MUHAMMED ISA BAKARI v. THE STATE
(2018)LCN/12154(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 16th day of November, 2018
CA/J/304C/2017
RATIO
CRIMINAL LAW: TO SECURE A CHARGE OF MURDER
“It is well settled that in order to secure conviction in a charge of murder, the prosecution must prove: a) That the deceased had died, b) That the death of the deceased was caused by the accused, c) That the act or omission of the accused which caused death of the deceased must have been intentional with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequences Ubani v State (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 85) pages 224, Uguru v State (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt. 771) 90 Adava v State (2006) 9 NWLR (P VFRRRRRRRFt. 984) 155.” PER ADZIRA GANA MSHELIA, J.C.A.
EVIDENCE: PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
“As earlier stated in criminal cases the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. This burden of proof lies throughout on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and it never shifts. See Ani v State (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt. 830) 142 and Ifejirika v State (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt. 593) 59. It must, however, be stated that proof beyond reasonable doubt is ‘not proof to the hilt’ and is thus not synonymous with proof beyond all iota of doubt. This is because absolute certainty is impossible in any human adventure including the administration of justice. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, this simply means establishing the guilt of the defendant with compelling and conclusive evidence to a degree of compulsion which is consistent with a high degree of probability. Once the prosecution has been able to prove that an offence has been committed and that no person other than the accused committed the offence, the prosecution is said to have established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Adeleke v State (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt.1381) 556 and Babarinde v State (2014) 3 NWLR (Pt.1381) 568.” PER ADZIRA GANA MSHELIA, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
ADZIRA GANA MSHELIA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
TANI YUSUF HASSAN Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
BOLOUKUROMO MOSES UGO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
MUHAMMED ISA BAKARI Appellant(s)
AND
THE STATE Respondent(s)
ADZIRA GANA MSHELIA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
This is an appeal against the Judgment of Hon. Justice Ali Garba of the Yobe State High Court (Potiskum Judicial Division) delivered on the 13th day of March, 2017 in charge No. YBS/DT/HC/30C/2016, wherein accused was convicted for Culpable Homicide punishable with death under S. 221 of the Penal Code and sentenced to death by hanging.
The brief facts of the case as presented by the prosecution, is that on the 20/09/2016 at about 1100hrs one Umar Ibrahim of Sabon Fegi ward Damaturu, reported at ‘B’ Division that his brother Abubakar Ibrahim was attacked by Mohammed Isah Bakari of Sabon Fegi ward Damaturu with a knife and stabbed the deceased who sustained serious injury on his neck and was rushed to State Specialist Hospital, Damaturu where he was certified dead by the Medical Doctor.
The Appellant was arraigned before the High Court of Justice and charged as follows:
THE CHARGE
That you Mohammed Isah Bakari ‘M’ on or about the 29th September, 2016 at about 1100hrs in Sabon Fegi ward, Damaturu which is within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court did commit Culpable Homicide punishable with death in that you caused the death of one Abubakar Ibrahim ‘M’ by doing an act to wit stabbing him on his neck with a knife with the knowledge that death would be the probable consequences of your act and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 221 of the Penal Code.
In the course of trial, the charge was read over and explained to the accused person, who pleaded not guilty to the charge. The prosecution opened its case and called six witnesses and tendered two Exhibits. While the accused/appellant testified and called a witness. At the end of the trial the learned trial Judge assessed the evidence, ascribed probative value to the evidence of witnesses and found the accused guilty of the offence charged. Accused/Appellant was convicted and sentenced to death by hanging under S.221 of the Penal Code.
The Accused/Appellant dissatisfied with the decision of the trial Court lodged an appeal to this Court vide his Notice of Appeal dated 8th day of May, 2017 and filed on 9th day of May, 2017 containing 3 (three) Grounds of Appeal.
In compliance with the Rules of Court, parties exchanged their respective Briefs of Argument. Appellant’s Brief settled by T.I Stephen, Esq., was dated 11th day of January, 2018 and filed on 12th day of January, 2018. While the Respondent’s Brief of Argument settled by Usman Ismaila Chief State Counsel Ministry of Justice Yobe State was dated 29th January, 2018 and filed on 5th day of February, 2018.
When the appeal came up for hearing Appellant’s Counsel D. G Goke holding the brief of T. I Stephen, Esq., adopted the Brief of Argument and urged the Court to allow the appeal. While Respondent’s counsel U. Ismaila Chief State Counsel adopted Respondent’s Brief of Argument and urged the Court to dismiss the appeal.
In the Appellant’s Brief of Argument three issues were distilled for determination as follows:
1. Whether the prosecution could be said to have proved the charge against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt having failed to mention the locus criminis of the alleged incident (Sabon Fegi) as stated on the charge sheet.
2. Whether the trial Court was right when it held that the cause of death of the deceased was a result of the bleeding in the absence of medical evidence.
3. Whether or not the trial Judge was right in law when he held that the act of the appellant caused the death of the deceased having regard to the evidence placed before the Court.
The Respondent on the other hand adopted the issues formulated by Appellant for determination in this app
I have examined the issues formulated by the appellant which was adopted by the Respondent. It is my humble view that the three issues can be treated under one issue which I formulate thus:
Whether having regard to the totality of the evidence adduced, prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt?
Issues 1-3 can be treated together. Learned counsel commenced his argument by submitting that in criminal trials the onus is on the prosecution to prove a charge against the accused person beyond reasonable doubt. That any lingering doubts must be resolved in favour of the accused. Reliance placed on Aiguoreghian v State (2004) NWLR (Pt. 860) 360 @ 129 ratio 31 & 35. Counsel submitted that a locus criminis is a fact in issue or principal fact. It was submitted that nowhere in the evidence led before the lower Court that the locus criminis and time as reflected on the charge was mentioned by the prosecution witnesses as required by law.
It was argued that on the charge the locus criminis is Sabon Fegi ward in Damaturu and time accused was alleged to have committed the offence was 1100hrs. That failure of the prosecution witnesses to mention the locus criminis and time as reflected on the charge for which the accused appellant was convicted is fatal. Counsel submitted that the Supreme Court in plethora of cases had held repeatedly that where evidence led before a Court is at variance with the charge, the prosecution may apply and even the Court suo motu can amend the charge. That where this is lacking the conviction of the accused cannot stand. See Muhammed v State (2015) 61 NSCQR 1706 at page 1745 @ 1767.
It was submitted under issue two that there is nothing from the evidence of PW3 and PW5 to show that in the absence of medical evidence the act of the accused caused the death of the deceased. Counsel maintained that PW5 admitted that a post mortem examination was not conducted to ascertain the cause of death. Counsel contended that where the deceased did not die on the spot, medical evidence is required as to the cause of death of the deceased. That the medical evidence must unequivocally establish the death of the deceased, the date, the cause of the death of the deceased, the unlawful act of the accused person. Most importantly the identity of the corpse. See Ebong v State (supra) 1954. Counsel submitted that the medical evidence led before the trial Court was insufficient and did not meet the requirement of the law. He urged the Court to resolve the issue in favour of the appellant.
In arguing issue 3, counsel submitted that the trial Judge was wrong on holding that the act of the accused/appellant caused the death of the deceased. Reference was made to page 51 lines 1-20 of the record. Counsel contended that none of the prosecution witness led evidence to the fact that the deceased died on the spot. See the evidence of PW3. That in determining the cause of death of the deceased, the duration between the alleged act of the appellant which caused the death of the deceased and the death is important, more so where the deceased did not die on the spot. Reliance placed on Ebong v State (supra) page 1945 @ 1951, Liman v State (1976) 7 SC 61. Counsel contended that the onus of proving the cause of death rests squarely on the prosecution and not on the defence.
In response, Respondent’s counsel submitted under issue one that from a long line of decided cases, it is already settled beyond controversy that for the prosecution to secure conviction on a charge of murder, the burden is on the prosecution to prove the following:
1) That the deceased had died,
2) That the death of the deceased was caused by the accused,
3) That the act or omission of the accused which cause the death of the deceased was intentional with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence.
Counsel submitted that it is trite law that in order to secure conviction against the appellant all the essential ingredients of the offence must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Reliance placed on John Ogbu & Anor v The State (2007) LPELR ? SC 2289 (SC), Abainta Okendu Ubani & Ors v The State (2003) 12 SCM 310 at 317, Ogba v The State (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt.222) 164, Monday Nwaeze v The State (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt. 428) 11, Fred Dapere Gira v The State (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt. 443) 375. Learned counsel submitted that the guilt of an accused person?s case can be proved in any of the three ways
1) By evidence of eye witness
2) By circumstantial evidence
3) By confessional evidence; Cited in aid Emeka v The State (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 734) 666 at 669 ratio 1.
Learned counsel submitted that in the instant appeal the respondent at the lower Court has met the pre-requisite for securing conviction against the appellant the offence of Culpable Homicide punishable with death under Section 221 of the Penal Code through the direct oral evidence of the evidences of PW1 – PW6. Reference made to pages 14-25 of the record and Exhibit ?B? which is the extra judicial statement of the Appellant at CID Damaturu where he gave a vivid account as to how he committed the charge against him.
Counsel submitted that there is no any discrepancy between the location of the offence and the credible evidence led by the prosecution before the lower Court. That prosecution had led credible evidence with respect to the locus criminis and the time the offence was committed by the appellant.
Reference was made to the evidence of PW1 who is an eye witness at pages 20-23 and PW2 page 14 lines 20-21 page 15 lines 4-5 and page 16 lines 2-3 respectively. Counsel submitted that generally, the Court does not regard any omission or errors in the charge as material except the accused was infact misled by such error or omission. See Duru v The Police (1960) LIR 130, Ogbomor v The State (1985) 1 NWLR 223, Ogbudo v The State 1987 SC, 497 and Sugh v The State (1988) NWLR 475.
Counsel cited the case of Obakpolor v The State (1991) 1 SCNJ 91, wherein the Supreme Court held that objection to a defective charge should be made immediately after the charge is read over and explained to the accused because pleading to such charge is a submission to jurisdiction, if the defect does not deprive the Court of its jurisdiction. It was further submitted that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof beyond shadow of doubt. Cited in support are the cases of: Ugo v Commissioner of Police (1972) 11 SC @ 37, Ameh v State (1973) 6-7 SC at 27 and Moses Jua v State (2010) 43 WRN page 1 at 24-25. He urged the Court to resolve this issue against the appellant.
Learned counsel also argued issues 2 and 3 together. Counsel submitted that for the respondent in a case of Homicide as in this instant appeal it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove the cause of death, and it can do so either by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence that creates no room for doubt or speculation. Reliance placed on R v Oledinma (1940) 6 WACA 202, Uyo v Attorney-General of Bendel State (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.17) 418 at 426 and Gabriel v The State (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt.122) 457. Counsel submitted that the important consideration for determining responsibility is whether death of the deceased was caused by injuries he sustained through the act of the accused and not whether from the medical point of view death was caused by such injuries. See R v Efanga (1969) 1 ALL NLR 339-11 and Eric Uyo v Attorney-General Bendel State (1986) 2 SC pp. 33 at 31-33.
It was further submitted that although medical evidence is desirable to establish the cause of death in a case of murder but it is not a sine qua non. That it has been stated in plethora of cases that cause of death can be established by sufficient evidence which shows beyond reasonable doubt that death resulted from the particular unlawful act of the accused person or the manner of death of the deceased. See Azu v The State (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 299) 303, Akpuenya v The State (1976) 11 SC 269 and Ilori v The State (1980) 8-11 SC 81.
Learned counsel submitted that Appellant’s counsel has made a heavy weather on the absence of medical report to prove the cause of death. That it has been stated several times, that it is not necessary to tender the doctor’s report when the Doctor is available to give evidence. Counsel contended that the Doctor gave oral testimony as PW5. Reference made to pages 23 and 24 of the record. See Ayo Gabriel v The State (1989) 12 SCNJ 184 @ 192.
That where medical evidence as to the cause of death is either not produced or is not available, the Court may infer such cause of death upon the circumstantial evidence adduced before it provided that the circumstantial evidence is positively and irresistibly consistent with no other rational conclusion than the deceased is dead and his death was caused by the act of the accused person.
See Essien v The State (1984) 3 SC 14 at 18. That there can be no doubt that a person stabbing his victim with a knife on a vulnerable part of the body such as the neck must be deemed to have intended to cause such bodily injury as he know that death would be the probable consequence of his act. Reference was made to evidence of PW4, Exhibit ‘B’ and Muhammad Garba & Ors v The State 2 SCNQR part 11 402 @ 413 and Atiku v State (2010) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1199) 241 at 250 – 251 ratio 13. He urged the Court to resolve issue two and three against the appellant.
It is well settled that in order to secure conviction in a charge of murder, the prosecution must prove:
a) That the deceased had died,
b) That the death of the deceased was caused by the accused,
c) That the act or omission of the accused which caused death of the deceased must have been intentional with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequences Ubani v State (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 85) pages 224, Uguru v State (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt. 771) 90 Adava v State (2006) 9 NWLR (Pt. 984) 155.
See also Abogede v State (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt.448) 270. The ingredients must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. In Ogba v The State (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 222) 164 at 198 paras C-D this Court reiterated the law thus:
“These three conditions must co-exist and where one of them is absent or tainted with doubt the charge is not said to be proved. The onus of proof is on the prosecution throughout and does not shift.” See Obade v The State (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt.198) 435 at 456.
I shall now proceed to ascertain how the prosecution has striven to prove the three ingredients of the charge of murder leading to the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt as to warrant his conviction and sentence to death.
It is settled that the guilt of an accused person can be proved by:
a) The confessional statement of the accused person,
b) Circumstantial evidence; or
c) Evidence of eye-witness of the crime. See Emeka v State (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 734) 668 @ 683.
From the facts as revealed in evidence, it is not in dispute that the deceased died. PW1 Cpl. Dawu Ganguwa No. 468164 stated that he was detailed to investigate a case of Culpable Homicide reported at Divisional Crime Branch Damaturu. They took the victim to General Sani Abacha Specialist Hospital. The victim was lying on bed in a pool of blood. That the Doctor certified the victim as dead. That he took photographs of the deceased and released the body to his relatives for burial. PW3 Umaru Ibrahim deceased brother confirmed the death of his brother. He was told Bukar Ibrahim his brother was stabbed with a knife. PW4 Abubakar Saidu Ibrahim was an eye witness to the incident. He confirmed that accused stabbed the deceased with a knife and he was rushed to the hospital. PW5 Dr. Alami Machina, a Medical Doctor attached to General Sani Abacha Hospital examined a patient that was brought dead to the hospital. He noticed a deep cut on left side of the neck of the patient and was covered with blood. He declared the patient clinically dead. He then signed the death certificate. In Exhibit ‘B’, the accused extra judicial statement, he gave a vivid account of the incident and did not deny the fact that the victim died. These pieces of evidence confirmed the death of the deceased.
What is however disputed is whether it was the act of the appellant that caused the death of the deceased. The proof required from the prosecution is to prove that the act or omission of the accused person caused the death. There is no doubt that the accused, appellant stabbed the deceased. Appellant admitted stabbing the deceased in his voluntary statement Exhibit ‘B’ which he recorded by himself. The evidence also disclosed that as a result of the stabbing the deceased bleed to death. PW4 was an eye witness. He testified to the effect that he was present when appellant stabbed the deceased under the ear and deceased started bleeding immediately. PW5 Dr. Al-Amin stated that he examined the patient and found that there was no evidence of life. He confirmed the cause of death was bleeding from the wound the deceased had which was a deep cut on the left side of his neck. It is trite that in every case, it is alleged that death resulted from the acts of the accused a causal link between the death and the act must be established and proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The cause of death must be proved. See Oforlete v State (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt. 631) pages 415, Oche v State (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1027) page 214. Cause of death can be proved by direct evidence like in this case. The deceased died from the stab wound. The cause of death was bleeding from the deep wound inflicted by the appellant on the deceased left side of the neck. See Uguru v State (supra). In the present case, there was no intervening factor. The deceased died on same date he was stabbed with a knife. The chain of events from the time appellant stabbed the deceased and his death was not broken. See Aiguoreghian v State (2004) 3 NWLR (Pt. 860) 367.
The testimonies PW1-PW5 clearly supports the fact that deceased died on same date he was stabbed by the appellant with a knife. The appellant had strenuously argued that the absence of post mortem report as to the cause of death was fatal to the prosecution’s case. It is in evidence that the medical doctor testified as PW5. It is the law that it is not necessary for the prosecution to tender the medical report of a doctor when the doctor is available to give evidence.
See Adekunle v State (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 123) 505, Ifenodo v State (1967) NMLR 200, Agbeyin v The State (1967) NMLR 129, Edoho v State (2002) LPELR 10605 (CA), (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) 17. In Amayo v The State (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 745) 251, (2001) 12 Sc (Pt.1) 1, (2001) LPELR ? 459 (SC). The Supreme Court per Uwaifo JSC stated thus:
“It is an accepted principle of law that where the cause of death is obvious, medical evidence ceases to be of any practical or legal necessity in homicide cases. This is usually so where death came by violent means and was instantaneous or nearly so.”
I agree with the finding of the learned trial Judge appearing at page 51 of the record wherein he said:
“I am of the view that we can safely say that from the evidence above, the cause of death is bleeding from the wound inflicted by the accused on the deceased. See the case of Atiku v State (2010) 9 NWLR (Pt. 199) 241 @ 250-251 ratio 13.”
Was the act of the appellant intentionally? The law is settled that an intent to kill can be inferred from the nature of the wound inflicted on the deceased, per Uwais CJN as he then was in the case of Orisakwe v The State (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt. 887) 258. See also Ejelikwu v State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 307) pages 534. In the English case of Ayam v DPP (1974) 2 ALL ER page 43, The House of Lords held:
“An intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm is established if it is proved that the accused deliberately and intentionally did an act knowing that it was probable that it will result in death or grievous bodily harm to the victim.”
In the instant case, the appellant who stabbed the deceased on the left side of his neck intended to inflict on the deceased grievous bodily harm or death. The deceased died, therefore it would be right to say that the appellant intended to inflict grievous bodily harm on the deceased which resulted to his death.
In coming to the conclusion that the Appellant intentionally inflicted the injury on the deceased, the learned trial Judge at page 51 of the record had this to say:
“As submitted by learned counsel for the prosecution to determining (sic) that the accused intended the consequence of his act, the Court will have to look at the circumstances of the case i.e
1. The nature of the injury inflicted on the deceased,
2. The part of the body where the injury was inflicted.
3. The type of weapon used by the accused person.
As submitted by the learned counsel for the prosecution and as revealed by the evidence before the Court, the accused person used knife, which is a dangerous weapon to inflict the injury. Secondly, the injury was inflicted on the neck which is a vital part of human body ? See testimony of PW4 and PW5 and Exhibit B. Looking at Exhibit B, pages 2, it will be seen that the accused intended and planned the act, and indeed carried it out at the appropriate time, for he stated in the Exhibit B that ‘but due to the anger I went to my house and took a kitchen knife and conceal it on me and went to the residence of Abubakar’.
These pieces of evidence shows that the act was predicated and he knows what would be the consequence of his act.
The accused person used a knife which is a dangerous weapon to carry out the act, and he first kicked the deceased with his leg and when the deceased bent forward he stabbed him on the neck with the knife. All these pieces of evidence show that the accused knew what he was doing and intended the consequence of his act. A reasonable person would know that if you stab a human being with a knife on the neck the probable consequence would be death. I am therefore satisfied that the accused person planned and intended the consequence of his act.
The above finding of the learned trial Judge in my humble view is unassailable.
The appellant in his evidence in chief tried to set up a defence of provocation. The question now is whether the defence of provocation is available to the appellant having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case at hand. To benefit from the defence of provocation is that the provocation given must be grave and sudden and the retaliation must not be disproportionate to the provocation given. See Rasulu Oladipupo v State (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt.298) 131 @ 139.
In law, for the defence of provocation to succeed, it must be shown by the accused person:
(1) That the act relied on by the accused is obviously provocative;
(2) That the provocative act deprived the accused of self-control;
(3) The provocative act came from the deceased, the sudden fight between the accused and the deceased was instantaneous and continuous with no time for passion to cool down; and
(4) The force used by the accused in repelling the provocation is not disproportionate in the circumstance. See Nwede v State (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt. 13) 444; Akalezi v State (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt.273) 1; Okonji v State (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt 52) 659 and Ekpenyong v State (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 295) 513.
In the instant case, the appellant stated in his evidence in chief and in his extra-judicial statement marked as Exhibit ‘B’ that he was suspected of stealing a phone. He got angry and went to his house and took a kitchen knife, concealed it and went to the residence of Abubakar a.k.a Commissioner and looked for him but he wasn’t at home. From there he went to look for the deceased. PW4 an eyewitness testified to the effect that he tried to cool the accused/appellant but the appellant removed a knife from his trouser and refused to listen. Appellant chased the deceased while PW4 tried to push the accused away.
According to him, the accused ran to the deceased, kicked him with his leg, and when the deceased bent forward, the accused stabbed the deceased under the ear. I agree with the learned trial Judge’s finding that from these pieces of evidence the provocation was not sudden. Appellant had all the time for his passion to cool down. The evidence disclosed that he had time to go to his house and pick the knife and went to the house of the deceased looking for him. PW4 also tried to intervene by cooling appellant?s temper but he refused.
Although the accusation of stealing a phone could amount to provocation, the stabbing of the deceased did not follow instantaneously. Appellant in my view did not stab the deceased in the heat of passion. The provocation was also not grave enough to call for this kind of retaliation, for using a knife to stab a person on the neck is very disproportionate to the provocation given. See Uwagboe v State (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1102) 621, (2008) LPELR 3444 SC, Chukwu v State (1992) 1 NWLR (Pt. 217) 255.
It could be rightly stated that accused intended, planned and carried out the act.
Appellant’s counsel had strenuously argued in Appellant’s brief of argument that the failure of the prosecution witnesses to mention the locus criminis and time the offence was committed as reflected on the charge for which appellant was convicted is fatal to the prosecution’s case. Contrary to the argument of learned counsel for the appellant, PW4 who was an eye witness gave cogent and credible evidence in line with the charge. The remaining witnesses’ i.e PW1, PW2, PW3 and PW5 narrated what they know and did in connection with the case at hand. It is my humble view that there is no discrepancy between the location of the alleged crime (Locus Criminis) and the evidence led.
From the totality of the evidence adduced, it is my firm view that all the required ingredients of the offence of Culpable Homicide punishable under Section 221 of the Penal Code as charged against the accused person now appellant had been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
As earlier stated in criminal cases the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. This burden of proof lies throughout on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and it never shifts. See Ani v State (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt. 830) 142 and Ifejirika v State (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt. 593) 59. It must, however, be stated that proof beyond reasonable doubt is ‘not proof to the hilt’ and is thus not synonymous with proof beyond all iota of doubt. This is because absolute certainty is impossible in any human adventure including the administration of justice. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, this simply means establishing the guilt of the defendant with compelling and conclusive evidence to a degree of compulsion which is consistent with a high degree of probability.
Once the prosecution has been able to prove that an offence has been committed and that no person other than the accused committed the offence, the prosecution is said to have established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Adeleke v State (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt.1381) 556 and Babarinde v State (2014) 3 NWLR (Pt.1381) 568.
In the present case, the learned trial Judge rightly in my humble view found the appellant guilty of the offence of Culpable Homicide punishable under Section 221 of the Penal Code. The conviction and sentence were in order.
In the result, I hold that the appellant’s appeal is unmeritorious and fails. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The Judgment of the High Court of Justice, Damaturu Yobe State delivered by Hon. Justice Ali Garba in Charge No. YBS/DT/HC/30C/2016 is hereby affirmed. The conviction and sentence of death are hereby affirmed.
TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment of my learned brother, ADZIRA GANA MSHELIA, PJCA in this appeal. I entirely agree with the reasoning and conclusions reached therein and find that there is no merit in the appeal. I also dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial Court.
BOLOUKUROMO MOSES UGO, J.C.A.: My learned brother Adzira Gana Mshelia, P.J.C.A., had earlier given me his leading judgment to read. I am in complete agreement with his reasoning and conclusion. I am also of the view that there is no merit in the appeal, accordingly I also dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the lower Court.
Appearances:
D.G. Goke, holding the brief of T.I. Stephen, Esq.For Appellant(s)
Usman Ismail. (Chief State Counsel, Ministry of Justice, Yobe State)For Respondent(s)
