MR. IBRAHIM O. SARKI & ORS v. MINISTRY FOR CHIEFTAINCY AFFAIRS, KADUNA STATE & ORS (2014)

MR. IBRAHIM O. SARKI & ORS v. MINISTRY FOR CHIEFTAINCY AFFAIRS, KADUNA STATE & ORS

(2014)LCN/7413(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Tuesday, the 15th day of July, 2014

CA/K/63/2011

RATIO

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: INTERPRETING THE PROVISION OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION LAW OF KADUNA STATE; WHETHER THE WORDS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION LAW OF KADUNA STATE ARE PLAIN, DIRECT, CLEAR, AND UNAMBIGUOUS, AND EFFECT MUST BE GIVEN TO IT IN ITS INTERPRETATION

Sections 133 and 134 of that law provide for issuance and service of pre-action notice in the following words;
“133(1) No suit shall be commenced against a Local Government until one month at least after written notice of intention to commence the same has been served upon the Local Government by the intending plaintiff or his agent.
(2) Such notice shall state the cause of such action, the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief which he claims.
134. The notice referred to in Section 133 and any summons, notice or other document required or authorized to be served on a Local Government in connection with any suit by or against such Local Government shall be served by delivering the same to, or by sending it by registered post addressed to the Secretary to the Local Government at the principal office of the Local Government.
Provided that the Court may, with regard to any particular suit, or document’ order that service shall be effected in accordance with the terms of such order”.
The words of these sections are very plain, clear, lucid and unambiguous and they do not require any aid to interpret them.
They should be ascribed their ordinary and simple meaning. One of the canons of interpretation of statues that is now well recognized is that where the words of a statute or any enactment are plain, direct, clear, and unambiguous, effect must be given to those words in the interpretation of that statute or enactment.
See AWOLOWO V. SHAGARI (1979) 6 – 9 SC 73; A.G. BENDEL STATE V. A.G. FEDERATION (1982) 3 N.C.L.R. 1; OWENA BANK NIG. PLC. V. N.S.E. LTD. (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt. 515) 1; UGWU V. ARARUME (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt. 377) 807; KRAUS THOMPSON ORGANISATION V. NIPSS (2004) 17 NWLR (Pt. 90) 44; CITY ENGINEERING (NIG.) LTD. V. NIGERIAN AIRPORTS AUTHORITY (1999) 6 SC (Pt. 1) 41. per. ISAIAH OLUFEMI AKEJU, J.C.A.

ACTION: PRE-ACTION NOTICE; WHETHER PRE-ACTION NOTICE IS REQUIRED TO BE SERVED BEFORE COMMENCING AN ACTION AND THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE FAILURE TO DO SO
The provisions of these two sections make it mandatory for an intending plaintiff or any person contemplating an action or suit against a Local Government in Kaduna State to give a notice of at least one month prior to the commencement of such a suit, and to serve the notice on the secretary to that Local Government. This notice is what is known in law as pre – action notice. per. ISAIAH OLUFEMI AKEJU, J.C.A.

It has been held in NGELEGLA V. TRIBAL AUTHORITY NONGWA CHIEFDOM (1953) 1 WACA 325 that the requirement for pre-action notice is a legitimate and recognised procedural step which among other purposes aims at giving the defendant time to determine whether he would make reparation to the plaintiff.
Where a pre-action notice is required to be served before commencing a suit, the consequence of failure to do so is that the jurisdiction of the Court has not been activated but put in abeyance until the requirement is fulfilled. See NNOYE V. ANYICHIE (2005) 1 SC (Pt. II) 96. per. ISAIAH OLUFEMI AKEJU, J.C.A.

EVIDENCE: BURDEN OF PROOF; THE BURDEN OF PROVING A PARTICULAR ISSUE

The law is that the burden of proving a particular issue rests squarely on that party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who has asserted the affirmative of that issue, and not the party asserting the negative. See PLATEAU STATE V. ATT. GEN. FEDERATION (2006) ALL FWLR (Pt. 305) 590; MELIFONWU V. EGBUJI (1982) 9 SC 145. per. ISAIAH OLUFEMI AKEJU, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

ISAIAH OLUFEMI AKEJU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

O. A. ADEFOPE-OKOJIE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

AMINA A. WAMBAI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

1. MR. IBRAHIM O. SARKI (DISTRICT HEAD, DULU/SARKIN YAMMAN JERE)
2. MR. YERIMA DAKOYI (DISTRICT HEAD, IDAH/JAGABAN APPELLANT JERE)
3. ALHAJI HALIDU ZAKWAI (DISTRICT HEAD, CHAKWAMA/AGACIN JERE) Appellant(s)

AND

1. MINISTRY FOR CHIEFTAINCY AFFAIRS, KADUNA STATE
2. JERE TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, KADUNA STATE
3. KAGARKO LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL
4. HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS (HRH) DR. SAAD USMAN JERE, CHIEF OF JERE (SARKIN JERE)
5. MR. DIKKO ALKALI, (AG. DISTRICT HEAD DULU)
6. MR. JAMES BAWA, (AG. DISTRICT HEAD IDAH)
7. ALHAJI NUHU ABUBAKAR, AG. DISTRICT HEAD, CHAKWAMA
8. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, KADUNA STATE Respondent(s)

ISAIAH OLUFEMI AKEJU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the decision of the High Court of Kaduna State contained in the Ruling delivered by Hon. Justice T. Zailani sitting at Kaduna Division on 27th September, 2011 in Suit No. KDH/KAD/579/2009, commenced by the Appellants as Plaintiffs through the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim dated 4th August 2009 and 31st July, 2009 respectively for five declaratory reliefs, three orders and a nineth relief for “Such other or further Order(s) or Declaration(s) as the Honourable Court may deem fit and proper to make in the circumstances and in the interest of justice”.

The Respondents as Defendants in that court filed their Memorandum of Appearance and Joint statement of Defence with leave of Court to which the Appellants filed a Reply also with leave of the court. The suit was struck out for non-diligence on the part of the plaintiffs, but was relisted and restored by the court.
The Respondents filed a motion on notice on 3rd August, 2010 praying the Court for the following:-
“1. An ORDER setting down paragraph 21 of the Plaintiffs Statement of Claim and paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Defendants Statement of Defence herein in order that same may be considered and determined forth with without the need of going further into any questions of fact in this action.
2. An ORDER striking out the Plaintiffs/Respondents instant action in their entirety.
3. AND for such further order or other orders on (sic) this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case”.

The basis for the application as set out by the applicants are as follows:-
“1. This Honourable Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiffs’/Respondents action in their entirety as:
(a) No prior notice of intention to institute this action was ever served on the 3rd Defendant/Applicant by Plaintiffs/Respondents as provided by law.
(b) The necessary condition precedent to the filing of the instant proceedings has not been complied with by the Plaintiffs/Respondents.
(c) The subject matter now in issue is vested exclusively within jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court”.
The facts upon which the applicants relied are in the eight Paragraphs Affidavit in Support of the motion to which one J. M. RANDA deposed and filed with the motion on notice while the Applicants Written Address in Support was also filed.

With the order of court enlarging the time following the application of the appellants, they filed their Counter Affidavit of 9 paragraphs on 23/11/10 deposed to by Regina Solomon, the Litigation Secretary in the law firm of their solicitors while the Written Address was also filed.
After listening to the parties in respect of the motion, the learned trial judge in the ruling of 8/2/11 determined the objection only on failure to issue pre-action notice and held on page 338 of the record of appeal as follows:-
“… To institute this suit there is the necessity to give that Pre-Notice (sic) as provided by law.
Failure to do so vitiate the entire processes filed.
And the one given in a case already determined cannot properly be taken to take care of the present case”.
The learned judge then held that having so determined that issue it was not necessary to go into the other issues raised by the parties. The court upheld the objection that the suit was incompetent, and that the court thereby lack the jurisdiction to entertain it. The suit was consequently struck out in its entirety.

The Appellants were dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court, and they filed their Notice of Appeal on 10/2/2011 based upon three Grounds of Appeal. In prosecution of the appeal, the Appellants’ Brief of Argument settled by Kayode Faturiyele Esq, of counsel was filed on 9th April, 2013 in reaction to which the Respondents’ learned counsel Sanusi Usman prepared the Respondents’ Brief of Argument filed on 17/1/14. The appellants subsequently filed the Appellants’ Reply Brief on 31/1/14.

The issue for determination as formulated by the appellants and adopted, by the respondents is:
Whether the trial court was right to have construct (sic) and interpret Exhibit KF1 (i.e. the Appellants’ letter dated 28th May 2009) as a pre-action notice served on the 3rd Respondent in respect of a suit for the enforcement of their right to fair hearing and not for challenging their unlawful and illegal suspension from offices as District Heads.
I have considered the three grounds of appeal and I am of the view that the lone issue set by the appellants has been properly and validly distilled therefrom. I will also adopt the issue for the determination of the appeal.

In his argument of this issue, the appellants’ counsel referred to the pre action notice written to the 3rd respondent dated 28th May 2009 copied on pages 80 – 81 and 297 – 298 of the record of appeal. The learned counsel contended that the “Or” used in paragraph 3 of the notice indicates the alternative action to be taken by the appellants against the 3rd respondent. The use of the word “Or”, learned counsel submitted shows in the pre-action notice that the appellants intended to bring an alternative suit apart from the one to enforce their fundamental right to fair hearing. He cited BUHARI V. INEC [2008] 4 NWLR (PT. 1078) 546 on the effect of the use of the word “Or” and on principles governing interpretation of documents, he cited the case of RECTOR KWARA POLY V. ADEFILA (2007)15 NWLR [pt. 1056] 42. The learned Counsel submitted that the pre-action notice dated 28th May 2009 must be interpreted as a whole to include a suit challenging the Appellants’ unlawful and illegal suspension from offices as District heads, citing the cases of ZENITH BANK PLC. V. EKEREUWEM [2012] 4 NWLR [PT. 1290] 207 AND AMOKWANDOH V. U.A.C. LTD. 1 WACA 179.

For the respondents it was contended that the dispute between the parties in this action is one between an employer and the employee and the proper procedure for seeking redress in such a matter is by writ of summons and not by application under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979 relying on a number of judicial decisions in cases which include EGBUONU V. BORNO RADIO TELEVISION CORPORATION [1997] 2 NWLR (PT. 531) 27; SEA TRUCKS LTD. V. ANIGBORO (2001) FWLR (PT. 37) 1000.

It was submitted that the appellants could choose to institute their action by writ of summons or by enforcement of Fundamental Human Right but they must stick to only the procedure they choose; NUT v. CONF OF SEC. SCHOOL TEACHERS (2006) ALL FWLR (PT. 295) 656. The word “or” refers to an action under Fundamental Rights.
It was further argued that the pre-action notice relied upon by the appellants has no legal effect, same not having been properly served on the Secretary but on someone “for the secretary” in violation of Section 136 of Kaduna State Local Government (Administration Law which requires that such document be served by delivery to the secretary to the Local Government at the principal office of the Local Government. The learned counsel submitted that service of any document on any person other than the person named in the statute amounts to nothing; GBADAMOSI V. NRN (2007) ALL FWLR (PT. 367) 855.

In the Appellants’ Reply Brief, the learned counsel contended that the issues of the proper procedure for commencement of the appellants’ action and sticking to a procedure were not canvassed at the trial court and did not arise from the grounds of appeal and not canvassed in the Appellants’ Brief of Argument. It was submitted that a Respondent’s Brief must deal with only the issue raised in the Appellants’ Brief; INIAMA V. AKPABIO [2008] 17 NWLR [PT. 1116] 225; and in any event the appellants filed their action at the trial court by way of a writ of summons. The case of NUT V. CONF. OF SEC, SCHOOL TEACHERS (supra) is irrelevant and the pronouncement therein was quoted out of con contrary to the holding in AJAYI V. MILAD. ONDO STATE (1997) 5 NWLR [PT. 504] 237.

The learned counsel further argued that the issue of service of the pre action notice on designated officer was not evaluated by the trial judge same having not been canvassed before that Court, and Section 136 of Kaduna State Local Government (Administration Law 2003 (as amended) does not stipulate service of pre-action notice on the Secretary personally. It was submitted that the pre-action notice in this instance was served.
It was submitted that the issue of service now raised by the Respondents is a resort to technicality so as to defeat justice, and this the courts do not allow, citing ORIJA v. AKOGUN (2009) 10 NWLR (PT. 1150) 437.

At the hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel to the parties (KAYODE FATURIYELE ESQ. for appellants and SANI USMAN DCL, MIN of Justice Kaduna for Respondents) adopted their Briefs of Argument and urged the court to decide the appeal in line with the prayers in their respective briefs.

The claim of the Appellants as disclosed in their writ of summons and statement of claim is that they were respectively the District Heads of Dullu, Iddah and Chakwama, and members of Jere traditional council, (the 2nd Defendant). They were officers in the Public Service of Kaduna State and holders of traditional titles of Sarkin Yamman Jere, Jagaba Jere and Fagacin Jere respectively in the Jere Chiefdom in Kaduna State while they all resided in Kagarko Local Government Area of Kaduna State.

Their grievances against the defendants are as averred in paragraph 20 of the statement of claim thus:
“(a) The 4th Defendant wrongly wrote his letter dated 22/12/2009 to 1st Defendant containing certain false charges and allegations against the plaintiffs, even though the 1st Defendant has no statutory powers to discipline the plaintiffs.
(b) The 1st Defendant assumed powers to discipline the plaintiffs and further unlawfully adopted strange methods in the course of the discipline of the plaintiffs, which methods are not contained in chapter 4 of the Public Service Rules/Civil Service Rules; hence the illegality and unlawfulness of its letter dated 23/4/2009 with reference MCA/CA/17/VOL.1.
(c) The 2nd Defendant gave notices of the 1st Defendant’s illegal and unlawful indefinite suspension to the Plaintiffs, through its letters dated 04/05/2009 with references JTC/PER/DLD/VOL.1 JTC/PER/IDD/VOL. 1, and JTC/PER/CKD/VOL.1 delivered to each of the plaintiffs on 07/05/2009.
(d) The 3rd Defendant conveyed the 1st Defendant’s illegal and unlawful indefinite suspension to the plaintiffs through its Chairman’s letter dated 06/05/2009 with the Common reference KGKLG/482/GEN/VOL. 111/212, also delivered to each of the plaintiffs on 07/05/2009.
(e) Since the indefinite suspension of the Plaintiffs are illegal and unlawful, and there is no provision in Chapter 4 of the Public Service Rules/Civil Service Rules for appointment of persons to occupy the offices of the plaintiffs as the District Heads of Dullu, Iddah and Chakwamo, respectively which offices were not vacant, the appointment of the 5th, 6th and 7th Defendants as Acting (Ag) District Heads of Dullu, Iddah and Chakwama are illegal, ultravires, null and void; and
(f) The plaintiffs are entitled to be reinstated to their offices as District Heads of Dullu, Iddah and Chakwama respectively, be paid all their salaries stopped by the 1st to 4th Defendants as a result of their illegal and unlawful indefinite suspension from their respective offices, and be paid exemplary damages by the 1st to 4th Defendants jointly and severally”.
Thus the appellants’ action is neither for enforcement of their fundamental human rights nor under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, but commenced by way of writ of summons and statement of claim to challenge their discipline through indefinite suspension by the 1st – 4th respondents and the appointment of the 5th – 7th respondents into their respective offices.

The motion on notice filed by the (Defendants) respondents on 3/8/2010 and the ruling of which has led to this appeal had sought that paragraph 21 of the plaintiffs’ statement of claim and paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Defendants’ statement of Defence be set down for same to be considered and determined, and for ease of reference I reproduce those paragraphs as follows:
“21. The plaintiffs have duly issued the statutory pre-action notice to the 3rd Defendant vide their solicitors’ letter with reference CA/CIV/450/2009 dated 28/5/2009”.
The letter reference CA/CIV/450/2009 is listed as “G” among the documents listed under paragraph 22 of the statement of claim.

By paragraphs 10 and 11 of their joint statement of defence, the respondents averred that the appellants did not serve any notice as alleged in paragraph 21 of the statement of claim.
They specifically stated that;
“10. In answer to paragraph 21 of the plaintiffs statement of claim, which the defendants denies, (sic) the Defendants, particularly the 3rd herein aver that the plaintiffs at no time material to this action ever served any statutory pre – action notice on it.
11. Further to paragraph 10 hereinbefore the Defendants aver that the plaintiffs had filed a similar action to this instant one against the Defendants in the High Court of Justice, Kaduna State in suit No. KDH/KAD/365/2009 which action was heard determined and resolved in favour of the Defendants.
The Defendants hereby plead the afore said action and shall at the hearing of the instant suit rely on a certified true copy of the said decision”.

This fact of non service of pre-action notice on the 3rd respondent in respect of the instant action was equally emphasized by the respondents in paragraph 5 of the affidavit in support of their motion wherein they further deposed that the letter of the appellants reference No. CA/CIV/450/2007 has no connection with this action but is only in respect of a similar action in suit No. KDH/KAD/365/2009 which was already heard and determined on 27/7/2009, a certified true copy of which was attached.

Now undisputedly the 3rd respondent that was joined as the 3rd defendant at the trial Court is Kagarko Local Government Council in Kaduna State to which the provisions of the Local Government Administration Law of Kaduna State 2012, apply.
Sections 133 and 134 of that law provide for issuance and service of pre-action notice in the following words;
“133(1) No suit shall be commenced against a Local Government until one month at least after written notice of intention to commence the same has been served upon the Local Government by the intending plaintiff or his agent.
(2) Such notice shall state the cause of such action, the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief which he claims.
134. The notice referred to in Section 133 and any summons, notice or other document required or authorized to be served on a Local Government in connection with any suit by or against such Local Government shall be served by delivering the same to, or by sending it by registered post addressed to the Secretary to the Local Government at the principal office of the Local Government.
Provided that the Court may, with regard to any particular suit, or document’ order that service shall be effected in accordance with the terms of such order”.
The words of these sections are very plain, clear, lucid and unambiguous and they do not require any aid to interpret them.
They should be ascribed their ordinary and simple meaning. One of the canons of interpretation of statues that is now well recognized is that where the words of a statute or any enactment are plain, direct, clear, and unambiguous, effect must be given to those words in the interpretation of that statute or enactment.
See AWOLOWO V. SHAGARI (1979) 6 – 9 SC 73; A.G. BENDEL STATE V. A.G. FEDERATION (1982) 3 N.C.L.R. 1; OWENA BANK NIG. PLC. V. N.S.E. LTD. (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt. 515) 1; UGWU V. ARARUME (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt. 377) 807; KRAUS THOMPSON ORGANISATION V. NIPSS (2004) 17 NWLR (Pt. 90) 44; CITY ENGINEERING (NIG.) LTD. V. NIGERIAN AIRPORTS AUTHORITY (1999) 6 SC (Pt. 1) 41.
The provisions of these two sections make it mandatory for an intending plaintiff or any person contemplating an action or suit against a Local Government in Kaduna State to give a notice of at least one month prior to the commencement of such a suit, and to serve the notice on the secretary to that Local Government. This notice is what is known in law as pre – action notice.

To confer jurisdiction on the Court in an action against the 3rd respondent therefore it must be convincingly demonstrated that the requirements of Sections 133 and 134 of the Local Government Law of Kaduna State cited have been fulfilled in that adequate pre-action notice has been issued and served on the Secretary of the Local Government.
Although the learned trial judge in his ruling under appeal did not directly touch on the issue of service as argued by the learned counsel for appellants, this issue is in my view clearly embedded in the decision that no pre-action notice was issued as non-issuance thereof implies that none could have been served. What should now be resolved are whether the appellants issued proper and valid pre-action notice before commencement of the instant action against the 3rd respondent, and whether same was served.

From the state of pleadings and the affidavit evidence in the motion on notice, it is the appellants as plaintiffs who asserted the affirmative of these issues that they issued and served pre-action notice while the respondents asserted the negative thereof that no such notice was issued and served. The law is that the burden of proving a particular issue rests squarely on that party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who has asserted the affirmative of that issue, and not the party asserting the negative. See PLATEAU STATE V. ATT. GEN. FEDERATION (2006) ALL FWLR (Pt. 305) 590; MELIFONWU V. EGBUJI (1982) 9 SC 145. It was the appellants that had to prove the issuance and service of the pre-action notice.

In their quest to discharge this onus, the appellants in paragraph 4 of their counter affidavit relied on their letter reference No. AC/CIV/450/2009 dated 28th May, 2009 and exhibited as KF1 which had undisputedly been issued in respect of suit No. KDH/KAD/365/2009, an action for the enforcement of fundamental rights which had earlier been disposed by the Court.
The appellants deposed in paragraph 4 (a) (iii) that “the plaintiffs solicitors pre-action notice dated 28th May, 2010 (sic) is not only meant for the Enforcement of Fundamental Right’s suit which has been determined but also this instant suit”. In other words, the appellants had intended to rely on the same document to serve as notice for two actions filed at different intervals or that the exhibit KF1 will serve as notice for all suits they might initiate against the 3rd respondent.

The use of only one pre-action notice for more than one suit or for all actions an intending plaintiff may file is not contemplated by the provisions of Sections 179 and 180 of the Local Government Law (supra) where the words “No suit shall be commenced” have been sued. It was required that a pre-action notice be issued by the appellants before the commencement of the instant suit against the 3rd respondent, and since none was issued which presupposes that none was served on the 3rd respondent the consequence of this failure is that no competent action has been instituted against the 3rd respondent.

From the meaning thereof in Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, International Students edition page 1027, the “or” used by the appellants only means that they could either bring their action as fundamental rights enforcement, or an action challenging their suspension. The use of “or” cannot be a basis for reliance on a notice in respect of a concluded action to commence another suit against the 3rd respondent without notice.
The learned trial judge had however in upholding the respondent’s objection struck out the suit in his entirety i.e. against all the respondents. It must be noted that the issuance and service of pre-action notice only affects the 3rd respondent, Kagarko Local Government, and only the 3rd respondent can be the beneficiary of the grant of the application. It was therefore not right for the learned trial judge to have extended the benefit of his ruling to the other respondents who obviously do not require any pre-action notice. The decision has led to a miscarriage of justice which should not stand, the consequence of which is that that aspect of the decision of the trial Court must be, and it is hereby set aside. The suit remains valid and maintainable against all the other respondents except the 3rd and I so hold.

Consequently, this appeal succeeds partially as I hereby order that the suit No. KDH/KAD/579/2009 be returned to the Hon. Chief Judge of Kaduna State to be assigned to another judge within jurisdiction, for trial of appellants’ case against the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th respondents.
I make no order as to costs.

OLUDOTUN ADEBOLA ADEFOPE-OKOJI, J.C.A.: The lower Court, in this case had, pursuant to an application filed by the Respondents seeking the striking out of the suit on the ground, inter alia, that pre-action notice was not served on the 3rd Respondent, struck out the suit in its entirety.
Dissatisfied with this decision, the Appellants have appealed to this Court.

I am in agreement with my learned brother Isaiah Olufemi Akeju, JCA in the lead judgment, that the beneficiary of the requirement of pre-action notice is only the 3rd Respondent. The trial Judge was therefore in error to have struck out the suit in its entirety against all the Respondents.
I also hold that the suit remains valid and maintainable against all other Respondents save the 3rd Respondent.

I adopt the fuller reasoning and orders made by my learned brother in his resolution of this appeal. I also order that Suit No. KDH/KAD/519/2009 be reassigned by the Chief Judge of Kaduna State to another judge within jurisdiction, for trial of the Appellants’ case against all the Respondents, save the 3rd Respondent.

AMINA AUDI WAMBAI, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother I. O. Akeju JCA, I agree with his reasoning and the conclusion reached that the appeal succeeds in part. I am also in agreement that the matter be remitted for trial as between the appellant and all but the 3rd respondent.

Appearances

Kayode Faturiyele Esq.For Appellant

AND

Sani Usman DCL, Ministry of Justice KadunaFor Respondent