MR. VICTOR IKE OYE v. COMRADE MIKE ALIOKE & ORS (2017)

MR. VICTOR IKE OYE v. COMRADE MIKE ALIOKE & ORS

(2017)LCN/10335(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Wednesday, the 16th day of August, 2017

CA/E/367/2017

JUSTICES

ABDU ABOKI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

IBRAHIM SHATA BDLIYA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

MR. VICTOR IKE OYE
(National Chairman, APGA, for himself on behalf of members of the National Executive Committee of APGA) Appellant(s)

AND

1. COMRADE MIKE ALIOKE
2. ALL PROGRESSIVES GRAND ALLIANCE
3. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC)
4. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
5. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, ENUGU STATE Respondent(s)

RATIO

PRELIMINARY OBJECTION: THE PURPOSE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION; THE EFFECT OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION WHERE IT SUCCEEDS

It is trite law that the purpose of preliminary objection incorporated in a brief of argument by parties as in the instant case is to contend that the appeal is incompetent and if it succeeds it puts an end to the entire appeal. In other words a preliminary objection is filed against the hearing of the appeal, if it succeeds the appeal abates. See the cases of NEPA VS ANGO (2001) 15 NWLR (PT.737) PG 627, OKEREKE VS JAMES (2012) 16 NWLR (PT.1326) PG 339. PER ABDU ABOKI, J.C.A.

NECESSARY PARTY: THE EFFECT OF ANY JUDGMENT OBTAINED AGAINST A NECESSARY PARTY WHO WAS NOT JOINED IN THE ACTION

The law is settled that where a necessary party who is likely to be affected by the result of an action is not joined in the action, any judgment obtained against him will be to no avail. See N. U. R. T. W. v. R. T. E. A. N (2012) LPELR – 7840 (SC). PER ABDU ABOKI, J.C.A.

NECESSARY PARTY: WHO IS A NECESSARY PARTY

As recent as 12th July, 2017, the Supreme Court in POROYE & ORS. v. MAKARFI SC.130 per Ariwoola JSC. explained who is a necessary party in a case and held as follows:

“A necessary party in an action has been held to be that person who is not only interested in the subject matter of the proceedings but also who in his absence, the proceedings could not be fairly dealt with. In other words, the question to be settled or determined in the action between the existing parties must be a question which cannot be properly and fairly settled unless he is a party to the action, instituted by the plaintiff. See CHIEF ABUSI DAVID GREEN VS. CHIEF (DR) E. T. DUBLIN GREEN (1987) NWLR (PT.61) 4811 (1987) LPELR – 1338 (SC); AMON VS. RAPHAEL TRUCK & SON (1956), 1 WR 357; CHIEF REX KOLA OLAWOYE V. ENGINEER RAPHAEL JIMOH & ORS (2012) 13 NWLR (PT.1371) 362; (2013) 10 SCM 191; (2013) 4 SCNJ 25. In the same vein, a necessary party has been held to be a person whose presence in an action is essential for the effectual and complete determination of the claim before the Court. He is the party in the absence of whom the claim cannot be effectively and completely fairly determined by the Court.” PER ABDU ABOKI, J.C.A.

JURISDICTION: WHAT CONFERS JURISDICTION ON A COURT; WHAT THE COURT WILL CONSIDER IN DETERMINING ITS JURISDICTION ON A PARTICULAR MATTER

It is settled that by the combined reading of Sections 6 and 230-284 of the Constitution as amended, the jurisdiction of any Court established by the Constitution or an Act of the National Assembly such as a State High Court to entertain any matter brought to it is donated by the provisions of the Constitution and any Act of the National Assembly which specifically confers jurisdiction in a matter on the Court. In construing the provisions of the Constitution and/or relevant statute to determine its jurisdiction on a particular matter, the Court must advert its mind to (i) The status of the parties (ii) the nature of the claim. See NEPA V. EDEGBERO (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt.798) 79, (2002) GOLDMARK NIG. LTD. & ORS v. IBAFON COY. LTD & ORS (2012) LPELR-9349 (SC). PER ABDU ABOKI, J.C.A.

JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT: WHICH COURT HAS THE JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN ANY ACTION OR PROCEEDINGS FOR A DECLARATION OR INJUNCTION AFFECTING THE VALIDITY OF ANY EXECUTIVE OR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION OR DECISION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OR ANY OF ITS AGENCIES

It is settled that by virtue of Section 251 (1), (r) and (s), the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in any action or proceedings for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies. In the case on appeal, there is no doubt that the 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents are agencies of the Federal Government. There is also no doubt that the reliefs sought are directed at the executive decisions of the agencies. My clear view is that the reliefs sought by the 1st and 2nd respondents are within the provisions of Section 251(1)(r) of the Constitution. The Federal High Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the matter The High Court of Enugu State had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter. See INEGBEDION V. SELO-OJEMEN & ANOR (2013) LPELR – 19769 (SC) GBILEVE & ANOR v. ADDINGI & ANOR. (2014) LPELR- 22141 (SC), AGBASO v. IWUNZE & ORS. (2014) LPELR -24108), WEMA SECURITIES AND FINANCE PLC V. NIG. AGRIC. INS. COP. (2015) LPELR – 24833 (SC). PER ABDU ABOKI, J.C.A.

ABDU ABOKI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal emanate from the decision of Enugu State High Court of Justice delivered on the 22nd day of May, 2017 by A. R. Ozoemena J. in suit No.E/291M/2017 wherein the 1st and 2nd respondents’ application for Judicial Review was upheld.

The 1st and 2nd Respondents herein were the applicants at the lower Court while the 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents were the 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents at the lower Court respectively.

On 4th day of May, 2017, the 1st and 2nd respondents/applicants had brought an application for judicial review to wit; declaration, mandamus and prohibition against the 3rd, 4th and 5th Respondents herein dated the same 4th day of May, 2017.
The said application was for the following reliefs;
a) An order of Mandamus compelling the 1st respondent to accept and/or recognize the decisions of the 2nd applicant in appointing Chief Martin Agbaso as the Acting National Chairman of All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA).
b) A declaration of the honourable Court that by Section 4 of the Police Act, the 2nd and 3rd respondents are bound to ensure the

compliance of the decision of the 2nd applicant as it regard the appointment of Chief Matin Agbaso as the Acting National Chairman of the All Progressive Grand Alliance in order to forestall a breakdown of law and order.
c) An order of the honourable Court prohibiting the 1st Respondent and his privies from recognizing and/or accepting any other person as the National Chairman of the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) other than the name submitted to it by the 2nd applicant in the person of Chief Martin Agbaso.

Attached to the application were, statement in support containing the name, address and description of the applicants, reliefs sought from the Court, grounds of the application and 5 Paragraphs affidavit verifying facts relied on by the applicants to which the 1st applicant deposed. Annexed to the said affidavit are various documents marked Exhibit A, B, C, D, E, F & G respectively.

The said application was heard on 22nd day of May, 2017 and ruling was delivered on the same day. The trial Court in its ruling granted the reliefs as sought. The appellant herein who was the chairman of the 2nd respondent APGA and alleged to have been

suspended by the National Working Committee of the party was not joined as a party to the case at the Court below. He could not therefore appeal as of right against the judgment to this Court. However, the appellant filed an application for leave to appeal as a party interested in the matter against the judgment on 16/6/2017 and a notice of appeal on the same day. From the record before this Court, the motion came up before R. N. Onuorah J. on 20/6/2017 but he declined to entertain the application “because of the undue and unnecessary pressure from some person on me to compromise this suit in their favour more especially the author of the letter just read out in open Court.” He returned the case to the Chief Judge for re-assignment. Upon the decision of the Court below not to entertain the appellant’s motion, the appellant on that same 20/6/2017 filed another motion in this Court with appeal no. CA/E/358M/2017 and sought the following orders:
1. An order granting the appellant/applicant leave to appeal as in interested party against the ruling of this Court coram A. R. Ozoemena J. delivered on 22nd May, 2017 in suit No.E/291M/2017 COMRADE MIKE ALIOKE

& ANOR VS INEC & ORS.
2. An order that the leave to appeal as an interested party granted to the appellant/applicant shall operate as a stay of execution of the aforesaid ruling/orders of this honorable must delivered on 22nd May, 2017 pending the determination of the appeal.
3. An order deeming the notice of appeal dated 15th June, 2017 and filed on 16th June, 2017 as properly filed and served, the appropriate filing fees thereto having been paid.
4. An order granting an accelerated hearing of this appeal.
5. Such further order(s) as the honorable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.

As an indication of seriousness and willingness to prosecute the appeal, the record of appeal was compiled and transmitted to this Court on 22/6/2017. On 28th day of June, 2017 the appellant filed a motion on notice at registry of this Court praying the Court for the following orders;
1. An order granting leave to the appellant/applicant to compile and transmit the record of appeal to this Court within the period allowed the registrar of the Court below to compile and transmit the record of appeal.
2. An order deeming the record

of appeal already compiled and transmitted by the appellant/applicant to this Court vide the notice of appeal filed on 16th June, 2017 and consequent upon which the appeal is now entered/numbered as Appeal No.CA/E/367/2017 as properly compiled and transmitted, all necessary fees having been paid.
3. An order granting an accelerated hearing of this appeal.
4. Such further and or other orders as the Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.

From the records of this Court, the two motions were heard and granted on 10/7/2017.

Briefs of argument were in accordance with the relevant rules of this Court duly filed and exchanged. The Appellant’s brief of argument settled by Chief Wole Olanipekun, OFR, SAN, dated 10th July, 2017 was filed on 11th July, 2017. The Appellant’s reply brief to the 1st respondent’s brief dated 26th July, 2017 was filed on 27th July, 2017, while the Appellant?s reply brief to the 2nd Respondents brief dated 26th July, 2017 was filed on 27th July, 2017. The 1st Respondent’s brief of argument settled by K. C. Nwufo SAN dated 20th July, 2017 was filed on 24th July, 2017. The 2nd Respondent’s amended brief of

argument dated 8th August, 2017 and filed on the same day was settled by N. K. Uzoma Esq.

Learned senior Advocate for the Appellant adopted the appellant’s briefs and the arguments contained therein. He urged the Court to set aside the decision of the lower Court and allow this appeal.

The learned Senior Advocate for the 1st respondent adopted the 1st respondent’s brief and urged the Court to dismiss the appeal.
The 2nd respondent’s brief was adopted by Tochukwu Maduka, Esq., He urged the Court to dismiss this appeal.

The Appellant’s counsel distilled two issues from the 5 grounds of appeal as follows:
1. Whether the decision of the lower Court was not in breach of the appellant?s right to fair hearing. (Ground 4).
2. Whether the entire proceedings before the lower Court are not liable to be treated as a nullity for being conducted in the absence of jurisdiction.
(Grounds 1, 2, 3 & 5)

The 1st respondent in his brief of argument adopted the two issues for determination as distilled by the appellant in this appeal. He also incorporated a notice of preliminary objection to the hearing of this appeal in his brief

of argument.

The 2nd respondent in his amended brief of argument raised two issues for determination of this appeal as follows;
1. Whether the High Court lacked the jurisdiction to hear and determine the application for judicial review and to grant the reliefs sought therein? (Grounds 1, 2, 3 and 5).
2. Whether the judgment of the High Court was in breach of the Appellant?s right to fair hearing? (Ground 4)

I have earlier said that the 1st respondent incorporates a notice of preliminary objection to the hearing of this appeal in his brief of argument. Therefore, this Court will commence its deliberation with the consideration of the 1st respondent’s preliminary objection, because if it succeeds it may put an end to the entire appeal.

PRELIMINARY OBJECTION.
The grounds of the 1st respondent’s notice of preliminary objection are contained in paragraph 2 page 5 of his brief of argument dated 20th July, 2017 and filed on 24th day of July, 2017.

?The learned Silk for the 1st respondent in his argument in support of grounds (i), (ii) and (iii) of the 1st respondents preliminary objection submitted that the appellant?s

grounds of appeal are incompetent in that the particulars of errors in respect of the said grounds are argumentative, verbose and conclusions. He contended that the penalty for having such particular of errors that are argumentative and conclusions is an order striking them out as being incompetent. He referred the Court to unreported decisions of the Port Harcourt Division of this Court delivered on the 10th day of December 2008 in Appeal Nos. CA/PH/EPT/228/2008 and CA/PH/EPT/228A/2008 – ELECHI v. HON. ONUOHA & ORS at page 6 paragraph 2. STIRLING CIVIL ENG. NIG LTD V. YAHAYA (2002) 2 NWLR PART 750 PAGE 1 AT 15. NWADIKE V. IBEKWE (1987) 4 NWLR PART 67 PAGE 718. BEREYIN V. GBODO (1989) 1 NWLR PART 97 PAGE 372.

Learned senior Advocate submitted that in the circumstances the entire notice of appeal is incompetent and therefore it is liable to be struck out as it will serve no useful purpose. He cited in support the case of N.W.D.M LTD Vs. UFT ENGR. LTD (2011) 8 NWLR PART 1249 PAGE 308 AT 927. He further submitted that an issue for determination cannot be formulated from an incompetent ground of appeal and where such an issue is argued together with an

issue formulated from a competent ground of appeal, both grounds will be rendered incompetent as the Court cannot pick and chose which of the two grounds is competent. He referred the Court to the case of AKIBOYE V. ADEKO (2011) 6 NWLR PART 1244 PAGE 415 AT 434. He urged the Court to strike out this appeal as well as issues 1 and 2 which according to him were distilled from incompetent grounds of appeal.

In respect of ground (iv) of the objection, Learned senior counsel submitted that the notice of appeal filed on the 16th day of June, 2017 by the Appellant was without the prior leave of the Court first sought and obtained. He contended that the appellant who was not a party at the trial Court ought to have sought and obtained the leave of Court to appeal as an interested party before filing the notice of appeal. He argued that the notice of appeal is deemed not to have been filed in the first place and no subsequent regularization can save it from being incompetent. He relied on N.W.D.M LTD V. UFT ENGR. LTD (SUPRA). He urged the Court to strike out this Appeal.

?Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant in the appellant?s reply brief to the 1st

respondent’s preliminary objection submitted that the 1st respondent failed in his preliminary objection to highlight, demonstrate or even show in specific details any of the particulars of error which are argumentative. He further submitted that it is not the duty of a Court to conduct a party’s case on his behalf. He referred to MOHAMMED v. STATE (2010) LPELR-9019 (CA) 1 at 93-34. He contended that the 1st respondent’s objection is not founded on any legal and/or empirical basis and on this ground alone the Court is urged to discountenance same.

He also submitted that a ground of appeal can only be struck out where it is vague and generic under Order 7 Rule 3 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2016 and that there is no provision that particulars of a ground of appeal can be struck out for being argumentative. He referred the Court to the unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Appeal No.SC.133/2017 PDP V. SENATOR ALI MODU SHERIFF & ORS Delivered on 12th July, 2017, ADEROUNMU VS. OLOWU (2002) 2 SCNJ 180. Learned silk further submitted that the absence of particulars in support of a ground of appeal would not vitiate the viability of a ground of appeal.

In effect, once the ground of appeal discloses a comprehensible complaint against the judgment of the lower Court, defective particulars, or even lack of same cannot render such ground of appeal incompetent. He referred to ABE V. UNILORIN (2013) 16 NWLR (PT.1379) 183 at 199. THE MINISTER OF PETROLEUM AND MINERAL RESOURCES & ANOR. V. EXPO SHIPPING LINE (NIG) LTD NSCQLR volume 42 (2010) 1020. MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR OF BENUE STATE AND 7 ORS V. O.P. ULEGEDE ESQ & ANOR. NSCQLR Volume 8 (2001) 110.
PRINCE (DR) B. A. ONAFOWOKAN & 2 ORS V. WEMA BANK PLC & 2 ORS NSCQLR Volume 45 (2011) 181 SC
BEST (NIGERIA) LTD V. BLACK WOOD HODGE (NIGERIA)

On the 1st respondent?s submission that the notice of appeal is incompetent as same was filed before leave of Court was sought and obtained. Learned Senior Counsel referred to prayer (3) contained in the appellant’s motion for leave to appeal as an interested party dated 20th June 2017, which prayers were granted by this Court on 10th July 2017. He submitted that the prayer granted takes the wind out of the sail of the 1st respondent’s objection. He referred to WILLIAMS V. MOKWE (2005) 14

NWLR (PT.945) 249 at 267. APPEAL No; SC 130/2017 – BIYI POROYE & ORS V. MAKARFI & ORS DELIVERED ON 12 JULY, 2017. He contended that the case of NWDM LTD V. UFT ENGR. LTD (SUPRA) relied on by the 1st respondent is inapplicable to the instant appeal.

In the 1st respondent?s reply to the reply brief of the appellant to the notice of preliminary objection, Learned Senior Counsel to the 1st respondent submitted that the appellant’s contention that the 1st respondent did not highlight, in specific details any of the particulars of error in the grounds of appeal which are argumentative was grossly misconceived in that the argumentative nature of the particulars of error speaks for themselves and urge the Court to take judicial notice thereof pursuant to Section 122(2m) of the Evidence Act, 2011.

On the appellant’s submission that there is no provision in the Court of Appeal Rules, 2016 which provides that particulars of error to a ground of Appeal shall not be argumentative. Learned senior counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that the said submission was not the true position of the law. He submitted that the provision of Order 7 Rule 2 (3)

and 3 of Court of Appeal Rules, 2016 provides that no ground of appeal shall be argumentative and narrative. He further submitted that the CASES Of PDP V. SENATOR ALI MODU SHERIFF AND ORS (SUPRA). ADEROUNMU V. OLOWU (2002) 2 SCNJ 180 cited by the appellant are not applicable to the circumstances of this objection.

Learned senior counsel submitted that the appellant’s submission in paragraph 2.4 and 2.5 of his brief of argument that the absence of particulars in support of a ground of appeal would not vitiate its viability, once the ground of appeal discloses a comprehensive complaint against the judgment of the lower Court is grossly misconceived.

On the appellant’s submission that the order of this honorable Court granted on the 10th of July, 2017 deeming the notice of appeal filed by the appellant on the 16th day of July, 2017 as properly filed and served took the wind out of sail of the 1st Respondent’s objection on the appellant’s appeal that was filed without the prior leave of either the trial Court or this Court. Learned senior counsel submitted that both the order of 10th July, 2017 and the decision in WILLIAMS V. MOKWE (2005) 14 NWLR PART 945

PAGE 249 AT 267 does not come in aid of the Appellant. He referred the Court to HON. VICTOR ASSAMS & 2 ORS v. SEN. IFEANYI GODWIN ARARUME & ORS (2016) 1 NWLR PART 1493 PAGE 368 AT 386 (PARAGRAPH D TO H) TO 388. He urged the Court to strike out the Appeal for being incompetent.

RESOLUTION OF THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
It is trite law that the purpose of preliminary objection incorporated in a brief of argument by parties as in the instant case is to contend that the appeal is incompetent and if it succeeds it puts an end to the entire appeal. In other words a preliminary objection is filed against the hearing of the appeal, if it succeeds the appeal abates. See the cases of NEPA VS ANGO (2001) 15 NWLR (PT.737) PG 627, OKEREKE VS JAMES (2012) 16 NWLR (PT.1326) PG 339.

The compliant in grounds (i), (ii) and (iii) of the objection is that the grounds of appeal are incompetent because the particulars of error in all the grounds of appeal are argumentative and conclusions. In resolving this issue, it is pertinent for me to reproduce Order 7 Rule 2 (3) and 3 of Court of Appeal Rules, 2016 to which the 1st respondent relied upon.

?Order 7 Rule

2 (3) provides thus;
“The notice of appeal shall set forth concisely and under distinct heads the grounds upon which the appellant intends to rely at the hearing of the appeal without any argument or narrative and shall be numbered consecutively.”
Order 7 Rule 3 provides thus;
‘Any ground which is vague or general in terms or which discloses no reasonable ground of appeal shall not be permitted, save the general ground that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence, and ground of appeal or any part thereof which is not permitted under this rule may be struck out by the Court of its own motion or on the application by the respondent.”

The law is settled that the purpose of stating the particulars of error alleged in a ground of appeal is to highlight the specific error(s) or misdirection(s) complained against in a judgment so that the error(s) or misdirection(s) and the issues involved in the appeal can clearly be understood. Particulars of ground of appeal must not be verbose, argumentative or conclusive. The particulars must be concise and must relate to the grounds of appeal.

?I have perused the grounds of this appeal and the

particulars in respect of each ground, I cannot find any argument or conclusion in the particulars. The particulars only highlighted and stated the specific complaints of the appellant in respect of the judgment. It is my view that the appellant’s grounds of appeal filed as contained at page 236 to 242 of the record of appeal are very clear and they represent an appellant’s complaint against the decision of the lower Court. Even if the particulars of the grounds of appeal are argumentative and conclusions, It is my view as rightly submitted by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that there is no provision in the Court of Appeal Rules 2016 that a particular in a ground of appeal can be struck out for being argumentative or conclusions. In any case grounds of appeal may stand on their own once they represent an appellant’s complaint against the decision he is not satisfied with and in respect of which grouse he seeks the appellate Court’s intervention as the law is firmly settled that lack of or defective particulars in a ground of appeal would not necessarily render the ground of appeal incompetent. See ABE vs UNILORIN (2013) 16 NWLR (PT.1379) PG. 183

AT 199.
It is not the 1st respondent’s contention that any of the grounds of appeal is defective or that the particulars do not flow or relate to the grounds of appeal filed. The attitude of the Court towards defective or incompetent particulars of appeal is that once the parties to an appeal and the Court are not misled by the contents of a grounds of appeal, the grounds of appeal cannot be struck out simply because some of the particulars are found to be incompetent as doing so will amount to technical justice and not in consonance with substantial justice. See OLORUNTOBA-OJU & ORS. V. ABDUL-RAHEEM (2009) 13 NWLR (PT.1157) 83, ABE V. UNIV. OF ILORIN & ANOR. (2012) LPELR – 20649 (SC), OMISORE & ANOR V. AREGBESOLA & ORS. (2015) LPELR-24803 (SC), OLEKSANDR & ORS V. LONESTAR DRILLING COY. LTD & ANOR. (2015) LPELR – 2461 (SC). ADEROUNMU V. OLOWU (SUPRA). The respondents are not left in any doubt as to the appellant’s complaint in the said grounds of appeal. The 1st respondent himself did not object to any of the 5 grounds of appeal, but rather some of the particulars. The fact that the 1st respondent adopted the issues formulated by

the appellant confirms a clear understanding of the complaints of the appellant and that the 1st respondent was not misled in any way by the grounds of appeal and their particulars.

For the above reasons, the objection to the competence of the appeal on the ground that the particulars are argumentative and conclusions must fail.

Ground (iv) of the objection is that the notice of appeal filed on 16/6/2017 by the appellant without prior leave of the Court sought and obtained as an interested party is incompetent.

By virtue of the provisions of Section 243 (a) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended, a right of appeal to this Court from the decisions of the Federal High Court or a High Court conferred by the Constitution is exercisable by a party having an interest in the matter with the leave of the Federal High Court or the High Court or this Court. It is on record that the appellant filed an application for leave to appeal as an interested party against the judgment of the Court below and his notice of appeal on the same day, 16/6/2017. The Court below failed to hear the application and which failure necessitated the

filing of a fresh application in this Court. Exhibit GB which is the record of proceedings of this Court of 10th day of July, 2017 presided by Hon. Justice Ignatus Igwe Agube JCA, and which the 1st respondent’s counsel himself attached to the copy of his alleged motion on notice for stay of proceedings at the Supreme Court dated 19th July, 2017 and forwarded to the Registrar of this Court in his letter dated 10th August, 2017. The record clearly shows that the appellant’s counsel moved the motion for leave to appeal as an interested party filed in this Court on 20/612017 in terms of the prayers on the motion. The Court after hearing counsel to both parties granted the orders as prayed. Only prayer 2 was refused. The prayers in that application have been reproduced earlier in this judgment. See also page 8 of the said proceedings (Exhibit GB).

The contention of the 1st respondent is that the notice of appeal having been filed on 16/6/2017 before obtaining the leave of this Court on 10/7/2017, the appeal is incompetent. The position of the Supreme Court on a situation like this is that by virtue of the provisions of Section 242 (2) and 243 of the

Constitution, the Court of Appeal has the discretion to grant or refuse an application for leave to appeal as an interested party and like any other discretionary power the exercise of that discretionary power remains valid unless it is shown to have been wrongly exercised. It is my view that this Court having granted the orders as prayed and having specifically stated that prayer 2 was refused, it is obvious that prayer 3 which sought an order deeming the notice of appeal as properly filed and served was granted. The position of the Supreme Court on a notice of appeal filed by an interested party before obtaining leave to appeal is that the notice of appeal is void and a nullity at the stage it was filed but the Court of Appeal has a discretionary power to regularize such notice of appeal by deeming the notice of appeal as properly filed and served especially when the necessary filing fees has been paid. It is the position of the Supreme Court that the exercise of judicial powers conferred on the Courts established by the Constitution by Section 6 (1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended include all the powers and sanctions which a Court of law ought to

exercise in order to do justice and the inherent powers are the powers which enable it to effectively and effectually exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it. The powers include consequential orders which promote the process of litigation and ensure proper delivery of substantial justice. See ERISI V. IDIKA (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.66) 503. WILLIAMS v. MOKWE (SUPRA), NURUDEEN ONIWAYA V. IKUOMOLA & ORS (2007) LPELR – 8687 (CA). This Court having exercised its discretionary power to regularize the notice of appeal filed on 16/6/2017, the contention of the 1st respondent’s counsel that the notice of appeal is incompetent cannot fly. The objection fails on that ground.

For all the reasons stated above, the 1st respondents preliminary objection is hereby dismissed, for being lacking in merit.

Now, having dismissed the 1st respondent preliminary objection, I will now consider the merit of the main appeal. In doing that, the two issues as distilled by the appellant are adopted in the determination of the main appeal.

ISSUE ONE.
Whether the decision of the lower Court was not in breach of the appellant?s right to fair hearing.
The Learned

senior counsel to the appellant submitted that Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution disallowed, forbade and proscribed the lower Court from making orders that affected the interest of the appellant without hearing the appellant at all. He referred to AKPAMGBO OKADIGBO V. CHIDI (NO.1) (2015) 10 NWLR (PT.1466) 171. MAKARFI V. POROYE (2016) LPELR-41296 (CA); JEGEDE v. POROYE (2016) LPELR-41292 (CA). He submitted that it is settled position of law that breach of fair hearing is not only actionable without the need to prove any damage, but where a breach is established it vitiates the entire decision irrespective of the correctness or otherwise of the decision.

He further submitted that it cannot be a defence in law that in the absence of the breach complained of, the same decision would have been reached since the occurrence of the breach is sufficient to warrant the setting aside of the decision. He referred to ADIGUN V. AG OYO STATE (1987) 1 NWLR (PT 53) 678 AT 721-722 PARA H-B. SALU v. EGEIBON (1994) 6 NWLR (PT.348) 23 AT 44; NIGERIAN ARAB BANK LTD V. COMEX LIMITED (1999) 6 NWLR (PT.608) AT 663-664. OTAPO V. SUNMONU (1987) 2 NWLR (PT.58) 587 AT 605; OVUNWO

V. WOKO (2011) 17 NWLR (PT.1277) 522 AT 529; MAKARFI V. POROYE (SUPRA).

He contended that relief (c) sought in the application for the recognition of Chief Agbaso as the National Chairman of APGA to the exclusion of the appellant who has been described as substantive National Chairman of APGA is not only absurd, it amount to breach of appellant’s right to fair hearing and the fundamental failure suffices for the setting aside of the decision of 22nd May, 2017 as it vitiates the entirety of the ruling. He referred to AWONIYI V. REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF AMORC (2000) 10 NWLR (PT.676) 522 @ 533 (CITATION INCOMPLETE) UZOR V. NIGERIAN STORE WORKERS UNION (1973) 9-10 SC 35. OKONTA V. PHILIPS (2010) 18 NWLR (PT.1225) 320 AT 326.G & T. INVEST. LTD V. WITT & BUSH LTD (2011) 8 NWLR (PT.1250) 500 AT 531-532 H-B
BEST VISION CENTRE LIMITED V. U.A.C.N.P.D.C. PLC (2003) 13 NWLR (PT.838) PG.594. IKEME V. ANAKWE (2000) 8 NWLR (PT.669) PG.484. PEENOK LIMITED V. HOTEL PRESIDENTIAL (1983) 4 NCLR PG 122. EHIDIMHEN V. MUSA (2000) 8 NWLR (PT.669) PG.540.

?He submitted that the mere fact of granting order in favour of one Chief Martin Agbaso who was not a party

before it evinces the null nature of the proceedings before the lower Court. A Court of law cannot be a father Christmas charitably gifting to persons who are not parties before it, beneficial orders for their exclusive enjoyment. He referred to; AYOADE V. SPRING BANK (2014) 4 NWLR (PT.1395) 93 at 132 PARAS C. BIYU V. IBRAHIM (2006) 8 NWLR (PT.981)1. NNAEMEKA V. CHUKWUGOR NIG LIMITED (2007) 5 NWLR (PT.1026) 60.

He finally contended that the judgment of the lower court having been given in violation of this sacrosanct right to fair hearing is a nullity and same is liable to be set aside’ He referred to;CHIME V. ONYIA (2009) 2 NWLR (PT.1124) 1 at 18, 51, 52, 53, OTAPO v. SUNMONU (1987) 2 NWLR (PT.58) 587, EGOLUM V. OBASANJO (1999) 7 NWLR (PT.611) 355. IKA LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA v. MBA (2007) 121 ALL NLR 424.

Learned senior counsel to the 1st Respondent submitted that the decision of the lower Court did not breach the appellant’s right to fair hearing. He contended that the motion on notice for Mandamus contained at pages 70 to 136 of the Record of Appeal reveals that no allegation was made against the appellant and no relief was sought against him in

the application for Mandamus.

He submitted that the Appellant did not deny the fact of his suspension as the National Chairman of the APGA and that Ozo Nwabueze Okafor was selected to replace him as Acting National Chairman and that following the demise of Ozo Nwabueze Okafor, Chief Martin Agbaso was further selected and assumed office as the Acting National Chairman of APGA. He insisted that the appellant accepted his said suspension and so the 1st and 2nd respondents had no problem with him.

Learned senior counsel also submitted that the cause of action in the Suit No. E/291M/2016 was the reluctance of the 3rd Respondent to comply with the changes in leadership of the APGA and this was precisely why the appellant and Chief Martin Agbaso were not made parties in the suit. He argued that the cases cited in submitting that the appellant was denied right to fair hearing were cited out of con as far as this appeal is concerned.

Learned senior Advocate argued that the non joinder of parties has been held by the Supreme Court as not being capable of vitiating any proceeding as the Court is entitled to proceed with the matter on the basis of the

parties before it. He referred the Court to the cases of;
UNION BEVERAGES V. PEPSICOLA (1994) 2 SCNJ PAGE 157 AT 173. OKOYE & ORS V. NIGERIA CONSTRUCTION & FURNITURE CO. LTD (1991) 6 NWLR (PART 19) 501.

He contended that in so far as there was no complaint made against the appellant and no relief sought against him in the suit, he was not a party without whom the issues raised in the suit cannot be completely settled. Therefore, the case of AYOADE V. SPRING BANK (2014) 4 NWLR PART 1396 93 AT 132 cited in paragraph 4:17 and 4:18 of the Appellants Brief of Argument is misconceived. He urged the Court to discountenance same.

The 2nd respondent in its amended brief of argument emphasized the fact that the central complaint of the 1st and 2nd respondents at the trial Court is the refusal of INEC and police to give due recognition and acceptance to the decision of the party appointing Chief Martin Agbaso as the acting national chairman of the 2nd respondent. He referred to paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 of the statement of the 1st and 2nd respondents filed at the trial Court. He submitted that the appellant was not a necessary party who ought to have

been joined or heard in the suit at the trial Court. He referred the Court to GREEN VS GREEN 1987 3 NWLR PT.61 PG 480.

The appellant in his reply brief to the 1st respondent on this issue submitted that apart from mere generic denials/response, the case of the appellant has not been resisted by the 1st respondent on this issue.

In his reply to the 2nd respondent’s argument on this issue, the appellant submitted that in grounds 5 and 6 of the application granted by the trial Court, the appellant was represented as a suspended national chairman. Therefore, it cannot be contended that the appellant does not deserve to be heard.

RESOLUTION
The 1st and 2nd respondents filed a statement in support of their application for mandamus. Paragraphs 5-15 of the statement are reproduced below:
5. ?That the fact culminating to this suit is that at a duly convened meeting of the National Working Committee of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) held on 5/10/2016, issues of gross misconducts and breaches of APGA Constitution were among others raised against the then National Chairman of APGA – Mr Victor Ike Oye and others.
6. The net

effect of the above emerged offences received against the said National Chairman at the meeting duly convened by him was his suspension pending the outcome of the disciplinary committee constituted relating to his suspension. Others affected by the suspension are Deputy National Chairman (South) and Deputy National Chairman (North).
7. That all decisions of the party emanating from the meeting was further made public through the print and electronic media including the circulation of the minute of the said meeting to all leaders of APGA in different states of the federation including Enugu State of which we are in charge.
8. That consequent upon the suspension of the National Chairman of APGA, the National Working Committee acting under the authority of the 2nd applicant had unanimously appointed the then National Vice Chairman South East-Hon. Ozo Nwabueze Okafor who is from Enugu State to assume the office as the Acting National Chairman of the party and later on 18/11/2016 appointed Chief Martin Agbaso as the Acting Deputy National Chairman (South) to fill in the seat arising from the suspension gap.
9. That the said Acting National

Chairman of APGA had continued to preside and act in that capacity to the knowledge of the respondents which were all respectively made in a letter dated 21/10/2016 and 6/10/2016.
10. That during this period, Ozo Nwabueze Okafor who was then appointed as the Acting National Chairman of the Party suddenly embraced the great beyond (died) after a brief illness and was buried on 27/1/2017.
11. That consequent upon his burial, an emergency meeting of the National Working Committee (NWC) of APGA was then convened at Universal Hotels Enugu on the 30th day of January 2017 wherein members unanimously adopted Chief Martin Agbaso who was the Acting National Chairman (South) to then assume the office of the Acting National Chairman of the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) to replace the deceased as nature abhors vacuum and in line with Article 20 (2) APGA Constitution (as amended).
12. That the decision of the applicants regarding the above leadership changes had been communicated expressly to the respondents wherein the applicants had demanded the due recognition and acceptance of Chief Martin Agbaso as the Acting National Chairman of APGA and

according him with all the necessary platforms to function effectively.
13. That it beats the imagination of the applicants that despite all the entreaties already made to the respondents to recognize and accept the decisions of APGA, the respondents had chosen to remain adamant and refused to recognize the said decisions for no just cause thereby failing to abide by the decisions of the party and performing their duties in that regard as Public Officers.
14. That the refusal of the respondents to abide by the decisions of the applicants is a violent breach of trust and social contract which by their oath of office, they have sworn to uphold.
15. That in one of the discussions with the respondents and their privies, they had insisted that they need a Court order empowering them before they can comply with same and it is on this pavement that this suit has been activated.

It is clear that it was on the basis of the above facts which were verified by an affidavit sworn to by the 1st respondent that the Court below granted the orders sought by the 1st and 2nd respondents. It is also very clear from the reliefs sought and granted that the

matter before the Court centered on the Chairmanship of APGA and recognition of Chief Martin Agbaso who was said to have been appointed as the Acting National Chairman as a replacement for the appellant. The appellant was said to have been suspended as the Chairman of the party. Neither the appellant nor the person appointed in his place as acting chairman was joined as a party to the case. There is no doubt that the appellant is a party who should have been joined by the 1st and 2nd respondents. He was a party whose presence before the Court was necessary to enable the Court effectually and effectively and completely adjudicate on the matter. The law is settled that where a necessary party who is likely to be affected by the result of an action is not joined in the action, any judgment obtained against him will be to no avail. See N. U. R. T. W. v. R. T. E. A. N (2012) LPELR – 7840 (SC).

As recent as 12th July, 2017, the Supreme Court in POROYE & ORS. v. MAKARFI SC.130 per Ariwoola JSC. explained who is a necessary party in a case and held as follows:
“A necessary party in an action has been held to be that person who is not only interested in the

subject matter of the proceedings but also who in his absence, the proceedings could not be fairly dealt with. In other words, the question to be settled or determined in the action between the existing parties must be a question which cannot be properly and fairly settled unless he is a party to the action, instituted by the plaintiff. See CHIEF ABUSI DAVID GREEN VS. CHIEF (DR) E. T. DUBLIN GREEN (1987) NWLR (PT.61) 4811 (1987) LPELR ? 1338 (SC); AMON VS. RAPHAEL TRUCK & SON (1956), 1 WR 357; CHIEF REX KOLA OLAWOYE V. ENGINEER RAPHAEL JIMOH & ORS (2012) 13 NWLR (PT.1371) 362; (2013) 10 SCM 191; (2013) 4 SCNJ 25. In the same vein, a necessary party has been held to be a person whose presence in an action is essential for the effectual and complete determination of the claim before the Court. He is the party in the absence of whom the claim cannot be effectively and completely fairly determined by the Court.?

In the instant case, there is no doubt that the orders made by the Court below affected the right of the appellant who is said to have been suspended for misconduct and who was not given the opportunity of being heard before the

decision of the Court. Where there is failure to hear all necessary parties to a dispute before a decision is reached as in the case on appeal, there is a breach of Section 36 (1) of the Constitution as amended. The party affected by such a decision is entitled to have it set aside as such decision is null and void and without any legal effect. The learned trial judge seriously erred in law when he granted the orders sought by the 1st and 2nd respondents which tantamount to a recognition of Chief Martin Agbaso and upholding the alleged suspension of the appellant without affording him an opportunity of being heard. Issue 1 is resolved in favour of the appellant.

ISSUE TWO
Whether the entire proceedings before the lower court are not liable to be treated as a nullity for being conducted in the absence of jurisdiction. (Grounds 1, 2, 3 & 5)
Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the lower Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate over the subject matter of this action. He referred the Court to LEEDO PRESIDENTIAL MOTEL VS B.O.N LTD 1998 10 NWLR W.570 PG 353. OKONKWO VS FRN 2011 NWLR PT.1258 215 AT 248. CHUKWUGOR VS A.G CROSS RIVERS

STATE 1998 1 NWLR PT.534 AT 395-396. MADUKOLU VS NKEMDILIM 1962 2 ALL NLR 581 AT 589-590. LADOJA VS INEC 2007 12 NWLR PT.1047 PG 119 AT 181. AJAYI VS ADEBIYI 2012 11 NWLR PT.1310 PG 137.

On the contention that the lower Court does not have jurisdiction over the matter, learned silk argued that by Section 272 of the 1999 Constitution as amended, the unlimited jurisdiction of the State High Court is only subject to the jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court and the National Industrial Court under and by virtue of Sections 251 and 254C of the 1999 Constitution. He submitted that this connotes that the State High Court has the unfettered and unhindered jurisdiction to adjudicate on disputes, the subject matter of which is not contained in Sections 251 and 254C of the Constitution.

Learned senior counsel submitted that it is beyond any dispute that the subject matter adjudicated on by the lower Court relate to the administration, control and management of the 3rd to 5th respondents who are all Federal Government agencies and the reliefs sought directly affect the validity or otherwise of the actions or inactions and decisions of the 3rd to 5th

respondents. He referred to pages 1-2 of the record of appeal containing the originating processes filed before the lower Court, Paragraph 15 (c) of the 3rd Schedule to the 1999 Constitution, Section 4 of the Police Act, FAWEHINMI VS IGP 2002 7 NWLR PT.767 PG 606 AT 697. SKYE BANK PLC VS VICTOR ANAEMEM IWU Unreported SC/885/2014 DELIVERED ON 30th June, 2017. ABIEC vs KANU 2013 13 NWLR PT.1370 69 AT 83. ADEYEMI VS OPEYORI 1976 9-10 SC 31 AT 51. OKOROCHA VS UNITED BANK FOR AFRICA PLC 2011 1 NWLR PT.1228 AT 373. AG FEDERATION VS AG ABIA 2001 11 NWLR PT.725 AT 740, TUKUR VS GOVT OF GONGOLA STATE 1989 4 NWLR PT.117 AT 549. OAMEN VS OWENAM 1993 8 NWLR PT.311 AT 368.

On the issue of Lack of Locus standi of the 1st and 2nd respondents to institute the action before the lower Court, learned senior Advocate submitted that the issue of locus standi affects the jurisdiction of the Court to adjudicate between the parties. Where the question of locus standi is raised it should be settled in a decisive manner and not shelved. He referred to OWODUNNI v. REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF CCC 2000 10 NWLR PT.675 AT 338. ANISU VS OSAYOMI 2008 15 NWLR PT.1110 AT 280. EBHODAGHE VS OKOYE

2004 18 NWLR PT.905 AT 472. BAKARE VS AJOSE-ADEOGUN 2014 ALL FWLR PT.737 AT 636. MR. EUGENE OBI OKOYE & ANOR VS BEATITUDES NIG. LTD 2014 LPELR-23014 (CA) AT 10. He submitted that where a claim of the plaintiff do not disclose sufficient interest in the subject matter of litigation, he would be adjudged not to have locus standi. He contended that a holistic consideration of the grounds of the application and verifying affidavit which attached exhibits do not disclose any interest or right on the respondents, in respect of which the action before the lower Court could be commenced. He referred to OGIDI VS STATE 2005 5 NWLR PT.918 AT 327. FAWEHINMI VS IGP SUPRA MOBIL OIL PRODUCING VS LASEPA 2002 18 NWLR PT.798 AT 34-35. OLORIODE VS OYEBI 1984 14 NSCC 286 AT 400. ODENEYE VS EFUNUGA 1990 7 NWLR PT. 164 AT 639. MOMOH VS OLOTU 1970 1 ALL NLR 121 AT 127. THOMAS VS OLUFOSOYE 1986 1 NWLR PT.18 AT 669. He urged the Court to strike out or dismiss the action before the lower Court for lack of locus standi to institute same.

?Learned senior counsel for the appellant also contended that the facts culminating in the claims sought at the lower Court raise domestic

issues bordering on the internal working of a political party, APGA which by law are not justiciable. He submitted that the lower Court lack the jurisdiction to adjudicate over the domestic internal affairs of a political party. He cited PAM vs ANPP 2008 4 NWLR Pt.1077 AT 242. ONUOHA Vs OKAFOR 1983 2 SCNLR 244. ABDULKADIR VS. MAMMAN 2003 14 NWLR PT.839 AT 1. DALHATU VS TURAKI 2003 15 NWLR PT.843 AT 310.

Learned senior counsel for the 1st respondent in his response submitted that the entire proceedings before the lower Court are neither nullity nor conducted in the absence or want of jurisdiction. He urged the Court to discountenance the appellant?s submission that the subject matter adjudicated over by the lower Court falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. He argued that the provision of Section 251(supra) does not confer an automatic exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court once the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party in the claim. He referred to PPMC LTD VS MESSRS DELPHI PETROLEUM (2005) 8 NWLR PT.880 AT 479.

?He further submitted that it is immaterial that Federal Government agencies are

sued in the suit, the material consideration is whether the reliefs sought against them adversely affect them and the answer is obviously negative in the instant case. He contended that the appellant herein is a busy body crying wolf where there is none and he has not shown any authority given to him by the 3rd to 5th respondents to complain on their behalf. He urged the Court to dismiss the appeal.

He submitted that this issue of locus standi as canvassed by the appellant is academic and hypothetical. He referred the Court to the case of CHIEF GREAT OGBORU & ANOR VS DR. EMMANUEL UDUAGHAN & 2 ORS 2011 12 SCNJ PG 209 AT 228. He argued that assuming without conceding that the 1st respondent had no locus standi, can it be the 2nd respondent has no locus standi? The answer is of course in the negative. He urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the 1st and 2nd respondent.

On the appellant’s argument that the lower Court lacks the jurisdiction to adjudicate over internal affairs of a political party, learned senior counsel submitted that the Court have the jurisdiction to entertain internal dispute of a political party in order to ensure

that they do not act arbitrarily. He referred to UZODINMA VS IZUNASO (NO.2) 2011 17 NWLR PT. 1275 AT 60.

Learned counsel to the 2nd respondent submitted that the cause of action at the lower Court from which this appeal emanated does not touch on any of the items listed in Section 251 (1) of the CFRN 1999 as amended. He referred the Court to Section 251(1) (supra) and the case of TRADE BANK PLC VS BENILUX NIG. LTD 2003 9 NWLR PT.825 AT 416. He contended that the matter before the lower Court was the inaction of INEC and police in failing to recognize the decision of APGA. He referred to paragraphs 10-14 of the grounds of the application for judicial review and the reliefs sought at pages 4-5 of the record.

On the issue of locus standi, learned counsel submitted that the 1st respondent as card carrying member of the 2nd respondent disclosed sufficient interest in the subject matter before the lower Court. He urged the Court to hold that the lower Court was vested with the jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

On the contention that the subject matter of the suit at the lower Court was in respect of the domestic affairs of a political party over

which the Court does not have jurisdiction, learned counsel adopted the same line of argument as the 1st respondent. He referred to PDP VS KSIEC 2006 3 NWLR PT.968 AT 865. He urged the Court to resolve this issue against the appellant and dismiss the appeal.

The appellant in his reply brief to the 1st respondent on the contention that the appellant is a busy body and that an issue of jurisdiction can only be raised by the 3rd to 5th respondents referred to ELUGBE VS OMOKHAFE 2004 18 NWLR PT.904 AT 332. IBRAHIM VS LAWAL 2015 LPELR – 24736 SC. On the whole he urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the appellant.

RESOLUTION
Under this issue, the first contention of the appellant is that the Court below does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter before it in that reliefs sought directly affect the validity or otherwise of the actions, inaction and decisions of the 3rd – 5th respondents. The 3rd respondent is INEC. The 4th respondent is the Inspector General of Police while the 5th respondent is the Commissioner of Police. The 1st and 2nd respondents filed an application for an order of MANDAMUS compelling the 1st respondent to accept

and/or recognize the decisions of the 2nd applicant in appointing Chief Martin Agbaso as the Acting National Chairman of All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA). They sought a declaration that by Section 4 of the Police Act, the 2nd and 3rd respondents are bound to ensure the compliance of the decision of the 2nd applicant as it regard the appointment of Chief Martin Agbaso as the Acting National Chairman of the All Progressive Grand Alliance in order to forestall a breakdown of law and order and an order-prohibiting the 1st Respondent and his privies from recognizing and/or accepting any other person as the National Chairman of the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) other than the name submitted to it by the 2nd applicant in the person of Chief Martin Agbaso.

the Court. In construing the provisions of the Constitution and/or relevant statute to determine its jurisdiction on a particular matter, the Court must advert its mind to (i) The status of the parties (ii) the nature of the claim. See NEPA V. EDEGBERO (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt.798) 79, (2002) GOLDMARK NIG. LTD. & ORS v. IBAFON COY. LTD & ORS (2012) LPELR-9349 (SC). By Section 153 (1) (f) of the Constitution as amended and Paragraph 14 of the Third Schedule thereto, there is no doubt that INEC, 3rd respondent herein is an agency of the Federal Government conferred with constitutional and statutory powers to register political parties in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an Act of the National Assembly, monitor the organization and operation of the political parties including their finances, arrange for the annual examination and auditing of the funds and accounts of political parties, monitor political campaigns and provide rules and regulations which shall govern the political parties among other statutory and constitutional duties. It is in the realization of the enormous duties and powers of the 3rd respondent that the 1st and 2nd respondents

had to inform the 3rd respondent of the alleged appointment of an acting chairman and sought for its recognition of the new leadership. There is no doubt that the alleged refusal of the 3rd respondent to recognize the acting chairman is an administrative and/or executive decision pursuant to its statutory power.

The 4th and 5th respondents are also creation of the Constitution by virtue of Sections 214 and 215 of the Constitution as amended. By virtue of Section 215 (B) of the Constitution, the President or such other Minister of the Government of the Federation as he may authorize in that behalf may give to the Inspector General of Police (IGP) such lawful direction with respect to the maintenance and securing of public safety and public order as he may consider necessary and the IGP shall comply with those directions and cause them to be complied with Section 215(4) provides that “subject to the provisions of this Section, the Governor of a State or such Commissioner of the Government of the State as he may authorize in that behalf may give to the commissioner of Police of that State such lawful directions with respect to the maintenance and securing of

public safety and public within the State as he may consider necessary and the Commissioner of Police shall comply with the directions or cause them to be complied with provided that before carrying out any such directions under foregoing provisions of this subsection the Commissioner of Police may request that the matter be referred to the President or such Minister of the Government of the Federation as may be authorized in that behalf by the President for his directions.? Thus, it is clear by the above provisions of the Constitution that in the performance of its duties under Section 4 of the Police Act to prevent and detect crime, apprehend offenders, preserve law and order, protect life and property and enforcing all law and regulations with which they are specifically charged, the police headed by IGP is strictly under the control of the Federal Government. There is therefore no doubt that the 4th and 5th respondents are agents of the Federal Government. The decision to accept or refuse the request of the 1st and 2nd respondents to ensure the compliance of the decision of the 2nd respondent regarding the appointment of Chief Matin Agbaso as Acting

National chairman is strictly within its constitutional and statutory duties as an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria.

24108), WEMA SECURITIES AND FINANCE PLC V. NIG. AGRIC. INS. COP. (2015) LPELR – 24833 (SC).

The second contention of the appellant under issue 1 is that the 1st and 2nd respondents lack the locus standi to institute the action at the Court below in that the 1st respondent has no interest whatsoever in becoming the National Chairman of the APGA and the 2nd respondent is not a member of the National Working or Executive Committee of APGA whose purported decision suspending the appellant and appointing Chief Agbaso was sought to be ratified and eventually ratified by the Court below.

The term, locus standi has been defined and explained in a plethora of cases. It is the consensus of the cases that a plaintiff will have the locus standi to sue if he has sufficient or special interest in the performance of the duty sought to be enforced or where his interest is adversely affected. His interest must be tangible not vague or speculative and not an interest that he shares with other members of the society, one fundamental aspect of locus standi is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his compliant before the Court and not on the issues he wished to

have adjudicated. See IJELU & ORS v. LSDP & ORS (1992) LPELR – 1464 (SC), (1992) NWLR (PT.266) 414. In the instant appeal it is not in dispute that the 1st respondent is a member of APGA and he described himself as Deputy Chairman of the party. The crux of the dispute is the Chairmanship of the party. It is therefore clear that both the 1st and the 2nd respondents have a stake and an undeniable interest not only in the chairmanship of the party but also in the running and management of the party. They have sufficient interest in the matter which clothes them with the necessary locus standi to institute the action.

The third contention is that the Court below lacks the jurisdiction to adjudicate on the domestic/internal affairs of a political party. The law as it stands today is that the management and running of a political party is still an internal affair of political party so long it operates within its own Constitution. However, the matter taken before the Court below has taken the dispute beyond the realm of internal affairs of the party. The action is a challenge to the exercise of statutory powers by the 3rd – 5th respondents. The

respondents themselves admitted that the action and the orders sought were targeted at the 3rd – 5th respondents. Therefore, the Court that is the Federal High Court has the jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter not the State High Court. Thus issue 2 is resolved in favour of the respondents.

In conclusion, I hereby find that this appeal has merit. It is hereby allowed. The ruling/orders made by Hon. Justice A. R. Ozoemena sitting at High Court of Enugu State in suit no.E/291M/2017 on 22/5/2017 is hereby set aside. The said suit is hereby struck out for lack of jurisdiction. Parties should bear their own costs.

IBRAHIM SHATA BDLIYA, J.C.A.: I have had the advantage of reading in draft the leading judgment delivered by my brother, Aboki J.C.A. I am in full agreement with the reasonings and conclusion arrived at therein. I have nothing useful to add to the said judgment other than to adopt my lord’s reasoning and conclusion as mine, and to allow the appeal. I allow the appeal; accordingly.

MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A.: I was privileged to read in draft the judgment

of my learned brother, HON. JUSTICE ABDU ABOKI, JCA. I agree that the appeal has merit. I too allow the appeal. I abide by then consequential orders made therein.

Appearances:

Chief Wole Olanipekan, OFR, SAN, with him, Dr. Onyechi Ikpeazu (SAN), P.I.N. Ikwueto (SAN), Ken E. Mozia (SAN), Ahmed Raji (SAN), Emeka Etiaba (SAN), Bolarinwa Awojooola, Tolu Adetomiwa, A. R. Agbo, Nnamdi Anyachebelu, Victor AgunzuFor Appellant(s)

K. C. Nwufo, SAN with him, Nwosu Ndubuisi and U. N. Isaac for the 1st Respondent.

Tochukwu Maduka with him, Ngozi Uzoma, Alex Amujiogu, Kingsley Ogbodo and D. C. Oti for the 2nd Respondent.

Nkiru Frank-Mmegwa (ACLO) with him, A. R. Agbo-Aneke, Esq. for the 3rd Respondent.

O. J. Nnadi, SAN with him, U. C. Nwozor and C. I. Agbo for the 4th & 5th Respondent.For Respondent(s)

Appearances

AND

K. C. Nwufo, SAN with him, Nwosu Ndubuisi and U. N. Isaac for the 1st Respondent.

Tochukwu Maduka with him, Ngozi Uzoma, Alex Amujiogu, Kingsley Ogbodo and D. C. Oti for the 2nd Respondent.

Nkiru Frank-Mmegwa (ACLO) with him, A. R. Agbo-Aneke, Esq. for the 3rd Respondent.

O. J. Nnadi, SAN with him, U. C. Nwozor and C. I. Agbo for the 4th & 5th Respondent.For Respondent

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