MRS. LUCY DANGANA v. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
(2018)LCN/12462(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 8th day of June, 2018
CA/A/223c/2013
RATIO
EVIDENCE: WHEN AN EVIDENCE IS SAID TO BE HEARSAY
“Evidence is said to be hearsay, only when it “…does not derive its value from the credit given to the witness himself, but which rests in part on the veracity or competence of some other person. It is the evidence of a witness who is not giving evidence of what he knew or did personally but of what he was told by another person. Such evidence would be rejected as hearsay.” Per Kekere-Ekun (JCA, then) in MKPEDEM & ORS V UBA PLC & ANOR. (2016) LPELR-42039-CA; See also UKPO VS IMOKE (2010) 6 EPR 851 at 907.” PER MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A.
EVIDENCE: WHETHER THE LAW PRESCRIBES NUMBER OF WITNESS
“The law does not prescribe any number of witnesses a party should call before he gets judgment in his favour. The Evidence Act does not require any particular number of witnesses for proof of any fact. It is the quality of evidence adduced that matters and not the number of witnesses called; see AKPAN V. STATE (1991) 3 NWLR (PT. 182) P. 664 and EGBERETAMU V. STATE (2014) 22 WRN PAGE 166…The question is whether the evidence of one credible witness, on a particular point, is believed and accepted, as it is the case with PW1 in this case. If the answer is in the affirmative, then the evidence of such a witness is sufficient to support a conviction; see ALI V. THE STATE (1988) 1 NWLR (PT. 68) 1.” PER MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A.
EVIDENCE: WHERE A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT IS IRRELEVANT
“A confession becomes irrelevant if it appears to the Court that in making it the accused person was induced, threatened or promised any advantage or evidence of any evil in relation to the charge against him by a person in authority over the case. Having said that it is very important to appreciate that once the Court is satisfied that the confession is voluntary and free, that settles the matter to all intents and purposes, and it is for this reason that a trial within trial is conducted just as was done in this case, leading the trial Court to arrive at the conclusion that the confession was admissible.” PER MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A.
Before Their Lordships
TINUADE AKOMOLAFE-WILSONJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIMJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MOHAMMED MUSTAPHAJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
MRS. LUCY DANGANAAppellant(s)
AND
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE (IGP)Respondent(s)
MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
This appeal is against the Judgment of the Federal High Court, sitting in Abuja; Coram Hon. Justice Gladys Olotu, delivered on 7th day of March, 2013 in Suit No: FHC/ABJ/CR/4812011.
The Appellant herein was arrested on the 10th day of November, 2010, and upon conclusion of investigation arraigned before the trial Court on the 10th June, 2011 for unlawful possession of ten (10) prohibited firearms and nine (9) pieces of magazines; unlawful importation into Nigeria by land of the alleged prohibited firearms and magazines and illegal possession of the alleged firearms and magazines for the purpose of selling them – punishable under Section 27 (a)(i), 27 (d)(i) and 27(b)(ii) of the Firearms Act, Cap. F28 Volume 7, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN), 2004.
The Prosecution called three witnesses in proof of its case, while the defense called two, and in a considered judgment the trial Court convicted the Appellant as charged and sentenced her to ten years imprisonment on the first and second counts and five years imprisonment on the third count with hard labour.
Dissatisfied with the said Judgment, the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court on 21st day of March, 2013 and Additional Grounds of Appeal on the 22nd day of April 2013. The grounds of appeal shorn of their respective particulars are as follows:-
GROUND ONE:
The decision of the trial Court is unreasonable, unwarranted and unsupportable by the evidence before it.
GROUND TWO:
The trial Court erred in law in admitting Exhibit C, the purported second confessional statement of the Accused/Appellant after the first confessional Statement of the Accused/Appellant was rejected during the first trial within trial.
GROUND THREE:
The trial Court erred in law when it held that summary trial in the Federal High Court, unlike trial on application in the State High Court, does not require proof of evidence and thereby erroneously admitted the evidence of PW3 on reliance of which it convicted the Accused/Appellant.
GROUND FOUR:
The trial Court erred in law when it held that the evidence of PW2 was not hearsay evidence.
GROUND FIVE:
The trial Court erred in law in holding that Exhibit A1-A10 were Firearms within the meaning of Section 2 of the Firearms Act without any scientific evidence/report as required by Section 68 of the Evidence Act.
GROUND SIX:
The Learned Trial Judge erred in law in admitting the purported confessional statement of the Accused/Appellant in spite of the apparent and unequivocal evidence during trial within trial that it was obtained by duress.
GROUND SEVEN:
The learned trial judge erred in law in assuming the position of both the prosecution and the judge at the same time.
Sen. Ameh Ebute Esq., (CON), of counsel for the Appellant submitted six issues for the determination of this appeal in the Appellant’s Brief filed on the 21st day of June, 2013, thus:-
1. Whether in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, proof of possession in criminal law and the case of the prosecution can be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether or not the Constitutional Right of the Accused/Appellant has not been breached by the admission of the evidence of PW3 and all the exhibits tendered through him as his name and his extra judicial statement were not contained or included in the proof of evidence served on her on 10th June, 2011.
3. Whether or not the evidence of PW2 and all the exhibits tendered through him are not hearsay evidence and therefore inadmissible in evidence.
4. Whether or not Exhibits A1 – A10 fall within the meaning of firearm as defined by Section 2 of the Firearms Act Cap. F28 LFN 2004.
5. Whether the confessional statement upon which the Accused/Appellant was convicted was proved to have been made voluntarily during the trial within trial.
6. Whether or not the trial Court has not done the case for the prosecution by answering all the issues raised by the defence in his final Address filed on 12th October, 2012.
In response, SP. Oloye Torugbene Esq., of counsel for the Respondent formulated a sole issue for the determination of this appeal in the Respondent’s Brief filed on the 3rd day of October, 2016, but deemed properly filed on the 9th day of April, 2018, thus:-
“Whether the Learned Trial Judge misdirected herself in fact and in law having regard to the total evidence before the Court to infer an unfair prejudice to the defence or to have occasioned a miscarriage of justice.”
The sole issue for determination formulated on behalf of the respondent encapsulates all the issues formulated for the appellant, and therefore suffices for the determination of this appeal.
The sole issue:
Whether the Learned Trial Judge misdirected herself in fact and in law having regard to the total evidence before the Court to infer an unfair prejudice to the defence or to have occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
It is submitted for the appellant that the evidence of the sole witness for the prosecution, PW1, has not proved possession on the part of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, because the accused was not the only person in the vehicle, and she was not the one who brought down the four bags containing the exhibits from the vehicle. This is more so, it is argued, as the police informant was not called to lead evidence that the bags belonged to the appellant, especially as none of the other officers who participated in the arrest with PW1 was called to testify.
That it was not the appellant who brought down the bags for search, but the driver of the vehicle, and also that the finger prints of the appellant were not taken to compare it with the ones on the jute bags containing the riffles.
Learned counsel submitted that in view of these insufficiencies the evidence of PW1 did not prove possession on the part of the appellant; he referred this Court to ESOF EDOHO V THE STATE (2004) 5 NWLR part 865 page 17 and REX V JUDGE KUREE 7 WACA page 175.
That the failure of the prosecution to call Saidu Bulama, the informant, who ought to have seen or known the person who owned the four bags, loaded them into the vehicle is fatal to the case of the prosecution, as it created doubt in the mind, because the evidence of the sole witness is not enough to ground a conviction, and where doubt is created such doubt must be resolved in favour of the prosecution, learned counsel referred the Court to AIGUOREGHIAN & ANOR V THE STATE (2004) 3 NWLR part 860 page 479.
That also the alleged admission of ownership of Exhibits A1-A10 by the appellant should have been confirmed or corroborated by a second witness, learned counsel referred the Court to MARY ANTHONY V ANTHONY EKPEKPEKPE (1964) LRNN page 74.
Learned counsel further submitted that the proof of evidence served on the appellant on the 10th of June, 2011, does not contain the name of PW3, Sgt. Tersugh Kpenkpen and his extra judicial statement.
That Section 33 of the Federal High Court Act and Sections 77, 78 and 277 of the Criminal Procedure Act do not dispense with service of proof of evidence on the accused facing trial before the Federal High Court, learned counsel referred this Court to GBOKO V STATE (2011) 6 NCC page 312 and BABA V N.C.A.T.C (1991) 5 NWLR part 192 page 388.
Learned counsel also submitted that the evidence of PW2 is hearsay evidence and therefore inadmissible, because oral evidence must be direct evidence of a witness who saw, heard or perceived the facts and that this witness only testified on the basis of what the team leader Inspector Yusuf Audu narrated to him; learned counsel referred this Court to FRN V USMAN (2012) 49 III NSCQR and OMISORE V THE STATE (2008) 3 NCC page 60.
It is also submitted for the appellant that the trial Court not being an expert, ought not to have given an opinion on whether Exhibits A1 -A10 qualify as firearm in view of Section 68 (1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011; learned counsel referred this court to OMOSHOLA V COP (1977) NSCC page 158 and STATE V OLATUNJI (2003) 14 NWLR part 839 page 138.
That in doing so, the trial Court erred in relying on its own opinion, to hold that Exhibits A1 -A10 do not require the evidence of an expert to qualify as firearm.
Learned counsel further submitted that the confessional statement on which the appellant was convicted was not shown to have been voluntarily made during the trial; he referred this Court to ADEKANBI V A.G. WESTERN MG. (1966) 1 SCNLR page 75.
That the trial Court ought to have gone beyond the evidence of the witness who allegedly obtained the statement voluntarily or the witness who allegedly made the statement, to the evidence of other witnesses, in order to know the one who is telling the truth; learned counsel referred this Court to OGUDO V STATE (2011) 48 NSCQR page 377; contending that the statement made by the appellant to two police women was also not tendered because it is not favourable to the police.
That also in spite of the evidence of DWS 1 and 2 showing the statement of the appellant was obtained under duress the trial Court disbelieved them and believed the uncorroborated testimony of PW1.
Learned counsel further submitted that the trial Court disbelieved the testimony of DW2 mainly because the witness is the appellant’s sister, and that the mere fact that a witness has a relationship with a victim or the accused does not affect the probative value of that witness’ testimony; learned counsel referred to the Court to YAHAYA V STATE (2005) 1 NCC 120 and AIGUOREGHIAN V STATE (2005) 1 NCC page 458.
That also the prosecution failed to controvert the five issues raised by the accused/appellant, as such the issues are deemed admitted; learned counsel referred this Court to NWANKWO V YAR’ADUA (2010) 43 NSCQR page 25.
It is submitted for the respondent in response that the sole evidence of the PW1 was enough to convict because it was direct, especially as he was on duty when the arrest was made; learned counsel referred this Court to ALONGE V POLICE (1959) 5 CNLR 516 and EKPENYONG V STATE (1991) 6 NWLR part 200 page 700.
That also the evidence of the informant would not have added anything other than corroborate the evidence of PW1 and that the appellant only denied ownership of the bags in Court and so there was no need for fingerprint proof of her ownership of the bags, as possession was not in dispute; learned counsel referred this Court to OGOALA V STATE (1991) 2 NWLR part 175 and OLADELE V STATE (1991) 1 NWLR part 170.
That the service of proof of evidence was not an issue as contended for the appellant, as the appellant had sufficient information of the nature of the offense contained in the charge, and was given a fair hearing in accordance with Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution, as amended; learned counsel referred this Court to OKENE V ORIANWO (1998) 9 NWLR part 566 and ODOFIN V AYOOLA (1984) 11 SC 72.
Learned counsel submitted that the findings of the trial Court were premised on cogent evidence adduced at trial from what it saw and heard from witnesses, and that cannot be substituted with the findings of this Court, even if it comes to a different conclusion; he referred this Court to FRANK EBBA V CHIEF OGODO (1984) 4 SC 84.
That the provisions of Section 33 (2) of the Federal High Court Act clearly states that criminal trials in the Court shall be summary, contrary to the elaborate procedures of the State High Courts, and that this is in compliance and tandem with Section 78 (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, which also subscribes a simple procedure of proffering a charge on an accused with such information or notice made in compliance with Section 36(6) of the Constitution.
Learned counsel submitted that the evidence of PW2 is not hear say evidence as it did not attempt to reconstruct what transpired at the locus criminis; learned counsel referred this Court to UGWUMBA V THE STATE (1993) 5 NWLR part 296 page 660.
That Exhibits A1 -A10 do not need an expert or ballistician to declare them firearms, by reason of being rifles, learned counsel referred this Court to STATE V OLATUNJI supra and part 1 of the Firearms Act as well as EKPENYONG V STATE supra; and further submitted that the trial within trial had established the voluntariness of the confession relied upon by the trial Court.
RESOLUTION:
The law does not prescribe any number of witnesses a party should call before he gets judgment in his favour. The Evidence Act does not require any particular number of witnesses for proof of any fact. It is the quality of evidence adduced that matters and not the number of witnesses called; see AKPAN V. STATE (1991) 3 NWLR (PT. 182) P. 664 and EGBERETAMU V. STATE (2014) 22 WRN PAGE 166
Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the evidence of PW1 is not enough to establish that the accused actually owned or possessed the jute bags containing Exhibits A1 -A10, and that the evidence of the informant, Saidu Bulama, along with fingerprint evidence is needed for proper identification of the bags as belonging to the appellant.
First the circumstances of this particular case are such that no fingerprint is needed to establish who amongst the ten passengers in the vehicle owned the four jute bags. Evidence was led to establish that there were ten passengers and every passenger easily identified his bag and disembarked along with it, leaving the appellant with the bags containing the exhibits; and it was needless for the appellant to offload her bags herself before they can be identified as her own, after all, the evidence was that the informant was alarmed by the weight of the bags leading him to report their unusual weight to PW1, and if that is so, it is not unusual for the driver or anyone else to help offload the said bags for the appellant, who on her own could not have carried the bags, because of their weight.
Contrary to the contention of learned counsel to the appellant on sufficiency of evidence, the credibility of evidence does not ordinarily depend on the number of witnesses that testify on a particular point. The question is whether the evidence of one credible witness, on a particular point, is believed and accepted, as it is the case with PW1 in this case. If the answer is in the affirmative, then the evidence of such a witness is sufficient to support a conviction; see ALI V. THE STATE (1988) 1 NWLR (PT. 68) 1.
Granted the evidence of the informant could have been useful to the prosecution, but he is clearly not a vital witness, because his evidence is not such as may determine the case one way or the other, and failure to call him is not fatal to the prosecution’s case; see – OCHIBA V. STATE (2011) 17 NWLR (PT. 1277) P. 663 AT 696.
The PW1 is the vital witness in this case, because he was not only on duty, but the leader of the team when the appellant was arrested, and even the informant gave the information direct to him.
The fact that the appellant was the last person to disembark, put paid to the contention that there was doubt as to whether the appellant was in possession of the bags when she was arrested; see page 105-106 of the record of appeal.
The law is quite settled that one solitary witness is enough, if his or her evidence proves the essential issue in dispute, and, if he or she is believed; ADELUMOLA V. STATE (1988) 1 NSCC 165; AFOLALU V. STATE (2010) 6-7 MJSC 187 and IDIOK V. STATE (2008) 6 MJSC 36.
The evidence of PW1 who received the information leading to the arrest, participated in the arrest, led the arresting team, saw the exhibits is enough and sufficient to discharge the onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt in the circumstances of this case.
In a criminal trial such as this, there is no need for a host of witnesses by the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. A single witness, as the PW1 in this case who gives cogent eye witness account on a vital point will suffice; see OGEDENGBE V. STATE (2014) LPELR-23065 (SC).
In its ruling at pages 189 to 198 the trial Court meticulously took pains to analyse the laws regulating the procedure for conducting criminal proceedings in the Federal High Court. Learned counsel for the appellant admitted that proof of evidence was served on the appellant on the 10th June, 2011, even though without the name of the 3rd accused.
The issues are clear as elaborated by the trial Court, because by the combined effect of Sections 77, 78 and 277 of the Criminal Procedure Act, trial by information is excluded from the Federal High Court summary trial proceedings, especially when those sections are read in conjunction with Section 33 (2) of the Federal High Court Act; the effect of which is that the manner of initiating criminal proceedings is the same as in magistrates’ Courts, under the summary trial proceedings; and the of authority of ALAMIEYESEIGHA V FRN (2006) 16 NWLR part 1004 settles this issue sufficiently.
Whether the proof of evidence served is ‘jara’ or not counts for very little, the point is made that the evidence of PW3 was properly admitted, along with the confessional statement. The trial Court cannot be faulted in the circumstances.
Section 33 of the Federal High Court Act, provides to the effect that criminal proceedings before the Federal High Court shall be conducted substantially in accordance with the provisions of the CPA; Section 33 (2) on the other hand provides that notwithstanding the generality of Subsection (1), all criminal causes or matters before the Court shall be tried summarily. It is very important to appreciate the fact that the objective here is to make criminal proceedings before the Federal High Court less formal, than those in the State High Courts; the right to fair hearing of the appellant was clearly not infringed by the trial Court in the circumstances of this case.
Contrary to the submissions of learned counsel to the appellant, the testimony of P2 is direct evidence of what he saw and did as a police officer in the discharge of his duties, see pages 110 to 123 of the record of appeal; the evidence of PW2 clearly satisfies the conditions laid down in Sections 77 and 155 of the Evidence Act; See the case of LASUN V AWOYEMI (2009) 16 N.W.L.R Part 1168 page 513 at 554. The testimony of the witness is direct and therefore clearly admissible; See the case of OMORINBOLA II V MILITARY GOV. OF ONDO STATE (1995) 9 N.W.L.R Part 418 page 201 at 221.
Evidence is said to be hearsay, only when it “…does not derive its value from the credit given to the witness himself, but which rests in part on the veracity or competence of some other person. It is the evidence of a witness who is not giving evidence of what he knew or did personally but of what he was told by another person. Such evidence would be rejected as hearsay.” Per Kekere-Ekun (JCA, then) in MKPEDEM & ORS V UBA PLC & ANOR. (2016) LPELR-42039-CA; See also UKPO VS IMOKE (2010) 6 EPR 851 at 907.
The evidence of PW 2 does not by any stretch of imagination qualify as hearsay; it is the direct evidence of a witness who gave account of what role he played in the lead up to the prosecution and subsequent conviction of the appellant, the witness does not have to be at the point of arrest, because the investigation does not begin and end at the point of arrest. The evidence of PW2 is admissible evidence properly admitted.
Learned counsel to the appellant submits that the trial Court was wrong to hold that the AK 47 rifles i.e. Exhibits A1 to A10 qualified as firearms; this argument lost sight of this court’s finding in MOHAMMED & ORS V STATE (2013) LPELR-22352-CA per Abiru JCA that: “In KAYODE VS STATE (2012) 11 NWLR (PT. 1312) 523, the Court of Appeal defined firearm to include any cannon, gun, rifle, carbine, machine gun, cap-gun, flint lock gun, revolver, pistol, explosive, or ammunition or other firearm, whether whole or in detached pieces.”
It is clear that an AK47 rifle qualifies as a firearm by any stretch of imagination; this Court further clarified this in MOMODU V STATE (2007) LPELR-8380-CA in the following words: “Firearm” means any lethal barreled weapon of any description from which any shot, bullet or other missile can be discharged, and includes a prohibited firearm, a personal firearm and a muzzle loading firearm of any of the categories referred to in Parts I, II and III respectively of the schedule hereto, and any component part of any such firearms.”
By this definition any `lethal’ barreled weapon of any description from which any shot, bullet can be fired is a `firearm’; and that being so, it is absurd to suggest that an AK47 riffle does not qualify as a ‘firearm’, by any description.
Once the voluntariness of a confession is challenged by an accused person, the prosecution bears the burden of proving that it was voluntarily made before it can be admitted in evidence; see NWANGBOMU V. THE STATE (1994) 2 SCNJ 107.
This principle of law is based on Section 28 of the Evidence Act which provides:
28. “A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal Proceeding, if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage of avoid any evil of a temporal nature.”
A confession becomes irrelevant if it appears to the Court that in making it the accused person was induced, threatened or promised any advantage or evidence of any evil in relation to the charge against him by a person in authority over the case. Having said that it is very important to appreciate that once the Court is satisfied that the confession is voluntary and free, that settles the matter to all intents and purposes, and it is for this reason that a trial within trial is conducted just as was done in this case, leading the trial Court to arrive at the conclusion that the confession was admissible.
The suggestion that the confession was not voluntary simply because the accused was handcuffed is stretching common sense and logic too far. It should be expected that once a suspect is arrested, if the police is of the view that he or she is either dangerous or likely to flee, if given the chance, the police has every reason to handcuff such suspect to secure him; and the decision whether to handcuff or not is entirely that of the officer in custody of the suspect, because he alone can tell from the behaviour of the suspect whether it is safe or not to handcuff him.
The trial Court did not, contrary to the contention of learned counsel to the appellant, disbelieve the DW2, solely because she was the appellant’s sister. Granted, a Court is expected to ignore inconsistent statement earlier made to the police; but that does not detract from the Court’s prerogative to believe or disbelieve a witness.
It is the prerogative of the trial Court to believe or disbelieve a witness and evidence; “…and for evidence to be worthy of credit, it must not only proceed from a credible source but must be credible in itself, in the sense of being so natural, reasonable and probable in view of the transaction which it describes or to which it relates as to make it easy to believe it, see AGBI V. OGBEH (supra). In this case, the learned trial Judge was right, in my view, not to believe the appellant.” Per Augie (JCA, then).
Where an issue is raised by either of the parties, whether addressed by one of them in response or not, the Court is bound to resolve same. It is settled law, that all issues raised by the parties should be resolved one way or the other, and the resolution of such issues includes appraisal and findings on each of the issues; see OGUNYADE V. OSHUNKEYE (2007) NWLR (Pt. 1057) and OJOGBUE V. NNUBIA, (1972) 1 ALL NWLR.
Having said that it should be borne in mind also that submissions of counsel, no matter how brilliant cannot take the place of evidence in Court, as such where evidence is led in Court in proof of a fact, and counsel through inadvertence fails to respond to issues raised in address by the opposing counsel; the Court cannot ignore the evidence led, on account of failure of counsel to respond to issues raised.
Address of counsel is by no means evidence on its own, it can only assist the Court in narrowing down issues in contention. Without evidence, address of counsel counts for little or next to nothing; as such the trial Court is perfectly right to have evaluated the totality of the evidence before it to arrive at the conclusion it did, regardless of the fact that one of the counsel failed to respond to those issues; see OKWEJIMINOR V GBAKEJI (2008) 5 NWLR PART 1079 PAGE 172, MICHIKA L.G. V. NATIONAL POPULATION COMMISSION (1998) 11 NWLR (PT. 573) 201 and TAPSHANG V. LEKRET (2000) 13 NWLR (PT. 684) 381.
The failure of a respondent to reply to issues could very well be immaterial to the final outcome of the case, because, an appellant succeeds on the strength of his case, even though a respondent will be deemed to have admitted the truth of everything stated in the appellant’s Brief in so far as such is borne out by the Records.
In other words, the success or failure of the appellant is not automatic on account of failure by the respondent to respond to certain issues; see the cases of JOHN HOLT VENTURE LTD. V. OPUTA (1996) 9 NWLR (PT. 470) 101 C.A; ONYEJEKWE V. THE NIGERIA POLICE COUNCIL (1996) 7 NWLR (PT. 463) 704 C.A.; WAZIRI V. WAZIRI (1998) NWLR (PT. 533) 322 C.A. and UBA PLC. V. AJILEYE (1999) 13 NWLR (PT. 633) 116 C.A.
It is for these reasons that the sole issue for determination is resolved in favour of the respondent, against the appellant, that being so, the appeal fails for lack of merit, and it is accordingly dismissed.
Judgment of the trial Federal High Court presided by Honourable Justice Gladys Olotu, delivered on the 7th of March, 2013 in FHC/ABJ/CR/48/2011 is hereby affirmed.
TINUADE AKOMOLAFE-WILSON, J.C.A.: I read in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, JCA. I am in agreement with the reasoning and conclusion and orders reached therein.
EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my Learned brother, MUSTAPHA MOHAMMED JCA. I agree with the reasoning, conclusions and orders therein.
Appearances:
J.E. Moses, Esq.For Appellant(s)
Gabriel EVA, Esq.For Respondent(s)
