setting aside and/or nullifying any decision taken by the Defendant against the Plaintiff or any other political party by way of de-registration, based on Section 225A (B&C) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Fourth Alteration, NO 9, Act 2017), for being illegal, ultra vires its powers, null and void in its entirety until election is fully conducted in the 774 local government Councils in Nigeria and the 36 states of the Federation.
5. AND FOR SUCH other or further orders as this Honourable Court shall deem fit to make in the circumstances.

Before going into the appeal, below is a summary of the facts involved in this Appeal. In the Appellant’s originating summons, he raised three issues for determination before the Trial

Court thus:
1. Whether having regards to the provisions of Section 225A Paragraph B and C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (Fourth Alteration NO 9, Act 2017, the Defendant has the powers to deregister the Plaintiff as a political party for failure to win any of the offices mentioned therein or score certain percent of votes mention therein without the completion of election in the 774 local government Area in Nigeria and all the state of the Federation.
2. Whether by the provisions of Section 225A of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (Fourth Alteration NO 9, Act 2017 the Defendant can validly de-register or impose any sanction or take any other administrative action against the Plaintiff when the Plaintiff has not breached any of the requirement under Section 222 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as Amended).
3. Whether the Plaintiff as a registered political party in Nigeria has acted or conducted its affairs unlawfully or breached any law and therefore eligible to be de-registered as a political party in Nigeria for any reason whatsoever.

Summarily, the Appellant claims that sometime in November, 2019, the Respondent wrote to the Appellant and other political parties for further verification which procedure the Appellant claims it has already fulfilled before its registration. He further claimed that the Appellants candidates are contesting various elections for the chairmanship as well as councillorship positions in many states of the Federation.

It is also the Appellant’s claim that the Respondent deregistered the Appellant on the 5th February, 2020 while it was still contesting various elections for chairmanship as well as councillorship positions in many states of the Federation without any basis.

On the 26th March, 2020, the matter was heard and adjourned to 27th April, 2020 for Judgment.

The Learned Trial Judge, Honourable Justice Taiwo O. Taiwo delivered Judgment in the Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/211/2020 on the 18th March, 2020 wherein the trial judge granted judgment in favour of the 1st Respondent.

Dissatisfied with the Judgment of the trial Court, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal dated 31st March, 2020 comprising of Five grounds of appeal. The parties in the appeal before

this Court filed and exchanged their respective briefs of argument.

In the Appellant’s brief of argument as settled by his counsel Chigozie K. Eburuo Esq., and dated 13th July, 2020 and filed 15th July, 2020, the following issues for determination were distilled from the grounds of appeal as follows:
1. Whether the Lower Court was not wrong in its interpretation of the provisions of Section 225A (b) and (c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Fourth Alternation NO. 9) Act 2017 and thereby occasion miscarriage of justice on the Appellant. (Ground 1 and 3 of the Notice of Appeal).
2. Whether the Appellant did not place sufficient material facts and evidence before the Lower Court (Grounds 2, 4 and 5 of the Notice of Appeal).

On Issue One, the Appellant’s Counsel argued that the interpretation of the provisions of Section 225A (b) and (c) of the Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria 1999 (Fourth Alteration NO. 9 is erroneous and contrary to the intendment of the legislature. Counsel further argued that the settled principle of interpretation is that it ought to be interpreted more liberally in

favour of the Appellant and more strictly against the Respondent. On this point, he cited the cases of ARARUME VS. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION & 2 ORS (2007) 9 NWLR (PART 1038) 127, 157 F – H and ELELU-HABEEB & ANOR VS. THE HONOURABLE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION & 2 ORS (2012) 13 NWLR (PART 1318) 423, 489 – 491 E – B.

The Appellant’s Counsel also argued that reading the said provision as a whole, this Court will find out that a party needs not fulfill all the conditions stated therein.

The Appellant’s Counsel also argued that the right or power of the Respondent to deregister the Appellant must at all times await the final conduct of all elections, including chairmanship and councillorship elections which are yet to be conducted in all states of the Federation before it can be validly exercised.

On Issue Two, the Appellant Counsel argued that in line with the Constitutional Provisions, the Appellant placed sufficient material evidence before the Court that Local Government Chairmanship and Councillorship elections across the Country are yet to be conducted or completed and the

Appellant is actively participating in various such elections with high prospect of winning and that the Court ought to have taken judicial notice of it.

The Appellant Counsel further argued that the Appellant pleaded credible facts of its participation in the upcoming elections and thereby discharged the evidential burden placed on it.

The Appellant’s Counsel also argued that the findings of the Trial Court did not arise from facts, material or evidence before it. On this point, he cited the case of IWUOHA VS. NIPOST LIMITED (2003) 8 NWLR (PART 822) 308.

In conclusion, the Appellant Counsel urged this Court to hold that the powers of the Respondent under Section 225A of the Constitution was wrongly exercised thereby making it ultra vires and therefore null and void.

On the other hand, the Respondent filed its Respondent Brief dated 20th July, 2020 and filed on the 22nd July, 2020 settled by its Counsel Emeka Jude Phillipe Obegolu Esq.

The Respondent’s Counsel adopted the Issues raised by the Appellant in its Brief of Argument.

On Issue One, the Respondent’s Counsel argued that there is no where in the legislation

or constitutional provision where it was stated that the provisions of Section 225A of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Fourth Alteration no. 9 Act 2017) was created against a lesser entity. Counsel further argued that the Trial Judge limited himself to the literal meaning of the said provisions since the section is clear and unambiguous. On this point, counsel cited the case of NDOMA-EGBA VS. CHUKWUOGOR (2004) FWLR (PART 217) 735.

The Respondent Counsel argued that construing the word ‘OR’ conjunctively would sometimes lead to a manifest absurdity or conflict with other parts of the statute. On this point, he cited the case of KABIRIKIM VS. EMEFOR (2009) 14 NWLR (PART 1162) 602 AT 623 PARA 11 and Section 18(3) of the Interpretation Act. Counsel further argued that the Appellant has erroneously misinterpreted the provision of Section 225 as being conjunctive hence his assertions and argument.

The Respondent’s Counsel further argued that it is clear from the provisions of the said Section 225A on the conditions that a political party that violates any of the grounds is liable to being deregistered.

Counsel further argued that assuming without conceding that the intendment of the legislators is to have a conjunctive reading and application of the said Section 225A, there is nowhere in the provision that the powers of the Respondent to deregister any political party in breach of any of the provisions is restricted or curtailed by any time limitation.

In conclusion of the argument on Issue One, the Respondent’s Counsel urged this Court to uphold the decision of the Trial Court.

On Issue Two, the Respondent’s Counsel argued that the Appellant had the burden of proving before the lower Court that the Respondent had no powers to deregister its party from the list of political parties in Nigeria and also that the Appellant has not breached any of the grounds for deregistration as a political party as provided under the Constitution which the Appellant failed to prove same by credible evidence. On this point, Counsel cited the case of PETER OJOH VS. OWUALA KAMALU & ORS (2005) LPELR – 2389 (SC) and Section 135 – 137 of the Evidence Act. The Respondent’s Counsel further argued that the Trial Court is empowered to take Judicial

Notice of certain matters which are notorious but those matters are established by Section 122 of the Evidence Act.

The Respondent’s Counsel also argued that the Respondent failed to show the Trial Court any documentary evidence in support of its assertion and this Court cannot go on a voyage of discovery or for the Trial Court to speculate.

The Respondent’s Counsel also argued that the Appellant did not file a reply to its Counter affidavit to the originating summons to challenge the averments therein. On this point, he cited the case of CHINWO & ORS VS. CHINWO & ANOR (2010) LPELR – 9113 (CA).

In conclusion, the Respondent’s Counsel urged this Court to discountenance the arguments of the Appellant as same is not the position of the law and for this Court to affirm the decision of the Trial Court.

Having summarized the arguments of counsel, I wish to adopt the issues raised by the Appellant herein, and will address same thereon:
1. Whether the Lower Court was not wrong in its interpretation of the provisions of Section 225A (b) and (c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Fourth Alternation NO. 9) Act 2017

and thereby occasion miscarriage of justice on the Appellant.
2. Whether the Appellant did not place sufficient material facts and evidence before the Lower Court.

ISSUE ONE
Whether the Lower Court was not wrong in its interpretation of the provisions of Section 225A (b) and (c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Fourth Alteration NO. 9) Act 2017 and thereby occasion miscarriage of justice on the Appellant.

Before I make my findings on this issue, for want of emphasis, I think it necessary to reproduce the said Section 225A (b) and (c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Fourth Alteration No. 9) Act 2017 as follows:
The Independent National Electoral Commission shall have power to de-register a political party for-
a. Breach of any of the requirements for registration:
b. Failure to win at least twenty-five percent of votes cast in –
(i) One state of the Federation in a Presidential election; or
(ii) One Local Government of the State in a Governorship election.
c. Failure to win at least-
(i) One ward in the chairmanship

election;
(ii) One seat in the National or State House of Assembly election; or
(iii) One seat in the Councillorship election.
The Appellant’s Counsel argued in paragraph 3.03 of the Appellant Brief of argument that this Court would find that the above provisions created a duty against a lesser entity, the Appellant. On this point, he cited the case of ARARUME VS. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION & 2 ORS (2007) 9 NWLR (PART 1038) 127, 157 F – H, which clearly, was interpreted out of context by the Appellant Counsel. It is and still remains the trite position of the law that in the interpretation of statutes, clear and unambiguous words in statute needs to be given their ordinary meaning when construing such statute. See the case of BAMAIYI VS. A. G. OF FED (2001) 12 NWLR (PART 727) PAGE 468. The words in Section 225A (b) and (c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Fourth Alteration NO. 9) Act 2017 as reproduced above are clear on the face of it and this Court has a duty to look at it and give it its true meaning.
The Appellant’s Counsel further argued in Paragraph 3.08 of the Appellant

Brief of Argument that the interpretation of the word ‘OR’ as used in the said section by the Trial Court was contrary to the intendment of the draftsmen and negated the constitutional essence of the provision. I do not see any need to beat about the bush, because when the intention of the legislature is clear and leaves no room for guess work, effect must be given to those words of the statute. Going further and for the avoidance of doubt, it is the duty of this Court within its interpretative jurisdiction to examine and give meaning to the clear and unambiguous provisions of Section 225A (b) and (c) including the subsections in order to answer the question whether the said section should have been interpreted conjunctively or disjunctively.
In interpreting the said provision, I think it necessary to consider the punctuation marks and the words used in the sentence of the provision. In doing this I shall consider the meaning and use of the word ‘OR’ as well as punctuation marks like semi colon, colon, full stop and dash.
According to the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, 7th Edition the punctuation marks, semi-colon,

colon, full stop and dash means:
“Semi-Colon (;) it is used to separate the parts of a complicated sentence or items in a detailed list, showing a pause that is longer than a comma but shorter than a full stop/Period.
Colon (:) it is used to introduce a list, a summary, an explanation, etc or before reporting what some body has said.
Full stop (.) used at the end of a sentence and in some abbreviations, for example e.g. come ‘Come to a full stop’ to stop completely.
Dash (-) used to separate parts of a sentence often instead of a colon or in pairs instead of a brackets/parentheses.
‘OR’: “The word “or” is a disjunctive participle used to express an alternative or to give a choice of one among two or more things. It separates the provision preceding it from the provision coming after it. Its role is to show that the provision in which it is appearing are distinct and separate one from the other. See the cases of BUHARI V. INEC (2008) 4 NWLR (PT. 1078) 546 AT PP. 643-644, PARAS. ARUBO V. AIYELERU (1993) 3 NWLR (PT. 280) 126; ABIA STATE UNIVERSITY V. ANYAIBE (1996) 3 NWLR (PT. 439) 646.” (Emphasis Mine)

From the above definitions and explanation of the terms, it is clear that the colon, semi colon and dash used in the provisions signifies a continuation of a sentence to be connoted as a whole but the use of the word ‘OR’ signifies the point where the sentence becomes disjunctive. Not only does the use of the word ‘OR’ signify that Subsections (b) and (c) are disjunctive, the full stop used at the end of Subsection(b) before the continuation of Subsection (c) shows that both subsections are disjunctive.
With the inclusiveness of my findings on whether Subsection (b) and (c) of Section 225A of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Fourth Alteration No. 9 Act) are disjunctive, I agree in totality with the findings of the Trial Court on this Issue. It is therefore my well-considered view that the learned trial Judge was right in its interpretation of the said provisions and has therefore occasioned no miscarriage of justice to the Appellant.
This Issue is hereby resolved in favour of the Respondent.

ISSUE TWO
Whether the Appellant did not place sufficient material facts and evidence

before the Lower Court.

It is trite that any party who wants the Court to act in its favour must place sufficient material before the Court.
Firstly, the Appellant Counsel argued in paragraph 3.12 of the Appellant Brief of Argument that the Appellant placed sufficient materials before the Court and that the Appellant are actively participating in various elections with high prospect of winning, a fact which the Trial Judge ought to have taken judicial notice of.
Assuming that the Trial Court ought to have taken judicial notice of the conduct of elections in the Country, should the Court also take judicial notice of the fact that the Appellant participated in the said elections? That would leave the Court in the Cross-road of speculations and assumptions which road the Court is not permitted to take. See the case of IKENTA BEST (NIG.) LIMITED VS. ATTORNEY GENERAL RIVERS STATE (2008) LPELR – 1476 (SC) wherein the Supreme Court per Ogbuagu, JSC held inter alia that:
“Speculation has no place in our Courts. Neither the parties nor the Court is permitted or entitled to speculate anything. A Court will interfere to set any speculation aside….”

Secondly, I have read the affidavit in support of the Originating summons filed by the Appellant as plaintiff at the trial Court especially in paragraphs 5 – 14. The Appellant stated facts but failed to place before the Court material evidence to support those facts and like the Trial Court held in page 114 of the Record of Appeal there is nothing to show that that the Appellant, even in the states where elections into Local Governments have been held has met the criteria for it not to be de-registered. Going further, I agree no less with the respondent Counsel’s argument as well that even though the Appellant argued that the Respondent cannot de-register it because it had hope of winning a futuristic election, nothing was placed on record before the Court to show any evidence of the date of the future election, preparation or even participation and if I may add, their candidates for such future elections.

Before I conclude on my findings on this Issue, it is also worthy of note here that the Respondent filed a counter affidavit to the affidavit in support of the originating summons filed by the Appellant wherein

the Respondent made certain depositions especially in Paragraphs 5 – 20 which were not challenged by the Appellant. It is trite that these averments/depositions not having been specifically denied are deemed as accepted and unchallenged facts and the Court can act on them and has rightly acted on them. See the case of UGWUANYI VS. NICON INSURANCE PLC (2013) LPELR – 20092 (SC).

From my findings on this issue therefore, it is my strong and unshaken view that the Appellant did not place sufficient evidence before the trial Court. This Issue is hereby resolved in favour of the Respondent against the Appellant.

In the Final result, I hereby uphold the decision of the trial Court in its entirety. I hold that this Appeal is lacking in merit and thus dismissed. I make no order as to cost.

PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.: I agree.

YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in draft the Judgment just delivered by learned brother, MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS JCA and I agree with the reasoning contained therein and the conclusion arrived there at.

My brother has adequately considered the two issues formulated for determination

in this Appeal. I have nothing useful to add. For the same reasoning advanced in the lead Judgment which I adopt as mine, this Appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed.
I abide by the other orders made therein in the lead Judgment.

Appearances:

IBEGBUNAM, ESQ. For Appellant(s)

OBEGOLU, ESQ., with him, A. ELACHI, ESQ., and O. P. JAMES, ESQ. For Respondent(s)