MRS. CLARA OLUJOBADE & ANOR v. HIGH CHIEF JIDE OLALUSI & ORS
(2011)LCN/4947(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 1st day of December, 2011
CA/B/82/2008
RATIO
NATIVE LAND TENANCY: WHETHER STATUTES OF LIMITATION ARE APPLICABLE TO LAND TENURES UNDER NATIVE LAW AND CUSTOM
It is true that the law seems settled, that statutes of limitation are inapplicable to land tenures under native law and custom. This principle of law is a principle of long standing – a very old and acceptable principle. See AGBOOLA V. ABIMBOLA (supra) at 266 – 267 were COKER, AG. CJN (as he then was) stated thus: ”Be that as it may, the Registrar held in this case that the English statutes of Limitations 1833 and 1934 applied so as to bar the interest of the Oloto Chieftaincy family in the land. The reason he gave for this was that as far back as the year 1913 Kanyinde, an Egba refugee had assumed a form of possession over the land which was obviously adverse to that of the Oloto’s. With respect, this is not a correct exposition of the legal situation. Assuming and this fact was not proved and was in fact later jettisoned that Kanyinde was an Egba refugee at the time that he purported to sell the land, he had no more than an interest under native law and custom. We do not consider that any authorities are now needed to show the inapplicability of Statutes of Limitations to such tenures. It is therefore not possible to support the use made herein by the Registrar of Titles of the Statutes of Limitations 1833 and 1834. PER MOORE A.A. ADUMEIN, J.C.A
TENURE: MEANING OF THE WORD ”TENURE” IN RELATION TO PROPERTY
The word ”tenure” in relation to property, means ”the rights of a tenant to hold property, or the holding of property as a tenant” – ENCARTA WORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, page 1925. In legal parlance, the word ”tenure” means ”A right, term, or mode of holding lands or tenements in subordination to a superior” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, EIGHTH EDITION, page 1509. PER MOORE A.A. ADUMEIN, J.C.A
CAUSE OF ACTION: MEANING OF THE PHRASE “CAUSE OF ACTION”
The phrase “cause of action” has no precise definition but it has been held to mean a factual situation that gives a right to judicial relief or remedy EGBE V. ADEFARASIN (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.47) 1. PER MOORE A.A. ADUMEIN, J.C.A
EVIDENCE OF UNPLEADED FACT: EFFECT OF EVIDENCE OF FACTS NOT PLEADED
I wish to state immediately that I agree with Mr. Omotosho that evidence of facts not pleaded goes to no issue. PER MOORE A.A. ADUMEIN, J.C.A
FRESH ISSUE: WHETHER ISSUES NOT RAISED OR CANVASSED IN THE LOWER COURT CAN ONLY BE RAISED WITH THE LEAVE OF THE COURT
I also agree that an issue not raised or canvassed in the lower court can only be raised on appeal with the leave of court. PER MOORE A.A. ADUMEIN, J.C.A
INSTRUMENT: DEFINITION OF ”INSTRUMENT” UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE LAND INSTRUMENTS REGISTRATION LAND, CAP. 54, LAWS OF ONDO STATE, 1978
An ”instrument” under section 2 of the Land Instruments Registration Land, Cap. 54, Laws of Ondo State, 1978 is defined to mean: ”a document affecting land in the State whereby one party (hereinafter called the grantor) confers, transfers, limits, charges or extinguishes in favour of another party (hereinafter called the grantee) any right or title to or interest in land in the State………….” By a literal interpretation of section 2 of the said Land Instruments Law, exhibit E2, reproduced above, although inelegantly drafted, seems to confer or transfer title to land to the appellants’ father Mr. Jimoh Aderomilehin Mechanic and may qualify as an ”instrument” under the said Law, if not properly scrutinized. PER MOORE A.A. ADUMEIN, J.C.A
ADMISSIBLITY OF RECEIPT: WHETHER A LAND PURCHASE RECEIPT CAN BE PLEADED AND TENDERED IN EVIDENCE TO PROVE EQUITABLE INTEREST IN THE LAND AND OR AS A RECEIPT OF PAYMENT OF THE PURCHASE PRICE
It is clear from the appellants’ pleading and evidence that exhibit E1 (exhibit E2) was pleaded and tendered in evidence as a receipt of payment of the purchase price and not as an instrument of title to the land. The learned trial judge erred, therefore, when his lordship held at page 61 of the record of appeal as follows: ”I hold that Exhibit E1 was not registered in accordance with the relevant law it is rendered inadmissible and it is hereby expunged.” Having regard to the facts of this case exhibit E1 (exhibit E2) is admissible, assuming that it is even a registrable instrument under the Land Instruments Registration Law of Ondo State, to prove the appellants’ equitable interest in the land and or payment of the purchase money by the appellants’ father to the said Olatunbosun Ojo. See the cases of BUCKNOR-MACLEAN V. INLAKS (1980) 1 – 11 S.C.1; ONI V. ARIMOKO (1973) 3 S.C. 163; OKOYE V. DUMEZ NIGERIA LIMITED (1985) 6 Sc 3 at 12 and AWOAGBO V. EZE (1995) 1 SCNJ 157 Under the circumstances of this case, Exhibit E1 and its English translation (exhibit E2) were admissible and they were wrongly expunged by the trial court. PER MOORE A.A. ADUMEIN, J.C.A
JUSTICES
KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
CHINWE EUGENIA IYIZOBA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MOORE A.A. ADUMEIN Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. MRS. CLARA OLUJOBADE
2. MRS. MOJISOLA ADESINA
(For themselves and family of Late Mr. Jimoh Mechanic) Appellant(s)
AND
1. HIGH CHIEF JIDE OLALUSI
2. CHIEF FRANCIS ALABI
3. MR. OLASEINDE ALABI
(For and on behalf of Atanlae Family) Respondent(s)
MOORE A.A. ADUMEIN, J.C.A (Delivering the Leading Judgment): In Suit No. AK/157/2004 filed on the 2nd day of July, 2004 in the High Court of Ondo State, Akure Division, the respondents who were the plaintiffs sought in their statement of claim of 28 paragraphs the following relief against the appellants, who were the defendants:
“1. A DECLARATION that the Plaintiffs are the persons entitled to the grant of the Statutory Right of Occupancy over all that vast parcel of measuring 99.514 hectares and known as Atanlae Family land lying, situate and being at Igbojaro, Off Ilesa Road Akure and as further confirmed by the judgment of this Honorable Court in suit No. AK6/89 delivered on 15/2/96.
2. A DECLARATION that the false claim of ownership and purported exercise of rights of possession by the Defendants over a part of all that vast parcel of land known as Atanlae family land, lying, situate and being at Igbojaro Off Ilesa Road Akure, constitute acts of trespass and invasion of the proprietary rights of the Plaintiffs on the said parcel of land.
3. One Million Naira (N1, 000, 000, 00k) damages for trespass.
4. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the defendants either by themselves, or by their agents, servants, assigns, privies or successors-in-title or by any other person(s) claiming through them from further trespassing on any part of that parcel of land measuring 99.514 Hectares or any part thereof known as Atanlae family land which is lying, situate and being at Igbojaro off Ilesa Road Akure.”
The appellants filed a statement of defence of 24 paragraphs wherein they denied the respondents’ claim. The respondents filed a reply to the statement of defence. The statement of claim, the statement of defence and the reply to the statement of defence span pages 4-16 of the record of appeal.
The case proceeded to trial. The respondents called three witnesses – PW1, PW2 and PW3 while the appellants called only one witness – DW1.
The evidence of all these witnesses covers pages 26 – 38 of the record of appeal. At the close of evidence, the parties through their learned counsel addressed the lower court. The address of the appellants’ learned counsel is from pages 39 – 42, while the address of the learned counsel for the respondents is from pages 46 – 50 of the record of appeal. The appellants’ reply on points of law is at page 50 of the record. In a reserved judgment delivered by the lower court on the 12th day of November, 2007 judgment was entered in favour of the respondents. The judgment of Osoba, J the learned trial Judge is at pages 51-62 of the record of appeal. The appellants were not satisfied with the whole judgment of the lower court and they filed a notice of appeal containing 5 (five) grounds. The grounds of appeal, shorn of their particulars, are hereby reproduced:
1. The learned trial judge erred in law when she failed to consider the fact and hold that the plaintiffs’ claim is statute barred having regard to the time when the causes of action arose.
2. The learned trial judge erred in law when she held that Exhibit E1 which is the purchase receipt of the land in dispute in 1957 is a registrable instrument and not being registered, is inadmissible in evidence, null and void and does not confer the title of the land in dispute on the Defendants’ father.
3. The learned trial judge misdirected herself and thereby came to a wrong conclusion when she held that:
”I have no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW1 and PW3, I therefore believe them contrary to the evidence of history of the land in dispute given in evidence by DW1 which is mere hearsay evidence and which cannot be admitted in evidence”.
4. The learned trial judge erred in law when she held as follows:
”I have no evidence before me that the Atanlae family land had been partitioned. It is trite that in order to effect a valid sale or alienation of family with the principal members must participate in the exercise. See Layinka & ors V. Gegele (1993) 3 NWLR PT 285 518. Kabiawu V. Lawal 1969. 1 ALL NLR 329.
There is ample evidence before this court that family members were opposed to the sale of the cocoa farm by Ojo Olatunbosun to the father of the Defendant. That being so, I hold that sale of the family land by Olatunbosun Ojo to the father of the Defendant without the consent of the head and principal members of the Atanlae family is void.”
5. The entire judgment is altogether unwarranted and cannot be supported by the evidence before the court.
The parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument in accordance with the Rules of this Court. The appellants’ brief dated the 17th day of April, 2009 and was filed on the 23rd day of April, 2009 but deemed properly filed and served on the 24th day of September, 2009. The respondents’ brief dated the 22rd day of October, 2009 was filed on the 23rd day of October, 2009. On the 4th day of November 2009 the appellants’ filed a reply brief dated the 3rd day of November, 2009.
At the hearing of the appeal, the appellants adopted their said briefs, relied on them and urged the Court to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the lower court. The respondents, on the other hand, adopted and relied on their brief and urged the Court to dismiss the appeal for lacking merit and to affirm the judgment of the lower court.
In their brief of argument, the appellants framed the following five issues:-
a. Whether the plaintiffs’ claim is statute barred having regard to the time the plaintiffs/respondents became aware of the sale of the land in dispute to the father of the defendants/appellants in 1957.
b. Whether exhibits E1 will confer equitable interest on the defendants which has been converted into legal estate by specific performance by putting the father of the defendants into possession of the land in dispute in 1957.
c. Whether evidence of traditional history of ownership of land in dispute as given by the defence witness can be regarded as hearsay evidence.
d. whether the land in dispute can still be regarded as family land having regard to the uncontroverted evidence of the only defence witness.
e. Whether the learned trial judge had properly reviewed the evidence of the parties to entitle the plaintiff to judgment.
The respondents, however, formulated only three issues for determination:-
1. whether the Respondent’ action is statute barred. (Ground 1).
2. whether the trial court was right in expunging from its record Exhibit El. (Ground 2).
3. Whether the trial court properly evaluated the evidence adduced by the parties before arriving at its conclusion that the Respondents’ was entitled to judgment. (Ground 3 & 4).
I think that the three issues formulated by F. Omotosho, Esq, learned counsel for the respondents, adequately cover the issues that call for determination in this appeal. With a very slight modification of issue No. 3, which I think also covers ground 5 of the appellants’ grounds of appeal, I adopt the three issues formulated by the respondents as the issues for determination in this appeal.
ISSUE NO.1:
Whether the Respondent’ action is statute barred.
The appellants referred to the prayers of the respondents in the lower court, the parties’ pleadings, particularly paragraphs 15, 16, 17 , 18 and 19 of the statement of claim and paragraphs 5, 6, 7 , 8, 9, 10, 11 and 24 of the statement of defence and also to the evidence adduced by PW1 and DW1 and argued that the respondents were fully aware of the sale of the land to the appellants’ father in 1957 but they did not complain notwithstanding that the land was family land. The appellants contended that when dealing with a statute of limitation, it is important to determine when the cause of action arose as time would start to run from then. They referred to and relied on the cases of IKINE V. EDJERODE (2002) FWLR (Pt.92) 1775 at 1795; AFOLAYAN V. OGUNRINDE (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 127) 369 and MUHAMMED V. MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR, PLATEAU STATE (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt .740) 524 at 545 – 546.
The appellants referred to section 6 (2) of the Limitation Law, Cap. 61, Laws of Ondo State 1978 and argued that no action could be brought to recover land at the expiration of 12 years. They contended that the cause of action in this case arose in 1957 when the disputed land was sold to the appellants’ father and that at the time the respondents filed their writ of summons, 47 (forty-seven) years after the cause of action had accrued, the respondents’ right had been extinguished. On this point the appellants referred to and relied on the cases of ALLEN V. ODUBEKO (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt.506) 638 and IBRAHIM V. OSUNDE (2003) 2 NWLR (Pt.804) 241 at 265 – 266.
The appellants referred to the meaning of cause of action, which is a factual situation that gives a person right to judicial relief, as given in the case of EGBE V. ADEFARASIN (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1 and further contended thus:
”As at the time the appellants’ father bought the land in dispute in 1957, a cause of action had arisen and there were persons who could sue the father of the appellants then. Instead of waiting for forty seven years after. It is therefore submitted that the action of the respondents in the lower court is statute barred and ought to have been dismissed since there was nothing for the court to try when the period allowed for bringing an action had expired. see the cases of:
1. FADARE Vs AG, OYO STATE (1982) 4 SCI
2. R. T. C. vs FOB INVESTMENT & PROPERTY
LIMITED (2001) 6 NWLR part 208 page 246 at 261 paragraph E – F.”
The respondent, however, argued that to determine whether the respondents’ action was caught by section 6 (2) of the Limitation Law, Cap 61, Laws of Ondo State 1978 the writ of summons and the statement of claim must be examined even without taking evidence. They referred, on this point, to the case of INYANG v. REGISTERED TRUSTEES F. C. G. C. (2006) All FWLR (Pt.314) 278 at 290 – 291 . The respondents contended that an examination of paragraphs 23, 24 and 25 of the statement of claim would reveal that they promptly instituted this action on the 2nd day of July, 2004 after the appellants’ acts of trespass to the land which occurred in May, 2004 by the appellants commencing the erection of survey pillars in an attempt to claim ownership of the land in dispute. They further referred to paragraphs 2, 7 and 8 of their reply to the statement of defence and the evidence of PW1 and PW3 and urged the court to hold that their action was not statute barred. In support of their argument the respondents called to their aid the Supreme Court decision in OWEI V. IGHIWI (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt.917) 184 at224.
The respondents contended that their ownership of the land was not disturbed from 1957 until when the appellants attempted to dermacate and carve out the land in 2004 and, therefore, the cause of action arose in that year – 2004.
The respondents, relying on the cases of MAJEKODUMI V. ABINA (2002) FWLR (Pt.100) 1336 at 1362 and AGBOOLA V. ABIMBOLA (1969) 6 NSCC 263, argued that assuming without conceding that the transaction of 1957 was made under customary law, as claimed by the appellants, the Limitation Law of Ondo State would not apply to the transaction and that their action would not be statute barred.
The respondents urged the Court to resolve this issue in their favour.
It is true that the law seems settled, that statutes of limitation are inapplicable to land tenures under native law and custom. This principle of law is a principle of long standing – a very old and acceptable principle. See AGBOOLA V. ABIMBOLA (supra) at 266 – 267 were COKER, AG. CJN (as he then was) stated thus:
”Be that as it may, the Registrar held in this case that the English statutes of Limitations 1833 and 1934 applied so as to bar the interest of the Oloto Chieftaincy family in the land. The reason he gave for this was that as far back as the year 1913 Kanyinde, an Egba refugee had assumed a form of possession over the land which was obviously adverse to that of the Oloto’s. With respect, this is not a correct exposition of the legal situation. Assuming and this fact was not proved and was in fact later jettisoned that Kanyinde was an Egba refugee at the time that he purported to sell the land, he had no more than an interest under native law and custom. We do not consider that any authorities are now needed to show the inapplicability of Statutes of Limitations to such tenures. It is therefore not possible to support the use made herein by the Registrar of Titles of the Statutes of Limitations 1833 and 1834.”(Underlining mine)
In this case, commenced in the High Court of Ondo State, sitting at Akure, section 6 (2) of the Limitation Law, Cap 61, Laws of Ondo State provides, thus:
”No action shall be brought by any other person to recover any land after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to him or, if it first accrued to some person through whom he claims, to that person:
Provided that, if the right of action first accrued to the State through which the person bringing the action claims, the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of the period during which the action could have been brought by the State, or of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to some person other than the State, whichever period first expires.”
In the present case, notwithstanding the argument of the appellants’ learned counsel, the issue of customary land tenure does not arise as the appellants are claiming absolute ownership of the land through purchase for value. The word ”tenure” in relation to property, means ”the rights of a tenant to hold property, or the holding of property as a tenant” – ENCARTA WORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, page 1925. In legal parlance, the word ”tenure” means ”A right, term, or mode of holding lands or tenements in subordination to a superior” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, EIGHTH EDITION, page 1509.
The appellants averred in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of their statement of defence thus:
”7 In further denial of paragraph 9 of the statement of claim the defendants aver as follows:
(i) All the children of Atanlae are female including the mother of Ojo (Olatunbosun’s father).
(ii) The mother of Ojo was the first person to give birth to a male child ever (in the person of Ojo) out of all the children of Atanlae.
(iii) The said Ojo who was the father of Olatunbosun then became the head of the family.
(iv) Atanlae was so happy to have a male child in her lineage that she personally gave the land in dispute absolutely to the said Ojo as his personal land.
(v) The said Ojo had children one of whom is Olatunbosun.
(vi) The said Olatunbosun was also the first son of Ojo and the head of his father’s house.
(vii) That when there was need to raise money for an important matter and or project the said Olatunbosun Ojo with the consent of other Children of his father and the advice another principal member of their extended family the land in dispute was sold to Jimoh a mechanic, father of the defendants absolutely to raise the money.
8. Contrary to paragraph 10 of the statement of claim, the plaintiffs’ family land can no longer have the said boundaries in view of the sale and the purchase of the said land by the defendants’ father from the said olatunbosun ojo whom the land devolved on at the demise of ojo who formerly owns the land exclusively as the first male child from Atanlae maternal lineage.
9. In reply to paragraphs 12, 13 & 14 of the statement of claim, the area in dispute does not form part of the plaintiffs’ land as it has been disposed off more than forty years ago to the knowledge of the plaintiffs’ family while the defendants including their late father had been enjoying undisturbed possession of the land since then.
10. The defendants’ father was in undisturbed possession of the land in dispute while he planted both arable and permanent crops on the land as far back as 1958.”
In their reply, the respondents averred in paragraph 3 (d) of their reply to the statement of defence as follows:
”3. In reply to paragraph 7 of the statement of Defence, the plaintiffs state as follows:
a ………………….
b …………………
c ………………..
d. Olatunbosun Ojo was involved in a criminal matter for stealing a sum of money belonging to one Late George Sule, which led to his purported sale of the cocoa farm to the Defendants’ father in order to raise money to refund the stolen money.”
The issue is absolute sale as claimed by the appellants or ”purported sale” as claimed by the respondents. There is no issue of customary land tenure or any tenure at all in this matter.
The land in dispute, as can be seen from the respondents’ prayers, is land which is subject to a statutory right of occupancy over which a customary court has no jurisdiction. This, perhaps, is the reason while the respondents’ action was initiated in the High Court and not in the customary court.
For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that the Limitation Law, Cap. 61, of Laws Ondo State, applies to this case. The question, however, is whether the respondents’ action was statute barred when the suit was filed in the court below.
The respondents averred in paragraphs 15, 16, 17 and 18 of their statement of claim as follows:
”15. The Plaintiffs aver that the Defendants’ father Jimoh (Mechanic) allegedly purchased a Cocoa farm on part of the land in dispute from Olatunbosun Ojo.
16. The Plaintiffs aver that the Cocoa farm purported sold to the Defendants father belong to Ojo, a member of Atanlae family and was sold without the concurrence of the other children e.g Omolayo Ojo after the death of their father and without the consent of the entire Atanlae family, the original owners of both the land in dispute and other adjoining parcels of land. The said Olatunbosun Ojo was assisted by his mother’s relation to sell the Cocoa farm land to Jimoh (Mechanic).
17. The Plaintiffs aver that the said Olatunbosun Ojo sold his father’s Cocoa farm, or the land in dispute which was not shared to him after the death of his father among other children, of his father and without the consent of the then Head of the family late Pa Akinola Olalusi (the father of the 1st Plaintiff) and other Principal members of Atanlae family.
18. The Plaintiffs aver that the then Head of the family, Pa Akinola Olalusi the 1st plaintiff’s father, and other family members, frowned at his action, attempted to refund the cost of purchase to the Defendants’ father who refused to cooperate, and since thereon Olatunbosun Ojo never came to family meetings and never performed the burial rite of his late father before he (Olatunbosun) died himself.”
From paragraphs 7 to 10 and other paragraphs of the appellants’ statement of defence, partially reproduced above, the appellants claim that the land was lawfully sold to their father by the said Olatunbosun Ojo and that as far back as 1958 their father had planted ”arable and permanent crops” and had been in undisturbed possession of the land in dispute.
In Court, the 1st respondent who testified as PW1, stated in his evidence-in-chief at page 27 of the record, inter alia, as follows:
”I know Olatunbosun had no authority to sell because family elders told me including the 3rd plaintiff who is now the head of the family now. The relationship of Olatunbosun Ojo and other family members was the same as regard the land.
The reaction of the family was one of protest and opposition to the sale. They wanted to refund money
paid by defendant father to him.”
(Underlining mine)
Under cross-examination, at page 32, the 1st respondent testified, inter alia, thus:
”My family knew about the transaction immediately after the transaction and family wanted to refund the money. My father challenged the father of the defendant for buying the cocoa farm.”
(Underlining mine)
From the pleadings and the evidence adduced by the parties, the respondents knew of the alleged ‘unlawful’ sale of the land in dispute, attempted unsuccessfully to refund the money paid by the appellants’ father and also knew that the appellants had taken over possession of the land in or about 1957. As at that time, the factual situation was such the respondents could institute an action against the said Olatunbosun Ojo, his mother’s relation who assisted him to sell the land and the appellants’ father who ‘unlawfully’ bought the land and ‘unlawfully’ took over possession of the land. The cause of action therefore arose in 1957 when the land was sold by Olatunbosun Ojo, allegedly without the consent of the principal members of the respondents’ family and the appellants’ father started planting “both arable and permanent crops on the land”.
The phrase “cause of action” has no precise definition but it has been held to mean a factual situation that gives a right to judicial relief or remedy EGBE V. ADEFARASIN (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.47) 1. In the present case, the facts or set of facts were such that the respondents’ family had a cause of action which entitled them to judicial relief, if any, in 1957/1958.
By the endorsement on the respondents writ of summons, at page 1 of the record of appeal, the respondents brought their action on the 2nd day of July , 2004 a period of over 46 years after the cause of action arose. This is clearly outside the twelve-year limitation period prescribed by section 6 (2) of the Limitation Law, Cap 61, Laws of Ondo State, 1978. The respondents’ action was clearly statute barred.
I resolve this issue in favour of the appellants and against the respondents.
I would have stopped here but I have a duty to resolve all the issues that call for determination in this appeal. This duty is imperative, especially in case I am wrong in my resolution of issue No. 1. I will proceed to resolve the remaining two issues which call for determination.
ISSUE NO.2:
Whether the trial court was right in expunging from its record Exhibit E1.
The appellants referred to exhibit E1/exhibit E2 and stated that the document being a receipt acknowledging payment of the purchase price of the land in dispute is not a registrable instrument under the Land instruments Registration Law, Cap. 54, Laws of Ondo State 1978. The appellants contended the transaction whereby the appellants’ father bought the land in dispute in 1957 from Olatunbosun Ojo was under Yoruba Native Law and Custom under which an absolute transfer of land could be effected in the presence of witnesses. They argued that in the present case their father was put into possession of the land by Olatunbosun Ojo in the presence of witnesses and this was sufficient to effect absolute transfer of title under native law and custom. The appellants, in support of this contention, referred to the cases of ETAJATA V. OLOGBO (2001) all FWLR (Pt.386) 584 at 630; FOLARIN V. DUROJAIYE (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.70) 351 and COLE V. FOLAMI (1956) 1 FSC 66.
The appellants further contended that although exhibit E1 (Exhibit E2 the English translation of exhibit E1) is a mere receipt showing the payment of the purchase price, since the vendor – Olatunbosun Ojo let the appellants into actual possession of the land, the appellants had at least equitable interest coupled with possession which could not be overridden by a legal estate. On this point, they referred to and relied on the cases of ETAJATA V. OLOGBO (supra); ORASANMI V. IDOWU (1959) 4 FSC 40 and OSHODI V. BALOGUN (1936) 4 WACA 1.
The respondents, however, submitted that exhibit E1 by its form and content qualifies as an instrument affecting land under the Lands Instrument Registration Law of Ondo State and it “must be registered in proof of the Appellants’ title by inheritance to the land in dispute through their father”. They called to their aid the cases of OGBIMI V. NIGER CONSTRUCTION LTD. & 2 ORS. (2006) 9 NWLR (Pt.986) 471 at 492 493 and AKINDURO V ALAYA (2007) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1457) 312 The respondents, accordingly, submitted that exhibit E1 was rightly expunged by the trial court.
The respondents referred to the appellants’ argument and submitted that the issue of the sale of the land in dispute “being made under customary law, is unsupported by any pleading” and that it should not be countenanced. They submitted further that the cases of ETAJATA V. OLOGBO (supra); FOLARIN V. DUROJAIYE (supra) and COLE V. FOLAMI (supra) cited by the appellants were not applicable to this case because “the material facts that the sale of the land was effected in the presence of witnesses who actually saw the actual handing over of the property were not pleaded” by the appellants. They relied on the case of ADEYERI V. OKOBI (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt.510) 534 at 547 and argued that evidence led on facts not pleaded goes to no issue. The respondents argued further that even this issue was not raised and canvassed by the in the lower court and they could not raise it without leave of this Court. On this issue, the respondents referred the court to the cases of LEBILE V. REGD. TRUSTEES, CHERUBIM & SERAPHIM (2003) FWLR (Pt. 142) 89 at 103 and G.T.B. PLC V. FADCO IND LTD. (2007) All FWLR (Pt.310) 1575 at 1595.
The respondents urged the Court to resolve this issue their favour.
I wish to state immediately that I agree with Mr. Omotosho that evidence of facts not pleaded goes to no issue. I also agree that an issue not raised or canvassed in the lower court can only be raised on appeal with the leave of court. I will, therefore, confine myself to only the question whether the trial court rightly expunged exhibit E1 (and exhibit E2 – the English translation of exhibit E1). Exhibit F.2, the English translation of exhibit E1 – written in Yoruba Language read thus:
“ODLA 14058
This is an agreement over my land and my cocoa farm in Igbo Ijaro at Akure.
This is an agreement between me, Rufus Olatunbosun Ojo who lives at Isinkan, Akure and Mr. Jimoh Aderomilehin Mechanic who lives along Boiwdillon Road, Akure.
Today which is 4th of August, 1957, on the sale of my land and my cocoa farm together with tick forest surrounded with water have been sold to Mr. Jimoh Aderomilehin Mechanic for 40 (Forty Pounds) Mechanic has paid that 40 (Forty Pounds) to me today which is 4th August 1957.
I have sold my land and cocoa farm together with tick forest which is surrounded by stream
before I append my signature to this document.
Junior brother to my father in person of Mr. Amusa and my mother stood as my witnesses over the sale of my cocoa farm together with that tick forest to Mr. Jimoh Aderomilehin Mechanic.
Signed …………….. Signed……………..
Seller 4/8/57 Mr. Amusa (Witness)
Signed …………….. Signed……………..
Mr. Jimoh Aderomilehin Chief Officer LGP
Ondo Province
Akure. 4/8/57”.
An ”instrument” under section 2 of the Land Instruments Registration Land, Cap. 54, Laws of Ondo State, 1978 is defined to mean:
”a document affecting land in the State whereby one party (hereinafter called the grantor) confers, transfers, limits, charges or extinguishes in favour of another party (hereinafter called the grantee) any right or title to or interest in land in the State………….”
By a literal interpretation of section 2 of the said Land Instruments Law, exhibit E2, reproduced above, although inelegantly drafted, seems to confer or transfer title to land to the appellants’ father Mr. Jimoh Aderomilehin Mechanic and may qualify as an ”instrument” under the said Law, if not properly scrutinized.
Exhibit E2 also qualifies as a purchase receipt a written acknowledgment that money had been given by the person who issued it.
Although exhibit E2 describes itself as “an agreement” and it was signed by both the seller and the buyer of the land and two witnesses, the constant use of the pronoun ”I” and the first person possessive determiner “my” clearly confirms that the document was intended more as a purchase receipt issued by the seller of the land than an agreement properly so called. In any case, the appellants pleaded in paragraph 23 of their statement of defence thus:
“23. The defendant will rely on the purchase receipt written in Yoruba language and shall translate same to English the language of the court at the trial of the case.”
In her evidence, the 1st appellant testified, inter alia, at page37 of the record of appeal as follows:
“My father paid 40 pounds for the land to Olatunbosun. He gave my father a purchase receipt for 40 pounds. The receipt was in my custody.”
(Underlining mine)
It is clear from the appellants’ pleading and evidence that exhibit E1 (exhibit E2) was pleaded and tendered in evidence as a receipt of payment of the purchase price and not as an instrument of title to the land. The learned trial judge erred, therefore, when his lordship held at page 61 of the record of appeal as follows:
”I hold that Exhibit E1 was not registered in accordance with the relevant law it is rendered inadmissible and it is hereby expunged.”
Having regard to the facts of this case exhibit E1 (exhibit E2) is admissible, assuming that it is even a registrable instrument under the Land Instruments Registration Law of Ondo State, to prove the appellants’ equitable interest in the land and or payment of the purchase money by the appellants’ father to the said Olatunbosun Ojo. See the cases of BUCKNOR-MACLEAN V. INLAKS (1980) 1 – 11 S.C.1; ONI V. ARIMOKO (1973) 3 S.C. 163; OKOYE V. DUMEZ NIGERIA LIMITED (1985) 6 Sc 3 at 12 and AWOAGBO V. EZE (1995) 1 SCNJ 157
Under the circumstances of this case, Exhibit E1 and its English translation (exhibit E2) were admissible and they were wrongly expunged by the trial court.
I resolve to this issue against the respondents.
ISSUE NO 3:
Whether the trial court properly evaluated the evidence adduced by the parties before arriving at its conclusion that the respondents were entitled to judgment.
The appellants argued that “the evidence of DW1 regarding the traditional history of the land as stated to her by the vendor of the land in dispute who had died long before the action commenced can therefore not be regarded as hearsay.” In support of this argument, the appellants referred to section 45 of the Evidence Act and the cases of OYEKOLA V. AJIBADE (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 242) 436 at 456 – 457 and ELEGUSHI V. OSENI (2005) 4 NWLR (Pt. 945) 348 at 366 – 367.
The appellants referred to the case of ISHOLA V. UBN LTD (2005) All FWLR (Pt.256) 202 and argued that the duty of evaluation of evidence is primarily that of a trial judge. They submitted, however, that an appellate court would intervene if the findings of the trial court were perverse or if the evidence was not properly evaluated. On this point, they referred to and relied on the cases of BUHARI V. INEC & ORS (2008) 12 SCM (Pt. 2)234 and TIZA V. BEGHA (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 272) 200 at 218.
The appellants contended that the findings of the trial court, in this case, were perverse especially on the appellants traditional history of how their father acquired the land and which was erroneously regarded as hearsay; when traditional history is an exception to the hearsay rule OYEKOLA V. AJIBADE (supra) was further relied upon. The appellants complained that the trial court did not, on the other hand, refer to the traditional history given by the respondents as hearsay and, therefore, failed to evaluate the evidence adduced by the parties “on an imaginary scale and find out which of the evidence is heavier and more probable”.
The case of OLALEYE V. ADEJUMO (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 264) 827 at 845 – 846 was cited and relied on.
The appellants submitted that in a case where a party relies or the parties rely on traditional history handed down by word of mouth from one generation to another, mistakes might occur and if there was conflict the court would resolve same by “reference to facts in recent years to see which of the two (sic) evidence is more probable”. They, the appellants, referred to the cases of EBOADE V. ATOMESIN (1997) 5 SCNJ 13 at 19 and OLALEYE V. ADEJUMO (supra) and contended that in the present case in recent years, the facts were that “the appellants father acquired the land in 1957 by purchase from one Olatunbosun Ojo and occupied the place until his death in 1984 and his children including the appellants succeeded to the land in dispute and continue (sic) to farm on the same until 2004 when the respondents suddenly laid claim to the land in dispute.”
In countering the arguments of the appellants, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that “evaluation of evidence and approbation of weight … are primarily the duty of a trial court. It is the trial court that is in a position to observe the demeanour of witnesses and assess their credibility”. The learned counsel referred to the case of FAGBENRO V. AROBADI (2006) All FWLR (pt. 310) 1575 at 1595 and submitted that it is only when the trial court abdicated its duty that this court can intervene to evaluate the evidence, provided that the exercise would not involve credibility of witnesses who testified at the trial.
The respondents referred to their pleadings and the evidence adduced and the judgment of the trial court and argued that on the authority of EZE AKABEKWE & ORS. V. EMENIKE (1998) 9 SCNJ the lower concluded that the traditional history by the respondents was adequate proof of their title to the land as it believed the evidence of respondents’ two witnesses and dismissed the evidence of the only witness for the appellants – DW1 as hearsay. The respondents relied on the case of JOLAYAYI V. ALAOYE (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt. 887) 322 at 341 and submitted that DW1 stated in her evidence that “it was Olatunbosun that told me this story” and her evidence was hearsay as she was not talking from her personal knowledge.
It was also submitted by the respondents that the trial court properly and rightly evaluated the evidence before arriving at its decision that the respondents satisfactorily established their title to the land in dispute.
The respondents urged the court to strike out the appellants’ fifth issue “as it amounts to proliferation of issues, since there are only four grounds of appeal. See. Ibikunle V. Lawani (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt. 398) 359 at 369.”
I have already reproduced, in this judgment, the grounds of appeal filed by the appellants. The grounds of appeal are five. There is no proliferation of issues by the appellants, notwithstanding the fact that I prefer the three issues formulated by the respondents to the five issues framed by the appellants.
I wish to state immediately, that I agree with both learned counsel that the duty of evaluation of evidence and ascription of probative value is primarily that of a trial court which had the rare and singular opportunity of watching and or observing the demeanour of witnesses.I also agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that where a trial court abandons its primary and sacred duty of evaluating the evidence before it and ascribing probative value to it, an appellate court can intervene and assume that duty. An appellate court will also intervene where the findings of the trial court are obviously perverse or wrong. See BUHARI V. INEC & ORS. (2008) 19 NWLR (Pt.1120) 246 at 412 – 413-
In the present case, the trial court failed to properly evaluate the evidence adduced by the contending parties. It also failed to place the respective evidence on an imaginary scale to find out which party’s evidence outweighed the other. In particular, the trial court wrongly expunged exhibit E1 (E2 the English translation); it also improperly dismissed the first appellant’s evidence as hearsay but did not mete out the same punishment to the traditional history or evidence of the 1st respondent. The respective evidence adduced by the appellants and the respondents was not even-handedly weighed by the trial court.
I will not shirk the responsibility of evaluating the evidence, especially as I can do so without taking into consideration the credibility or demeanour of the witnesses who testified at the trial.
The law is settled that there are five (5) ways of establishing title to land in Nigeria. The five ways, as approved by the Supreme Court as in the case of IDUNDUN V. OKUMAGBA (1976) 1 – 10 SC 224 are:
1. By traditional history
2. By production of the documents of title
3. By proving acts of ownership numerous and positive enough to warrant an inference that the person is the true owner.
4. By proving acts of long possession and enjoyment of the land.
5. Proof of possession of connected or adjacent land, otherwise known as the contiguity rule.
The law in respect of a claim for declaration of title to land is also well-settled. It is that a claimant must on the strength of his own case succeed and not on the weakness of the defendant’s case. In other words, a claimant or plaintiff must succeed by credible evidence adduced by him.
See the cases of KODINLINYE V. ODU 2 WACA 336 and O.K.O. MOGAJI v. CADBURY NIGERIA LTD. (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 7) 393
In the present case, the respondents, as claimants or plaintiffs, called 3 (three) witnesses – PW1 (High Chief Jide Olalusi – the 1st respondent) whose testimony spans pages 26 33; PW2 (Surv. Supo Ayeni) whose evidence is at page 34 and PW3 (the 2nd respondent Oloye Francis Kehinde Alabi) whose evidence covers pages 34 35 of the record of appeal. In his evidence-in-chief, PW1 testified at page 29 of the record of appeal, inter alia, that the cocoa farm was sold to the defendants’ parent by Olatubosun Ojo without the consent of the head and principal members of their family. He said that the head of Atanlae family was late Pa Akinola Olalusi – his own (PW1’s) father. He stated further that his family protested the sale and wanted to refund the purchase money to the appellants’ father but he (the appellants’ father) refused. At page 30, lines 28 -29 of the record of appeal, PW1 testified thus:
“What my family sold to the defendant father was nothing.
It was a member of the family that sold to him not the Atanlaye family.”
(Underlining mine)
At page 32 of the record, the 1st respondent (PW1) under cross-examination testified, inter alia, as follows;
“My family knew about the transaction immediately after the transaction and family wanted to refund the money. My father challenged the father of the defendant for buying the cocoa farm.
He was challenged for planting other crops too in areas not sold to him. We took him as a tenant. He bought cocoa farm from the family.”
(Underlining mine)
As can be seen from the underlined portions of the evidence of PW1, reproduced above, in one breath the witness said that it was Olatunbosun Ojo who sold his cocoa farm to the appellants’ father without the consent of the respondents head and principal members of the family; in another breath PW1 said that his family sold nothing to the appellants’ father and yet in another further breath PW1 said the appellants’ father bought cocoa farm from their family. Which version of the 1st respondent’s evidence was the trial court to believe or to disbelieve? The trial court ought not to have overlooked or glossed over these material contradictions in the evidence of PW1.
In paragraph 9 of their statement of claim the respondents pleaded thus:
9. The plaintiffs aver and will lead evidence in proof of their ownership and title of the entire land as follows;
(i). The plaintiffs and other members of Atanlae family are Princes and Princesses to the core through the royal family of Oba Osupa and the Iralepo of Isinkan.
(ii). The Historical mother of Atanlae, one Princess Olajosoye who hailed from Owo was bestowed to the then Deji of Akure, Oba Osupatadolaa.
(iii). After being barren for many years, she had only one female child for Oba Osupa through the worship of the god of Atan, and the child was thereafter named Atankolae now Atanlae.
(iv). The Princess Atanlae was bestowed to the late Iralepo Arulewolasi of Isinkan and had issues among whom was Olasiku
(v). Olasiku had three children who were Farintokun, Alape and Ojegede, all female.
(vi). Farintokun, the first female child of Olasiku begat Ige(f) Fatan (m) and Omotosho. Alape begat Atansusi (f) Alabi (m) and Ojo (m) while Ojegede begat Ajayi, Dada Mama Olore.
(vii). The 1st Plaintiff is the grandson of Ige, the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs are grandchildren of Alape, while one Olatunbosun Ojo is also the grandson of Alape.
(viii). Being descendants of one royal family to another, the aforementioned parcel of land part of which is the land in dispute at Igbojaro was granted absolutely to Atanlae and her children by the Iralepo of Isinkan and the Plaintiffs on the said parcel of land.
(ix). It is on part of the entire land, that the Defendants are making false claim of ownership and purported exercise of right of possession, which constitutes acts of trespass and invasion of proprietary right of the Plaintiffs on the said parcel of land.
In his evidence-in-chief, the 1st respondent said, among other things at page 31 of the record that “Alanlae had only 1 female child Olasiku, Olasiku had 3 female Farintokun, Alape and Ojegede.” Under cross-examination, at page 32 of the record, PW1 confirmed thus:
“I have heard about Olasiku, the 1st and only daughter of Atanlae”.
On the other hand, the 2nd respondent who testified as PW3 testified under cross-examination (page 35 of the record) as follows:
“I am one of the Atanlaye family members. I know its history Olaseku is the mother of Atanlaye, Olaseku had only 1 child. Atanlaye is the 1 child. Atanlaye had Fatokun, Alape, Ojegede.”
Without picking and choosing the two versions of the respondents’ family history, as presented by PW1 and PW3, which version to believe and which version to disbelieve, it seems clear to me the respondents could not satisfactorily trace the tine of succession to the land. Where a line of succession is not satisfactorily traced in an action for a declaration of the title to the land, such line of succession should be rejected O.K.O. MOGAJI V. CADBURY NIGERIA LTD (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 7) 393 S.C.
If one may ask, which of the two versions of the respondents’ family history was the trial court to believe. In the present, very obvious relevant and material contradictions between the evidence of PW1 and PW3 were overlooked by the trial judge who wrongly held, at page 59 of the record of appeal thus:
“I have examined the evidence of PW1 & PW3 who testified that the land in dispute belonged to the Atanlaye family by traditional evidence indeed this piece of evidence has not been controverted by the
defendant.”
From the record of appeal, the 1st appellant testified as DW1. Her testimony spans pages 36 – 38 of the record of appeal. DW1 testified, inter alia, as follows:
“I know where the land in dispute is. It is at Igbojaro, off Ilesha Road, Akure. The land belongs to me and my sister. In the 1957 my father and Iwere at home when the child of one Aturu brought a message from his father that my father should see Chief Aturu. My father was a mechanic he bought a cocoa farm.
He agreed to buy the virgin land and the cocoa land. My father paid 40 pounds for the land to Olatubosun. He gave my father a purchase receipt for 840 pounds. The receipt was in my custody.”
DW1 further testified that after purchasing the land, her father “continued to use the farm, planting crop on it cocoa, kolanut, orange, walnut, palm tree, rubber, he also built a bungalow. I know this because I used to follow my father”.
The witness – DW1 was not cross-examined by the respondents. The records show that the respondents applied for DW1 to be recalled for cross-examination, but there is nothing on record to show that the respondents’ application was ever granted and that DW1 was eventually cross-examined by the respondents. See pages 43 – 46 of the records of appeal.
The record, however, shows that both parties addressed the lower court.
In the circumstances of this case, the evidence of DW1 the appellants’ sole witness remained unchallenged, undisturbed and uncontroverted.
In his judgment, the learned trial judge held, inter alia, as follows:
“I have no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW1 and PW3. I therefore believe them contrary to evidence of history of the land in dispute given in evidence by DW1 which is mere hearsay evidence and which cannot be admitted in evidence.”
(Underlining mine)
The evidence of DW1 of how her father bought the land in dispute and was led into possession thereof was wrongly regarded as hearsay evidence by the trial court. The witness said that she witnessed the entire transaction and she was not challenged by the respondents. The evidence given by DW1 in respect of the land purchase transaction between her father and Olatubosun Ojo was direct and admissible because she was physically present with her father.
The only aspect of the evidence of DW1 that one could regard as hearsay is at page 37 of the record where she testified thus:
“Atanlae is a woman she had 3 daughters. Her 1st born had Ojo. Who is a male because Atanlae had no son she gave Ojo land for his own possession. That after the death of Ojo. Olatunbosun inherited the land. It was Olatunbosun that told me this story when my father wanted to buy”.
This aspect of the evidence of DW1 had nothing to do with the issue of whether or not her father bought the land in dispute from Olatunbosun Ojo in 1957 and paid the sum of 40 pounds as the purchase price. The evidence of DW1 in respect of her father’s purchase of the land in 1957, amply supported by the contents of exhibit E2 (the English translation of exhibit E1) was direct and was not hearsay. It was very wrong of the trial court to have dismissed the whole of the evidence of DW1 as hearsay. If the trial court had not wrongly rejected the evidence of DW1 as hearsay and if it had properly evaluated the evidence before it, including exhibit E1 (Exhibit E2) it would have easily reached the right conclusion that the appellants’ father, with the knowledge of the respondents’ family, bought the land in dispute in 1957 and was duly let in physical possession thereof.
The learned trial judge held that there was no evidence that the land was partitioned before its alleged sale and further that the respondents’ family protested the sale of the land by Olatunbosun Ojo. As I stated earlier, by 1957 when the respondents knew that their land was ‘wrongly seized and sold’ by their family member Olatunbosun Ojo, the respondents had a right to seek legal redress but they did nothing. Save for their feeble and failed attempt to refund the purchase money to the appellants’ father, the respondents fully acquiesced to the sale of the land by Olatunbosun Ojo. Since 1957 the appellants’ father bought the land, appellants’ father, the respondents fully acquiesced to the sale of the land by Olatunbosun Ojo. Since 1957 the appellants’ father bought the land, took over possession, exercised sundry acts of ownership and enjoyment of the land without any complaint or challenge by the respondents. The respondents’ action was commenced 23 years after the original purchaser of the land had died and 47 years after the land was bought!
The law is settled that long possession does not confer title on a party where another traces his title to the true owners. However, where the long possession, as in the instant case, is of such a nature that the true owner by his acquiescence had conceded ownership of the land, the true owner’s title can be ousted or extinguished. See THOMAS V. HOLDER 12 WACA 78 and DA COSTA V. IKOMI (1968) 1 All NLR 394.
In the present case, the purchase by the appellant’s father of the land in dispute in 1957, coupled with his unchallenged long possession and acts of ownership and enjoyment of the land are such as to oust any title of the respondents by their acquiescence. The respondents’ action in Suit No. AK/157/2004 claiming title to the land in dispute appears very oppressive of the appellants.
I resolve this issue in favour of the appellants against the respondents.
CONCLUSION
I have no difficulty, therefore, in finding that there is preponderance of evidence that the land in dispute, measuring approximately 5. 224 hectares and more particularly delineated and verged yellow in Survey Plan No. LUMA/OD/2004/001 dated 20-7-2004 signed by Surveyor Supo Ayeni and was admitted in evidence as exhibit “D” by the lower court, belongs to the appellants and not the respondents and I so hold.
Without more, I hold that this appeal has merit. I hereby allow the appeal. Consequently, the judgment of Ondo State High Court, Akure Division, in Suit No: AK/157/2004 delivered on the 12th day of November, 2007 is hereby set aside.
The sum of N50, 000.00 is hereby awarded as costs in favour of the appellants against the respondents.
KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, J.C.A.: I have read before now the judgment of my learned brother, Adumein, JCA, just delivered. I agree with his reasoning and conclusion that this appeal is meritorious and ought to be allowed. I accordingly allow it. The judgment of the Ondo State High Court Akure Division in Suit No. AK/157/2004 delivered on 12/11/2007 is hereby set aside.
N50,000 costs are awarded in favour of the appellants against the respondents,
CHINWE E. IYIZOBA, J.C.A.: I read before now the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Moore A.A. Adumein JCA. I agree with his reasoning and conclusions.
He has dealt fully and comprehensively with all the issues raised in the appeal. The cause of action in this case arose in 1957 when the appellant’s father bought the land in dispute from a member of the family who had no authority to sell. The family knew about the sale and made an unsuccessful attempt at the time to refund the purchase price.
But no action was taken to recover the land until 47 years after the cause of action accrued. The action was clearly statute barred by virtue of Section 6(2) of the Limitation laws, Cap 61, Laws of Ondo State 1978. See Aremo II v. Adekanye [2004] 13 NWLR [Pt. 891] 572:
“Where a Statute of Limitation prescribes period within which action must be commenced, legal proceedings cannot be properly of validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Where an action is statute barred, a plaintiff who might otherwise have had a cause of action loses the right to enforce it by judicial process because the period of time laid down by the Limitation for instituting such an action has elapsed,” Per Edozie JSC at 592 C-F
See also Williams v. Williams (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095) 364
The respondents herein had lost their right to recover the family land sold without the consent of the family. I agree that the appeal has merit and should be allowed. I too hereby allow the appeal. I abide by the consequential orders in the judgment including the order as to costs.
Appearances
PRINCE A. A. OJOPAGOGO with GIDEON OKPARA, ESQ.For Appellant
AND
F. OMOTOSHO, ESQ. with MISS O. EDREMODAFor Respondent
