NATIONAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL v. HON. JUSTICE IYABO YERIMA & ANOR
(2014)LCN/7631(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Wednesday, the 10th day of December, 2014
CA/A/523/2011
RATIO
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: ISSUE OF FACTS; WHEN DOES AN ISSUE OF FACT ARISES
As earlier stated, an issue of fact arises where one party asserts a material fact and the other party properly denies the same. In NWADIALO’S CIVIL PROCEDURE IN NIGERIA, 2nd Ed. P.365, it is stated thus,
“A traverse is a categorical denial in the statement of defence of any fact alleged in the statement of claim.
There cannot be such a traverse of what is not averred in the statement of claim”. (underlining mine for emphasis).
At pages 304 – 305 of the same , the learned author states that,
“…. It is only those facts alleged in the statement of claim and denied in the statement of defence that will require proof and be in issue at the trial…..These alone call for trial, evidence has to be adduced to prove them”.
In the case of IFOP V. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (1974) NSCC 219, 225, ELIAS, CJN, as he then was, stated that
“The rule of pleading only requires the defendant to deny specifically what is clearly stated by the plaintiff in the statement of claim”. per. JOSEPH E. EKANEM, J.C.A.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: NOMINATION OF ISSUES; WHETHER IT IS THE PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT WHO CAN NOMINATE ISSUES
What the 2nd respondent did or attempted to do in the instant case was to nominate issues for trial in his capacity as a defendant. This is not permissible in law. In the case of LONGE V. FIRST BANK (NIG) PLC (2010) 6 NWLR (1189) 1, 24 25 the Supreme Court, per OGUNTADE, JSC, stated thus,
“It is a plaintiff who by his statement of claim primarily nominates the issue to be tried in a suit and on which he relies to have the judgment of the court for a defendant, it is only necessary to resist the plaintiff’s claims on the facts pleaded. It is not for the defendant to set up facts which would convey that it is not just setting up a defence to the plaintiff’s suit but setting up a new case of his own. He is only permitted to do this when he is setting up a counter-claim”. See also OSOLA V. OSOLA (2003) 113 LRCN 2641, 2666 – 2667 and ORJI V. ORJI (2011) 17 NWLR (1275) 113, 135. per. JOSEPH E. EKANEM, J.C.A.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF FAIR HEARING; THE PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE RIGHT OF FAIR HEARING AND THE TWIN PILLARS OF JUSTICE
In regard to issue one, which is as to whether or not the lower court was correct in holding that the 1st respondent was not afforded fair hearing by the investigation committee of the appellant, it is pertinent to set out the provision of section 36(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). It reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such a manner as to secure its independence and impartiality”.
The above provision gives constitutional flavour to the twin pillars of natural justice, viz, (a) Audi alterem Partem and (b) Nemo Judex in causa sua. They apply to not only to courts of law or tribunals but also to administrative bodies, such as the appellant’s investigation committee, that exercise judicial functions in the sense that they have to decide on materials before them “between an allegation and a defence”. Such bodies are required to act fairly. See HART V. MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF RIVERS STATE (1976) 11 SC 211, LEGAL PRACTITIONERS DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE V. FAWEHINMI (1985) 7 SC 178, 251 and ADIGUN V. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF OYO STATE (1987) 1 NWLR (53) 678.
In the case of GARBA V. UNIVERSITY OF MAIDUGURI (1986) 1 NWLR (18) 550, 618, OPUTA, JSC, stated as follows;
“It is my humble view that fair hearing implies much more than hearing the Appellant testifying before the Disciplinary Investigation Panel; it implies much more than summoning the appellant before the panel; it implies much more than other staff or students testifying before the panel behind the backs of the Appellant, it implies much more than the appellant being “given a chance to explain their own side of the story”. per. JOSEPH E. EKANEM, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
ABUBAKAR J. ABDULKADIR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
CON Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
TANI Y. HASSAN Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JOSEPH E. EKANEM Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
NATIONAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL Appellant(s)
AND
1. HON. JUSTICE IYABO YERIMA
2. THE GOVERNOR OF OYO STATE Respondent(s)
JOSEPH E. EKANEM, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgment of Federal Ahigh Court, Abuja (Coram. Adamu Bello, J.) delivered on 29th January, 2011 in suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/351/2008. The Court (hereinafter referred to as “the lower court”) granted the claims of the plaintiff (1st respondent in this appeal) and among other reliefs declared the recommendation of the 1st appellant for removal of the 1st respondent from her office as a Judge as illegal, unlawful and unconstitutional on account of violation of her right to fair hearing.
Aggrieved by the decision, the appellant has appealed to this court by way of a notice of appeal containing four grounds of appeal.
It is necessary for me to state the facts of the case leading to this appeal.
Two petitions were written against the 1st respondent in her capacity as a judge of the Oyo State Judiciary. The first one was signed by Adebayo Shittu, ESQ: in his capacity as the Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice, Oyo State. The second was by an organisation known as the committee for the Defence of Rule of Law in Oyo State. The petitions raised allegations bordering on corruption and incontinent behaviour. Upon receipt of the petitions, the appellant brought them to the 1st respondent’s notice, requesting her to respond in writing. She did so.
The appellant set up an investigation committee to look into the allegations in the petition. At the end of the process, the committee recommended her removal from office. The appellant accepted the recommendation and wrote to the 2nd respondent accordingly.
When the appeal came up for hearing, Counsel for the appellant and 1st respondent adopted their briefs of argument.
In his brief of argument, Rotimi Oguneso (SAN) of counsel, for the appellant, formulated two issues for the court’s determination of the appeal. The issues are;
“1. Whether having regard to the facts of this case as disclosed in the pleadings and evidence led, the trial court was correct when it held that the plaintiff was not afforded a fair hearing by the investigation committee of the appellant,
2. Whether having regard to the pleadings filed especially the plaintiff’s statement of claim, and the 1st defendant’s statement of defence, the trial court was right in allowing the 1st defendant (sic; 2nd defendant) to lead evidence in the way and manner it did throughout the trial and whether such evidence led did not embarrass the 1st defendant and unduly prejudice its case”.
On his part, Dr Alex Izinyon (SAN) of counsel for the 1st respondent formulated the following issues for the court’s determination of the appeal;
“1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he held that the 1st Respondent was not afforded a fair hearing by the Appellant’s investigation committee when the petition dated 9th May, 2007 written by the Attorney General of Oyo State against the 1st Respondent signed by Barrister Adebayo Shittu in his official capacity having been withdrawn by the subsequent Attorney General of Oyo State Barrister Michael Lana the said petition still form the basis of any complain or petition.
2. Whether there was any petition/complain before the Appellant’s investigation committee against the 1st Respondent having regards to the facts of this case as disclosed in the pleadings and evidence led.
3. Whether having regard to the 2nd Defendant’s statement of defence filed, the 2nd defendant had the right to lead evidence in the suit.
It should be mentioned that the 2nd respondent did not file a brief of argument.
It is my view that the issues formulated by appellant’s counsel are more precise than the issues formulated by 1st respondent’s counsel. I shall therefore adopt the issues formulated by him in determining this appeal.
Arguing his issue one, the Senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the lower court was not right in holding that the 1st respondent was denied fair hearing. He further submitted that there is nothing in law or in deed the Constitution that prohibits the appellant from looking into the allegation in the petition which the lower court held had been withdrawn. This, he said is important if regard is had to the fact that the plaintiff being a Judge, the 1st Defendant has a constitutional obligation to look into the truth or otherwise of the allegations made against her – at least for the purpose of preserving and maintaining the sanctity and dignity of her office.
This, he said, is added to the fact that the author of the petition was available and willing to testify.
Continuing, senior counsel submitted that the lower court did not take into consideration Section 158(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), which, he submitted gave the appellant powers to determine the way and manner it would go about exercising disciplinary control as stipulated in the Constitution.
He went on to submit that the appellant was correct when it allowed Mr. Adebayo Shittu to give evidence in respect of the petition written by the Committee for the Defence of Rule of Law. He noted that the lower court was obviously swayed by the assertion that the Committee was faceless without considering the duty of the appellant to ascertain the truth or otherwise of the allegations. He further noted that Adebayo Shittu appeared before the panel as a representative of the committee and did not appear as a counsel and was sufficiently familiar with the facts. It was his view that allowing a person who had no knowledge of the content of the petition to give evidence on it could not translate to lack of fair hearing.
Citing the case of MOHAMMED V. KANO NATIVE AUTHORITY (1968) 1 ALL NLR 422 and ADIGUN V. ATTORNEY – GENARAL OYO STATE (1987) 1 NWLR (53) 678, senior counsel submitted that the 1st respondent was informed of the allegations against her, saw her accusers, cross- examined them and also called her witnesses. He wondered as to what other form of fair hearing she wanted.
Arguing his issues two, senior counsel submitted that there was no claim against the 2nd respondent and so there was nothing for it to answer. There was no issue of fact joined as between appellant and 2nd respondent and as such there was nothing for it to give evidence on, he observed. He opined that the evidence of 2nd respondent which was hostile to the appellant is not allowed in law. He cited and relied on NWADIALO’s CIVIL PROCEDURE IN NIGERIA 2nd Ed. and AGUDA’S PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2ND Ed. It was his further submission that what the 2nd respondent did was to assist the appellant which clearly embarrassed the appellant and prejudiced his case.
Senior counsel proceeded to submit that the evidence of 2nd respondent was at variance with its pleading and so went to no issue.
He finally urged the court to allow the appeal.
Senior counsel for the 1st respondent proferred the following arguments in respect of the issues identified by him:
Regarding issue one, he submitted that the lower court was perfectly right to have concluded that as at the time of the appellant’s panel’s sitting, there was no valid petition to investigate, same having been withdrawn by the authority on whose behalf it was written. Barrister Shittu having ceased to be Attorney-General could not validly present the petition which was written by the Attorney-General in his official capacity. Referring to section 158(1) of the Constitution, senior counsel argued that an investigation in line with it can only be kick-started by a petition written against a judge and the petition was withdrawn long before the investigation committee started sitting. He noted that appellant’s first witness admitted this fact.
He went on to submit that the lower court was right in its holding that Shittu, who was not the author of the petition written by the committee for the Defence of the Rule of Law, could not be allowed to transform himself from a counsel to the author of the petition to give evidence. He observed that the averment in the statement of claim that the said committee was a faceless and non – existent body was not controverted in the amended statement of defence. He made a similar submission in respect of the 1st respondent’s averment that she demanded to be allowed to cross- examine the petitioners face to face but none of them was present. He noted that Dw1 admitted the absence of the petitioners and so there was no way that the 1st respondent could have confronted her accusers with a view to cross-examining them. Citing the case of GARBA V. UNIVERSITY OF MAIDUGURI (1986) 1 NWLR (18) 550, he submitted that this negated the principles of fair hearing.
As regards his issue two, he noted that there were two petitions against the 1st respondent; one was withdrawn and in respect of the second one, its faceless writers were not cross-examined on it. He urged the court to hold that the investigation committee had no petition before her against the 1st respondent.
Arguing his issue three, senior counsel contended that 2nd respondent joined issues with the 1st respondent at the trial court. He referred to paragraph 7 of 2nd respondent’s statement of defence and submitted that the 2nd respondent had the right to file witness statement and lead evidence to prove its stance. He was of the opinion that claims of the 1st respondent were against the appellant and the 2nd respondent. He then referred to some paragraphs of the statement of defence which he said contain averments against the 2nd respondent and added that the 1st respondent proved her case without the assistance of the 2nd respondent. It was further submitted that the evidence of Dw2 did not prejudice the case of the appellant and did not vary with her pleading.
He finally urged the court to dismiss the appeal.
I shall commence my consideration of the argument of counsel on both sides by dealing first with issue two of the appellant which is reflected in the 1st respondent’s issue three. It was argued by senior counsel for the appellant that there was no issue of fact joined as between the appellant and the 2nd respondent and so it should not have been allowed to lead evidence. Senior counsel for the 1st respondent argued to the contrary.
In a suit commenced by writ of summons, as the instant case, issues between parties are circumscribed and determined by the pleadings of the parties. This enables the parties and the court to know the exact case they have to meet at the hearing. See NOIBI V. FIKOLATI (1987) 3 SC 105, 119. An issue of fact arises in such a case where by the pleadings of the parties a material fact is affirmed by one of the parties but is properly denied or traversed by the opposite side. This is then what goes to trial. See MESSRS LEWIS and PEAT (NRI) LTD V. AKHIMIEN (1976) 1 ALL NLR (1) 460, 465 and AKINTOLA V. SOLANO (1986) 4 SC 141, 188 – 189.
In the instant case, a close scrutiny of the statement of claim at pages 6 – 11 of the record of appeal shows that there was no allegation by the 1st respondent against the 2nd respondent regarding denial of fair hearing. The allegation of denial of fair hearing was made only against the appellant. However in paragraph 7 of the 2nd respondent’s statement of defence, he stated that,
“…….. the 2nd defendant did not deny the plaintiff any right to fair hearing”.
Thus the 2nd respondent purported to traverse or deny what is not in the statement of claim. As earlier stated, an issue of fact arises where one party asserts a material fact and the other party properly denies the same. In NWADIALO’S CIVIL PROCEDURE IN NIGERIA, 2nd Ed. P.365, it is stated thus,
“A traverse is a categorical denial in the statement of defence of any fact alleged in the statement of claim.
There cannot be such a traverse of what is not averred in the statement of claim”. (underlining mine for emphasis).
At pages 304 – 305 of the same , the learned author states that,
“…. It is only those facts alleged in the statement of claim and denied in the statement of defence that will require proof and be in issue at the trial…..These alone call for trial, evidence has to be adduced to prove them”.
In the case of IFOP V. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (1974) NSCC 219, 225, ELIAS, CJN, as he then was, stated that
“The rule of pleading only requires the defendant to deny specifically what is clearly stated by the plaintiff in the statement of claim”.
What the 2nd respondent did or attempted to do in the instant case was to nominate issues for trial in his capacity as a defendant. This is not permissible in law. In the case of LONGE V. FIRST BANK (NIG) PLC (2010) 6 NWLR (1189) 1, 24 25 the Supreme Court, per OGUNTADE, JSC, stated thus,
“It is a plaintiff who by his statement of claim primarily nominates the issue to be tried in a suit and on which he relies to have the judgment of the court for a defendant, it is only necessary to resist the plaintiff’s claims on the facts pleaded. It is not for the defendant to set up facts which would convey that it is not just setting up a defence to the plaintiff’s suit but setting up a new case of his own. He is only permitted to do this when he is setting up a counter-claim”. See also OSOLA V. OSOLA (2003) 113 LRCN 2641, 2666 – 2667 and ORJI V. ORJI (2011) 17 NWLR (1275) 113, 135.
Thus the lower court was not right when it held on page 516 of the record that
“…….the averment in paragraph 7 of the 2nd Defendant’s statement of Defence has effectively joined issues with the plaintiff on the point’, and that,
“…. 2nd Defendant has the right to file a witness statement and lead evidence to prove that it has not denied the plaintiff her right to fair hearing”.
Since there was no crossing of swords between the 1st and 2nd respondents on the issue of denial of fair hearing, the evidence of Dw3 was unnecessary. I do not however see how it unduly prejudiced the case of the appellant and cannot therefore lead to a reversal of the lower court’s decision in view of Section 251(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011. I will only ignore the evidence in this judgment.
In regard to issue one, which is as to whether or not the lower court was correct in holding that the 1st respondent was not afforded fair hearing by the investigation committee of the appellant, it is pertinent to set out the provision of section 36(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). It reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such a manner as to secure its independence and impartiality”.
The above provision gives constitutional flavour to the twin pillars of natural justice, viz, (a) Audi alterem Partem and (b) Nemo Judex in causa sua. They apply to not only to courts of law or tribunals but also to administrative bodies, such as the appellant’s investigation committee, that exercise judicial functions in the sense that they have to decide on materials before them “between an allegation and a defence”. Such bodies are required to act fairly. See HART V. MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF RIVERS STATE (1976) 11 SC 211, LEGAL PRACTITIONERS DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE V. FAWEHINMI (1985) 7 SC 178, 251 and ADIGUN V. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF OYO STATE (1987) 1 NWLR (53) 678.
In the case of GARBA V. UNIVERSITY OF MAIDUGURI (1986) 1 NWLR (18) 550, 618, OPUTA, JSC, stated as follows;
“It is my humble view that fair hearing implies much more than hearing the Appellant testifying before the Disciplinary Investigation Panel; it implies much more than summoning the appellant before the panel; it implies much more than other staff or students testifying before the panel behind the backs of the Appellant, it implies much more than the appellant being “given a chance to explain their own side of the story”.
To constitute a fair hearing whether it be before the regular courts or before Tribunals and Boards of Inquiry, the person accused should know what is alleged against him; he should be present when any evidence against him is tendered; and he should be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict such evidence. How else is this done, if it be not by cross-examination?”
Senior counsel for the appellant submitted that all these were accorded the 1st respondent and soliloquized as to what other form of fair hearing the 1st respondent wanted.
The lower court held that as at the time of the panel’s sitting there was no valid petition by the Attorney – General-Oyo State, to investigate, same having been withdrawn by that office and that it was wrong and oppressive for the appellant’s investigation panel to allow Adebayo Shittu Esq, the former Attorney- General to present the petition. See pages 530 – 531 of the record of appeal.
What in part kick-started the process of investigation was the petition written by the Attorney-General of Oyo State (Exhibit 12) in his official capacity. The same was withdrawn by a new Attorney – General in his official capacity. The office of the Attorney General of a state is provided for in section 195(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). Its provision makes it clear that it is a corporation sole with a separate and distinct personality from the natural person who for the time being holds the office. See CARLEN (NIGERIA) LIMITED V. UNIVERSITY OF JOS (1994) 1 NWLR (323) 631, 656 and ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION V. ALL NIGERIA PEOPLES PARTY (2004) 114 LRCN 2671, 2687. Once the holder of the office at the relevant time (Mr. Michael Lana) withdrew the petition in his capacity as the Attorney-General, it implied that the Attorney-General, Oyo State, and indeed Oyo State Government had withdrawn the petition and there was nothing left in that regard to be investigated by the panel.
The court’s attention was drawn by senior counsel for the appellant to Section 158(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria which reads in parts as follows:
“In exercising its power to make appointments or to exercise disciplinary control over persons ….. the National Judicial Council …. shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other authority or person”.
In interpreting this provision, OKORO, JCA as he was then was, in MANUWA V. NATIONAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL (2013) 2 NWLR (1337) 1, 24 held that,
“This means that the National Judicial Council shall remain independent and shall not be influenced by any person or authority while exercising its powers … no authority or person …. can interfere by giving directive or exercising any form of control”.
It does not imply that a person who wrote a petition against a judicial officer cannot withdraw the petition and that if withdrawn, an investigation panel set up by the appellant must insist on hearing it. I agree with the lower court that it was wrong and oppressive for the investigation panel to allow the former Attorney- General (who had by then become a private citizen) to present the petition. The ultimate test of fair hearing is the “impression of a reasonable person who was present at the trial; whether from his observation, justice has been done in the case”. See MOHAMMED V. KANO NATIVE AUTHORITY (1968) 1 ALL NLR 422 and ADIGUN ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF OYO STATE supra. 719. What is oppressive cannot be said to be fair.
The lower court also held the view that it was unfair for the investigation panel to allow Mr. Adebayo Shittu to metamorphose from being counsel to the first petitioner (Committee for the Defence of the Rule of Law Oyo State) to testify for them, Senior counsel for the appellant submitted that Mr. Shittu appeared before the panel as a representative of the committee and not as a counsel.
In paragraph 12 of the statement of claim, the 1st respondent averred in essence that Shittu appeared as counsel for the committee without the physical presence of the petitioners. This material fact was not specifically denied by the appellant in its statement of defence and so it was admitted by it. See LEWIS PEAT (NRI) LTD V. AKHIMIEN (1976) 7 SC 107 and AKINTOLA V. SOLANO (1996) 2 NWLR (24) 598. Mr. Shittu apologised for the absence of the Committee without giving any reason for the absence of its members and he was not asked why they were absent, and whether or not they would later attend. This is found at page 4 of Exhibit 22D, proceedings of the NJC Investigation Committee. However he testified on behalf of the committee and was cross-examined by the 1st respondent. How Mr Shittu was allowed to act as Janus by being counsel and witness at the same time is baffling. I agree with the lower court that the procedure was most unorthodox and negates the principles of natural justice. This is especially so since the averment in paragraph 16 of the statement of claim that the said Shittu was not involved in two of the suits from which the petitions emanated and was not present on the day the order complained of was made in the third suit was not specifically denied. Besides Mr Shittu was not a member of the Committee.
It follows therefore that the 1st respondent was not afforded the opportunity of confronting her accusers (the Committee) and cross-examining them on their allegations against her. Fair hearing requires that a person must be given not only an opportunity but a fair opportunity to cross- examine her accusers. See GARBA V. UNIVERSITY OF MAIDGURI supra. 618. The testimony of Mr. Shittu and the cross-examination of him did not serve this purpose.
In this circumstances, I agree with the lower court that,
“There is no way the plaintiff could have confronted her accusers with a view to cross – examining them …..”and that,
“it is absolutely absurd to say that the plaintiff was given opportunity to cross examine the representative of the Committee who is neither the author of the petition nor a member of the organisation”.
In the recent case of ADEWUNMI V. NIGERIAN EAGLE FLOUR MILLS (2014) 14 NWLR (1428) 443, 458, DONGBAN-MENSEM, JCA, Stated that,
“A procedure where an accuser is shielded from the accused all through the inquiry is certainly not one in compliance with natural justice. Presence and direct confrontation has a lot of impact……”
It has also been held that,
“……. fair hearing in the con of Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution encompasses fair hearing in the narrow technical sense of the twin pillar of justice, that is audi alterem partem and nemo judex in causa sua, as well as in the broad sense of what is not only right and fair to all concerned but also seems to be so”. See ETIM V. REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF PRESBYTARIAN CHURCH OF NIGERIA (2004) 11 NWLR (883) 79, 92.
On account of the above, I resolve issue two against the appellant.
Having resolved issue two against the appellant, I hold that the appeal fails and I accordingly dismiss it. I affirm the decision of the lower court.
I assess the costs of the appeal at N50, 000:00 in favour of the 1st respondent.
ABUBAKAR JEGA ABDUL-KADIR CON, J.C.A.: I had the opportunity of reading before now the lead judgment of my learned brother, EKANEM, JCA, just delivered. My lord’s through treatment of the issues raised by the appeal suffices. I adopt the reasonings as well as the conclusion in the Judgment that the appeal lacks merit.
I for the same reasons hereby dismiss the appeal and abide by the consequential orders made in the lead judgment.
TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A.: My learned brother Joseph E. Ekanem, JCA made available to me a draft copy of the Judgment just delivered.
I am in agreement with the thoroughly resolved issues and conclusion therein. I have nothing to add. I also dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the lower court. I abide by N50,000.00k cost in favour of the 1st Respondent.
Appearances
Rotimi Oguneso (SAN) (with him, Mabruk Kunmi – Olayiwola, Esq)For Appellant
AND
Dr. A. A. Izinyon (SAN) (with him, Kenneth Omoruan, Esq; Mrs Hannatu Abdulrahman, Alex Izinyon 11 and J. A. Majebi (Miss) for 1st respondent.
M. O. Adebayo, Esq (Attorney – General, Oyo State) (with him, N. A. Abiola, Esq; Deputy Director, Civil Litigation Ministry of Justice, Oyo State) for 2nd respondent.For Respondent
