MRS. GLORIA LEWECHI ONYIRIUKA v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ENUGU STATE
(2018)LCN/11959(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 13th day of July, 2018
CA/E/80/2016
RATIO
JURISDICTION: THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
“The eminent jurist and revered Mohammed Bello, C. J. N. (now of blessed memory) in the judicial words on marble on jurisdiction, in Chief Utuedo Uttih & 6 Ors v. Jacob U. Onoyivwe & 5 Ors (1991) 1 SCNJ 25 at 49, had succinctly stated that: ‘Jurisdiction is the blood that gives life to the survival of an action in a Court of law and without jurisdiction, the action will be like an animal that has been drained of its blood. It will cease to have life and any attempt to resuscitate it without infusing blood into it, would be an abortive exercise.'” PER TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
MRS. GLORIA LEWECHI ONYIRIUKA Appellant(s)
AND
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ENUGU STATE Respondent(s)
TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
The appellant had approached the Federal High Court, holden at Enugu, by way of an originating motion for enforcement of her fundamental human rights. In the application, the appellant prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:
a. A declaration that the purported disengagement of the Applicant by the Enugu State Government on the ground that the Applicant is not from Enugu State is a violation of the Applicant?s right to freedom from discrimination as enshrined in Section 42 of the 1999 Constitution, as amended.
b. A Declaration that the Applicant as a citizen of Nigeria is entitled to work in any part of the country whether public or private establishment and as such treated as a citizen of Nigeria.
c. N20,000,000 (Twenty Million Naira) General Damages against the Respondent as monetary compensation to the Applicant for the violation of her right to freedom from discrimination, agony and loss of income by reason of the purported disengagement.
The grounds upon which the reliefs were sought are that:
(i) The Applicant is a citizen of Nigeria whose rights are stipulated and protected by the 1999 Constitution as amended.
(ii) The Applicant is entitled to the right to freedom from discrimination and to always be treated as a Nigerian irrespective of place of origin, sex, religion or political opinion.
(iii) That the Applicant is entitled to compensation for the breach of her constitutional and fundamental right by the Respondent.
There is an affidavit of 15 paragraphs and seven documentary exhibits annexed thereto, in support of the application. The appellant also filed a written address contemporaneously, in support of the application.
The respondent, in opposing the application, filed a six paragraphed counter-affidavit and also a Notice of Preliminary Objection, against the hearing and determination of the appellant?s application, thus:
NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
TAKE NOTICE that this Honourable Court will be moved on the ……………. day of ……………………… 2013 at 9 O’clock in the forenoon or so soon thereafter as counsel to the Respondent may be heard, praying the Court for:
An Order striking out this application for want of jurisdiction to hear and determine same as presently constituted.
AND TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that the ground for seeking the above relief is that this application as presently constituted is not such as could be heard under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009.
PARTICULARS OF OBJECTION
1. The complaint of the Applicant borders on disengagement from service. An action for disengagement from service cannot be brought under Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009.
2. The Applicant also complains of non payment of her entitlements, to wit: her gratuity and pension. Payment of entitlement cannot be brought under Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009.
3. The main claim of the Applicant is not an issue that borders on violation of her Fundamental Rights.
4. The main claim of the Applicant is within exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court.
The respondent filed a written address in support of his preliminary objection and in her response to the preliminary objection, the appellant filed a written address.
At the hearing of the matter on 6th February, 2014, both learned counsel for the parties adopted their respective written addresses.
The learned trial judge, in his judgment delivered on 5th May, 2014 came to the decision that the appellant’s action ought to have been filed at the National Industrial Court since her claim bordered on labour and employment. Hence, his Lordship declined jurisdiction and consequently, struck out the appellant’s action.
This appeal, anchored on two grounds of appeal, is against the decision of the Court below, rendered on 5th May, 2014.
In order to prosecute the appeal, the appellant’s brief of argument, settled by Ikeazor Akaraiwe, Esq., was dated 3rd March, 2016 and filed on 4th March, 2016. The respondent’s brief of argument, settled by Chief M. E. Eze, ACI Arb, the Hon., Attorney General, Enugu State with B. N. Edeh, Esq., Legal Officer, Ministry of Justice, Enugu State, was dated 19th January, 2017 and filed on 22nd February, 2017. Thereafter, the appellant’s reply brief was filed on 5th May, 2017.
The appellant proposed two issues for the determination of the appeal, namely:
1. Whether the Court below was right when it held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the subject matter borders on labour and employment and cannot be enforced through Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure?
2. Whether a group of reliefs can be claimed for under the Fundamental Human Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules if the Principal Relief is one for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights in Chapter IV of the Constitution?
On his part, the respondent nominated a sole issue for the resolution of the appeal, thus:
Whether or not the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to determine causes and matters relating to loss of employment and income for pension and gratuity from such employment.
Having considered the claim and reliefs prayed for by the appellant, the judgment of the Court below and the grounds of appeal against that judgment, I am satisfied that the two issues identified by the appellant are apt for the resolution of the appeal. I shall take and consider them together.
Appellant’s arguments:
The learned appellant’s counsel submitted that the appellant is a Nigerian and as such entitled to work in any part of the country without discrimination or fear of discrimination. This is in line with the spirit of Section 42 of the 1999 Constitution as amended. It was therefore wrong for the Respondent to have disengaged the Appellant solely on the ground that she is not from Enugu State
Having submitted that the basis of Appellant’s dismissal was discrimination, contrary to the provisions of Section 42 of the Constitution, the appellant, next dealt with the question of whether the Federal High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. He contended that jurisdiction being a threshold issue, the law is settled that jurisdiction is determined by the Plaintiff’s claim. He relied on Tukur v. Govt. Of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (pt. 117) 517 @ 549.
In other words, according to him, it is the claim before the Court that has to be looked at or examined to ascertain whether it comes within the jurisdiction conferred on the Court. He referred to the Appellant’s claim at the Court below as stated at pages 4 to 5 of the record of appeal and paragraph 2.4 of appellant’s brief of argument.
He submitted to the effect that there is no place in the claim of the Appellant at the Court below for a declaration that she was entitled to her pension and terminal benefits. There is also no claim for conversion to retirement. The main claim of the Appellant concerns a declaration that the purported disengagement of the Appellant by the Enugu State Government on the ground that she is not from Enugu State is a violation of the Appellant’s right to freedom from discrimination as enshrined in Section 42 of the 1999 Constitution as amended.
Furthermore, the appellant contended that the principal relief claimed by the appellant at the Court below, was the enforcement of her fundamental rights, hence according to learned appellant’s counsel, the appellant’s action was properly laid at the Court below. He referred to Nwali v. EBISEC & ORS (2015) 2 CAR 481; UNILORIN v. Oluwadare (2006) 27 NSCQR 18. And that where a set of facts discloses multiple causes of action, including an infringement of a fundamental right, the aggrieved party could commence two different actions, by writ of summons and the other by motion under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules. He placed reliance on Sokoto L. G. v. Amale (2001) 8 NWLR (pt. 714) 224 at 241.
Respondents Arguments:
The Hon. Attorney General submitted that the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction to determine matters relating to labour, employment or pecuniary/monetary entitlements arising from employment. Issue of labour, employment or monetary entitlements to an employee fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court, by virtue of Section 12(1)(a) and (d) of the National Industrial Court Act 2011 and Section 254C(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution as amended in 2011. Furthermore, he submitted that Section 254C(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution specifically provides that the National Industrial Court shall have jurisdiction on matters:-
(d) relating to or connected with any dispute over the interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter IV of this Constitution as it relates to any employment, labour, industrial relations, trade unionism, employer’s association or any other matter which the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine.
The principal claim of the Appellant at the Court below according to him, can be deciphered from her Affidavit in support of her Motion on Notice which is contained in pages 6 and 7 that she was wrongfully disengaged from the services of the Enugu State Ministry of Health and as such she was entitled to be paid compensation for loss of her entitlement as a Chief Nursing Officer. (Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the affidavit in support of the application at pages 6 and 7). In her statement pursuant to Order 2 Rule 3 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 she prayed for reliefs a, b and c at page 4 of the record of appeal.
The Learned Attorney General further submitted that appellant claimed that her disengagement as a Chief Nursing Officer from the employment of the Enugu State Ministry of Health constitutes a breach of her Fundamental Right to freedom from discrimination as enshrined in Section 42 of the 1999 Constitution as amended. He however, submitted that the issue of discrimination is ancillary to loss of her employment and income from employment which is in the nature of salaries, allowances, gratuities and pension. These issues according to him, belong exclusively to the jurisdictional domain of the National Industrial Court.
Learned Respondent’s counsel also submitted that the Supreme Court has in litany of cases held that where the main claim in a suit is not the enforcement or securing the enforcement of fundamental rights, the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be properly invoked by initiating a suit by means of a motion on notice, to be decided on affidavit evidence (as it is in the instant case), but by means of Writ of Summons, to be decided on the parties’ pleadings. He placed reliance on Tukur v. Government of Taraba State (1997) 6 NWLR (pt. 510) 549 at 576; Borno Radio Television Corporation v. Basil Egbuonu (1991) 2 NWLR (pt. 171) 81 at 90; WAEC v. Adeyanju (2008) 4 SC 27 at 51.
Learned Respondent’s counsel, furthermore insisted that going by the provision of Section 254C(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, the Court below being a Federal High Court, no longer has jurisdiction to entertain matters relating to or connected with any labour, employment, disengagement from services, employee matters and matters incidental or connected thereto, as the said jurisdiction has been donated to the National Industrial Court. According to the Learned Attorney General, having regards to the instant case, the main claim of the Applicant (now appellant) revolves on her disengagement from service and non payment of her gratuity and pension which is her entitlement are so inextricably bound to be affected by the provision of Section 254C(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. The Court below being a Federal High Court and having been divested of the jurisdiction over the main claim cannot embark on entertaining the subsidiary claim which is the fundamental right of the Applicant of freedom from discrimination. Even if this action is cognizable in the Federal High Court (which is denied), he submitted that the procedure for initiating the action should have been by a writ of summons.
Resolution:
Jurisdiction is the authority that a Court has in order to decide any matter laid before it or even take cognisance of a matter presented before it in a formal way for its decision on such matters. Therefore, where a Court lacks the jurisdiction to try any matter presented before it, such a decision amounts to nothing as it will be tantamount to an exercise in futility. To underscore the criticality and quintessence of jurisdiction to adjudication, the Supreme Court in a plethora of decided authorities, one of which is Hon. Ehioze Egharevba v. Hon. Crosby Osadulor Eribo & Ors (2010) 9 NWLR (pt. 1199) 411; (2010) LPELR 9716 (SC); (2010) 3 SCNJ 9 pt. 11) 441 at 453 – 454, re-echoed the law succinctly, per Adekeye, JSC that:
”Jurisdiction is a term of comprehensive import embracing every kind of judicial action.
It is the power of a Court to decide a matter in controversy and presupposes the existence of a duly constituted Court, with control over the subject matter and the parties. Jurisdiction also defines the power of the Court to inquire into facts, apply the law, make decisions and declare judgment. It is the legal right by which judges exercise their authority. Jurisdiction is equally to Court, what a door is to a house. That is why the question of a Court’s jurisdiction is called a threshold issue, because it is at the threshold of the temple of justice. Jurisdiction is a radical and fundamental question of competence, for if the Court has no jurisdiction to hear the case, the proceedings are and remains a nullity however well- conducted and brilliantly decided they might have been. A defect in competence is not intrinsic but rather extrinsic to adjudication. Oloba v. Akereja (1988) 3 NWLR (pt. 84) pg. 508; Oloriode v. Oyebi (1984) 1 SCNLR pg. 390; Ezomo v. Oyakhire (1985) 1 NWLR (pt. 2) pg. 105; Petrojessica Enterprises Ltd v. Leventis Technical Co. Ltd (1992) 2 SCNLR pg. 341; Barclays Bank v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1976) 6 SC pg. 175; African Newspapers of Nigeria v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (1985) 2 NWLR pt. 6 pg. 137; Adeleke v. OSHA (2006) 16 NWLR pt. 1006 pg. 608; Attorney General Anambra State v. A – G Federation (1993) 6 NWLR pt. 302 pg. 692; Saleh v. Monguno (2003) 1 NWLR pt. 801 pg. 221.
The issue of jurisdiction being fundamental can be raised and challenged at any stage of the proceedings in the lower Court, in the Court of Appeal or even for the first time in the Supreme Court. The issue of jurisdiction being so pivotal can be raised suo motu by the Court so long as the parties are accorded the opportunity to react to the issue.”
The eminent jurist and revered Mohammed Bello, C. J. N. (now of blessed memory) in the judicial words on marble on jurisdiction, in Chief Utuedo Uttih & 6 Ors v. Jacob U. Onoyivwe & 5 Ors (1991) 1 SCNJ 25 at 49, had succinctly stated that:
”Jurisdiction is the blood that gives life to the survival of an action in a Court of law and without jurisdiction, the action will be like an animal that has been drained of its blood. It will cease to have life and any attempt to resuscitate it without infusing blood into it, would be an abortive exercise.”
The reason for this analogy is not farfetched. It is because the life of the flesh is in the blood. In other words, jurisdiction is the life in the action, placed before the Court, for adjudication.
The law is trite and very well settled to the effect that in determining the question of jurisdiction of a Court to entertain and determine an action before it, it is the reliefs in the plaintiff’s claim, that is examined. Merill v. Worldgate (2012) 3 SCNJ (pt. II) 639 at 662; UBA Plc v. BTL Industries Ltd (2006) 19 NWLR (pt. 1013) 61 at 103; Nika v. Lavina (2008) 7 SCNJ 72 at 85; Tukur v. Govt. Of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (pt. 117) 517 at 671; Adeyemi v. Opeyori (1976) 1 NMLR 149.
I have perused the reliefs sought for by the appellant, set out earlier in this judgment. It is clear to me that the crux and crucible of the appellant’s claim is anchored on Section 42(1) & (2) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended, aimed at the protection of her fundamental rights, from discrimination on the ground of her place of birth or ethnicity. To my mind, that is the real meat and main claim of the appellant. None of the reliefs pertained to a claim for her salaries, pension and gratuity.
I am unable to see anywhere in the reliefs and the grounds upon which the reliefs are predicated, where the appellant mentioned the question of a claim for her salaries, pension and gratuity. The only remote mention of a monetary claim is relief C and ground (iii) which are to the effect that because of the alleged unconstitutional disengagement from the services of Enugu State Government, by the latter, she needed to be compensated, for the breach of her fundamental right, of freedom from discrimination.
From the reliefs claimed by the appellant and the facts deposed to in the affidavit in support of the application, I am of the considered and firm opinion that the appellant’s main claim is the alleged breach of her fundamental and constitutional right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of her place of birth and ethnicity.
The learned trial judge in his judgment at pages 66 – 68 of the record of appeal found, thus:
Having looked at the reliefs sought by the applicant, it is not in doubt that her complaint borders on disengagement from service, and non payment of her entitlements, i.e her gratuity and pension. These reliefs are definitely not enforceable under fundamental human rights rules. The main claim of the applicant obviously is not an issue that borders on violation of her fundamental human rights. In my opinion, the reliefs sought by the applicants all border on labour, employment or trade dispute matters. That jurisdiction no longer resides with the Federal High Court.
It has been held by the superior Courts of record that where the main or principal claim in a suit is not the enforcement or securing enforcement of fundamental right, the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be properly exercised as it will be incompetent. See the case of; Tukur v. Government of Taraba State (1997) 6 NWLR (pt. 510) 549 at 574 paragraph B – C, H575 paragraph A. See also B. R. T. C. v. Egbuonu (1991) 2 NWLR (pt. 171) 81.
It was further held in Tukur v. Government of Taraba state (supra) that where incidental or ancillary claims of a party are so inextricably tied to or bound up with the main claims before the Court in the suit, a Court of law cannot adjudicate over them where it has no jurisdiction to entertain the main claims if such incidental or ancillary claims cannot be determined without a determination at the same time of the given claims or where the determination of such incidental or ancillary claims must involve a consideration or determination of the main claims.
In this present application the main claim of the applicant which borders on her disengagement from service and non payment of gratuity and pension which is her entitlement are so inextricably bound up with the applicants subsidiary or incidental claim that this Court having found it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the principal claims cannot embark on trying the subsidiary claim which is enforcement of fundamental human rights of the applicant.
As I mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment jurisdiction to handle labour, employment or trade dispute matters no longer resides with the Federal High Court.
By the provision of Section 254C(1) (a) of the 3rd Alteration Acts 2010 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the jurisdiction relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from work place, the conditions of service including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee matters and matters incidental thereto or connected there with now resides with the National Industrial Court.
I am afraid and with due respect to his Lordship, his findings are clearly not borne out of the reliefs sought for the appellant. Those findings are perverse.
The appellant’s claim is squarely and fittingly anchored on Section 42(1) & (2) and Section 46(1) & (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended.
They each provide thus:-
42(1) A citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, ethnic group, place of origin, sex, religion or political opinion shall not, by reason only that he is such a person
(a) be subjected either expressly by, or in the practical application of, any law in force in Nigeria or any executive or administrative action or the government, to disabilities or restrictions to which citizens of Nigeria of other communities, ethnic groups, places of origin, sex, religions or political opinions are not made subject; or
(b) be accorded either expressly by, or in the practical application of, any law in force in Nigeria or any such executive or administrative action, any privilege or advantage that is not accorded to citizens of Nigeria of other communities, ethnic groups, places of origin, sex, religions or political opinions.
(2) No citizen of Nigeria shall be subjected to any disability or deprivation merely by reason of the circumstances of his birth.
46(1) Any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this Chapter has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High Court in that State for redress.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made to it in pursuance of the provisions of this section and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement within that State of any right to which the person who makes the application may be entitled under this Chapter.
Unarguably, by virtue of Section 46(1) & (2) of the Constitution reproduced above, a High Court such as the Court below, albeit a Federal High Court, has an original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made to it pursuant to the provisions of Section 42(1) & (2) of the same Constitution, premised on Chapter IV thereof, that an applicant’s fundamental right has been or is being or likely to be contravened by any person. Olutola v. University of Ilorin (2004) 18 NWLR (pt. 905) 416; Jack v. University of Agriculture, Makurdi (2004) 5 NWLR (pt. 865) 208; The Nigerian Navy v. Garrick (2006) 4 NWLR (pt. 969); Zakari v. Inspector General of Police (2000) 8 NWLR (pt. 670) 666. The important thing to be considered by the Court is that the applicant’s claim to enforce his fundamental rights under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 must be founded on the constitutionally guaranteed rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended.
In other words, where the main claim of an applicant is anchored on a breach or threatened breach of his fundamental right, the High Court has the jurisdiction to entertain and determine the application. Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Abacha (2007) LPELR 8177 (CA); Surveyor General of Cross River State v. Jonathan (2014) LPELR 23380 (CA).
However, the converse is that where an alleged breach of a fundamental right is an ancillary or incidental claim and not a main claim, the jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be activated in considering such an application. Tukur v. Govt. of Gongola State (supra); Dongtoe v. Civil Service Commission, Plateau State (2001) 9 NWLR (pt. 717) 132 at 152; Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Ifegwu(2003) 15 NWLR (pt. 842) 113 at 132 – 135; University of Ilorin v. Oluwadare (2006) 14 NWLR (pt. 1000) 751.
In the instant case, I have found that the main claim of the appellant at the Court below was for the enforcement of her fundamental right against discrimination on account of her ethnicity, place of birth. Therefore, the Court below possesses the jurisdiction to entertain and determine her application.
Before I draw the curtain on this appeal, I feel impelled to re-echo the quintessence of fundamental rights as I had cause to say in H. R. H. Eze Sir J. E. Ukaobasi v. Berthram Ezimora & 8 Ors. (2016) LPELR 40174 (CA) to the effect that : ”The entrenchment of fundamental rights and the mode of enforcing its breach in the Nigerian Constitutions over the years, undoubtedly underscores its importance and the need to zealously protect the sanctity of human life. Therefore, the Courts do not usually shirk their responsibility in ensuring that the human rights of the individual is not compromised and on no account should such rights be swept under the carpet or taken away by any person or government under any guise. The apex Court in Ransome-Kuti & Ors. v. Attor. Gen. Federation & Ors (1985) LPELR 2940 (SC) at 33 – 34, per his Lordship, Eso, JSC in defining fundamental rights succinctly stated thus:
”What is the nature of a fundamental right? It is a right which stands above the ordinary laws of the land and which in fact is antecedent to political society itself. It is a primary condition to a civilized society existence and what has been done by our Constitution, since independence, starting with the Independence Constitution, that is, the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council 1960 up to the present Constitution, that is, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 (the latter does not in fact apply to this case: it is the 1963 Constitution that applies) is to have these rights enshrined in the Constitution so that the rights could be ‘immutable’ to the extent of the ‘non-immutability’ of the Constitution itself. It is not in all countries that the Fundamental Rights guaranteed to the citizen are written into the Constitution. For instance, in England, where there is no written constitution, it stands to reason that a written code of fundamental rights could not be expected. But notwithstanding, there are fundamental rights. The guarantee against inhuman treatment, as specified in Section 19 of the 1963 Constitution, would, for instance, appear to be the same as some of the fundamental rights guaranteed in England, contained in the Magna Carter 1215 Articles 19 and 40 which provide .. no freeman may be taken or imprisoned, or disused of his freehold or liabilities in free customs or be outlawed or exiled or in any way molested nor judged or condemned except by lawful judgment in accordance with the law of the land ….”
Furthermore, in BLACK?S LAW DICTIONARY, 8th Edition at 697, the phrase Fundamental right is defined as:
”1. A right derived from natural or fundamental law.
2. Constitutional law. A significant component of liberty, encroachments of which are rigorously tested by Courts to ascertain the soundness of purported governmental justifications.”
And fundamental law is defined at same page 697 of Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition to mean:
”The organic law that establishes the governing principles of a nation or state, esp., Constitutional law – Also termed Organic law; ground – law.”
In sum, I resolve the two issues in this appeal against the respondent and in favour of the appellant. The appeal therefore succeeds.
The judgment of D. V. Agishi, J., in re – Suit No. FHC/EN/M/100/2013 delivered on 5th May, 2014 is hereby set aside.
The suit is remitted to the Chief Judge of the Federal High Court and to be re-assigned to another Judge of that Court at its Enugu Division for hearing and determination, on the merits.
N100,000 costs awarded to the appellant against the respondent.
IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE, J.C.A.:I have had a preview of the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, JCA. All the pertinent issues to the instant Appeal matter have been exhaustively and meticulously dealt with and duly resolved in the said lead judgment. Indeed, I have nothing to add thereto. Thus, I agree with the reasoning and conclusion of my learned brother, YAKUBU, JCA. I also adopt them as mine. I abide by the consequential orders made therein, inclusive of the one made with regard to costs.
RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU, J.C.A.: I had read in draft, the lead judgment just delivered by my brother TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, JCA.
I agree with his reasoning and conclusion. I also set aside the judgment of D. V. Agichi J. in Suit No. FHC/EN/M/100/2013 delivered on the 5th of May 2014.
I remit the suit to the Chief Judge of the Federal High Court, to re-assign to another Judge of that Court, for hearing and determination.
I abide by the consequential order made as to costs.
Appearances:
I. A. Akaraiwe, Esq. with him, Dr. J. C. Duru & Miss S. M. K. AkaraiweFor Appellant(s)
Chief M. E. Eze (Attorney General, Enugu State) with him, B. N. Edeh,Esq. (Snr. Legal Officer) and V. C. Ogbodo, Esq. (Snr. Legal Officer, Ministry of Justice, Enugu State)For Respondent(s)
