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NATIONAL PENSION COMMISSION v. GIWA & ANOR (2022)

NATIONAL PENSION COMMISSION v. GIWA & ANOR

(2022)LCN/17179(CA) 

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Monday, July 25, 2022

CA/ABJ/CV/479/2020

Before Our Lordships:

Haruna Simon Tsammani Justice of the Court of Appeal

Elfrieda Oluwayemisi Williams-Dawodu Justice of the Court of Appeal

Danlami Zama Senchi Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

NATIONAL PENSION COMMISSION APPELANT(S)

And

1. MAROOF ABDUL GIWA 2. ARM PENSION MANAGERS LIMITED RESPONDENT(S)

 

RATIO

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF JURISDICTION

The issue of jurisdiction in the administration of justice system has become so elementary and beyond any debate. Jurisdiction is the authority which a Court has to decide a matter before it. It is the entire foundation for a Court to take cognizance of any matter presented before it for adjudication. It is very radical and crucial in the adjudication of any matter as it is the cornerstone, the foundation for and life line therein. Any Court proceeding without jurisdiction amounts to a nullity and of course a futile exercise. See the cases of IDIH V. UTENO 2009 LPELR – CA/A/230/06, MADUKOLU V. NKEMDILIM 1962 2 SCNLR P.341, HAMZAT V. SANNI 2015 5 NWLR PT. 1453 486 and TUKUR V. GOVT. OF GONGOLA STATE 1989 4 NWLR PT. 117 592. It can be raised at any time and in any manner for the first time on appeal and even viva voce. See the case of PETROJESSICA ENTERPRISES LTD. V. LEVENTIS TECH. CO. LTD. 1992 5 NWLR PT. 244 675.  PER WILLIAMS-DAWODU, J.C.A. 

THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN CIVIL MATTERS

Proof in civil cases such as herein is on preponderance of evidence or balance of probabilities. See the cases of DAODU V. NNPC 1998 2 NWLR PT. 538 355, KALA V. POTISKUM 1998 3 NWLR PT. 540 1 and ITAUMA V. AKPA-IME 2000 7 SC PT. II 24.
The burden is first on the Plaintiff to establish his case first with cogent and credible evidence before it shifts to the Defendant and the Plaintiff cannot rely on the weakness of the Defendant’s case except where the Defendant’s case supports his case. See the case of IHEKORONYE V. HART 2000 15 NWLR PT. 692 840. 

The greater weight of evidence is otherwise referred to as preponderance of evidence which is not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by the most convincing evidence with superior evidentiary weight that even though it is not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt will suffice to swing the mind impartially to one side other than the other. See the case of SUNDAT OKORIE V. IGNATIUS UNAKALAMBA 2013 LPELR-2011. One will consider these Issues along with the findings of the Court below. PER WILLIAMS-DAWODU, J.C.A. 

ELFRIEDA OLUWAYEMISI WILLIAMS-DAWODU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal emanated from the judgment of the National Industrial Court, Abuja, delivered on May 18th, 2020 by Hon. Justice O. O. Oyewunmi in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/218/2018 wherein judgment was entered in favour of the 1st Respondent who was the Claimant at the Court below against the Appellant, the 2nd Defendant at the Court below.

The case of the 1st Respondent against the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent at the Court below was for the following reliefs:
“a. A DECLARATION that the computation of the claimant’s lump sum/benefits by the defendant done on the basis (sic) 25% of the claimant’s total Retirement Savings domiciled with the 1st defendant is in bad faith, wrong, defective, ran foul of the law, not known to law, offends the principle of justice, fair dealing and good conscience therefore null and void of (sic) and no effect whatsoever.
b. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the defendants to pay the claimant the amount of Fifteen Million, Eight Hundred and Ninety – Seven Thousand, Six Hundred and Eighty Naira, One Hundred and Seventy-Five Kobo (N15,897,680,175) representing 75% of the claimant’s total Retirement Saving Account domiciled with the 1st defendant.
c. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the defendants to part to the claimant 75% of the claimant’s total retirement savings at the time of the judgment from the claimant (sic) retirement savings account domiciled with the 1st defendant
d. Interest on the judgment sum at the rate of 10%.
e. Damages in the sum of N10,000,000 (Ten Million Naira) for non-payment of the correct lump sum to the claimant, the claimant having lost a life changing business opportunities and having suffered financial embarrassment, inconvenience, pains and economic hardship.
f. The sum of One Hundred Thousand Naira (N100,000) as the cost of the suit.”

As stated earlier, the judgment was against the Appellant and being aggrieved thereby, approached this Court with its Notice and Five (5) Grounds of Appeal as amended dated September 22nd, 2021, filed September 24th, 2021 and deemed properly filed and served on November 29th, 2021. The Appellant seeks an order allowing the appeal setting aside the judgment of the Court below except the part that refused the claims for damages, general and exemplary and the 10% post-judgment interest on the judgment sum against the Appellant.

The brief gist of facts that resulted in the instant appeal is, according to the Appellant, that the 1st Respondent a retiree under the Contributory Pension Scheme complained to the Dispute Resolution procedure of the Appellant being dissatisfied with the payment of lump sum pension by the 2nd Respondent (the 1st Defendant at the Court below). Without completing the process, he went before the National Industrial Court on July 29th, 2019 against both the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent.

According to the 1st Respondent, when in May, 2018 after retirement on December 24th, 2017 from Public Service at the age of 60 years, the 1st Respondent sought lump sum payment of his benefit, from his Retirement Savings Account with N21,196,906.90, the 2nd Respondent proposed to pay N5,512,593.14 as 25% of the total savings and a sum of N132,587.69 as monthly programmed withdrawal. Not satisfied with the proposed pattern of payment, after many attempts to resolve the issue which went nowhere he instated an action and sought the prayers afore stated.

The Court found in his favour and granted most part of his reliefs.

Parties in compliance with the rules of this Court filed and exchanged their briefs. The Appellant’s dated September 22nd, 2021, filed September 24th, 2021, deemed November 29th, 2021 as properly filed and served and settled by J. U. K. Igwe SAN, who urged at the hearing of the appeal that it be allowed. The 1st Respondent’s dated November 2nd, 2021, filed November 3rd, 2021 and deemed as properly filed and served on November 29th, 2021 and was settled by Maroof Giwa Esq., the 2nd Respondent failed to file any brief of argument.

The following issues were submitted by the parties for determination:
APPELLANT’S FIVE ISSUES:
“1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in assuming jurisdiction and upholding the Claimant’s principal declaratory relief number A when the relief contained in paragraph 32 (a) of the amended statement of facts as sought by the Claimant was incompetent and ought to have been struck out (Ground 1)
2. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in suo motu awarding 50 percent lump sum pension to the Claimant without inviting the parties to address him on the propriety or otherwise of the said award (Ground 2).
3. Whether the Claimant discharged the burden of proof placed upon him and entitled to the reliefs granted to him by the learned trial Judge (Ground 3).
4. Whether the learned trial Judge breached the Appellant’s right to fair hearing and breached his statutory duty by failing to determine the fundamental jurisdictional issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies raised and argued before him (Ground 4)
5. Whether the Claimant’s action was initiated by the due processes of law through exhaustion of remedies and fulfilment of the condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the National Industrial Court (Ground 5)
RESPONDENT’S SINGULAR ISSUE
“1. Whether the so-called Guiding Computation Template, a subordinate rule allegedly used by the Appellant and 2nd Respondent to limit the lump sum of the 1st Respondent (claimant) to 25% is not at variance with the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic Nigeria, Pension Reform Act, 2014 and the Regulation (Ground 2).

Carefully going through the issues submitted, I shall adopt for the determination of this appeal, the issues submitted by the Appellant, even though there is repetition of issues.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF PARTIES
APPELLANT’S ARGUMENT
The Appellant submitted that the 1st Respondent failed to complete the dispute resolution procedure prescribed under the relevant law and commenced a suit at the Court below therefore, the Court was wrong to have assumed jurisdiction even when the lapse was raised by the Appellant. He referred to Section 106(1) (2), (3) and Section 107 (1), (2) and (3) of the Pension Reform Act. That the Court shut it out and violated its fundamental right to fair hearing and cited in support the case of ALL PROGRESSIVE CONGRESS (APC) V. NDUUL & 2 ORS 2018 2 NWLR PT. 1602 1. Further argued that there was no cause of action to warrant the allegations and assertions of the 1st Respondent and the reliefs sought were consequently premature and in support cited the case of IKECHUKWU V …

The learned Counsel for the Appellant contended that the pleadings of the 1st Respondent lacked clarity and was not precise, offended Order 30 Rule 3 and 4 of the Rules of the Court below as it failed to specifically state the exact particulars of the wrong done by the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent and should be struck out. He submitted that by Section 99 (1) of the Pension Reform Act 2014, where indeed there is a contravention of the Act as the 1st Respondent claimed against the Appellant an offence was committed and it is a must that such offence or wrongful act be known and clear to the Appellant. In support cited the case of ANYANWU & 5 ORS V. UZOWUAKA & 13 ORS 2009 6-7 SC PT. II 44, BELGORE & 2 ORS V. AHMED & 3 ORS 2013 8 NWLR PT. 1353 60 and PDP V. INEC 2012 7 NWLR PT. 1300 538. That the Court has no jurisdiction over vague and speculative claims. He urged that Section 15 of the Rules of this Court be applied to strike out the declaratory reliefs and cited the case of ODEOLO V. OGBUEGBUEBEGO 2015 13 NWLR PT. 1476 229 and AWONIYI & 2 ORS V. THE REGISTERED TRUSTEE OF THE ROSICRUCIAN ORDER (AMORC) 200 6 SC PT. 1103.

He submitted that the fundamental right of the Appellant was breached when the Court awarded 50% lump sum payment without addresses from the parties on the issue, as the 1st Respondent never prayed for it. That the claim for 75% by the 1st Respondent was inconsistent with the law and the Regulations, Guidelines and approved template. That the award of 50% was without evidence before the Court and should be rejected. In support, he cited the cases OGUNDELE V, AGIRI 2009 12 SC PT. 1 135 and NIGERIA NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION & ANOR V. ORHIOWASELE & 2 ORS 2013 4-5 SC PT. II 1.

The 1st Respondent did not establish his claim as he ought especially for declaratory prayers he argued and cited in support the case of OGAH V. IKPEAZU & 3 ORS and OGAH V. PDP & 4 ORS 2017 17 NWLR PT. 4594. There is nothing before the Court to show that it was the Appellant computed any lump sum. Further that the finding of unlawfulness, bad faith, defectiveness, unfair dealings and bad conscience was unsupported by evidence as should be and cited the cases of ADEGBUYI V. APC & 2 ORS 2014 12 SC PT. 1 and NBC PLC V. UBANI 2013 SC 95 in support.

He argued that Section 1 (c) and (d) of the Pension Reform Act was inserted to ensure that every Pensioner receives his retirement benefit and are catered for during old age. Therefore, contributory pension funds are not exposed to business ventures unregulated by the Commission and therefore the programmed withdrawal. That all Pensioners are involved and the Appellant not singled out. That the computation of 75% was a wrong presumption on the part of the Court and it had no powers to do so outside the laws and regulation.

In conclusion, he urged that the non-exhaustion of the statutory prescribed administrative steps by the 1st Respondent was fatal to his case, the jurisdiction of the Court was prematurely invoked and therefore the entire proceedings ought to be set aside.

1ST RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
It was submitted on behalf of the 1st Respondent that the 1999 Constitution as amended, Pension Reform Act 2014 and the Regulation for the Administration of Retirement and Terminal Benefits (the Regulations) take priority in application against any computed Templates, guidelines benchmark circulars and subordinate subsidiary legislations in respect of pension administration.

The 1st Respondent asserted that there were multiple entreaties of the Appellant which yielded no fruit and that was why he instituted action against the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent at the Court below. He submitted that the 1st Respondent satisfied the basic rules on pleadings, as the issues are clear not vague and in summary form of material facts. And that the pleadings are in tandem with the reliefs sought.

He argued that the conduct of the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent amounted to forceful takeover of the property of the 1st Respondent in violation of Section 44 (1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. That to peg the available lump sum for payment to 25% was unlawful and in bad faith and in support cited the case of SHODEINDE & ORS V. REGISTERED TRUSTEE OF AHMADIYYA 1983 LPELR-3064 SC 53.

On the argument that the 1st Respondent should have gone to arbitration other than litigation, the 1st Respondent argued that arbitration clause does not necessarily oust the jurisdiction of the Court, that the right to go for arbitration is personal and can be waived by either of the parties and referred to Section 6 (b) of the 1999 Constitution.

That there is a difference between mandatory retirement as in the case of the 1st Respondent and other category of retirements and for the category the 1st Respondent falls within, it is as stated in Section 7(1) (a-c) of the PRA. That withdrawal of lump sum is mandatory as of right in the case of the 1st Respondent and not limited to a particular percentage and thereafter the programmed monthly or periodic withdrawal is determined from the sum left. Further that the lump sum amount is not determined by the Appellant, 2nd Respondent or any guideline or on the basis of life expectancy. That to control the amount to be paid as lump sum will breach Sections 39 and 173 of the 1999 Constitution. 25% lump sum payment he argued does not in any way apply to the 1st Respondent along with the provisions of clauses 5.1.1 and 5.1.5 of the Regulation. He submitted that subordinate legislation, the computation template which was not tendered in evidence cannot go beyond the substantive legislation, the Pension Reform Act and cited in support the cases of MOBIL PRODUCING NIG. UNLIMITED V. OKON JOHNSON & 17 ORS SC 33/2010 and PRINCE ADEMOLU ODENEYE V. PRINCE DAVID OLU EFUNUGA 1990 11-22 SC. The Appellant abandoned the issue of the template as no evidence was presented in that regard and cited in support the cases of DAME PAULINE TALLEN & ORS V. DAVID JONAH & ORS 2011 LPELR-9311 CA.

In conclusion, he urged that the appeal be disallowed and dismissed.

THE COURT
As earlier stated that the 1st Respondent herein is a retiree and under the contributory pension scheme with the 2nd Respondent. The Appellant being aggrieved with the judgment being given in favour of the 1st Respondent as encapsulated in the five issues distilled for determination of this appeal. I shall first of all consider together and for obvious reason issues 1, 4 and 5 which deal with the question of jurisdiction of the Court and whether the Suit was properly and duly commenced at the Court below. Issues 1, 4 and 5 are hereunder reproduced for ease of reference:
ISSUE 1
“Whether the learned trial Judge was right in assuming jurisdiction and upholding the Claimant’s principal declaratory relief number A when the relief contained in paragraph 32 (a) of the amended statement of facts as sought by the Claimant was incompetent and ought to have been struck out”
ISSUE 4
“Whether the learned trial Judge breached the Appellant’s right to fair hearing and breached his statutory duty by failing to determine the fundamental jurisdictional issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies raised and argued before him.”
ISSUE 5
“Whether the Claimant’s action was initiated by the due processes of law through exhaustion of remedies and fulfilment of the condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the National Industrial Court.”

The contention of the Appellant included the allegation that the 1st Respondent was wrong to have commenced the Suit at the time he did without completing the procedure of dispute resolution he initiated when he lodged a complaint against the 2nd Respondent on the latter’s intention to pay him 25% lump sum out of his pension savings. It was argued for the Appellant that for that reason, he failed to comply with the due process of the law and the jurisdiction of the Court was prematurely invoked. Further that the applicable Regulation provided for the parties to go for arbitration before litigation.

The issue of jurisdiction in the administration of justice system has become so elementary and beyond any debate. Jurisdiction is the authority which a Court has to decide a matter before it. It is the entire foundation for a Court to take cognizance of any matter presented before it for adjudication. It is very radical and crucial in the adjudication of any matter as it is the cornerstone, the foundation for and life line therein. Any Court proceeding without jurisdiction amounts to a nullity and of course a futile exercise. See the cases of IDIH V. UTENO 2009 LPELR – CA/A/230/06, MADUKOLU V. NKEMDILIM 1962 2 SCNLR P.341, HAMZAT V. SANNI 2015 5 NWLR PT. 1453 486 and TUKUR V. GOVT. OF GONGOLA STATE 1989 4 NWLR PT. 117 592. It can be raised at any time and in any manner for the first time on appeal and even viva voce. See the case of PETROJESSICA ENTERPRISES LTD. V. LEVENTIS TECH. CO. LTD. 1992 5 NWLR PT. 244 675. 

The Appellant argued that the case of the 1st Respondent in its paragraph 32(a) of the amended Statement of Facts was incompetent and should have been struck out. The said paragraph 32(a) states thus as contained on page 114 of the Record:
“A DECLARATION that the computation of the Claimant’s lump sum/benefits by the Defendants done on the basis of 25% of the Claimant’s total retirement saving is in bad faith, wrong, defective, ran afoul of the law, not known to law, offends the principle of justice, fair dealings and good conscience therefore null and void and no effect whatsoever (sic).”
This Court in the case of C. S. INC. V. M/T CINDY GALA 2007 4 NWLR PT. 1024 222 per Ogunbiyi JCA as she then was clarified when a Claimant’s pleading or relief can be said not to be cognizable as follows:
“Therefore, the determination of whether the Appellant’s claim at the lower Court was cognizable in admiralty is dependent on the totality of the facts on the Statement of Claim. In other words, isolated and randomly picked paragraphs or even reliefs sought would not suffice to give a good picture of the totality of the claim.”
In effect, to pick paragraph 32(a) as is being argued herein to the effect that the paragraph is vague as exact particulars of the wrong done by the Appellant and 2nd Respondent were not given. Respectfully, one holds a contrary view and humbly because with an overall reading of the 1st Respondent’s said amended Statement of Facts and indeed the paragraph itself, one is not in doubt of what the 1st Respondent’s grouse is neither would the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent be misled or confused as to his grouse. That being the position, the submission that paragraph 32(a) is incompetent cannot be sustained.

As regards the argument of the Appellant that the Court failed to determine fundamental jurisdictional issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies by the 1st Respondent. That thereby, the Appellant was deprived of its right to fair hearing, miscarriage of justice was occasioned on the Appellant and the entire proceedings rendered void and of no effect in consequence. It is therefore pertinent at this juncture to consider what the Appellant refers to as the administrative remedies provided. One finds in the Pension Reforms Act Section 106 which provides for dispute resolution as follow:
“Section 106 (1) – An employee or beneficiary of a Retirement Savings Account who is dissatisfied with a decision of the Pension Fund Administrator or employer in respect of pension matters under this Act, may request, in writing, that such decisions be reviewed by the Commission with a view to ensuring that such decision is made in accordance with the provisions of this Act or any regulation made there under.”

From a very careful reading of the Record, pages 111-114, the 1st Respondent’s back and forth with the 2nd Respondent which maintained their stand to pay 25% in response to his request for 75% lump sum of his pension savings and his complaint to the Appellant which was not attended to timeously, the 1st Respondent according to him had no option but to proceed to the Court. One however fails to see and indeed respectfully that miscarriage of justice was occasioned on the Appellant as its fundamental right was not.

ISSUES
“2. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in suo motu awarding 50 percent lump sum pension to the Claimant without inviting the parties to address him on the propriety or otherwise of the said award.
3. Whether the Claimant discharged the burden of proof placed upon him and entitled to the reliefs granted to him by the learned trial Judge.”

The foregoing two issues will be considered together.

Proof in civil cases such as herein is on preponderance of evidence or balance of probabilities. See the cases of DAODU V. NNPC 1998 2 NWLR PT. 538 355, KALA V. POTISKUM 1998 3 NWLR PT. 540 1 and ITAUMA V. AKPA-IME 2000 7 SC PT. II 24.
The burden is first on the Plaintiff to establish his case first with cogent and credible evidence before it shifts to the Defendant and the Plaintiff cannot rely on the weakness of the Defendant’s case except where the Defendant’s case supports his case. See the case of IHEKORONYE V. HART 2000 15 NWLR PT. 692 840. 

The greater weight of evidence is otherwise referred to as preponderance of evidence which is not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by the most convincing evidence with superior evidentiary weight that even though it is not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt will suffice to swing the mind impartially to one side other than the other. See the case of SUNDAT OKORIE V. IGNATIUS UNAKALAMBA 2013 LPELR-2011. One will consider these Issues along with the findings of the Court below.

The Court made the following findings:
By Section 1 of the Pension Reform Act, 2014, retirees are to receive their pension as at when due and to cater for their livelihood during old age. Section 7 (1) of the Act provides as follows: “7 (1) A holder of a retirement savings account shall upon retirement or attaining the age of 50 years, whichever is later, utilize the amount credited to his retirement savings account for the following benefits:-
a. Withdrawal of a lump sum from the total amount credited to his retirement savings account provided that the amount left after the lump sum withdrawal shall be sufficient to procure a programmed fund withdrawals or annuity for life; in accordance with extant guidelines issued by the commission, from time to time or
b. Programmed monthly or quarterly withdrawals calculated on the basis of an expected life span; or
c. d and e.
The position of the Court with regard to the foregoing provision of Section 7 (1) a and b is that “the claimant is entitled to lump sum withdrawal, it is noted that the Act did not make mention of a specific percentage of the lump sum which a retiree of the claimant’s age shall withdraw as it did vide Section 7 (2) of the same Act in relation to retirees of age 50 years, the only proviso lies in the fact that the amount after withdrawal of the lump sum by a retiree of other ages above 50 years should be sufficient to procure a programmed fund withdrawal or annuity/income for life based on the life expectancy of the retiree.”
See pages 445-446 of the Record. In my view and humbly, this interpretation is correct of the foregoing quoted Section 7 (1) given its clear and unambiguous provision. In contrast, Section 7 (2) provides differently as follows and as correctly noted by the Court-
“7 (2) Where an employee voluntarily retires, disengages or is disengaged from employment as provided for under Section 16 (2) and (5) of this Act, the employee may with the approval of the Commission, withdraw an amount of money not exceeding 25 percent of the total amount credited to his retirement savings account, provided that such withdrawals shall only be made after four months of such retirement or cessation of employment and the employee does not secure another employment.”

The Court further found from the amount the 2nd Respondent offered to pay as lump sum to the 1st Respondent to be 25% of the money in his account which was N21,196,906.90 and the Appellant offered to pay N5,065,501 at the first time and upon re-computation it offered the sum of N5,512,593.14 still representing 25%. And the Court stated on page 446 of the Record thus correctly:
“What this means is that the 1st defendant calculated his lump sum based on 25% as applicable to the retiree of 50 years. The claimant’s grouse however is that he cannot be treated like a retiree who retired voluntarily under Section 7 (2) of the Act. He is 60 years and above and would thus want to withdraw 50% or 75% of his total pension.”
Further stated thus on page 447 of the Record:
“…In other words, the age category of the claimant i.e. 60 years and above was not in the contemplation of Section 7 (2) of the Act that specifically made provision for a 50 year old retiree to withdraw 25% lump sum …
The Act was silent on the percentage lump sum a 60 year old and above who retires mandatorily is entitled to withdraw from his account presupposes that the claimant or any retiree of his age bracket can withdraw a substantial percentage as lump sum from his RSA account without any let or hindrance. This in view of the unambiguous provision of Section 7 (1) of the Act …
The only proviso here is that the balance after withdrawal of the lump sum shall be enough to procure annuity for life for the retiree. This by Paragraph (b) of Section 7 (1) should be calculated on the basis of his life expectancy.”

The Court applied the provision of Section 173 (2) of the 1999 Constitution which states as follows:
“173 (2) Any benefit to which a person is entitled in accordance with or under such law as is referred to in Subsection (1) of this Section shall not be withheld or altered to his disadvantage except to such extent as is permissible under any law, including the Code of Conduct.”

The aforegoing position of the Court is found in Clauses 4.0 and 5.1.1.

On whether or not the percentage to be awarded should be 50% or 75% of his total pension:
As was found by the Court, there was no evidence by the 2nd Respondent to show the basis of its calculation, and the number years projected as the life expectancy of the 1st Respondent upon which the 2nd Respondent calculated the said 25% lump sum. It however found that given the age of the 1st Respondent and by the 1st Respondent’s letter of May 30th, 2019, requesting the payment of 50% lump sum and the WHO life expectancy of male Nigerian it found 50% lump sum of his pension and the remaining 50% should be sufficient to procure a program fund withdrawals or annuity for life for the 1st Respondent.

On the claim for 10% interest on the judgment sum, the Court found no credible evidence in that regard from the 1st Respondent and therefore that relief was refused. The claim for general damages was rightly refused based on the principle of the law amongst other reasons and that he failed to substantiate his claim that he suffered financial embarrassment, inconvenience, life changing business, pains and economic hardship. 

And for finding that the 1st Respondent should not have been put to the expenses of litigation if the Appellant intervened timeously and in accordance with the law by giving the 1st Respondent 50% lump sum it requested.

One agrees with the foregoing findings and conclusion of the Court and for that reason the instant appeal cannot be allowed, it is hereby accordingly dismissed and affirm the judgment.

HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI, J.C.A.: My learned brother, E. O. Williams-Dawodu, JCA gave me the benefit of reading in advance the judgment just delivered.

My learned brother has comprehensively considered and resolved the essential issues that came up for determination in this appeal. Having carefully read the record of appeal and the submissions of counsel in their respective Briefs of Arguments, I am in complete agreement with my learned brother that this appeal lacks merit. It is hereby dismissed. The judgment of the Court below is hereby affirmed.

DANLAMI ZAMA SENCHI, J.C.A.: The lead judgment of my learned brother, E. O. Williams-Dawodu, JCA just delivered was read by me before now. I agree with the finding and conclusion reached therein that this appeal is unmeritorious and it is dismissed by me as well.

Accordingly, the judgment of the National Industrial Court, Abuja in suit No. NICN/ABJ/218/2018 delivered on the 18th day of May, 2020 by O. O OYEWUNMI, J is hereby affirmed.
No award as to cost.

Appearances:

Mr. J. U. K. Igwe, SAN, with him, Mr. Elendu O. Awa, and Ejiro Gbetsere. For Appellant(s)

Mr. Abdulkarim A. Ibrahim, with him, Mr. Ibrahim S. Arisekola, – for 1st Respondent

Mr. Olujimi Olujide- Poko, with him, Mr. Jonga Yusuf, – for 2nd Respondent. For Respondent(s)