MRS OLUBUKOLA AKINNIRANYE v. STANBIC IBTC & ORS (2014)

MRS OLUBUKOLA AKINNIRANYE v. STANBIC IBTC & ORS

(2014)LCN/6826(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Wednesday, the 5th day of February, 2014

CA/L/961/2011

JUSTICES

JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

CHINWE EUGENIA IYIZOBA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

MRS OLUBUKOLA AKINNIRANYE Appellant(s)

AND

1. STANBIC IBTC
2. MR. MOSES ADEDOYIN
3. MR. MOSES UZOEGBU
4. MRS ABIOLA OROJO Respondent(s)

RATIO

DUTIES OF BOTH EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE

CHINWE EUGENIA IYIZOBA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant herein who was the Claimant in the lower court was employed by Chartered Bank Plc (now known as Stanbic Ibtc Bank Plc) in January 1992 as a Supervisor. She worked in various departments and held different positions and eventually rose to the position of Operations Manager of the 1st Respondent at its Head Office Branch.

On the 17th day of July, 2003, the Appellant issued a Bank draft (Exhibit DF7) in the sum of N250,950 000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Million, Nine Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira) in favour of Messrs Sahara Energy Limited, which threw the account of their customer, Tessijane International Ltd into a debit balance. The Appellant’s authorization limit as Operations Manager was N100, 000,000.00 only according to the 1st Respondent’s Operations Manual (Exhibit G). Further, it was alleged that she debited the account of Tessijane International Ltd when all the conditions precedents for the draw down of the loan approved for it by the 1st Respondent were not in place. The Appellant was later suspended and placed on half salary. In response to a query issued to her, she claimed she was instructed orally to issue the Bank draft contrary to the 1st Respondents’ laid down procedure by her superior officers who assured her that all the conditions would be met. She also claimed that she was requested by her superior officers to treat the transaction urgently. The Appellant was later dismissed and asked to return all the 1st Respondent’s properties in her possession including an official car, a Nissan Saloon Car. She did not return the car but commenced this suit at the High Court of Lagos State in the Lagos Judicial Division. By her 2nd Amended Statement of Claim dated the 18th day of January, 2011 the Appellant claimed against the Respondents as follows:

1. A declaration that the action of the Defendants between the 24th of October, 2004 and the 19th August, 2005 against the Claimant is unfair and in breach of the Contract of Employment existing between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant since January, 1992 till July 2005 and therefore null and void.

2. The sum of N12, 600,000.00 (Twelve Million, Six Hundred Thousand Naira) representing general and special damages for unlawful dismissal/wrongful termination of the employment of the Claimant and consequent breach of contract.

3. The sum of N500, 000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) representing cost of this suit.

The Respondents denied all the allegations of the Appellant and in their statement of defence/counterclaim dated 18/11/05 counterclaimed against the Appellant as follows:

a. A declaration that the issuing of a draft in the sum of N250, 950,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Million, Nine Hundred and Fifty thousand Naira) in favour of Sahara Energy (Resources) Limited by the Claimant which enabled Tessijane International Limited to draw the facility without all the preconditions for disbursement is a breach of the 1st Defendant’s credit and cash operation policies.

b. A declaration that the debiting of Tessijane account by the Claimant in the sum of N250, 950,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Million, Nine Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira) an amount over her authorized limit of N100, 000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) without approval, which threw the account into an unauthorized debit balance of N250, 950,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Million, Nine Hundred and Fifty thousand Naira) is a breach of the 1st Defendant’s credit and cash operations policy.

c. An order directing the Claimant to pay to the 1st Defendant the sum of N250, 950,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Million, Nine Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira) being the sum lost by the 1st Defendant through the negligence of the Claimant at an interest rate of 10% per annum from the 16th July, 2003 till the date of judgment and at the rate of 5% from the date of judgment till the whole sum is finally liquidated.

d. An order directing the Claimant to hand over the official vehicle a grey color Nissan Super Saloon Car with registration No. DP 189 EKY, Chassis No. JNICFAN160058728 and Engine No. QG16282440 in her possession to the 1st Defendant.

The Appellant filed a reply to the defence/counterclaim and the Respondents also filed a reply to the Appellant’s defence to the counterclaim. At the close of pleadings and after the pre-trial conference, hearing commenced with the appellant testifying for herself and calling no other witness. The Respondents called two witnesses. The parties filed their written addresses which they duly adopted. In its judgment the court below dismissed the Appellant’s claims in its entirety, while allowing in part, the 1st Respondent’s Counter Claim. Dissatisfied with the judgment, the Appellant appealed to this court by a notice of appeal containing four grounds of appeal out of which three issues were distilled as follows:

(a). Whether or not the lower court was right in upholding the counter claim after having found that the 1st respondent condoned the action of the appellant, and that the transaction between the 1st respondent and its customers was a business gone bad. (Grounds 1, 2 & 3 of the Notice of Appeal).

(b). Whether or not the trial judge was right in applying the principles applicable in gross negligence cases especially the case of Danusa Vs UBA Plc (2005) 9 NWLR (PT. 931) 526 at 539 etc. to ground her findings against the claimant, after having found that the 1st respondent did condone the actions of the claimant by their own actions. (Grounds 2 & 3 of the Notice of Appeal).

(c). Whether or not the learned trial judge was right when she held that:
”Thus in my view the procedure adopted by the 1st defendant in dismissing the claimant was lawful and proper”. (See page 1663 of the records of proceedings para 2, last sentence.)

‘In conclusion, I find the claimant has failed on preponderance of evidence and balance of probabilities to prove her case. She is therefore not entitled to the claims in the Writ of Summons and Statement of claim”. (See page 1663 of the records of proceedings para 3).

After having found that:
”….. in agreement with the claimant’s Counsel’s observation that the bank condoned the procedure adopted by the claimant in processing the loan”.
”I am inclined to agree with learned counsel for the claimant, that the claimant was the scape goat for the incident which involved several officers of the bank who has since resigned or left the bank”. (Ground 4 of the Notice of Appeal).

The Respondents in their brief identified just one issue for determination thus:

“Whether the learned trial judge at the court below was right in dismissing the Appellant’s claim and ordering the Appellant to pay to the Respondents the balance outstanding on the Appellant Nissan Saloon Car in possession of the Appellant.”(Grounds 1, 2, 3 and 4).

The Respondent’s sole issue encompasses all the three issues of the Appellant and captures succinctly the essence of this appeal. I shall therefore adopt that sole issue in the determination of this appeal.

APPELLANTS ARGUMENTS:
Appellants brief was settled by Toyin Bashorun (Mrs.). The summary of her arguments is that the learned trial judge erred in concluding that the Appellant was negligent and in dismissing her claims after making a definite finding that the bank condoned her act. Learned counsel submitted that there was uncontradicted evidence that the transaction in this matter was a business between the bank and third parties which went bad and that being a business, the various anticipatory approvals and instructions to ”treat urgently” gave the Appellant good reasons for issuing the bank draft. Counsel contended that the Respondents conducted themselves in a manner which lent credence to the fact that the Appellant was attending to the urgent business of her employers with their support. Counsel claimed that it explained why she was never immediately queried or sanctioned for over 15 (fifteen) months but was on the contrary promoted in 2003 and encouraged to start a new career path within the bank. Counsel further contended that ‘eye brow’ was raised over the loan for the first time over a year after the draft was issued and ten months after the Loan Instruction Memorandum (LIM) was in place on the 16th of July 2003. Counsel argued that based on these findings by the lower court, the appellant cannot be held to be negligent when the 1st respondent actively encouraged the act done by the appellant. Learned counsel argued that the Respondents were aware of the anomalies and actually actively condoned and encouraged the circumventions because of the huge profit expected. Counsel further argued that things did not turn out as expected and the Respondents then turned round to blame the Appellant for the failure of the transaction.

Relying on the case of MAJA Vs STOCCO (1968) NMLR 372, counsel submitted that an employee is duty bound to obey lawfully constituted authorities of the employer in the management and running of an organization including written codes and oral instructions. Counsel argued that if the Appellant had refused to obey the oral instruction of her superior officers, she would have been sanctioned. Learned counsel relying on various authorities urged the court to re-evaluate the evidence led in the case which the learned trial judge wrongly evaluated, allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the lower court and to grant all the reliefs sought by the Appellant in her 2nd amended statement of claim

RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS:
The Respondents’ brief was settled by S.N. Agweh Esq. In his brief, he submitted that the learned trial judge properly reviewed and evaluated the evidence before her as put forward by the Appellant and the Respondents before arriving at her decision. Counsel submitted that the Appellants’ cause of action is founded on wrongful dismissal and that the dismissal of the Appellant was as a result of her failure to adhere strictly to the 1st Respondent’s laid down Rules, which failure amounted to negligence and misconduct on the part of the Appellant. Learned counsel contended that the Appellant was an Operations Manager in the employment of the 1st Respondent. By virtue of her rank and office, she had no power to issue a cheque of over N100, 000,000.00. Page 25 of Exhibit G at page 250 Volume 1 of the Record of appeal. Counsel submitted that the Appellant contended that she got oral instructions to issue a cheque of N250, 950,000.00 and she did so despite the fact that she had no power to raise a cheque of over N100, 000,000.00, and when all the conditions necessary for draw down of a loan facility were not in place and the account of Tessijane Ltd was not funded. Counsel contended that these facts were admitted by the Appellant in her pleadings and evidence before the court. Relying on the cases of Olaniyan Vs. University of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 509 and Sule Vs. Nigerian Cotton Board (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.5) 17, in the case of Nwoboshi Vs. A.C.B. Ltd (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt.404) 658, counsel submitted that the Appellant’s conduct was of such grave and weighty character as to undermine the relationship of confidence which should exist between her and her employer and therefore amounted to gross misconduct justifying a dismissal. The remaining submissions of counsel are encapsulated in his summary thus:
1. That the Respondents did not condone the act of the Appellant.
2. That the Appellant cannot jettison the laid down procedure of the 1st Respondent for the oral instructions of her supposedly, superior officers.
3. That the Appellant is guilty of negligence and gross misconduct.

Learned counsel finally submitted that the learned trial judge properly evaluated the evidence in this case; and that from the pleadings and evidence the learned trial judge was right in dismissing the Appellant’s case and ordering the Appellant to pay to the Respondents the balance outstanding for the purchase of the Nissan Saloon Car. Counsel urged the court to resolve the sole issue in favour of the Respondents and to dismiss the appeal as lacking in merit.

RESOLUTION:
Mrs. Bashorun for the Appellant in her brief did not dispute the fact that the procedure the appellant adopted in debiting the account of Tessijane International Ltd was not in compliance with the laid down procedure of the Respondents. She started her arguments on the Appellant’s issues one and two with the contention that the appellant could not be held to have acted negligently because her employers condoned or encouraged the procedure. She claimed that the principles of negligence as they apply to the relationship of an employer and its employee recognize condonation as an exception to the rules. She relied on ECN v. NICOL (1968) ANLR 199 @ 205. Counsel relied on the observations of the learned trial judge at page 1661 of the Record.
“…I am also in agreement with the claimant’s counsel observation that the bank condoned the procedure adopted by the claimant…….”
“when considering the way and manner the loan facility was ”approved by the principal officers of the bank and how the claimant was urged to treat the matter urgently on Exhibit C1”.

Mr. Agweh for the Respondents had argued that those observations cannot be taken in isolation. He submitted that the learned trial judge after making those observations concluded thus:

“From the foregoing facts, it is clear that the Claimant knew that there were some conditions, which had to be fulfilled before issuing the draft. Firstly, the system revealed that the account has not been funded; second the Loan Instrument Manual (Memorandum) has not been signed off and sent to MIS for booking but because she got oral confirmation of Head of MIS Bayo Adelore that the facility was booked she went ahead and issued the cheque.”

Counsel further contended that the above findings read together with the earlier observations show that the earlier observations of the learned trial judge was nothing but a prelude to the actual findings of the court. I agree with Mr. Agweh. The primary issue was whether the Appellant acted negligently. If she did, the fact that some staff of the 1st Respondent who were part of the conspiracy and while still in the bank used their position to prevent discovery of the anomaly cannot be interpreted to mean that the 1st Respondent knew and did nothing thereby condoning the negligent act. Mr. Agweh in his brief put it succinctly thus:

“Also of note, is that DW1 stated that Sola Odeseye and Tola Seriki were handling the account at the material time and Sola Odeseye had left the bank. He also stated that MIS (i.e. Management Information Services) issued a report immediately they noticed that an account has been overdrawn and it is circulated to those involved including Credit and Operations. DW1 further stated that there was no Asset Report in respect of this particular account which should have been raised when the Appellant issued N250,950,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Million, Nine Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira) draft on a zero amount account. Page 1661 of the Record.
From the above, it is obvious that the Appellant, Sola Odeseye and Tola Seriki were working hand-in-hand to suppress the violation of the 1st Respondent’s laid down procedure. The 1st Respondent cannot therefore be said to have condoned or encouraged the Appellant’s to breach it’s laid down procedure.”

I agree that in the circumstances, the 1st Respondent cannot be said to have condoned the breach of its laid down procedure. Further as submitted by Mr. Agweh, the case of ECN Vs. NICOL (Supra) cited by the Appellant is not apposite. The instant case was a single case of negligence bordering on gross misconduct as opposed to the situation in ECN Vs. NICOLE (supra) where the Respondent’s act was not a single act but several wrongful acts for which he was never queried. The Appellant in Nicole’s case was aware of the misdeeds but never complained. When Nicole was later dismissed for these several acts stretching over a period without any complaint by his employers, the employer was found to have condoned the various acts. In the instant case, it was a single act and the 1st Respondent was not shown to have been aware in the sense that the Board of the Bank knew and did nothing. On the contrary when the Bank became aware, its Management Information Services (MIS) issued a report immediately to those involved including Credit and Operations. The Appellant was then issued a query Exhibit B. Sola Odeseye, who was one of the Appellant’s superiors at the time and who gave her the oral instructions to issue the draft had left the bank. In the circumstances, the 1st Respondent acting through its Board cannot be said to have condoned the act of the Appellant notwithstanding that it took a rather long time to react to the misconduct. From the sequence of events, there was collusion by a number of officials in the 1st Respondent’s employ and they apparently took steps to ensure that the wrongful act did not come to the attention of the 1st Respondent promptly. The 1st Respondent acted immediately it became aware of the misconduct. An employee is bound to obey only lawful orders, or instructions from her supervising superiors. The Appellant cannot escape from the consequences of her negligent act on the ground that she was carrying out the oral illegal orders of her superiors. The reason why an institution such as the bank has several different stages in any given transaction manned by different officials is to impose checks and balances so that if one officer defaults, another by doing the proper thing will check the excesses of the defaulting officer. Where a particular officer fails in carrying out his duties as required by the bank’s regulations, he cannot hide under the claim that he was obeying the instructions (and oral for that matter) of his superiors. The Appellant’s superiors such as Sola Odeseye managed to leave the bank before their wrongful act was exposed. The Appellant having been caught and being still a staff of the bank must pay the price for her default. The learned trial judge very aptly put it thus:

“From the foregoing facts, it is clear that the Claimant knew that there were some conditions which had to be fulfilled before issuing the draft. Firstly, the system revealed that the account had not been funded; secondly, the Loan Instrument Manual (LIM) had not been signed off and sent to MIS for booking but because she got the oral confirmation of Head of MIS Bayo Adelore that the facility was booked she went ahead and issued the cheque. It was after the draft had been issued that the facility was booked on 8/10/2003. It is also my view that the BDN and Head MIS must have known that the Claimant had approval limit of only N100,000,000.00 but encouraged the Claimant to issue a draft of N250,950,000.00. No alarm or alert was raised nor was the Claimant immediately queried when it was discovered in the system of the Bank that the Loan Instruction Memorandum had not been booked.
The bank draft was issued on 16/7/2003 but the Claimant did not receive a query until she was suspended on August 17, 2004 a year later.
Thus I am inclined to agree with Learned Counsel for the Claimant that the Claimant was the scape goat for the incident which involved several other officers of the bank who have since resigned or left the bank.
Notwithstanding however I do find that the Claimant was not careful enough in the performance of her duties. She ought to have taken more care and ensured that the LIM had been signed off and sent to MIS for booking before issuing the draft
The Claimant was a senior member of staff with over 13 years experience. She was an Operations Manager of the Branch and she ought to have abided strictly with the rules and regulations of the bank, more so where it involved a huge sum of N250,950,000.00. The Loan Instrument Memorandum indicates that all conditions necessary for disbursement of a credit facility have been met and until the LIM is shown on the Claimant’s system the Claimant ought not to have disbursed the sum………………………
I am of the view that the negligence of the Claimant in disbursing the draft without following the laid down procedure in Exhibit G and Exhibit DF3 amounts to misconduct of a serious nature which justified the bank dismissing her summarily.”

The reasoning of the learned trial Judge cannot be faulted. The Appellant attempted to justify her act by the fact of the Anticipatory Approval given for the loan, Exhibit C which she said the learned trial judge overlooked. Exhibit C was not as she claimed an approval by the 1st Respondent. Rather it was as suggested by the name in anticipation of a final approval. DW1 at pages 1572 – 1573 gave an account of how an anticipatory approval is obtained. It is still subject to a final approval or ratification and until that final approval is in place, it cannot be acted on.

The Appellant surely cannot hide under the manifestly wrong premise that she was carrying out the oral instructions of her superiors. An experienced bank official such as she was at the time if she felt compelled to obey her superior, should have written down the oral instructions and gotten her superior officers to confirm it in writing. That way, she would have protected herself. One cannot help but conclude that she deliberately played ball because she was in cahoots with the other bank officials to perpetrate the wrongful act. The fact that the other officials have left the bank cannot stop the bank from taking the appropriate action to discipline her for the role she played. The security for the loan was a Multiparty Ware Housing Agreement between the bank and three others. Tessijane International Ltd had been granted the loan for the purchase of AGO (Petroleum products) and was to repay the credit facility by domiciling the sale proceeds into its account with the bank. Even though the loan had been approved and the LIM finally in place, if everything was in order before the draft was raised and paid out, the bank would have been in a better position to monitor the arrival and sale of the products.

The remaining point for resolution is whether the lower court was right in its conclusion that the 1st Respondent followed its laid down procedure in the dismissal of the Appellant. The learned trial Judge at page 1662 of the Record of Appeal stated:

“The law of Employer/Employee recognizes that there are certain common law duties which the courts over the years have recognized and upheld as attaching to both the employer and the employee.
The duties of an employee include the duty to take reasonable care and to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duties.
It is my humble view that the Claimant in the instant case owed a duty of reasonable care to her employer and to exercise due diligence in the performance of her duties.
It has been held by the Supreme Court that negligence even without a criminal import can be so gross as to be misconduct of a kind which justifies dismissal. See the case of Danusa Vs. UBA PLC (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 931) Pg 526 at 539 and Usen Vs. Bank of West Africa Ltd (1965) 1 All NLR where the Bank dismissed the Claimant for issuing a teller bearing his signature and the imprint of his rubber stamp to a customer for an amount which he neither entered nor accounted for and the manager felt obliged to honour the teller and pay on it. The Supreme Court held that the Claimant in that case was properly dismissed by the bank.
Similarly I am of the view that the negligence of the Claimant in disbursing the draft without following the laid down procedure in Exhibit G and Exhibit DF3 amounts to misconduct of a serious nature which justified the bank dismissing her summarily………….Furthermore the Employees Manual Exhibit DF1 makes it clear that the Bank does not need to go through the four stages involved in the disciplinary procedure. Depending on the seriousness of the offence discipline may begin at any stage in the procedure. See Pg. 138 – 139 of Exhibit DF1. Thus in my view the procedure adopted by the 1st Defendant in dismissing the Claimant was lawful and proper.”

The learned trial Judge’s findings and conclusions are supported by the Human Resources Policies and Procedures Manual of the Bank Exhibit DF1 which is the current Employee Manual. Therein, an employee may be summarily dismissed without notice for gross misconduct. There are four stages involved in the disciplinary procedure. They are verbal warning, written warning, suspension and termination or dismissal. Depending on the seriousness of the offence, discipline may begin at any stage of the procedure. The Appellant’s offence was failure to follow bank policies and procedures resulting in substantial loss of bank funds/income. This in the manual is considered a serious misconduct and attracts the disciplinary action of dismissal. The Appellant did not deny committing the offence. Her defence was that she acted on the oral instruction of her superior officers. The Appellant’s contention that she was never served with the result of the investigation conducted and that she was not allowed to testify before the investigating panel are clearly not part of the disciplinary procedure in respect of her kind of misconduct. The Manual provides for summary dismissal. The learned trial Judge was consequently right in holding the dismissal proper and in dismissing all the claims of the Appellant.

With respect to the counterclaim of the Respondents, the court granted the following:
a. A declaration that the issuing of a draft in the sum of N250,950,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Million, Nine Hundred and Fifty thousand Naira) in favour of Sahara Energy (Resources) Limited by the Claimant which enabled Tessijane International Limited to draw the facility without all the preconditions for disbursement is a breach of the 1st Defendant’s credit and cash operation policies.

b. A declaration that the debiting of Tessijane account by the Claimant in the sum of N250,950,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Million, Nine Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira) an amount over her authorized limit of N100, 000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) without approval, which threw the account into an unauthorized debit balance of N250, 950,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Million, Nine Hundred and Fifty thousand Naira) is a breach of the 1st Defendant’s credit and cash operations policy.

The lower Court further directed the Claimant to pay the Defendants any outstanding balance on the loan she received to purchase the Nissan Super Saloon car and N20, 000.00 costs.

I am of the view that the learned trial Judge properly evaluated the evidence in the case and was very fair to the Appellant. Upon the pleadings and evidence led, the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing the Appellant’s case and ordering the appellant to pay to the Respondents the balance outstanding for the purchase of the Nissan Saloon car. The Appellant had in her evidence admitted that she had paid 50% of the value of the car when she was dismissed. She had testified at page 336 of the Record that as at the time she was dismissed she had not finished paying for the car and that the car was still with her. The sole issue raised by the Respondents which encompassed the issues formulated by the Appellant is resolved against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondents. The appeal consequently lacks merit and is hereby dismissed. The judgment of Taiwo J of the High Court of Lagos State in suit No LD/1391/2005 delivered on the 20th day of April 2011 is affirmed. I make no order as to costs.

JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in draft the lucid judgment of my learned brother, Chinwe Eugenia Iyizoba, J.C.A., with which I agree and adopt as my judgment.

From the facts of the case, the 1st respondent acted swiftly or immediately it became aware of the misconduct that brought about the demise of the appellant’s employment by launching disciplinary action against her. Condonation of the misconduct of the appellant by the 1st respondent could only have occurred if the 1st respondent had been aware of the misconduct but nonetheless accepted to treat it as if it was not serious thus forgiving the misconduct, which was not the case here.

The appellant was aware that by Exhibit G, the 1st respondent’s Operation Manual, she was not to exceed N100 million in granting credit facility to customers of the 1st respondent. It is strange that the appellant would flout the Operation Manual, Exhibit G, and rely unwittingly on and/or prefer the verbal instruction from her superiors, who like the appellant are all answerable to the 1st respondent, to grant unauthorised credit facility of N250,950,000.00 to a customer that turned out to be running a debit account with the 1st respondent.

By the appellant succumbing to the unprotected and unreliable oral assurance by the appellant’s superiors who were merely employees of the 1st respondent and did not own the 1st respondent, the appellant overshot her monetary mandate of N100 million by N1,950,000.00 in a transaction that turned out to be awry and led to avoidable financial loss to the 1st respondent, the appellant’s employer. Notwithstanding the spirited arguments made by Ms. Bashorun for the appellant, the facts of the case clearly weigh unfavourably/adversely against the appellant, her client.

For these reasons and for the more comprehensive reasons contained in the lead judgment I too find the appeal unmeritorious and hereby dismiss it and affirm the judgment of the court below (Taiwo, J).

Parties to bear their costs.

RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU, J.C.A.: I had the advantage of reading in draft, the lead Judgment just delivered by my brother CHINWE EUGENIA IYIZOBA JCA. I agree with her opinion and conclusion that the learned trial Judge properly evaluated the evidence in the Court below before arriving at the conclusion which he did. That conclusion cannot be faulted by this Court.

I also dismiss the appeal for want of merit. I make no order as to costs.

Appearances

Toyin Bashorun (MS) with Olaide Benjamin (Miss)For Appellant

AND

S. N. Agweh Esq., with O. Banmah Esq., and C. Maduagwuna (Mrs)For Respondent