NATIONAL ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY v. B. ATUKPOR(2000)

NATIONAL ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY v. B. ATUKPOR

(2000)LCN/0745(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Wednesday, the 5th day of April, 2000

CA/I/142/97

JUSTICES

ALOMA MARIAM MUKHTAR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

MORONKEJI OMOTAYO ONALAJA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

OLUFUNLOLA OYELOLA ADEKEYE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

NATIONAL ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY Appellant(s)

AND

ATUKPOR Respondent(s)

RATIO

THE POSITION OF THE LAW ON WHEN A CAUSE OF ACTION IS SAID TO ARISE

The emphasis here is on the law that was in existence at the time the cause of action arose, which must be applied in determining jurisdiction and other relevant issues. A law that comes into effect thereafter becomes irrelevant and will not be reckoned with in the course of deciding a breach of rights and obligations of a party. Adekola, J., was right when in his ruling he said inter alia:-
“There is no doubt that by the provisions of section 230(1)(q) and (s) of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993, the Federal High Court has been granted the same jurisdiction as the States High Courts and in addition, has exclusive jurisdiction as the State High Courts and in addition has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of matters relating to Federal Government and its parastatals and its other agencies.
Can it be said however, that the provision of section 230 of Decree 107 of 1993 has retrospective or retroactive effect in respect of cases pending before the State High Courts, the Decree No.107 of 1993 was promulgated?
My answer to this point is in the negative. PER MUKHTAR, J.C.A.

THE PRINCIPLE OF THE LAW ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

It is trite, that laws are to be given their ordinary and plain meaning, within the con of its provisions, and not to import any other meaning extraneous or otherwise nor there in and not intended by the legislator. See Toriola v. Williams (1982) 7 SC 27; Ifezue v. Mbandugha (1984) 1 SC NLR 427 and Lawal v. G. B. Olivant (1972) 3 SC 124.
It is significantly clear from the provision of Decree No.107 Supra that nothing therein signifies retroactive effect or retrospective operation. See Kuti v. A.-C., of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.6) page 211, and Ojukolobo v. Alamu (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.61) page 377 cited by learned counsel for the respondent. PER MUKHTAR, J.C.A.

MUKHTAR, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the ruling of the High Court of Oyo State sitting in Ibadan delivered on 28th November, 1996 on a preliminary objection that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, raised by the defendant, who is now the appellant. The claims in the High Court, as per the writ of summons and the statement of claim are as follows:
(i) Declaration that the purported dismissal of the plaintiff from the services of the 1st defendant by a letter dated 18th March, 1992 is unconstitutional, contrary to the rules of natural justice and/or procedures laid down in the conditions of the appellant’s appointment, irregular, illegal, null, void and of no effect.
(ii) Mandatory order directed to the 1st defendant to reinstate the plaintiff to the position where his contemporaries are in the employment of the 1st defendant.
(iii) An order directing the 1st defendant to pay the Plaintiff’s arrears of salary and other emoluments from 18th March, 1992 until the plaintiff is fully reinstated to the employment of the first defendant.
(iv) N1.5 million Naira as general damages suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the dismissal.
As was pleaded in the statement of claim, the plaintiff was employed as an Assistant Time Keeper by the 1st defendant on 1st June, 1977, and became an Investigation Officer. His duties included:- the checking of meters, illegal connections and taking evidence against other staff. In the course of these duties, he disconnected the light of one Mr. Ayodimeji. On the payment of the necessary fees, the High Investigation Officer directed that the metre should be replaced, but he couldn’t find it, so he was ordered to pay a sum of N285.00 to the defendant by the District Commercial Manager, which he did. A query was issued to the plaintiff which he answered and he was summoned to appear before an Ad hoc committee, and dismissed by a letter dated 18th March, 1992 in breach of the rule of natural justice, since he had been punished for the same offence.
In its pleadings, the 1st defendant denied most of the plaintiff’s allegations and the fact that the commercial manager gave the plaintiff any directive to pay the alleged sum of N285.00, or that the amount was in excess of the actual consumption. The answer to the query issued to the plaintiff was unsatisfactory, so it set up a disciplinary committee to which the plaintiff testified and agreed that, he misappropriated the alleged metre. At the close of pleadings, the defendants filed a notice of preliminary objection as follows:
“…that the ground upon which this application is made is that, having regard to the provisions of section 230(1) (q) and (s) of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No.107 of 1993 and the recent Court of Appeal judgment in University of Abuja v. Professor Kingsley Owoniyi Ologe (1994)4 NWLR (Pt.445) at page 706, this Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit herein as the same involves questions relating to the validity of an Executive/Administrative decision taken by a Federal Government Agency”.
Both counsels made their submissions on the objection, and the learned trial Judge after a thorough consideration of the submissions overruled the objection. Dissatisfied with the ruling, the defendant appealed to this Court on two grounds of appeal which read:
“The learned trial Court erred in law when it held that the Oyo State High Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on this case”

Particulars of Error
1. The learned trial Judge acknowledged in his decision that appellant’s counsel relied on the following binding authorities namely:
(a) University of Abuja v. Kingsley Owoniyi Ologe (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt. 445) 906.
(b) Section 230(1)(q) and (s) of 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree 107 of 1993 and failed to properly consider the acknowledged authorities and wrongly appraised or construed the said statutory and judicial authorities and failed to apply, the same to this case in his ruling.
2. Error of law
The learned trial Judge held that he had jurisdiction to entertain this suit.
In compliance with order 6 rules (2) and (4) of the Court of Appeal Rules 1981 as amended, learned counsel for the two sides exchanged briefs of argument. In each brief of argument, only one issue for determination was formulated, but I will adopt the one in the appellant’s brief of argument. The issue is, whether the lower court is right to hold that its jurisdiction to hear and determine this case is not affected by the provisions of section 230(1)(q) and (s) of Decree No. 107 of 1993?. Alternatively, whether the provisions of section 230(1)(q) and (s) of Decree 107 of 1993 effectively deprived the state High Court of Oyo state its jurisdiction to hear and determine the respondent’s case? In arguing this issue, learned counsel for the appellant referred to S.230 (1)(q) of the 1979 Constitution of the Federation as amended by Decree 107 of 1993 which he said is relevant to its determination. The said S.230 (1) supra reads:
S.230(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly or a Decree, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters arising from:
(q) the administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies;
(s) any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies:
“provided that, nothing in the provisions of paragraphs (q) (r) and (s) of the sub-section shall prevent a person from seeking redress against the Federal Government or any of its agencies in an action for damages, injunction or specific performance where the action is based on any enactment, law or equity”.
It is the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the question of the jurisdiction of a court is fundamental to any process, that any defect in the competence of the Court of adjudication renders the proceedings before it and the outcome of the adjudication a nullity. He cited the case of Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 All NLR 587. He further submitted that, in a case like this the judicial duty of the Court was to look at the endorsement on the writ of summons and statement of claim filed by the respondent to find materials in determining whether it has jurisdiction or not. See RTEA v. NURTW (1986) 8 NWLR (pt.469) page 743, he relied upon. There is no doubt whatsoever that these submissions are in order, and they are not disputed, but I think, the crux of the matter in this appeal is the relevance and applicability of the provision of the amendment of the above provision of the Constitution, as amended by Decree No. 107 of 1993 to the case on hand. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that, a proper reading of S.230(1)(q) and (s) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree 107 of 1993 shows unmistakably clearly that, it is the Federal High Court that has exclusive jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court to entertain the matters specified therein. I agree that, the provision vests jurisdiction of this case in dispute on the Federal High Court, but that is if the cause of action started from the commencement of the provision, or the action was commenced after the commencement of the said Decree No. 107. As can be seen from the writ of summons, it was taken on 1/4/93, and the cause of action emanated from a letter of dismissal of the respondent from the services of the Appellant dated 8/3/92. Decree 107, Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 1993 has its commencement date as 17th November, 1993, seven months after the action resulting in this appeal was filed in the High Court, and as learned counsel for the respondent has rightly posited in his brief of argument, it has not been contended by the appellant that the Decree has retroactive provisions. I have perused the Decree in general, and I find nothing to suggest such retroactive effect. Right before the preamble of the Decree is clearly written (17th November, 1993) commencement. In a situation like this, where the cause of action arose before the date of the commencement of the Decree, and the action was instituted before the commencement of the Decree, the application of the provision of the Decree to the case on hand is doubtful, and completely out of the question. In the absence of any retroactive or retrospective provision in this Decree, it is the law in operation when the cause of action arose that governs the case and that is applicable. See Adigun v. Ayinde & Ors (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt.313) page 516. As said above, this action was instituted on 1/4/93 well before the promulgation of Decree No. 107 supra. The law governing the case was therefore the law in force as at that time. The provision of the Decree becomes irrelevant because, after all the case was clearly pending in court when it was promulgated and came into effect. See the case of Joshua Alao v. Gbadamosi Akana (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.71) page 431, where Agbaje, J.S.C., in his concurrent judgment in considering the governing law in that case opined thus:-
“But it is quite clear from the record of proceedings in this case that the cause of action in this case arose before the 1979 Constitution came into effect. And this Court has decided it in the case of Uwaifo v. Attorney-General, Bendel State (1982) 7 SC 124 that the right and obligations of the parties must be considered in the light of the provisions of the law as it was when the cause of action arose. The change in the law after the cause of action arose is of no relevance. So, the law applicable to the case in hand is as contained in the former Constitution that is, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1963”.
The emphasis here is on the law that was in existence at the time the cause of action arose, which must be applied in determining jurisdiction and other relevant issues. A law that comes into effect thereafter becomes irrelevant and will not be reckoned with in the course of deciding a breach of rights and obligations of a party. Adekola, J., was right when in his ruling he said inter alia:-
“There is no doubt that by the provisions of section 230(1)(q) and (s) of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993, the Federal High Court has been granted the same jurisdiction as the States High Courts and in addition, has exclusive jurisdiction as the State High Courts and in addition has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of matters relating to Federal Government and its parastatals and its other agencies.
Can it be said however, that the provision of section 230 of Decree 107 of 1993 has retrospective or retroactive effect in respect of cases pending before the State High Courts, the Decree No.107 of 1993 was promulgated?
My answer to this point is in the negative”.
The learned trial Judge further proceeded to compare the provision of the above Decree with that of Decree No.13 of 1973 reproducing and referring in particular to S.8(1) of the aforementioned Decree No.13. S.8(1) states:-
8(1) In so far as jurisdiction is conferred upon the Federal Revenue Court in respect of the causes or matters mentioned in the foregoing provisions of this Part of the High Court or any other court of a State shall, to the extent that jurisdiction is so conferred upon the Federal Revenue Court, ceases to have jurisdiction in relation to such causes or matters.
Then S.8 (3) states:-
8(3) Nothing in the foregoing provisions shall affect the jurisdiction and all other powers of the High Court or any other court of a State to continue to hear and determine causes and matters which are pending before such court at the date of the assumption of the functions of the Federal Revenue Court or at the date when jurisdiction is otherwise conferred on the Federal Revenue Court by the Head of the Federal Military Government, and any proceedings in any such causes and matters, which are still pending at the expiration of the period of six months beginning with the date of assumption of the functions of the Federal Revenue Court or at the date when jurisdiction is otherwise conferred on the Federal Revenue Court, shall abate on the expiration of that period.
That the above Decree which established the Federal Revenue Court specifically mentioned a period of grace is as clear as crystal. The statute in its provisions on jurisdiction of any of the two Courts (i.e. High Court and Federal Revenue Court) is not in the least ambiguous or silent on the prescribed period of transition. See Inland Revenue v. Rescallah (1962) 1 All NLR, 1 relied upon by respondent’s counsel. If the period of grace was not meant to be, it would have been silent, and if actions instituted or pending in the High Court were not intended to be abated after this period, the word abatement would not have been used. In fact, the use or the word (abate) in Decree No. 13 supra draws a distinct picture of the fate that will befall such actions pending at the commencement of the decree. This is however, not so in the case of Decree No.107 supra. It is in this vein, that I fully endorse the following holding of the learned Judge:-
“In the absence of the use of the word ‘abatement’ in Decree No.107 of 1993 regarding the pending actions in the states High Court, it is my view that Decree No. 107 of 1993 has no retrospective effect. In the circumstances, case pending before State High Courts will not abate in the absence of specific word of abatement being used in the said Decree”.
It is trite, that laws are to be given their ordinary and plain meaning, within the con of its provisions, and not to import any other meaning extraneous or otherwise nor there in and not intended by the legislator. See Toriola v. Williams (1982) 7 SC 27; Ifezue v. Mbandugha (1984) 1 SC NLR 427 and Lawal v. G. B. Olivant (1972) 3 SC 124.
It is significantly clear from the provision of Decree No.107 Supra that nothing therein signifies retroactive effect or retrospective operation. See Kuti v. A.-C., of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.6) page 211, and Ojukolobo v. Alamu (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.61) page 377 cited by learned counsel for the respondent. In the light of the foregoing reasoning, the above sole issue in this appeal is resolved in favour of the respondent and so the grounds of appeal fail and are dismissed. The end reason of this appeal is that, it lacks merit and must be dismissed. The ruling of the lower Court is affirmed and the appeal is therefore dismissed. It is hereby ordered that the suit No. 283/93 be heard to its logical conclusion by the Oyo State High Court. I award the sum of N3,000.00 in favour of the respondent against the appellant as costs.

ONALAJA, J.C.A.: A perusal of the lead judgment by my noble Lord Mukhtar, J.C.A., focused on the interpretation and applicability of section 230(q) and (s) of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993, thereby raised in a classical manner in a democracy, the doctrine of separation of powers. As to the function of judiciary in the instant case, the JUDEX was put by Sir Francis Bacon in his book ‘Essay on Judicature’, the office of the Judge or Judex is Jus Dicere not JUS DARE that is to state the law and not to give law adopted by Bairamian, J.S.C in D.E. Okumagba v. Egbe (1965) 1 All NLR 62 that the Courts below should not have gone in for judicial legislation; see also Monday Ogbona & 50 Ors v. The Presided of Nigeria & 14 Ors (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt.142) page 130 per Awogu, J.C.A.
The constitutional doctrine of separation of powers was even embedded in our Constitution under the military administration and under our nascent 1999 Constitution which sets out the legislative, executive and judicial powers in sections 4, 5 and 6 with the subsections respectively; Unongo v. Aper Aku (1983) 2 SCNLR page 332 at 362-363. It is trite law that a liberal approach be given by the Courts in the interpretation of the constitution; Nafiu Rabiu v. The State (1980) 8/12 SC 130 at 149; Dr. Tunji Braithwaite v. Grassroots Democratic Movement and Ors (1998) 7 NWLR page 307 CA. The issue that arose for consideration in this appeal and as reflected in the lead judgment is the interpretation to amendment of section 230 (1) of 1979 Constitution as amended by decree 107 of 1993 which enlarged the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. The approach in the lead judgment, the reasoning and conclusion are impeccable, thereby making me to adopt them as my own although this is without prejudice to few comments on my part.
In consideration of the only issue raised by the respondent, the point raised was whether decree 107 of 1993 was retroactive. It is trite law that the Courts frown on retrospective and retroactive legislations. Ojokolobo v. Aloma (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.61) page 377 at 402, SC; Afolabi v. Governor of Oyo State (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.9) page 734 SC.
It is common ground that respondent sought from the High Court declaratory and mandatory orders for his reinstatement into the services of employment of the appellant, purported to have been terminated by letter dated 18th March, 1992. In addition, respondent claimed general damages for wrongful dismissal. The cause of action arose from 18th March, 1992. The applicable law to entertain whether the dismissal was unconstitutional was the operative law as at 18th March, 1992. Uwaifo v. A.-G., Bendel State (1982) 7 SC 124; Mustapha v. Governor of Lagos State (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt.58) page 539 at 541; Oyelami v. Military Administrator, Osun State (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt.547) page 624 CA, Wema Bank Ltd v. International Fishing Co. Ltd. (1998) 6 NWLR (Pt.555) page 557 CA.
Respondent sought remedy from the High Court of Oyo State when he issued a writ of summons against appellant on 1st April, 1993. The Court endowed with jurisdiction as at 1st April, 1993 was the High Court under section 236(1) 1979 Constitution of Nigeria. Bronik Motors Ltd v. Wema Bank Ltd. 1983) 6 SC 158, (1983) 1 SCNLR 296; Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 All NLR page 587; Savanab Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v. Pan Atlantic Shipping & Transport Agencies Ltd. & Anor (1987) 1 SC 198-332, (1987) 1 49 NWLR (Pt.49) page 212 SC.
The commencement date of Decree 107, Constitution (Suspension and Modification) 1993 in clear and unequivocal terms was 17th November, 1993, this was at a time that respondent’s action was already pending in court. To deprive the High Court must be through ouster of jurisdiction by stating that actions now covered by Decree 107 aforesaid shall abate. The lower Court and the lead judgment considered the issue of ‘Abatement’ as the said word was not used, the lead judgment affirmed the conclusion of the lower Court that the submission of Appellant on ouster of jurisdiction was to crown Decree 107, 1993 with retrospective and retroactive effects which the Court frowns upon as stated supra in this contribution to the leading judgment. See further Shitta-Bey v. A.-G., Federation (1998) 10 NWLR (PT.570) page 392.
My understanding of the contention or the appellant is that, since the word ‘abatement’ was not provided, the lower Court should have filled the gap and thereby oust the jurisdiction of the Court by judicial legislation. Lord Denning, the greatest master of the Rolls in England last century advocated in his book ‘The Discipline of Law’ at page 11 to 14 by filling the gap as decided by him in Seaford Court Estate Ltd. v. Asher (1949) 2 KB 481 which was rejected by the House of Lords in Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v. New Port Corporation (1951) 2 All ER 839 that, the filling of the gap was ‘A naked usurpation of the legislative function’ which was also condemned by Bairamian, J.S.C in D. E. Okumagba v. Egbe supra that the lower Court should not have gone into judicial legislation as the function of the JUDEX is ‘JUS DICERE’ not DARE supra.
In Chief (Engr.) Onla G. Edozien (The Onu Otu of Asaba) v. Prof. Ogbuefi Joseph Chike Edozie & 4 Ors (1998) 13 NWLR (Pt.580) page 133 the Court of Appeal held as under at page 152 that:-
“Courts should not read into an enactment words which are not to be found there and which will alter its operative effect. In this case, the Appellant’s insistence on the ‘DIOPKA’ personally doing the presentation amounts to reading into the Edict a limiting word which is not there. This is not legally permissible (Effiong v. Henshaw (1972) 7 NSCC 329; Summonu v. Oladokun Oladokun (1996) 8 NWLR (Pt.467) page 387; Tukur v. Governor of Gongola State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.68) page 39 referred to.)”.
In the instant appeal, appellant is pressing this court to read the word ‘abatement’ into decree 107 of 1993 which is legally impossible and rightly so affirmed in the lead judgment.
For the fuller reasons given in the lead judgment and my few comments above, I am in complete agreement that the Court cannot involve itself in retrospective and retroactive effects of Decree 107 of 1993 and shall not involve itself in judicial legislation by filling the gap or adding the word ‘abatement’ to provision of Decree 107 of 1993 aforesaid. The lead judgment came to a right decision that the appeal ought to be dismissed and was rightly dismissed. I abide with the consequential orders of remittal to the High Court to hear the case on merit and the order of costs.

ADEKEYE, J.C.A.: I had read the ruling of my learned brother, Aloma M. Mukhtar, J.C.A., in draft. The preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the trial High Court in suit 1/288/93. B Atukpor v. N.E.P.A., involving an individual and a Federal Government Agency in view of section 230 (1) (q) and (s)of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993 was exhaustively considered. I agree with her reasoning and conclusion. I however wish to add that, it is not disputed that section 230(1)(q) and (s) of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No 107 of 1993 precludes the State High Courts from sitting on matters affecting the Federal Government or its agencies and now vests exclusive jurisdiction in such matters in the Federal High Court. The date of commencement of the decree was the 17th of November, 1993. The pertinent question in this instant appeal is, what is the position of all the actions pending against the Federal Government and its agencies in the High Courts before the commencement of Decree 107 of 1993?.
Does the State High Courts have the jurisdiction to prosecute such cases to its conclusion or are they to be commenced at the Federal High Courts de novo?. The latter is the contention of the appellant in this appeal.
The answer to this question can be found in the provisions of the decree itself and the interpretation given to the relevant provisions by this Court. It is trite that by the literal rule of interpretation of a statute, words are to be given their ordinary and simple grammatical meaning and connotation when the provisions are being interpreted, particularly where the provisions are clear and unambiguous. Such interpretation must reflect and convey the meaning intended by the legislator. Ketson Komplex International Ltd v. Bendel Development and Planning Authority (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt.275 page 332; Amokeodo v. I.G.P. (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt.607) page 467; Olanrewaju v. Arewa (1998) 11 NWLR (Pt.573 page 239; Higher Progress Ltd. v. North East Line Corporation (1989) 8 NWLR (Pt.107) page 6.
It is well established principle of law that, a case is governed by the law in operation when the cause of action arose. The rights and obligations of parties can only be determined by the provisions of the active law when their cause of action arose.
Adigun v. Ayinde & Ors (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt.313) page 516. Suit No.1/288/93 before the State High Court was filed on 1/4/93 long before the commencement of decree 107. The provisions of the decree is however silent on the position of all cases pending before the Suite High Courts as at the time of its promulgation and commencement. The only logical interpretation to be given to the Decree in the circumstance is that, it has no retrospective clause effect.
In applying principles guiding interpretation of statutes, a court has no power to fill any lacuna disclosed in a legislation as to do so would amount to usurping the function of the legislature. Consequently, I agree with the observation of the learned trial Judge of the High Court that in the absence of the use of the word ‘abatememt’ in the decree No.107 of 1993 regarding pending actions in the State High Court therefore Decree No. 107 of 1993 has no retrospective effect.
Since Decree 107 shall repeal or suspend all related laws in existence before its commencement I cannot but refer to the provisions of section 6(1) of the Interpretation Act 1990, when an enactment expires, lapses or ceases to have effect or is repealed such expiry or repealing shall not:-
i. Affect the previous operation of the enactment or anything duly done or suffered under the enactment.
ii. Affect any right, privileges, obligation or liability accrued or incurred under the enactment.
iii Affect any investigation. Legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment, and any such investigation, legal proceedings or remedy may be instituted, continued, or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture, or punishment may be imposed as if the enactment had not been repealed.
Abaye v. Ofili (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.15) page 134 at page 146. Suit No.1/288/93 shall continue to be heard before the State High Court until determined. For fuller reasons given in the leading ruling – this appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed. The ruling of the lower Court is affirmed. I adopt the order for costs as mine.

Appeal dismissed.

Appearances