MR. SUNDAY IKENNE v. THE STATE(2018)

SUNDAY IKENNE v. THE STATE

(2018) LCN/4726(SC)

In The Supreme Court of Nigeria

On Friday, the 8th day of June, 2018

SC.856/2014

RATIO

POSITION OF THE LAW ON WHERE THE ORAL EVIDENCE OF A WITNESS IS INCONSISTENT WITH HIS EXTRA JUDICIAL STATEMENTS

Now, this appeal is about the inconsistency rule and how it impacts on the burden of proof in criminal proceedings. Our jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the principle. The inconsistency rule, in relation to the testimony of a witness, renders incredible and unreliable the oral evidence of a witness as well as his earlier statement the oral evidence materially contradicts. Thus in the instant case, if as asserted by the appellant, the oral evidence of PW2 and PW3 indeed materially contradict their extra judicial statements, their statements as well as their contradictory oral evidence, must necessarily be discountenanced. Being incredible and unreliable, the statements and the oral evidence will be incapable of sustaining the concurrent conviction of the appellant by the two lower Courts. See Tunde Asimi V. The State (2016) LPELR- 40436 (SC), Friday Smart V. State (2016) LPELR-40827 (SC) and Akinlolu V. State (2015) LPELR-25985. PER MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.

CONDITION FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF THE INCONSISTENCY RULE

It is pertinent to stress that for the inconsistency rule to apply, PW2 and PW3, must be seen to have failed, on being confronted with their earlier contradictory statements in the course of their oral testimony, to explain away the inconsistencies which, again, must be fundamental. lt follows, therefore, that the rule will neither apply if they were not confronted with the earlier contradictory statements in the course of their oral testimony or, having been confronted, they had given sufficient reasons or explanations for the inconsistencies in the earlier statements and subsequent oral evidence. See Jizurumba V. State (19760 NSCC (Vol. 10) 156, Egboghonone V. State (1993) 9 SCNJ 1. PER MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.

WHETHER THE PROSECUTION IS REQUIRED TO CALL A PARTICULAR NUMBER OF WITNESSES TO PROVE ITS CASE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; WHETHER THE COURT CAN CONVICT AN ACCUSED UPON THE EVIDENCE OF A SINGLE WITNESS

The law is long settled that the prosecution is only required to call the number of witnesses necessary to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. What is important is the degree of proof attained and not the number of the witnesses the prosecution called. A single credible witness, if believed, is enough to establish an accused person’s guilt. See Chukwu V. The State (1992) 1 NWLR (Pt 217) 255 at 263-264, ljiofor V. The State (2006) 6 NSCQR (Pt 1) 209 at 237, Julius Bayode Ayeni V. The State (2016) LPELR-40105 (SC). PER MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.

CONDITIONS FOR AN ACCUSED PERSON TO BE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF DOUBT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

The duty of the prosecution is to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt but not beyond the shadow of a doubt. For an accused person to be entitled to the benefit of doubt, the doubt must be genuine and reasonable, arising from the evidence before the Court. See: State Vs Aibangbee & Anor. (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 84) 548; Bakare Vs The State (1987) 3 SCNJ 9; Stephen Vs The State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 153. PER KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C.

POSITION OF THE LAW ON THE STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED OF THE ACCUSED WHEN THE PROSECUTION HAS ADDUCED CREDIBLE AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENCE

Once the prosecution has adduced credible and convincing evidence of the commission of the offence, the onus shifts to the defence to cast reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case. The standard of proof in the circumstance is upon a preponderance of evidence. See: Akinmoju Vs The State (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt.662) 608 @ 629; Jua Vs The State (2010) 4 NWLR (Pt.1184) 217. PER KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C.

JUSTICES

MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

AMINA ADAMU AUGIE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

EJEMBI EKO Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

Between

SUNDAY IKENNE Appellant(s)

AND

THE STATE Respondent(s)

MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.(Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Enugu Division, hereinafter referred to as the lower Court, dismissing appellant’s appeal against the decision of the Anambra State High Court, hereinafter referred to as the trial Court.

The appellant and three others were arraigned before the trial Court for the murder of one IFEANYICHUKWU UDECHUKWU contrary to Section 274(1) of the Criminal Code Cap 36 Vol. 2 Revised Laws of Anambra State 1991. The four pleaded not guilty and the case proceeded to trial. The prosecution called six witnesses while each of the four accused gave evidence in his own defence. Three other witnesses also testified on behalf of the accused persons. At the end of trial including final addresses of counsel, the Court on the 19th November 2012 delivered its judgment discharging the 1st, 3rd and 4th accused persons but convicting and sentencing the appellant as charged.

This appeal is against the dismissal of appellant’s appeal against the trial Court’s judgment by the lower Court in its decision dated 14th November 2014.

At the hearing of the appeal, having identified the briefs parties earlier filed and exchanged, counsel adopted and relied on same as their arguments for and against the appeal. The unusually repetitive seven issues distilled in the appellants brief as having arisen for the determination of the appeal read:-
“ISSUE ONE ARISING FROM GROUND ONE
Whether the Justices of the Court of Appeal of Nigeria, Enugu Division, were right when they upheld and/or confirmed the conviction of the appellant for murder and the death sentence passed on him by the trial Court
ISSUE TWO ARISING FROM GROUND TWO
Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal of Nigeria, Enugu Division, were right when they held that the learned trial judge had no obligation to make any findings on the inconsistencies and contradictions in exhibits “C and “D vis-a-vis oral evidence in Court of PW2 because no submissions were made on them by counsel for inter-alia, the appellant in trial Court in his final address
ISSUE THREE ARISING FROM GROUND THREE
Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal of Nigeria, Enugu Division, were right when they

held that it was too late in the day for the appellant’s counsel to ventilate the question of consistency or contradiction in the extrajudicial statement of PW2 tendered as exhibit “D” vis-a-vis his oral evidence and therefore the appellant’s submission on the alleged contradictions are of no moment as they go to no findings of the trial judge
ISSUE FOUR ARISING FROM GROUND FOUR
Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal of Nigeria, Enugu Division, were right when they failed to declare the findings of the trial judge on his evaluation of the evidence of PW2 and PW3 as being perverse which would have enabled them to intervene and reevaluate their evidence
ISSUE FIVE ARISING FROM GROUND FIVE
Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal of Nigeria, Enugu Division, were right when they held that the prosecution was not obliged to call Chekwube Aniakor and Chimezie Okafor who PW2 and PW3 claimed were with them and witnessed what happened but who made statements that did not support the evidence PW2 and PW3 gave in Court
ISSUE SIX ARISING FROM GROUND SIX
Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal

of Nigeria, Enugu Division, were right when they agreed with the trial judge that the appellant shot the deceased on 13/12/2008 which he intended to cause him grievous bodily harm and which eventually led to his death
ISSUE SEVEN ARISING FROM GROUND SEVEN
Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal of Nigeria, Enugu Division, were right when they affirmed the learned trial judge’s disbelief of the appellant’s evidence”

The three issues the respondent proposes in its brief as calling for determination in the appeal are:-
“Issue No. 1
Whether the Justices of the Court of Appeal of Nigeria Enugu Division were right when they held that the prosecution has through PW2, PW3 and PW5 proved their case against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue No. 2
Whether the Justices of the Court of Appeal of Nigeria, Enugu Division were right when they held that there was no material contradiction in the evidence of prosecution witnesses.
Issue No.3
Whether the Justices of the Court of Appeal of Nigeria, Enugu Division were right when they declared that the learned trial judge properly evaluated the evidence the defence put by the appellant.”

Certainly, the appellant does not require all the seven issues he distilled, one each from his seven grounds of appeal, to succeed in his appeal. The practice is not commendable. It is never the number of but, rather, the relevance of the issues and the potency of the arguments on them which put the appellant on a better stead. See Ikweki V. Ebele (2005) 2 SC (Pt II) 95, and Simon Ezechukwu & anor V. I.O.C. Onwuka {2016} LPELR-26055 (SC}.

Appellant’s real grouse in the appeal hinges on the concurrent decisions of the two Courts below convicting and sentencing him as charged notwithstanding the prosecution’s failure to prove the offence for which he is convicted beyond reasonable doubt as required by law and/or on the basis of contradictory and incredible evidence. Indeed, appellant’s first issue alone subsumes all the concerns he desires to canvass in the appeal. The issue will, accordingly, be the basis of the resolution of the appeal.

Arguing the appeal, learned appellant’s counsel submits that for the prosecution to secure the conviction of the appellant for murder under Section 274 of the Criminal Code, it must prove all the ingredients of the offence by

credible evidence. Both Courts below, it is submitted, relied on the evidence of PW2, PW3 and PW5 in arriving at their concurrent verdict. The oral evidence of PW2 at pages 182 to 185 of the record of appeal, learned counsel contends, stands in material contradiction to exhibits C” and “D”, his extra-judicial statement to the police, and exhibit “R”, the police investigation report tendered through PW6. Exhibit “R”, it is submitted, are summaries of the statements of Chekwube Aniakor and particularly Chimezie Okafor the prosecution deliberately refused to call as witnesses. The summaries of the extra judicial statements of this witnesses that were never called to testify, it is further submitted, violently contradict the oral evidence of PW2 and PW3. The respondent, in the light of the quality of the evidence it relied upon, it is argued, cannot be said to have discharged the burden the law places on it to obtain the concurrent findings of guilt of the appellant by the two Courts. The material contradictions between the oral evidence of PW2 and exhibit C, D, as well as between the oral evidence of PW2, PW3 and exhibit

R render the evidence too incredible for any Court to rely upon to convict the appellant. Learned counsel relies on Ezemba V. lbeneme (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt 674) 61 at 63, Tangale Traditional Council V. Fawu (2001) 17 NWLR (Pt742) 293 at 330, Akalonu V. State (2000) 2 NWLR (Pt 643) 165 in urging that the incredible evidence on which the two Courts rely be expunged and their decisions set-aside.

Responding, learned counsel submits that the ingredients of the offence of murder for which the appellant is convicted have all been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence of PW2, it is contended, at pages 182-184 of the record of appeal, states it all. PW3 who was apprehended by the appellant and his co-accused on the day of the murder and equally witnessed the commission of the offence corroborated the testimony of PW2 at pages 205-207 of the record of appeal. PW5, the pathologist, at page 237 of the record confirmed the death of IFEANYI UDECHUKWU. Relying on Agbo V. The State (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt 977) 545 at 564, learned respondent’s counsel submits that the material contradictions the law envisages to render oral evidence

of witnesses incredible do not arise in relation to the statements of PW2 and PW3.

Further relying on Uwagboe V. State (2007) 6 NWLR {Pt 1031) 606 at 620, learned respondent’s counsel submits that the appellant’s act of firing a gun at an unarmed person without provocation justifies the lower Court’s affirmation, at pages 411-412 of the record of appeal, of the trial Court’s finding that appellant had intended to cause the deceased the grievous bodily harm which eventually led to his death.

Further arguing the appeal, learned counsel emphasizes that with the failure of learned counsel to the appellant to raise the issue of inconsistency or contradiction in exhibits C and D vis-a-vis the oral evidence of PW2 at the trial Court, the lower Court’s unassailable finding that it was belated to raise it on appeal, be upheld. lf there is any such inconsistency, however, same not being material and fundamental, it is contended, is not fatal to the prosecution’s case. Certainly, it is submitted, exhibit R not being prepared by PW6 through whom it was tendered and the PW6 not being an eye witness, the report cannot be the basis of rejecting the evidence of PW2 and PW3.

Citing in Ani Vs State (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt 830) 142, Ikwuepenikan V. State (2011) 1 NWLR (Pt 1229) Page 449 at 481, Ochiba Vs. State (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt 1277) at 659 696 and Garko Vs. State (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt977) 524, counsel urges that the issue be resolved against the appellant and his appeal dismissed.

(SC), Friday Smart V. State (2016) LPELR-40827 (SC) and Akinlolu V. State (2015) LPELR-25985.

It is pertinent to stress that for the inconsistency rule to apply, PW2 and PW3, must be seen to have failed, on being confronted with their earlier contradictory statements in the course of their oral testimony, to explain away the inconsistencies which, again, must be fundamental. lt follows, therefore, that the rule will neither apply if they were not confronted with the earlier contradictory statements in the course of their oral testimony or, having been confronted, they had given sufficient reasons or explanations for the inconsistencies in the earlier statements and subsequent oral evidence. See Jizurumba V. State (1976) NSCC (Vol. 10) 156, Egboghonome V. State (1993) 9 SCNJ 1.

In the case at hand, the witnesses whose oral evidence the appellant asserts contradict their extra judicial statements were never confronted with the statements, in the course of their testimony, with the view to having them explain the inconsistencies between the two. Raising the matter in counsel’s address alone, I agree with learned respondent’s

counsel, is insufficient. on the point in issue, the lower Court firstly held as follows:-
“It appears too late in the day for Mr. Moghalu now learned counsel to the appellant, to ventilate the question of any alleged inconsistency or contradiction in the extrajudicial statement, particularly, exhibit “D” vis-a-vis the evidence of PW2 at the trial. He cannot be permitted now, to do in this Court what neither he nor C.P Oguchienti Esq, failed to do at the trial Court. Therefore the submissions contained at paragraphs 5.02-5.04 of the appellant brief of argument which dealt extensively with alleged contradictions in exhibit “D” and the oral evidence of the PW2 are of no moment, as they go to no finding of the learned trial judge. They therefore pale into insignificance and are accordingly discountenanced by me, since they were not ventilated or raised by the appellant’s counsel in his written address at page 106-113 of the record of appeal, hence the learned trial judge made no findings thereon in his judgment.”

The Court enthused further thus:-
“Furthermore, neither HNC Moghalu Esq. for the 1st defendant at the trial nor C.P. Oguchienti Esq, for the

2nd defendant/appellant, in their final written addresses at the trial Court, made any submission with respect to any inconsistency or contradiction in exhibits “C” and “D” vis-a-vis the oral evidence in Court by PW2. Hence, the learned trial judge had no obligation to make any findings on them.”

The foregoing affirmations of the trial Court’s findings by the lower Court are unassailable.

It is evident from the record of appeal that PW2 and PW3 were never confronted with the inconsistencies the appellant insists exist in their statements and oral evidence for their explanation. Most importantly, the record of appeal does not reveal any vital inconsistency between the statements of the witnesses and their oral evidence. Learned appellant counsel’s submissions that the inconsistency rule applies to render the evidence of PW2 and PW3 unreliable is accordingly misconceived.

Both sides agree, and rightly too, that to prove the offence of murder for which the appellant is convicted the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt:-
(a) The death of the deceased.
(b) The act or omission of the accused which caused death and

(c) That the act or omission was intentionally done with the knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm will ensue.
See Dare Jimoh V. The State (2014) LPELR-22464 (SC) and Ugochukwu V. State (2016) LPELR-40012 (SC).

PW2 and PW3 gave eye witnesses account of the act of the appellant, firing a gun shot at close range, which resulted in the death of the deceased. The testimony of PW5, the pathologist, proves the fact of the death of the deceased. The uncontroverted evidence of the three witnesses establish beyond reasonable doubt the ingredients of the offence for which appellant is convicted. The Courts below have not erred in their concurrent findings in this regard.

I remain equally unimpressed by learned appellant counsel’s argument that the respondent’s failure to call witnesses whose extra judicial statements as summarized in exhibit “R” favour the appellant is fatal to his conviction. The law is long settled that the prosecution is only required to call the number of witnesses necessary to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. What is important is the degree of proof attained and not the number of the witnesses the prosecution called. A single credible witness, if believed,

is enough to establish an accused person’s guilt. See Chukwu V. The State (1992) 1 NWLR (Pt 217) 255 at 263-264, Ijiofor V. The State (2006) 6 NSCQR (Pt 1) 209 at 237, Julius Bayode Ayeni V. The State (2016) LPELR-40105 (SC).

As a whole, I find no merit in this appeal. In dismissing same, the concurrent judgments of the two lower Courts the appellant failed to show are perverse or hereby affirmed.

KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C.: I have had a preview of the judgment of my learned brother, MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, JSC just delivered. His Lordship has comprehensively considered and ably resolved the issue in contention in this appeal, I agree entirely with the reasoning and conclusion that the appeal lack merit and deserves to be dismissed.

Stephen Vs The State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 153. In the instant case, there was credible evidence from the eye witnesses, PW2 and PW3 as to how the appellant shot the deceased who was unarmed and without provocation.

I agree with the Court below that having failed to confront PW2 and PW3 at the trial with the alleged inconsistencies in their extra judicial statements, as required by Section 232 of the Evidence Act 2011, it was too late in the day to raise the issue on appeal, particularly as no finding was made on the issue by the learned trial Judge.

Furthermore, in a criminal trial, the prosecution is under no obligation to call a host of witnesses to testify. It is only required to call those witnesses, whose evidence, if believed, is sufficient to discharge its burden of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt. See: Ogoala Vs The State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 175) 509; Saidu Vs The State (1982) 4 SC 41 @ 68 – 99; Udofia Vs The State (1981) 11 -12 SC 49; Oguonzee Vs The State (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt. 551) 521.

Once the prosecution has adduced credible and convincing evidence of the commission of the offence, the onus shifts to the defence to cast reasonable doubt

on the prosecution’s case. The standard of proof in the circumstance is upon a preponderance of evidence. See: Akinmoju Vs The State (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt.662) 608 @ 629; Jua Vs The State (2010) 4 NWLR (Pt.1184) 217.

He has failed woefully to adduce any evidence, which raises any reasonable doubt in this case. The concurrent findings of the two lower Courts, based on the credible evidence on record, has not been shown to be perverse.
There is no reason for this Court to interfere.

For the above and the more detailed reasoning in the lead judgment, I find the appeal to be devoid of merit. It is hereby dismissed. The judgment of the Court below is affirmed.
Appeal dismissed.

CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.S.C.: I read, in advance, the draft of the leading judgement which my Lord, Musa Dattijo Muhammad, JSC, just delivered. I entirely, agree with my Lord that this appeal is unmeritorious.

It is no longer in doubt that the evidence of a single witness, if believed by the Court, can sustain a charge even in a criminal matter relating to murder, Onafowokan v. The State [1987] 3 NWLR (pt. 61) 538;

Effiong v. The State[1998] 8 NWLR (pt. 562) 362; Ali v. The State [1988] 1 NWLR (pt. 68) 1; Princewill v. The State [1994] 20 LRCN 303, 318; (1994) 6 NWLR (pt. 353) 703.

It is for these, and the more elaborate reasons in the leading judgement that I, too, shall enter an order dismissing this appeal as being unmeritorious. Appeal dismissed.

AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.S.C.: I had a preview of the lead Judgment just delivered by my learned brother – M. D. Muhammad, JSC, and I agree with his reasoning and conclusion that this Appeal must be dismissed in the circumstances.

He said all there is to say in the lead Judgment and it is clear from his sound reasoning in the lead Judgment that the lower Court’s findings on the issues at stake in this matter cannot be faulted at all.

The Appellant has not proffered any reasons to question the findings of the lower Courts. lt is settled that where there is sufficient evidence to support concurrent findings of fact by two lower Courts, they will not be disturbed unless they are shown to be perverse, or miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of law or procedure is shown – see Ogoala V. The State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.175) 509 SC.

In this case, there is more than enough evidence established by the Prosecution to support the concurrent findings of the trial Court and Court below, and this Court is not in the position to intervene.
It is for this and the other reasons in the lead Judgment that I also dismiss this Appeal and affirm the decision of the Court below.

EJEMBI EKO, J.S.C.: This is an appeal against the concurrent judgments of the trial and the appellate Courts affirming the prosecution’s assertion, upon evidence, that the Appellant did murder one Ifeanyichukwu udechukwu contrary to Section 274(1) of the Criminal Code Law, Cap. 36 of the 1991 Revised Laws of Anambra State. I agree, as held by my learned brother, M.D. MUHAMMAD, JSC, in the lead judgment just delivered that the Appellant failed to show that the concurrent judgments are perverse or wrong.

The Appellant made a huge fuss of Exhibit D, the extrajudicial statement of the PW.2, and the oral evidence of the PW.2 being contradictory. PW.2 made exhibit D. At the trial Exhibit D was tendered obviously under Section 232 of the Evidence Act, 2011, for the purpose of

contradicting and discrediting the PW.2s oral testimony at the trial Court. The condition precedent for this procedure is that the attention of the PW’2 must be first drawn to the contradictory portion of the previous statement in writing that is intended to contradict or discredit the present testimony. The witness whose previous statement in writing is intended to be used to contradict and discredit him is entitled to be fairly treated and in accordance with the rule of law. The ambush strategy adopted by the Appellant’s legal team to discredit PW.2 is not permitted by law.

In any case, the Court of Appeal had evaluated Exhibit D viz-a-viz the oral evidence of PW.2 and found that Exhibit D did not materially contradict the PW.2’s evidence at trial. What the Appellant’s Counsel calls contradiction are merely matters of details.

The Court of Appeal found, and I agree, that “the alleged contradictions in Exhibit D and the oral evidence of the PW.2 are of no moment, as they go to no finding of the learned trial Judge. This finding of fact has not been impugned. The Court of Appeal, as I understand this finding, is saying that no miscarriage

of justice had been occasioned to the Appellant. The Appellant, not contesting this finding, is deemed to have accepted it.

The Appellant has also made a huge fire ball out of the failure of the prosecution to call eye witnesses whose evidence, they say were material. And on this failure’ they submit that these eye witnesses were not called because their evidence, if they were called, would be unfavorable and/or prejudicial to the prosecution’s case. They pitch this argument on the statutory presumption under Section 167(d) of the Evidence Act, 2011. That presumption does not avail the Appellant. It also does not impose on the prosecution the duty to call particular witnesses. The burden on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt is discharged, once the prosecution proved same by some qualitative evidence, and not necessarily on any quantum of evidence. Credible evidence of a single witness, believed, completely discharges this burden: IJIOFOR v. THE STATE (2005) 5 N.S.C.Q.R (Pt. 1) 209 at 2037.
The duty of the prosecution to prosecute and not to persecute the Appellant, does not impose on them

any duty or burden to call hostile witnesses. Their duty is discharged if they made available, at the trial, facts uncovered from investigation that establish the alleged guilt of the accused person; and the defence has been given an opportunity to call any evidence, if they are mindful to, that rebuts or refutes the prosecution’s evidence. Cross-examination of prosecution’s witnesses is another opportunity the defence has to dislodge the prosecution’s case.
The presumption under Section 167(d) of the Evidence Act works on both sides. The defence made so much fuss about the failure of the prosecution to call the alleged eye witnesses without telling the world why they also did not call the evidence of these alleged witnesses.

I have no cause to disturb the concurrent judgments of the two Courts. The Appellant failed in his duty to establish that the concurrent judgments are perverse, unreasonable and they occasion miscarriage of justice to him. The appeal lacking in substance is hereby dismissed, and the judgment appealed is hereby affirmed.

Appearances:

H.N.C. MOGHALU with him, O. M. Ogundipe For Appellant(s)

S.A.N. OFOKANSI (Asst. Director, Public Prosecution, Anambra State) with him, Daniel Ezechukwu, Senior State Counsel For Respondent(s)

Appearances

H.N.C. MOGHALU with him, O. M. Ogundipe For Appellant

AND

S.A.N. OFOKANSI (Asst. Director, Public Prosecution, Anambra State) with him, Daniel Ezechukwu, Senior State Counsel For Respondent