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National Industrial Court

Mrs. Briggs Yitonierani -VS- Diobu Micro Finance Bank Limited

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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE PORT HARCOURT JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT PORT HARCOURT

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HONOURABLE JUSTICE F. I. KOLA-OLALERE

 

Date: October 10, 2019                                                            Suit No: NICN/PHC/09/2018

Between:

 

Mrs. Briggs Yitonierani                                            Claimant

 

And

 

Diobu Micro Finance Bank Limited                     Defendant

 

Representation:

O.I Briggs for the claimant.

N.A Ayewoh for the defendant with Gift Sonia

 

COURT’S JUDGMENT

  1. On January 30, 2018 the claimant sued the defendant to this Court for the following reliefs:
  2. A Declaration that the Claimant’s letter to the Defendant, dated 12th May, 2015 Captioned “Letter of Resignation” is a sufficient notice and valid.
  3. A Declaration that, sending monthly returns of the Defendant to the CBN using the Claimant’s name as MD/CEO in the months of May, June and July 2015 after the Claimant’s Resignation letter dated 12th May, 2015 to the Defendant is wrongful, unlawful, unconstitutional and fraud on the part of the Defendant.

iii.         A Declaration that, the letter of the Defendant to the Claimant dated 16th  December, 2015 Captioned; ‘Summary Dismissal’ after the Claimant’s Resignation letter dated 12th May, 2015 to the Defendant is unconstitutional, unlawful, wrongful, null and void and of no effect.

  1. An Order, quashing the Defendant’s letter to the Claimant dated 16th December, 2015 Captioned; ‘Summary Dismissal’.
  2. An Order directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of Two Million, Seven Hundred and Sixty-One Thousand, Four Hundred and Eighty-Four Naira, Twenty-Five Kobo) only as severance benefits.
  3. An Order mandating the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N20, 000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) as General Damages.

vii.       An Order of injunction restraining the Defendant, their agents, privies, officers etc. from further embarrassing, harassing, intimidating or interfering howsoever, with the Right to dignity of the Claimant by virtue of this suit.

viii.    And any such Order(s) the Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case.

 

Other initiating processes were filed along with the complaint in line with the Rules of this Court. In response, the defendant entered appearance through its counsel and filed its statement of defence with other processes, in compliance with the Rules of this Court.

 

  1. CLAIMANT’S CASE AS PLEADED

The case of the claimant is that she was a former employee of the defendant and that in the course of his employment, she rose from the rank of Marketing Staff to the position of Acting Managing Director; a position she held until she resigned. The claimant avers that since the beginning of her employment with the defendant, she has never been allowed to proceed on annual leave. She continued that due to some health challenges she had, she then applied for a four days casual leave in line with her terms and conditions of service as stated in the Defendant’s staff manual and that the Board of the defendant agreed to it and even granted her additional 14 days outside the 28 days annual leave she was officially entitled to; so as to adequately take care of her health challenges. The claimant went on that this notwithstanding, the Head Administration of the defendant failed to comply with the directive of the Board to issue her with approval letter and that the Board only gave her approval letter after  she had tendered her notice of resignation to the Defendant. The claimant continued that the defendant rejected her resignation letter and subsequently invited her to offer some explanations on “Suspected fraud of N1.7 Million and other expenditure infractions” in the bank; and that she was placed on indefinite suspension without pay and later, summarily dismissed; notwithstanding her earlier resignation from the defendant’s employment.

  1. THE DEFENDANT’S CASE AS PLEADED

The case of the defendant on the other hand is that, the Claimant never resigned from her employment with the Bank but that she was dismissed from the services of the Defendant. The defendant went on that during the period of the claimant’s employment with the Bank, the Claimant severally applied for time off and that most of these requests were granted by the Defendant. The Bank avers that the Claimant was under investigation for financial misappropriations in the Defendant and in an attempt to frustrate the said investigation; the Claimant attempted to and/or purported to have resigned her employment with the Defendant. The Bank again avers that the purported resignation of the claimant did not comply with this laid down procedure in the terms and conditions of his employment guiding the employment of all staff of the Defendant in her supposed resignation; and so, same was out-rightly rejected. The defendant continued that at the conclusion of its investigation on the financial misappropriations, the Claimant was found liable hence; she was dismissed from the services of the Defendant.

During hearing of the case, the claimant testified as CW1 while one Ochuko Akakporo testified on behalf of the defendant as DW1. Counsel were directed to file their final written addresses by the Court and they complied with the direction.

  1. THE DEFENDANT’S WRITTEN ARGUMENTS

In his final written address, counsel to the defendant formulated one issue for Court’s determination this way:

Whether on the state of the pleadings and the evidence led in this suit, the Claimant is entitled to her claims in this suit.

Arguing the said issue, counsel raised preliminary question on some exhibits tendered by the Claimant. The first set of documents challenged is: Exhibits C6, C6 (a) & C6 (b). These are monthly returns of the Defendant to the Central Bank of Nigeria for the months of May, June and July 2015. Counsel submitted that these exhibits were not signed; therefore, they are entitled to no weight at all in law, citing Omega Bank (Nig.) Ltd v. OBC Ltd [2005] All FWLR (Pt. 249) 1; Garuba v. Kwara State Investment Co. Ltd [2005] All FWLR (Pt. 252) 469 at 478 E, 479 C-E; Gbadamosi v. Biala [2014] LPELR 24389; Brewtech Nig. Ltd v. Akannawo [2016] LPELR 40054.

On Exhibit C9, which is the Record of Proceedings from the Criminal case against the claimant by the defendant with Suit No: PMC/1726C/2016 between the Commissioner of Police v. Yitonierani Briggs before the Rivers State Magistrates’ Court sitting in Port Harcourt; counsel submitted that the Record of proceedings in a criminal trial should not be admitted in evidence in a civil proceeding, citing Abubakar v. Joseph [2008] All FWLR (Pt. 432) 1065 at 1103 F-G and Nwachukwu v. Egbuchu [1990] 3 NWLR (Pt. 139) 435.

Counsel submitted further that where a piece of evidence, which is inadmissible at all in law is wrongly admitted in evidence, the proper thing to do by the trial court is to discountenance it completely when writing its judgment, even if admitted by consent. He maintained that Exhibits C6, C6 (a), C6 and (b) exhibit C9 should be discountenanced, relying on John v. Blakk [2002] FWLR (Pt. 95) 320 at 330 A-B; Nwabuoku v. Onwordi [2002] FWLR (Pt. 123) 337 at 359 F-G.; Hyppolite v. Agharevha [1998] 11 NWLR (Pt. 575) 598 and  Agbi v. Ogbeh [2006] All FWLR (Pt. 329) 941.

  1. In addition, counsel contended that from the claimant’s prayer 1, it is the position of the defendant that the claimant has power to resign but that the defendant too can refuse the resignation if there is reason for that. In other word, the counsel is canvassing that an employer may reject a letter of resignation on the ground that the employee has questions to answer and that permitting him to go may hinder an ongoing investigation against him/her, citing Benson v. Onitiri [1960] NSCC 52; Graham-Douglas v. Attorney General Rivers State [1973] NMLR 77; Ibama v. SPDC (Nig.) Ltd [2005] All FWLR (Pt. 287) 832 at 843 – 844 G-A and Exhibit C2. Counsel continued that by the provisions of Article 8(B) (i) of Exhibit C8, the Defendant’s Staff Manual, all employees have free will to discontinue their services with the Bank at any time. However, they are expected to give mandatory one-month notice or pay salary in lieu. To counsel, Exhibit C.1 before this Court is the supposed letter of resignation by the Claimant and that this exhibit did not comply with the mandatory terms of her employment and so, the letter is void by reason of none compliance with of Exhibit C8. Counsel argued that in the circumstance, the Defendant was right in rejecting the letter of resignation as it had sufficient and cogent reasons to do so.

 

  1. On the Claimant’s prayer 2 for A Declaration that, sending monthly returns of the Defendant to the CBN using the Claimant’s name as MD/CEO in the months of May, June and July 2015 after the Claimant had Resigned from the Defendant via her letter of May 12, 2015 is wrongful, unlawful, unconstitutional and fraudulent on the part of the Defendant. Counsel submitted that Exhibits C6, C6 (a) and C6 (b) are supposedly monthly returns by the Defendant to the Central Bank of Nigeria for the months of May, June and July 2015. He continued that Exhibits C6, C6 (a) and C6 (b) are unsigned; therefore, they are worthless and void, as the court cannot rely on unsigned documents to establish a fact since they are of doubtful origins. He submitted that the Claimant’s prayer 2 has no foundation to stand on because the claimant cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stand.  He urged the Court to discountenance those exhibits, citing Garuba v. Kwara State Investment Co. Ltd [2005] All FWLR (Pt. 252) 469 at 478 E, 479 C-E and Ofem v. Presbyterian Church of Nigeria [2012] All FWLR (Pt. 647) 801 at 813 E.
  2. Counsel continued that by Exhibit C3, it is clear that the Claimant was placed on suspension from June 2, 2015 and by Exhibit C4 the Claimant was dismissed by the Defendant on December 16, 2015. He went on that during the period of her suspension, the claimant was still a staff of the defendant and so, there was nothing wrong when the Defendant published her name as its Acting Managing Director between the months of May 2015 and November 2015; (the period of her suspension from the Bank), relying on Longe v. FBN Plc [2010] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1189) 1; Trucks (Nig) Ltd v. Anigboro [2001] 2 NWLR (Pt.696) 159 and University of Ilorin v. Akinrogunde [2002] FWLR (Pt. 98) 1006 at 1016 D-E.

Still on prayers 3 and 4 of the Claimant in this suit, counsel submitted that it is already shown that Exhibit C1 is void and that the Claimant remained in the employment of the Defendant until December 16, 2015 when Exhibit C4 was issued and served on her by the Defendant. He further submitted that an employer can suspend, retire, terminate or dismiss his or its employee’s /servant’s appointment for good or bad reason or even for no reason at all, citing Ayorinde v. Oyo State Government [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 356) 709 at 722-723 G-B and urged the court to refuse the prayers.

  1. On Prayer 5 of the Claimant, which is for payment of severance benefits; Counsel submitted that an employer has no obligation whatsoever to award any financial compensation to a dismissed employee, citing New Nigeria Bank Plc. v. Imonikhe [2002] FWLR (Pt. 118) 1385 at 1428 B-D.

On Prayer 6 for general damages, counsel submitted that there is no iota of evidence before this Hon. Court in this case to show that the Defendant caused any sort of injury to the Claimant or that the Defendant violated the Claimant’s right in any form. He referred the court to the cases of NDIC v. K.B. & C.S Ltd [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 357) 916 and Gari v. Sairafina Nig. Ltd [2008] All FWLR (Pt. 399) 434 at 477.

On Prayer 7 for an Order of injunction restraining the Defendant, their agents, privies, officers etc. from further embarrassing, harassing, intimidating or interfering howsoever, with the Right to dignity of the claimant by virtue of this suit; counsel submitted that there is no form of evidence whatsoever to show that the defendant has ever embarrassed, harassed, intimidated or interfered; howsoever with the Right to dignity of and or defaming the claimant as a result of this suit, citing Azeni v. Adesina [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 370)1451 at 1467 F-H; Olaifa v. Aina [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 286) 192 and Okafor v. Ikeanyi [1979] 3-4 SC 99.

Counsel went on that it is not compulsary for an employer to ensure prosecution of employee for commission of a crime before dismissing him, citing Uzondu v. UBN Plc. [2008] All FWLR (Pt. 443) 1389 at 1399. Finally, counsel concluded that the claimant has not made out any case against the defendant, to entitle her to the reliefs she is seeking for in this suit . He urged the court to dismiss the action with substantial costs.

  1. Counsel to the claimant raised four issues for determination of the Court in his final written address as follows:
  2. Whether the claimant’s Exhibit C.1 was not a sufficient notice to the defendant of her disengagement from service
  3. Whether the defendant can send its monthly returns to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) using the claimant’s name as MD/CEO for the months of May, June and July 2015 after becoming aware of claimant’s Exhibit C.1.

iii.         Whether the defendant can dismiss the claimant, 7 months after becoming aware of claimant’s Exhibit “C.1”.

  1. Whether the claimant is not entitled to all the reliefs sought in this case.

 

  1. Arguing the first issue, counsel referred the court toBlack’s Law Dictionary (with Pronunciations) Sixth Edition, page 1310, the case of Merriam-Webster WAEC v. Oshionebo [2006] 12 NWLR (Pt. 994) pg. 258 and Adefemi v. Abegunde [2004] 15 NWLR (Pt. 895) 6 on the principle that the tendering of a Letter of Resignation carries with it the right to leave service automatically without any benefit subject to the employee paying any of his indebtedness to his employer. He continued that a Notice of Resignation is effective not from the date of the letter, nor from the date of any purported acceptance but from the date on, which the letter was received by the employer or his agent. He contended that in the whole of its pleadings, the defendant never said that the claimant was indebted to it in any way or that she did not follow due process in tendering her resignation letter. Counsel maintained that it is on record that, upon being served with the claimant’s Exhibit “C1”; the defendant wrote Exhibit “C2” dated May 18, 2015; which states that the defendant got the notice of claimant’s resignation on May 14, 2015. The claimant’s reply to defendant’s letter (Exhibit “C2”) is Exhibit “C2(a)”. Meanwhile, the claimant tendered her letter of resignation while still on her annual leave.

 

  1. Counsel went on that by Exhibit “C7”, the claimant applied for her annual leave on the April 22, 2015; the approved/effective date for the annual leave was April 23, 2015 and to resume on June 2, 2015 but the letter conveying same is dated April 29, 2015 and it was received by the claimant on June 3, 2015.He continued that while Exhibit “C3” is dated June 2, 2015; the purported date of resumption; the claimant had resigned since May 12, 2015. Counsel noted that, it is not the case of the defendant that the claimant was paid her salary in the month of May 2015 when she tendered her resignation letter. To the claimant’s counsel, the purported indefinite suspension of the claimant without pay through Exhibit “C3” is dated June 2, 2015. Again, the claimant was not paid any salary for the months of June and July 2015 when her name was still being used to send defendant’s monthly returns in Exhibits “C6, C6 (a) and C6 (b)”.

 

  1. Arguing issue 2 of whether the defendant can send its monthly returns to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) for the months of May, June and July 2015; using the claimant’s name as MD/CEO after becoming aware of her resignation, counsel submitted thatthe defendant having received the claimant’s resignation letter ought not to continue with the use of her name as its Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer in sending its monthly returns to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). He contended that it is wrongful and illegal, more so that the Defendant had stopped the claimant’s salary the moment it received her notice of disengagement from service. Invariably, for the three months the claimant’s name was being used; no salary was paid to her. To counsel, this amounts to conscripting the claimant to work for the defendant against her will, thereby violating her Fundamental Right under section 34 (1) (c) of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 (as amended).

 

  1. Arguing issue three ofwhether the defendant can dismiss the claimant, 7 months after receiving her letter of resignation; counsel contended that from May 14, 2015 when the Defendant got notice of Claimant’s disengagement from its service to December 16, 2015 when the letter of Summary Dismissal was written and served on the Claimant, it was a clear seven months’ interval. He referred the court to Ekaegwu v. Nigerian Army [2006] 11 NWLR (Pt.991) pg.382 Paragraphs A-C & page 14 paragraphs 20 and 21 of its statement of defence of February 12, 2018 but filed February 13, 2018. He also referred to Exhibits C.4 and C.8. Counsel submitted that any decision to dismiss an employee must satisfy the requirements of natural Justice; particularly, the right to fair hearing as enshrined in Section 36 (1) of the Constitution of the FRN (As Amended). To him, Natural Justice is the rule of procedure; which requires that a person should be tried by an independent Tribunal as well as to have the right to defend himself. It is a rule, which in the conduct of human affairs, demands fairness and morality amongst people and that the principle of natural justice is of universal application.

 

  1. Counsel contended that seven (7) months after the claimant tendered her resignation letter, Exhibit “C4” (letter of summary dismissal) was issued and served on her. To counsel, the defendant was the investigator that carried out an internal forensic Audit, (being the accuser) and the judge who found the claimant guilty in the Bank’s Court and in the absence of the claimant and awarded the punishment of dismissal against her. He went on that this is against the twin pillars of natural justice of Nemo judex in casua sua and Audi alteram partem; meaning, no one can be a judge in his own cause and that the other side of the case should always be heard. Counsel further submitted that the defendant having gotten notice of claimant’s disengagement from service on May 14, 2015 cannot turn around to dismiss her on December 16, 2015 from the same office or service that she had vacated voluntarily, citing Wilson v. A.G. Bendel State [1985] NWLR (Pt. 4) 572: [1985] 2 SC 191.

 

  1. Responding to paragraphs 4.1 to 4.3 of the defendant’s written address on the authenticity of Exhibits C6, C6(a) and C6(b) that they were not signed; counsel submitted that the said Exhibits are templates sent on-line by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to various Microfinance Banks including the defendant to only key in the financial figures of their transactions for the months under review and the name of the Managing Director authorizing same and send back a copy on-line and print the hard copy for office file for the usual CBN periodic inspection. He argued that the signature of the authorizing officer was not needed, only to insert the name of the Managing Director of the given Microfinance Bank. Counsel maintained that the defendant had the opportunity to disprove the said Exhibits by producing the signed ones bearing the name of who signed it for the said months, but this it never did. The defendant was again given ‘Notice’ to produce the original or counterpart copy but it failed to produce same. Counsel contended that, it is the law thatwhere notice to produce is served on a party who fails to produce same; secondary evidence may be given of the document in question where it is available; citing Buhari v. Obasanjo [2005] 7 SCNJ 1 at Pg.52. Counsel urged the court to accept Exhibits C6, C6 (a) and C6 (b) as documents relevant to the determination of this case.

 

  1. Responding to paragraphs 4.4 to 4.7 of the defendant’s final written address on Exhibit C9 that same is not admissible in law; being the record of proceeding in a criminal case and citingAbubakar v. Joseph (supra) and Nwachukwu v. Egbuchu (supra), counsel submitted that the record of proceedings of the criminal case against the claimant at the Magistrate Court, Exhibit “C9” only show the evidence of Madam Magella Iwuoha, the Head Admin of the Defendant in the case with Charge No. PMC/1726C/2016 referred to in paragraph 21 of the defendant statement of defence. Therefore, it is relevant to the determination of this case. He further submitted that assuming without conceding that Exhibit “C9” is inadmissible, its inadmissibility does not remove the fact that as at when the letter of dismissal, Exhibit “C4” was issued and served on the Claimant, the purported reason for the dismissal was still pending in Magistrate Court and that this is the main reason for the prosecution in Exhibit “C9”, citing section 4 of the Evidence Act, 2011. Counsel went on that the claimant was dismissed before being charged to court for the alleged crime. To counsel, a person who is accused of a crime cannot be so dismissed by his employer, referring to Prof. OVC Okene [2000] in his book, ‘Industrial Law in Nigeria’ – A Concise Text (Vol. 1) page 76.

 

  1. Arguing issue four of whether the claimant is not entitled to all the reliefs she is seeking for, counsel referred the court to the legal maxim of “Ubi jus, ibi remedium” “where there is a wrong there is a remedy”. He submitted that the actions of the defendant led to the loss of the claimant’s new employment, the psychological trauma of being charged to court for no just cause, the cost in monetary worth and time expended in the whole litigation; all these amounts to a wrong that the claimant is entitled to a remedy in the circumstance of this case and he urged the Court to so hold.

 

  1. COURT’S DECISION

I have read through all the facts of this case, the written arguments of the parties including their cited authorities, from all of this, I am of the considered view that the following issues need to be resolved by the Court between the parties:

  1. Whether or not the resignation of the claimant via Exhibit C.1 is valid and sufficient notice of the disengagement of her service from the defendant and whether the Bank can reject same and subsequently dismiss her as it did.
  2. Whether the claimant is entitled to severance benefit and damages from the defendant as claimed by her.

 

Before resolving the above framed issues, let us decide on some basic problems that came up during the trial. They are on the admissibility of Exhibits C.6, C.6a & C.6b together with Exhibit C.9 in the case.

19. On admissibility of Exhibits C6, C6 (a) and C6 (b)

The 2nd relief of the claimant before this court is praying for “A Declaration that, sending monthly returns of the Defendant to the CBN using the Claimant’s name as MD/CEO in the months of May, June and July 2015 after the Claimant’s Resignation letter dated 12th May, 2015 to the Defendant; is wrongful, unlawful, unconstitutional and fraud on the part of the Defendant.

In paragraph 16 of the Statement of Claims, the claimant avers that the defendant was fraudulently using her name to transact its business (of sending) its monthly returns to CBN. The claimant frontloaded Exhibits C6, C6 (a) and C6 (b) to buttress her pleadings here. In paragraph 14 of the statement of defence, the defendant denied this act; it went further to state that the defendant has never being involved in any fraudulent act and that it never used the name of the claimant in any fraudulent deed.

In the defendant’s final written address, it is the submission of its counsel at paragraphs 4.1 to 4.3 of the address that those Exhibits were not signed; therefore, they are entitled to no weight at all in law. In his own arguments in paragraphs 4.14 to 4.15 of his written address, counsel to the claimant contended that Exhibits C.6, C.6 (a) and C.6 (b) are templates sent on-line by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to various Microfinance Banks including the Defendant to only key in the financial figures of their transactions for the months under review and that the name of the Managing Director authorizing same and to send back a copy on-line and then print the hard copy for office file for the usual CBN periodic inspection. He continued that the signature of the authorizing officer was not needed, but only to insert the name of the Managing Director of the given Microfinance Bank.

  1. Exhibits C.6, C.6(a) and C.6(b) before the court are monthly returns to CBN from the defendant for May 30, 2015; June 30, 2015 and July 30, 2015 respectively. A critical look at them reveals that they are not signed and there is no evidence that they were sent to CBN. The position of the claimant’s counsel is that the defendant had the opportunity to disprove Exhibits C.6, C.6(a) and C.6(b) by producing their signed ones, bearing the name of whoever signed them for those months; but this the Bank never did. He went on that the defendant was again given ‘Notice’ to produce their original or counterpart copies but it failed to produce same. He further contended that; it is the law that where notice to produce is served on a party who fails to produce same, secondary evidence may be given of the document in question where it is available.

The law is that an unsigned or irregularly signed document is worthless and it should not be ascribed any weight at all in law; see Dantiye & anor v. Kanya & ors [2008] LPELR-CA/K/EP/NA/26/2007 (page 39 paragraphs F-G). In part, I agree with the claimant’s counsel that the claimant can use secondary evidence to support her case in certain circumstances as she contended, but such secondary document must not be offensive to law out-rightly. In this particular instance, the law says an unsigned document is worthless and that it is a trash that has no legal or evidential value. Since Exhibits C.6, C.6(a) and C.6(b) are not signed; they have no evidential value. Therefore, the fact that the defendant failed to disprove that it issued those documents or that the Bank failed to produce the original or counterpart copies of these exhibits as requested by the claimant, will not assist the claimant in making those documents legal and reliable for this judgment. Furthermore, there is no evidence on the face of these documents that they were actually sent by the defendant to CBN, as alleged by the claimant more so, that the defendant has denied sending them to CBN in paragraph 14 of the Statement of Defence. In the circumstance, I hold that Exhibits C.6, C.6(a) and C.6(b) are worthless documents without any legal value; they are accordingly discountenanced in this judgment.

  1. More to the point is that the allegation of the claimant that the defendant fraudulently used her name after her resignation to transact business by sending the Bank’s monthly returns with her name; forms the basis of the claimant’s relief No 2 and this is a criminal allegation. Such allegation of crime in a civil proceedings is still required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt as provided in section 135 (1) & (2) of the Evidence Act 2011 and as held in the case ofStatoil (Nig.) Ltd v. Inducon (Nig.) Ltd [2014] 9 NWLR (Pt.1411) CA 43 at 96 paras A-B. The claimant who asserts this crime must prove same beyond reasonable doubt but this, she has failed to do here. Therefore, I hold that the claimant is not entitled to a ‘Declaration that, sending monthly returns of the Defendant to the CBN using the Claimant’s name as MD/CEO in the months of May, June and July 2015 after the Claimant’s Resignation letter dated 12th May, 2015 to the Defendant is wrongful, unlawful, unconstitutional and fraud on the part of the Defendant’. In the circumstance, this court declines granting relief 2 of the claimant based on the content of Exhibits C.6, C.6(a) and C.6(b) before the Court as these documents have no legal value and I so hold.

 

  1. On the admissibility of Exhibit C9

Exhibit C9 is the Record of Proceedings on a Criminal case with Suit No: PMC/1726C/2016 between Commissioner of Police v. Yitonierani Briggs (the claimant) at the Rivers State Magistrates’ Court; sitting in Port Harcourt. By the judgment of the Supreme Court on Abubakar v. Joseph [2008] All FWLR (Pt. 432) 1065 at 1103 F-G, per Ogbuagu, JSC stated thus:

I will pause here to state on decided authorities that the admission of the said (Exhibit D) the criminal proceedings in a civil trial or proceedings was wrong. Such proceedings, was certainly in admissible in any event. In other words, record of proceedings in a criminal proceeding should not be admitted in evidence in a civil proceeding.

 

This court is bound by the Supreme Court’s decision reflected above on the principle that, record of proceedings in a criminal proceeding should not be admitted in evidence in a civil proceeding. Based on this case law principle, I hold that Exhibit C.9 is not admissible in this case. Notwithstanding that the document is already admitted in evidence in this case, it admission is hereby set aside and its content is accordingly discountenanced in this judgment.

 

  1. Whether the resignation of the claimant via Exhibit C.1 is valid

Resignation is the act or an instance of surrendering or relinquishing an office. It is a formal notification of relinquishing an office or position as the case may be; see the case of Liman v. Access Bank [2014] 45 NLLR (Pt. 146) 626 at Page 657 paragraph E. It is the submission of counsel to the claimant in paragraphs 4.01 to 4.03 of his final written address that the tendering of a Letter of Resignation carries with it the right to leave service automatically subject to the employee paying any of his indebtedness to his employer and that a Notice of Resignation is effective from the date the letter was received by the employer or his agent. On the other hand, the argument of counsel to the defendant in paragraphs 4.9 to 4.12 of his Final Written Address is to the effect that an employer can reject its employee’s Letter of Resignation if there is reason to so act. For instance, on the ground that the employee has questions to answer on an ongoing investigation and that permitting him to go may hinder the investigations, citing Graham-Douglas v. Attorney General Rivers State [1973] NMLR 77.

 

  1. To the defendant’s counsel, the court will not look into any other matter outside the terms agreed thereon by the parties in determining the right and obligations of the parties, relying onIbama v. SPDC (Nig.) Ltd [2005] All FWLR (Pt. 287) 832 at 843 – 844 G-A and Exhibit C.2 (the defendant’s reply rejecting the claimant’s resignation at pg. 17 of the record). He continued that by the provisions of Article 8(B) (i) of Exhibit C.8, the Defendant’s Staff Manual; all employees have free will to discontinue their services to the Bank at any time. However, they are expected to give mandatory one-month notice or pay salary in lieu. He maintained that in Exhibit C.1 before this Court, the supposed Letter of Resignation; the Claimant did not comply with this mandatory provision in Exhibit C.8 as she did not give the defendant a month notice of her resignation; neither did she pay her one month salary in lieu of notice. To counsel, the Defendant was right in rejecting the claimant’s Letter of Resignation as it had sufficient and cogent reasons for it.

I agreed with the submission of counsel to the defendant that the contract of service is the pivot and the foundation upon which an aggrieved employee must found his case, he succeeds or falls upon the said terms and the court will not look into any other matter outside the terms and conditions in determining the rights and obligations of the parties, see Ibama v. SPDC (Nig.) Ltd (supra).

  1. On the effect of the claimant’s resignation letter

It is a settled law that in determining the right, duties, obligations and liabilities of parties in a contract of service, the court is to examine the terms and conditions of the service ; see Odiase v. Auchi Polytechnic, Auchi [2015]60 NLLR (Pt. 208)1 CA at 23-24, paragraphs F-A and West African Examination Counsel v. Oshionebo [2015] 55 NLLA (Pt. 187) 165 at  185 paragraphs A-D. It is worthy of note that both parties in this case are in agreement that Exhibit C.8; the Defendant’s Staff Manual at pages 32 to 39 of the record contains the terms and conditions governing their employment relationship. Therefore; the right, duties, obligations and liabilities of parties in this employment relationship will be determined by the contents of Exhibit C.8.

Article 8(B) (i) of Exhibit C.8 provides:

All employees have free will to discontinue their services to the Bank at any time. However, they are expected to give mandatory one-month notice or salary in lieu. The bank would view seriously and seek redress for any breach of this.

  1. Exhibit C.1, the claimant’s Letter of Resignation is at page 16 of the record and it is dated May 12, 2015. Onthe face of it, the letter was received by the defendant on May 14, 2015 and no one month mandatory notice is given to the defendant in the letter as provided for in Article 8(B) (i) of Exhibit C.8; neither is there any evidence before the Court that she gave the defendant a month salary in lieu notice. In the circumstance, I find that the claimant’s letter of resignation was issued not in compliance with the provision of the terms and conditions of the parties’ agreement as contained in the defendant’s manual, Exhibit C.8.

 

In Adefemi v. Abegunde [2004] 14 NWLR (Pt. 895) 1 (CA); Onnoghen JCA (as he then was) held thus on the effect of resignation from employment:

Resignation date is from the date notice is received. There is absolute power to resign and no discretion to refuse to accept the notice. If resignation will only become effective after acceptance, the payment of salary in lieu of notice of registration for the slated month will only be effective resignation after the expiration of the month for which the salary in lieu was paid. That cannot be so.

 

The effect of the above decision is that an employee has unconditional power to resign; consequently, I hold that; even though the claimant did not give one month notice of her resignation to the defendant as required by the terms and conditions of her employment, the said resignation was still effective from May 14, 2015 when the defendant received that letter of resignation. However, for not giving the required notice, I further hold that the claimant has an obligation to pay to the defendant, her one month’s salary in lieu of the one month notice of her resignation.

       

  1. On whether the defendant can reject the claimant’s resignation

As held above, Resignation from an employment is effective from the date that the letter of resignation was received by the employer. It is trite that there is absolute power to resign and no discretion to refuse to accept the resignation letter/notice. See Adefemi v. Abegunde (supra) and Sidmach Technologies Nigeria Ltd v. Onuorah [2014] 46 NLLR (Pt. 148) 258 at 290 paragraphs C-F.

From the content of Exhibit C8, the Defendant’s Staff Manual there is nothing in the terms and conditions of the agreement between the parties, which gives the defendant right to reject the claimant’s resignation. By the provisions of ILO Convention (No. 29) of 1930 on Forced Labour; any work or service, which is exacted from any person under threat of a penalty and for which the person has not offered himself or herself voluntarily, is forced labour. Nigeria has ratified and domesticated this convention. And so, even if the parties’ terms and conditions of the employment relationship allow the defendant to reject the claimant’s letter of resignation, that will amount to forced labour and it will also be against International Best Practice and International Labour Standard as entrenched in section 254C (1) (f) & (h) of the Constitution of the FRN (As Amended). Therefore, this court will not uphold such obnoxious agreement.

 

  1. It is the finding of this Court above that the defendant received the claimant’s letter of resignation,Exhibit C.1 of May 12, 2015; on May 14, 2015. See the face of this letter at page 16 of the record. In the circumstance, I reiterate that the effective date of the claimant’s resignation is May 14, 2015. As a result, I hold that the defendant has no discretion to refuse to accept the said registration of the claimant with effect from May 14, 2015. Consequently, I further hold that the following actions taking by the defendant against the claimant after her resignation, which are: the rejection of her resignation via Exhibit C.2, her indefinite suspension without pay, Exhibit C.3 and her summary dismissal via Exhibit C. 4, seven months after her resignation (see pages 17, 20 and 21 of the record respectively) are all null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
  2. Whether the claimant is entitled to severance benefit and damages.

By her reliefs v & vi, the claimant is claiming against the defendant the sum of N2,761,484.25k (Two Million, seven hundred and sixty-one thousand, four hundred and eighty-four naira, twenty-five kobo) only as severance benefits and, the sum of ‘N20, 000,000.00 (Ten million naira)’ as general damages.

Article 8 (B) (ii) of the Defendant’s staff Manual (Exhibit C.8) is on benefit in respect of resignation. By this citation; the claimant, an employee of the defendant who resigned from the employment of the defendant is entitled to benefits as provided in Article 8 (A) (iv) of Exhibit C. 8. See page 35 of the record.

 

  1. On August 19, 2008; the claimant was employed by the defendant, see paragraph 2 of the Statement of Claim in page 5 of the record. On May 14, 2015 the claimant’s resignation letter of May 12, 2015 was received by the defendant. See page 17 of the record. This means that the claimant was in the employment of the defendant from August 19, 2008 to May 14, 2015; which is a period of 6years, 9months and 5days. Thus, the claimant is entitled to severance benefit under the group of the defendant’s employees who served the Bank forFive years but less than 15years. This entitles the claimant to her Six Weeks’ salary for each completed years of service and I so hold.
  2. However, from the claimant’s pleadings and evidence, there is no fact or evidence before the Court stating any specific sum of money as the claimant’s salary to enable the court confirm or otherwise the sum of N2,761,484.25k being claimed by the claimant as her severance benefits. The Court is not even sure how she arrived at that sum of money in the first place. Consequently, I find and hold that the claimant failed to prove to the satisfaction of this Court that what she is entitled to as her severance benefit is N2,761,484.25k. In the circumstances, I decline from directing the defendant to pay the said sum to the claimant as her severance benefit in this judgment.

 

  1. On the Claimant’s claim for the sum of N50,000,000.00 as General Damages.

In Relief No. 6 of the claimant as endorsed on her complaint, she is seeking for an Order, mandating the Defendant to pay her “the sum of N20,000,000.00 (Ten million naira) as general damages” (sic); see page 3 of the record. Nevertheless, in paragraph 22 (6) of the “statement of claim” at page 8 of the record and paragraph 21(6) of the claimant’s written statement on oath at page 12 of the record, the claimant is praying the court for an order mandating the Defendant to pay her the sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty million naira) as general damages.

The claimant adopted his written statement on oath before the Court, in the face of the contradiction between the endorsed claim of the sum of N20,000,000.00 (Ten million naira) as general damages on her complaint and the sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty million naira) as general damages as pleaded and as deposed to in her written statement on oath. The law is that statement of claims/facts supersedes the writ of summons or the endorsement on the complaint as in the instant case; see the case of Salisu v. Mobolaji [2016] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1535) page 242 at 290 para B-C. In the circumstance, I find that the amount of money the claimant is seeking for as general damages from the defendant in this case is N50,000,000.00.

  1. In paragraph 17 of the Statement of Claim and paragraph 16 of the claimant’s Written Statement on Oath, the claimant pleaded and testified that in response to a request for employee verification from her new employers (RGPMF Bank), the Defendant defamed her through a letter dated October 19, 2015; which eventually cost her to loose her new job. She continued that this gave her trauma and emotional pains. See Exhibit C.5 at pages 22 to 24 of the Court’s record. The defendant confirmed that the Bank wrote the letter in question dated October 19, 2015 to the said new employer of the claimant. See paragraphs 16 to 19 of the Statement of Defence, paragraphs 19 to 22 of the written Statement on Oath of the defendant’s witness, Lady Magella Iwuoha and the content of Exhibits D. 2 & D.2 (a) at pages 90 to 92 of the record; which was based on the outcome of the Disciplinary actions that the defendant carried out against the claimant.

Counsel to the claimant contended inter alia, in his Final Written Address that the legal maxim of “Ubi jus, ibi remedium”, which means “where there is a wrong there is a remedy”; applies to the claimant in the instant case. He maintained that the actions of the Defendant led to the loss of the claimant’s new employment and also to the psychological trauma of being charged to court for no just cause. He argued that the cost of these losses in monetary worth and of the time she expended on the whole litigation is a wrong that entitles the claimant to a remedy of general damages in this instance and he urged the Court to so hold.

 

  1. It is trite that General Damages are such damages, which the law presumes to be the direct or probable consequences of the act complained of; while special damages are such damages, which the law will not infer from the nature of the act complained of. The Court can even make an award of general damages regardless of the fact that it has nothing to measure its assessment of the wrong with, except what is the opinion of a reasonable man; seeUBN Plc. v. O. Nuorah & Ors [2007] LPELR- 11845 (CA) and Joseph v. Abubakar [2002] 5 NWLR (Pt.759) 185.

 

I have held above that the subsequent disciplinary actions of the defendant against the claimant after her resignation; such as: her indefinite suspension without pay and her summary dismissal are nullity and of not effect. Thus, I find that the letter written by the defendant to the claimant’s new employer, based on the outcome/report of the disciplinary actions taken against the claimant by the defendant, i. e. Exhibits C.5 and D.2 & D.2(a); as a result of which the claimant lost her new employment with new employer (RGPMF Bank) led to the loss of her new job with her new employer. Consequently, I hold that the claimant is entitled to general damages on this score. I further hold that the defendant shall pay the sum of N10,000,000.00  only to the claimant for this loss and for the claimant’s needless psychological trauma and pain.

  1. On the whole, I hold and order as follows:
  2. I hold and Declare that the Claimant’s Letter of Resignation to the Defendant, dated May 12, 2015 is sufficient and valid for the voluntary determination of her employment with the defendant.
  3. I hold that the claimant has absolute power to resign and that the defendant has no discretion reject the resignation.

iii.      I hold that the claimant resigned from her employment with the defendant with effect from May 14, 2015 when the defendant received the claimant’s letter of resignation.

  1. I hold and declare that the defendant’s subsequent actions against the claimant after her resignation; i. e. her indefinite suspension without pay and her summary dismissal are null and void and of no effect.
  2. I hold that the defendant shall pay N10, 000,000.00 general damages to the claimant for her loss, her needless psychological trauma and pain.
  3. I hold that the claimant failed to satisfy the court that the defendant sent its monthly returns to the CBN using her name as its MD/CEO for the months of May, June and July 2015 after her Resignation.

vii.    I hold that the claimant failed to prove her entitlement to the sum of N2,761,484.25k as her severance benefit; and so, I decline from directing the Defendant to pay the said sum to the claimant. She can however, file another action for her severance benefits with this judgment by properly supplying her last salary particulars with the defendant.

viii. I hereby direct the claimant to pay to the defendant her one month’s salary in lieu of notice of the resignation of her employment within 30days from today.

  1. I direct the defendant to pay the awarded N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) only general damages to the claimant within 30days from today.
  2. The defendant is to pay N500,000.00 cost to the claimant within 30days from today.

Judgment is entered accordingly.

 

Hon. Justice F. I. Kola-Olalere

Presiding Judge

 

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